EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent,
G.R. No. 152398 April 14, 2005 456 SCRA 45

FACTS:

On Oct. 19, 1993, petitioner SPO1 Edgar Crisostomo (Crisostomo) was charged with the murder
of Renato Suba (Renato), a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal jail. The information alleged that
Crisostomo conspired with his 6 co-accused who were identified all as inmates at the said jail wherein
the former pleaded not guilty during arraignment.

According to the prosecution Renato was found dead in the floor outside his cell. Renato was
detained alone in one of the four cells at the municipal jail. Each cells had locks but were usually left
open and only one jail guard at the time was assigned at the said jail where Crisostomo was the one on
duty at the time of the death of the victim. Crisostomo’s position in relation to the cell where the victim
was killed was such that Crisostomo as jail guard could have heard if not seen what was going on inside
the cell at the time Renato was killed. Unexplained discrepancies in the list of detainees/prisoners and
police blotter were found indicating that on February 20, 1989 the list shows 8 prisoners at the time
when Renato was killed on Feb. 14, 1989 but only 6 were turned over by Crisostomo after the victim’s
death. On Feb. 15, 9 prisoners/detainees were on the list, including the victim. However, the police
blotter shows that only 6 were under custody. The persons who were detained with Renato at the time
of his death were release without being investigated by the Solano Police. The exhumation and autopsy
reports ruled out suicide as the cause of Renato's death. The deafening silence of the inmates and the
jail guard pointed to conspiracy, and the jump bail during trial by Crisostomo made his guilt apparent.

The presentation of evidence for Crisostomo’s defense was deemed waived for his failure to
appear at the scheduled hearings despite notice. The Sandiganbayan ruled that only Crisostomo and one
named co-accused Calingayan stood trail when the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence to
convict Crisostomo. Petitioner Crisostomo filed an appeal by certiorari when he was denied for the
Motion for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner’s absence on the day of his hearing deemed a waiver of his right to
present evidence.

HELD:

No. The SC held that Crisostomo's absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been
deemed as a waiver of his right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived, such
waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo
did not voluntarily waive in person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. Under
Section 2(c), Rule 114 and Section 1(c), Rule 115 of the Rules of Court, Crisostomo's non-appearance
during the 22 June 1995 trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for trial on such date only
and not for the succeeding trial dates. 62 Section 1(c) of Rule 115 clearly states that:

. . . The absence of the accused without any justifiable cause at the trial on a particular date of which he
had notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present during that trial. When an accused
under custody had been notified of the date of the trial and escapes, he shall be deemed to have waived
his right to be present on said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody is regained.

In criminal cases where the imposable penalty may be death, as in the present case, the court is
called upon to see to it that the accused is personally made aware of the consequences of a waiver of
the right to present evidence. 64 In fact, it is not enough that the accused is simply warned of the
consequences of another failure to attend the succeeding hearings. 65 The court must first explain to
the accused personally in clear terms the exact nature and consequences of a waiver. 66 Crisostomo
was not even forewarned. The Sandiganbayan simply went ahead to deprive Crisostomo of his right to
present evidence without even allowing Crisostomo to explain his absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing.
The prosecution's evidence failed to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence warranting
Crisostomo's acquittal.

PETER ANDRADA, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

G.R. No. 135222 March 04, 2005 452 SCRA 685

FACTS:

Petitioner Peter Andrada was charged with frustrated murder for attacking Arsenio Ugerio while
the latter was seating and finishing his meal in a restaurant. Petitioner ran away after hacking the victim
on the head with a bolo. The victim was brought to a hospital. Petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed
along the road. During arraignment, petitioner with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. The hearing of the case ensued. The trial court found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision and modified the imposable
penalty because it found that petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
as he was only 17 years, 9 months and 20 days old at the time of the incident. CA denied the MR.

Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the SC claiming that its constitutional
right to due process was violated because of his counsel’s gross incompetence or gross negligence. He
contends that his counsel:

1. Failed to present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is innocent of the crime charged;
2. Failed to present the medical certificate showing the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim;
3. Did not notify him to attend the hearing when Sgt. Sumabong was cross-examined; and
4. Failed to submit a memorandum.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioner’s right to due process was violated;

HELD:

No. There was no violation of petitioner’s right to due process. In criminal cases, the negligence
or incompetence of counsel to be deemed gross must have prejudiced the constitutional right of an
accused to be heard. Record shows that the counsel actively participated in the cross-examination of the
witnesses for the prosecution to test their credibility. The fact that he did not choose to present other
witnesses did not affect any of petitioner’s substantial rights.

Petitioner was represented by counsel of his choice. When he decided to retain the services of
his counsel during the entire proceedings, in which he was present, petitioner must be deemed bound
by any mistake committed by him. For if an accused feels that his counsel is inept, he should take action
by discharging him earlier, instead of waiting until an adverse decision is rendered and thereupon blame
his counsel for incompetence.

The long-standing rule is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. Mistakes of
attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to summon
witnesses, and to argue the case, unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case, do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence.

