Political Law

ATENEO CENTRAL
BAR OPERATIONS 2022 POLITICAL LAW BLUE TIPS
PRAYER FOR THE BAR EXAMINATIONS
O God, we come before You this day,

as we are preparing/studying for the bar examinations.
This is the most important event in our lives,

one full of consequences for our own future,
and for the hopes and expectations of many who love us and
are concerned for us: our parents and relatives, our friends,
our professors who have worked hard to prepare us for it.
We ask for help.

Make our memories ready to recall all the
knowledge we have stored in them by our study.
Help us to understand the full meaning of the questions and
to see the exact answers.
Give us the facility of expression to answer
clearly and accurately.
Give us peace of soul
that we may not get upset under the pressure of the task.
We do not ask this by our own merits.

We cannot point to our faithful service
in the past as deserving of this special help.
We have in fact been careless and disobedient.
We ask this from Your Fatherly mercy and compassion through

Your Son, our Lord Jesus Christ.
Listen to our prayers through the intercession of our Blessed Mother,
patroness of our University and of St. Thomas More,
patron of our Law School.
Amen.
What do you call a group of songbirds flying over the West Philippine Sea?
Regimes Velasquez
Special thanks to Atty. Eugene Kaw, Atty. Alu Dorotan, Atty. Dianna Wilwayco,
and Atty. Carlo Cruz.
THE BLUE TIPS ARE EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE USE OF ATENEO BAR TAKERS FOR THE 2022 BAR
EXAMINATIONS. UNAUTHORIZED USE AND REPRODUCTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS PROHIBITED.
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ATENEO CENTRAL
I. BASIC CONCEPTS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
Q1: What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

A1: It is a doctrine of national territory articulated in the second sentence of Article I, Section 1, which provides
that: “The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth
and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines.” (PHIL. CONST. Art. I, §1)
It is based on the principle that an archipelago, which consists of a number of islands separated by bodies of
water, should be treated as one integral unit. (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, 2011)
Q2: Did the Philippines lose its sovereignty over the KIG and Scarborough Shoal under R.A. No. 9522?
A2: No. R.A. No. 9522 is a statutory tool to demarcate the maritime zone and continental shelf of the Philippines
under UNCLOS III, and does not alter the national territory. The law has nothing to do with acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of territory, as States may only acquire (or lose) territory through the following modes:
Cession, Accretion, Prescription and Occupation. (Magallona, supra)
Q3: Explain the concept of “Regime of Islands”.

A3: Under Article 121 of the UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tides, qualifies under the category of “regime of islands” whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones (e.g., Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal).
1. Kalayaan Islands has its own Territorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic Zone.
2. BUT Scarborough Shoal ONLY has a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.
3. There can be a Continental Shelf without an EEZ, but not an EEZ without a Continental Shelf.
Q4: What is the limitation of the territorial jurisdiction of LGUs?

A4: The territorial jurisdiction of LGUs are limited to the land area and physical metes and bounds as defined in
their charters and does not extend to the continental shelf for purposes of determining the equitable share.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941, December 4, 2018)
However, the Court further clarified that it is inaccurate to declare that a local government unit's territory, and by
extension, its territorial jurisdiction, can only be over land that is contiguous. When the territory consists of one
(1) or more islands, territorial jurisdiction can also be exercised over all waters found inland, or in any area that
is part of its seabed, subsoil, or continental margin, "in the manner provided by law(.)" (Republic v. Provincial
Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941 (Resolution), January 21, 2020)
Q5: The Provincial Assessor of Batangas issued Assessments of Real Property against Capitol Wireless
(Capwire).Provincial Assessor had determined that the submarine cable systems described in Capwire's
Sworn Statement of True Value of Real Properties are taxable real property. Capwire argues that these
are not taxable as the cable system lies outside of the Philippine territory, i.e. on international waters. Is
Capwire correct in its assertion?
A5: No. Nasugbu is a coastal town and the surrounding sea falls within what the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) would define as the country's territorial sea (to the extent of 12 nautical miles
outward from the nearest baseline, under Part II, Sections 1 and 2) over which the country has sovereignty,
including the seabed and subsoil, it follows that indeed a portion of the submarine cable system lies within
Philippine territory and thus falls within the jurisdiction of the said local taxing authorities.
Even if such portion does not lie in the 12-nautical-mile vicinity of the territorial sea but further inward, Magallona
v Ermita held that "whether referred to as Philippine 'internal waters' under Article I of the Constitution or as
'archipelagic waters' under UNCLOS Part III, Article 49(1, 2, 4), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over the
body of water lying landward of (its) baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas
underneath." (Capital Wireless v. Provincial Government of Batangas, G.R. No. 180110,2016)
Q6: Can the State be sued?

A6: Yes. However, Article XVI Section 3 provides that the State may not be sued without its consent.
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Q7: How is consent to be sued given by the State?

A7: Consent may be given either expressly or impliedly. There is express consent when there is a law (General
or Special) expressly granting authority to sue the State or any of its agencies. There is implied consent:
a. When the State commences litigation, it becomes vulnerable to a counterclaim; (US v Guinto, G.R. No.
76590, 1990)
b. State enters into a business contract (thus exercising proprietary functions); (Id.)
c. When it would be inequitable for the State to invoke immunity;
d. In eminent domain cases.
Q7: When is the restrictive application of State Immunity proper?

A7: The traditional rule of State immunity which exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another State
without the former's consent or waiver has evolved into a restrictive doctrine which distinguishes sovereign and
governmental acts (Jure imperii) from private, commercial and proprietary acts (Jure gestionis). Under the
restrictive rule of State immunity, State immunity extends only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of
State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs (Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, Sept. 16, 2014).
Q8: In the Matter of South China Sea Arbitration Case

PH Claim: All its submissions are entirely within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and are admissible.
PRC Claim: The matter should be settled through negotiations, pursuant to the PH-CH bilateral
agreement. China asserts that this essentially concerns territorial sovereignty over maritime features
which is beyond the scope of the UNCLOS and is excluded by the declaration filed by China in 2006.
A8: It was held that:

a. Jurisdiction and Admissibility. The matters submitted to arbitration do not concern sovereignty and
are neither subject to the exceptions to the dispute settlement provisions of the UNCLOS nor covered by
the existing agreements between PH and PRC as to to dispute settlements. As such, the Tribunal has
jurisdiction despite China’s non-participation.
b. Historic Right Claim. China failed to show that it has exercised exclusive control over the water of the
South China Sea or their resources. All historic rights in China’s EEZ, ECS and high seas were
extinguished upon the effectivity of the UNCLOS.
c. Geological Features in the Spratlys. None of the geologic features in Spratlys are capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own so as to be entitled to a 200 NM EEZ. As to the China-occupied
geologic features in Spratlys the Tribunal classified some of them as HTE Reefs and LTE Reefs where the
former are entitled to 12 NM territorial sea and the latter are not. Among the said reefs, Mischief Reef has
been bound to be within the Philippine EEX and part of its CS. The Tribunal ruled that the Scarborough
Shoal is a HTE entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea only.
d. Harm to Environment. China violated its obligations to prevent harm to the environment for building
islands on reefs and for failing to prevent its fishermen from harvesting endangered species in the
Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal causing “permanent and irreparable harm to the coral reef system.”
e. Manner of Enforcement
1. By coastal state: conduct of naval and aerie patrol in EEZ and exploitation of resources
2. By other states: freedom of navigation and overflight in high seas and EEZs
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION
Q10: Can the state deny relief under a tax treaty due to technicalities or procedural lapses?
A10: No. A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislation those
modifications that ensure granting of reliefs under tax treaties. (Deutsche Bank v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, 2010)
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Q11: What does the prohibition against taxation of religious, charitable and educational entities pertain
to?
A11: Exemption from real property taxes. (Sec. 28 [3], Art. VI, Constitution)
WHO WHAT HOW
Non-stock non- Revenues Exempt as long as it is used actually, directly and exclusively (ADE) for
profit educational purposes, regardless of its source. (Sec. 4[3], Art. XIV,
educational Constitution; DLSU v. CIR, 2016)
institutions
Assets Exempt from RPT as long as they are used ADE for educational
purposes. Id.
Non-stock non- Revenues Exempt from income tax if they are organized and operated exclusively for
profit Hospitals charitable purposes and no part of its net income or asset inures to the
benefit of any member, organizer, etc. (Sec. 30[E], NIRC)
Income from real or personal properties or from activities conducted for

profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject
to income tax. (Sec. 30, last par., NIRC)
Assets Exempt from RPT as long as they are used ADE for charitable purposes.
(Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, Constitution)
Other non-stock Revenues Exempt provided that is organized and operated exclusively for charitable
non-profit purposes and no part of its net income or asset inures to the benefit of
charitable any member, organizer, etc. (Sec. 30[E], NIRC).
institutions
Income from real or personal properties or from activities conducted for
profit, regardless of the disposition made of such income, shall be subject
to income tax. (Sec. 30, last par., NIRC)
Assets Exempt as long as the property is ADE used for charitable purposes.
(Sec. 28[3], Art. VI, Constitution)
Proprietary Revenues Exempt from income tax if they are organized and operated exclusively for
non-stock non- charitable purposes and no part of its net income or asset inures to the
profit benefit of any member, organizer, etc. (Sec. 30[E], NIRC).
educational
institutions If the non-profit hospital/education institution earns income from its for-
profit activities, it will retain its tax exemption for its charitable activities,
but the income from for- profit activities will be subject to the preferential
rate of 10% under Section 27 (B), NIRC, Provided, that beginning July
1,2020 until June 30,2023, the rate of one percent (1%) shall apply,
provided that its gross income from unrelated trade, business or activity
does not exceed 50% of its total gross income.
Assets Exempt as long as the property is ADE used for educational or charitable
purposes. (Sec. 28[3], Art. VI. Consti)
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Q12: What are the various rules on situs of taxation?
A12:
OBJECT SITUS RULE
Person Residence, Domicile, Citizenship
Real Property Location of the property
Tangible Personal Physical location although the owner resides in another jurisdiction; where title of
Property property passes.
Royalties Where the use of or right to use is exercised.
Income Citizenship, Residence, Source of Income
Transfer of property Citizenship, Residence, Location of Property
Business or Where the act/business/occupation is performed/exercised

Occupation
Q13: What are requisites of valid taxation?

