G.R. No.

152133             February 9, 2006

ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner Rollie
Calimutan prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306,
dated 29 August 2001,1 affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, of
Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November 1998,2 finding petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the Revised
Penal Code.

The Information3 filed with the RTC charged petitioner Calimutan with the crime of homicide,
allegedly committed as follows –

That on or about February 4, 1996, in the morning thereof, at sitio Capsay, Barangay Panique,
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and throw a stone at PHILIP CANTRE, hitting him at the back left portion
of his body, resulting in laceration of spleen due to impact which caused his death a day after.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Masbate, Masbate, September 11, 1996.

Accordingly, the RTC issued, on 02 December 1996, a warrant4 for the arrest of petitioner
Calimutan. On 09 January 1997, however, he was provisionally released5 after posting sufficient
bailbond.6 During the arraignment on 21 May 1997, petitioner Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the
crime of homicide charged against him.7

In the course of the trial, the prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Ronaldo B.
Mendez, a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI); (2) Belen B.
Cantre, mother of the victim, Philip Cantre; and (3) Rene L. Sañano, companion of the victim Cantre
when the alleged crime took place. Their testimonies are collectively summarized below.

On 04 February 1996, at around 10:00 a.m., the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, together with
two other companions, had a drinking spree at a videoke bar in Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy,
Masbate. From the videoke bar, the victim Cantre and witness Sañano proceeded to go home to
their respective houses, but along the way, they crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a
certain Michael Bulalacao. Victim Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the
latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre’s house on a previous night. Thus,
upon seeing Bulalacao, victim Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, petitioner
Calimutan dashed towards the backs of victim Cantre and witness Sañano. Petitioner Calimutan
then picked up a stone, as big as a man’s fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left
side of his back. When hit by the stone, victim Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back.
Witness Sañano put himself between the victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan, and attempted to
pacify the two, even convincing petitioner Calimutan to put down another stone he was already
holding. He also urged victim Cantre and petitioner Calimutan to just go home. Witness Sañano
accompanied victim Cantre to the latter’s house, and on the way, victim Cantre complained of the
pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. They arrived at the Cantre’s house at around 12:00
noon, and witness Sañano left victim Cantre to the care of the latter’s mother, Belen.8

Victim Cantre immediately told his mother, Belen, of the stoning incident involving petitioner
Calimutan. He again complained of backache and also of stomachache, and was unable to eat. By
nighttime, victim Cantre was alternately feeling cold and then warm. He was sweating profusely and
his entire body felt numb. His family would have wanted to bring him to a doctor but they had no
vehicle. At around 3:00 a.m. of the following day, 05 February 1996, Belen was wiping his son with a
piece of cloth, when victim Cantre asked for some food. He was able to eat a little, but he also later
vomited whatever he ate. For the last time, he complained of backache and stomachache, and
shortly thereafter, he died.9

Right after his death, victim Cantre was examined by Dr. Conchita S. Ulanday, the Municipal Health
Officer of Aroroy, Masbate. The Post-Mortem Examination Report10 and Certification of
Death,11 issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated that the cause of death of victim Cantre was
cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning. The body of victim Cantre was
subsequently embalmed and buried on 13 February 1996.

Unsatisfied with the findings of Dr. Ulanday, the Cantre family, with the help of the Lingkod Bayan-
Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, requested for an exhumation and autopsy of the
body of the victim Cantre by the NBI. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre
was conducted by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez on 15 April 1996,12 after which, he reported the following
findings –

Body; fairly well-preserved with sign of partial autopsy; clad in white Barong Tagalog and blue pants
placed inside a wooden golden-brown coffin and buried in a concrete niche.

Contused-abrasion, 2.3 x 1.0 cms., posterior chest wall, left side.

Hematoma, 16.0 x 8.0 cms., abdomen, along mid-line.

Hemoperitoneum, massive, clotte [sic].

Laceration, spleen.

Other visceral organ, pale and embalmed.

Stomach contains small amount of whitish fluid and other partially digested food particles.

xxxx

CAUSE OF DEATH: TRAUMATIC INJURY OF THE ABDOMEN.

In his testimony before the RTC, Dr. Mendez affirmed the contents of his exhumation and autopsy
report. He explained that the victim Cantre suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was
massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of
the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed
the possibility that the victim Cantre was stoned to death by petitioner Calimutan.13
To counter the evidence of the prosecution, the defense presented the sole testimony of the
accused, herein petitioner, Calimutan.

According to petitioner Calimutan, at about 1:00 p.m. on 04 February 1996, he was walking with his
house helper, Michael Bulalacao, on their way to Crossing Capsay, Panique, Aroroy, Masbate, when
they met with the victim Cantre and witness Sañano. The victim Cantre took hold of Bulalacao and
punched him several times. Petitioner Calimutan attempted to pacify the victim Cantre but the latter
refused to calm down, pulling out from his waist an eight-inch Batangas knife and uttering that he
was looking for trouble, either "to kill or be killed." At this point, petitioner Calimutan was about ten
meters away from the victim Cantre and was too frightened to move any closer for fear that the
enraged man would turn on him; he still had a family to take care of. When he saw that the victim
Cantre was about to stab Bulalacao, petitioner Calimutan picked up a stone, which he described as
approximately one-inch in diameter, and threw it at the victim Cantre. He was able to hit the victim
Cantre on his right buttock. Petitioner Calimutan and Bulalacao then started to run away, and victim
Cantre chased after them, but witness Sañano was able to pacify the victim Cantre. Petitioner
Calimutan allegedly reported the incident to a kagawad of Barangay Panique and to the police
authorities and sought their help in settling the dispute between Bulalacao and the victim Cantre.
Bulalacao, meanwhile, refused to seek medical help despite the advice of petitioner Calimutan and,
instead, chose to go back to his hometown.14

Petitioner Calimutan was totally unaware of what had happened to the victim Cantre after the
stoning incident on 04 February 1996. Some of his friends told him that they still saw the victim
Cantre drinking at a videoke bar on the night of 04 February 1996. As far as he knew, the victim
Cantre died the following day, on 05 February 1996, because of food poisoning. Petitioner Calimutan
maintained that he had no personal grudge against the victim Cantre previous to the stoning
incident.15

On 19 November 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision,16 essentially adopting the prosecution’s
account of the incident on 04 February 1996, and pronouncing that –

It cannot be legally contended that the throwing of the stone by the accused was in defense of his
companion, a stranger, because after the boxing Michael was able to run. While it appears that the
victim was the unlawful aggressor at the beginning, but the aggression already ceased after Michael
was able to run and there was no more need for throwing a stone. The throwing of the stone to the
victim which was a retaliatory act can be considered unlawful, hence the accused can be held
criminally liable under paragraph 1 of Art. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a
treacherous one and the accused committed a felony causing physical injuries to the victim. The
physical injury of hematoma as a result of the impact of the stone resulted in the laceration of the
spleen causing the death of the victim. The accused is criminally liable for all the direct and natural
consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had not been intended. (Art. 4, Par. 1,
Revised Penal Code; People vs. Narciso, CA-G.R. No. 03532-CR, Jan. 13, 1964)

One is not relieved from criminal liability for the natural consequences of one’s illegal acts merely
because one does not intend to produce such consequences (U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil. 310).

The crime committed is Homicide as defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds and so holds that accused ROLLIE CALIMUTAN is GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide defined and penalized under Art. 249 of the Revised
Penal Code with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law hereby imposes the penalty of imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS of Prision Mayor
as minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and
to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as
compensatory damages and the sum of Fifty Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Petitioner Calimutan appealed the Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals, in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001,17 sustained the conviction of homicide rendered by
the RTC against petitioner Calimutan, ratiocinating thus –

The prosecution has sufficiently established that the serious internal injury sustained by the victim
was caused by the stone thrown at the victim by the accused which, the accused-appellant does not
deny. It was likewise shown that the internal injury sustained by the victim was the result of the
impact of the stone that hit the victim. It resulted to a traumatic injury of the abdomen causing the
laceration of the victim’s spleen.

This is clearly shown by the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Ronaldo Mendez, a Senior Medico Legal
Officer of the NBI after the exhumation of the victim’s cadaver…

The Court cannot give credence to the post mortem report prepared by Municipal Health Officer Dr.
Conchita Ulanday stating that the cause of the victim’s death was food poisoning. Dr. Ulanday was
not even presented to testify in court hence she was not even able to identify and/or affirm the
contents of her report. She was not made available for cross-examination on the accuracy and
correctness of her findings.

Dr. Conchita Ulanday’s post mortem report cannot prevail over the autopsy report (Exh. "C") of the
Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who testified and was cross-examined by the defense.

Besides, if accused-appellant was convinced that the victim indeed died of food poisoning, as
reported by Dr. Conchita Ulanday, why did they not present her as their witness to belie the report of
the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI.

The trial court’s evaluation of the testimony of Dr. Mendez is accorded the highest respect because it
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of said witness.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Branch
46, finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide is hereby
AFFIRMED.

The Court of Appeals, in its Resolution, dated 15 January 2002,18 denied the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by petitioner Calimutan for lack of merit since the issues raised therein had
already been passed and ruled upon in its Decision, dated 29 August 2001.

Comes now petitioner Calimutan, by way of the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, seeking (1)
the reversal of the Decisions of the RTC, dated 19 November 1998, and of the Court of Appeals,
dated 29 August 2001, convicting him of the crime of homicide; and, (2) consequently, his acquittal
of the said crime based on reasonable doubt.
Petitioner Calimutan contended that the existence of the two autopsy reports, with dissimilar findings
on the cause of death of the victim Cantre, constituted reasonable doubt as to the liability of
petitioner Calimutan for the said death, arguing that –

x x x [I]t was Dra. Conchita Ulanday, Municipal Health Officer of Aroroy, Masbate was the first
physician of the government who conducted an examination on the cadaver of the victim Philip
Cantre whose findings was that the cause of his death was due to food poisoning while the second
government physician NBI Medico Legal Officer Dr. Ronaldo Mendez whose findings was that the
cause of the death was due to a traumatic injury of the abdomen caused by a lacerated spleen and
with these findings of two (2) government physicians whose findings are at variance with each other
materially, it is humbly contended that the same issue raised a reasonable doubt on the culpability of
the petitioner.

As there are improbabilities and uncertainties of the evidence for the prosecution in the case at bar,
it suffices to reaise [sic] reasonable doubt as to the petitioner’s guilt and therefore, he is entitled to
acquittal (People vs. Delmendo, G.R. No. 32146, November 23, 1981).19

In this jurisdiction, an accused in a criminal case may only be convicted if his or her guilt is
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a
moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind; it does
not demand absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error.20

In the Petition at bar, this Court finds that there is proof beyond reasonable doubt to hold petitioner
Calimutan liable for the death of the victim Cantre.

Undoubtedly, the exhumation and autopsy report and the personal testimony before the RTC of
prosecution witness, NBI Senior Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Mendez, are vital pieces of evidence
against petitioner Calimutan. Dr. Mendez determined that the victim Cantre died of internal
hemorrhage or bleeding due to the laceration of his spleen. In his testimony, Dr. Mendez clearly and
consistently explained that the spleen could be lacerated or ruptured when the abdominal area was
hit with a blunt object, such as the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre.

It bears to emphasize that Dr. Mendez was presented by the prosecution as an expert witness,
whose "competency and academic qualification and background" was admitted by the defense
itself.21 As a Senior Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI, Dr. Mendez is presumed to possess sufficient
knowledge of pathology, surgery, gynecology, toxicology, and such other branches of medicine
germane to the issues involved in a case.22

Dr. Mendez’s testimony as an expert witness is evidence,23 and although it does not necessarily bind
the courts, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had properly accorded it great weight and
probative value. Having testified as to matters undeniably within his area of expertise, and having
performed a thorough autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre, his findings as to the cause of death
of the victim Cantre are more than just the mere speculations of an ordinary person. They may
sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the petitioner Calimutan
and the lacerated spleen of the victim Cantre which, subsequently, resulted in the latter’s death. With
no apparent mistake or irregularity, whether in the manner by which Dr. Mendez performed the
autopsy on the body of the victim Cantre or in his findings, then his report and testimony must be
seriously considered by this Court.

Moreover, reference to other resource materials on abdominal injuries would also support the
conclusion of Dr. Mendez that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan caused the death of the
victim Cantre.
One source explains the nature of abdominal injuries24 in the following manner –

The skin may remain unmarked inspite of extensive internal injuries with bleeding and disruption of
the internal organs. The areas most vulnerable are the point of attachment of internal organs,
especially at the source of its blood supply and at the point where blood vessels change direction.

The area in the middle superior half of the abdomen, forming a triangle bounded by the ribs on the
two sides and a line drawn horizontally through the umbilicus forming its base is vulnerable to
trauma applied from any direction. In this triangle are found several blood vessels changing
direction, particularly the celiac trunk, its branches (the hepatic, splenic and gastric arteries) as
well as the accompanying veins. The loop of the duodenum, the ligament of Treitz and the pancreas
are in the retroperitoneal space, and the stomach and transverse colon are in the triangle, located in
the peritoneal cavity. Compression or blow on the area may cause detachment, laceration, stretch-
stress, contusion of the organs (Legal Medicine 1980, Cyril H. Wecht et., p. 41).

As to injuries to the spleen, in particular,25 the same source expounds that –

The spleen usually suffers traumatic rupture resulting from the impact of a fall or blow from the
crushing and grinding effects of wheels of motor vehicles. Although the organ is protected at its
upper portion by the ribs and also by the air-containing visceral organs, yet on account of
its superficiality and fragility, it is usually affected by trauma. x x x.

Certainly, there are some terms in the above-quoted paragraphs difficult to comprehend for people
without medical backgrounds. Nevertheless, there are some points that can be plainly derived
therefrom: (1) Contrary to common perception, the abdominal area is more than just the waist area.
The entire abdominal area is divided into different triangles, and the spleen is located in the upper
triangle, bounded by the rib cage; (2) The spleen and all internal organs in the same triangle are
vulnerable to trauma from all directions. Therefore, the stone need not hit the victim Cantre from
the front. Even impact from a stone hitting the back of the victim Cantre, in the area of the afore-
mentioned triangle, could rupture the spleen; and (3) Although the spleen had already been ruptured
or lacerated, there may not always be a perceptible external injury to the victim. Injury to the spleen
cannot, at all times, be attributed to an obvious, external injury such as a cut or bruise. The
laceration of the victim Cantre’s spleen can be caused by a stone thrown hard enough, which
qualifies as a nonpenetrating trauma26 –

Nonpenetrating Trauma. The spleen, alone or in combination with other viscera, is the most

frequently injured organ following blunt trauma to the abdomen or the lower thoracic cage.
Automobile accidents provide the predominating cause, while falls, sledding and bicycle injuries, and
blows incurred during contact sports are frequently implicated in children. x x x

The sheer impact of the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre could
rupture or lacerate the spleen – an organ described as vulnerable, superficial, and fragile – even
without causing any other external physical injury. Accordingly, the findings of Dr. Mendez that the
victim Cantre died of internal hemorrhage from his lacerated spleen, and the cause of the laceration
of the spleen was the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the back of the victim Cantre, does not
necessarily contradict his testimony before the RTC that none of the external injuries of the victim
Cantre were fatal.

Based on the foregoing discussion, the prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause
of the death of the victim Cantre was the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Proximate
cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."27

The two other witnesses presented by the prosecution, namely Sañano and Belen Cantre, had
adequately recounted the events that transpired on 04 February 1996 to 05 February 1996. Between
the two of them, the said witnesses accounted for the whereabouts, actions, and physical condition
of the victim Cantre during the said period. Before the encounter with petitioner Calimutan and
Bulalacao, the victim Cantre seemed to be physically fine. However, after being hit at the back by
the stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan, the victim Cantre had continuously complained of
backache. Subsequently, his physical condition rapidly deteriorated, until finally, he died. Other than
being stoned by petitioner Calimutan, there was no other instance when the victim Cantre may have
been hit by another blunt instrument which could have caused the laceration of his spleen.

Hence, this Court is morally persuaded that the victim Cantre died from a lacerated spleen, an injury
sustained after being hit by a stone thrown at him by petitioner Calimutan. Not even the post-mortem
report of Dr. Ulanday, the Municipal Health Officer who first examined the body of the victim Cantre,
can raise reasonable doubt as to the cause of death of the victim Cantre. Invoking Dr. Ulanday’s
post-mortem report, the defense insisted on the possibility that the victim Cantre died of food
poisoning. The post-mortem report, though, cannot be given much weight and probative value for
the following reasons –

First, a closer scrutiny of the words used by Dr. Ulanday in her post-mortem report, as well as in the
death certificate of the victim Cantre, reveals that although she suspected food poisoning as the
cause of death, she held back from making a categorical statement that it was so. In the post-
mortem report, 28 she found that "x x x the provable (sic) cause of death was due to cardio-
respiratory arrest. Food poisoning must be confirm (sic) by laboratory e(x)am." In the death
certificate of the victim Cantre, 29 she wrote that the immediate cause of death was "Cardio-
Respiratory Arrest" and the antecedent cause was "Food Poisoning Suspect." There was no
showing that further laboratory tests were indeed conducted to confirm Dr. Ulanday’s suspicion that
the victim Cantre suffered from food poisoning, and without such confirmation, her suspicion as to
the cause of death remains just that – a suspicion.

Second, Dr. Ulanday executed before the NBI a sworn statement30 in which she had explained her
findings in the post-mortem report, to wit –

05. Q: Did you conduct an autopsy on his cadaver?

A: I did sir, but not as exhaustive as that done by the NBI Medico-legal.

06. Q: Now, what do you want to state regarding your certification on the death of PHILIP B.
CANTRE?

A: I stated in the certification and even in the Death Certificate about "Food Poisoning". What I
stated in the Death Certificate was that CANTRE was a SUSPECTED victim of food poisoning. I
didn’t state that he was a case of food poisoning. And in the Certification, I even recommended that
an examination be done to confirm that suspicion.

07. Q: What gave you that suspicion of poisoning?

A: As there were no external signs of fatal injuries except that of the contusion or abrasion,
measuring as that size of a 25 centavo coin, I based my suspicion from the history of the victim and
from the police investigation.

08. Q: You also mentioned in your Certification that there was no internal hemorrhage in the
cadaver. Did you open the body of the cadaver?

A: As I have already stated sir, I did not conduct an exhaustive autopsy. I made an incision on the
abdomen and I explored the internal organs of the cadaver with my hand in search for any clotting
inside. But I found none. I did not open the body of the cadaver.

09. Q: You mentioned about a contusion you have observed on the cadaver. Where was it located?

A: On the left portion of his back, sir.

10. Q: Now, is it possible that if somebody be hit by a hard object on that part of his body, his
SPLEEN could be injured?

A: Yes, sir. But that would depend on how strong or forceful the impact was.

In contrast, Dr. Mendez described in his testimony before the RTC31 how he conducted the autopsy
of the body of the victim Cantre, as follows –

Q What specific procedure did you do in connection with the exhumation of the body of the victim in
this case?

A We opened the head, chest and the abdomen.

Q That was part of the autopsy you have conducted?

A Yes, sir.

Q Aside from opening the head as well as the body of the victim Philip Cantre, what other matters
did you do in connection therewith?

A We examined the internal organs.

Q What in particular internal organs you have examined?

A The brain, the heart, the lungs, the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas plus the intestines.

xxxx

Q The cause of death as you have listed here in your findings is listed as traumatic injury of the
abdomen, will you kindly tell us Doctor what is the significance of this medical term traumatic injury
of the abdomen?

A We, medico-legal officers of the NBI don’t do what other doctors do as they make causes of death
as internal hemorrhage we particularly point to the injury of the body like this particular case the
injury was at the abdomen of the victim.
Q Will you tell as Doctor what particular portion of the abdomen of the victim this traumatic injury is
located?

A Along the midline but the damaged organ was at the left.

Q What particular organ are you referring to?

A The spleen, sir.

The difference in the extent of the examinations conducted by the two doctors of the body of the
victim Cantre provides an adequate explanation for their apparent inconsistent findings as to the
cause of death. Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed
suspicion of food poisoning of the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by
Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of a ruptured spleen as the cause of death of the victim Cantre,
then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the courts.

Third, that the prosecution no longer presented Dr. Ulanday before the RTC despite being included
in its list of witnesses did not amount to a willful suppression of evidence that would give rise to the
presumption that her testimony would be adverse to the prosecution if produced.32 As this Court
already expounded in the case of People v. Jumamoy33 –

The prosecution's failure to present the other witnesses listed in the information did not constitute,
contrary to the contention of the accused, suppression of evidence. The prosecutor has the
exclusive prerogative to determine the witnesses to be presented for the prosecution. If the
prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, the prosecutor need not present all of
them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may,
therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature. This Court has ruled that the
non-presentation of corroborative witnesses would not constitute suppression of evidence and would
not be fatal to the prosecution's case. Besides, there is no showing that the eyewitnesses who were
not presented in court as witnesses were not available to the accused. We reiterate the rule that the
adverse presumption from a suppression of evidence is not applicable when (1) the suppression is
not willful; (2) the evidence suppressed or withheld is merely corroborative or cumulative; (3) the
evidence is at the disposal of both parties; and (4) the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Moreover, if the accused believed that the failure to present the other witnesses was because their
testimonies would be unfavorable to the prosecution, he should have compelled their appearance,
by compulsory process, to testify as his own witnesses or even as hostile witnesses.

It was a judgment call for the prosecution to no longer present Dr. Ulanday before the RTC, perhaps
believing that it had already presented sufficient evidence to merit the conviction of petitioner
Calimutan even without her testimony. There was nothing, however, preventing the defense from
calling on, or even compelling, with the appropriate court processes, Dr. Ulanday to testify in court
as its witness if it truly believed that her testimony would be adverse to the case presented by the
prosecution.

While this Court is in accord with the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals and
affirms that there is ample evidence proving that the death of the victim Cantre was caused by his
lacerated spleen, an injury which resulted from being hit by the stone thrown at him by petitioner
Calimutan, this Court, nonetheless, is at variance with the RTC and the Court of Appeals as to the
determination of the appropriate crime or offense for which the petitioner should have been
convicted for.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are
committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of
felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the
offender –

In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the
act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in
incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or
omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is
"unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." (People vs.
Sara, 55 Phil. 939). As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight or lack of skill.34

In the Petition at bar, this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any
malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, this
Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as
rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, this Court finds petitioner
Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code expressly provides for the definition of reckless imprudence –

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from
which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person
performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place.

There are several circumstances, discussed in the succeeding paragraphs, that demonstrate
petitioner Calimutan’s lack of intent to kill the victim Cantre, and conversely, that substantiate the
view of this Court that the death of victim Cantre was a result of petitioner Calimutan’s reckless
imprudence. The RTC and the Court of Appeals may have failed to appreciate, or had completely
overlooked, the significance of such circumstances.

It should be remembered that the meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Sañano, on the one
hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as
the two parties were on their way to different destinations. The victim Cantre and witness Sañano
were on their way home from a drinking spree in Crossing Capsay, while petitioner Calimutan and
his helper Bulalacao were walking from the market to Crossing Capsay. While the evidence on
record suggests that a running grudge existed between the victim Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not
establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between the victim Cantre and petitioner
Calimutan. 1avvphil.net

In both versions of the events of 04 February 1996 submitted by the prosecution and the defense, it
was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. He suddenly punched Bulalacao, the helper and
companion of petitioner Calimutan, when they met on the road. The attack of the victim Cantre was
swift and unprovoked, which spurred petitioner Calimutan into responsive action. Given that this
Court dismisses the claim of petitioner Calimutan that the victim Cantre was holding a knife, it does
take into account that the victim Cantre was considerably older and bigger, at 26 years of age and
with a height of five feet and nine inches, compared to Bulalacao, the boy he attacked, who was only
15 years old and stood at about five feet. Even with his bare hands, the victim Cantre could have
hurt Bulalacao. Petitioner Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of the
victim Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at the victim Cantre. The
stone was readily available as a weapon to petitioner Calimutan since the incident took place on a
road. That he threw the stone at the back of the victim Cantre does not automatically imply treachery
on the part of petitioner Calimutan as it is highly probable that in the midst of the fray, he threw the
stone rashly and impulsively, with no regard as to the position of the victim Cantre. When the victim
Cantre stopped his aggression after being hit by the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan, the latter
also desisted from any other act of violence against the victim Cantre.

The above-described incident could not have taken more than just a few minutes. It was a very brief
scuffle, in which the parties involved would hardly have the time to ponder upon the most
appropriate course of action to take. With this in mind, this Court cannot concur in the declaration
made by the Court of Appeals that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre as a
retaliatory act. It was evidently a swift and spontaneous reaction to an unexpected and unprovoked
attack by the victim Cantre on Bulalacao. That Bulalacao was already able to run away from the
victim Cantre may have escaped the notice of the petitioner Calimutan who, under the pressure of
the circumstances, was forced to act as quickly as possible.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with
the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre. What is obvious to this
Court was petitioner Calimutan’s intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the
victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was, as earlier described, much younger and
smaller in built than the victim Cantre.35

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawful objective when he threw the stone at the
victim Cantre, his act was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution. He failed to consider that a
stone the size of a man’s fist could inflict substantial injury on someone. He also miscalculated his
own strength, perhaps unaware, or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone with
such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone, at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

Since it is irrefragable that the stone thrown by petitioner Calimutan at the victim Cantre was the
proximate cause of the latter’s death, despite being done with reckless imprudence rather than with
malicious intent, petitioner Calimutan remains civilly liable for such death. This Court, therefore,
retains the reward made by the RTC and the Court of Appeals to the heirs of the victim Cantre of the
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for his death and another ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23306, dated 29
August 2001, affirming the Decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 8184, dated 19 November
1998, is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is
accordingly sentenced to imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a
maximum period of two years and one day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further
ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
latter’s death and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 165842 November 29, 2005]

EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION
 CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 26877, affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3,
convicting Eduardo P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then
previously and legally married to RUBYLUS [GAÑA] and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA
GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant, who does not know the existence of the first marriage of
said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaña].

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaña
before Msgr. Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.4 He
met the private complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She
stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a
Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was 39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit
her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a motel where, despite Tina's resistance,
Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage on several occasions,
assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet Tina's
parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on
April 22, 1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of the RTC of Baguio City, Branch
61.5 It appeared in their marriage contract that Eduardo was "single."

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they
were able to build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel
started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless,
and whenever she asked money from Eduardo, he would slap her.6 Sometime in January 2001,
Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office
(NSO) in Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-
certified copy of the marriage contract.7 She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned
that Eduardo was in fact already married when they exchanged their own vows.8

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a
Guest Relations Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his
previous marriage to Rubylus Gaña, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital
relationship was in order until this one time when he noticed that she had a "love-bite" on her neck.
He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he was "single" in his marriage
contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not
know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to
commit suicide unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned.
He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina
believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more
than 20 years.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of bigamy. He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10)
months, as minimum, to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private
complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.9

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements
of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardo's belief, that his first
marriage had been dissolved because of his first wife's 20-year absence, even if true, did not
exculpate him from liability for bigamy. Citing the ruling of this Court in People v. Bitdu,10 the trial
court further ruled that even if the private complainant had known that Eduardo had been previously
married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.

Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy
because when he married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious
intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest
belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He was not
motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out of his
overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into
account Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this
Court in United States v. Peñalosa11 and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.12

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardo's defense of good faith and reliance on
the Court's ruling in United States v. Enriquez13 were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the
Family Code, which amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v.
Nolasco,14 the OSG further posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for
a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to
marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void, the parties thereto should not be permitted to
judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the
private complainant's knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an
offense against the State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was
erroneous and sought the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to
the penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel
could lawfully marry the private complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaña's
presumptive death as the absent spouse. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado
v. Tan15 and Domingo v. Court of Appeals16 to support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is
hereby MODIFIED to reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor  as maximum. Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.

SO ORDERED.17

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari , insisting that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER'S FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE CIVIL
CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED FOR
UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE AWARD
OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACT AND IN LAW.18

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e.,
that the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married
Gandalera in 1996, Gaña had been "absent" for 21 years since 1975; under Article 390 of the Civil
Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the first paragraph of
Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is still
alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph
refers to the rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law
upon the satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouse's reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that
he was able to prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no
knowledge of her whereabouts or whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family
Code, the presumptive death of Gaña had arisen by operation of law, as the two requirements of
Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that he should thus be acquitted of
the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil
Code, the rule therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of
the Civil Code does it require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on
presumptive death would apply. He further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and
appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the
Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in
favor of the private complainant. The private complainant was a "GRO" before he married her, and
even knew that he was already married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her
financial support. He also pointed out that she had an illicit relationship with a lover whom she
brought to their house.

In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the
petitioner's conviction is in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster
its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.19

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. 'The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract
a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legÃtimamente disuelto el anterior, será
castigado con la pena de prision mayor.  xxx
The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage
established by law.20 The phrase "or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead
by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings" was incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code because the drafters of the law were of the impression that "in consonance with the civil law
which provides for the presumption of death after an absence of a number of years, the judicial
declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a justification for
bigamy."21

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a)
he/she has been legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former
marriage having been lawfully dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second
marriage or subsequent marriage.22 It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged
second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence
of the first marriage.23 Viada avers that a third element of the crime is that the second marriage must
be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential element of a felony
by dolo.24 On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of bigamy:
(1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a
second marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such
marriages have juridical effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.25 As the
Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of Appeals26 and Mercado v. Tan,27 under the Family Code of the
Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is a defense.

In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that
there are three (3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3)
fraudulent intention constituting the felony of the act.28 He explained that:

'This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle
antedating all codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no
willfulness there is no crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong
evidence, and if this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person
who contracts a second marriage in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead,
because of the many years that have elapsed since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite
of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the crime of bigamy, because there is no
fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.29

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony
by dolo (deceit). Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when
the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony
by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary.30 Although the words "with malice"
do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary."31

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or
justification from which another suffers injury.32 When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is
proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been
intentional.33 Indeed, it is a legal presumption of law that every man intends the natural or probable
consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the contrary, and such presumption must
prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole evidence.34

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and
an evil intent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.35

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaña in 1975, and
such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.36 The
prosecution also proved that the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the
effectivity of the Family Code.
The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private
complainant. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a
prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance
of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem
excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant
in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975.
He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death
of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the
Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith,
and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to
discharge his burden.

The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the
consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of
bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12
of the Constitution, the "State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution." Marriage is a social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and
the interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and
its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by law.37 The laws regulating civil
marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order, comfort or general welfare of the
community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings. A civil
marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving
State. On marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on
every aspect of life and death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent
parties and to society, are so serious that the law may well take means calculated to ensure the
procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first spouse or of the presumptive death of
the absent spouse38 after the lapse of the period provided for under the law. One such means is the
requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent spouse as
proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death
of the first spouse. Indeed, "men readily believe what they wish to be true," is a maxim of the old
jurists. To sustain a second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the
other to be dead would make the existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain
extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment and proof, but by the subjective condition of
individuals.39 Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so dissolved as to permit second
marriages.40 Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution of marriage
dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable
of accurate judicial cognizance,41 namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioner's sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is
misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide'

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives,
he shall be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of ten years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years
shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate
among the heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;

(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown
whether or not the absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial
declaration.42 However, Article 41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on
presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be
null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years  and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two years
shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.43

With the effectivity of the Family Code,44 the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article
390 of the Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may
contract a subsequent marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
the presumptive death of the absentee spouse,45 without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of
the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in Armas v. Calisterio:46

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may
exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of
the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is
danger of death under the circumstances stated in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of
disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already
dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee
for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial
intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the
Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioner's contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse
present to contract a valid second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy.
Such provision was designed to harmonize civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put
to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this Court and comments of eminent authorities on
Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela47 that, for purposes of the marriage
law, it is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse
present may contract a subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary
precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage,
however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at
the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to
be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.48 In In Re Szatraw,49 the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven
years, being a presumption juris tantum  only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of
finality or become final; and that proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard
from in seven years, would have to be made in another proceeding to have such particular fact finally
determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree declaring a person presumptively dead because
he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become final and executory even after the
lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such presumption is still
disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is useless,
unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste
its valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.50 The Court also took
note that a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made
in collusion with the other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,51 the Court declared that the words "proper proceedings" in
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390
and 391 of the Civil Code which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased
person. In Gue v. Republic of the Philippines,52 the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner
therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code, the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive
death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court reiterated its rulings in Szatraw,
Lukban  and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that "the provision of Article 349 or "before the
absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper
proceedings" is erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision
presupposes that, if the prior marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has
not been declared presumptively dead in a proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is
bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.53 A second marriage is bigamous only when
the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are not present.54 Former
Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require judicial decree of
dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in good
faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be
annullable, should not give rise to bigamy.55 Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of
the view that in the case of an absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a
second marriage.56

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391
of the Civil Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a
spouse is absent for the requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only
after securing a judgment declaring the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being
charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will have to adduce evidence that he had a well-
founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.57 Such judgment is proof of the good faith of
the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the present spouse is later
charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime. As
explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

'Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present
spouse must first ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be
guilty of bigamy in case he or she marries again.
The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse
contracting a second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latter's
reappearance. This provision is intended to protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for
bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code because with the judicial declaration that the
missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present spouse in contracting a second
marriage is already established.58

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that
things are now clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for
purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will
suffice, with possible clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full
grasp of the facts. The judgment declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause "before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead x x x" should be disregarded because of Article 83,
paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for
the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.59

According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal
Law, in some cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial
declaration of presumptive death, which could then be made only in the proceedings for the
settlement of his estate.60 Before such declaration, it was held that the remarriage of the other spouse
is bigamous even if done in good faith.61 Justice Regalado opined that there were contrary views
because of the ruling in Jones  and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil Code, which, however,
appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, "which requires a summary hearing
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry."

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same
Code.62

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral
damages in favor of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be
awarded only in any of the cases provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of
them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate court failed to apply its ruling in People v.
Bondoc,63 where an award of moral damages for bigamy was disallowed. In any case, the petitioner
maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she
adduced evidence to prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in
those cases enumerated in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral
damages against the petitioner. The appellate court ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling
in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daños, ello se debió indedublamente porque el articulo
2219 del Código Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicación de daños morales en los delitos de
estupro, rapto, violación, adulterio o concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta
enumeración el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente, base legal para adjudicar aquà los
daños de  P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.64

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The
OSG, likewise, avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the
defendant's wrongful act or omission.65 An award for moral damages requires the confluence of the
following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly
sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission factually established; third,
the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the
claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219 or
Article 2220 of the Civil Code.66

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in
Article 2219, paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases, viz.:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article,
may also recover moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No.
9 of this article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved
party has suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings,
moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another,
otherwise, there would not have been any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 221967 and
analogous cases (which refer to those cases bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some
others or resembling, in other respects, as in form, proportion, relation, etc.)68

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the
offender may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party.
Nevertheless, the petitioner is liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219
in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

According to Article 19, "every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith." This provision contains
what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which
must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties.
The standards are the following: act with justice; give everyone his due; and observe honesty and
good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal right or duty; (b) exercised in bad
faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.69

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide
for its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards
set forth in the said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed
for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.70 If the provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to
another shall indemnify the latter for the same." On the other hand, Article 21 provides that "any
person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages." The latter provision is adopted to
remedy "the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for
specifically in the statutes." Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting
in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law
depends upon the circumstances of each case.71

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He
assured her that he was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant
where he and his parents made the same assurance - that he was single. Thus, the private
complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in the certificate of marriage that he was
single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his wife, believing all the
while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly abandoned
her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they  were
married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's chicanery and heartless
deception, the fraud consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day,
he maintained the appearance of being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who changed her
status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a
single man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to
a man who it turned out was not her lawful husband.72

The Court rules that the petitioner's collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his
marriage with the private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the
latter. That she did not sustain any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages.
Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,73 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser,
supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper & James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where
the wrong is willful rather than negligent, recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and
proximate consequences though they consist of shame, humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel
v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers,
etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser, supra, at p. 38. Here
the defendant's conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful. It was
bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did
ensue the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See
Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF.
Note, "Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts," 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified
that because of the defendant's bigamous marriage to her and the attendant publicity she not only
was embarrassed and "ashamed to go out" but "couldn't sleep" but "couldn't eat," had terrific
headaches" and "lost quite a lot of weight." No just basis appears for judicial interference with the
jury's reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher,
37 N.J. Super 249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.74 1955).
The Court thus declares that the petitioner's acts are against public policy as they undermine and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner's perfidy, she is not barred
from claiming moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her
from recovery. As held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald:75

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in

consequence of such misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in
fact a criminal offense, he has a right of action against the person so inducing him for damages
sustained by him in consequence of his having done such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816.
In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep. 721, the court said that a false
representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby the plaintiff was
induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the
fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with
him would be no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages.
The injury to the plaintiff was said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and
assistance of a wife to one who was not her husband and to assume and act in a relation and
condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for such an injury were held to be
recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass. 339, 343, 8 Am.
Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression
of the law by herself but upon the defendant's misrepresentation. The criminal relations which
followed, innocently on her part, were but one of the incidental results of the defendant's fraud for
which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been
maintained in other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.)
819; Larson v. McMillan, 99 Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec.
747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33 L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not
prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the plaintiff was conscious of no moral
turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendant's misrepresentation, and that she
does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a
contract illegal on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal
act upon which the cause of action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E.
251, 49 A. L. R. 958.76

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for
moral damages to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO
GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO
GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:

In a decision   dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in
1

Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto
Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida," found
all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not
yet arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. They were sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the
sum of P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."   The victim was Lloyd Peñacerrada, 44, landowner, and a
2

resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.

Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal
from the trial court's decision. During the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon
could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-appellants, except Custodio
Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for
parole before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division.  3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision   on the appeal of Custodio
4

Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peñacerrada in the amount of P30,000.00.
In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling
in People vs. Ramos,   the appellate court certified this case to us for review.
5 6

The antecedent facts are as follows:

At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of
Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their landlord, Lloyd Peñacerrada, and
thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his
to take the spouses to the police authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed,
Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his motorcycle, to the municipal
building.   Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
7

incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales
spouses went back to Barangay Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's
residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman Centeno, and Augusto proceeded
to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred.   There they
8

saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peñacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside
the bedroom.   The group stayed for about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected
9

the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the immediate surroundings.   The next
10

day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied by
a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta
Gonzales, on the other hand, was brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the
police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion arrived at Sitio Nabitasan,
two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed
of the incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued
with his sketch; photographs of the scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then
brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peñacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22,
1981; after completed, a report was made with the following findings:

PHYSICAL FINDINGS

1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on
cadaveric rigidity.

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior
aspect of the arm, right, directed upward to the right axillary pit.

2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior
aspect with an entrance of 5 cm. in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the
middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound exit.

3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the
forearm right, 1 cm. in width.

4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum,
6th and 7th ribs, right located 1.5 inches below the right nipple.

5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic
cavity right, located at the left midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.

6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic
cavity, located at the mid left scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.

7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed
toward the left thoracic cavity.

8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid
muscle, located at the upper 3rd axilla left.

9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect,

proximal 3rd arm left, directed downward.

10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect,
palm right.

11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large
intestine and mysentery coming out.

12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right,
directed downward to the aspex of the light thoracic cavity.

13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of
the medial border of the right scapula.
 14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of
the right elbow.

15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion,
middle 3rd, forearm, right.

16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.

INTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.

2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the
lungs.

3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.

4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large
intestine, thru and thru.

5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs
(sic).

CAUSE OF DEATH:

MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE

LACERATED, STABBED (sic), INCISED AND
PUNCTURED WOUNDS.

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal
because they penetrated the internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."  12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-
station in the poblacion of Ajuy and voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for
detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada. He
requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was
already detained having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force.  13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st
P.C. Company, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal
of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The information read as follows:

The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO

GONZALES of the crime of MURDER committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province
of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named
accused with four other companions whose identities are still unknown and are still at
large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and
helping each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent
and decided purpose to kill, and taking advantage of their superior strength and
 number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab,
hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peñacerrada, with the weapons with which said
accused were provided at the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada
multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown by autopsy report attached
to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of
said Lloyd D. Peñacerrada.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Iloilo City, August 26, 1981. 

14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty.
Before trial, however, Jose Huntoria   who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd
15

Peñacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peñacerrada, the victim's widow, on October 6, 1981, and
volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information,   dated March 3, 1982,
16

naming as additional accused Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr.,
Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the accused except as earlier explained,
Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.

At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who
conducted the autopsy on the body of the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay
Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy Police Force; Sgt. (ret)
Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose
Huntoria; and Nanie Peñacerrada, the widow.

Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd
Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of
Ajuy.   His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds comprising of four (4)
17

punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In
his testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all
the wounds (except the lacerated wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the
number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability that at least two instruments were
used is high.   The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
18

the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peñacerrada testified
mainly on the expenses she incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain
Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.

By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the
incident. According to Huntoria, who gave his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982,   at 5:00
19

o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo
where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home;   he took a short-
20

cut route.   While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in
21

the evening, he heard cries for help.   Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the
22

shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away, he hid himself behind a clump of
banana
trees.   From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in
23

stabbing and hacking the victim Lloyd Peñacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said
he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in moonlight.   Huntoria further
24

recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25
meters away from the "linasan".   Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his
25

house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his wife   before he went to sleep.   Huntoria
26 27

explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed for fear of
his life.   In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly
28

witnessed, bothered by his conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the
victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter, he thought of helping the victim's
widow, Nanie Peñacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peñacerrada lived, and related to
her what he saw on February 21, 1981.  29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peñacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased
attempted to rape her, all the accused denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-
appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep   in his house which was located
30

some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime   when the incident happened. He asserted
31

that he only came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his
house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform him.  32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the
trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged
eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.

The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the
appellate court held that:

. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-
appellant, as the assailants of Peñacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim
that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a distance of 15 to 20
meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-
39) If Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased,
it was only because the assailant were moving around the victim.

As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's
explanation is satisfactory. He said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated
in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural reticence of most
people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People
v. Delfin, '. . . the initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer
information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be involved in or dragged
into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"

It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria
for about 10 years and that he and Huntoria were in good terms and had no
misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that he could not
think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's
credibility. is beyond question. 
33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi.   The appellate court,
34

however, found the sentence imposed by the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said
the appellate court:
 Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12
years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for
murder under Article 248 is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. As
there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the
Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity for death, the award of P40,000.00
should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128
SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado, 128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No.
68731, Feb. 27, 1987). 35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the
penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to
convict the appellant of the crime charged.

To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired.
Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police force in his sworn statements   even gave the date of the
36

commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch   he made of the scene is of
37

little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to
the scene of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather
unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering that there are two versions proferred on where
the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a more definite clue
as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired
inside the bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the
couple's bedroom or even on the ground directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an
additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On the other hand, if the
prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then
blood stains in that place would have been more than in any other place.

The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police
Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February
23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would even appear that Augusto
"surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon
likewise admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the
killing of the victim. Finally, without any evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C.
Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned in their criminal
complaint   four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to
38

have conspired in killing Lloyd Peñacerrada.

Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described
in the autopsy report were caused by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the
possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus, insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony
and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible
for the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas
that there were only five wounds that could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy
report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.

It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be
sustained, it can only be on the basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness.
Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns
in hacking and stabbing Lloyd Peñacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21,
1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood concealed behind a clump of banana
trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him, he
recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the
moon. He further stated that the stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-
examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six accused did the
stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.

ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):

Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?

A Yes, Sir.

Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and
the stabbing, at that distance by the herein accused as identified by
you?

A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.

Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this
Honorable Court who was hacking the victim?

A Because they were surrounding Peñacerrada and were in constant

movement, I could not determine who did the hacking.

ATTY. GATON:

The interpretation is not clear.

COURT:

They were doing it rapidly.

A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I

only saw the rapid movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot
determine who was hacking and who was stabbing. But I saw the
hacking and the stabbing blow.

ATTY. GATON:

Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked
Lloyd Peñacerrada?

A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.

Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who
did the stabbing?
 A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.

Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify
the weapons used because according to you it was just flashing?

A Yes, sir. 39

(Emphasis supplied)

From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or
contributed, by the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada.

It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of
Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct
participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in
the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same
Article 17, or by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part
in the killing did the appellant perform to support the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of
Appeals on him?

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.

Art. 4. Criminal liability — Criminal liability shall be incurred:

1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended.

2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or

property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony.
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.

Art. 3. Definition — Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).

Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault
(culpa).

There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault
when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack
of skill.

(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or
omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the
omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has
committed a felony in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what
act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as used in Article 3 of the Revised
Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world."   In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the
40

appellant which would have inflicted any harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.

Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who
"stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus this principal witness did not say, because he could not
whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not know what specific act
was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid
down by Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the
victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while
there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could
not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex
gratia argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not
him? Is he not after all the oldest (already sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the
five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is possible, nay even probable,
that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable,
that all the fatal wounds, including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in
rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor. But more importantly, there being not an iota
of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's
conviction can not be sustained.

Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out
to testify in October 1981, or eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21,
1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,  here, the
41

unreasonable delay in Huntoria's coming out engenders doubt on his veracity.   If the silence of
42

coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his credibility doubtful,   the more it
43

should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he
allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life
would be endangered is too pat to be believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the
accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible retaliation from the
accused,   why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto
44

and Fausta Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still
free and around; they were not yet named in the original information,   thus the supposed danger on
45

Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.

Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He

admitted that he was a tenant of the deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons
why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you
saw the stabbing and hacking of Lloyd Peñacerrada when you told
Mrs. Peñacerrada about what happened to her husband?
 A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was
haunted by my conscience and secondly the victim was also my
landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim. 46

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Emphasis ours.)

At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the
very source of his livelihood, if not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land
to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden to their landlords and seek ways and
means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the
entire family of Augusto Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd
Peñacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself
with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get into
the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be
employed as early as May 1981.   Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he
47

was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of action for shortly after he volunteered
and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the victim's
uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family.   Given all the
48

foregoing circumstances, we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the
least.

At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the
killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada doubtful — it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the
Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated by their adult children
from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who
are much younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of
their 65-year old   father, the appellant, in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim
49

was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence was about one kilometer
from the scene of the crime,   we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of
50

aiding his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and
sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing of Lloyd Peñacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived
enemy.

Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,   under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant
51

case in which the participation of the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as
exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of alibi for if taken in the
light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.  52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 120744-46               June 25, 2012

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 122677

MARIO D. REYES, ANDRES S. REYES and VIRGILIO A. MANGUERRA, Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 122776

GERVACIO B. CUNANAN, JR. and ERNESTO PUNO, Petitioners,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Law enforcers thrust their lives in unimaginable zones of peril. Yet resort to wanton violence is never
justified when their duty could be performed otherwise. A "shoot first, think later" disposition
occupies no decent place in a civilized society. Never has homicide or murder been a function of law
enforcement. The public peace is never predicated on the cost of human life.

These are petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June
30, 1995 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614 – cases
1 

for murder, frustrated murder and multiple counts of attempted murder, respectively. The cases are
predicated on a shooting incident on April 5, 1988 in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando,
Pampanga which caused the death of Leodevince Licup (Licup) and injured Noel Villanueva
(Villanueva). Accused were petitioners Salvador Yapyuco, Jr. (Yapyuco) and Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
(Cunanan) and Ernesto Puno (Puno) who were members of the Integrated National Police
(INP) stationed at the Sindalan Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga; Jose Pamintuan
2 

(Pamintuan) and Mario Reyes, who were barangay captains of Quebiawan and Del Carmen,
respectively; Ernesto Puno, Andres Reyes and Virgilio Manguerra (Manguerra), Carlos David,
Ruben Lugtu, Moises Lacson (Lacson), Renato Yu, Jaime Pabalan (Pabalan) and Carlos David
(David), who were either members of the Civil Home Defense Force (CHDF) or civilian volunteer
officers in Barangays Quebiawan, Del Carmen and Telebastagan. They were all charged with
murder, multiple attempted murder and frustrated murder in three Informations, the inculpatory
portions of which read:

Criminal Case No. 16612:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and while
responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with deliberate intent to
take the life of Leodevince S. Licup, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the
green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by Leodevince S. Licup and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
which are necessarily mortal on the different parts of the body, thereby causing the direct and
immediate death of the latter.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 3

Criminal Case No. 16613:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and while
responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, attack
Eduardo S. Flores, Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican with automatic
weapons by firing directly at the green Toyota Tamaraw jitney ridden by said Eduardo S. Flores,
Alejandro R. de Vera, Restituto G. Calma and Raul V. Panlican, having commenced the commission
of murder directly by overt acts of execution which should produce the murder by reason of some
cause or accident other than their own spontaneous desistance.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. 16614:

That on or about the 5th day of April 1988, in Barangay Quebiawan, San Fernando, Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, all public
officers, being then policemen, Brgy. Captains, Brgy. Tanod and members of the Civil Home
Defense Force (CHDF), respectively, confederating and mutually helping one another, and while
responding to information about the presence of armed men in said barangay and conducting
surveillance thereof, thus committing the offense in relation to their office, did then and there, with
treachery and evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent of taking the
life of Noel C. Villanueva, attack the latter with automatic weapons by firing directly at the green
Toyota Tamaraw jitney driven by said Noel C. Villanueva and inflicting multiple gunshot wounds
which are necessarily mortal and having performed all the acts which would have produced the
crime of murder, but which did not, by reason of causes independent of the defendants’ will, namely,
the able and timely medical assistance given to said Noel C. Villanueva, which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Hailed to court on April 30, 1991 after having voluntarily surrendered to the authorities, the accused
6 

– except Pabalan who died earlier on June 12, 1990, and Yapyuco who was then allegedly
7 

indisposed – entered individual pleas of not guilty. A month later, Yapyuco voluntarily surrendered to
8  9 

the authorities, and at his arraignment likewise entered a negative plea. In the meantime, Mario
10 

Reyes, Andres Reyes, David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguerra jointly filed a Motion for Bail relative
to Criminal Case No. 16612. Said motion was heard on the premise, as previously agreed upon by
11 

both the prosecution and the defense, that these cases would be jointly tried and that the evidence
adduced at said hearing would automatically constitute evidence at the trial on the merits. On May
12 
10, 1991, the Sandiganbayan granted bail in Criminal Case No. 16612. Yapyuco likewise applied for
13 

bail on May 15, 1991 and the same was also granted on May 21, 1991. Pamintuan died on
14 

November 21, 1992, and accordingly, the charges against him were dismissed.
15 

At the July 4, 1991 pre-trial conference, the remaining accused waived the pre-trial inquest.  Hence,
16 

joint trial on the merits ensued and picked up from where the presentation of evidence left off at the
hearing on the bail applications.

The prosecution established that in the evening of April 5, 1988, Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera,
Panlican and Licup were at the residence of Salangsang as guests at the barrio fiesta celebrations
between 5:00 and 7:30 p.m.. The company decided to leave at around 7:30 p.m., shortly after the
religious procession had passed. As they were all inebriated, Salangsang reminded Villanueva, who
was on the wheel, to drive carefully and watch out for potholes and open canals on the road. With
Licup in the passenger seat and the rest of his companions at the back of his Tamaraw jeepney,
Villanueva allegedly proceeded at 5-10 kph with headlights dimmed. Suddenly, as they were
approaching a curve on the road, they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup
were both wounded and bleeding profusely. 17

Both Flores and Villanueva, contrary to what the defense would claim, allegedly did not see any one
on the road flag them down. In open court, Flores executed a sketch depicting the relative location
18  19 

of the Tamaraw jeepney on the road, the residence of Salangsang where they had come from and
the house situated on the right side of the road right after the curve where the jeepney had taken a
left turn; he identified said house to be that of a certain Lenlen Naron where the gunmen allegedly
took post and opened fire at him and his companions. He could not tell how many firearms were
used. He recounted that after the shooting, he, unaware that Licup and Villanueva were wounded,
jumped out of the jeepney when he saw from behind them Pamintuan emerging from the yard of
Naron’s house. Frantic and shaken, he instantaneously introduced himself and his companions to be
employees of San Miguel Corporation but instead, Pamintuan reproved them for not stopping when
flagged. At this point, he was distracted when Villanueva cried out and told him to summon
Salangsang for help as he (Villanueva) and Licup were wounded. He dashed back to Salangsang’s
house as instructed and, returning to the scene, he observed that petitioner Yu was also there, and
Villanueva and Licup were being loaded into a Sarao jeepney to be taken to the hospital. This was
20 

corroborated by Villanueva who stated that as soon as the firing had ceased, two armed men,
together with Pamintuan, approached them and transferred him and Licup to another jeepney and
taken to the nearby St. Francis Hospital. 21

Flores remembered that there were two sudden bursts of gunfire which very rapidly succeeded each
other, and that they were given no warning shot at all contrary to what the defense would say. He 22 

professed that he, together with his co-passengers, were also aboard the Sarao jeepney on its way
to the hospital and inside it he observed two men, each holding long firearms, seated beside the
driver. He continued that as soon as he and his companions had been dropped off at the hospital,
the driver of the Sarao jeepney immediately drove off together with his two armed companions. He 23 

further narrated that the day after the shooting, he brought Licup to the Makati Medical Center where
the latter expired on April 7, 1988. He claimed that all the accused in the case had not been known
24 

to him prior to the incident, except for Pamintuan whom he identified to be his wife’s uncle and with
whom he denied having had any rift nor with the other accused for that matter, which would have
otherwise inspired ill motives.  He claimed the bullet holes on the Tamaraw jeepney were on the
25 

passenger side and that there were no other bullet holes at the back or in any other portion of the
vehicle.
26

Salangsang, also an electrician at the San Miguel Corporation plant, affirmed the presence of his
companions at his residence on the subject date and time, and corroborated Villanueva’s and Flores’
narration of the events immediately preceding the shooting. He recounted that after seeing off his
guests shortly after the procession had passed his house and reminding them to proceed carefully
on the pothole-studded roads, he was alarmed when moments later, he heard a volley of gunfire
from a distance which was shortly followed by Flores’ frantic call for help. He immediately proceeded
to the scene on his bicycle and saw Pamintuan by the lamppost just outside the gate of Naron’s
house where, inside, he noticed a congregation of more or less six people whom he could not
recognize.  At this point, he witnessed Licup and Villanueva being loaded into another jeepney
27 

occupied by three men who appeared to be in uniform. He then retrieved the keys of the Tamaraw
jeepney from Villanueva and decided to deliver it to his mother’s house, but before driving off, he
allegedly caught a glance of Mario Reyes on the wheel of an owner-type jeepney idling in front of the
ill-fated Tamaraw; it was the same jeepney which he remembered to be that frequently used by
Yapyuco in patrolling the barangay. He claimed he spent the night at his mother’s house and in the
morning, a policeman came looking for him with whom, however, he was not able to talk. 28

Salangsang observed that the scene of the incident was dark because the electric post in front of
Naron’s house was strangely not lit when he arrived, and that none of the neighboring houses was
illuminated. He admitted his uncertainty as to whether it was Yapyuco’s group or the group of
Pamintuan that brought his injured companions to the hospital, but he could tell with certainty that it
was the Sarao jeepney previously identified by Villanueva and Flores that brought his injured
companions to the hospital. 29

Daisy Dabor, forensic chemist at the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Camp Olivas,
affirmed that she had previously examined the firearms suspected to have been used by petitioners
in the shooting and found them positive for gunpowder residue. She could not, however, determine
exactly when the firearms were discharged; neither could she tell how many firearms were
discharged that night nor the relative positions of the gunmen. She admitted having declined to
administer paraffin test on petitioners and on the other accused because the opportunity therefor
came only 72 hours after the incident. She affirmed having also examined the Tamaraw jeepney and
found eleven (11) bullet holes on it, most of which had punctured the door at the passenger side of
the vehicle at oblique and perpendicular directions. She explained, rather inconclusively, that the
bullets that hit at an angle might have been fired while the jeepney was either at a standstill or
moving forward in a straight line, or gradually making a turn at the curve on the road. Additionally,
30 

Silvestre Lapitan, administrative and supply officer of the INP-Pampanga Provincial Command
tasked with the issuance of firearms and ammunitions to members of the local police force and
CHDF and CVO members, identified in court the memorandum receipts for the firearms he had
issued to Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Manguerra, Pabalan and Yapyuco. 31

Dr. Pedro Solis, Jr., medico-legal consultant at the Makati Medical Center, examined the injuries of
Villanueva and Licup on April 6, 1988. He recovered multiple metal shrapnel from the occipital region
of Villanueva’s head as well as from the posterior aspect of his chest; he noted nothing serious in
these wounds in that the incapacity would last between 10 and 30 days only. He also located a bullet
wound on the front lateral portion of the right thigh, and he theorized that this wound would be
caused by a firearm discharged in front of the victim, assuming the assailant and the victim were
both standing upright on the ground and the firearm was fired from the level of the assailant’s waist;
but if the victim was seated, the position of his thigh must be horizontal so that with the shot coming
from his front, the trajectory of the bullet would be upward. He hypothesized that if the shot would
come behind Villanueva, the bullet would enter the thigh of the seated victim and exit at a lower
level.
32

With respect to Licup, Dr. Solis declared he was still alive when examined. On the patient, he noted
a lacerated wound at the right temporal region of the head – one consistent with being hit by a hard
and blunt object and not a bullet. He noted three (3) gunshot wounds the locations of which
suggested that Licup was upright when fired upon from the front: one is a through-and-through
wound in the middle lateral aspect of the middle portion of the right leg; another, through-and-
through wound at the middle portion of the right forearm; and third one, a wound in the abdomen
which critically and fatally involved the stomach and the intestines. He hypothesized that if Licup was
seated in the passenger seat as claimed, his right leg must have been exposed and the assailant
must have been in front of him holding the gun slightly higher than the level of the bullet entry in the
leg. He found that the wound in the abdomen had entered from the left side and crossed over to and
exited at the right, which suggested that the gunman must have been positioned at Licup’s left side.
He explained that if this wound had been inflicted ahead of that in the forearm, then the former must
have been fired after Licup had changed his position as a reaction to the first bullet that hit him. He
said that the wound on the leg must have been caused by a bullet fired at the victim’s back and hit
the jeepney at a downward angle without hitting any hard surface prior. 33

Dr. Solis believed that the wound on Licup’s right forearm must have been caused by a bullet fired
from the front but slightly obliquely to the right of the victim. Hypothesizing, he held the improbability
of Licup being hit on the abdomen, considering that he might have changed position following the
infliction of the other wounds, unless there was more than one assailant who fired multiple shots
from either side of the Tamaraw jeepney; however, he proceeded to rule out the possibility of Licup
having changed position especially if the gunfire was delivered very rapidly. He could not tell which
of Licup’s three wounds was first inflicted, yet it could be that the bullet to the abdomen was
delivered ahead of the others because it would have caused Licup to lean forward and stoop down
with his head lying low and steady. 34

Finally, Atty. Victor Bartolome, hearing officer at the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM)
affirmed that the accused police officers Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno had been administratively
charged with and tried for gross misconduct as a consequence of the subject shooting incident and
that he had in fact conducted investigations thereon sometime in 1989 and 1990 which culminated in
their dismissal from service. Dolly Porqueriño, stenographer at the NAPOLCOM, testified that at the
35 

hearing of the administrative case, Yapyuco authenticated the report on the shooting incident dated
April 5, 1988 which he had previously prepared at his office. This, according to her, together with the
sketch showing the relative position of the responding law enforcers and the Tamaraw jeepney at
the scene of the incident, had been forwarded to the NAPOLCOM Central Office for
consideration. The Sandiganbayan, in fact, subpoenaed these documents together with the joint
36 

counter-affidavits which had been submitted in that case by Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno.

Of all the accused, only Yapyuco took the stand for the defense. He identified himself as the
commander of the Sindalan Police Substation in San Fernando, Pampanga and the superior officer
of petitioners Cunanan and Puno and of the accused Yu whose jurisdiction included Barangays
Quebiawan and Telebastagan. He narrated that in the afternoon of April 5, 1988, he and his men
were investigating a physical injuries case when Yu suddenly received a summon for police
assistance from David, who supposedly was instructed by Pamintuan, concerning a reported
presence of armed NPA members in Quebiawan. Yapyuco allegedly called on their main station in
San Fernando for reinforcement but at the time no additional men could be dispatched. Hence, he
decided to respond and instructed his men to put on their uniforms and bring their M-16 rifles with
them. 37

Yapyuco continued that at the place appointed, he and his group met with Pamintuan who told him
that he had earlier spotted four (4) men carrying long firearms. As if sizing up their collective
strength, Pamintuan allegedly intimated that he and barangay captain Mario Reyes of nearby Del
Carmen had also brought in a number of armed men and that there were likewise Cafgu members
convened at the residence of Naron. Moments later, Pamintuan announced the approach of his
suspects, hence Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno took post in the middle of the road at the curve where
the Tamaraw jeepney conveying the victims would make an inevitable turn. As the jeepney came
much closer, Pamintuan announced that it was the target vehicle, so he, with Cunanan and Puno
behind him, allegedly flagged it down and signaled for it to stop. He claimed that instead of stopping,
the jeepney accelerated and swerved to its left. This allegedly inspired him, and his fellow police
officers Cunanan and Puno, to fire warning shots but the jeepney continued pacing forward, hence
38 

they were impelled to fire at the tires thereof and instantaneously, gunshots allegedly came bursting
from the direction of Naron’s house directly at the subject jeepney.39

Yapyuco recalled that one of the occupants of the jeepney then alighted and exclaimed at
Pamintuan that they were San Miguel Corporation employees. Holding their fire, Yapyuco and his
men then immediately searched the vehicle but found no firearms but instead, two injured
passengers whom they loaded into his jeepney and delivered to nearby St. Francis Hospital. From
there he and his men returned to the scene supposedly to investigate and look for the people who
fired directly at the jeepney. They found no one; the Tamaraw jeepney was likewise gone. 40

Yapyuco explained that the peace and order situation in Barangay Quebiawan at the time was in
bad shape, as in fact there were several law enforcement officers in the area who had been
ambushed supposedly by rebel elements, and that he frequently patrolled the barangay on account
41 

of reported sightings of unidentified armed men therein. That night, he said, his group which
42 

responded to the scene were twelve (12) in all, comprised of Cunanan and Puno from the Sindalan
Police Substation,  the team composed of Pamintuan and his men, as well as the team headed by
43 

Captain Mario Reyes. He admitted that all of them, including himself, were armed. He denied that
44 

they had committed an ambuscade because otherwise, all the occupants of the Tamaraw jeepney
would have been killed.  He said that the shots which directly hit the passenger door of the jeepney
45 

did not come from him or from his fellow police officers but rather from Cafgu members assembled in
the residence of Naron, inasmuch as said shots were fired only when the jeepney had gone past the
spot on the road where they were assembled. 46

Furthermore, Yapyuco professed that he had not communicated with any one of the accused after
the incident because he was at the time very confused; yet he did know that his co-accused had
already been investigated by the main police station in San Fernando, but the inquiries did not
include himself, Cunanan and Puno. He admitted an administrative case against him, Cunanan and
47 

Puno at the close of which they had been ordered dismissed from service; yet on appeal, the
decision was reversed and they were exonerated. He likewise alluded to an investigation
independently conducted by their station commander, S/Supt. Rolando Cinco.  48

S/Supt Rolando Cinco, then Station Commander of the INP in San Fernando, Pampanga
acknowledged the volatility of the peace and order situation in his jurisdiction, where members of the
police force had fallen victims of ambuscade by lawless elements. He said that he himself has
actually conducted investigations on the Pamintuan report that rebel elements had been trying to
infiltrate the employment force of San Miguel Corporation plant, and that he has accordingly
conducted "clearing operations" in sugarcane plantations in the barangay. He intimated that days
prior to the incident, Yapyuco’s team had already been alerted of the presence of NPA members in
the area. Corroborating Yapyuco’s declaration, he confessed having investigated the shooting
incident and making a report on it in which, curiously, was supposedly attached Pamintuan’s
statement referring to Flores as being "married to a resident of Barangay Quebiawan" and found
after surveillance to be "frequently visited by NPA members." He affirmed having found that guns
were indeed fired that night and that the chief investigator was able to gather bullet shells from the
scene. 49
Cunanan and Puno did not take the witness stand but adopted the testimony of Yapyuco as well as
the latter’s documentary evidence. Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and Manguera,
50 

waived their right to present evidence and submitted their memorandum as told. 51

The Sandiganbayan reduced the basic issue to whether the accused had acted in the regular and
lawful performance of their duties in the maintenance of peace and order either as barangay officials
and as members of the police and the CHDF, and hence, could take shelter in the justifying
circumstance provided in Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code; or whether they had deliberately
ambushed the victims with the intent of killing them. With the evidence in hand, it found Yapyuco,
52 

Cunanan, Puno, Manguera and Mario and Andres Reyes guilty as co-principals in the separate
offense of homicide for the eventual death of Licup (instead of murder as charged in Criminal Case
No. 16612) and of attempted homicide for the injury sustained by Villanueva (instead of frustrated
murder as charged in Criminal Case No. 16614), and acquitted the rest in those cases. It acquitted
all of them of attempted murder charged in Criminal Case No. 16613 in respect of Flores, Panlican,
De Vera and Calma. The dispositive portion of the June 30, 1995 Joint Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

I. In Crim. Case No. 16612, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense of Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code, and crediting all of them with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, without any aggravating circumstance present or proven, each of said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from SIX (6) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision correccional, as the minimum, to TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the
deceased victim Leodevince Licup in the amounts of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and
₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary damages, and to pay their proportionate shares of the
costs of said action.

II. In Crim. Case No. 16613, for insufficiency of evidence, all the accused charged in the
information, namely, Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr. y Basco,
Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Carlos David y Bañez, Ruben Lugtu y Lacson,
Moises Lacson y Adona, Renato Yu y Barrera, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and Virgilio
Manguerra y Adona are hereby acquitted of the offense of Multiple Attempted Murder
charged therein, with costs de oficio.

III. In Crim. Case No. 16614, accused Salvador Yapyuco y Enriquez, Generoso Cunanan, Jr.
y Basco, Ernesto Puno y Tungol, Mario Reyes y David, Andres Reyes y Salangsang and
Virgilio Manguerra y Adona are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as co-
principals in the offense Attempted Homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249, in
relation to Article 6, paragraph 3, both of the Revised Penal Code, and crediting them with
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, without any aggravating circumstance
present or proven, each of said accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the offended party Noel Villanueva in the amount of
₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages, plus ₱120,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs of said action.

SO ORDERED. 53
The Sandiganbayan declared that the shootout which caused injuries to Villanueva and which
brought the eventual death of Licup has been committed by petitioners herein willfully under the
guise of maintaining peace and order; that the acts performed by them preparatory to the shooting,
54 

which ensured the execution of their evil plan without risk to themselves, demonstrate a clear intent
to kill the occupants of the subject vehicle; that the fact they had by collective action deliberately and
consciously intended to inflict harm and injury and had voluntarily performed those acts negates their
defense of lawful performance of official duty; that the theory of mistaken belief could not likewise
55 

benefit petitioners because there was supposedly no showing that they had sufficient basis or
probable cause to rely fully on Pamintuan’s report that the victims were armed NPA members, and
they have not been able by evidence to preclude ulterior motives or gross inexcusable negligence
when they acted as they did; that there was insufficient or total absence of factual basis to assume
56 

that the occupants of the jeepney were members of the NPA or criminals for that matter; and that the
shooting incident could not have been the product of a well-planned and well-coordinated police
operation but was the result of either a hidden agenda concocted by Barangay Captains Mario
Reyes and Pamintuan, or a hasty and amateurish attempt to gain commendation. 57

These findings obtain context principally from the open court statements of prosecution witnesses
Villanueva, Flores and Salangsang, particularly on the circumstances prior to the subject incident.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that the Tamaraw jeepney would have indeed stopped if it had truly
been flagged down as claimed by Yapyuco especially since – as it turned out after the search of the
vehicle – they had no firearms with them, and hence, they had nothing to be scared of. It observed
58 

that while Salangsang and Flores had been bona fide residents of Barangay Quebiawan, then it
would be impossible for Pamintuan, barangay captain no less, not to have known them and the
location of their houses which were not far from the scene of the incident; so much so that the
presence of the victims and of the Tamaraw jeepney in Salangsang’s house that evening could not
have possibly escaped his notice. In this regard, it noted that Pamintuan’s Sworn Statement dated
April 11, 1988 did not sufficiently explain his suspicions as to the identities of the victims as well as
his apparent certainty on the identity and whereabouts of the subject Tamaraw jeepney.  It surmised
59 

how the defense, especially Yapyuco in his testimony, could have failed to explain why a large group
of armed men – which allegedly included Cafgu members from neighboring barangays – were
assembled at the house of Naron that night, and how petitioners were able to identify the Tamaraw
jeepney to be the target vehicle. From this, it inferred that petitioners had already known that their
suspect vehicle would be coming from the direction of Salangsang’s house – such knowledge is
supposedly evident first, in the manner by which they advantageously positioned themselves at the
scene to afford a direct line of fire at the target vehicle, and second, in the fact that the house of
Naron, the neighboring houses and the electric post referred to by prosecution witnesses were
deliberately not lit that night.
60

The Sandiganbayan also drew information from Flores’ sketch depicting the position of the Tamaraw
jeepney and the assailants on the road, and concluded that judging by the bullet holes on the right
side of the jeepney and by the declarations of Dr. Solis respecting the trajectory of the bullets that hit
Villanueva and Licup, the assailants were inside the yard of Naron’s residence and the shots were
fired at the jeepney while it was slowly moving past them. It also gave weight to the testimony and
the report of Dabor telling that the service firearms of petitioners had been tested and found to be
positive of gunpowder residue, therefore indicating that they had indeed been discharged. 61

The Sandiganbayan summed up what it found to be overwhelming circumstantial evidence pointing

to the culpability of petitioners: the nature and location of the bullet holes on the jeepney and the
gunshot wounds on the victims, as well as the trajectory of the bullets that caused such damage and
injuries; particularly, the number, location and trajectory of the bullets that hit the front passenger
side of the jeepney; the strategic placement of the accused on the right side of the street and inside
the front yard of Naron’s house; the deliberate shutting off of the lights in the nearby houses and the
lamp post; and the positive ballistic findings on the firearms of petitioners. 
62
This evidentiary resumé, according to the Sandiganbayan, not only fortified petitioners’ admission
that they did discharge their firearms, but also provided a predicate to its conclusion that petitioners
conspired with one another to achieve a common purpose, design and objective to harm the
unarmed and innocent victims. Thus, since there was no conclusive proof of who among the several
accused had actually fired the gunshots that injured Villanueva and fatally wounded Licup, the
Sandiganbayan imposed collective responsibility on all those who were shown to have discharged
their firearms that night – petitioners herein. Interestingly, it was speculated that the manner by
63 

which the accused collectively and individually acted prior or subsequent to or contemporaneously
with the shooting indicated that they were either drunk or that some, if not all of them, had a grudge
against the employees of San Miguel Corporation; and that on the basis of the self-serving evidence
64 

adduced by the defense, there could possibly have been a massive cover-up of the incident by
Philippine Constabulary and INP authorities in Pampanga as well as by the NAPOLCOM. It likewise
65 

found very consequential the fact that the other accused had chosen not to take the witness stand;
this, supposedly because it was incumbent upon them to individually explain their participation in the
shooting in view of the weight of the prosecution evidence, their invocation of the justifying
circumstance of lawful performance of official duty and the declaration of some of them in their
affidavits to the effect that they had been deployed that evening in the front yard of Naron’s
residence from which the volley of gunfire was discharged as admitted by Yapyuco himself. 66

As to the nature of the offenses committed, the Sandiganbayan found that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery has not been proved because first, it was supposedly not shown how the
aggression commenced and how the acts causing injury to Villanueva and fatally injuring Licup
began and developed, and second, this circumstance must be supported by proof of a deliberate
and conscious adoption of the mode of attack and cannot be drawn from mere suppositions or from
circumstances immediately preceding the aggression. The same finding holds true for evident
premeditation because between the time Yapyuco received the summons for assistance from
Pamintuan through David and the time he and his men responded at the scene, there was found to
be no sufficient time to allow for the materialization of all the elements of that circumstance. 67

Finally as to damages, Villanueva had testified that his injury required leave from work for 60 days
which were all charged against his accumulated leave credits; that he was earning ₱8,350.00
68 

monthly; and that he had spent ₱35,000.00 for the repair of his Tamaraw jeepney. Also, Teodoro
69  70 

Licup had stated that his family had spent ₱18,000.00 for the funeral of his son, ₱28,000.00 during
the wake, ₱11,000.00 for the funeral plot and ₱20,000.00 in attorney’s fees for the prosecution of
these cases. He also submitted a certification from San Miguel Corporation reflecting the income of
71 

his deceased son. On these bases, the Sandiganbayan ordered petitioners, jointly and severally, to
72 

indemnify (a) Villanueva ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and ₱120,000.00 as
moral/exemplary damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action, and (b) the heirs of deceased
Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱600,000.00 as moral/exemplary
damages, plus the proportionate costs of the action.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, the present recourse.

In G.R. Nos. 120744-46, Yapyuco disputes the Sandiganbayan’s finding of conspiracy and labels the
same to be conjectural. He points out that the court a quo has not clearly established that he had by
positive acts intended to participate in any criminal object in common with the other accused, and
that his participation in a supposed common criminal object has not been proved beyond reasonable
doubt. He believes the finding is belied by Flores and Villanueva, who saw him at the scene only
after the shooting incident when the wounded passengers were taken to the hospital on his
jeepney. He also points out the uncertainty in the Sandiganbayan’s declaration that the incident
73 

could not have been the product of a well-planned police operation, but rather was the result of
either a hidden agenda concocted against the victims by the barangay officials involved or an
amateurish attempt on their part to earn commendation. He theorizes that, if it were the latter
alternative, then he could hardly be found guilty of homicide or frustrated homicide but rather of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and frustrated homicide.  He laments that, assuming
74 

arguendo that the injuries sustained by the victims were caused by his warning shots, he must
nevertheless be exonerated because he responded to the scene of the incident as a bona fide
member of the police force and, hence, his presence at the scene of the incident was in line with the
fulfillment of his duty as he was in fact in the lawful performance thereof – a fact which has been
affirmed by the NAPOLCOM en banc when it dismissed on appeal the complaint for gross
misconduct against him, Cunanan and Puno. He also invokes the concept of mistake of fact and
75 

attributes to Pamintuan the responsibility why he, as well as the other accused in these cases, had
entertained the belief that the suspects were armed rebel elements. 76

In G.R. No. 122677, petitioners Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes claim that the
Sandiganbayan has not proved their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and the assailed decision was
based on acts the evidence for which has been adduced at a separate trial but erroneously
attributed to them. They explain that there were two sets of accused, in the case: one, the police
officers comprised of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno and, two, the barangay officials and CHDFs
comprised of David, Lugtu, Lacson, Yu and themselves who had waived the presentation of
evidence. They question their conviction of the charges vis-a-vis the acquittal of David, Lugtu,
Lacson and Yu who, like them, were barangay officials and had waived their right to present
evidence in their behalf. They emphasize in this regard that all accused barangay officials and
CHDFs did not participate in the presentation of the evidence by the accused police officers and,
hence, the finding that they too had fired upon the Tamaraw jeepney is hardly based on an
established fact. Also, they believe that the findings of fact by the Sandiganbayan were based on
77 

inadmissible evidence, specifically on evidence rejected by the court itself and those presented in a
separate trial. They label the assailed decision to be speculative, conjectural and suspicious and,
hence, antithetical to the quantum of evidence required in a criminal prosecution. Finally, they
78 

lament that the finding of conspiracy has no basis in evidence and that the prosecution has not even
shown that they were with the other accused at the scene of the incident or that they were among
those who fired at the victims, and neither were they identified as among the perpetrators of the
crime.79

In G.R. No. 122776, Cunanan and Puno likewise dispute the finding of conspiracy. They claim that
judging by the uncertainty in the conclusion of the Sandiganbayan as to whether the incident was the
result of a legitimate police operation or a careless plot designed by the accused to obtain
commendation, conspiracy has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. This, because they
believe the prosecution has not, as far as both of them are concerned, shown that they had ever
been part of such malicious design to commit an ambuscade as that alluded to in the assailed
decision. They advance that as police officers, they merely followed orders from their commander,
Yapyuco, but were not privy to the conversation among the latter, David and Pamintuan, moments
before the shooting. They posit they could hardly be assumed to have had community of criminal
design with the rest of the accused. They affirm Yapyuco’s statement that they fired warning shots
80 

at the subject jeepney, but only after it had passed the place where they were posted and only after
81 

it failed to stop when flagged down as it then became apparent that it was going to speed away – as
supposedly shown by bullet holes on the chassis and not on the rear portion of the jeepney. They
also harp on the absence of proof of ill motives that would have otherwise urged them to commit the
crimes charged, especially since none of the victims had been personally or even remotely known to
either of them. That they were not intending to commit a crime is, they believe, shown by the fact
that they did not directly aim their rifles at the passengers of the jeepney and that in fact, they
immediately held their fire when Flores identified themselves as employees of San Miguel
Corporation. They conceded that if killing was their intent, then they could have easily fired at the
victims directly.
82
Commenting on these petitions, the Office of the Special Prosecutor stands by the finding of
conspiracy as established by the fact that all accused, some of them armed, had assembled
themselves and awaited the suspect vehicle as though having previously known that it would be
coming from Salangsang’s residence. It posits that the manner by which the jeepney was fired upon
demonstrates a community of purpose and design to commit the crimes charged. It believes that
83 

criminal intent is discernible from the posts the accused had chosen to take on the road that would
give them a direct line of fire at the target – as shown by the trajectories of the bullets that hit the
Tamaraw jeepney. This intent was supposedly realized when after the volley of gunfire, both Flores
84 

and Licup were wounded and the latter died as a supervening consequence. It refutes the
85 

invocation of lawful performance of duty, mainly because there was no factual basis to support the
belief of the accused that the occupants were members of the NPA, as indeed they have not shown
that they had previously verified the whereabouts of the suspect vehicle. But while it recognizes that
the accused had merely responded to the call of duty when summoned by Pamintuan through David,
it is convinced that they had exceeded the performance thereof when they fired upon the Tamaraw
jeepney occupied, as it turned out, by innocent individuals instead. 86

As to the contention of Mario Reyes, Andres Reyes and Manguerra that the evidence adduced
before the Sandiganbayan as well the findings based thereon should not be binding on them, the
OSP explains that said petitioners, together with Pamintuan, David, Lugtu, Lacson and Yu, had
previously withdrawn their motion for separate trial and as directed later on submitted the case for
decision as to them with the filing of their memorandum. It asserts there was no denial of due
process to said petitioners in view of their agreement for the reproduction of the evidence on the
motion for bail at the trial proper as well as by their manifestation to forego with the presentation of
their own evidence. The right to present witnesses is waivable. Also, where an accused is jointly
tried and testifies in court, the testimony binds the other accused, especially where the latter has
failed to register his objection thereto.
87

The decision on review apparently is laden with conclusions and inferences that seem to rest on
loose predicates. Yet we have pored over the records of the case and found that evidence
nonetheless exists to support the penultimate finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

I.

It is as much undisputed as it is borne by the records that petitioners were at the situs of the incident
on the date and time alleged in the Informations. Yapyuco, in his testimony – which was adopted by
Cunanan and Puno – as well as Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes in their affidavits which
had been offered in evidence by the prosecution, explained that their presence at the scene was in
88 

response to the information relayed by Pamintuan through David that armed rebel elements on
board a vehicle described to be that occupied by the victims were reportedly spotted in Barangay
Quebiawan. It is on the basis of this suspicion that petitioners now appeal to justification under
Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code and under the concept of mistake of fact. Petitioners admit
that it was not by accident or mistake but by deliberation that the shooting transpired when it became
apparent that the suspect vehicle was attempting to flee, yet contention arises as to whether or not
there was intention to harm or even kill the passengers aboard, and who among them had
discharged the bullets that caused the eventual death of Licup and injured Villanueva.

The first duty of the prosecution is not to present the crime but to identify the criminal. To this end,
89 

the prosecution in these cases offered in evidence the joint counter-affidavit of Andres Reyes and
90 

Manguerra; the counter-affidavit of Mario Reyes; the joint counter-affidavit of Cunanan and Puno;
91  92 

the counter-affidavit of Yapyuco; and the joint counter-affidavit of Yapyuco, Cunanan and Puno
93  94 

executed immediately after the incident in question. In brief, Cunanan and Puno stated therein that
"[their] team was forced to fire at the said vehicle" when it accelerated after warning shots were fired
in air and when it ignored Yapyuco’s signal for it to stop; in their earlier affidavit they, together with
95 

Yapyuco, declared that they were "constrained x x x to fire directly to (sic) the said fleeing
vehicle." Yapyuco’s open court declaration, which was adopted by Cunanan and Puno, is that he
96 

twice discharged his firearm: first, to give warning to the subject jeepney after it allegedly failed to
stop when flagged down and second, at the tires thereof when it came clear that it was trying to
escape. He suggested – substantiating the implication in his affidavit that it was "the whole team
97 

[which fired] at the fleeing vehicle"  – that the bullets which hit the passenger side of the ill-fated
98 

jeepney could have come only from the CHDFs posted inside the yard of Naron where Manguerra,
Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes admitted having taken post while awaiting the arrival of the suspect
vehicle.99

Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes, relying on their affidavits, declared that it was only Manguerra from
their group who discharged a firearm but only into the air to give warning shots, and that it was the
100 

"policemen [who] directly fired upon" the jeepney. Manguerra himself shared this statement. Yet
101  102 

these accounts do not sit well with the physical evidence found in the bullet holes on the passenger
door of the jeepney which Dabor, in both her report and testimony, described to have come from
bullets sprayed from perpendicular and oblique directions. This evidence in fact supports Yapyuco’s
claim that he, Cunanan and Puno did fire directly at the jeepney after it had made a right turn and
had already moved past them such that the line of fire to the passengers thereof would be at an
oblique angle from behind. It also bolsters his claim that, almost simultaneously, gunshots came
bursting after the jeepney has passed the spot where he, Cunanan and Puno had taken post, and
when the vehicle was already right in front of the yard of Naron’s house sitting on the right side of the
road after the curve and where Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres Reyes were positioned, such
that the line of fire would be direct and perpendicular to it. 103

While Dabor’s ballistics findings are open to challenge for being inconclusive as to who among the
accused actually discharged their firearms that night, her report pertaining to the examination of the
ill-fated Tamaraw jeepney affirms the irreducible fact that the CHDFs posted within the yard of
Naron’s house had indeed sprayed bullets at the said vehicle. Manguerra, Mario Reyes and Andres
Reyes seek to insulate themselves by arguing that such finding cannot be applied to them as it is
evidence adduced in a separate trial. But as the OSP noted, they may not evade the effect of their
having withdrawn their motion for separate trial, their agreement to a joint trial of the cases, and the
binding effect on them of the testimony of their co-accused, Yapyuco. 104

Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only against said
accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or admitter repeats in
court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial and the other accused
is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission is admissible against both
accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. It is thus perplexing why, despite
105 

the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as well as the latter’s testimony
implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their right to present evidence when,
in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their participation or non-participation in the offenses
charged. We, therefore, reject their claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as
they opted not to testify and be cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their
affidavits and, accordingly, disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

II.

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a right or
office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused acted in the
performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the injury caused or the
offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful
exercise of such right or office. The justification is based on the complete absence of intent and
106 

negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a felony connotes that it was committed
with criminal intent or with fault or negligence. Where invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts
107 

to an acknowledgment that the accused has caused the injury or has committed the offense charged
for which, however, he may not be penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary
consequence of the due performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it
must be shown that the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or
duly performed; the burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

We find that the requisites for justification under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code do not
obtain in this case.

The undisputed presence of all the accused at the situs of the incident is a legitimate law
enforcement operation. No objection is strong enough to defeat the claim that all of them – who were
either police and barangay officers or CHDF members tasked with the maintenance of peace and
order – were bound to, as they did, respond to information of a suspected rebel infiltration in the
locality. Theirs, therefore, is the specific duty to identify the occupants of their suspect vehicle and
search for firearms inside it to validate the information they had received; they may even effect a
bloodless arrest should they find cause to believe that their suspects had just committed, were
committing or were bound to commit a crime. While, it may certainly be argued that rebellion is a
continuing offense, it is interesting that nothing in the evidence suggests that the accused were
acting under an official order to open fire at or kill the suspects under any and all circumstances.
Even more telling is the absence of reference to the victims having launched such aggression as
would threaten the safety of any one of the accused, or having exhibited such defiance of authority
that would have instigated the accused, particularly those armed, to embark on a violent attack with
their firearms in self-defense. In fact, no material evidence was presented at the trial to show that the
accused were placed in real mortal danger in the presence of the victims, except maybe their bare
suspicion that the suspects were armed and were probably prepared to conduct hostilities.

But whether or not the passengers of the subject jeepney were NPA members and whether or not
they were at the time armed, are immaterial in the present inquiry inasmuch as they do not stand as
accused in the prosecution at hand. Besides, even assuming that they were as the accused believed
them to be, the actuations of these responding law enforcers must inevitably be ranged against
reasonable expectations that arise in the legitimate course of performance of policing duties. The
rules of engagement, of which every law enforcer must be thoroughly knowledgeable and for which
he must always exercise the highest caution, do not require that he should immediately draw or fire
his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his
next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride. Police work requires
nothing more than the lawful apprehension of suspects, since the completion of the process pertains
to other government officers or agencies. 108

A law enforcer in the performance of duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary
to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. United States v. Campo has laid down the rule that
109  110 

in the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except in an
extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance, and finds no other means to
comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or
death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or
causing the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force. He is, however, never
111 

justified in using unnecessary force or in treating the offender with wanton violence, or in resorting to
dangerous means when the arrest could be effected otherwise. People v. Ulep teaches that –
112  113 
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last resort, and under
circumstances indicating that the offender cannot otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law
does not clothe police officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be true
that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when pressured by a situation where an
immediate and decisive, but legal, action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment
and discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be exercised neither
capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable limits. In the absence of a clear and legal
provision to the contrary, they must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and
within the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy law enforcement
officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence upon the persons they are apprehending.
They must always bear in mind that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with human rights. 114

Thus, in People v. Tabag, where members of the Davao CHDF had killed four members of a family
115 

in their home because of suspicions that they were NPA members, and the accused sought
exoneration by invoking among others the justifying circumstance in Article 11 (5) of the Revised
Penal Code, the Court in dismissing the claim and holding them liable for murder said, thus:

In no way can Sarenas claim the privileges under paragraphs 5 and 6, Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code, for the massacre of the Magdasals can by no means be considered as done in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of an office or in obedience to an order issued by a
superior for some lawful purpose. Other than "suspicion," there is no evidence that Welbino
Magdasal, Sr., his wife Wendelyn, and their children were members of the NPA. And even if they
were members of the NPA, they were entitled to due process of law. On that fateful night, they were
peacefully resting in their humble home expecting for the dawn of another uncertain day. Clearly,
therefore, nothing justified the sudden and unprovoked attack, at nighttime, on the Magdasals. The
massacre was nothing but a merciless vigilante-style execution. 116

Petitioners rationalize their election to aim their fire directly at the jeepney by claiming that it failed to
heed the first round of warning shots as well as the signal for it to stop and instead tried to flee.
While it is possible that the jeepney had been flagged down but because it was pacing the dark road
with its headlights dimmed missed petitioners’ signal to stop, and compound to it the admitted fact
that the passengers thereof were drunk from the party they had just been to, still, we find
117 

incomprehensible petitioners’ quick resolve to use their firearms when in fact there was at least one
other vehicle at the scene – the Sarao jeepney owned by Yapyuco – which they could actually have
used to pursue their suspects whom they supposedly perceived to be in flight.

Lawlessness is to be dealt with according to the law. Only absolute necessity justifies the use of
force, and it is incumbent on herein petitioners to prove such necessity. We find, however, that
petitioners failed in that respect. Although the employment of powerful firearms does not necessarily
connote unnecessary force, petitioners in this case do not seem to have been confronted with the
rational necessity to open fire at the moving jeepney occupied by the victims. No explanation is
offered why they, in that instant, were inclined for a violent attack at their suspects except perhaps
their over-anxiety or impatience or simply their careless disposition to take no chances. Clearly, they
exceeded the fulfillment of police duties the moment they actualized such resolve, thereby inflicting
Licup with a mortal bullet wound, causing injury to Villanueva and exposing the rest of the
passengers of the jeepney to grave danger to life and limb – all of which could not have been the
necessary consequence of the fulfillment of their duties.

III.
At this juncture, we find that the invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In
the context of criminal law, a "mistake of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would
have justified the act or omission which is the subject of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable
118 

mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the
crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only general intent. The
119  120 

inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief or state of
121 

mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be
122 

honest and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negate the culpability required
123  124 

to commit the crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to
125 

an element of the offense. 126

The leading authority in mistake of fact as ground for non-liability is found in United States v. Ah
Chong, but in that setting, the principle was treated as a function of self-defense where the physical
127 

circumstances of the case had mentally manifested to the accused an aggression which it was his
instinct to repel. There, the accused, fearful of bad elements, was woken by the sound of his
bedroom door being broken open and, receiving no response from the intruder after having
demanded identification, believed that a robber had broken in. He threatened to kill the intruder but
at that moment he was struck by a chair which he had placed against the door and, perceiving that
he was under attack, seized a knife and fatally stabbed the intruder who turned out to be his
roommate. Charged with homicide, he was acquitted because of his honest mistake of fact. Finding
that the accused had no evil intent to commit the charge, the Court explained:

x x x The maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is, in all cases
of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse").

Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability, provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." x x x

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the existence of
facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the principles on which the
rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does not believe them — he is legally guiltless of
homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an innocent person is unfortunately
extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right of self-defense and the not quite
harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason, and sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that
notwithstanding some decisions apparently adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is
justified in acting on the facts as they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled
concerning them, and defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be,
the law will not punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he has really no occasion for the
extreme measure. x x x  128

Besides, as held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is
129  130 

otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the
part of the accused. Thus, Ah Chong further explained that –
131 

The question then squarely presents itself, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake of fact was not due to negligence or bad faith. 132

IV.

This brings us to whether the guilt of petitioners for homicide and frustrated homicide has been
established beyond cavil of doubt. The precept in all criminal cases is that the prosecution is bound
by the invariable requisite of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the evidence of the accused.
The weakness of the defense of the accused does not relieve the prosecution of its responsibility of
proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. By reasonable doubt is meant that doubt engendered by an
133 

investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. The overriding consideration is not whether the court doubts the
134 

innocence of the accused, but whether it entertains reasonable doubt as to his guilt. 135

The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct

evidence or by circumstantial or presumptive evidence. Corpus delicti consists of two things: first,
136 

the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. In homicide (by dolo)
137 

as well as in murder cases, the prosecution must prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be
dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was
not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act
or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. In other words,
proof of homicide or murder requires incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the
victim was deliberately killed (with malice), that is, with intent to kill. Such evidence may consist in
the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or immediately after the killing of
the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed. In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is homicide because
138 

with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results
following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences
thereof.  Evidence of intent to kill is crucial only to a finding of frustrated and attempted homicide, as
139 

the same is an essential element of these offenses, and thus must be proved with the same degree
of certainty as that required of the other elements of said offenses. 140

The records disclose no ill motives attributed to petitioners by the prosecution. It is interesting that, in
negating the allegation that they had by their acts intended to kill the occupants of the jeepney,
petitioners turn to their co-accused Pamintuan, whose picture depicted in the defense evidence is
certainly an ugly one: petitioners’ affidavits as well as Yapyuco’s testimony are replete with
suggestions that it was Pamintuan alone who harbored the motive to ambush the suspects as it was
he who their (petitioners’) minds that which they later on conceded to be a mistaken belief as to the
identity of the suspects. Cinco, for one, stated in court that Pamintuan had once reported to him that
Flores, a relative of his (Pamintuan), was frequently meeting with NPA members and that the San
Miguel Corporation plant where the victims were employed was being penetrated by NPA members.
He also affirmed Yapyuco’s claim that there had been a number of ambuscades launched against
members of law enforcement in Quebiawan and in the neighboring areas supposedly by NPA
members at around the time of the incident. But as the Sandiganbayan pointed out, it is unfortunate
that Pamintuan had died during the pendency of these cases even before his opportunity to testify in
court emerged. 141

Yet whether such claims suffice to demonstrate ill motives evades relevance and materiality. Motive
is generally held to be immaterial inasmuch as it is not an element of a crime. It gains significance
when the commission of a crime is established by evidence purely circumstantial or otherwise
inconclusive. The question of motive is important in cases where there is doubt as to whether the
142 

defendant is or is not the person who committed the act, but when there is no doubt that the
defendant was the one who caused the death of the deceased, it is not so important to know the
reason for the deed. 143

In the instant case, petitioners, without abandoning their claim that they did not intend to kill anyone
of the victims, admit having willfully discharged their service firearms; and the manner by which the
bullets concentrated on the passenger side of the jeepney permits no other conclusion than that the
shots were intended for the persons lying along the line of fire. We do not doubt that instances
abound where the discharge of a firearm at another is not in itself sufficient to sustain a finding of
intention to kill, and that there are instances where the attendant circumstances conclusively
establish that the discharge was not in fact animated by intent to kill. Yet the rule is that in
ascertaining the intention with which a specific act is committed, it is always proper and necessary to
look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant circumstances so far as they develop in the
evidence. 144

The firearms used by petitioners were either M16 rifle, .30 caliber garand rifle and .30 caliber
carbine. While the use of these weapons does not always amount to unnecessary force, they are
145 

nevertheless inherently lethal in nature. At the level the bullets were fired and hit the jeepney, it is
not difficult to imagine the possibility of the passengers thereof being hit and even killed. It must be
stressed that the subject jeepney was fired upon while it was pacing the road and at that moment, it
is not as much too difficult to aim and target the tires thereof as it is to imagine the peril to which its
passengers would be exposed even assuming that the gunfire was aimed at the tires – especially
considering that petitioners do not appear to be mere rookie law enforcers or unskilled neophytes in
encounters with lawless elements in the streets.

Thus, judging by the location of the bullet holes on the subject jeepney and the firearms employed,
the likelihood of the passenger next to the driver – and in fact even the driver himself – of being hit
and injured or even killed is great to say the least, certain to be precise. This, we find to be
consistent with the uniform claim of petitioners that the impulse to fire directly at the jeepney came
when it occurred to them that it was proceeding to evade their authority. And in instances like this,
their natural and logical impulse was to debilitate the vehicle by firing upon the tires thereof, or to
debilitate the driver and hence put the vehicle to a halt. The evidence we found on the jeepney
suggests that petitioners’ actuations leaned towards the latter.

This demonstrates the clear intent of petitioners to bring forth death on Licup who was seated on the
passenger side and to Villanueva who was occupying the wheel, together with all the consequences
arising from their deed. The circumstances of the shooting breed no other inference than that the
firing was deliberate and not attributable to sheer accident or mere lack of skill. Thus, Cupps v.
State tells that:
146 

This rule that every person is presumed to contemplate the ordinary and natural consequences of
his own acts, is applied even in capital cases. Because men generally act deliberately and by the
determination of their own will, and not from the impulse of blind passion, the law presumes that
every man always thus acts, until the contrary appears. Therefore, when one man is found to have
killed another, if the circumstances of the homicide do not of themselves show that it was not
intended, but was accidental, it is presumed that the death of the deceased was designed by the
slayer; and the burden of proof is on him to show that it was otherwise.

V.
Verily, the shooting incident subject of these petitions was actualized with the deliberate intent of
killing Licup and Villanueva, hence we dismiss Yapyuco’s alternative claim in G.R. No. 120744 that
he and his co-petitioners must be found guilty merely of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
and frustrated homicide. Here is why:

First, the crimes committed in these cases are not merely criminal negligence, the killing being
intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be
unintentional, it being the incident of another act performed without malice. People v. Guillen and
147  148 

People v. Nanquil  declare that a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent
149 

with the idea of reckless imprudence. And in People v. Castillo, we held that that there can be no
150 

frustrated homicide through reckless negligence inasmuch as reckless negligence implies lack of
intent to kill, and without intent to kill the crime of frustrated homicide cannot exist.

Second, that petitioners by their acts exhibited conspiracy, as correctly found by the Sandiganbayan,
likewise militates against their claim of reckless imprudence.

Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons
agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design.
Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though
apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy once found,
continues until the object of it has been accomplished and unless abandoned or broken up. To hold
an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 151

Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the
occurrence.  From the legal viewpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the
1a\^/phi1

offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. The instant case
152 

requires no proof of any previous agreement among petitioners that they were really bent on a
violent attack upon their suspects. While it is far-fetched to conclude that conspiracy arose from the
moment petitioners, or all of the accused for that matter, had converged and strategically posted
themselves at the place appointed by Pamintuan, we nevertheless find that petitioners had been
ignited by the common impulse not to let their suspect jeepney flee and evade their authority when it
suddenly occurred to them that the vehicle was attempting to escape as it supposedly accelerated
despite the signal for it to stop and submit to them. As aforesaid, at that point, petitioners were
confronted with the convenient yet irrational option to take no chances by preventing the jeepney’s
supposed escape even if it meant killing the driver thereof. It appears that such was their common
purpose. And by their concerted action of almost simultaneously opening fire at the jeepney from the
posts they had deliberately taken around the immediate environment of the suspects, conveniently
affording an opportunity to target the driver, they did achieve their object as shown by the
concentration of bullet entries on the passenger side of the jeepney at angular and perpendicular
trajectories. Indeed, there is no definitive proof that tells which of all the accused had discharged
their weapons that night and which directly caused the injuries sustained by Villanueva and fatally
wounded Licup, yet we adopt the Sandiganbayan’s conclusion that since only herein petitioners
were shown to have been in possession of their service firearms that night and had fired the same,
they should be held collectively responsible for the consequences of the subject law enforcement
operation which had gone terribly wrong. 153
 VI.

The Sandiganbayan correctly found that petitioners are guilty as co-principals in the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide only, respectively for the death of Licup and for the non-fatal
injuries sustained by Villanueva, and that they deserve an acquittal together with the other accused,
of the charge of attempted murder with respect to the unharmed victims. The allegation of evident
154 

premeditation has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt because the evidence is consistent
with the fact that the urge to kill had materialized in the minds of petitioners as instantaneously as
they perceived their suspects to be attempting flight and evading arrest. The same is true with
treachery, inasmuch as there is no clear and indubitable proof that the mode of attack was
consciously and deliberately adopted by petitioners.

Homicide, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is punished by reclusion temporal whereas
an attempt thereof, under Article 250 in relation to Article 51, warrants a penalty lower by two
degrees than that prescribed for principals in a consummated homicide. Petitioners in these cases
are entitled to the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, and there being no
aggravating circumstance proved and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Sandiganbayan
has properly fixed in Criminal Case No. 16612 the range of the penalty from six (6) years and one
(1) day, but should have denominated the same as prision mayor, not prision correccional, to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal.

However, upon the finding that petitioners in Criminal Case No. 16614 had committed attempted
homicide, a modification of the penalty is in order. The penalty of attempted homicide is two (2)
degrees lower to that of a consummated homicide, which is prision correccional. Taking into account
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence to
be meted out on petitioners is within the minimum period of prision correccional, which is six (6)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, whereas the
minimum of the sentence, which under the Indeterminate Sentence Law must be within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed for the offense, which is one (1) month and one (1) day to
six (6) months of arresto mayor.

We likewise modify the award of damages in these cases, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, and order herein petitioners, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs of
Leodevince Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages and ₱50,000.00 in moral
damages. With respect to Noel Villanueva, petitioners are likewise bound to pay, jointly and
severally, the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages and ₱20,000.00 as
moral damages. The award of exemplary damages should be deleted, there being no aggravating
circumstance that attended the commission of the crimes.

WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED. The joint decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 16612, 16613 and 16614, dated June 27, 1995, are hereby AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

(a) In Criminal Case No. 16612, petitioners are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum, to twelve (12) years and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as the maximum; in Criminal Case No. 16614, the
indeterminate sentence is hereby modified to Two (2) years and four (4) months of prision
correccional, as the maximum, and Six (6) months of arresto mayor, as the minimum.

(b) Petitioners are DIRECTED to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Leodevince
Licup in the amount of ₱77,000.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 in moral damages, as
 well as Noel Villanueva, in the amount of ₱51,700.00 as actual and compensatory damages,
and ₱20,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.

[A.M. NO. RTJ-02-1673 : August 11, 2004]

EDUARDO P. DIEGO, Complainant, v. JUDGE SILVERIO Q. CASTILLO, REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT, DAGUPAN CITY, BRANCH 43, Respondent.

DECISION

AZCUNA, J.:

This is an administrative complaint against Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q.

Castillo for allegedly knowingly rendering an unjust judgment in a criminal case and/or
rendering judgment in gross ignorance of the law.

The facts and circumstances of the criminal case are summarized, as follows:

a) On January 9, 1965, accused Lucena Escoto contracted marriage with Jorge de Perio,
Jr., solemnized before then Mayor Liberato Reyna of Dagupan City. The couple were
both Filipinos. In the marriage contract, the accused used and adopted the name
Crescencia Escoto, with a civil status of single;

b) In a document dated February 15, 1978, denominated as a "Decree of Divorce" and

purportedly issued to Jorge de Perio as petitioner by the Family District Court of Harris
County, Texas (247th Judicial District), it was "ordered, adjudged and decreed, that the
bonds of matrimony heretofore existing between Jorge de Perio and Crescencia de Perio
are hereby Dissolved, Cancelled and Annulled and the Petitioner is hereby granted a
Divorce."

c) Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, the same Crescencia Escoto contracted marriage

with herein complainant's brother, Manuel P. Diego, solemnized before the Rev. Fr.
Clemente T. Godoy, parish priest of Dagupan City. The marriage contract shows that
this time, the accused used and adopted the name Lucena Escoto, again, with a civil
status of single.1

After trial of the criminal case for bigamy, respondent Judge promulgated a decision, on
February 24, 1999, the dispositive part of which stated:

WHEREFORE, for failure of the STATE to prove accused's guilt beyond whisper of doubt,
the COURT hereby orders her ACQUITTAL with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.2

The decision states that the main basis for the acquittal was good faith on the part of
the accused. Respondent Judge gave credence to the defense of the accused that she
acted without any malicious intent. The combined testimonial and documentary
evidence of the defense was aimed at convincing the court that accused Lucena Escoto
had sufficient grounds to believe that her previous marriage to Jorge de Perio had been
validly dissolved by the divorce decree and that she was legally free to contract the
second marriage with Manuel P. Diego.

In rendering the decision, respondent Judge reasoned, thus:

While it is true that in our jurisdiction the matrimonial bond between Jorge de Perio and
the accused are not yet annulled, it remains undisputed that cessation of the same was
decreed in the Family District Court of Harris County, Texas, 247th Judicial District,
effective February 15, 1978.

xxx

The CHARGE filed against the accused is categorized as Mala en se (sic) which requires
the indispensable presence of criminal intent/dolo.

The felony on BIGAMY as defined and penalized by the Revised Penal Code explicitly
mandates that it must be committed with criminal intent. In other words, there must be
an unquestionable demonstration on the part of the perpetrator that he/she criminally,
willfully and unlawfully contracted a second marriage despite knowledge that his/her
first marriage is still existing.

As borne out by the evidence adduced, the accused contracted the second marriage
after she was informed and furnished of the Divorce Decree which was granted by the
Family District Court of Harris County Texas in her favor.

As an ordinary laywoman accused being a recipient of a divorce decree, she entertains

the impression that she can contract a subsequent marriage which she did when she
married the late Manuel Diego.

To the honest evaluation of the Court the act complained of against the accused is not
patently illegal for the reason that she acted in good faith believing that her marriage
was already annulled by a foreign judgment.3

Complainant herein alleges that the decision rendered by the respondent Judge is
manifestly against the law and contrary to the evidence. He questions the evidentiary
weight and admissibility of the divorce decree as a basis for the finding of good faith. In
addition, complainant stresses that the evidence on record negates respondent Judge's
finding of good faith on the part of the accused. Thus, complainant urges this Court to
impose sanctions upon respondent Judge as, according to complainant, these acts
amount to knowingly rendering an unjust judgment and/or gross ignorance of the law.

In his comment, respondent Judge explains that what was in issue was the criminal
culpability of the accused under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Respondent
Judge does not dispute that the second marriage was bigamous because at the time it
was contracted, the first marriage was still subsisting since divorce is not recognized in
our country and because the accused's first husband was still alive. Respondent Judge,
however, maintains that what was controlling was whether by virtue of the divorce
decree the accused honestly believed, albeit mistakenly, that her first marriage had
been severed and she could marry again. According to respondent Judge, the same is a
state of mind personal to the accused. He further stressed that knowledge of the law
should not be exacted strictly from the accused since she is a lay person, and that
ineptitude should not be confused with criminal intent.

By separate manifestations, both parties agreed to submit the case for resolution based
on the pleadings.

The Disputed Decision

A careful study of the disputed decision reveals that respondent Judge had been less
than circumspect in his study of the law and jurisprudence applicable to the bigamy
case.

In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accused married Manuel P. Diego
in the honest belief that she was free to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a
mistake of fact."

This Court, in People v. Bitdu,4 carefully distinguished between a mistake of fact, which

could be a basis for the defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from a mistake of law,
which does not excuse a person, even a lay person, from liability. Bitdu held that even
if the accused, who had obtained a divorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly
believed that in contracting her second marriage she was not committing any violation
of the law, and that she had no criminal intent, the same does not justify her act. This
Court further stated therein that with respect to the contention that the accused acted
in good faith in contracting the second marriage, believing that she had been validly
divorced from her first husband, it is sufficient to say that everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of
the law does not exempt him from the consequences thereof.5

Moreover, squarely applicable to the criminal case for bigamy, is People v.

Schneckenburger, 6 where it was held that the accused who secured a foreign divorce,
and later remarried in the Philippines, in the belief that the foreign divorce was valid, is
liable for bigamy.

These findings notwithstanding, the issue before us is whether or not respondent Judge
should be held administratively liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment
and/or gross ignorance of the law.

Knowingly Rendering an Unjust Judgment

Knowingly rendering an unjust judgment is a criminal offense defined and penalized

under Article 2047 of the Revised Penal Code. For conviction to lie, it must be proved
that the judgment is unjust and that the judge knows that it is unjust. Knowingly
means consciously, intelligently, willfully or intentionally. It is firmly established in this
jurisdiction that for a judge to be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is not
supported by the evidence, and that the same was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice.8

The law requires that (a) the offender is a judge; (b) he renders a judgment in a case
submitted to him for decision; (c) the judgment is unjust; (d) he knew that said
judgment is unjust.9 This Court reiterates that in order to hold a judge liable, it must be
shown that the judgment is unjust and that it was made with conscious and deliberate
intent to do an injustice. That good faith is a defense to the charge of knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment remains the law.10

As held in Alforte v. Santos,11 even assuming that a judge erred in acquitting an

accused, she still cannot be administratively charged lacking the element of bad faith,
malice or corrupt purpose. Malice or bad faith on the part of the judge in rendering an
unjust decision must still be proved and failure on the part of the complainant to prove
the same warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint.12

There is, therefore, no basis for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment.

Gross Ignorance of the Law

Anent the charge of gross ignorance of the law, Mañozca v. Domagas,13 is instructive.

Therein respondent judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law resulting in a
manifestly unjust judgment for granting a demurrer to the evidence in a bigamy case.
The grant of the demurrer to the evidence was based on the judge's finding of good
faith on the part of the accused, anchored upon a document denominated as a
"Separation of Property with Renunciation of Rights." This Court stated that said act of
the judge exhibited ignorance of the law, and accordingly he was fined in the amount
of P5,000.

Also, in Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 14 where therein respondent judge was given a

reprimand with a stern warning of a more severe penalty should the same or similar act
be committed in the future, this Court explained:

We have heretofore ruled that a judge may not be held administratively accountable for
every erroneous order or decision he renders. To unjustifiably hold otherwise, assuming
that he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position
doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the law in the
process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. The error must be
gross or patent, malicious, deliberate or in evident bad faith. It is only in this latter
instance, when the judge acts fraudulently or with gross ignorance, that administrative
sanctions are called for as an imperative duty of this Court.

As a matter of public policy then, the acts of a judge in his official capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Good faith and
absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper considerations are sufficient defenses in
which a judge charged with ignorance of the law can find refuge. It does not mean,
however, that a judge, given the leeway he is accorded in such cases, should not evince
due care in the performance of his adjudicatory prerogatives.
Furthermore, in Wingarts v. Mejia,15 where therein respondent judge, although absolved
of any guilt for the charge of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, was still
imposed sanctions by this Court, thus:

In any event, respondent judge deserves to be appropriately penalized for his

regrettably erroneous action in connection with Criminal Case No. 2664 of his court. We
have repeatedly stressed that a municipal trial judge occupies the forefront of the
judicial arm that is closest in reach to the public he serves, and he must accordingly act
at all times with great constancy and utmost probity. Any kind of failure in the
discharge of this grave responsibility cannot be countenanced, in order to maintain the
faith of the public in the judiciary, especially on the level of courts to which most of
them resort for redress.16

Applying these precedents to the present case, the error committed by respondent
Judge being gross and patent, the same constitutes ignorance of the law of a nature
sufficient to warrant disciplinary action.

Penalty

After evaluation of the merits of the case, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
recommended that respondent Judge be reprimanded with a stern warning of a more
severe penalty in the future.

The act of respondent Judge in rendering the decision in question took place on
February 24, 1999 or before the effectivity, on October 1, 2001, of A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC which classified gross ignorance of the law as a serious charge and penalized the
offense with a fine of not less than P20,000 but not more than P40,000.

Applying the rule as then prevailing,17 and in line with applicable jurisprudence,18 the

sanction on respondent Judge should be a fine in the amount of P10,000.

WHEREFORE, Regional Trial Court Judge Silverio Q. Castillo is hereby FINED in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-5272             March 19, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
AH CHONG, defendant-appellant.

Gibb & Gale, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

The evidence as to many of the essential and vital facts in this case is limited to the testimony of the
accused himself, because from the very nature of these facts and from the circumstances
surrounding the incident upon which these proceedings rest, no other evidence as to these facts was
available either to the prosecution or to the defense. We think, however, that, giving the accused the
benefit of the doubt as to the weight of the evidence touching those details of the incident as to
which there can be said to be any doubt, the following statement of the material facts disclose by the
record may be taken to be substantially correct:

The defendant, Ah Chong, was employed as a cook at "Officers' quarters, No. 27," Fort Mc Kinley,
Rizal Province, and at the same place Pascual Gualberto, deceased, was employed as a house boy
or muchacho. "Officers' quarters No. 27" as a detached house situates some 40 meters from the
nearest building, and in August, 19087, was occupied solely as an officers' mess or club. No one
slept in the house except the two servants, who jointly occupied a small room toward the rear of the
building, the door of which opened upon a narrow porch running along the side of the building, by
which communication was had with the other part of the house. This porch was covered by a heavy
growth of vines for its entire length and height. The door of the room was not furnished with a
permanent bolt or lock, and occupants, as a measure of security, had attached a small hook or catch
on the inside of the door, and were in the habit of reinforcing this somewhat insecure means of
fastening the door by placing against it a chair. In the room there was but one small window, which,
like the door, opened on the porch. Aside from the door and window, there were no other openings
of any kind in the room.

On the night of August 14, 1908, at about 10 o'clock, the defendant, who had received for the night,
was suddenly awakened by some trying to force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and
called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no answer and was convinced by the noise at the door
that it was being pushed open by someone bent upon forcing his way into the room. Due to the
heavy growth of vines along the front of the porch, the room was very dark, and the defendant,
fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief, leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the
room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck just above the knee by the edge of the chair
which had been placed against the door. In the darkness and confusion the defendant thought that
the blow had been inflicted by the person who had forced the door open, whom he supposed to be a
burglar, though in the light of after events, it is probable that the chair was merely thrown back into
the room by the sudden opening of the door against which it rested. Seizing a common kitchen knife
which he kept under his pillow, the defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards
turned out, was his roommate, Pascual. Pascual ran out upon the porch and fell down on the steps
in a desperately wounded condition, followed by the defendant, who immediately recognized him in
the moonlight. Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers who slept in the next
house, No. 28, and ran back to his room to secure bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.

There had been several robberies in Fort McKinley not long prior to the date of the incident just
described, one of which took place in a house in which the defendant was employed as cook; and as
defendant alleges, it was because of these repeated robberies he kept a knife under his pillow for his
personal protection.

The deceased and the accused, who roomed together and who appear to have on friendly and
amicable terms prior to the fatal incident, had an understanding that when either returned at night,
he should knock at the door and acquiant his companion with his identity. Pascual had left the house
early in the evening and gone for a walk with his friends, Celestino Quiambao and Mariano Ibañez,
servants employed at officers' quarters No. 28, the nearest house to the mess hall. The three
returned from their walk at about 10 o'clock, and Celestino and Mariano stopped at their room at No.
28, Pascual going on to his room at No. 27. A few moments after the party separated, Celestino and
Mariano heard cries for assistance and upon returning to No. 27 found Pascual sitting on the back
steps fatally wounded in the stomach, whereupon one of them ran back to No. 28 and called
Liuetenants Jacobs and Healy, who immediately went to the aid of the wounded man.
The defendant then and there admitted that he had stabbed his roommate, but said that he did it
under the impression that Pascual was "a ladron" because he forced open the door of their sleeping
room, despite defendant's warnings.

No reasonable explanation of the remarkable conduct on the part of Pascuals suggests itself, unless
it be that the boy in a spirit of mischief was playing a trick on his Chinese roommate, and sought to
frightened him by forcing his way into the room, refusing to give his name or say who he was, in
order to make Ah Chong believe that he was being attacked by a robber.

Defendant was placed under arrest forthwith, and Pascual was conveyed to the military hospital,
where he died from the effects of the wound on the following day.

The defendant was charged with the crime of assassination, tried, and found guilty by the trial court
of simple homicide, with extenuating circumstances, and sentenced to six years and one
day presidio mayor, the minimum penalty prescribed by law.

At the trial in the court below the defendant admitted that he killed his roommate, Pascual Gualberto,
but insisted that he struck the fatal blow without any intent to do a wrongful act, in the exercise of his
lawful right of self-defense.

Article 8 of the Penal Code provides that —

The following are not delinquent and are therefore exempt from criminal liability:

xxx             xxx             xxx

4 He who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided there are the following attendant
circumstances:

(1) Illegal aggression.

(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Under these provisions we think that there can be no doubt that defendant would be entitle to
complete exception from criminal liability for the death of the victim of his fatal blow, if the intruder
who forced open the door of his room had been in fact a dangerous thief or "ladron," as the
defendant believed him to be. No one, under such circumstances, would doubt the right of the
defendant to resist and repel such an intrusion, and the thief having forced open the door
notwithstanding defendant's thrice-repeated warning to desist, and his threat that he would kill the
intruder if he persisted in his attempt, it will not be questioned that in the darkness of the night, in a
small room, with no means of escape, with the thief advancing upon him despite his warnings
defendant would have been wholly justified in using any available weapon to defend himself from
such an assault, and in striking promptly, without waiting for the thief to discover his whereabouts
and deliver the first blow.

But the evidence clearly discloses that the intruder was not a thief or a "ladron." That neither the
defendant nor his property nor any of the property under his charge was in real danger at the time
when he struck the fatal blow. That there was no such "unlawful aggression" on the part of a thief or
"ladron" as defendant believed he was repelling and resisting, and that there was no real "necessity"
for the use of the knife to defend his person or his property or the property under his charge.

The question then squarely presents it self, whether in this jurisdiction one can be held criminally
responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the
crime of homicide or assassination if the actor had known the true state of the facts at the time when
he committed the act. To this question we think there can be but one answer, and we hold that under
such circumstances there is no criminal liability, provided always that the alleged ignorance or
mistake or fact was not due to negligence or bad faith.

In broader terms, ignorance or mistake of fact, if such ignorance or mistake of fact is sufficient to
negative a particular intent which under the law is a necessary ingredient of the offense charged
(e.g., in larcerny, animus furendi; in murder, malice; in crimes intent) "cancels the presumption of
intent," and works an acquittal; except in those cases where the circumstances demand a conviction
under the penal provisions touching criminal negligence; and in cases where, under the provisions of
article 1 of the Penal Code one voluntarily committing a crime or misdeamor incurs criminal liability
for any wrongful act committed by him, even though it be different from that which he intended to
commit. (Wharton's Criminal Law, sec. 87 and cases cited; McClain's Crim. Law, sec. 133 and cases
cited; Pettit vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 240; Commonwealth vs. Power, 7 Met., 596; Yates vs. People, 32
N.Y., 509; Isham vs. State, 38 Ala., 213; Commonwealth vs. Rogers, 7 Met., 500.)

The general proposition thus stated hardly admits of discussion, and the only question worthy of
consideration is whether malice or criminal intent is an essential element or ingredient of the crimes
of homicide and assassination as defined and penalized in the Penal Code. It has been said that
since the definitions there given of these as well as most other crimes and offense therein defined,
do not specifically and expressly declare that the acts constituting the crime or offense must be
committed with malice or with criminal intent in order that the actor may be held criminally liable, the
commission of the acts set out in the various definitions subjects the actor to the penalties described
therein, unless it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express
provisions of article 8 of the code, which treats of exemption. But while it is true that contrary to the
general rule of legislative enactment in the United States, the definitions of crimes and offenses as
set out in the Penal Code rarely contain provisions expressly declaring that malice or criminal intent
is an essential ingredient of the crime, nevertheless, the general provisions of article 1 of the code
clearly indicate that malice, or criminal intent in some form, is an essential requisite of all crimes and
offense therein defined, in the absence of express provisions modifying the general rule, such as are
those touching liability resulting from acts negligently or imprudently committed, and acts done by
one voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor, where the act committed is different from that
which he intended to commit. And it is to be observed that even these exceptions are more apparent
than real, for "There is little distinction, except in degree, between a will to do a wrongful thing and
indifference whether it is done or not. Therefore carelessness is criminal, and within limits supplies
the place of the affirmative criminal intent" (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, s. 313); and, again,
"There is so little difference between a disposition to do a great harm and a disposition to do harm
that one of them may very well be looked upon as the measure of the other. Since, therefore, the
guilt of a crime consists in the disposition to do harm, which the criminal shows by committing it, and
since this disposition is greater or less in proportion to the harm which is done by the crime, the
consequence is that the guilt of the crime follows the same proportion; it is greater or less according
as the crime in its own nature does greater or less harm" (Ruth. Ints. C. 18, p. 11); or, as it has been
otherwise stated, the thing done, having proceeded from a corrupt mid, is to be viewed the same
whether the corruption was of one particular form or another.

Article 1 of the Penal Code is as follows:

 Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.

Acts and omissions punished by law are always presumed to be voluntarily unless the
contrary shall appear.

An person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even
though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.

The celebrated Spanish jurist Pacheco, discussing the meaning of the word "voluntary" as used in
this article, say that a voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act, and roundly asserts that
without intention (intention to do wrong or criminal intention) there can be no crime; and that the
word "voluntary" implies and includes the words "con malicia," which were expressly set out in the
definition of the word "crime" in the code of 1822, but omitted from the code of 1870, because, as
Pacheco insists, their use in the former code was redundant, being implied and included in the word
"voluntary." (Pacheco, Codigo Penal, vol. 1, p. 74.)

Viada, while insisting that the absence of intention to commit the crime can only be said to exempt
from criminal responsibility when the act which was actually intended to be done was in itself a lawful
one, and in the absence of negligence or imprudence, nevertheless admits and recognizes in his
discussion of the provisions of this article of the code that in general without intention there can be
no crime. (Viada, vol. 1, p. 16.) And, as we have shown above, the exceptions insisted upon by
Viada are more apparent than real.

Silvela, in discussing the doctrine herein laid down, says:

In fact, it is sufficient to remember the first article, which declared that where there is no
intention there is no crime . . . in order to affirm, without fear of mistake, that under our code
there can be no crime if there is no act, an act which must fall within the sphere of ethics if
there is no moral injury. (Vol. 2, the Criminal Law, folio 169.)

And to the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, as, for example in its
sentence of May 31, 1882, in which it made use of the following language:

It is necessary that this act, in order to constitute a crime, involve all the malice which is
supposed from the operation of the will and an intent to cause the injury which may be the
object of the crime.

And again in its sentence of March 16, 1892, wherein it held that "considering that, whatever may be
the civil effects of the inscription of his three sons, made by the appellant in the civil registry and in
the parochial church, there can be no crime because of the lack of the necessary element or criminal
intention, which characterizes every action or ommission punished by law; nor is he guilty of criminal
negligence."

And to the same effect in its sentence of December 30, 1896, it made use of the following language:

. . . Considering that the moral element of the crime, that is, intent or malice or their absence
in the commission of an act defined and punished by law as criminal, is not a necessary
question of fact submitted to the exclusive judgment and decision of the trial court.
That the author of the Penal Code deemed criminal intent or malice to be an essential element of the
various crimes and misdemeanors therein defined becomes clear also from an examination of the
provisions of article 568, which are as follows:

He who shall execute through reckless negligence an act that, if done with malice, would
constitute a grave crime, shall be punished with the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
degree, to prision correccional in its minimum degrees if it shall constitute a less grave
crime.

He who in violation of the regulations shall commit a crime through simple imprudence or
negligence shall incur the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum degrees.

In the application of these penalties the courts shall proceed according to their discretion,
without being subject to the rules prescribed in article 81.

The provisions of this article shall not be applicable if the penalty prescribed for the crime is
equal to or less than those contained in the first paragraph thereof, in which case the courts
shall apply the next one thereto in the degree which they may consider proper.

The word "malice" in this article is manifestly substantially equivalent to the words "criminal intent,"
and the direct inference from its provisions is that the commission of the acts contemplated therein,
in the absence of malice (criminal intent), negligence, and imprudence, does not impose any criminal
liability on the actor.

The word "voluntary" as used in article 1 of the Penal Code would seem to approximate in meaning
the word "willful" as used in English and American statute to designate a form of criminal intent. It
has been said that while the word "willful" sometimes means little more than intentionally or
designedly, yet it is more frequently understood to extent a little further and approximate the idea of
the milder kind of legal malice; that is, it signifies an evil intent without justifiable excuse. In one case
it was said to mean, as employed in a statute in contemplation, "wantonly" or "causelessly;" in
another, "without reasonable grounds to believe the thing lawful." And Shaw, C. J., once said that
ordinarily in a statute it means "not merely `voluntarily' but with a bad purpose; in other words,
corruptly." In English and the American statutes defining crimes "malice," "malicious," "maliciously,"
and "malice aforethought" are words indicating intent, more purely technical than "willful" or willfully,"
but "the difference between them is not great;" the word "malice" not often being understood to
require general malevolence toward a particular individual, and signifying rather the intent from our
legal justification. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs. 428 and 429, and cases cited.)

But even in the absence of express words in a statute, setting out a condition in the definition of a
crime that it be committed "voluntarily," willfully," "maliciously" "with malice aforethought," or in one of
the various modes generally construed to imply a criminal intent, we think that reasoning from
general principles it will always be found that with the rare exceptions hereinafter mentioned, to
constitute a crime evil intent must combine with an act. Mr. Bishop, who supports his position with
numerous citations from the decided cases, thus forcely present this doctrine:

In no one thing does criminal jurisprudence differ more from civil than in the rule as to the
intent. In controversies between private parties the quo animo with which a thing was done is
sometimes important, not always; but crime proceeds only from a criminal mind. So that —

There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sentence of wickedness, without which it can not be. And neither in philosophical
speculation nor in religious or mortal sentiment would any people in any age allow that a
 man should be deemed guilty unless his mind was so. It is therefore a principle of our legal
system, as probably it is of every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent,
without which it can not exists. We find this doctrine confirmed by —

Legal maxims. — The ancient wisdom of the law, equally with the modern, is distinct on this
subject. It consequently has supplied to us such maxims as Actus non facit reum nisi mens
sit rea, "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his intention were so;" Actus me incito
factus non est meus actus, "an act done by me against my will is not my act;" and others of
the like sort. In this, as just said, criminal jurisprudence differs from civil. So also —

Moral science and moral sentiment teach the same thing. "By reference to the intention, we
inculpate or exculpate others or ourselves without any respect to the happiness or misery
actually produced. Let the result of an action be what it may, we hold a man guilty simply on
the ground of intention; or, on the dame ground, we hold him innocent." The calm judgment
of mankind keeps this doctrine among its jewels. In times of excitement, when vengeance
takes the place of justice, every guard around the innocent is cast down. But with the return
of reason comes the public voice that where the mind is pure, he who differs in act from his
neighbors does not offend. And —

In the spontaneous judgment which springs from the nature given by God to man, no one
deems another to deserve punishment for what he did from an upright mind, destitute of
every form of evil. And whenever a person is made to suffer a punishment which the
community deems not his due, so far from its placing an evil mark upon him, it elevates him
to the seat of the martyr. Even infancy itself spontaneously pleads the want of bad intent in
justification of what has the appearance of wrong, with the utmost confidence that the plea, if
its truth is credited, will be accepted as good. Now these facts are only the voice of nature
uttering one of her immutable truths. It is, then, the doctrine of the law, superior to all other
doctrines, because first in nature from which the law itself proceeds, that no man is to be
punished as a criminal unless his intent is wrong. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, vol. 1, secs.
286 to 290.)

Compelled by necessity, "the great master of all things," an apparent departure from this doctrine of
abstract justice result from the adoption of the arbitrary rule that Ignorantia juris non
excusat ("Ignorance of the law excuses no man"), without which justice could not be administered in
our tribunals; and compelled also by the same doctrine of necessity, the courts have recognized the
power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the doing of certain acts, and to make
their commission criminal without regard to the intent of the doer. Without discussing these
exceptional cases at length, it is sufficient here to say that the courts have always held that unless
the intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to the
intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed (cases cited in
Cyc., vol. 12, p. 158, notes 76 and 77); and the rule that ignorance of the law excuses no man has
been said not to be a real departure from the law's fundamental principle that crime exists only
where the mind is at fault, because "the evil purpose need not be to break the law, and if suffices if it
is simply to do the thing which the law in fact forbids." (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 300, and
cases cited.)

But, however this may be, there is no technical rule, and no pressing necessity therefore, requiring
mistake in fact to be dealt with otherwise that in strict accord with the principles of abstract justice.
On the contrary, the maxim here is Ignorantia facti excusat ("Ignorance or mistake in point of fact is,
in all cases of supposed offense, a sufficient excuse"). (Brown's Leg. Max., 2d ed., 190.)
Since evil intent is in general an inseparable element in every crime, any such mistake of fact as
shows the act committed to have proceeded from no sort of evil in the mind necessarily relieves the
actor from criminal liability provided always there is no fault or negligence on his part; and as laid
down by Baron Parke, "The guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear
to him." (Reg. vs. Thurborn, 1 Den. C., 387; P. vs. Anderson, 44 Cal.., 65; P. vs. Lamb, 54 Barb.,
342; Yates vs. P., 32 N. Y., 509; Patterson vs. P., 46 Barb., 625; Reg. vs. Cohen, 8 Cox C. C., 41;
P. vs. Miles, 55 Cal., 207, 209; Nalley vs. S., 28 Tex. Ap., 387.) That is to say, the question as to
whether he honestly, in good faith, and without fault or negligence fell into the mistake is to be
determined by the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time when the mistake was made,
and the effect which the surrounding circumstances might reasonably be expected to have on his
mind, in forming the intent, criminal or other wise, upon which he acted.

If, in language not uncommon in the cases, one has reasonable cause to believe the
existence of facts which will justify a killing — or, in terms more nicely in accord with the
principles on which the rule is founded, if without fault or carelessness he does believe them
— he is legally guiltless of the homicide; though he mistook the facts, and so the life of an
innocent person is unfortunately extinguished. In other words, and with reference to the right
of self-defense and the not quite harmonious authorities, it is the doctrine of reason and
sufficiently sustained in adjudication, that notwithstanding some decisions apparently
adverse, whenever a man undertakes self-defense, he is justified in acting on the facts as
they appear to him. If, without fault or carelessness, he is misled concerning them, and
defends himself correctly according to what he thus supposes the facts to be the law will not
punish him though they are in truth otherwise, and he was really no occassion for the
extreme measures. (Bishop's New Criminal Law, sec. 305, and large array of cases there
cited.)

The common illustration in the American and English textbooks of the application of this rule is the
case where a man, masked and disguised as a footpad, at night and on a lonely road, "holds up" his
friends in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled pistol demands his money or his life, but is killed by
his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack is a real one, that the pistol leveled at his head is
loaded, and that his life and property are in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor. No one
will doubt that if the facts were such as the slayer believed them to be he would be innocent of the
commission of any crime and wholly exempt from criminal liability, although if he knew the real state
of the facts when he took the life of his friend he would undoubtedly be guilty of the crime of
homicide or assassination. Under such circumstances, proof of his innocent mistake of the facts
overcomes the presumption of malice or criminal intent, and (since malice or criminal intent is a
necessary ingredient of the "act punished by law" in cases of homicide or assassination) overcomes
at the same time the presumption established in article 1 of the code, that the "act punished by law"
was committed "voluntarily."

Parson, C.J., in the Massachusetts court, once said:

If the party killing had reasonable grounds for believing that the person slain had a felonious
design against him, and under that supposition killed him, although it should afterwards
appear that there was no such design, it will not be murder, but it will be either manslaughter
or excusable homicide, according to the degree of caution used and the probable grounds of
such belief. (Charge to the grand jury in Selfridge's case, Whart, Hom., 417, 418, Lloyd's
report of the case, p.7.)

In this case, Parker, J., charging the petit jury, enforced the doctrine as follows:
 A, in the peaceable pursuit of his affairs, sees B rushing rapidly toward him, with an
outstretched arms and a pistol in his hand, and using violent menaces against his life as he
advances. Having approached near enough in the same attitude, A, who has a club in his
hand, strikes B over the head before or at the instant the pistol is discharged; and of the
wound B dies. It turns out the pistol was loaded with powder only, and that the real design of
B was only to terrify A. Will any reasonable man say that A is more criminal that he would
have been if there had been a bullet in the pistol? Those who hold such doctrine must
require that a man so attacked must, before he strikes the assailant, stop and ascertain how
the pistol is loaded — a doctrine which would entirely take away the essential right of self-
defense. And when it is considered that the jury who try the cause, and not the party killing,
are to judge of the reasonable grounds of his apprehension, no danger can be supposed to
flow from this principle. (Lloyd's Rep., p. 160.)

To the same effect are various decisions of the supreme court of Spain, cited by Viada, a few of
which are here set out in full because the facts are somewhat analogous to those in the case at bar.

QUESTION III. When it is shown that the accused was sitting at his hearth, at night, in
company only of his wife, without other light than reflected from the fire, and that the man
with his back to the door was attending to the fire, there suddenly entered a person whom he
did not see or know, who struck him one or two blows, producing a contusion on the
shoulder, because of which he turned, seized the person and took from his the stick with
which he had undoubtedly been struck, and gave the unknown person a blow, knocking him
to the floor, and afterwards striking him another blow on the head, leaving the unknown lying
on the floor, and left the house. It turned out the unknown person was his father-in-law, to
whom he rendered assistance as soon as he learned his identity, and who died in about six
days in consequence of cerebral congestion resulting from the blow. The accused, who
confessed the facts, had always sustained pleasant relations with his father-in-law, whom he
visited during his sickness, demonstrating great grief over the occurrence. Shall he be
considered free from criminal responsibility, as having acted in self-defense, with all the
circumstances related in paragraph 4, article 8, of the Penal Code? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Valladolid found that he was an illegal aggressor, without sufficient
provocation, and that there did not exists rational necessity for the employment of the force
used, and in accordance with articles 419 and 87 of the Penal Code condemned him to
twenty months of imprisonment, with accessory penalty and costs. Upon appeal by the
accused, he was acquitted by the supreme court, under the following sentence:
"Considering, from the facts found by the sentence to have been proven, that the accused
was surprised from behind, at night, in his house beside his wife who was nursing her child,
was attacked, struck, and beaten, without being able to distinguish with which they might
have executed their criminal intent, because of the there was no other than fire light in the
room, and considering that in such a situation and when the acts executed demonstrated
that they might endanger his existence, and possibly that of his wife and child, more
especially because his assailant was unknown, he should have defended himself, and in
doing so with the same stick with which he was attacked, he did not exceed the limits of self-
defense, nor did he use means which were not rationally necessary, particularly because the
instrument with which he killed was the one which he took from his assailant, and was
capable of producing death, and in the darkness of the house and the consteration which
naturally resulted from such strong aggression, it was not given him to known or distinguish
whether there was one or more assailants, nor the arms which they might bear, not that
which they might accomplish, and considering that the lower court did not find from the
accepted facts that there existed rational necessity for the means employed, and that it did
not apply paragraph 4 of article 8 of the Penal Code, it erred, etc." (Sentence of supreme
court of Spain, February 28, 1876.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 266.) .
 QUESTION XIX. A person returning, at night, to his house, which was situated in a retired
part of the city, upon arriving at a point where there was no light, heard the voice of a man, at
a distance of some 8 paces, saying: "Face down, hand over you money!" because of which,
and almost at the same money, he fired two shots from his pistol, distinguishing immediately
the voice of one of his friends (who had before simulated a different voice) saying, "Oh! they
have killed me," and hastening to his assistance, finding the body lying upon the ground, he
cried, "Miguel, Miguel, speak, for God's sake, or I am ruined," realizing that he had been the
victim of a joke, and not receiving a reply, and observing that his friend was a corpse, he
retired from the place. Shall he be declared exempt in toto from responsibility as the author
of this homicide, as having acted in just self-defense under the circumstances defined in
paragraph 4, article 8, Penal Code? The criminal branch of the Audiencia of Malaga did not
so find, but only found in favor of the accused two of the requisites of said article, but not that
of the reasonableness of the means employed to repel the attack, and, therefore,
condemned the accused to eight years and one day of prison mayor, etc. The supreme court
acquitted the accused on his appeal from this sentence, holding that the accused was acting
under a justifiable and excusable mistake of fact as to the identity of the person calling to
him, and that under the circumstances, the darkness and remoteness, etc., the means
employed were rational and the shooting justifiable. (Sentence supreme court, March 17,
1885.) (Viada, Vol. I, p. 136.)

QUESTION VI. The owner of a mill, situated in a remote spot, is awakened, at night, by a
large stone thrown against his window — at this, he puts his head out of the window and
inquires what is wanted, and is answered "the delivery of all of his money, otherwise his
house would be burned" — because of which, and observing in an alley adjacent to the mill
four individuals, one of whom addressed him with blasphemy, he fired his pistol at one the
men, who, on the next morning was found dead on the same spot. Shall this man be
declared exempt from criminal responsibility as having acted in just self-defense with all of
the requisites of law? The criminal branch of the requisites of law? The criminal branch of
the Audiencia of Zaragoza finds that there existed in favor of the accused a majority of the
requisites to exempt him from criminal responsibility, but not that of reasonable necessity for
the means, employed, and condemned the accused to twelve months of prision
correctional for the homicide committed. Upon appeal, the supreme court acquitted the
condemned, finding that the accused, in firing at the malefactors, who attack his mill at night
in a remote spot by threatening robbery and incendiarism, was acting in just self-defense of
his person, property, and family. (Sentence of May 23, 1877). (I Viada, p. 128.)

A careful examination of the facts as disclosed in the case at bar convinces us that the defendant
Chinaman struck the fatal blow alleged in the information in the firm belief that the intruder who
forced open the door of his sleeping room was a thief, from whose assault he was in imminent peril,
both of his life and of his property and of the property committed to his charge; that in view of all the
circumstances, as they must have presented themselves to the defendant at the time, he acted in
good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that he was doing no more than exercising
his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as he believed them to be he would have
been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his act; and that he can not be said to have
been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the
facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend himself from the imminent danger which he believe
threatened his person and his property and the property under his charge.

The judgment of conviction and the sentence imposed by the trial court should be reversed, and the
defendant acquitted of the crime with which he is charged and his bail bond exonerated, with the
costs of both instance de oficio. So ordered.
Johnson Moreland and Elliott, JJ., concur.
Arellano, C.J., and Mapa, J., dissent.

Separate Opinions

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The writer, with due respect to the opinion of the majority of the court, believes that, according to the
merits of the case, the crime of homicide by reckless negligence, defined and punishes in article 568
of the Penal Code, was committed, inasmuch as the victim was wilfully (voluntariomente) killed, and
while the act was done without malice or criminal intent it was, however, executed with real
negligence, for the acts committed by the deceased could not warrant the aggression by the
defendant under the erroneous belief on the part of the accused that the person who assaulted him
was a malefactor; the defendant therefore incurred responsibility in attacking with a knife the person
who was accustomed to enter said room, without any justifiable motive.

By reason of the nature of the crime committed, in the opinion of the undersigned the accused
should be sentenced to the penalty of one year and one month of prision correctional, to suffer the
accessory penalties provided in article 61, and to pay an indemnify of P1,000 to the heirs of the
deceased, with the costs of both instances, thereby reversing the judgment appealed from.

G.R. No. 209464               July 1, 2015

DANDY L. DUNGO and GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The fraternal contract should not be signed in blood, celebrated with pain, marred by injuries, and
perpetrated through suffering. That is the essence of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8049 or the Anti-
Hazing Law of 1995.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the April 26, 2013
Decision  and the October 8, 2013 Resolution  of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
1 2

05046, which affirmed the February 23, 2011 Decision  of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
3

Calamba City (RTC). The RTC found petitioners Dandy L. Dungo (Dungo) and Gregorio A. Sibal, Jr.
(Sibal), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049, and
sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Facts

On February 1, 2006, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba, Laguna, filed the
Information  against the petitioners before the R TC, the accusatory portion of which reads: That on
4

or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba ,City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, during an initiation rite and being then members of Alpha Phi Omega fraternity and
present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and officers, whose identity is
not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal
violence upon one M4-RLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof and as condition for his
admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting to his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, upon motion, the RTC admitted the Amended Information  which reads:
5

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
name accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting
to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 7, 2006, Dungo filed a motion to quash for lack of probable cause,  but it was denied by
6

the trial court because the ground cited therein was not provided by law and jurisprudence. When
arraigned, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.  Thereafter, trial ensued.
7

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented twenty (20) witnesses to prove the crime charged. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:

At around 3:20 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, the victim Marlon Villanueva (Villanueva)
was brought to the emergency room of Dr. Jose P. Rizal District Hospital (JP Rizal Hospital). Dr.
Ramon Masilungan (Dr. Masilungan), who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Villanueva was motionless, not breathing and had no heartbeat. Dr. Masilungan tried
to revive Villlanueva for about 15 to 30 minutes. Villanueva, however, did not respond to the
resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the
left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and legs. He further attested that
Villanueva 's face was cyanotic, meaning that blood was no longer running through his body due to
lack of oxygen; and when he pulled down Villanueva's pants, he saw large contusions on both legs,
which extended from the upper portion of the thighs, down to the couplexial portion, or back of the
knees.

Dr. Masilungan disclosed that two (2) men brought Villanueva to the hospital. The two told him that
they found Villanueva lying motionless on the ground at a store in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City, and
brought him to the hospital. When he asked them where they came from, one of them answered that
they came from Los Baños, Laguna, en route to San Pablo City. He questioned them on how they
found Villanueva, when the latter was in Brgy. Pansol, Calamba City. One of the men just said that
they were headed somewhere else.

Dr. Masilungan reduced his findings in a medico-legal report.  Due to the nature, extent and location
8

of the injuries, he opined that Villanueva was a victim of hazing. He was familiar with hazing injuries
because he had undergone hazing himself when he was a student, and also because of his
experience in treating victims of hazing incidents.
Dr. Roy Camarillo (Dr. Camarillo), Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory (PNP-CL) in Region IV, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he
performed an autopsy on the body of Villanueva on January 14, 2006 and placed down his findings
in an autopsy report.  Upon examination of the body, he found various external injuries in the head,
9

trunk and extremities. There were thirty-three (33) external injuries, with various severity and nature.
He concluded that the cause of death was subdural hemorrhage due to head injury contusion-
hematoma. Based on multiple injuries and contusions on the body, and his previous examinations of
hazing injuries, Dr. Camarillo opined that these injuries were hazing-related. During the autopsy, he
retrieved two (2) matchsticks from the cadaver with the marking of Alpha Phi Omega (APO)
Fraternity.
10

Susan Ignacio (Ignacio) was the owner of the sari-sari store located at Purok 5, Pansol, Calamba
City, in front of Villa Novaliches Resort, which was barely ten steps away. On January 13, 2006, at
around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, she was tending her store when she saw a jeepney with
more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the resort. Ignacio identified Dungo as the person seated
beside the driver of the jeepney.  She estimated the ages of these persons in the group to be
11

between 20 to 30 years old. They were in civilian clothes, while the other men wore white long-
sleeved shirts. Before entering the resort, the men and women shook hands and embraced each
other. Three (3) persons, riding on a single motorcycle, also arrived at the resort.

Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace of the resort who looked like they
were praying, and then the lights of the resort were turned off. Later that evening, at least three (3) of
these persons went to her store to buy some items. During her testimony, she was shown
photographs and she identified Christopher Braseros and Sibal as two of those who went to her
store.  It was only on the morning of January 14, 2006 that she learned from the policemen visiting
12

the resort that the deceased person was Villanueva.

Donato Magat (Magat), a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that at
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at the comer
of Villa Novaliches Resort. A man approached him and told him that someone inside the resort
needed a ride. Magat went to the resort and asked the two (2) men at the gate who needed a ride.
Afterwards, he saw three (3) men in their 20's carrying another man, who looked very weak, like a
vegetable, towards his tricycle. Magat touched the body of the man being carried and sensed it was
cold.

Magat asked the men what happened to their companion. They replied that he had too much to
drink. Then they instructed Magat to go to the nearest hospital. He drove the tricycle to JP Rizal
Hospital. Upon their arrival, two of his passengers brought their unconscious companion inside the
emergency room, while their other companion paid the tricycle fare. Magat then left to go home.
Several days after, he learned that the person brought to the hospital had died.

Abelardo Natividad (Natividad) and Seferino Espina y Jabay (Espina) were the security guards on
duty at JP Rizal Hospital, from 11 :00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006 until 7:00 o'clock in
the morning of January 14, 2006. In the early morning of January 14, 2006, two men, who signed on
the logbook  under the names Brandon Gonzales and Jerico Paril, brought the lifeless body of a
13

person. Pursuant to the standard operating procedure of the hospital, the security guards did not
allow the two men to leave the hospital because they called the police station .so that an
investigation could be conducted. Two policemen arrived later at the hospital. During his testimony,
Natividad identified Sibal and Dupgo as the two persons who brought Villanueva to the hospital.

PO2 Alaindelon Ignacio (P02 Ignacio). testified that on January 14, 2006 at around 3:30 o'clock in
the early morning, Natividad called up the PNP Calamba City Station to report that a lifeless body of
a man was brought to JP Rizal Hospital. When P02 Ignacio arrived, he saw Villanueva' s corpse with
contusions and bite marks all over his body. P02 Ignacio and his policemen companions then
brought Dungo and Sibal to the police station. He asked them about what happened, but they
invoked their right to remain silent. The policemen then proceeded to Brgy. Pansol at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning. After finding Villa Novaliches Resort, they knocked on the door and the
caretaker, Maricel Capillan (Capillan), opened it.

The police asked Capillan if there were University of the Philippines Los Baños (UP Los Baños)
students who rented the resort on the evening of January 13, 2006. Capillan said yes and added that
about twenty (20) persons arrived onboard a jeepney and told her that they would be renting the
resort from 9:30 o'clock in the evening up to 7:00 o'clock the following morning.

Gay Czarina Sunga (Sunga) was a food technology student at UP Los Baños during the academic
year of 2005-2006 and a member of the Symbiosis UPLB Biological Society. Around 3:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of January 13, 2006, she was at their organization's tambayan in the UPLB Biological
Sciences Building, when she noticed three (3) men seated two meters away from her. She identified
the two of the three men as Sibal and Dungo.  They were wearing black shirts with the logo of APO.
14

Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men arrived and, with their heads bowed,
approached the three men. One of them was Villanueva, who was carrying a 5-gallon water
container. Dungo then stood up and asked Villanueva why the latter did not report to him when he
was just at their tambayan. Dungo then punched Villanueva twice, but the latter just kept quiet with
his head bowed. Fifteen minutes later, all the men left.

Joey Atienza (Atienza) had been a good friend of Villanueva since 2004. They were roommates at
the UP Los Baños Men's Dormitory and housemates at the DPS Apartment in Umali Subdivision,
Los Baños, Laguna. According to Atienza, on January 9, 2006, Villanueva introduced him to Daryl
Decena (Decena) as his APO - Theta Chapter batchmate, who was also to undergo final initiation
rites on January 13, 2006.

Severino Cuevas, Director of the Students Affairs at UP Los Baños, testified that Dungo and Sibal
were both members of the APO Fraternity, and that there was no record of any request for initiation
or hazing activity filed by the said fraternity.

McArthur Padua of the Office of the Registrar, UP Los Baños, testified that Villanueva was a B.S.
Agricultural Economics student at the UP Los Baños,  as evidenced by his official transcript of
15

record.16

Atty. Eleno Peralta and Dina S. Carlos, officers of the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of the UP
Los Baños, testified that an administrative disciplinary case was filed on March 31, 2006 against the
APO Fraternity regarding the death of Villanueva. They confirmed that Capilla of Villa Novaliches
Resort and Irene Tan (Tan) of APO Sorority Theta Chapter appeared as witnesses for the
complainant. 17

Roman Miguel De Jesus, UP - Office of the Legal Aid (UP-OLA) supervising student, testified that he
met Tan of the APO Sorority sometime between July and August 2006 in UP Diliman: to convince
her to testify in the criminal case. Tan, however, refused because she feared for her safety. She said
that after testifying in the SDT hearing, her place in Imus, Cavite was padlocked and vandalized.

Evelyn Villanueva, mother of victim Villanueva, testified that, as a result of the death of her son, her
family incurred actual damages consisting of medical, burial and funeral expenses in the aggregate
amount of ₱140,000.00 which were evidenced by receipts.  Her husband also incurred travel
18

expenses in the amount of ₱7,000.00 in returning to the Philippines to attend his son's wake and
burial, as supported by a plane ticket.  She further attested that she experienced mental anguish,
19

sleepless nights, substantial weight loss, and strained family relationship as a result of her son's
death.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented seven (7) witnesses to prove the innocence of the petitioners. Their
testimonies are summarized as follow:

Richard Cornelio (Cornelio), an APO Fraternity member, testified that on January 13, 2006, around
4:00 to 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, he met Dungo at the UP Los Baños Graduate School. Dungo
asked him if he would attend the initiation ceremony, and Cornelio answered in the negative
because he had other things to do. At 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Cornelio again
met Dungo and his girlfriend while eating a hamburger at the Burger Machine along Raymundo
Street, Umali Subdivision, Los Baños, Laguna (Raymundo Street). He asked Dungo if he would
attend the initiation ceremony. Dungo replied that he would not because he and his girlfriend had
something to do.

Ana Danife Rivera (Rivera), the girlfriend of Dungo, testified that on January 13, 2006 at around 1 :
00 o'clock in the afternoon, Dungo came and visited her at her boarding house on Raymundo Street.
Around 4:00 o'clock of the same afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and
saw Cornelio. Afterwards, they went back to her boarding house and stayed there from 5:00 o'clock
in the afternoon to 7:00 o'clock in the evening. Then, they went to Lacxo Restaurant for dinner and
left at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On their way back to her boarding house, they
encountered Cornelio again at the Burger Machine. Dungo then stayed and slept at her boarding
house. Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, they were roused from their
sleep by a phone call from Sibal, asking Dungo to go to a resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo
then left the boarding house.

Dungo testified that around 1:00 o'clock in the early afternoon of January 13, 2006, he arrived at the
boarding house of his girlfriend, Rivera, on Raymundo Street. At around 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, they went to the UP Los Baños Graduate School and inquired about the requirements for
a master's degree. They walked back to the boarding house and met Cornelio. They talked about
their fraternity's ,final initiation ceremony for that night in Pansol, Calamba City. Dungo and Rivera
then reached the latter's boarding house around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. At around 7:00 o'clock
in the evening, they went out for dinner at the Lacxo Restaurant, near Crossing Junction, Los Baños.
They ate and stayed at the restaurant for at least one and a half hours. Then they walked back to the
boarding house of Rivera and, along the way, they met Cornelio again at the Burger Machine along
Raymundo Street. Cornelio asked Dungo if he would attend their fraternity's final initiation ceremony,
to which he replied in the negative. Dungo and Rivera reached the boarding house around 9:00
o'clock in the evening and they slept there.

Around 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of January 14, 2006, Dungo was roused from his sleep
because Sibal was palling him on his cellphone. Sibal asked for his help, requesting him to go to
Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Upon Dungo 's arrival at the resort, Sibal led him
inside. There, he saw Rudolfo Castillo (Castillo), a fellow APO fraternity brother, and Villanueva, who
was unconscious. Dungo told them that they should bring Villanueva to the hospital. They all agreed,
and Castillo called a tricycle that brought them to JP Rizal Hospital. He identified himself before the
security guard as Jerico Paril because he was scared to tell his real name.

Gilbert Gopez (Gopez) testified that he was the Grand Chancellor of the APO -Theta Chapter for
years 2005-2006. At around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 13, 2006, he was at the
tambayan of their fraternity in UP Los Baños because their neophytes would be initiated that night.
Around 8:30 o'clock in the evening, they met their fraternity brothers in Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños.
He noticed that their neophyte, Villanueva, was with Castillo and that there was a bruise on the left
side of his face. Then they boarded a jeepney and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol,
Calamba City. There, Gopez instructed Sibal to take Villanueva to the second floor of the resort. He
confronted Castillo as to what happened to Villanueva. Around 11:00 or 11:30 o'clock in the evening,
Gopez decided to cancel the final rites. He told Sibal to stay at the resort and accompany Villanueva
and Castillo. Together with the other neophytes, Gopez left the resort and went back to UP Los
Baños.

Sibal testified that he was a DOST Scholar at the UP Los Baños from 2002 to 2006, taking up B.S.
Agricultural Chemistry. He was a Brother Actuary of the APO - Theta Chapter, and was in charge of
fraternity activities, such as tree planting, free medical and dental missions, and blood donations. On
January 13, 2006, at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the fraternity's tambayan for the
final initiation rites of their neophytes. After preparing the food for the initiation rites, Sibal, together
with some neophytes, went to Bagong Kalsada, Los Baños, where he saw fellow fraternity brother
Castillo with their neophyte Villanueva, who had a bruised face. Thereafter, they boarded a jeepney
and proceeded to Villa Novaliches Resort in Pansol, Calamba City. Once inside the resort, he
accompanied Villanueva upstairs for the latter to take a rest. A few minutes later, he went down and
confronted Castillo about the bruises on Villanueva's face. He was angry and irritated with Castillo.
He then stayed outside the resort until Gopez and the other neophytes came out and told him that
the final initiation rite was cancelled, and that they were returning to UP Los Baños. Sibal wanted to
go with them but ;he was ordered to stay with Villanueva and Castillo.

After the group of Gopez left, Sibal checked on the condition of Villanueva, who was sleeping on the
second; floor of the resort. Then he went outside for one hour, or until 1 :00 o 'dock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006. Sibal entered the resort again and saw Villanueva, who looked
unconscious, seated in one of the benc6es on the ground floor. Sibal inquired about Villanueva's
condition but he was ignored by Castillo. He then called Dungo for help. After Dungo arrived at the
resort, they hailed a tricycle and brought Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital. There, he gave a false
name to the security guard as he heard that Dungo had done the same.

The RTC Ruling

On February 23, 2011, the RTC found Dungo and Sibal guilty of the crime of violating Section 4 of
the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The trial court
stated that the prosecution established the presence of Dungo and Sibal (1) at the UP Los Banos
Campus on January 13, 2006 around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, by the testimony of Sunga and
(2) at the Villa Novaliches Resort around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day by the
testimony of Ignacio. With the extensive testimonies of Dr. Masilungan and Dr. Camarillo, the
prosecution also proved that Villanueva died from hazing injuries.

According to the RTC, the evidence of the prosecution undeniably proved that Villanueva, a UP Los
Bafios student, was a neophyte of the APO - Theta Chapter Fraternity; that Dungo and Sibal were
members of the said fraternity; that on the evening of January 13, 2006, Dungo and Sibal, together
with the other fraternity members, officers and alumni, brought and transported Villanueva and two
other neophytes to Villa Novaliches Resort at Barangay Pansol, Calamba City, for the final initiation
rites; that the initiation rites were conducted inside the resort, performed under the cover of darkness
and secrecy; that due to the injuries sustained by Villanueva, the fraternity members and the other
two neophytes haphazardly left the resort; and that Dungo and Sibal boarded a tricycle and brought
the lifeless body of Villanueva to JP Rizal Hospital, where Villanueva was pronounced dead.
The RTC explained that even if there was no evidence that Dungo and Sibal participated to bodily
assault and harm the victim, it was irrefutable that they brought Villanueva to the resort for their final
initiation rites. Clearly, they did not merely induce Villanueva to attend the final initiation rites, but
they also brought him to Villa Novaliches Resort.

The RTC held that the defense of denial and alibi were self-serving negative assertions. The
defense of denial and alibi of Dungo, which was corroborated by the testimony of his girlfriend
Rivera and his co-fraternity brother, could not be given credence. The witnesses presented by the
defense were partial and could not be considered as disinterested parties. The defense of denial of
Sibal likewise failed. The corroborative testimonies of his fraternity brothers were suspect because
they had so much at stake in the outcome of the criminal action.

The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Dandy Dungo and Gregorio Sibal GUILTY of violating
Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and order them to jointly and severally pay the family /heirs of Deceased Marlon
Villanueva the following sums of money:

1. ₱141,324.00 for and as actual damages;

2. ₱200,000.00 for and as moral damages;

3. ₱100,000.00 for and as exemplary damages; and

4. ₱50,000.00 for the death of Marlon Villanueva.

SO ORDERED. 20

Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a notice of appeal. In their brief, they contended that the prosecution
failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating R.A. No. 8049. They also assailed
the constitutionality of Section 4 of the said law, which stated that mere presence in the hazing was
prima facie evidence of participation therein, because it allegedly violated the constitutional
presumption of innocence of the accused.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the appeal of Dungo and Sibal was bereft of merit. It stated that, in finding them
guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049, the RTC properly relied on circumstantial evidence adduced by the
prosecution. The CA painstakingly discussed the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence to
convict Dungo and Sibal as principals in the crime of hazing.

It further found that the defense of denial and alibi of Dungo and Sibal failed to cast doubt on the
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses; and that denial, being inherently weak,
could not prevail over the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime. The
CA also stated that Dungo and Sibal were not only convicted based on their presence in the venue
of the hazing, but also in their act of bringing the victim to Villa Novaliches Resort for the final
initiation rites.

The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2011 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 36 of Calamba City in CRIM. Case No. 13958-2006-C, finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of R.A. 8049 is hereby AFFIRMED in TOTO.

SO ORDERED. 21

Dungo and Sibal moved for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in the assailed
October 8, 2013 Resolution.

Hence, this petition.

SOLE ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR HE JUDGMENTS OF THE RTC AND THE CA A QUO

CONSTITUTE A VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF ACCUSATION AGAINST THEM BECAUSE THE
OFFENSE PROVED AS FOUND AND PRONOUNCED THEREBY IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION, NOR DOES ONE INCLUDE OR NECESSARILY INCLUDE
THE OTHER. 22

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal argue that the amended information charged them as they "did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault and use personal violence upon one Marlon
Villanueva y Mejilla."  Yet, both the RTC and the CA found them guilty of violating R.A. No. 8049
23

because they "[i]nduced the victim to be present"  during the initiation rites. The crime of hazing by
24

inducement does not necessarily include the criminal charge of hazing by actual participation. Thus,
they cannot be convicted of a crime not stated or necessarily included in the information. By reason
of the foregoing, the petitioners contend that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against them has been violated.

In its Comment,  filed on May 23, 2014, the Office of the Solicitor General (DSG) asserted that
25

Dungo and Sibal were charged in the amended information with the proper offense and convicted for
such. The phrases "planned initiation" and "in conspiracy with more or less twenty members and
officers" in the amended information sufficiently cover "knowingly cooperated in carrying out the
hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat." The planned initiation rite would not have been
accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners in inducing the victim to be present thereat
and it was obviously conducted in conspiracy with the others.  In their Reply  filed on September 10,
26 27

2014, Dungo and Sibal insisted that there was a variance between the, offense charged of "actually
participated in the infliction of physical harm," and the offense "knowingly cooperated in carrying out
the hazing by inducing the victim to be present thereat."  The prosecution, moreover, failed to
28

establish conspiracy because no act or circumstance was proved pointing to a joint purpose and
design between and among the petitioners and the other twenty accused.

The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Procedural Matter

An appeal is a proceeding undertaken to have a decision reconsidered by bringing it to a higher

court authority.  The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is it a component of due process. It
29

is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. 30
Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended by A.M. No. 00-5-
03, dated October 15, 2004, governs the procedure on the appeal from the CA to the Court when the
penalty imposed is either reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.  According to the said provision,
31

"[i]n cases where the Court of Appeals imposes reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or a lesser
penalty, it shall render and enter judgment imposing such penalty. The judgment may be appealed
to the Supreme Court by notice of appeal filed with the Court of Appeals."

Hence, an accused, upon whom the penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment had been
imposed by the CA, can simply file a notice of appeal to allow him to pursue an appeal as a matter of
right before the Court. An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question
including one not raised by the parties.  Section 13(c), Rule 124 recognizes the constitutionally
32

conferred jurisdiction of the Court in all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher. 33

An accused, nevertheless, is not precluded in resorting to an appeal by certiorari to the Court via
Rule 45 under the Rules of Court. An appeal to this Court by petition for review on certiorari shall
raise only questions of law.  Moreover, such review is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
34

discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons.  In other words,
35

when the CA imposed a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) file
a notice of appeal under Section 13( c ), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before
the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of
law.

In this case, the CA affirmed the R TC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the
petitioners. The latter opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the
existence of conspiracy in their reply,  which is a question of fact that would require an examination
36

of the evidence ;presented. In the interest of justice, however, and due to the novelty of the issue
presented, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review.  Substantive Matter
37

In our contemporary society, hazing has been a nightmare of parents who send their children to
college or university. News of deaths and horrible beatings primarily among college students due to
hazing injuries continue to haunt us. Horrid images of eggplant-like buttocks and thighs and pounded
arms and shoulders of young men are depicted as a fervent warning to those who dare undergo the
hazing rites. The meaningless death of these promising students, and the agony, cries and ordeal of
their families, resonate through the very core of our beings. But no matter how modem and
sophisticated our society becomes, these barbaric acts of initiation of fraternities, sororities and other
organizations continue to thrive, even within the elite grounds of the academe.

The history and phenomenon of hazing had been thoroughly discussed in the recent case of
Villareal v. People.  It is believed that the fraternity system and its accompanying culture of hazing
38

were transported by the Americans to the Philippines in the late 19th century.  Thus, a study of the
39

laws and jurisprudence of the United States (US) on hazing can enlighten the current predicament of
violent initiations in fraternities, sororities and other organizations.

United States Laws and

Jurisprudence on Hazing

There are different definitions of hazing, depending on the laws of the states.  In the case of People
40

v. Lenti,  the defendant therein challenged the constitutionality of the state law defining hazing on
41
the ground of vagueness. The court rejected such contention and held that it would have been an
impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically

because fraternal organizations and associations never suffered for ideas in contriving new forms of
hazing. Presently, the acceptable definition of hazing is the practice of physically or emotionally
abusing newcomers to an organization as a means of initiation. 42

Hazing can be classified into various categories including, but not limited to, acts of violence, acts of
humiliation, sexual-related acts, and alcohol-related acts.  The physical form of hazing may include
43

beating, branding, paddling, excessive exercise, drinking, and using drugs. Sexual hazing have
included simulated sex acts, sodomy and forced kissing.  Moreover, hazing does not only result in
44

physical injuries and hospitalization, but also lead to emotional damage and traumatic stress. 45

Based on statistics and alarming frequency of hazing, states have attempted to combat hazing
through the passage of state laws that prohibit such acts.  Forty-four states, with the exception of
46

Alaska, Hawaii, Montana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Wyoming, have passed anti-hazing
laws.  The severity of these laws can range from minor penalties to a prison sentence for up to six
47

years.  In the states of Illinois, Idaho, Missouri, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, hazing that result in
48

death or "great bodily harm" is categorized as a felony. 49

In Florida, the Chad Meredith Act,  a law named after a student who died in a hazing incident, was
50

enacted on July 1, 2005. It provides that a person commits a third degree felony when he or she
intentionally or recklessly commits any act of hazing and the hazing results in serious bodily injury or
death. If a person only creates substantial risk of physical injury or death, then hazing is categorized
as a first degree misdemeanor. A similar provision can be observed in the Penal Law of New York. 51

Interestingly, some states included notable features in their anti-hazing statute to increase its
effectiveness. In Alabama, Arkansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, South Carolina and Texas,
the law imposes a duty on school personnel to report hazing.  In fact, in Alabama, no person is
52

allowed to knowingly permit, encourage, aid, or assist any person in committing the offense of
hazing, or willfully acquiesces in its commission.53

Also, some states enacted statutes that have been interpreted to mean that persons are guilty of
hazing even if they have the consent of the victim.  In New Jersey, consent is not a defense to a
54

hazing charge, and its law permits the prosecution of offenders under other applicable criminal
statutes.  By including these various provisions in their anti-hazing statutes, these states have
55

removed the subjective inquiry of consent from consideration, thus, presumably allowing courts to
effectively and properly adjudicate hazing cases. 56

In the US, hazing victims can either file a criminal action, based on anti-hazing statutes, or a civil
suit, arising from tort law and constitutional law, against the members of the local fraternity, the
national fraternity and even against the university or college concerned.  Hazing, which threatens to
57

needlessly harm students, must be attacked from whatever legal means are possible. 58

In State v. Brown,  a member of the Alpha Kappa Alpha at Kent State University was indicted for
59

complicity to hazing. The group physically disciplined their pledges by forcing them to stand on their
heads, beating them with paddles, and smacking and striking initiates in the face and head. The
Ohio court held that evidence presented therein was more than sufficient to sustain a conviction.

Excessive intake of alcohol in the fraternity initiations can be considered as hazing. In Oja v. Grand
Chapter of Theta Chi Fraternity Inc.,  a 17-year old college freshman died as a result of aspirating
60

his own vomit after consuming excessive amounts of alcohol in a fraternity initiation ritual. The
defendants in the said case contended that they only furnished the alcohol drinks to the victim. The
court denied the defense because such acts of the fraternity effectively contributed to the death of
the victim as part of their hazing.

Even in high school, hazing could exist. In Nice v. Centennial Area School District,  a tenth-grade
61

wrestler at William Tennet High School was subjected to various forms of hazing, including; a ritual
where the victim was forcibly held down, while a teammate sat on his face with his buttocks
exposed. The parents of the student sued the school because it failed to prevent the incident despite
its knowledge of the hazing rites. The court approved the settlement of the parties in the amount
ofUS$151,000.00.

More recently, the case of Yost v. Wabash College  involved the hazing of an 18-year old freshman,
62

who suffered physical and mental injuries in the initiation rites conducted by the Phi Kappa Psi
fraternity. As a pledge, the victim was thrown into a creek and was placed in a chokehold, until he
lost consciousness. The court upheld that action against the local fraternity because, even if the
student consented, the fraternity had the duty to ensure the safety of its activities.

The US anti-hazing laws and jurisprudence show that victims of hazing can properly attain redress
before the court. By crafting laws and prosecuting offenders, the state can address the distinct
dilemma of hazing.

Anti-Hazing Law in the

Philippines

R.A. No. 8049, or the Anti-Hazing Law .of 1995, has been enacted to regulate hazing and other
forms of initiation rites in fraternities, sororities, and other organizations. It was in response to the
rising incidents of death of hazing victims, particularly the death of Leonardo "Lenny" Villa.  Despite
63

its passage, reports of deaths resulting from i hazing continue to emerge. Recent victims were Guillo
Servando of the College of St. Benilde, Marc Andre Marcos and Marvin Reglos of the San', Beda
College - Manila, and Cris Anthony Mendez of the University of the Philippines - Diliman. With the
continuity of these senseless tragedies, one question implores for an answer: is R.A. No. 8049 a
sufficient deterrent against hazing?

To answer the question, the Court must dissect the provisions of the law and scrutinize its effect,
implication and application.

Criminal law has long divided crimes into acts wrong in themselves called acts mala in se; and acts
which would not be wrong but for the fact that positive law forbids them, called acts mala prohibita.
This distinction is important with reference to the intent with which a wrongful act is done. The rule
on the subject is that in acts mala in se, the intent governs; but in acts mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated? When an act is illegal, the intent of the offender is
immaterial.  When the doing of an act is prohibited by law, it is considered injurious to public welfare,
64

and the doing of the prohibited act is the crime itself. 65

A common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code (RPC),
while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. In reality, however, there may be
mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080, as amended.  Similarly, 66

there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the RPC, such as technical malversation. 67

The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the
determination of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. If the punishable act or
.omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se,- on the contrary, if it is not immoral in
itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission b)". reasons of public policy, then it is mala
prohibita. In the final analysis, whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately a
question of fact and frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the
statute.68

The crime of hazing under R.A. No. 8049 is malum prohibitum. The Senate deliberations would
show that the lawmakers intended the anti-hazing statute to be ma/um prohibitum, as follows:
SENATOR GUINGONA: Most of these acts, if not all, are already punished under the Revised Penal
Code.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA If hazing is done at present and it results in death, the charge would be
murder or homicide.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. If it does not result in death, it may be frustrated homicide or serious
physical injuries.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. Or, if the person who commits sexual abuse does so it can be penalized
under rape or acts of lasciviousness.

SENATOR LINA. That is correct, Mr. President.

SENATOR GUINGONA. So, what is the rationale for making a new offense under this definition of
the crime of hazing?

SENATOR LINA. To discourage persons or group of persons either composing a sorority, fraternity
or any association from making this requirement of initiation that has already resulted in these
specific acts or results, Mr. President.

That is the main rationale. We want to send a strong signal across the land that no group or
association can require the act of physical initiation before a person can become a member without
being held criminally liable.

x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. Yes, but what would be the rationale for that imposition? Because the
distinguished Sponsor has said that he is not punishing a mere organization, he is not seeking the
punishment of an initiation into a club or organization, he is seeking the punishment of certain acts
that resulted in death, etcetera as a result of hazing which are already covered crimes.

The penalty is increased in one, because we would like to discourage hazing, abusive hazing, but it
may be a legitimate defense for invoking two or more charges or offenses, because these very same
acts are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code

That is my difficulty, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. x x x

Another point, Mr. President, is this, and this is a very telling difference: When a person or group of
persons resort to hazing as a requirement for gaining entry into an organization, the intent to commit
a wrong is not visible or is not present, Mr. President. Whereas, in these specific crimes, Mr.
President, let us say there is death or there is homicide, mutilation, if one files a case, then the
intention to commit a wrong has to be proven. But if the crime of hazing is the basis, what is
important is the result from the act of hazing.

To me, that is the basic difference and that is what will prevent or deter the sororities or fraternities;
that they should really shun this activity called "hazing." Because, initially, these fraternities or
sororities do not even consider having a neophyte killed or maimed or that acts of lasciviousness are
even committed initially, Mr. President.

So, what we want to discourage, is the so-called initial innocent act. That is why there is need to
institute this kind of hazing. Ganiyan po ang nangyari. Ang fraternity o ang sorority ay magre-recruit.
Wala talaga silang intensiybng makamatay. Hindi ko na babanggitin at buhay pa iyong kaso. Pero
dito sa anim o pito na namatay nitong nakaraang taon, walang intensiyong patayin talaga iyong
neophyte. So, kung maghihintay pa tayo, na saka lamang natin isasakdal ng murder kung namatay
na, ay after the fact ho iyon. Pero, kung sasabihin natin sa mga kabataan na: "Huwag ninyong
gagawin iyong hazing. Iyan ay kasalanan at kung mamatay diyan, mataas ang penalty sa inyo."

x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. I join the lofty motives, Mr. President, of the distinguished Sponsor. But I
am again disturbed by his statement that the prosecution does not have to prove the intent that
resulted in the death, that resulted in the serious physical injuries, that resulted in the acts of
lasciviousness or deranged mind. We do not have to prove the willful intent of the accused in proving
or establishing the crime of hazing. This seems, to me, a novel situation where we create the special
crime without having to go into the intent, which is one of the basic elements of any crime.

If there is no intent, there is no crime. If the intent were merely to initiate, then there is no offense.
And even the distinguished Sponsor admits that the organization, the intent to initiate, the intent to
have a new society or a new club is, per se, not punishable at all. What are punishable are the acts
that lead to the result. But if these results are not going to be proven by intent, but just because there
was hazing, I am afraid that it will disturb the basic concepts of the Revised Penal Code, Mr.
President.

SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, the act of hazing, precisely, is being criminalized because in the
context of what is happening in the sororities and fraternities, when they conduct hazing, no one will
admit that their intention is to maim or to kill. So, we are already criminalizing the fact of inflicting
physical pain. Mr. President, it is a criminal act and we want it stopped, deterred, discouraged.

If that occurs, under this law, there is no necessity to prove that the masters intended to kill or the
masters intended to maim. What is important is the result of the act of hazing. Otherwise, the
masters or those who inflict the physical pain can easily escape responsibility and say, "We did not
have the intention to kill. This is part of our initiation rites. This is normal. We do not have any
intention to kill or maim."

This is the lusot, Mr. President. They might as well have been charged therefore with the ordinary
crime of homicide, mutilation, etcetera, where the prosecution will have a difficulty proving the
elements if they are separate offenses.
 x x x           x x x          x x x

SENATOR LINA. x x x

I am very happy that the distinguished Minority Leader brought out the idea of intent or whether it is
mala in se or mala prohibita. There can be a radical amendment if that is the point that he wants to
go to.

If we agree on the concept, then, maybe, we can just make this a special law on hazing. We will not
include this anymore under the Revised Penal Code. That is a possibility. I will not foreclose that
suggestion, Mr. President. 69

[Emphases Supplied]

Having in mind the potential conflict between the proposed law and the core principle of mala in se
adhered to under the RPC, the Congress did not simply enact an amendment thereto. Instead, it
created a special law on hazing, founded upon the principle of mala prohibita.  In Vedana v.
70

Valencia,  the Court noted that in our nation's very recent history, the people had spoken, through
71

the Congress, to deem conduct constitutive of hazing, an act previously considered harmless by
custom, as criminal.  The act of hazing itself is not inherently immoral, but the law deems the same
72

to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Accordingly, the existence of criminal intent is
immaterial in the crime of hazing. Also, the defense of good faith cannot be raised in its
prosecution. 73

Section 1 of R.A. No. 8049 defines hazing as an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for
admission into membership in a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or
applicant in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly,
foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological
suffering or injury. From the said definition, the elements of the crime of hazing can be determined:

1. That there is an initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership
in a fraternity, sorority or organization;

2. That there must be a recruit, neophyte or applicant of the fraternity, sorority or

organization; and

3. That the recruit, neophyte or applicant is placed in some embarrassing or humiliating

situations such as forcing him to do menial, silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities
or otherwise subjecting him to physical or psychological suffering or injury.

From the said definition of hazing, it is apparent that there must be an initiation rite or practice
performed by the fraternities, sororities or organization. The law, however, did not limit the definition
of these groups to those formed within academic colleges and universities.  In fact, the second
74

paragraph of Section 1 provides that the term "organization" shall include any club or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen's Military Training and Citizen's Army Training. Even
the president, manager, director or other responsible officer of a corporation engaged in hazing as a
requirement for employment are covered by the law.  R.A. No. 8049 qualifies that the physical,
75

mental and psychological testing and training procedure and practices to determine and enhance the
physical, mental and psychological fitness of prospective regular members of the AFP and the PNP,
as approved by the Secretary of National Defense and the National Police Commission, duly
recommended by the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Director General of the PNP, shall not be
considered as hazing.

And not all forms of initiation rites are prohibited by the law. Section 2 thereof provides that initiation
rites of fraternities, sororities or organizations shall be allowed provided that the following requisites
are met:

1. That the fraternity, sorority or organization has a prior written notice to the school
authorities or head of organization;

2. The said written notice must be secured at least seven (7) days before the conduct of
such initiation;

3. That the written notice shall indicate:

a. The period of the initiation activities, which shall not exceed three (3) days;

b. The names of those to be subjected to such activities; and

c. An undertaking that no physical violence be employed by anybody during such

initiation rites. Section 3 of R.A. No. 8049 imposes an obligation to the head of the
school or organization or their representatives that they must assign at least two (2)
representatives, as the case may be, to be present during these valid initiations. The
duty of such representative ,is to see to it that no physical harm of any kind shall be
inflicted upon a recruit, neophyte or applicant.

Noticeably, the law does not provide a penalty or sanction to fraternities, sororities or organizations
that fail to comply with the notice requirements of Section 2. Also, the school and organization
administrators do not have a clear liability for non-compliance with Section 3.

Any person who commits the crime of hazing shall be liable in accordance with Section 4 of the law,
which provides different classes of persons who are held liable as principals and accomplices.

The first class of principals would be the actual participants in the hazing. If the person subjected to
hazing or other forms of initiation rites suffers any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the
officers and members of the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. Interestingly, the presence of any person
during the hazing is prima facie evidence of actual participation, unless he prevented the
commission of the acts punishable herein. 76

The prescribed penalty on the principals depends on the extent of injury inflicted to the victim.  The
77

penalties appear to be similar to that of homicide, serious physical injuries, less serious physical
injuries, and slight physical injuries under the RPC,  with the penalties for hazing increased one
78

degree higher. Also, the law provides several circumstances which would aggravate the imposable
penalty.79

Curiously, although hazing has been defined as consisting of those activities involving physical or
psychological suffering or injury, the penalties for hazing only covered the infliction of physical harm.
At best, the only psychological injury recognized would be causing insanity to the victim. Conversely,
even if the victim only sustained physical injuries which did not incapacitate him, there is still a
prescribed penalty. 80
The second class of principals would be the officers, former officers, or alumni of the organization,
group, fraternity or sorority who actually planned the hazing.  Although these planners were not
81

present when the acts constituting hazing were committed, they shall still be liable as principals. The
provision took in consideration the non-resident members of the organization, such as their former
officers or alumni.

The third class of principals would ht; officers or members of an organization group, fraternity or
sorority who knowingly cooperated in carrying out the hazing by inducing the victim to be present
thereat.  These officers or members are penalized, not because of their direct participation in the
82

infliction of harm, but due to their indispensable cooperation in the crime by inducing the victim to
attend the hazing.

The next class of principals would be the fraternity or sorority's adviser who was present when the
acts constituting hazing were committed, and failed to take action to prevent them from
occurring.  The liability of the adviser arises, not only from his mere presence in the hazing, but also
83

his failure to prevent the same.

The last class of principals would be the parents of the officers or members of the fraternity, group,
or organization.  The hazing must be held in the home of one of the officers or members. The
84

parents must have actual knowledge of the hazing conducted in their homes and failed to take any
action to avoid the same from occurring.

The law also provides for accomplices in the crime of hazing. The school authorities, including
faculty members, who consented to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to
take any action to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices.  Likewise, the
85

owner of the place where the hazing was conducted can also be an accomplice to the crime.  The 86

owner of the place shall be liable when he has actual knowledge of the hazing conducted therein
and he failed to take any steps to stop the same. Recognizing the malum prohibitum characteristic of
hazing, the law provides that any person charged with the said crime shall not be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.  Also, the framers
87

of the law intended that the consent of the victim shall not be a defense in hazing. During the
discussion of whether sodomy shall be included as a punishable act under the law, the issue of
consent was tackled: SENATOR LINA x x x

But sodomy in this case is connected with hazing, Mr. President. Such that the act may even be
entered into with consent. It is not only sodomy. The infliction of pain may be done with the consent
of the neophyte. If the law is passed, that does not make the act of hazing not punishable because
the neophyte accepted the infliction of pain upon himself.

If the victim suffers from serious physical injuries, but the initiator said, "Well, he allowed it upon
himself. He consented to it." So, if we allow that reasoning that sodomy was done with the consent
of the victim, then we would not have passed any law at all. There will be no significance if we pass
this bill, because it will always be a defense that the victim allowed the infliction of pain or suffering.
He accepted it as part of the initiation rites.

But precisely, Mr. President that is one thing that we would want to prohibit. That the defense of
consent will not apply because the very act of inflicting physical pain or psychological suffering is, by
itself, a punishable act. The result of the act of hazing, like death or physical injuries merely
aggravates the act with higher penalties. But the defense of consent is not going to nullify the
criminal nature of the act.
So, if we accept the amendment that sodomy can only aggravate the offense if it is committed
without consent of the victim, then the whole foundation of this proposed law will collapse.

SENATOR BIAZON. Thank you, Mr. President.

SENATOR LINA. Thank you very much.

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any objection to the committee amendment? (Silence.) The Chair hears
none; the same is approved. 88

[Emphasis supplied]

Further, the law acknowledges that the offended party in the crime of hazing can seek different
courses of action. n '.'provides that the responsible officials of the school or of the police, military or
citizen's army training organization, may impose the appropriate administrative sanctions on the
person or the persons charged under this provision even before their conviction.  Necessarily, the
89

offended party can file either administrative, civil, or criminal actions against the offenders. 90

The study of the provisions of R.A. No. 8049 shows that, on paper, it is complete and robust in
penalizing the crime of hazing. It was made malum prohibitum to discount criminal intent and
disallow the defense of good faith. It took into consideration the different participants and
contributors in the hazing activities. While not all acts cited in the law are penalized, the penalties
imposed therein involve various and serious terms of imprisonment to discourage would-be
offenders. Indeed, the law against hazing is ideal and profound. As to whether the law can be
effectively implemented, the Court begs to continue on the merits of the case.

The Information properly

charged the offense proved

The petitioners claim that the amended ,information avers a criminal charge of hazing by actual
participation, but the only offense proved during the trial was hazing by inducement. Their1
contention must fail. The Amended Information reads:

That on or about 2:30 in the early morning of January 14, 2006, at Villa Novaliches, Brgy. Pansol,
Calamba City, Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, during a planned initiation rite and being then officers and members of Alpha Phi
Omega fraternity and present thereat, in conspiracy with more or less twenty other members and
officers, whose identity is not yet known, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault and use personal violence upon one MARLON VILLANUEVA y MEJILLA, a neophyte thereof
and as condition for his admission to the fraternity, thereby subjecting him to physical harm, resulting
to his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW. 91

On the manner of how the Information should be worded, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
is enlightening:

Section 9. Cause of the accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense
and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language
and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and
aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.
It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of
common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. 92

The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included
the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. In ordinary parlance, a planned event can be understood
to have different phases. Likewise, the hazing activity had different stages and the perpetrators had
different roles therein, not solely inflicting physical injury to the neophyte. One of the roles of the
petitioners in the hazing activity was to induce Villanueva to be present. Dungo and Sibal not only
induced Villanueva to be present at the resort, but they actually brought him there. They fulfilled their
roles in the planned hazing rite which eventually led to the death of Villanueva. The hazing would not
have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be
present.

Secrecy and silence are common characterizations of the dynamics of hazing.  To require the
93

prosecutor to indicate every step of the planned initiation rite in the information at the inception of the
criminal case, when details of the clandestine hazing are almost nil, would be an arduous task, if not
downright impossible. The law does not require the impossible (lex non cognit ad impossibilia).

The proper approach would be to require the prosecution to state every element of the crime of
hazing, the offenders, and the accompanying circumstances in the planned initiation activity which
has been satisfied in the present case. Accordingly, the amended information sufficiently informed
the petitioners that they were being criminally charged for their roles in the planned initiation rite.

Conspiracy of the
offenders was duly proven

The petitioners assail that the prosecution failed to establish the fact of conspiracy.

The Court disagrees.

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of
a felony and decide to commit it. To determine conspiracy, there must be a common design to
commit a felony.  The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the
94

actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by
moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. 95

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in express
terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and, from the
secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together,
indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.  Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined
96

to the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and
offenses incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. 97

The lawmakers deliberated on whether the prosecution was still obliged to prove the conspiracy
between the offenders under R.A. 8049, to wit:

SENATOR GUINGONA. Mr. President, assuming there was a group that initiated and a person died.
The charge is murder. My question is: Under this bill if it becomes a law, would the prosecution have
to prove conspiracy or not anymore?
SENATOR LINA. Mr. President, if the person is present during hazing x x x

SENATOR GUINGONA. The persons are present. First, would the prosecution have to prove
conspiracy? Second, would the prosecution have to prove intent to kill or not?

SENATOR LINA. No more. As to the second question, Mr. President, if that occurs, there is no need
to prove intent to kill.

SENATOR GUINGONA. But the charge is murder.

SENATOR LINA. That is why I said that it should not be murder. It should be hazing, Mr. President. 98

The Court does not categorically agree that, under R.A. No. 8049, the prosecution need not prove
conspiracy. Jurisprudence dictates that conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by
positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence
at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in
or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any
active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the common
design and purpose. 99

R.A. No. 8049, nevertheless, presents a novel provision that introduces a disputable presumption of
actual participation; and which modifies the concept of conspiracy. Section 4, paragraph 6 thereof
provides that the presence of any person during the hazing is prima facie evidence of participation
as principal, unless he prevented the commission of the punishable acts. This provision is unique
because a disputable presumption arises from the mere presence of the offender during the hazing,
which can be rebutted by proving that the accused took steps to prevent the commission of the
hazing.

The petitioners attempted to attack the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8049 before the CA,
hut did not succeed. "[A] finding of prima facie evidence x x x does not shatter the presumptive
innocence the accused enjoys because, before prima facie evidence arises, certain facts have still to
be proved; the trial court cannot depend alone on such evidence, because precisely, it is merely
prima facie. It must still satisfy that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense
charged. Neither can it rely on the weak defense the latter may adduce." 100

Penal laws which feature prima facie evidence by disputable presumptions against the offenders are
not new, and can be observed in the following: (1) the possession of drug paraphernalia gives rise to
prima facie evidence of the use of dangerous drug;  (2) the dishonor of the check for insufficient
101

funds is prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit;  and (3) the
102

possession of any good which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing.103

Verily, the disputable presumption under R.A. No. 8049 can be related to the conspiracy in the crime
of hazing. The common design of offenders is to haze the victim. Some of the overt acts that could
be committed by the offenders would be to (1) plan the hazing activity as a requirement of the
victim's initiation to the fraternity; (2) induce the victim to attend the hazing; and (3) actually
participate in the infliction of physical injuries.

In this case, there was prima facie evidence of the petitioners' participation in the hazing because of
their presence in the venue. As correctly held by the RTC, the presence of Dungo and Sibal during
the hazing at Villa Novaliches Resort was established by the testimony of Ignacio. She testified that
she saw Sibal emerge from the resort and approach her store, to wit:

MR. DIMACULANGAN

Q: And how many persons from this group did you see again?

WITNESS

A: Three (3), sir.

Q: Where did they come from, did they come out from the resort? Where did this 3 people or this
group of people coming from?

A: Inside the resort, sir.

Q: And around what time was this?

A: Around 9:00, sir.

Q: And what did they do if any if they came out of the resort?

A: They went to my store, sir.

xxxx

Q: Did you have any other visitors to your store that night?

xxxx

A: "Meron po".

Q: Who were these visitors?

A: I don't know their names but I recognize their faces, sir.

Q: If I show you pictures of these people, will you be able to identify them before this Court.

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Mrs. Ignacio, I am showing you this picture of persons marked as Exhibit "L" in the Pre-Trial, can
you please look over this document carefully and see if any of the persons whom you said visited
your store is here?

xxxx

A: "Siya rin po."

COURT:

Make it of record that the witness pinpointed to the first picture appearing on the left picture on the
first row.

xxxx

ATIY. PAMAOS:

For the record, your Honor, we manifest that the picture and the name pointed by the witness has
been previously marked as Exhibit "L-3" and previously admitted by the defense as referring to
Gregorio Sibal, Jr., accused in this case… 104

Ignacio, also positively identified Dungo as among the guests of Villa Novaliches Resort on the night
of the hazing, to wit:

COURT

Q: xx x Now, when you say other people you could identify who are not in the pictures then how
would you know that these people are indeed those people you could identify?

WITNESS

A: "Iyon pong ... di ba po nagkuwento ako na dumating sila tapos nag shake hands at saka iyong
nagyakapan po ... "

Q: And what will be the significance of the alleged embrace and shake hands for you to say that you
could identify those people?

A: "Hindi po. Noong dumating po sila nasa isang jeep, meron pong lalaki doon sa may tabi ng driver
bumaba siya tapos po noong bumaba siya tapos iyong mga kasamahan nya sa likod nagbaba-an
din, iyon po nagbati-an po sila."

Q: And from these greeting, how could you identify these people?

A: "Ngayon ko lang po napag masdan ang taong iyon, hindi ko po alam na akusado po sa kabila
iyon."

Q: And who was that person?

A: "Siya po, iyon po."

Q: Who are you pointing to?

A: "Iyon pong naka-dilaw na ... " (Witness pointing to Dandy Dungo)

Q: So, are you telling the Court that this person you positively saw seated beside the driver came out
and subsequently embraced and shook hands with the other people from the jeepney, is that your
testimony?
A: Yes, your Honor. 105

The testimony of Ignacio was direct and straightforward. Her testimony was given great weight
because she was a disinterested and credible witness. The prosecution indubitably established the
presence of Dungo and Sibal during the hazing. Such gave rise to the prima facie evidence of their
actual participation in the hazing of Villanueva. They were given an opportunity to rebut and
overcome the prima facie evidence of the prosecution by proving that they prevented the
commission of the hazing, yet they failed to do so.

Because of the uncontroverted prima facie evidence against the petitioners, it was shown that they
performed an overt act in the furtherance of the criminal design of hazing. Not only did they induce
the victim to attend the hazing activity, the petitioners also actually participated in it based on the
prima facie evidence. These acts are sufficient to establish their roles in the conspiracy of hazing.

Hence, generally, mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to
conspiracy.  Exceptionally, under R.A. No. 8049, the participation of the offenders in the criminal
106

conspiracy can be proven by the prima facie evidence due to their presence during the hazing,
unless they prevented the commission of the acts therein.

The guilt of the

petitioners was proven
beyond reasonable doubt

Aside from inducing Villanueva to attend the initiation rites and their presence during the hazing, the
petitioners? guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the sequence of circumstantial evidence
presented by the prosecution. Their involvement in the hazing of Villanueva is not merely based on
prima facie evidence but was also established by circumstantial evidence.

In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the
status of the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.  In criminal law, proof beyond reasonable
107

doubt does not mean such degree of proof that produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is
required or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 108

While it is established that nothing less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required for a
conviction, this exacting standard does not preclude resort to circumstantial evidence when direct
evidence is not available. Direct evidence is not a condition sine qua non to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt. For in the absence of direct evidence, the prosecution may
resort to adducing circumstantial evidence to discharge its burden. Crimes are usually committed in
secret and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. If direct evidence is insisted on
under all circumstances, the prosecution of vicious felons who commit heinous crimes in secret or
secluded places will be hard, if not impossible, to prove.  Needless to state, the crime of hazing is
109

shrouded in secrecy. Fraternities and sororities, especially the Greek organizations, are secretive in
nature and their members are reluctant to give any information regarding initiation rites.  The silence
110

is only broken after someone has been injured so severely that medical attention is required. It is
only at this point that the secret is revealed and the activities become public.  Bearing in mind the
111

concealment of hazing, it is only logical and proper for the prosecution to resort to the presentation
of circumstantial evidence to prove it.

The rules on evidence and precedents to sustain the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence require the existence of the following requisites: (1) there are more than one circumstance;
(2) the inference must be based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all circumstances
produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.  To justify a conviction
112

upon circumstantial evidence, the combination of circumstances must be such as to leave no

reasonable doubt in the mind as to the criminal liability of the accused. Jurisprudence requires that
the circumstances must be established to form an unbroken chain of events leading to one fair
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the
crime.113

The CA meticulously wrote in detail the unbroken chain of circumstantial evidence which established
the petitioners' gult in the death of Villanueva as follows:

1. Marlon Villanueva is a neophyte of Alpha Phi Omega, as testified by his roommate Joey
Atienza.

2. At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of January 13, 2006, Sunga was staying at their
tambayan, talking to her organization mates. Three men were seated two meters way from
her. She identified two of the men as appellants Sibal and Dungo, while she did not know the
third man. The three men were wearing black shirts with the seal of the Alpha Phi Omega.

3. Later at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, two more men coming from the entomology wing
arrived and approached the three men. Among the men who just arrived was the victim,
Marlon Villanueva. One of the men wearing black APO shirts handed over to the two
fraternity neophytes some money and told the men "Mamalengke na kayo." He later took
back the money and said, "Huwag na, kami na lang."

4. One of the men wearing a black APO shirt, who was later identified as appellant Dungo,
stood up and asked Marlon if the latter already reported to him, and asked him why he did
not report to him when he was just at the tambayan. Dungo then continuously punched the
victim on his arm. This went on for five minutes. Marlon just kept quiet with his head bowed
down. Fifteen minutes later, the men left going towards the Entomology wing.

5. The deceased Marlon Villanueva was 'last seen alive by Joey Atienza at 7:00 in the
evening of 13 January 2006, from whom he borrowed the shoes he wore at the initiation right
[sic]. Marlon told Joey that it was his "finals" night.

6. On January 13, 2006 at around 8:30 to 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Susan Ignacio saw
more than twenty (20) persons arrive at the Villa Novaliches Resort onboard a jeepney.  She
1âwphi1

estimated the ages of these persons to be between 20 to 30 years old. Three (3) persons
riding a single motorcycle likewise arrived at the resort.

7. Ignacio saw about fifteen (15) persons gather on top of the terrace at the resort who
looked like they were praying. Later that evening, at least three (3) of these persons went to
her store to buy some items. She did not know their names but could identity [sic] their faces.
After she was shown colored photographs, she pointed to the man later identified as Herald
Christopher Braseros. She also pointed out the man later identified as Gregorio Sibal, Jr.

8. Donato Magat, a tricycle driver plying the route of Pansol, Calamba City, testified that
around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of January 14, 2006, he was waiting for passengers at
the corner of Villa Novaliches Resort when a man approached him and told him that
someone inside the resort needed a ride. Magat then went to the resort and asked the two
(2) men standing by the gate who will be riding his tricycle.
 9. The four (4) men boarded his tricycle but Magat noticed that when he touched the body of
the man who was being carried, it felt cold. The said man looked very weak like a vegetable.

10. Seferino Espina y Jabay testified that he worked as a security guard at the J.P. Rizal
Hospital and was assigned at the emergency room. At around 3:00 o'clock in the early
morning of January 14, 2006, he was with another security guard, Abelardo Natividad and
hospital helper Danilo Glindo a.k.a. Gringo, when a tricycle arrived at the emergency room
containing four (4) passengers, excluding the driver. He was an arm's length away from said
tricycle. He identified two of the passengers thereof as appellants Dungo and Sibal. Espina
said he and Glinda helped the passengers unload a body inside the tricycle and brought it to
the emergency room.

11. Afterwards, Espina asked the two meq for identification cards. The latter replied that they
did not bring with them any I.D. or wallet.  Instead of giving their true names, the appellants
1âwphi1

listed down their names in the hospital logbook as Brandon Gonzales y Lanzon and Jericho
Paril y Rivera. Espina then told the two men not to leave, not telling them that they secretly
called the police to report the incident which was their standard operating procedure when a
dead body was brought to the hospital.

12. Dr. Ramon Masilungan, who was then the attending physician at the emergency room,
observed that Marlon was motionless, had no heartbeat and already cyanotic.

13. Dr. Masilungan tried to revive Marlon for about 15 to 20 minutes. However, the latter did
not respond to resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big
contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim's face and several injuries on his arms and
legs. He further attested that Marlon's face was already cyanotic.

14. When Dr. Masilungan pulled down Marlon's pants, he saw a large contusion on both legs
which extended from the upper portion of his thigh down to the couplexial portion or the back
of the knee.

15. Due to the nature, extent and location of Marlon's injuries, Dr. Masilungan opined that he
was a victim of hazing. Dr. Masilungan is familiar with hazing injuries, having undergone
hazing when he was a student and also because of his experience treating victims of hazing
incidents.

16. Dr. Roy Camarillo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory in Region IV,
Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Calamba City, testified that he performed an autopsy on the
cadaver of the victim on January 14j 2006; that the victim's cause of death was blunt head
trauma. From 1999 to 2006, he was able to conduct post-mortem examination of the two (2)
persons whose deaths were attributed to hazing. These two (2) persons sustained multiple
contusions and injuries on different parts of their body, particularly on the buttocks, on both
upper and lower extremities. Both persons died of brain hemorrhage. Correlating these two
cases to the injuries found on the victim's body, Dr. Camarillo attested that the victim, Marlon
Villanueva, sustained similar injuries to those two (2) persons. Based on the presence of
multiple injuries and contusions on his body, he opined that these injuries were hazing-
related.114

Petitioners Dungo and Sibal, on the other hand, presented the defense of denial and alibi. These
defenses, however, must fail. Time and time again, this Court has ruled that denial and alibi are the
weakest of all defenses, because they are easy to concoct and fabricate.  As properly held by the
115

RTC, these defenses cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal identification of the petitioners
by prosecution witnesses Sunga and Ignacio. The testimonies of the defense witnesses also lacked
credibility and reliability. The corroboration of defense witness Rivera was suspect because she was
the girlfriend of Dungo, and it was only logical and emotional that she would stand by the man she
loved and cared for. The testimonies of their fellow fraternity brothers, likewise, do not hold much
weight because they had so much at stake in the outcome of the case. Stated differently, the
petitioners did not present credible and. disinterested witnesses to substantiate their defenses of
denial and alibi.

After a careful review of the records, the Court agrees with the CA and the R TC that the
circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution was overwhelming enough to establish the
guilt of the petitioners beyond a reasonable doubt. The unbroken chain of events laid down by the
CA leaves us no other conclusion other than the petitioners' participation in the hazing. They took
part in the hazing and, together; with their fellow fraternity officers and members, inflicted physical
injuries to Villanueva as a requirement of his initiation to the fraternity. The physical injuries
eventually took a toll on the body of the victim, which led to his death. Another young life lost.

With the fact of hazing, the identity ,of the petitioners, and their participation therein duly proven, the
moral certainty that produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind has been satisfied.

Final Note

Hazing has been a phenomenon that has beleaguered the country's educational institutions and
communities. News of young men beaten to death as part of fraternities' violent initiation rites
supposedly to seal fraternal bond has sent disturbing waves to lawmakers. Hence, R.A. No. 8049
was signed into to law on June 7, 1995. Doubts on the effectiveness of the law were raised. The
Court, however, scrutinized its provisions and it is convinced that the law is rigorous in penalizing the
crime of hazing.

Hopefully, the present case will serve as a guide to the bench and the bar on the application of R.A.
No. 8049. Through careful case-build up and proper presentation of evidence before the court, it is
not impossible for the exalted constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused to be
overcome and his guilt for the crime of hazing be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution
must bear in mind the secretive nature of hazing, and carefully weave its chain of circumstantial
evidence. Likewise, the defense must present a genuine defense and substantiate the same through
credible and reliable witnesses. The counsels of both parties must also consider hazing as a malum
prohibitum crime and the law's distinctive provisions.

While the Court finds R.A. No. 8049 adequate to deter and prosecute hazing, the law is far from
perfect. In Villareal v. People,  the Court suggested that the fact of intoxication and the presence of
116

non-resident or alumni fraternity members during hazing should be considered as aggravating

circumstances that would increase the applicable penalties. Equally, based on the discussion earlier,
this Court suggests some further amendments to the law. First, there should be a penalty or liability
for noncompliance with Section 2, or the written notice requirement, and with Section 3, or the
representation requirement. Second, the penalties under Section 4 should also consider the
psychological harm done to the victim of hazing. With these additional inputs on R.A. No. 8049, the
movement against hazing can be invigorated. R.A. No. 8049 is a democratic response to the uproar
against hazing. It demonstrates that there must, and should, be another way of fostering
brotherhood, other than through the culture of violence and suffering. The senseless deaths of these
young men shall never be forgotten, for justice is the spark that lights the candles of their graves.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The April 26, 2013 Decision and the October 8, 2013
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 05046 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice as guidance for
the proper implementation and prosecution of violators of R.A. No. 8049; and to the Senate
President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the
amendment of the Anti-Hazing Law to include the penalty for noncompliance with its Section 2 and
3, and the :penalty for the psychological harms to the surviving victims of hazing.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 192330               November 14, 2012

ARNOLD JAMES M. YSIDORO, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about a municipal mayor charged with illegal diversion of food intended for those
suffering from malnutrition to the beneficiaries of reconsideration projects affecting the homes of
victims of calamities.

The Facts and the Case

The Office of the Ombudsman for the Visayas accused Arnold James M. Ysidoro before the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 28228 of violation of illegal use of public propertry (technical
malversation) under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code. 1

The facts show that the Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,
Leyte, operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction materials to
indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The beneficiaries provided the labor
needed for construction.

On June 15, 2001 when construction for calamity victims in Sitio Luy-a, Barangay Tinugtogan, was
70% done, the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason that they had to find food for
their families. This worried Lolita Garcia (Garcia), the CSAP Officer-in-Charge, for such construction
stoppage could result in the loss of construction materials particularly the cement. Thus, she sought
the help of Cristina Polinio (Polinio), an officer of the MSWDO in charge of the municipality’s
Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP) that rationed food to malnourished children. Polinio told
Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in its storeroom. And since she had
already distributed food to the mother volunteers, what remained could be given to the CSAP
beneficiaries.

Garcia and Polinio went to petitioner Arnold James M. Ysidoro, the Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek
his approval. After explaining the situation to him, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the
withdrawal slip for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth P3,396.00 to CSAP. Mayor
2 

Ysidoro instructed Garcia and Polinio, however, to consult the accounting department regarding the
matter. On being consulted, Eldelissa Elises, the supervising clerk of the Municipal Accountant’s
Office, signed the withdrawal slip based on her view that it was an emergency situation justifying the
release of the goods. Subsequently, CSAP delivered those goods to its beneficiaries. Afterwards,
Garcia reported the matter to the MSWDO and to the municipal auditor as per auditing rules.

On August 27, 2001 Alfredo Doller, former member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte, filed the
present complaint against Ysidoro. Nierna Doller, Alfredo's wife and former MSWDO head, testified
that the subject SFP goods were intended for its target beneficiaries, Leyte’s malnourished children.
She also pointed out that the Supplemental Feeding Implementation Guidelines for Local
Government Units governed the distribution of SFP goods. Thus, Ysidoro committed technical
3 

malversation when he approved the distribution of SFP goods to the CSAP beneficiaries.

In his defense, Ysidoro claims that the diversion of the subject goods to a project also meant for the
poor of the municipality was valid since they came from the savings of the SFP and the Calamity
Fund. Ysidoro also claims good faith, believing that the municipality’s poor CSAP beneficiaries were
also in urgent need of food. Furthermore, Ysidoro pointed out that the COA Municipal Auditor
conducted a comprehensive audit of their municipality in 2001 and found nothing irregular in its
transactions.

On February 8, 2010 the Sandiganbayan found Ysidoro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of technical
malversation. But, since his action caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only
fined him P1,698.00 or 50% of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan held that Ysidoro applied
public property to a pubic purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law or
ordinance. On May 12, 2010 the Sandiganbayan denied Ysidoro’s motion for reconsideration. On
June 8, 2010 Ysidoro appealed the Sandiganbayan Decision to this Court.

The Questions Presented

In essence, Ysidoro questions the Sandiganbayan’s finding that he committed technical

malversation. He particularly raises the following questions:

1. Whether or not he approved the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose
different from their originally intended purpose;

2. Whether or not the goods he approved for diversion were in the nature of savings that
could be used to augment the other authorized expenditures of the municipality;

3. Whether or not his failure to present the municipal auditor can be taken against him; and

4. Whether or not good faith is a valid defense for technical malversation.

The Court’s Rulings

One. The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal
Code has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies
4 

public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and c) that the public use for
which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance. Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the
5 

offense under its third element because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the
CSAP beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.

But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte enacted
Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001. This appropriation was based on
6 
the executive budget which allocated P100,000.00 for the SFP and P113,957.64 for the
7 

Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services which covers the CSAP housing
8 

projects. The creation of the two items shows the Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate
9 

funds for SFP and the CSAP in the annual budget.

Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods should be used
for SFP’s needs, observing the rules prescribed for identifying the qualified beneficiaries of its
feeding programs. The target clientele of the SFP according to its manual are: 1) the moderately
10 

and severely underweight pre-school children aged 36 months to 72 months; and 2) the families of
six members whose total monthly income is P3,675.00 and below. This rule provides assurance that
11 

the SFP would cater only to the malnourished among its people who are in urgent need of the
government’s limited resources.

Ysidoro disregarded the guidelines when he approved the distribution of the goods to those
providing free labor for the rebuilding of their own homes. This is technical malversation. If Ysidoro
could not legally distribute the construction materials appropriated for the CSAP housing
beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the
latter to CSAP beneficiaries.

Two. Ysidoro claims that the subject goods already constituted savings of the SFP and that,
therefore, the same could already be diverted to the CSAP beneficiaries. He relies on Abdulla v.
People which states that funds classified as savings are not considered appropriated by law or
12 

ordinance and can be used for other public purposes. The Court cannot accept Ysidoro’s argument.

The subject goods could not be regarded as savings. The SFP is a continuing program that ran
throughout the year. Consequently, no one could say in mid-June 2001 that SFP had already
finished its project, leaving funds or goods that it no longer needed. The fact that Polinio had already
distributed the food items needed by the SFP beneficiaries for the second quarter of 2001 does not
mean that the remaining food items in its storeroom constituted unneeded savings. Since the
requirements of hungry mouths are hard to predict to the last sack of rice or can of sardines, the
view that the subject goods were no longer needed for the remainder of the year was quite
premature.

In any case, the Local Government Code provides that an ordinance has to be enacted to validly
apply funds, already appropriated for a determined public purpose, to some other purpose. Thus:

SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. – Funds shall be available exclusively for the
specific purpose for which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be passed authorizing
any transfer of appropriations from one item to another. However, the local chief executive or the
presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by ordinance, be authorized to augment any
item in the approved annual budget for their respective offices from savings in other items within the
same expense class of their respective appropriations.

The power of the purse is vested in the local legislative body. By requiring an ordinance, the law
gives the Sanggunian the power to determine whether savings have accrued and to authorize the
augmentation of other items on the budget with those savings.

Three. Ysidoro claims that, since the municipal auditor found nothing irregular in the diversion of the
subject goods, such finding should be respected. The SB ruled, however, that since Ysidoro failed to
present the municipal auditor at the trial, the presumption is that his testimony would have been
adverse if produced. Ysidoro argues that this goes against the rule on the presumption of innocence
and the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions.
Ysidoro may be right in that there is no basis for assuming that had the municipal auditor testified,
his testimony would have been adverse to the mayor. The municipal auditor’s view regarding the
transaction is not conclusive to the case and will not necessarily negate the mayor’s liability if it
happened to be favorable to him. The Court will not, therefore, be drawn into speculations regarding
what the municipal auditor would have said had he appeared and testified.

Four. Ysidoro insists that he acted in good faith since, first, the idea of using the SFP goods for the
CSAP beneficiaries came, not from him, but from Garcia and Polinio; and, second, he consulted the
accounting department if the goods could be distributed to those beneficiaries. Having no criminal
intent, he argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime. 1âwphi1

But criminal intent is not an element of technical malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting
public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public purpose to another public
purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive law forbids its commission based on considerations of
public policy, order, and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law, and not
13 

the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has been violated.
Hence, malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant.
14

Dura lex sed lex. Ysidoro’s act, no matter how noble or miniscule the amount diverted, constitutes
the crime of technical malversation. The law and this Court, however, recognize that his offense is
not grave, warranting a mere fine.

WHEREFORE, this Court AFFIRMS in its entirely the assailed Decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case 28228 dated February 8, 2010.

SO ORDERED.