ISIDRO OLIVAREZ, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 163866, July 29, 2005 465 SCRA 465

FACTS:

An information for violation of R.A. 7610, the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act was filed against Isidro Olivarez by the prosecution with the MTC San
Pedro Laguna. The case originated from a complaint filed by the offended party with the MTC San Pedro,
Laguna which was the basis upon which an information for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed against
petitioner. This Information states that petitioner committed acts of lasciviousness on the person of
Cristina Elitiong, by touching her breasts and kissing her lips, against her will.

The trial court found petitioner guilty of the crime charged. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court’s decision and denied the MR so petitioner filed a Petition for Review before
the SC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense,
which are age of the offended party and that she is an abused or exploited child as defined in the law,
for which he is being charged.

HELD:

NO. All the elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 were averred in the
Complaint mentioned in the Information of which a copy was furnished to the petitioner in which he
was informed of the age of the complainant. The prosecution has also established the minority of the
offended party through competent evidence. Cristina testified that she was 16 years old and a
certification from the Office of the Local Registrar of San Pedro, Laguna was presented showing that she
was born on October 17, 1980.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him. A complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation
of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place
where the offense was committed. The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be
made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. The acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary
and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment.

The information merely states that petitioner was being charged for the crime of “violation of
R.A. 7610” without citing the specific sections alleged to have been violated by petitioner. This omission
is not sufficient to invalidate the information. The character of the crime is not determined by the
caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they may be conclusions of law, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances
in the complaint or information. The sufficiency of an information is not negated by an incomplete or
defective designation of the crime in the caption or other parts of the information but by the narration
of facts and circumstances which adequately depicts a crime and sufficiently apprise the accused of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him.

JOEL P. LIBUIT, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 154363, September 13, 2005 469 SCRA 510

FACTS:

In May 1993, private complainant Domingo del Mundo brought his car to the motor shop owned
by petitioner Joel Libuit for repair. The car was received by a mechanic in the presence of the petitioner
who assured the private complainant that it would be safe in his motor shop.

Eight months later, private complainant returned to the motor shop but the repair work was not
finished yet and he was assured that they would finish and deliver the car after two weeks. However,
the petitioner failed to deliver the car to the owner. Private complainant gave him another two weeks to
finish the repairs. Thereafter, the private complainant returned to the motor shop and found that his car
was already missing. He reported the matter to the police, who discovered that the petitioner had sold
the car’s differential and cylinder head, while the engine could no longer be found. He filed a complaint
for estafa.

On arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty. On trial, petitioner
testified on direct examination. However, his defense counsel withdrew from the case after his initial
cross-examination. On motion of the petitioner, the continuation of his cross-examination was reset to
give him time to engage the services of another counsel. The petitioner eventually secured the services
of a new counsel.

At the subsequent hearings, his new counsel failed to appear despite notices. On motion of the
prosecution, the trial court issued an Order striking from the records the petitioner’s direct testimony
and declaring the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record. After
further proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of estafa.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. The petitioner
filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner’s contention: the trial court should have appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel
consistently failed to appear for his cross-examination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel.

HELD:

NO. The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for the accused who has no counsel of
choice and desires to employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of arraignment. No such
duty exists where the accused has proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his own
choice. Worth noting, when the time for the presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and the
defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his counsel was inexcusable.

In the present case, since the petitioner was represented by counsel de parte at the arraignment
and trial, the trial court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de oficio for the
continuation of his cross-examination. After his initial cross-examination, the trial court granted the
petitioner’s motion to postpone, giving him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel.
The failure of his newly hired lawyer to appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was sufficient
legal basis for the trial court to order the striking from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter
render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In fact, the repeated failure to appear of
defendant’s counsel at the trial may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay the court’s
proceedings.

ASSOCIATE JUSTICE DELILAH VIDALLON-MAGTOLIS vs. CIELITO M. SALUD,

A.M. No. CA-05-20-P, September 9, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent now faces several administrative complaints against him due to his material and
financial interest to the case of Lagua, which is now in the office of the Division Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals under Atty Madarang for promulgation. It was alleged that respondent served the
resolution and order of release in the National Penitentiary for the release of Lagua. In the meantime, in
the office of Atty. Madarang she received a phone call from a relative of Lagua and was asking for the
remaining balance they have to pay to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang through respondent Salud.
The caller also said they sought the help of a certain Valdez from the RTC where the case originated.
Atty. Madarang pretending to be a relative of Lagua then called the RTC and was looking for Valdez.

Later on, Justice Magtolis confronted the respondent in her office but respondent denied that
he was extorting or receiving money for Lagua’s release. Respondent however admitted to the Justice
that he served the copies of resolution and order of release to a person not authorized to receive the
documents. Justice Magtolis then lodged a complaint subjecting the respondent to disciplinary action
and administrative investigation. Justice Magtolis also instructed Atty. Madarang to continue
communicating with respondent via SMS (text messaging) under the name “Arlyn”. It was found out that
it was through this kind of venture or extortion or receiving money from cases which are pending in the
Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the admission of the text messages as evidence against respondent Salud
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy

HELD:

The respondent’s claim that the admission of the text messages as evidence against him
constitutes a violation of his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been classified as
“ephemeral electronic communication” under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence,
and “shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal
knowledge thereof.” Any question as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and academic,
as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel, already admitted that he was the sender of the first
three messages on Atty. Madarang’s cell phone.