A13:
1. Must be for a public purpose;
2. Should be uniform and equitable;
3. Either the person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the taxing authority;
4. Complies with the requirements of due process; and
5. Does not infringe any constitutional or inherent limitations.
Q14: Can taxes be subject to set-off against the government?

A14: Taxes are not subject to set-off or legal compensation because the government and the taxpayer are not
mutual creditor and debtor of each other. (Republic v. Mambulao Lumber Co., G.R. No. L-17725, 1962; Caltex
Phils. v. COA, G.R. No. 92585, 1992)
III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Q15: What are the non-legislative functions of Congress?

A15:
• To act as national board of canvassers for President and Vice President. (Art. VII, sec. 4).
• To act as a constituent assembly for the revision or amendment of the Constitution. (Art. XVII).
• To decide whether the President is temporarily disabled in the event he reassumes his office after the
Cabinet, by a majority of vote of its members, declares that he is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office. (Art. VII, sec. 11).
• To concur in the grant of amnesty by the President. (Art. VII, sec. 19).
• To initiate (HOR) and, to try all cases of impeachment (Senate), against the:
o President
o Vice President
o Members of the SC
o Members of the Constitutional Commissions
o Ombudsman
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Q16: Is the population requirement of 250,000 an indispensable Constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district?
A16: Distinction must be made between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the other. While a province is entitled to at least 1 representative regardless of
population, a city must initially meet a minimum population of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled. (Aquino
v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189793, 2010.)
Q17: To be entitled to an additional district, does a city have to increase its population by another
250,000?
A17: No, while Sec. 5(3), Art. VI requires a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another 250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
Q18: Is there a need for a plebiscite for the creation of legislative districts?
A18: No. The creation of legislative districts does not need confirmation by plebiscite if it does not involve the
creation of a local government unit (Bagabuyo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176970, Dec. 8, 2008).
When a municipality is converted into a city large enough to entitle it to one district, the incidental effect is
splitting the district into two. This does not need a consensus. There is no need for plebiscite under Art. X of the
Constitution when one district is split into two, because there is no creation of new juridical personalities nor
division of territory per se. There is only a need for plebiscite if you are creating a new Local Government Unit
(Tobias v. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994).
Q19: The Senate Rules of Procedures provides that a joint resolution can have the force and effect of
law, as it requires the approval of both houses and the President to take effect. Can a Joint Resolution
have the force and effect of law?
A19: No. Under the Constitution, only a bill can become a law. Sec. 26, Art. VI provides that before a bill can
become a law, it must pass three readings on separate days, unless the President certifies that its enactment is
urgent. A joint resolution is not a bill, and its passage does not enact the joint resolution into a law even if it
follows the requirements expressly prescribed in the Constitution for enacting a bill into a law. However, a joint
resolution can be part of the implementation of a law as provided in the law itself. A joint resolution can also be
treated as a recommendation to the Executive on how the law can be implemented. Neither the Rules of the
Senate nor the Rules of the House of Representatives can amend the Constitution which recognizes that only a
bill can become a law. (Ang Nars Partylist v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 215746, October 08, 2019)
Q20: What are the Cases When the Constitution Requires Yeas And Nays To Be Recorded?
A20:
1. Last and third readings of a bill
2. Upon 1/5 members’ request
3. Re-passing a bill over Presidential veto
Q21: What are the voting majorities required in Congress?

A21:
SENATE
NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTES BASIS
Concurrence in a treaty or international agreement 2/3 of All Sec. 21, Art. VII
Conviction in impeachment 2/3 of All Sec. 3(6), Art. XI
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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Affirm or Override Resolution to Impeach 1/3 of All Sec. 3(3), Art. XI
COMMON TO BOTH
Discipline Members 2/3 of All Sec. 16(3)
Election of Officers Majority of All Sec. 16(1)
Declare the Existence of a State of War ⅔ of Both Houses, voting Sec. 23

separately
Override President’s Veto ⅔ of All in the House of Sec. 27(1)

Origin
Quorum to do business Majority w/in Compulsive Sec. 16(2); Avelino

Power of the House v. Cuenco
Yeas and Nays in the Journal ⅕ of the Members present of Sec. 16(4)
each house
Tax Exemption Majority of All Sec. 28(4)
Confirmation of new VP nominated by President Majority of Both Houses, Art. VII, Sec. 9
voting Separately
Determination that Pres. unable to discharge powers ⅔ of Both Houses, voting Art. VII, Sec. 11
and duties separately
To break a tie in presidential election Majority of All, voting Art. VII, Sec. 4
separately
Revocation of Proclamation of Martial Law/Suspension Majority of All, voting jointly Art. VII, Sec. 18
of Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
Extension of Proclamation of Martial Law/Suspension Majority of All, voting jointly Art. VII, Sec. 18
of Privilege of Writ of Habeas Corpus
To Concur w/ President in granting amnesty Majority of All Art. VII, Sec. 19
Q22: Congress passes a law which requires that any amendment to this law will require the vote of ⅔ of
the Members of the House and the Senate, voting separately. Is this valid?
A22: No. The supermajority vote requirement in the law is unconstitutional for violating the principle that
Congress cannot pass irrepealable laws. The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to
amend and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to limit its power to amend or
repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress.
(Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Feb. 8, 2012)
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Q23: Congress passes a law postponing the regional elections in ARMM in order to synchronize it with
the local elections. It provides that, once the elective officials’ terms expire prior to the elections, the
President can appoint OICs to those positions.
a. Does the Constitution provide for synchronization of elections?
b. Can Congress provide for the holdover of elective officers despite their terms being extended
beyond that provided in the Constitution?
c. If the answer to the above is no, does the President have the power to appoint OICs to the
elective positions that will be left vacant before officers can be elected?
A23:
a. While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and local
elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII)
of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by deliberately making
adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
objective behind setting a common termination date for all elective officials, done among others through the
shortening the terms of the twelve winning senators with the least number of votes, is to synchronize the
holding of all future elections – whether national or local – to once every three years. Although called
regional elections, the ARMM elections should be included among the elections to be synchronized as it is a
"local" election based on the wording and structure of the Constitution.
b. No. In the case of the terms of local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally, allowing
no room for any implementing legislation with respect to the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would
allow an interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for local officials should stay at three
(3) years as fixed by the Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
c. Yes. Sec. 16, Art. VII provides that the President can appoint all other officers of the government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. Given that the President derives his power to
appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it falls under the classification of presidential
appointments covered by the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the President’s
appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis. (Abas Kida v. Senate, G.R. No. 196271, Oct. 18,
2011 and Feb. 8, 2012)
Q24: Differentiate legislative inquiries under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art VI:

A24:
Question Hour Inquiry in Aid of Legislation
Sec. 22, Art. VI Sec. 21, Art. VI
Oversight Function Purpose is to Elicit information that may

be used for legislation
Exceptions as to persons include: Exceptions as to persons include:

“All heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the (1) President
government shall secure the consent of the President prior to (2) Supreme Court Justices
appearing before either House of Congress.” (Section1, EO 464) (3) Members of the AFP if prevented by
the President as the Commander-In-
Chief (Gudani v. Senga, 2006)
Exception as to information:
(1) Executive privilege which must be invoked by the President himself or through the Executive Secretary by
authority of the President (Senate v. Ermita, 2006)
(2) Privileged information, e.g., national defense, diplomatic, military secrets.
(3) Right against self-incrimination
Discretionary Mandatory
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Q25: When does the jurisdiction of HRET/SET start?

A25: The COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to election, returns, and qualifications ends,
and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins once a winning candidate is:
1. proclaimed
2. taken his oath, and
3. assumed office as a Member of the House
of Representatives. (Aggabao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 163756, Jan. 26, 2005)
Q26: What is the difference between initiative and referendum?

A26: (SBMA v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 125416, Sept. 26, 1996)
INITIATIVE REFERENDUM
Power of the people to propose bills and Right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or
laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
independent of the legislative assembly which in most cases would without action on the part of
electors become a law
Entirely the work of the electorate Begun and consented to by the law-making body
A process of law- making by the people Consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what
themselves without the participation and has been drawn up or enacted by a legislative body
against the wishes of their elected
representatives
IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Q27: When may the Court declare sufficiency of factual basis for a suspension of martial law or a
declaration of a writ of habeas corpus?
A27: Parameters of the Court for Determining the Sufficiency of the Factual Basis for the Declaration of Martial
Law and/or the Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus (Sufficiency of the Factual Basis Test)
1. Actual rebellion or invasion
2. Public safety requires it
3. There is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
The scope of the Supreme Court’s power to review the declaration of Martial Law or suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus is limited to a determination of the sufficiency (not accuracy) of the factual basis of such
declaration or suspension. (Id.)
Q28: What is the prevailing rule regarding treaty withdrawal?
A28: The President does not have absolute unilateral authority to withdraw from a treaty.
1. The President enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be
contrary to the Constitution or statutes.
2. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur. When a statute is adopted, the President cannot withdraw from the treaty
being implemented unless the statute itself is repealed. (ex. Congress passed R.A 9581 ahead of the
Senate’s concurrence to the Rome Statute.)
3. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred
and expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence. Effecting treaties
is a shared function between the executive and legislative branches hence the Senate’s power to
concur with treaties necessarily includes the power to impose conditions for its concurrence.
(Pangilinan et. al. v. Cayetano et. al., G.R. No. 238875, G.R. No. 239483 & 240954, March 16, 2021)
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Q29: May the President appoint an individual as acting Solicitor General and acting Secretary of
Justice?
A29: The President may not appoint an individual as acting Solicitor General and acting Secretary of Justice in
a concurrent capacity. The designation of Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position as Solicitor General is in violation of the constitutional prohibition under Article VII, Section 13. It is of
no moment that the designation was in a temporary capacity. The Constitution makes no reference to the
nature of the designation (Funa v. Agra, G.R. No. 191644, Feb. 19, 2013).
Q30: Does the ban on “midnight appointments” under Sec. 15, Art VII apply to the judiciary?
A30: No, the prohibition does not extend to appointments in the Judiciary. Had the framers intended to extend
the prohibition to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. The
prohibition is confined to appointments in the Executive Department by the President or Acting President (De
Castro v. JBC, G.R. No. 191002, 2010). Neither does it apply to local executive officials. (Quirog v. Aumentado,
G.R. 163443, 2008).
Q31: Differentiate the Extraordinary/Commander- in-Chief Powers?

A31:
CALLING OUT POWERS SUSPENDING THE PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS/DECLARING MARTIAL LAW
GROUNDS
May be resorted to whenever it becomes May be exercised only when there is actual invasion or
necessary to prevent or suppress lawless rebellion, and public safety requires it
violence, invasion, or rebellion
ACTION BY THE LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL BRANCH
The Court may nullify the exercise of such power Congress may revoke such proclamation or suspension
only when the President acts in a manner and the Court may review the sufficiency of the factual
constituting grave abuse of discretion basis thereof
Q32: What is Executive Impoundment?

A33: Refusal of the President to spend funds already allocated by Congress for a specific purpose. It is, in
effect, an “impoundment” of the law allocating such expenditure of funds.
Q34: What are the limitations on the exercise of the President’s pardoning power?
A34:
1. Cannot extend to cases of impeachment. Sec. 19, Art. VII).
2. For violation of election laws, must have favorable recommendation by the COMELEC. Sec. 5, Art. IX-C).
3. Granted only after conviction by final judgment. (Sec. 19, Art. VII).
4. Cannot extend to cases of legislative contempt, or civil contempt.
5. Does not absolve civil liability. (People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, Sep. 7, 1995).
6. Does not restore public offices forfeited. (Monsanto v. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989).
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Q35: What are the Rules on Succession?

A35: Start of Term as of Noon June 30 (Art. VII, Sec. 7):
President VP Both
Fails to Qualify VP acts as P N/A Senate P or Speaker acts as P
Not Chosen VP acts as P N/A Senate P or Speaker acts as P
Death; P. Disability VP is P After June 30, Sec. 9 can apply. Senate P or Speaker acts as P.
Succession of President and Vice-President During Mid-Term (PHIL. CONST., art. VII, § 8)
VACANCY SUCCESSOR
President dies/ permanently VP becomes President for the unexpired term

disabled/ impeached or resigns
Both President and VP die/ Senate President, or in case of his inability, Speaker of the House
permanently disabled/ impeached or shall act as president until the President or VP shall have been
resign elected and qualified.
Death, permanent disability, or Congress shall determine, by law, who will be the Acting President
inability of Senate President and until a President or VP shall have been elected and qualified,
Speaker of the house as Acting subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as
President the Acting President
V. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Q35: Differentiate the judicial power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis for the declaration of
martial law and the suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus from the congressional power
to revoke such declaration and suspension.
A35:
JUDICIAL POWER TO REVIEW CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO REVOKE
Court can only refer to information available to the Congress may take into consideration:
President prior tooratthetimeofthe declaration • Data available to the President prior to or at
Court is not allowed to undertake an independent the time of the declaration and
investigation beyond the pleadings • Events supervening the declaration
Does not look into the absolute correctness of the Can probe further and deeper, can delve into
factual basis accuracy of facts presented before it
Passive power Automatic
Initiated by filing of a petition “in an appropriate May be activated by Congress itself at any time after
proceeding” by a citizen the proclamation or suspension was made
(Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Q36: Is the judiciary precluded from reviewing “political questions”?

A36: No, the 2nd clause of Sec. 1, Art. VIII (the power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion) effectively limits the “political question” are which, heretofore, was forbidden territory for the courts.
The Courts may now determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
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of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. (Francisco v. House of Rep, G.R. No.
160261, 2003).
Q37: What are the exceptions to the rule that the Courts will not entertain “moot” questions?
A37:
1. A grave violation of the Constitution
2. The exceptional character of the situation and paramount public interest is involved
3. A need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; and
4. The fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (International Service for the Acquisition of
Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia, G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276, 209301, and
209430, July 26, 2016).
Q38: The petitioners opposed a bill postponing the SK Elections. Petitioners' theory is that if the SK
elections were postponed to a date later than May 6, 2002, the postponement would disqualify from SK
membership youths who will turn 21 years old between May 6, 2002 and the date of the new SK
elections. Will the action prosper?
A38: Petitioners' prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the membership
age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is not subject to judicial review
because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty legally enforceable by the Court. A
proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The Court has no power to declare
a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the nature of rendering an advisory
opinion on a proposed act of Congress. (Montesclaros v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 152295. 2002)
Q39: When is the operative fact doctrine not applicable?

A39:
• Operative fact doctrine cannot be invoked if it will constitute an unjust enrichment. In the case of
Planters v. Fertiphil, the tax on fertilizers had already been collected and applied to a private
corporation’s needs. This was by virtue of the law imposing the tax. If the operative fact doctrine would
be applied in this case it would sanction the enrichment of the Planters Product at the expense of the
Fertiphil. (Planters Products, Inc. v. FertiPhil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, 2008).
• It should also not be applied if it will be iniquitous and would send a wrong signal that an act may be
justified when based on an unconstitutional provision. Simply put, it will not be applied if it will result to
injustice. (Phil. Coconut v. Republic, G.R. Nos 177857-58, 2012).
Q40: The JBC sorted Sandiganbayan Associate Justice nominees in 6 clusters. The President
appointed 2 nominees belonging in one cluster. The other nominees argued that the President could
only choose 1 nominee from each of the separate six shortlists or clusters provided by the JBC. Is the
clustering of nominees by JBC unconstitutional?
A40: Yes. It is unconstitutional. The JBC, in sorting the qualified nominees into six (6) clusters, one for every
vacancy, could influence the appointment process beyond its constitutional mandate of recommending qualified
nominees to the President. Clustering impinges upon the President’s power of appointment, as well as restricts
the chances for appointment of the qualified nominees. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, 2017).
Q41: Will a petition qualify as a taxpayer’s suit when there has been neither an appropriation nor an
authorization of disbursement of funds?
A41: No. A taxpayer’s suit contemplates a situation in which there is already an appropriation or a
disbursement of public funds. Therefore, until and unless the Legislature appropriates funds for a particular
project, or unless petitioners can pinpoint a specific item in the current budget that allows expenditure under the
agreement, the Court cannot rule that there is in fact an appropriation or a disbursement of funds that would
justify the filing of a taxpayer's suit. (Saguisag v. Ochoa Jr., G.R. Nos. 212426 & 212444, 2016)
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
Q42: What are the inhibitions/ disqualifications?

A42:
1. Shall not, during tenure, hold any other office or employment
2. Shall not engage in the practice of any profession
3. Shall not engage in the active management or control of any business which in any way may be
affected by the functions of his office
4. Shall not be financially interested, directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or
privilege granted by the Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
GOCCs or their subsidiaries. (Sec.2, Art. IX).
Q43: What constitutional offices does the rotational scheme of appointments apply?
A43:
1. Civil Service Commission
2. Commission on Elections
3. Commission on Audit
4. Judicial and Bar Council (Funa v. The Chairman, G.R. No. 192791, 2012).
Q44: Which entities are subject to COA’s post- audit jurisdiction?

A44:
a. Constitutional bodies, commissions, and offices granted fiscal autonomy
b. Autonomous state colleges and universities;
c. GOCCs without original charter and their subsidiaries
d. Non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity, directly or indirectly, from or through the
government, which are required by law, through the granting institution, to submit to such audit.
VII. BILL OF RIGHTS
Q45: What is the power of eminent domain?

A45: Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private property for public use
upon observance of due process of law and payment of just compensation.
Q46: What are the requisites for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain?
A46:
1. There is a taking of private property
2. Taking is for public use
3. Payment of just compensation
Q47: What is just compensation?

A47: It is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be expropriated. The general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of the condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is
that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to
sell, would agree on as a price to be paid by the buyer and received by the seller.
The general rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is expropriated. In such a case,
the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion actually taken, he is also entitled to recover the
consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. (Republic v. BPI, G.R. No. 203039, Sept. 11,
2013)
Q48: What are the rights of the accused?

A48:
1. Criminal due process
2. Bail
3. Presumption of innocence
4. Right to be heard
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5. Assistance of counsel
6. Right to be informed for the nature and cause of accusation
7. Right to speedy, impartial, and public trial
8. Right to confrontation
9. Compulsory process
10. Trials in absentia
Q49: What are custodial investigations?

A49: Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a
particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. (People v. Marra, G.R. No.
108494, Sept. 20, 1994)
Q50: What are the rights under custodial investigations?

A50:
1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention
are prohibited.
3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation
to and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families. (PHIL. CONST., art. 3,
§ 12)
Q51: What is the exclusionary rule?

A51: Any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizure shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (PHIL. CONST., art. III, § 3[2]). Evidence obtained and
confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be
excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
Q52: When is the exclusionary rule not applicable?

A52: It is not applicable to the violator of the right. Such confessions and admissions are admissible against the
person violating the constitutional prohibition, to the extent that admissibility is allowed by the ordinary rules on
evidence. (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 2009)
Q53: What is bail?

A53: Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may
be given in the form of corporate surety; property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (ROC, Rule 114, § 1).
Q54: Who is entitled to bail?

A54: General Rule: All persons actually detained shall, before conviction be entitled to bail. (PHIL. CONST., art.
3, § 13).
Exceptions: Persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment and death, when
evidence of guilt is strong
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Q55: What are the kinds of bail?

A55: Before Conviction, Bail is Either:
1. A matter of right: When the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
To this extent, the right is absolute.
2. A matter of discretion: When the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, it shall be denied
if the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
becomes a matter of right. (People v. Nitcha, G.R. No. 113517, Jan. 19, 1995)
Discretion refers to the court’s discretion to determine whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.
Do not confuse interpretation of Bail under Bill of Rights with the interpretation of Bail under Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Q56: What is extradition?

A56: The removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign
authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation
directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the
requesting state or government. [Philippine Extradition Law, Section 2(a)]
Extradition means the surrender of a person by one state to another state where he is wanted for prosecution or,
if already convicted, for punishment.
Q57: Does an extraditee have the right to bail?

A57: Yes, but only if the potential extraditee proves by “clear and convincing evidence” that :
1. he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court, and
2. that there exist special, humanitarian, and compelling reasons for him to be released on bail.
(Government of Hong Kong v. Olalia, Jr., G.R. No.153675, April 19, 2007)
VIII. CITIZENSHIP
Q58: What is the citizenship of Foundlings?

A58: Foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. A foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the
country of birth”. A foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country where he is found. (Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 221697 & 221698- 700, March 8, 2016)
Q59: What is the difference between Reacquisition v. Retention?

A59: Natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country shall re-acquire
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Natural-born Filipinos who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the same oath. The taking of oath of allegiance is required for both categories of natural-
born Filipino citizens who became citizens of a foreign country. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No, 199113, March 18,
2015)
Q60: X, a natural-born Filipino, became a naturalized Canadian while C.A. No. 63 was still in effect. X then
re-acquired his Filipino citizenship under R.A. 9225. He argues that he should be deemed to have never
lost his natural-born Filipino citizenship status during the period prior to his reacquisition under R.A.
9225. Is X correct?
A60: No. Since X lost his natural-born status under C.A. No. 63, he did not retain his natural-born citizenship. He
only reacquired it under R.A. 9225. Only those who became citizens of a foreign country after the effectivity of
R.A. 9225 are deemed to have retained natural-born citizenship without a break upon taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic. (David v. Agbay, G.R. No, 199113, March 18, 2015)
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Q61: What is Derivative Citizenship under R.A. 9225?

A61: The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those
who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the Philippines.
(R.A. 9225 § 4)
IX. LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS
ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS
Q62: What is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

A62: It is Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over appeals from criminal cases where the accused is a
government employee. Pursuant to RA 8249, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction
over final judgments, resolutions or orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. (Filomena v. People, G.R. No. 188630, 2011)
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
1. Violations of
1. R.A. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
2. R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of Ill-Gotten Wealth Act)
3. Chap.2, Sec. 2, Title VII, Book II, RPC
2. Where one or more of the accused are officials, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(R.A. No. 6758),
2. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
3. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
4. Chairmen and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
5. All other national and local officials classified as Grade ’27’ and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.
3. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section in relation to their office.
4. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986. (R.A. No. 10660, Sec. 2)
Q63: What is the exception to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan?

A63: The Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information:
a. does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or
b. alleges damage to the government or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or
acts in an amount not exceeding One million pesos (P1,000,000.00).” (R.A. No. 10660, Sec. 2)
NOTE: The RTC’s jurisdiction is regardless of the act if there is no such allegation of damage to the government
or bribery and if there is an allegation of bribery or damage the about be below one million pesos (1,000,000).
Before the amendment, the involvement of a mayor or a governor or any public official with salary grade 27 and
above must be filed with the Sandiganbayan, such is not the case now. There must be an allegation of bribery
or damage, and this must exceed one million pesos (1,000,000) in order to be within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan; otherwise, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction.
Q64: What is the venue for RTC exception cases?

A64: Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the official holds office.
(Non v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 251177, 2020 citing R.A. No. 10660) In Non, the case was dismissed as the case
was tried in NCR, the same judicial region where the official holds office.
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Q65: What is the cut off of the effectivity date for RA 1066 on the amended jurisdictional requirements?
A65: It only covers alleged offenses committed after the effectivity date of May 5, 2015 . If the alleged act is
committed Before May 5, 2015 refer back to the list of officers regardless of the amount of the damage or bribery
alleged . If the alleged act was committed After May 5, 2015, apply the threshold amount. (People v Bacaltos
G.R. No. 248701, 2020) In Bacaltos, the Sadiganbayan still had jurisdiction as the alleged act occurred before
the effectivity of RA 10660 on May 5, 2015 thus, there was no threshold amount yet for the damages or bribery.
Q66: A vice mayor was charged under the old Sandiganbayan law due to an act committed before the
effectivity of RA 10600 on May 5, 2015, was the case properly filed in the Office of the Ombudsman?
A66:  Yes, even though the charged officer was a vice mayor who is not necessarily under the salary grade 27
but under the old Sandiganbayan law, they are to be charged under the same. There is a specific listing of officers
under Section 4 that may or may not involve officials with salary grade 27; since the act was still committed before
May 5, 2015 the case was properly filed. (Ampongan v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 234670-71, 2019)
X. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
QUASI LEGISLATIVE COROLLARY PRINCIPLES
Q67: What is quasi-legislative power of an administrative agency?

A67: The authority delegated by Congress to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of
a law. (Carlo Cruz, Philippine Administrative Law 36, 2016). It is the power to issue rules and fill in details on how
a law will be implemented.
Q68: What is delegated legislative power?

A68: Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature or quasi-legislative (i.e., to make
rules and regulations), and, in practical effect, with the power to make law.However, the essential legislative
functions may not be delegated to administrative agencies and in this sense, it is said that administrative agencies
have no legislative power and are precluded from legislating in the strict sense.' What may be granted to an
administrative agency is rule-making power to implement the law it is entrusted to enforce. It necessarily includes
the power to amend, revise, alter, or repeal its rules and regulations. It is a standard provision in administrative
rules that prior issuances that are inconsistent therewith are declared repeated or modified. (De Leon,
Administrative Law: Text and Cases 90, 2016)
Authority delegated by Congress to the administrative body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out
the provisions of a law, and implement legislative policy. This is a form of delegated legislation. Valid regulations
have the force and effect of law.
Q69: What is the principle of non-delegability?

A69: The rule is that what has been delegated cannot be delegated, or as expressed in the Latin maxim: potestas
delegate non delegare potest. This rule is based upon the ethical principle that such delegated power constitutes
not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting
immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. This rule however
admits of recognized exceptions such as the grant of rule-making power to administrative agencies. They have
been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the implementation of a law entrusted to
them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in modern governance due to the increasing
complexity and variety of public functions. (Dagan v. Philippine Racing Commission, GR No. 175220, 2009)
Q70: What are the two tests that determine the validity of the delegation of legislative power?
A70:
1. The completeness test
2. The sufficient standard test.
A law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate.
It lays down a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
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must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. (Abakada Guro v. Purisima, GR No. 166715, 2008)
NOTE:
1. If the law passes the completeness test (e.g. K to 12 Law), there is no need to comply with the sufficient
standard test, it would constitute as a valid delegation.
2. If the law is not complete, but passes the sufficient standard test, it would constitute as a valid delegation.
3. If the law fails the sufficient standard test, then it would constitute as an undue delegation and hence,
unconstitutional.
Q71: Explain the completeness test

A71: Under the completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it. 148 The policy
to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate must be set forth therein. (Council of Teachers and
Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451,
217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 & 218465, [October 9, 2018])
Q72: What is considered to be compliant and not compliant with the sufficient standards test?
A72: The sufficient standard test mandates adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. To be sufficient, the standard
must specify the limits of the delegate's authority, announce the legislative policy and identify the conditions
under which it is to be implemented. (Council of Teachers and Staff of Colleges and Universities of the Philippines
v. Secretary of Education, G.R. Nos. 216930, 217451, 217752, 218045, 218098, 218123 & 218465, [October 9,
2018])
On the other hand, it fails if it is purely discretionary on the part f the Chief Executive or any official as seen in:
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used "to
[first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects” which gives a carte blanche authority to use the
fund for any infrastructure project that the President may deem as a priority. (Belgica v. Ochoa, GR No. 208566,
2013)
Q73: What is subordinate legislation?

A73: Legislative rules are in the nature of subordinate legislation and designed to implement a primary legislation
by providing the details thereof. They usually implement existing law, imposing general, extra-statutory
obligations pursuant to authority properly delegated by Congress and effect a change in existing law or policy
which affects individual rights and obligations.
Q74: What are the requisites of a valid administrative issuance?

A74: To be valid, an administrative issuance must comply with the following requisites (Executive Secretary v.
Southwing Heavy Industries, Inc., G.R. Nos. 164171, 164172 & 168741, 2006 citing Carlo Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law):
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.
There is a delegation made by Congress subject to the Completeness Test and the Sufficient Standard
Test.
2. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
DOCTRINES OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
Q75: What is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction?

A75:
1. Courts cannot determine a controversy, which requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge
of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters of intricate questions of fact are involved.
2. Relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the
court, even if the matter is within the jurisdiction of a court. (Republic of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R.
No. 158253, 2007).
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Q76: When is the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction not applicable?

A76:
1. Congress does not intend that the issues be left solely to the administrative agency for initial
determination;
2. When issues involve questions of law; and
3. When courts and administrative agencies have concurrent jurisdiction. (Republic of the Philippines v.
Martinez, G.R. No. 158253, 2007).
Q77: Can the doctrine of primary jurisdiction be waived?

A77: Yes, it may be waived. For reasons of equity, in cases where jurisdiction is lacking, failure to raise the issue
of non-compliance with the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction at an opportune time may bar a
subsequent filing of a motion to dismiss based on that ground by way of laches. Where a party participated in
the proceedings and the issue of non-compliance was raised only as an afterthought at the final stage of appeal,
the party invoking it may be estopped from doing so. (Republic v. Gallo, G.R. No. 207074, 2018)
Q78: What is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?

A78: An administrative decision must first be appealed to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review. It is a condition precedent that must be complied with.
(Sps. Sadang v. CA, G.R. No. 140138, 2006). The exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite and
must be complied with especially for acts which exercise quasi-judicial power.
Q80: When is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies not applicable?

A80:
(DARNN JP LICD DRIED LPS Quo):
1. If it should appear that an IRREPARABLE DAMAGE will be suffered by a party unless resort to the court
is immediately made.
2. When the respondent is the ALTER EGO of the President
3. When no administrative REVIEW is provided as a condition precedent for court action
4. Where insistence on its observance would result in the NULLIFICATION of the claim asserted
5. When there was NO DECISION rendered
6. When there are special circumstances demanding immediate JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
7. When the administrative remedy is PERMISSIVE or concurrent
8. When the question raised is ESSENTIALLY AND PURELY LEGAL
9. When strong PUBLIC INTEREST is involved
10. Where the issue raised is the CONSTITUTIONALITY of the statute, rule or regulation
11. Where it is a civil action for DAMAGES
12. Where the officer acted in utter DISREGARD OF DUE PROCESS
13. When there is NO OTHER plain, speedy, adequate REMEDY
14. When act complained of is PATENTLY ILLEGAL
15. When the administrative body or the person invoking the doctrine is in ESTOPPEL
16. When there is long-continued and UNREASONABLE DELAY
17. When the subject of controversy is PRIVATE LAND
18. When the controversy involves POSSESSORY ACTION involving public lands
19. When the claim involved is SMALL so that to require exhaustion would be oppressive and unreasonable
20. In QUO WARRANTO proceedings (Aklan v. Jody King Construction & Development Corp, G.R. No.
197592, 2013)
Q81: Illustrate one exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

A81: The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be discarded when to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies would be unreasonable, such as in cases when the Comelec En Banc already approved
the award of the bid to MPC, without the BAC informing the bidders, thus depriving the bidders of their opportunity
to avail of administrative remedies. (Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC (citing
Paat v. CA G.R. No. 111107, 1997), G.R. No. 159139, 2004)
Q82: Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies jurisdictional?

A82: No, it may be waived.
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XI. ELECTION LAW
1. COC CANCELLATION v. DISQUALIFICATION
Q83: Differentiate petition for disqualification and petition to deny due course/to cancel certificate of candidacy.
A83:
PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION PETITION TO DENY DUE COURSE
A person who is disqualified under Section 68 is A petition to deny due course or cancel
merely prohibited to continue as a candidate. Thus, certificate of candidacy is grounded on a statement of
a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 a material representation in the said certificate that is
can validly be substituted under Section 77 of the false.
OEC because he/she remains a candidate until
disqualified. The person whose certificate is cancelled or denied
due course is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a CoC. A person whose CoC has
been denied due course or cancelled under Section 78
cannot be substituted because he/she is never
considered a candidate.
Sec. 12, 68, OEC Sec. 78, OEC

Sec. 40, LGC
Q84: Abdul ran and won in the May 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections for Vice-Governor of Tawi-Tawi. After
being proclaimed Vice-Governor in the 2004 elections, his opponent, Khalil, filed an election protest
before the Commission on Election. Ruling with finality on the protest, the COMELEC declared Khalil as
the duly elected Vice-Governor though the decision was promulgated only in 2007, when Abdul had fully
served his 2004-2007 term and was in fact already on his 2007-2010 term as Vice Governor. Abdul now
consults you if the can still run for Vice-Governor of Tawi-Tawi in the forthcoming May 2010 election on
the premise that he could not be considered as having served as Vice- Governor from 2004-2007 because
he was not duly elected to the post, as he assumed office merely as a presumptive winner and that
presumption was later overturned when COMELEC decided with finality that had lost in the May 2004
elections. What will be your advice?
A84: I shall advise Abdul that he cannot run for Vice- Governor of Tawi-tawi in the May 2010 elections. His
second term should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed by Sec.
8, Art. X of the Constitution. Since the election protest against him was decided after the term of the contested
office has expired, it had no practical and legal use and value. (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, 2006)
Q85: Abdul also consults you whether his political party can validly nominate his wife as susbtitute
candidate for Vice-Mayor of Tawi-Tawi in May 2010 elections in case the COMELEC disqualifies him and
denies due course to or cancels his certificate of candidacy in view of a false material representation
therein. What will be your advice?
A85: I shall advise Abdul that his wife cannot be nominated as substitute candidate for Vice- Governor of Tawi-
tawi. The denial of due course to and cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is not one of the cases in which a
candidate may validly be substituted. A cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy. Under Sec.
77 of the Omnibus Election Code, a valid certificate of candidacy is an indispensable requisite in case of
substitution of a disqualified candidate. (Miranda v. Alegre, G.R. No. 136351, 1999)
Q86: Person A was declared winner in the elections for mayor. Person B, the 2nd placer, filed a petition
to disqualify, contending Person A wasn’t a Filipino citizen. The Supreme Court declared Person A as
not a Filipino Citizen. Can Person B be proclaimed as winner in the election?
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A86: Yes. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes,
even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications
and disqualifications of candidates. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates. Knowledge by the electorate of a
candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who placed second to a disqualified
one can be proclaimed as the winner (Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, 2013).
2. Meaning Of “False Material Representation”
Q87: When is there false and material misrepresentation?

A87: The false representation under Section 78 must consist of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or
hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. (Villafuerte v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, 2014) There is false and material misrepresentation in a certificate of candidacy
when the misrepresentation is:
1. FALSE
2. MATERIAL (goes into one’s qualifications)
3. DELIBERATE (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 2004)
Q88: When is there no false and material misrepresentation?

A88:
a. When a candidate uses the name of her longtime live-in partner OR states a false profession (Salcedo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 135886, 1999)
b. When the candidate is actually qualified even if the entries in the COC as filled up by the
candidate will show that he is not (RomualdezMarcos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 1995)
c. When the candidate, supported by a preponderance of evidence, believed that he was qualified since there
was no intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications
for public office (Tecson v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 2004)
d. Nickname is not considered a material fact, and there is no substantial evidence showing that in writing the
nickname “LRAY JR. MIGZ” in his COC, there is the intention to deceive the voters as to his identity which has
an effect on his eligibility or qualification for the office he seeks to
assume. (Villafuerte v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206698, 2014)
3. Serafica v. COMELEC –
Q89: If, during the pendency of such action/s but before election day, Gabriel withdraws his certificate
of candidacy, can he be substituted as candidate? If so, by whom and why? If not,
why not?
A89: If Gabriel withdraws, he may be substituted by a candidate nominated by his political party. Section 77 of
the Omnibus Election Code states: “If after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, an official
candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a
person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the
candidate who dies, withdrew or was disqualified.”
In this case, Gabriel already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was
not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless the certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in
accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, the certificate of candidacy is valid and may be validly
substituted. (Luna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165983, 2007)
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4. Angkla v. COMELEC
Q90: Petitioners pray that the COMELEC be enjoined in double counting the votes in favor of the two-
percenters. They propose that the 2% votes counted in the first round should first be excluded before
proceeding to the second round of seat allocation. In the allocation of seats, how should the 2% be
deducted from the percentage votes?
A90: BANAT instructs that 2% shall be deducted from the percentage votes of party-lists that obtained a
guaranteed seat. This deduction, however, is done in the second step of the second round of seat allocation,
not in the first step of the second round. As finally settled in the landmark case of BANAT, Section 11 (b) of
R.A. No. 7941 is to be applied, thus:
1. Round 1
a. The participating parties, organizations or coalitions shall be ranked from highest to lowest based on
the number of votes they each garnered in the party-list election.
b. Each of those receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to and guaranteed one seat each.
Rationale: The statute references a two-percent (2%) threshold. The one-seat guarantee based on this
arithmetical computation gives substance to this threshold.
2. Round 2, Part 1
a. The percentage of votes garnered by each of the parties, organizations and coalitions is multiplied by
the remaining available seats after Round 1. All party-list participants shall participate in this round
regardless of the percentage of votes they garnered
b. The party-list participants shall be entitled to additional seats based on the product arrived at in (a).
The whole integer of the product corresponds to a party's share in the remaining available seats.
Fractional seats shall not be awarded.
Rationale: This formula gives flesh to the proportionality rule in relation to the total number of votes
obtained by each of the participating party, organization, or coalition.
c. A Party-list shall be awarded no more than two (2) additional seats.
Rationale: The three-seat cap in the statute is to be observed.
3. Round 2, Part 2
a. The party-list party, organization or coalition next in rank shall be allocated one additional seat each until
all available seats are completely distributed.
Rationale: This algorithm endeavors to complete the 20% composition for party-list representation in the
House of Representatives.
Q91: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 insofar as it provides that
those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes cast for the party list system shall be entitled
to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. Petitioners essentially assert that the
allocation of additional seats in proportion to a party-list's "total number of votes" results in the
double-counting of votes in favor of the two-percenters. For the same votes which guarantee the two-
percenters a seat in the first round of seat allocation are again considered in the second round. The
proviso purportedly violates the equal protection clause, hence, is unconstitutional. Is the claim of the
petitioners correct?
A91: No, the petitioners are mistaken in claiming that the retention of the 2% votes in the second round of seat
allocation is unconstitutional. All votes, whether cast in favor of two-percenters and non-two-percenters, are
counted once. The perceived "double-counting of votes" does not offend the equal protection clause - it is an
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advantage given to two-percenters based on substantial distinction that the rule of law has long acknowledged
and confirmed.
As held in Veterans, the voting threshold ensures that only those parties, organizations, and coalitions having a
sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation are actually represented in the House of
Representatives. (ANGKLA v COMELEC, G.R. No. 246816, September 15, 2020)
5. Atong Paglaum
Q92: Can party lists that garnered less than 2 % of the total votes casts occupy a seat in the House?
A92: Yes. The additional seats (those remaining after allocation of the guaranteed seats to those with a
minimum of 2%), shall be distributed to the party-list organizations including those that received less than two
percent of the total votes. (Atong Paglaum v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 203766, 2013).
Q93: Who may participate in party-list elections?

A93: Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2)
regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organization
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral
lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided:

a. they register under the party-list system
b. do not field candidates in legislative district elections.
NOTE: A political party, whether majority or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a
coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking in well-defined
political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns
of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that
lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth.
A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented” must belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they represent. Similarly, a
majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies” must
belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
“marginalized and underrepresented,” or that represents those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,”
either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective
sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations.
National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are
disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified (Atong Paglaum,supra).
6. Marcos v. Robredo
Q93: A ran for Mayor in Antique against B. B won. A filed an election protest, alleging “discrepancies in the
Random Manual Audit, glitches in the operation of the Precinct Count Optical Scan machines and strange
pattern of votes (60-Team Pnoy, 30-UNA, and 10-Independents) obtained by the administration, opposition and
independent candidates in the Certificate of Canvass.” The protest, however, failed to specifically state in detail
the acts or omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested
precincts and how the various irregularities and anomalies had affected the results of the elections; identify the
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precincts where the PCOS machines malfunctioned, allege with particularity the number of precincts where the
CF cards were found defective; and explain with particularity the failure to transmit the results and in what
precincts. Will the election protest prosper?
A93: NO. Allegations in election protests must be specific. The results of an election may be challenged
through different legal vehicles: first, failure of election cases; second, pre-proclamation petitions; and third,
election contests. These have substantive and procedural differences, with varying remedies, but what remains
consistent across all modalities is the requirement of specificity. Particularity on one's allegations, grounds, and
bases cuts across all mechanisms for challenging election outcomes and must be present in all actions,
regardless of the mode. The Court stressed in Corvera v.Savillo that a protest lacking in detail as to the "acts or
omissions complained of showing the electoral frauds, anomalies, or irregularities" should be struck down for
being insufficient in form and substance. Bare claims of "glitches," strange voting patterns, and discrepancies in
the audit, without more, were found to be hollow accusations by a losing candidate unable to come to terms
with defeat. In so ruling, the Court affirmed the need for strict compliance with the specificity requirement. (See
Corvera v. Savillo, G.R. No. 208610, 2014)
Q94: What are the requisites for annulling an election?

A94:
a. The illegality of the ballots must affect more than fifty percent (50%) of the votes cast on the specific
precinct or precincts sought to be annulled, or in case of the entire municipality, more than fifty percent
(50%) of its total precincts and the votes cast therein;
b. It is impossible to distinguish with reasonable certainty between the lawful and unlawful ballots; and
c. There must be clear, convincing, and strong evidence showing that the protestee is the one
responsible for the unlawful acts complained of. (Marcos Jr. v. Robredo, PET Case NO. 005, 2021 citing
Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 222236, 2016)
7. TERM LIMITS
Q95: What is the term limit for all local elective officials?
A95: No local elective official may serve for more than three consecutive terms (Local Government Code, Sec.
43). The three-term limit of local elective officials - except barangay officials - applies only when these two
conditions concur: (1) the local official concerned has been elected through a regular election and (2) he has
fully served the term.
Q96: Atty. G ran for Governor of the Province of Pampanga, while his close friend, Atty. M, ran for
Mayor of the Municipality of Guagua, Pampanga. They both won convincingly. Eventually, the losing
candidates timely filed election protests. The losing gubernatorial candidate, Mr. A, filed his protest
before the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga (RTC), whereas the losing mayoralty candidate, Mr. B,
protest before the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga (MTC). What are the term limits for the
positions of Atty. G and Atty. M?
A: The term limits for both are three terms of three years for each term. (Section 43(a), Local Government
Code)
Q97: What shall be considered as an interruption to the 3-Term Limit?

A97: The following are interruptions to the Full Term (3-Term Limit does not apply - Hence, Not Barred):
1. Succession. Assumption by succession is by operation of law. To count as a term, one must have
been elected and fully served. Law allows the severance to effectuate succession. (Borja v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 133495, 1998; Montebon v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 180444, 2008)
2. Recall Election. Previously served for 3 full terms as mayor, then participated in a recall election; not
barred. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end
of the third consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by
the prohibition for two reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an
immediate reelection after three consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of service. (Socrates v. COMELEC, GR No. 154512, 2002)
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Previously served for 2 full terms as mayor (1992-1998), ran for a 3rd term (1998-2001) but lost, then
subsequently participated in a recall election (2000), which he won served the unexpired term; not
barred to run again for another term – not elected for 3 consecutive terms, continuity as mayor was
disrupted with the defeat, and was a private citizen for 2 years prior to the recall election. (Adormeo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 147927, 2002)
3. Dismissal as Penalty. Dismissals (as penalties) were involuntary interruptions; not considered to
have fully served a 3rd successive term of office. (Tallado v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 246679, 2019)
4. Election Protest.
1. Unseated during 3rd term as mayor because of an election protest; not barred as not deemed to
have been elected for that term – merely assumed office as a presumptive winner. (Lonzanida v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 1999)
2. Served as mayor in 2001, 2004, and 2007, but the 2004 (2nd term) was by virtue of an election
protest and served only the remainder of the 2nd term; not barred to run in 2010. (Abundo v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 201716, 2013)
3. Unseated for running and winning a 4th term (NOTE: 4th term was invalidated by the SC in
Rivera v. COMELEC), then relinquished office; not barred to run in the subsequent election.
On the other hand, the following are not an interruption to the Full Term (3-Term Limit applies - Hence,
Barred):
1. Running, winning and serving a different elective position is voluntary renunciation. Punong
barangay, while serving 3rd term, ran and won as municipal councilor and served the full term.
Considered as voluntary renunciation. (Bolos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 184082, 2009)
2. Circumvention. After serving 3 terms as Punong Barangay, got elected as barangay kagawad with
sister elected as Punong Barangay, who resigned the following day after oath of office to allow
succession. Considered as a conspiracy and hence, a circumvention of the 3-term limit. (Aguilar v.
Benlot, G.R. No. 232806, 2019)
3. Conversion. Conversion of a municipality to a city with no break in the service as a local chief
executive. (Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, 2003; Halili v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 231643, 2019)
4. Reapportionment of District. Served for 2 terms (2004, 2007) as Provincial Board Member (BM) in
the Cam. Sur 2nd dist. Cam. Sur was reapportioned by RA9716. In 2010 and 2013 he ran and won as
BM in the 3rd dist (which is essentially the same as the old 2nd dist). (Naval v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
207851, 2014)
5. Merger. Municipalities were merged and converted into a city, but the Punong Barangay from the
former municipality is the same as that in the city as the new political unit with the same territory and
inhabitants (hence, same group of voters). (Laceda v. Limena, G.R. No. 182867, 2008)
6. Preventive Suspension. Preventive suspension is not an interruption. Just a temporary inability; not
unseated and continued to hold office; just temporarily barred to exercise functions. (Aldovino v.
COMELEC, G.R. No. 184836, 2009)
7. Election protest but served 3 Full Terms. Election protest, but able to serve 3 full terms, including
the 2nd term (fully served) where the proclamation was voided. (Ong v. COMELEC, G.R. N0. 163295,
2006; Rivera v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 167591, 2007)
Q98: R was elected as Municipal Councilor for three (3) consecutive terms. Before the end of the third
term, Vice Mayor S died, rendering his post vacant. Since R was the highest-ranking Municipal
Councilor, he assumed the office of the Vice Mayor. One of his constituents, T, assailed R’s
assumption of office, arguing that elections should have been conducted to fill in the vacancy
following the death of Vice Mayor S. Assuming that R validly assumed S’s post, at the end of R’s term
as Vice Mayor, may he run, once more, for the position of Municipal Councilor? Or is he prescribed to
do so under the Local Government Code?
A98: R can still run for the position of Municipal Councilor. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel
the renounced term in the computation of the three-term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service
(Montebon v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 180444, 2008)
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Q99: Governor Paloma was administratively charged with abuse of authority before the Office of the
President. Pending hearing, he ran for reelection and won a second term. He then moved to dismiss the
charge against him based on this supervening event. Should the motion be granted?
A99: IT DEPENDS. The ruling promulgated in Morales v. Court of Appeals on the abandonment of the doctrine
of condonation had, indeed, become final only on April 12, 2016, and thus the abandonment should be
reckoned from April 12, 2016. (Crebello v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, 2019)
Accordingly, if the election happened BEFORE April 12, 2016 (i.e. May 2013 elections and earlier), then the
Condonation Doctrine will still apply as a defense. If the election happened AFTER April 12, 2016 (i.e. May
2016 elections onwards), then the Condonation Doctrine will no longer apply.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. (Carpio-Morales v. Binay, G.R. No.
217126- 27, 2015)
XII. LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
Q100: Does Congress still control the properties of LGUs?

A100: Yes. LGUs are still very much subject to the laws passed by Congress, including the properties within their
territorial jurisdiction, except for those which were acquired in their private or corporate capacity.
Q101: What is the territorial jurisdiction of LGUs?

A101: The territorial jurisdiction of LGUs are limited to the land area and physical metes and bounds as defined
in their charters and does not extend to the continental shelf for purposes of determining the equitable share.
(Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941 (Resolution), January 21, 2020)
Q102: Does the territorial jurisdiction of LGUs extend only over land that is contiguous?
A102: No. When the territory consists of one (1) or more islands, territorial jurisdiction can also be exercised over
all waters found inland, or in any area that is part of its seabed, subsoil, or continental margin, “in the manner
provided by law(.)” (Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941 (Resolution),
January 21, 2020)
Q103: Are the Camago-Malampaya reservoirs within the Province of Palawan which would entitle the
latter to the equitable share?
A103: No. In Republic v. Provincial Government of Palawan, there were no maps or statutes which conclusively
proved that the Camago-Malampaya reservoirs are within the Province of Palawan. Thus, the area remains under
the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines, unless otherwise provided by law. (Republic v.
Provincial Government of Palawan, G.R. Nos. 170867 & 185941 (Resolution), January 21, 2020)
Q104: When can a province, city, municipality, or barangay be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundary substantially altered?
A104: No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject
to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (PHIL. CONST.,
art. X, § 10)
Q105: What are the three factor tests in determining whether an LGU is a “political unit directly affected”
by an LGU change or conversion?
A105: Three Key Tests:
1. Territorial Alteration Test
2. Political Effects Test
3. Economic Effects Test
Take note that these are TESTS, not requisites. Thus, even if an LGU fails one test, the other tests could still be
applied. (Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020)
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Q106: What is the Territorial Alteration Test?

A106: The Territorial Alteration Test is whether or not the territorial jurisdictions of the newly created provinces
are within the present metes and bounds of all the municipalities that comprise the respective provinces. If the
answer is yes, then the LGU is affected by a change or conversion and is entitled to participate in the plebiscite.
(Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020)
Q107: What is the Political Effects Test?

A107: The Political Effects Test is whether or not the LGU participates or votes for local elective officials (e.g.
Highly Urbanized Cities, Independent Component Cities) or is subject to provincial oversight. If the answer is
yes, then the LGU is affected by a change or conversion and is entitled to participate in the plebiscite. (Del
Rosario v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 247610, March 10, 2020)
Q108: What is the Economic Effects Test?

A108: The Economic Effects Test is whether or not the LGU’s national tax allotment share would remain intact
or if the LGU’s taxing power is not diminished. If the answer is yes, then the LGU is affected by a change or
conversion and is entitled to participate in the plebiscite. (Del Rosario v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
247610, March 10, 2020)
Q109: What are the requirements for the creation of LGUs?

A109: As a general rule, the creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another
level shall be based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
a. Income. – It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential government
facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its population, as expected of
the local government unit concerned;
b. Population. – It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction
of the local government unit concerned; and
c. Land Area. – It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by metes and bounds with technical
descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its
populace. LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE, sec. 7)
Take note that these requirements for the creation of LGUs are different from the three factor tests in determining
whether an LGU is a “political unit directly affected” by an LGU change or conversion. The three factor tests refer
to the plebiscite requirement.
XIII. NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
Q110: What is the Regalian Doctrine?

A110: Universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown. All lands not otherwise clearly
appearing to be privately owned are presumed to belong to the State. (Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S.
449, Feb. 23, 1909)
Q111: What are the requisites in order for the Government to enter into a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with a foreign corporation?
A111:
1. The FTAA involves the large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum,
and other mineral oils.
2. The President must personally sign the FTAA upon prior authorization of the State via the Congress.
3. There must be a law allowing the agreement and providing its general terms and conditions.
4. The agreement must be based essentially on the potential contributions to the economic development
and the promotion of the general welfare. (La Bugal-B’laan, Inc. v. Ramos, 2004)
Q112: What activities have citizenship and/or equity requirements?

A112:
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Activity Citizenship and/or Equity Requirements
Exploration of natural 1. Filipino citizens

resources 2. Domestic corporations (60% Filipino owned)
Operation of Public Utilities 1. Filipino citizens

2. Domestic corporations (60% Filipino owned)
Acquisition of alienable lands 1. Filipino citizens

of the public domain 2. Domestic corporations (60% Filipino owned)
3. Former natural-born citizens of RP (as transferees with certain
legal restrictions)
4. Alien heirs (as transferees in case of intestate succession)
Practice of ALL professions 1. Filipino citizens only (natural persons)

2. Congress may, by law, otherwise prescribe
Mass Media 1. Filipino citizens

Advertising 1. Filipino citizens

Educational Institution 1. Filipino citizens

Exception: Schools established by religious groups and mission boards.
Congress may, by law, increase Filipino requirements for ALL educational

institutions
Other economic activities Congress may, by law, reserve to Filipino citizens or to Domestic
corporations (60% Filipino owned or higher) certain investment areas.
Q113: What type of shares are computed to determine equity requirements? Control Test
A:113 SEC Memorandum Circular No. 8, s. 2013, was issued and provides that: all covered corporations shall,
at all times, observe the constitutional or statutory ownership requirement in that “the required percentage of
Filipino ownership shall be applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding shares of stock, whether or not entitled to
vote in the election of directors.” (Roy III v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, Nov. 22, 2016)
XIV. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Q114: What is Social Justice?

A114: It is the embodiment of the principle that those who have less in life should have more in law. The import
of social justice is that when the law can be interpreted in more ways than one, an interpretation that favors the
underprivileged must be favored. It should be noted, however, that for all its liberality to the underprivileged, it
does not tolerate behavior contrary to law.
Q115: What are Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights?

A115: Economic, social, and cultural rights include the rights to adequate food, adequate housing, to education,
to health, to social security, to take part in cultural life, to water and sanitation, and to work. (United Nations
Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner)
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Q116: What is Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform?

A116: Redistribution of lands to farmers and regular farmworkers who are landless to lift the economic status of
the beneficiaries and all other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as production
or profit sharing, labor administration and the distribution of shares of stock which will allow beneficiaries to
receive a just share of the fruits of the lands they work. Its scope extends not only to private agricultural lands,
but also to “other natural resources”, even including the use and enjoyment of “communal marine and fishing
resources'' and “offshore fishing grounds.”
XV. AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION
Q117: Differentiate amendment from revision?

A117:
Amendment Revision
Coverage • Refers to a change that adds, reduces, or deletes • Broadly implies a change
without altering the basic principle involved that alters a basic principle in
• Generally affects only the specific provision being the Constitution
amended • Change alters the
Constitution substantially
when the change affects
substantial provisions
How 1. Congress upon 3/4 vote of all its members; 1. Congress upon ¾ vote of all
Proposed 2. Constitutional Convention, may be called by ¾ vote of its members; or
all members of Congress. Congress may by majority 2. Constitutional Convention
vote of all Its members submit to the electorate the
calling of a constitutional convention; A revision may NOT be achieved
3. People may directly propose amendments through through people's initiative
initiative of at least 12% of the total number of registered
voters and where every legislative district is represented
by at least 3% of the registered voters
Note: no implementing law yet (Defensor-Santiago v

COMELEC, 1997)
NOTE: Amendments or Revisions via Congress or a Constitutional Convention shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the approval
of the amendment or revision.
For amendments via people’s initiative, it shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite held not earlier than 60 days nor later than 90 days after the certification from COMELEC of the
sufficiency of the petition. (It is essentially a two-step process. Proposal and ratification/approval)
NOTE: The two steps are the first proposal from Congress, ConCon, or people’s initiative and the second step
is the confirmation via a plebiscite.
Q118: Can the shift to federalism be made through people's initiative?

A118: No. A shift to federalism contemplates a revision as It alters a basic principle in the Constitution or
affects substantial provisions of the Constitution. A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to
an amendment of the Constitution and not to its revision. (Lambino v. COMELEC, 2006)
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XVI. EDUCATION,SCIENCE,TECHNOLOGY,ARTS,CULTURE AND SPORTS
Q119: Which educational institutions are exempt from taxes?

A119:
1. Non-stock, non-profit educational institutions – All revenues and assets of non-stock, non-profit
educational institutions used actually, directly, and exclusively for educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxes and duties.
2. Proprietary educational institutions – Proprietary educational institutions, including those cooperatively
owned, may likewise be entitled to such exemptions, subject to the limitations provided by law, including
restrictions on dividends and provisions for reinvestment. (PHIL CONST., art XIV, § 4, ¶ 3)
Q120: BIR assessed DLSU for deficiency income tax on rental earnings from restaurant/canteens and
bookstores operating within the campus. DLSU protested and claimed tax exemption. DLSU submitted
documentary evidence proving that the rental income earnings were used to pay off the loan obtained
for the construction of the university’s P.E. Complex. Are DLSU’s income tax exempt?
A120: Yes. The requisites needed to avail of the tax exemption under Article 14, Section 4 (3) of the Constitution
are: (i) it is a non-stock, non-profit educational institution; and (ii) the income it seeks to be exempt is used
actually, directly, and exclusively for education purposes.
XVII. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
Q121: What is the act of state doctrine?

A121: Courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another in due deference
to the independence of sovereignty of every sovereign State (PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,G.R. No. 124772, August
14, 2007).
Q122: What is the difference between a treaty and an executive agreement?

A122:
TREATY EXECUTIVE AGREEMENT
Subject Matter: Subject Matter:
1. Political issues 1. Arrangements of Temporary Nature

2. Changes in National Policy 2. Implementation of Treaties and Statutes
3. International arrangements of a Permanent 3. Transitory effectivity
Character 4. Adjustment of details carrying out
established national policies and tradition
Must be ratified by 2/3 of the Senate to become Does not need to be ratified by the Senate.
valid and effective (1987 Constitution, art. 7, § 21).
Under international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have remained within
their powers. (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, 2011).
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Q123: Who is a refugee; Internally displaced person; asylum seeker?

A123:
REFUGEE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS ASYLUM SEEKERS
1. Outside his/her country A person who has been forced to flee his or A person who has applied for
of origin or outside the her home for the same reason as a refugee, asylum, but whose refugee
country of his/her former but remains in his or her own country and has status has not yet been
habitual residence; not crossed an international border. (UN determined (Art. 1 1951
2. Unable or unwilling to Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement) Refugee Convention)
avail
him/herself of the
protection that country
owing to a well-founded
fear of being persecuted;
and
3. Persecution feared is
based on at least one of
the five grounds: race,
religion, nationality,
membership of a
particular social group, or
political opinion
(Art 1, 1951 Refugee
Convention)
Q124: Can foreign warships that caused damage to the Tubbataha Reef be held liable for damages
under UNCLOS?
A124: Yes. Although the treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States (CS)
while navigating the latter's territorial sea, the Flag States shall be required to leave the territorial sea immediately
if they flout the laws and regulations of the CS, and they will be liable for damages caused by their warships or
any other government vessel operated for non-commercial purposes. Even non-parties to UNCLOS are bound
by this obligation because it Is considered as customary international law. (Argo v. Swift, 2014)
Q125: In the event of a collision or any other incident of navigation concerning a ship on the high seas,
involving penal or disciplinary responsibility, which State may claim jurisdiction?
A125: The flag State or the State of which the ship master is a national. (Art. 97, UNCLOS)
Q126: What are the rights under different maritime zones?

A126:
Archipelagic Waters Limited sovereignty. Subject to the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage,
(UNCLOS: Internal waters innocent passage, traditional fishing rights, and existing submarine cables.
are Archipelagic waters)
(Art. 49(1), UNCLOS III)
Territorial Sea (Art. 17, Subject to the right of innocent passage. Submarines and other underwater
UNCLOS III) vehicles are required to navigate on the surface to show their
fag.
Waters within 12 nautical miles
from baselines
Contiguous Zone (Art. 33, Limited control necessary for the State to prevent infringement of its
UNCLOS III) customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its
territory.
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24 nautical miles from

baselines
Exclusive Economic Zone Control of all economic resources within this zone, including fishing,
(Art. 56, UNCLOS III) mining, oil exploration, and any pollution of those resources. However,
other nations have the right of navigation over this area, subject to the
200 nautical miles from regulation of the coastal state.
baselines.
Continental Shelf (Art. 77, Limited sovereignty over shelf for exploration and exploitation of natural
UNCLOS III) resources.
Submerged promulgation of
the land territory
Extended Continental Shelf Limited sovereignty over the shelf for exploration and exploitation of natural
(Art. 47, UNCLOS III) resources. Surplus catch goes to another state.
Q127: What are the freedoms enjoyed by States on the high seas?
A127:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of overflight;
(3) Freedom of fishing:
(4) Freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations;
(5) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines; and
(6) Freedom of scientific research. (Sec. 1, Art. 87, UNCLOS)
Q128: How are disputes settled under the UNCLOS?

A128:
It may be settled by peaceful means chosen by the Parties (Art. 280, UNCLOS IIl) or under compulsory
procedures where a state party may go before the:
(a) International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS);
(b) Arbitral Tribunal;
(c) ICJ; and
(d) Special Arbitral Tribunal [disputes relating to fisheries, protection and preservation of the marine
environment, marine scientific research, or navigation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping] (Art.
287, UNCLOS III)
Q129: Differentiate the jurisdiction between the ICJ and the ICC.
A129:
ICJ ICC
Decides in accordance with international law, disputes of a legal nature that Has jurisdiction over the
are submitted to it by States; and gives advisory opinions on legal questions following:
at the request of the organization of the UN, specialized agencies or one (1) war crimes: (2) genocide; (3)
related organization authorized to make such a request (advisory crimes against humanity; and (4)
jurisdiction). (Article 36, ICJ) crimes of aggression (Article 5,
ICC Rome Statute)
Q130: What are the requirements to give domestic effect (ratification) to a treaty under Philippine law?
A130: Treaties and international agreements shall be valid and effective upon concurrence of at least two-thirds
of all the Members of the Senate. With the exception of: (1) foreign loan agreements which need prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board (e.g. debt buy back); and (2) military bases, troops or facilities which must
PAGE 32 OF 34
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be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State. (Art VII, Sections
20 & 21 & Article XVIII, Section 25, 1987 Constitution).
Q131: What are the voting requirements found in the Constitution?

A131:
Nature of Proceeding Voting Requirements
Revocation/Extension of proclamation of martial law Majority of all Members, voting jointly

or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.
Election of Senate President and House Speaker Majority of all Members of the Senate and
House, respectively
Confirmation of new VP nominated by President Majority of both Houses
Concurrence with President in granting amnesty Majority of all Members of Congress
To break a tie in presidential election Majority of all the Members of both Houses
of the Congress, voting separately.
Grant of tax exemption Majority of all Members of the Congress
Quorum to do business Majority of those within the compulsory

power of each House
Discipline of Members for disorderly behavior 2/3 of all Members of the respective House
(Suspension of Expulsion)
Declaration of existence of a state of war 2/3 of both Houses, in joint session

assembled
Overriding President's veto 2/3 of all Members of each House
Determination that President is unable to discharge 2/3 of both Houses

his powers and duties
Concurrence in ratification of treaty 2/3 of all Members of Senate
Affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of 1/3 of all Members of the House of
Impeachment or override the resolution of the Representatives
Committee on Justice
Verified complaint or resolution shall constitute the 1/3 of all Members of the House of
Articles of Impeachment Representatives
Conviction in impeachment 2/3 of all Members of Senate
Amendments or Revisions by Congress (1) Congress upon ¾ vote of all its

members; of
(2) Constitutional Convention
Calling the Constitutional Convention (1) By Congress - 2/3 of all memb. of each
House; or
PAGE 33 OF 34
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(2) Referral to people majority of all members of each

House
When are the yeas and nays required to be recorded (1) upon the third and last reading of a bill;
(2) at the request of 1/5 of the members
present; and
(3) in re-passing a bill due to President's
veto
PAGE 34 OF 34

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ATENEO CENTRAL

BAR OPERATIONS 2022 POLITICAL LAW BLUE TIPS

PRAYER FOR THE BAR EXAMINATIONS

O God, we come before You this day,

This is the most important event in our lives,

We ask for help.

We do not ask this by our own merits.

We ask this from Your Fatherly mercy and compassion through

I. BASIC CONCEPTS UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION

Q1: What is the Archipelagic Doctrine?

Q3: Explain the concept of “Regime of Islands”.

Q4: What is the limitation of the territorial jurisdiction of LGUs?

Q6: Can the State be sued?

Q7: How is consent to be sued given by the State?

Q7: When is the restrictive application of State Immunity proper?

Q8: In the Matter of South China Sea Arbitration Case

A8: It was held that:

II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF TAXATION

WHO WHAT HOW

Income from real or personal properties or from activities conducted for

Q12: What are the various rules on situs of taxation?

Person Residence, Domicile, Citizenship

Real Property Location of the property

Royalties Where the use of or right to use is exercised.

Income Citizenship, Residence, Source of Income

Transfer of property Citizenship, Residence, Location of Property

Business or Where the act/business/occupation is performed/exercised

Q13: What are requisites of valid taxation?

Q14: Can taxes be subject to set-off against the government?

III. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

Q15: What are the non-legislative functions of Congress?

Q21: What are the voting majorities required in Congress?

NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTES BASIS

Conviction in impeachment 2/3 of All Sec. 3(6), Art. XI

NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTES BASIS

Affirm or Override Resolution to Impeach 1/3 of All Sec. 3(3), Art. XI

NATURE OF PROCEEDING REQUIRED VOTES BASIS

Discipline Members 2/3 of All Sec. 16(3)

Election of Officers Majority of All Sec. 16(1)

Declare the Existence of a State of War ⅔ of Both Houses, voting Sec. 23

Override President’s Veto ⅔ of All in the House of Sec. 27(1)

Quorum to do business Majority w/in Compulsive Sec. 16(2); Avelino

Tax Exemption Majority of All Sec. 28(4)

To Concur w/ President in granting amnesty Majority of All Art. VII, Sec. 19

Q24: Differentiate legislative inquiries under Sec. 21 and 22 of Art VI:

Sec. 22, Art. VI Sec. 21, Art. VI

Oversight Function Purpose is to Elicit information that may

Exceptions as to persons include: Exceptions as to persons include:

Q25: When does the jurisdiction of HRET/SET start?

Q26: What is the difference between initiative and referendum?

IV. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Q28: What is the prevailing rule regarding treaty withdrawal?

Q31: Differentiate the Extraordinary/Commander- in-Chief Powers?

ACTION BY THE LEGISLATIVE OR JUDICIAL BRANCH

Q32: What is Executive Impoundment?

Q35: What are the Rules on Succession?

Fails to Qualify VP acts as P N/A Senate P or Speaker acts as P

Not Chosen VP acts as P N/A Senate P or Speaker acts as P

President dies/ permanently VP becomes President for the unexpired term

Passive power Automatic

Q36: Is the judiciary precluded from reviewing “political questions”?

Q39: When is the operative fact doctrine not applicable?

VI. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS