PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014

TOPIC: Marital rape

FACTS:

Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de Oro
City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to have sex
with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He treated
her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started
to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in
her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful for her so she would resist his
sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near the
bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to
instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to
her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the
bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up
from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to
copulate with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant
by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As
he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting: “Don ‘t do that
to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges
as her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover up
her extra-marital affairs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are either
based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or are simply
unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution
for the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital right
to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband and
wife unless the contrary is proved.
 According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits sexual
violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its accompanying Declaration,
defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

CORNELIA MATABUENA vs. PETRONILA CERVANTES

L-2877 (38 SCRA 284)

March 31, 1971

FACTS:

In 1956, herein appellant’s brother Felix Matabuena donated a piece of lot to his common-law
spouse, herein appellee Petronila Cervantes. Felix and Petronila got married only in 1962 or six years
after the deed of donation was executed. Five months later, or September 13, 1962, Felix died.
Thereafter, appellant Cornelia Matabuena, by reason of being the only sister and nearest collateral
relative of the deceased, filed a claim over the property, by virtue of a an affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by her in 1962, had the land declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes
thereon. The lower court of Sorsogon declared that the donation was valid inasmuch as it was made at
the time when Felix and Petronila were not yet spouses, rendering Article 133 of the Civil Code
inapplicable.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-
law relationship.

HELD:

Yes. It is a fundamental principle in statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of the law as what is written. Since the reason for the ban on donations between spouses
during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being
exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this prohibition shall not apply also to
common-law relationships.

However, the lack validity of the donation made by the deceased to Petronila does not necessarily mean
that the Cornelia will have exclusive rights to the disputed property because the relationship between
Felix and Petronila were legitimated by marriage. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil
Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to the other
half. (Matabuena vs. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971)
Agapay v. Palang

G.R. No. 116668, 28 July 1997

FACTS:
Miguel Palang married his first wife Carlina in 1949. In 1972, Miguel returned to the Philippines for good
but did not choose to live with his wife and daughter Herminia. In July 1973, then 63 years old Miguel
contracted his second marriage with 19 years old Erlinda Agapay.

In May 1973 or two months prior to their marriage Miguel and Erlinda jointly purchased a parcel of
agricultural land located at San Felipe, Binalonan, Pangasinan. Upon the death of Miguel in 1981, Carlina
and Herminia filed a case to recover the ownership and possession of the Agricultural land in
Pangasinan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property acquired during the illicit cohabitation or subsequent void marriage
(Erlinda and Miguel) belongs to conjugal property of the first and valid marriage (Carlina and Miguel).

RULING:

Yes. The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for cases of
cohabitation when a man and woman who are not capacitated to marry each other live exclusively with
each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel
and Erlinda contracted marriage, said union was patently void because earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still subsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.

Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual contribution is required by this provision, in
contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and
household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no
salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be
no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy-and-sell and had a
sari-sari store but failed to persuade the SC that she actually contributed money to buy the riceland.
Since petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the riceland, SC
finds no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.

HARDING V CUA

Gallery

Docena vs. Lapesura Case Digest

Docena vs. Lapesura
G.R. No. 140153 March 28, 2001
Facts: Casiano Hombria filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees,
petitioner-spouses Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on
occupation since time immemorial. A certain Guillermo Abuda intervened in the case. The trial court
ruled in favor of the petitioners and the intervenor Abuda. The CA reversed the judgment of the trial
court and ordered the petitioners to vacate the land they have leased from Casiano. The Complaint in
Intervention of Abuda was dismissed.

A Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed by the petitioners with the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge in issuing the Orders and of the sheriff in
issuing the Writ of Demolition.

Issue: Whether or not joint management or administration does require that the husband and the wife
always act together.

Ruling: Each spouse may validly exercise full power of management alone, subject to the intervention of
the court in proper cases. It is believed that even under the provisions of the Family Code, the husband
alone could have filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition to contest the writs of demolition issued
against the conjugal property with the Court of Appeals without being joined by his wife. The signing of
the attached certificate of non-forum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect. The signing
petitioner here made the certification in his behalf and that of his wife. The husband may reasonably be
presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his wife of any action or claim similar
to the petition for certiorari and prohibition given the notices and legal processes involved in a legal
proceeding involving real property

Uy vs CA
Uy vs. CA
GR No. 109557, November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Dr. Ernesto Jardelaza suffered stroke that rendered him comatose. Gilda, wife of the latter, filed a
petition in RTC Iloilo to be allowed as sole administrator of their conjugal property and be authorized to
sell the same as her husband is physically incapacitated to discharge his functions. She further contest
that such illness of the husband necessitated expenses that would require her to sell their property in
Lot 4291 and its improvement to meet such necessities. RTC ruled in favor of Gilda contending that such
decision is pursuant to Article 124 of FC and that the proceedings thereon are governed by the rules on
summary proceedings.

The son of the spouses, Teodoro, filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the petition made
by her mother was essentially a petition for guardianship of the person and properties of his father. As
such it cannot be prosecuted in accordance with the provisions on summary proceedings instead it
should follows the ruled governing special proceedings in the Revised Rules of Court requiring
procedural due process particularly the need for notice and a hearing on the merits. He further
reiterated that Chapter 2 of the FC comes under the heading on “Separation in Fact Between Husband
and Wife” contemplating a situation where both spouses are of disposing mind. Hence, he argued that
this should not be applied in their case.

During the pendency of the motion, Gilda sold the property to her daughter and son in law. Upon the
appeal by Teodoro, CA reversed the decision of the lower court.

ISSUE: WON Gilda as the wife of a husband who suffered stroke, a cerebrovascular accident rendering
him comatose, without motor and mental faculties, may assume sole powers of administration of the
conjugal property and dispose a parcel of land with improvements.

HELD:

SC ruled in favor of Teodoro. The rule on summary proceedings does not apply to cases where the non-
consenting spouse is incapacitated or incompetent to give consent. In this case, trial court found that
subject spouse was incompetent who was in a comatose condition and with a diagnosis of brain stem
infract. Hence, the proper remedy is a judicial guardianship proceeding under the Revised Rules of
Court. The law provides that wife who assumes sole powers of administration has the same powers and
duties as a guardian. Consequently, a spouse who desires to sell real property as administrator of the
conjugal property, must observe the procedure for the sale of the ward’s estate required of judicial
guardians, and not the summary judicial proceedings under FC. SC further held that such incapacity of
the trial court to provide for an opportunity to be heard is null and void on the ground of lack of due
process.

Quiao v. Quiao
Brigido Quiao v. Rita Quiao, Kitchie Quiao, Lotis Quiao, Petchie Quiao, represented by their mother Rita
Quiao
G.R. No 176556, July 4, 2012
Reyes, J.

FACTS:
Herein respondent Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against herein petitioner
Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido). Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision. As such, the herein parties shall
be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage bond shall not be severed.

Except for Letecia C. Quiao who is of legal age, the three minor children, namely, Kitchie, Lotis and
Petchie, all surnamed Quiao shall remain under the custody of the plaintiff who is the innocent spouse.
Further, except for the personal and real properties already foreclosed by the RCBC, all the remaining
properties, shall be divided equally between herein [respondents] and [petitioner] subject to the
respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities of [₱]45,740.00.
[Petitioner’s] share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children.

On July 7, 2006, or after more than nine months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner
filed before the RTC a Motion for Clarification,12 asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”
ISSUE:
What is the meaning of “net profits earned” by the conjugal partnership for purposes of forfeiture under
Article 63 of the Family Code?

HELD:
The net profits of the conjugal partnership of gains are all the fruits of the separate properties of the
spouses and the products of their labor and industry. The petitioner inquires from us the meaning of
“net profits” earned by the conjugal partnership for purposes of effecting the forfeiture authorized
under Article 63 of the Family Code. He insists that since there is no other provision under the Family
Code, which defines “net profits” earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation, then Article
102 of the Family Code applies.

Article 129 of the Family Code applies to the property relations of the parties. Moreover, as to the
definition of “net profits,” we cannot but refer to Article 102(4) of the Family Code, since it expressly
provides that for purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture under Article 43, No. (2)
and Article 63, No. (2), Article 102(4) applies. In this provision, net profits “shall be the increase in value
between the market value of the community property at the time of the celebration of the marriage and
the market value at the time of its dissolution.” Thus, without any iota of doubt, Article 102(4) applies to
both the dissolution of the absolute community regime under Article 102 of the Family Code, and to the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership regime under Article 129 of the Family Code.

DAVID A. NOVERAS v. LETICIA T. NOVERAS, GR No. 188289, 2014-08-20

Facts:

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June 2005
and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.[6] The California court granted to Leticia the custody
of her two children, as well as all the couple's properties in the USA.[7]

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David's failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer... all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3)
the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of
the purchase price as share of

Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment of P50,000.00 and P100,000.00
litigation expenses.[8]

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29 June
2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and... that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney's fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.
David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained
a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the
properties in the USA to

Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticia filed a petition for judicial separation
of conjugal properties.

Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had
been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where
David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Issues:

Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital infidelity
which can result into the forfeiture of the parties' properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2)
children.

Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the same can be
included in the judicial separation prayed for.

Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and respondent David
A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter's property rights over their conjugal
properties.

Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras is entitled to reimbursement of one-half of the P2.2 [M]illion sales
proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the P1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the
property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and... charges.

How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

Whether or not the attorney's fees and litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable against their
conjugal properties.

Leticia and David had indeed separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly
improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had
been living separately... since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own
business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez,
who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital... where
David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the
Consent for Operation form.[20] Third and more significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was
granted by the California court in June

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

Ruling:

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community
property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least
the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal case
of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and
David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of

P1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.

Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom.[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt
the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court's Decision with respect to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country... where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification made by the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolute community properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children's presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc property. While
both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property, absent a clear showing
where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have... come from the community
property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of P120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses... in the amount of
P300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least
the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166
duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise,... expenses incurred to settle the criminal case
of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia and
David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of P120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of

P1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
are therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net... assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of P410,000.00.

Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of P520,000.00 as their presumptive
legitimes therefrom.[21]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No.
88686 is AFFIRMED.

Wong vs IAC
Wong vs. IAC
GR No. 70082, August 19, 1991

FACTS:

Romario Henson married Katrina on January 1964. They had 3 children however, even during the early
years of their marriage, the spouses had been most of the time living separately. During the marriage or
on about January 1971, the husband bought a parcel of land in Angeles from his father using the money
borrowed from an officemate. Sometime in June 1972, Katrina entered an agreement with Anita Chan
where the latter consigned the former pieces of jewelry valued at P321,830.95. Katrina failed to return
the same within the 20 day period thus Anita demanded payment of their value. Katrina issued in
September 1972, check of P55,000 which was dishonored due to lack of funds. The spouses Anita Chan
and Ricky Wong filed action for collection of the sum of money against Katrina and her husband
Romarico. The reply with counterclaim filed was only in behalf of Katrina. Trial court ruled in favor of
the Wongs then a writ of execution was thereafter issued upon the 4 lots in Angeles City all in the name
of Romarico Henson married to Katrina Henson. 2 of the lots were sold at public auction to Juanito
Santos and the other two with Leonardo Joson. A month before such redemption, Romarico filed an
action for annulment of the decision including the writ and levy of execution.

ISSUE: WON debt of the wife without the knowledge of the husband can be satisfied through the
conjugal property.

HELD:

The writ of execution cannot be issued against Romarico and the execution of judgments extends only
over properties belonging to the judgment debtor. The conjugal properties cannot answer for Katrina’s
obligations as she exclusively incurred the latter without the consent of her husband nor they did
redound to the benefit of the family. There was also no evidence submitted that the administration of
the partnership had been transferred to Katrina by Romarico before said obligations were incurred. In
as much as the decision was void only in so far as Romarico and the conjugal properties concerned,
Spouses Wong may still execute the debt against Katrina, personally and exclusively.
JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS

September 25, 2012 § Leave a comment

JOCSON v. COURT OF APPEALS

February 16, 1989 (G.R. No. L-55322)

FACTS:
Emilio Jocon and Alejandra Jocson were husband and wife. The wife died first intestate then the
husband followed. Moises and Agustina are their children. Ernesto Vasquesz is the husband of Agustina.

The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson during
his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to Agustina Jocson-Vasquez what
apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-third (1/3) share in the estate of his
wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and prays that they be declared null and void
and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned between him and Agustina as the only heirs of
their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly sell. They
say it is conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete, because they were registered in the
name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete”.

ISSUE: WON the property registered under the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete” is
conjugal property or exclusive property.

HELD:
Exclusive. Article 60 of the CC proveides that All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. The
party who invokes this presumption must first prove that the property in controversy was acquired
during the marriage. In other words, proof of acquisition during the coverture is a condition sine qua
non for the operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership.

It is thus clear that before Moises Jocson may validly invoke the presumption under Article 160 he must
first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and
Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient.
The fact that the properties were registered in the name of “Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra
Poblete” is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses’ coverture. Acquisition of title
and registration thereof are two different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but
merely confirms one already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under
dispute were acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as married
to the latter.

Contrary to petitioner’s position, the certificates of title show, on their face, that the properties were
exclusively Emilio Jocson’s, the registered owner. This is so because the words “married to’ preceding
“Alejandra Poblete’ are merely descriptive of the civil status of Emilio Jocson. In other words, the import
from the certificates of title is that Emilio Jocson is the owner of the properties, the same having been
registered in his name alone, and that he is married to Alejandra Poblete.

De La Pena v. Avila, G.R. No. 187490, Feb. 8, 2012

FACTS: Antonia Dela Pena, who was married to Antegono Dela Pena, obtained a loan from Aguila Sons
and Co. As a security for the payment of the said loan, Antonia executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
in favour of Aguila on their residential lot in Marikina. However, Antonia also executed a Deed Of
absolute sale in favour of Gemma Avila over the same property because of Antonia’s failure to pay her
obligation from Aguila. Gemma Avila also mortgaged the same property to Far East Bank and Trust
Company (FEBTC-BPI) to secure a loan from the bank. Antonia, together with her son Alvin John, filed
against Gemma praying for the annulment of the said deed of sale. She claims that the said property
was conjugal property and was sold without the consent of his husband who already died by that time.
She also invokes the presumption of Conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code. The RTC ruled in
favour of Antonia and upheld the presumption of conjugality. The CA ruled otherwise. Thus, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the said property that was sold is part of the Conjugal Partnership

HELD: The presumption mentioned in the Art. 160 of the Civil Code applies only for the property
acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired. Moreover, the presumption in favour of the conjugality is rebuttable, but only with strong,
clear and convincing proof of exclusive ownership.

As the parties invoking the presumption of conjugality under Art. 160 of the Civil Code, the Dela Penas
did not even come close to proving that the subject property was acquired during the Marriage between
Antonia and Antegono. The record is bereft of evidence that from which the actual acquisition of the
property by Antonia was during the Marriage.

Although the title stated in its registration that it is under the name of, “Antonia Dela Pena, married to
Antegono dela Pena,” such is merely a description of the civil status of the wife and cannot mean that
the husband is also a registered owner. The reason for the inconclusiveness of the said description is
that it is possible that the property was acquired when she was single but only registered when she got
married.

PERSONS (3) CASE #2

MUÑOZ vs. RAMIREZ AND CARLOS 629 SCRA 38 (2010) BRION, J.:
FACTS:
The subject property in this case is a house and lot previously owned by Spouses Eliseo and Erlinda
Carlos, the TCT of which has already been transferred to petitioner Francisco Muñoz’s name. Original
petition in the RTC was Eliseo and Erlinda’s prayer for the nullification of the Deed of Sale, for the reason
that their transaction with petitioner was only an equitable mortgage and not a sale. The lot was part of
the parcel of land originally owned by Erlinda’s parents.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the property is paraphernal or conjugal and what are the effects on the sale
RULING:
The Court held that as a general rule, all property acquired by the spouses during the marriage are
conjugal. Article 92, paragraph 1, however, provides that properties acquired by gratuitous title by
either spouse shall be excluded from the community property and be the exclusive property of the
spouse. The lot was inherited by Erlinda from her parents, hence, it remains to be her exclusive
property. According to Article 120, a property may become part of the community property, if the
improvements made to it has a value higher than the value of the property before the improvement.
When this happens the spouse-owner is entitled to a reimbursement of the value of the property when
it was still exclusively owned by him. In this case, the improvements made, valued at about P60,755.76
paid by Eliseo as salary deductions was smaller in comparison to the amount paid to the GSIS for the
housing loan, the property remains to be the paraphernal property of Erlinda.
Also, since the property was paraphernal, Eliseo’s signatures were not needed in any of the
transfer documents.
C.C.E. Cuartero August 12, 2018
–
2:2

Aguete v. PNB, G.R. No. 170166 April 6, 2011

FACTS: Spouses Jose Ros and Estrella Aguete filed a complaint for the annulment of the Real Estate
Mortgage and all legal proceedings taken thereunder against PNB, Laoag Branch before the CFI of Ilocos
Norte.

The information disclosed that Jose Ros (petitioner) obtained a loan of P115,000 from ONB and
executed a real estate mortgage involving a parcel of land as security thereof. Upon maturity, the loan
remained unpaid and as a result, PNB initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the said
property. After which, the lot was sold to PNB as the highest bidder. Petitioner claims that she had no
knowledge of the loan incurred by her husband nor did she consent to the mortgage instituted on their
conjugal property. She then filed a complaint to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property (after the lapse of 1 year). The trial court rendered its decision in favor
of petitioners but was later reversed by the appellate court upon appeal.

ISSUE: WON the property is considered as redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.

HELD: Yes. Petition denied.

The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.17 Article 173 of the Civil
Code allows Aguete to question Ros’ encumbrance of the subject property. However, the same article
does not guarantee that the courts will declare the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be
declared only upon a finding that the wife did not give her consent.

It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very
nature of the contract of loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services
to be rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his business
or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband contracts obligations on
behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Ros’ loan from PNB redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Hence, the debt is chargeable
to the conjugal partnership.

Buado v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 145222, 24 April 2009

FACTS:
On April 30 1984, Spouses Roberto and Venus Buado, petitioners, filed a complaint for damages against
Erlinda Nicol for her civil liability arising from criminal offense of slander filed by petitioners. Trial court
rendered a decision to let Erlinda Nicol pay for damages. Finding Erlinda Nicol‘s personal properties
insufficient to satisfy the judgment. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction
sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr.
and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the
annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy
sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed
that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained
the P500, 000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of
Romulo Nicol.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on
the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said that
the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership.

RULING:

NO. Erlinda Nicol‟s liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership.

There is no dispute that contested property is conjugal in nature. Article 122 of the Family Code
explicitly provides that payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or
during the marriage shall not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar as they redounded
to the benefit of the family.Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by
either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property,
in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not
accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to
make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse.

Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal partnership. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third
party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce “a judgment for support”
filed by a third person, the third-party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal
to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing
of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

Francisco L. Gonzales vs. Erminda F. Gonzales

Promulgated

2005
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Facts:

Francisco Gonzales and Erminda Gonzales were living as husband and wife and they have blessed 4
children.

Erminda filed a complaint with RTC Makati City; for annulment of marriage alleges that Francisco is
psychological incapacitated to comply with the obligations of marriage. During the times they lived
together they acquired properties. Erminda managed their pizza business and work hard for its
development.

She prays for the declaration of the nullity of their marriage and for the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. But Francisco denied that allegations and claimed that he exclusively owns the
properties existing during their marriage.

The court rendered its decision, ordering the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains and
dividing the conjugal properties between Francisco and Erminda.

Francisco was not satisfied with the manner of dividing their properties, but he did not contest the part
of the decision which declared his marriage to respondent woid ab initio, so he appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the trial court. He filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was also denied.

Issue: Whether or not, Fransisco exclusively own the properties existing during their marriage.

Holding:

No,

The marriage of Francisco and Erminda is declared null and void consequently; their property relation
shall be governed by the provisions of Article 147

These provisions enumerate the two instances when the property relations between spouses shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. These are: (1) when a man and woman capacitated to marry
each other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without

the benefit of marriage; and (2) when a man and woman live together under a void marriage. Under this
property regime of co-ownership, properties acquired by both parties during their union, in the absence
of proof to the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained through the joint efforts of the parties
and will be owned by them in equal shares.

Article 147 creates a presumption that properties acquired during the cohabitation of the parties have
been acquired through their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned by them in equal shares.
Alipio vs. Court of Appeals
Joint Lessee (D) vs. Lessor (P)
GR 134100

Summary: A lease was executed by a husband and his wife together with another couple. Then, the
husband died. The lessor is suing the surviving wife as a solidary debtor.

Rule of Law: Spouses sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them are being
impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.

Facts: Romeo Jaring (P) subleased a fishpond to spouses Alipio (D) and spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel for P485,600 payable in two installments. The first installment was paid, but the
second was only partly paid. Despite due demand, the balance remain unpaid. Jaring (P) filed a case to
collect the balance from the spouses Alipio (D) and spouses Manuel with a prayer for the alternative of
rescission. Purita Alipio (D) moved to dismiss the case because her husband died and thus, dissolving
their conjugal partnership. Alipio (D) contended that the proper action for Jaring (P) is to file a claim in
the settlement of the estate.

The trial court denied Alipio's (D) motion on the ground that since she was herself a party to the
sublease contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with spouses Manuel and
that the death of her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.

On appeal, the court applied the ruling on Climaco vs. Siy Uy finding the surviving spouse solidary liable.

Issues: Is the surviving spouse a solidary debtor for a lease she and her late husband entered into?

Ruling: No. For marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered
into by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership
which is primarily bound for its repayment. (Rules of Court, Rule 79, §2) Thus, when the spouses are
sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by them, they are being impleaded in their
capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as independent debtors such that the
concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply.

A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of
a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper remedy is for him to
file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation
does not imply that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is
bound to render, entire compliance with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires solidarity.
—Article 1207, Civil Code

If from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an
obligation is presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are
debtors, each debt being considered distinct from one another. (Article 1208, Civil Code)
However,
Should the lessees or sub-lessees refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease
period and despite due demands by the lessor, they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the
use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not the contract of lease or sublease but the
fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.
—Abalos vs. Court of Appeals, GR 106029, Oct. 19, 1999.

Reading the pertinent portion of the contract, it is clear that the liability of the sublessees is merely
joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is chargeable against their respective
conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance should be divided into two.

PATROCINIA RAVINA AND WILFREDO RAVINA

vs.
MARY ANN P. VILLA ABRILLE, for herself and in behalf of INGRID D'LYN P. VILLA ABRILLE, INGREMARK
D'WIGHT VILLA ABRILLE, INGRESOLL DIELS VILLA ABRILLE AND INGRELYN DYAN VILLA ABRILLE
G.R. No. 160708
October 16, 2009
FACTS:
Respondent Mary Ann Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille are husband and wife. They have four
children, who are also parties to the instant case and are represented by their mother, Mary Ann.
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land denominated as Lot 7, located
in Davao City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is
adjacent to a parcel of land which Pedro acquired when he was still single and which is registered solely
in his name under TCT No. T-26471.

Through their joint efforts and the proceeds of a loan from the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP), the spouses built a house on Lot 7 and Pedro’s lot. The house was finished in the early
1980’s but the spouses continuously made improvements, including a poultry house and an annex.

In 1991, Pedro got a mistress and began to neglect his family. Mary Ann was forced to sell or mortgage
their movables to support the family and the studies of her children. By himself, Pedro offered to sell the
house and the two lots to herein petitioners, Patrocinia and Wilfredo Ravina. Mary Ann objected and
notified the petitioners of her objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold the house and the two lots
without Mary Ann’s consent, as evidenced by a Deed of Sale[5]. It appears on the said deed that Mary
Ann did not sign on top of her name.

On July 5, 1991 while Mary Ann was outside the house and the four children were in school,
Pedro together with armed members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) and acting
in connivance with petitioners began transferring all their belongings from the house to an apartment.

When Mary Ann and her daughter Ingrid Villa Abrille came home, they were stopped from
entering it. They waited outside the gate until evening under the rain. They sought help from the
Talomo Police Station, but police authorities refused to intervene, saying that it was a family matter.
Mary Ann alleged that the incident caused stress, tension and anxiety to her children, so much so that
one flunked at school.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the subject property covered by TCT No. T-88674 is an exclusive property of Pedro or
conjugal property, and
(2) Whether its sale by Pedro was valid considering the absence of Mary Ann’s consent.

HELD:
1. Article 160 of the New Civil Code provides, "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong
to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife."
There is no issue with regard to the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, which was an exclusive
property of Pedro, having been acquired by him before his marriage to Mary Ann. However, the lot
covered by TCT No. T-88674 was acquired in 1982 during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No
evidence was adduced to show that the subject property was acquired through exchange or barter. The
presumption of the conjugal nature of the property subsists in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is exclusively
owned by Pedro. Petitioners’ bare assertion would not suffice to overcome the presumption that TCT
No. T-88674, acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is conjugal. Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having been constructed through the joint efforts of the spouses, who had
even obtained a loan from DBP to construct the house.

2. A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that now treats such a disposition to be
void if done (a) without the consent of both the husband and the wife, or (b) in case of one spouse’s
inability, the authority of the court.
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely filed the action for annulment of sale within five (5) years
from the date of sale and execution of the deed. However, her action to annul the sale pertains only to
the conjugal house and lot and does not include the lot covered by TCT No. T-26471, a property
exclusively belonging to Pedro and which he can dispose of freely without Mary Ann’s consent.

Roxas v. CA
MELANIA A. ROXAS, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO M. CAYETANO,
respondents.

G.R. No. 92245, 26 June 1991.

PARAS, J.:

Petitioner Melania Roxas ("Melania") is married to Antonio Roxas ("Antonio"), although they are already
estranged and living separately.

Melania discovered that Antonio leased to Respondent Antonio Cayetano ("Mr. Cayetano") their
conjugal lot in Novaliches without her knowledge and consent.
Thus, Melanie filed a case before the RTC praying for the annulment of the contract of lease between
Antonio and Mr. Cayetano.

Mr. Cayetano moved to dismiss the complaint on the sole ground that the complaint states no cause of
action.

The RTC Judge resolved said Motion by dismissing Melania's complaint.

ISSUE: W/N a husband, may legally enter into a long-term contract of lease involving conjugal real
property without the consent of the wife.

Ruling: No. (Case remanded to the RTC by the SC)

No,

Although the husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership, however, administration does
not include acts of ownership. The husband can administer the conjugal assets unhampered; he cannot
alienate or encumber the conjugal realty. Thus, under Art. 166 of NCC “unless the wife has been
declared a non-compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a
leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership
the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant
the same.” This rule prevents abuse on the part of the husband, and guarantees the rights of the wife,
who is partly responsible for the acquisition of the property, particularly the real property. Contracts
entered into by the husband in violation of this prohibition are voidable and subject to annulment at the
instance of the aggrieved wife. (Art. 173 of the Civil Code) .

BENIGNO TODA, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROSE MARIE TUASON-TODA, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS

In June 1951, Benigno Toda Jr and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda got married and blessed with two children.
However, their conjugal union was jeopardized because of individual differences and the alleged
Benigno’s infidelity thereby prompting Rose Marie to file for petition for termination of conjugal
partnership on the ground of alleged mismanagement and dissipation of conjugal funds against Benigno.

After hearings were held, both parties agreed to a joint petition for judicial approval of the dissolution of
their conjugal partnership which was signed on March 30, 1981, embodied a compromise agreement
allocating to the spouses their respective shares in the conjugal partnership assets and dismissing the
previous appeals made before the CA and SC. Said petition was approved by the Trial Court in its order
of June 9,1981. Further, the trial court issued several orders pertaining to the interpretation and
implementation of the said compromise agreement.
ISSUE

Whether or not the compromise agreement takes effect on the time when it was approved by the trial
court

HOLDING

YES. The Supreme Court is in agreement with the Court of Appeals that the compromise agreement in
this case shall become effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was approved by the trial court
and not March 30,1981 when it was signed by the parties involved. Under Article 134 of the Family
Code: “in the absence of the express declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation of the
property between the spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.”
Hence, the separation of property is not effected by mere execution of a contract or agreement of the
parties but by the decree by the court approving the same.

Therefore, it becomes effective only upon the judicial approval, without which it is void. Article 137 of
this code explicitly provides that the conjugal partnership is dissolved only upon the issuance of a decree
of separation of property.

Espinosa v.Atty. Omana, A.C. No. 9081, October 12, 2011

FACTS: On 17 November 1997, Rodolfo Espinosa and his wife Elena Marantal sought Omana’s legal
advice on whether they could dissolve their marriage and live separately. Omana prepared a document
entitled “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” Espinosa and Marantal started implanting the conditions of the
said contract. However, Marantal took custody of all their children and took possession of most of the
conjugal property. Espinosa sought the advice of Glindo, his fellow employee who is a law graduate, who
informed him that the contract executed by Omana was not valid. They hired the services of a lawyer to
file a complaint against Omana before the IBP-CBD. Omana denied that she prepared the contract. She
admitted that Espinosa went to see her and requested for the notarization of the contract but she told
him that it was illegal. Omana alleged that Espinosa returned the next day while she was out of the
office and managed to persuade her part-time office staff to notarize the document. Her office staff
forged her signature and notarized the contract.

ISSUE: W/N Omaña violated the CPR in notartizing the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.” W/N the
Kasunduaan ng Paghihiwalay is valid.

HELD: SC has ruled that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial approval
is void. The Court has also ruled that a notary public should not facilitate the disintegration of a marriage
and the family by encouraging the separation of the spouses and extrajudicially dissolving the conjugal
partnership, which is exactly what Omaña did in this case.

Valdes vs RTC
Valdes vs. RTC
260 SCRA 221
FACTS:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings
are free to choose which they prefer.

Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation
of common property in “unions without marriage”. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed
a joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.

ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.

HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations
of the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is
prima facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate
in the acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said party’s
efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

Salas vs. Aguila

Facts: On September 7 1985, Juan Sevilla Salas Jr. and Eden Villena Aguila were married. Aguila
gave birth to their daughter on June 7 1986. Five months later, Salas left their conjugal dwelling. Since
then, he no longer communicated with Aguila or their child.

On October 7, 2003, Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage citing psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The petition states that they “have no conjugal
properties whatsoever”.

On May 7, 2007, RTC nullify their marriage and further provides the dissolution of their conjugal
property, if any.

On September 10, 2007, Aguila filed a manifestation and motion stating that she discovered 3 properties
registered to Juan S. Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.

However, Salas alleged that Aguila waived her rights to the Discovered Properties in consideration of
other properties waived by Salas in favour of Aguila. Thus, he contends that conjugal properties were
deemed partitioned.

RTC directed Salas and Aguila to partition by proper instruments of conveyance the discovered
properties. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the discovered properties are acquired during the marriage of Salas and Aguila,
thus a conjugal property and subject for partition between them.

Ruling: Yes. Aguila proved that the Discovered Properties were acquired by Salas during the validity of
their marriage.

The phrase “married to” in the title is merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner,
Salas.

Article 147 of the Family Code applies to the union of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred
by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is declared void under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Under this property regime, property acquired during marriage is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through the couple’s joint efforts and governed by the rules of co-ownership.

Thus, the Discovered Properties should be partitioned on the basis of co-ownership.