In the recent case of Zaldy Nuez v. Elvira Cruz-Apao, the Court, in finding the respondent therein
guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct, considered text messages addressed to the complainant
asking for a million pesos in exchange for a favorable decision in a case pending before the CA. The
Court had the occasion to state:

… The text messages were properly admitted by the Committee since the same are now covered by
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which provides:

“Ephemeral electronic communication” refers to telephone conversations, text messages … and other
electronic forms of communication the evidence of which is not recorded or retained.”

Under Section 2, Rule 11 of the [said rules], “Ephemeral electronic communications shall be
proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof … .” In this case, complainant who was the recipient of the said messages and therefore had
personal knowledge thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent herself admitted that
the cellphone number reflected in complainant’s cellphone from which the messages originated was
hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as to the admissibility of the text messages had
been laid to rest when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity of the text messages
between her and complainant. It is also well to remember that in administrative cases, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. We have no doubt as to the probative value of the text
messages as evidence in determining the guilt or lack thereof of respondent in this case.

ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner, v. ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA,
and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court, Manila,
Respondents. G.R. No. 148220, 15 June 2005 460 SCRA 197

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent), represented by his mother
Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages
against petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that
he is the biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with respondent’s
mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. To support the motion, respondent presented the testimony of Saturnina C. Halos, Ph.D.
When she testified, Dr. Halos was an Associate Professor at De La Salle University where she taught Cell
Biology. She was also head of the University of the Philippines Natural Sciences Research Institute (UP-
NSRI), a DNA analysis laboratory. She was a former professor at the University of the Philippines in
Diliman, Quezon City, where she developed the Molecular Biology Program and taught Molecular
Biology. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that
the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA Paternity testing violates Herrera’s right against self-incrimination.

HELD:

No. It is true that in 1997, the Supreme Court ruled in Pe Lim vs CA that DNA testing is not yet
recognized in the Philippines and at the time when he questioned the order of the trial court, the
prevailing doctrine was the Pe Lim case; however, in 2002 there is already no question as to the
acceptability of DNA test results as admissible object evidence in Philippine courts. This was the decisive
ruling in the case of People vs Vallejo (2002). It is also considered that the Vallejo Guidelines be
considered by the courts. The Vallejo Guidelines determines weight and probative value of DNA test
results.

The Vallejo Guidelines:

1. how the samples were collected;

2. how they were handled;
3. the possibility of contamination of the samples;
4. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples;
5. whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests; and
6. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

LILANY YULO y BILLONES, Petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 142762. March 04, 2005 452 SCRA 705

FACTS:

In August 1992, Lilany B. Yulo, petitioner, and Josefina Dimalanta went to the house of Myrna
Roque, private complainant, in Caloocan City. Josefina, introduced to Myrna petitioner Yulo as her best
friend and a good payer. Josefina told Myrna that petitioner wanted her checks encashed. In view of
Josefina’s assurance that petitioner is trustworthy, Myrna agreed to encash the checks. Petitioner then
issued to Myrna three checks: (a) Equitable Bank (EB) Check No. 237936 in the amount of ₱40,000.00,
postdated September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No. 237941 in the amount of ₱16,200.00; and (c) Bank of
the Philippine Islands (BPI) Check No. 656602 in the amount of ₱40,000.00, postdated November 18,
1992.

When Myrna presented the checks for payment to the drawee banks, they were dishonored. The EB
checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds," while the BPI check was stamped "Account Closed."
When no payment was forthcoming, Myrna lodged a complaint against petitioner with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Caloocan City. On August 23, 1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan
City Prosecutor with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 130, same city, for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22,

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of her right to speedy disposition of cases.

HELD:

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals resolved her motion for reconsideration only after
three (3) years from its filing. Such inaction violates her right to a speedy disposition of her case. In his
comment, the Solicitor General counters that the Appellate Court has explained satisfactorily why
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was not resolved immediately.

Article III, Section 16 of the Constitution provides:

SEC.16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-
judicial, or administrative bodies.

Under the foregoing provision, any party to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked
with the administration of justice to expedite its disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition
is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible concept.5 A mere mathematical reckoning of the
time involved is not sufficient.6 In applying the Constitutional guarantee, particular regard must be
taken of the facts and circumstances of each case.
 The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial,7 is deemed violated
only when the proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays, or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.8 To determine
whether the right has been violated, the following factors may be considered: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.9

In the instant case, we agree with the Solicitor General that the delay was sufficiently explained
by the Court of Appeals. The ponente of the decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 17513, Associate Justice Jainal D.
Rasul, retired during the pendency of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration filed on March 4, 1997.
However, the case was assigned to Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on February 28, 2000
and brought to her attention on March 2, 2000. We note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole only two (2)
weeks from notice to resolve the motion. Clearly, she did not incur any delay. We, therefore, rule that
there has been no violation of the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial.