Case Digest For Constitutional Law

Philippine Bar Association vs Commission on Elections
GR. No. 72915 Dec. 20 1985, 140 SCRA 453
FACTS:
Province of North Cotabto v. The GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain
GR. 183591 Oct. 14, 2008 568 SCRA 402
FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought
about by the Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front (MILF) as an aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled
to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. The agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity”
(BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and
Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all natural resources
within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic act
for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act
(IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on
public consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the
MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is
constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation
and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are
unconstitutional because it is contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution
thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on
both national and local levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the
mobilization and facilitation of people’s participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)
Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to
official records and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development
shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public
interest.
LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations.
No project or program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and
approval mus be obtained.”
Article VII (Executive Department)
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity
shall be associative characterized by shared authority and responsibility with a structure
of governance
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No

province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as
having an ―associative‖ relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state.
The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other
than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Article II, Section 22 The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous
cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development. the act
of placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice,
has generally been a preparation for independence, is certainly not conducive to
national unity.
The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its
specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on
its way to independence.
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime

baselines of the Philippines as an Archipelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting
some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around
Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the

UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to shorten
one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints and classify
KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.
Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main
reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages

hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken

our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is

just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand,
RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along coasts, serving
as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact

legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental
coastal states. Moreover, Right of innocent passage is a customary
international law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid
such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped

by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils.’ total maritime space.
Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of sovereignty
and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable

extent from the general configuration of the archipelago’.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll
breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration of the
archipelago
Government v. Monte de Piedad
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad
35 PHIL 728
FACTS:
About $400,000 were paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants
of the Spanish Dominions for the relief of those damaged by the earthquake on June 3,
1863, in the Philippines. Upon the petition of the governing body of the respondent,
the Philippine government directed its treasurer to turn over to the respondent the
sum of $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. Petitioner now brings
suit to recover said amount with interest against respondents in behalf of the various
petitions of the persons and heirs to whom the relief was intended. Defendant
contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court erred in stating
that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish government in its rights.
ISSUE:
Does the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the
respondent?
HELD:
The legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce
all charities of public nature. The court further asserted that said amount was not a
donation and that respondent is liable for the debt regardless of the cession of the
Philippine Islands to the United States. It is said that there is a total abrogation of the
former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the
circumstances present in the case are not political in nature. The great body of
municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continue in force until they
are abrogated or changed by the new ruler. As such, the government has the authority
to file a suit on behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae.
G.R. No. 167614 March 24, 2009
ANTONIO M. SERRANO, Petitioner,
vs.
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment.
During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a

downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. The downgrade is contrary to
the Chief Officer post that he initially signed up for. (with higher salary rate).
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months, but at the time of his
repatriation he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. He then
filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73
LA Decision – Declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits. As to the benefits, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC citing that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts
Respondents also appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to

question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
NLRC – The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded
to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Motion was denied.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause.
CA- Dismissed petitioner’s motion due to technicality. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Petitioner raised these main grounds to the Supreme Court:

1. CA erred to not acknowledge the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner
on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily
limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3)
months
The law in question is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 – Migrant Workers Act, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment

without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because
(1) it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their
overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary
package and
(2) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from
local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum
salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to
the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal;
that the disparate treatment
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1,Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a
protected sector
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
“No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have
only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected.
As to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of
the parties thereto.
2. YES. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
Such rights are not absolute. To be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes
of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to
all members of the class.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional

provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be
equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should
be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Cabanas v Pilapil Digest
Facts:
1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise

indicated that if he dies while the child is still a minor, the proceeds shall be administered by his
brother Francisco. Florentino died when the child was only ten years old hence, Francisco took
charge of Florentino’s benefits for the child. Meanwhile, the mother of the child
Melchora Cabañas filed a complaint seeking the delivery of the sum of money in her favor and allow
herself to be the child’s trustee. Francisco asserted the terms of the insurance policy and contended
that as a private contract its terms and obligations must be binding only to the parties and
intended beneficiaries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state may interfere by virtue of “parens patriae” to the terms
of the insurance policy?
YES.
The Constitution provides for the strengthening of the family as the basic social unit, and that
whenever any member thereof such as in the case at bar would be prejudiced and his interest
be affected then the judiciary if a litigation has been filed should resolve according to the best
interest of that person.
The uncle here should not be the trustee, it should be the mother as she was the
immediate relative of the minor child and it is assumed that the mother shows more care towards the
child than an uncle.
It is buttressed by its adherence to the concept that the judiciary, as an agency of the State acting
as parens patriae, is called upon whenever a pending suit of litigation affects one who is a minor to
accord priority to his best interest. It may happen, family relations may press their respective claims.
It would be more in consonance not only with the natural order of things but the tradition of the
country for a parent to be preferred. it could have been different if the conflict were between father
and mother. Such is not the case at all. It is a mother asserting priority. Certainly the judiciary as the
instrumentality of the State in its role of parens patriae, cannot remain insensible to the validity of her
plea.
Soriano v Laguardia
587 SCRA 79 (2009)
Velasco, Jr. J.:
FACTS:
In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as host of the

program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37, made the following remarks
directed towards private respondent Michael Sandoval, a minister of the Iglesia
ni Cristo and a host of the program Ang Tamang Daan:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka

pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang
kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and other
private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo before the MTRCB. On
16 Aug 2004, the MTRCB issued an order preventively suspending Ang Dating
Daan for 20 days in accordance with Sec 3(d) of PD 1986.
Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson

Consoliza Laguardia recuse themselves from hearing the case but later withdrew
his motion followed by the filing for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the
preventive suspension order.
On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months

suspension from the program Ang Dating Daan.
ISSUES:
 W/N MTRCB is authorized under PD 1986 to issue preventive suspension.
 W/N petitioner was deprived of due process and equal protection for lack
of due hearing in the case.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was religious speech protected by religious
freedom.
 W/N petitioner’s utterance was protected by freedom of speech and
expression.
HELD:
1.) Yes. The Court ruled that administrative agencies have powers and
functions which may be administrative, investigatory, regulatory, quasi-legislative,
or quasi-judicial, or a mix of the five, as conferred by the Constitution or the law.
The authority given should be liberally construed. A perusal of the PD 1986
reveal the possession of authority to issue preventive suspension as found in
Sec 3(d), “To supervise, regulate, and grant, deny or cancel… exhibition, and/or
television broadcast… as are determined by the BOARD to be objectionable…”
Any other construal would render its power to regulate, supervise, or discipline
illusory.
Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step

in an administrative investigation. And the power to discipline and impose
penalties, if granted, carries with it the power to investigate administrative
complaints and, during such investigation, to preventively suspend the person
subject of the complaint.
Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by

MTRCB in pursuant to PD 1986 merely formalizes the power bestowed by said
statute. The IRR provision on preventive suspension is applicable not only to
motion pictures and publicity materials but only beyond motion pictures. The
MTRCB would regretfully be rendered ineffective should it be subject to the
restrictions petitioner envisages.
2.) No. The Court ruled that since MTRCB handed out the assailed order in
response to a written notice after petitioner appeared before that Board for a
hearing on private respondents complaint, no violation of the guarantee was
made. Under Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the IRR of PD 1986, preventive suspension
shall issue any time during the pendency of the case. In this particular case, it
was done after MTRCB duly apprised petitioner of his having possibly violated
PD 1986 and of administrative complaints that had been filed against him for
such violation. At any event, that preventive suspension can validly be meted out
even without a hearing
Neither the guarantee of equal protection was denied. Petitioner argues that he
was unable to answer the criticisms coming from the INC ministers. The equal
protection clause demands that all persons subject to legislation should be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both in the privileges
conferred and liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that petitioner cannot, under
the premises, place himself in the same shoes as the INC ministers, who, for
one, are not facing administrative complaints before the MTRCB. For another,
he offers no proof to such allegations.
3.) No. The Court ruled that there is nothing in petitioner’s statements subject of
the complaints expressing any particular religious belief, nothing furthering his
avowed evangelical mission. The fact that he came out with his statements in a
televised bible exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another
person cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Even petitioners
attempts to place his words in context show that he was moved by anger and the
need to seek retribution, not by any religious conviction.
4.) No. The Court held that be it in the form of prior restraint, e.g., judicial
injunction against publication or threat of cancellation of license/franchise, or
subsequent liability, whether in libel and damage suits, prosecution for sedition,
or contempt proceedings, are anathema to the freedom of expression. Prior
restraint means official government restrictions on the press or other forms of
expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. The freedom of
speech may be regulated to serve important public interests and it may not be
invoked when the expression touches upon matters of essentially private
concern. The freedom to express ones sentiments and belief does not grant one
the license to vilify in public the honor and integrity of another. Any sentiments
must be expressed within the proper forum and with proper regard for the rights
of others. A speech would fall under the unprotected type if the utterances
involved are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step of truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.
The Petitioner’s statement can be treated as obscene, at least with respect to the
average child, and thus his utterances cannot be considered as protected
speech. Citing decisions from the US Supreme Court, the Court said that the
analysis should be context based and found the utterances to be obscene after
considering the use of television broadcasting as a medium, the time of the
show, and the “G” rating of the show, which are all factors that made the
utterances susceptible to children viewers. The Court emphasized on how the
uttered words could be easily understood by a child literally rather than in the
context that they were used.
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986
FACTS:
On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.
On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the "new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes. The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of
politics where only the people are the judge.
The Court further held that:
The people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective control of the entire country;
It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure government; and
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government
RUFFY v. CHIEF OF STAFF
75 PHIL 875FACTS:
Ramon Ruffy was the provincial commander stationed in Mindoro at the outbreak of
war on December 8, 1941. When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro on February
27, 1942, Mayor Ruffy retreated to the mountains and organized and led a guerrilla
outfit known as the Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. The case at bar is a petition for
prohibition praying that respondents be commanded to desist from further
proceedings in the trial of the petitioners on the ground that petitioners were not
subject to military law at the time of the offense.
ISSUE:
1. Are the petitioners subject to military law at the time of war and Japanese
occupation?
2. Is 93d Article of War constitutional?
HELD:
Petitioners were subject to military jurisdiction as provided for in Article of War (2d).
The Bolo Area was a contingent of the 6th military district which had been recognized
by the United States Army. The petitioners assailed the constitutionality of 93d Article
of War on the ground that it violates Article VIII Section 2 par. 4 of the Constitution
which provides that “National Assembly may not deprive the Supreme Court of its
original jurisdiction over all criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment”. The petitioners are in error for courts-martial are agencies of executive
character and are not a portion of the judiciary. The petition thus has no merits and is
dismissed with costs.
People v. Perfecto, G.R. No. L-18463, October 4, 1922
FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate,

Fernando Guerrero, discovered that the documents regarding the
testimony of the witnesses in an investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office. Then, the day following the convening of
Senate, the newspaper La Nacion – edited by herein respondent
Gregorio Perfecto – published an article against the Philippine Senate.
Here, Mr. Perfecto was alleged to have violated Article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code – provision that punishes those who insults the
Ministers of the Crown. Hence, the issue.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is

still in force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.

REASONING: The Court stated that during the Spanish Government,
Article 256 of the SPC was enacted to protect Spanish officials as
representatives of the King. However, the Court explains that in the
present case, we no longer have Kings nor its representatives for the
provision to protect. Also, with the change of sovereignty over the
Philippines from Spanish to American, it means
that the invoked provision of the SPC had been automatically abrogated.
The Court determined Article 256 of the SPC to be ‘political’ in nature for
it is about the relation of the State to its inhabitants, thus, the Court
emphasized that ‘it is a general principle of the public law that on
acquisition of territory, the previous political relations of the ceded region
are totally abrogated.’ Hence, Article 256 of the SPC is considered no
longer in force and cannot be applied to the present case. Therefore,
respondent was acquitted
LAUREL v. MISA
77 PHIL 856FACTS:
Anastacio Laurel filed a petition for habeas corpus contending that he cannot be
prosecuted for the crime of treason defined and penalized by the Article 114 of the
Revised Penal Code on the grounds that the sovereignty of the legitimate government
and the allegiance of Filipino citizens was then suspended, and that there was a change
of sovereignty over the Philippines upon the proclamation of the Philippine Republic.
ISSUE:
1. Is the absolute allegiance of the citizens suspended during Japanese occupation?
2. Is the petitioner subject to Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code?
HELD:
The absolute and permanent allegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by the
enemy of their legitimate government on the sovereign is not abrogated or severed by
the enemy occupation because the sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure
is not transferred to the occupier. There is no such thing as suspended allegiance.
The petitioner is subject to the Revised Penal Code for the change of form of
government does not affect the prosecution of those charged with the crime of treason
because it is an offense to the same government and same sovereign people.
Case Digest- CNMEG vs. Hon. Santamaria
G.R. No. 185572 February 7, 2012
CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,

vs.
HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 145, Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, et al., Respondents
Facts
On 14 September 2002, petitioner China National Machinery & Equipment Corp. (Group) (CNMEG), represented
by its chairperson, Ren Hongbin, entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the North Luzon Railways
Corporation (Northrail), represented by its president, Jose L. Cortes, Jr. for the conduct of a feasibility study on a
possible railway line from Manila to San Fernando, La Union (the Northrail Project).
On 30 August 2003, the Export Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank) and the Department of Finance of the
Philippines (DOF) entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (Aug 30 MOU), wherein China agreed to extend
Preferential Buyer’s Credit to the Philippine government to finance the Northrail Project. The Chinese government
designated EXIM Bank as the lender, while the Philippine government named the DOF as the borrower. Under the
Aug 30 MOU, EXIM Bank agreed to extend an amount not exceeding USD 400,000,000 in favor of the DOF,
payable in 20 years, with a 5-year grace period, and at the rate of 3% per annum.
On 1 October 2003, the Chinese Ambassador to the Philippines, Wang Chungui (Amb. Wang), wrote a letter to
DOF Secretary Jose Isidro Camacho (Sec. Camacho) informing him of CNMEG’s designation as the Prime
Contractor for the Northrail Project.
On 30 December 2003, Northrail and CNMEG executed a Contract Agreement for the construction of Section I,
Phase I of the North Luzon Railway System from Caloocan to Malolos on a turnkey basis (the Contract Agreement).
The contract price for the Northrail Project was pegged at USD 421,050,000.
On 26 February 2004, the Philippine government and EXIM Bank entered into a counterpart financial agreement –
Buyer Credit Loan Agreement No. BLA 04055 (the Loan Agreement). In the Loan Agreement, EXIM Bank agreed
to extend Preferential Buyer’s Credit in the amount of USD 400,000,000 in favor of the Philippine government in
order to finance the construction of Phase I of the Northrail Project.
On 13 February 2006, respondents filed a Complaint for Annulment of Contract and Injunction with Urgent Motion
for Summary Hearing to Determine the Existence of Facts and Circumstances Justifying the Issuance of Writs of
Preliminary Prohibitory and Mandatory Injunction and/or TRO against CNMEG, the Office of the Executive
Secretary, the DOF, the Department of Budget and Management, the National Economic Development Authority
and Northrail. RTC Br. 145 issued an Order dated 17 March 2006 setting the case for hearing on the issuance of
injunctive reliefs. On 29 March 2006, CNMEG filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of this Order. Before
RTC Br. 145 could rule thereon, CNMEG filed a Motion to Dismiss dated 12 April 2006, arguing that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over (a) its person, as it was an agent of the Chinese government, making it immune from
suit, and (b) the subject matter, as the Northrail Project was a product of an executive agreement.
On 15 May 2007, RTC Br. 145 issued an Omnibus Order denying CNMEG’s Motion to Dismiss and setting the case
for summary hearing to determine whether the injunctive reliefs prayed for should be issued. CNMEG then filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court in an Order dated 10 March 2008. Thus, CNMEG
filed before the CA a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction dated 4 April 2008.
In the assailed Decision dated 30 September 2008, the appellate court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari.
Subsequently, CNMEG filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated 5
December 2008.
Issue
Whether CNMEG is entitled to immunity, precluding it from being sued before a local court.
Ruling
There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established. According to
the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts of
another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized only
with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis.
Since the Philippines adheres to the restrictive theory, it is crucial to ascertain the legal nature of the act involved –
whether the entity claiming immunity performs governmental, as opposed to proprietary, functions. The restrictive
application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the
foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only
when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
It was CNMEG that initiated the undertaking, and not the Chinese government. The Feasibility Study was conducted
not because of any diplomatic gratuity from or exercise of sovereign functions by the Chinese government but was
plainly a business strategy employed by CNMEG with a view to securing this commercial enterprise.
The use of the term “state corporation” to refer to CNMEG was only descriptive of its nature as a government-
owned and/or -controlled corporation, and its assignment as the Primary Contractor did not imply that it was acting
on behalf of China in the performance of the latter’s sovereign functions. To imply otherwise would result in an
absurd situation, in which all Chinese corporations owned by the state would be automatically considered as
performing governmental activities, even if they are clearly engaged in commercial or proprietary pursuits.
Even assuming arguendo that CNMEG performs governmental functions, such claim does not automatically vest it
with immunity. This view finds support in Malong v. Philippine National Railways, in which this Court held that
“immunity from suit is determined by the character of the objects for which the entity was organized.”
In the case at bar, it is readily apparent that CNMEG cannot claim immunity from suit, even if it contends that it
performs governmental functions. Its designation as the Primary Contractor does not automatically grant it
immunity, just as the term “implementing agency” has no precise definition for purposes of ascertaining whether
GTZ was immune from suit. Although CNMEG claims to be a government-owned corporation, it failed to adduce
evidence that it has not consented to be sued under Chinese law. Thus, following this Court’s ruling in Deutsche
Gesellschaft, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, CNMEG is to be presumed to be a government-owned and
-controlled corporation without an original charter. As a result, it has the capacity to sue and be sued under Section
36 of the Corporation Code.
An agreement to submit any dispute to arbitration may be construed as an implicit waiver of immunity from suit.
In the United States, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 provides for a waiver by implication of state
immunity. In the said law, the agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in a foreign country is construed as an
implicit waiver of immunity from suit. Although there is no similar law in the Philippines, there is a reason to apply
the legal reasoning behind the waiver in this case.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012
FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction
of extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3rd was not
paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So Stern
Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3,
2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002, RTC denied it and issued a writ of
execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise denied. On December 21,
2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files
for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC
directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of
check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied
on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced
Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files
petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.
ISSUE:W/N the funds were proper subject of garnishment to satisfy the judgement award
HELD: HELD: UP's funds, being government funds, are not subject to garnishment. (Garnishment of public
funds; suability vs. liability of the State)
Despite its establishment as a body corporate, the UP remains to be a "chartered institution" performing a
legitimate government function. Irrefragably, the UP is a government instrumentality, performing the
States constitutional mandate of promoting quality and accessible education. As a government
instrumentality, the UP administers special funds sourced from the fees and income enumerated under
Act No. 1870 and Section 1 of Executive Order No. 714, and from the yearly appropriations, to achieve the
purposes laid down by Section 2 of Act 1870, as expanded in Republic Act No. 9500. All the funds going
into the possession of the UP, including any interest accruing from the deposit of such funds in any
banking institution, constitute a "special trust fund," the disbursement of which should always be aligned
with the UPs mvsission and purpose, and should always be subject to auditing by the COA. The funds of
the UP are government funds that are public in character. They include the income accruing from the use
of real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the attainment of its institutional objectives.
A marked distinction exists between suability of the State and its liability. As the Court succinctly stated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme: A distinction should first be made between suability
and liability. "Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable law and
the established facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is liable; on
the other hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded
by the mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its sovereign
immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.
The Constitution strictly mandated that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law." The execution of the monetary judgment against the UP was within the
primary jurisdiction of the COA. It was of no moment that a final and executory decision already validated
the claim against the UP.
ATO V. DAVID (G.R. NO. 159402; FEBRUARY 23, 2011)
CASE DIGEST: AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE v. SPOUSES DAVID & ELISEA RAMOS
FACTS: Respondent Spouses discovered that a portion of their registered land in Baguio City was being
used as part of the runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport being operated by petitioner Air
Transportation Office (ATO). The respondents agreed after negotiations to convey the affected portion by
deed of sale to the ATO in consideration of the amount of P778,150.00. However, the ATO failed to pay
despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, the respondents filed an action for collection against the ATO and some of its officials in the RTC. In
their answer, the ATO and its co-defendants invoked as an affirmative defense the issuance of
Proclamation No. 1358, whereby President Marcos had reserved certain parcels of land that included the
respondents affected portion for use of the Loakan Airport. They asserted that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the action without the States consent considering that the deed of sale had been entered into
in the performance of governmental functions.
The RTC held in favor of the Spouses, ordering the ATO to pay the plaintiffs Spouses the amount of
P778,150.00 being the value of the parcel of land appropriated by the defendant ATO as embodied in the
Deed of Sale, plus an annual interest of 12% from August 11, 1995, the date of the Deed of Sale until fully
paid; (2) The amount of P150,000.00 by way of moral damages and P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;
(3) the amount of P50,000.00 by way of attorneys fees plus P15,000.00 representing the 10, more or less,
court appearances of plaintiffs counsel; (4) The costs of this suit.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision withmodification deleting the awarded cost, and reducing
the moral and exemplary damage to P30,000.00 each, and attorneys fees is lowered to P10,000.00.
ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?
HELD: An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own
enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a
claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing
governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been
upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has
not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of
government but was essentially a business.
USA VS GUINTO
USA vs. GUINTO, 182 SCRA 644 Case Digest
These are cases that have been consolidated because they all involve the doctrine of state immunity. The
United States of America was not impleaded in the case at bar but has moved to dismiss on the ground that they are
in effect suits against it to which it has not consented.
FACTS:
1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)
The private respondents are suing several officers of the US Air Force in Clark Air Base in connection with the
bidding conducted by them for contracts for barber services in the said base, which was won by Dizon. The
respondents wanted to cancel the award because they claimed that Dizon had included in his bid an area not
included in the invitation to bid, and also, to conduct a rebidding.
2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)
Genove filed a complaint for damages for his dismissal as cook in the US Air Force Recreation Center at Camp
John Hay Air Station. It had been ascertained after investigation that Genove had poured urine into the soup stock
used in cooking the vegetables served to the club customers. The club manager suspended him and thereafter
referred the case to a board of arbitrators, which unanimously found him guilty and recommended his dismissal.
3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)
Bautista, a barracks boy in Camp O’ Donnell, was arrested following a buy-bust operation conducted by
petitioners, who were USAF officers and special agents of the Air Force Office. An information was filed against
Bautista and at the trial, petitioners testified against him. As a result of the charge, Bautista was dismissed from his
employment. He then filed for damages against petitioners claiming that it was because of the latter’s acts that he lost
his job.
4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)
A complaint for damages was filed by private respondents against petitioners (US military officers) for injuries
allegedly sustained by the former when defendants beat them up, handcuffed them and unleashed dogs on them.
The petitioners deny this and claim that respondents were arrested for theft but resisted arrest, thus incurring the
injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendants were immune from suit under the RP-US Bases Treaty for acts done by them
in the performance of their official duties.
RULING:
The rule that a State may not be sued without its consent is one of the generally accepted principles of
international law that were have adopted as part of the law of our land. Even without such affirmation, we would still
be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine of incorporation. Under this
doctrine, as accepted by the majority of the states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every
civilized state as a condition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. All states are sovereign
equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. While the doctrine appears to prohibit only suits against the
state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of the states for acts allegedly
performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the judgment against such officials will require
the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, the suit must be regarded as against the state
although it has not been formally impleaded. When the government enters into a contract, it is deemed to have
descended to the level of the other contracting party and divested of its sovereign immunity from suit with its implied
consent.
It bears stressing at this point that the aforesaid principle do not confer on the USA a blanket immunity for all
acts done by it or its agents in the Philippines. Neither may the other petitioners claim that they are also insulated
from suit in this country merely because they have acted as agents of the United States in the discharge of their
official functions.
There is no question that the USA, like any other state, will be deemed to have impliedly waived its non-
suability if it has entered into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity (commercial acts/jure gestionis). It is only
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental capacity (governmental acts/jure imperii) that no such
waiver may be implied.
In US vs GUINTO, the court finds the barbershops subject to the concessions granted by the US
government to be commercial enterprises operated by private persons. The Court would have directly resolved the
claims against the defendants as in USA vs RODRIGO, except for the paucity of the record as the evidence of the
alleged irregularity in the grant of the barbershop concessions were not available. Accordingly, this case was
remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
In US vs RODRIGO, the restaurant services offered at the John Hay Air Station partake of the nature of a
business enterprise undertaken by the US government in its proprietary capacity, as they were operated for profit, as
a commercial and not a governmental activity. Not even the US government can claim such immunity because by
entering into the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its proprietary functions, it impliedly divested
itself of its sovereign immunity from suit. But, the court still dismissed the complaint against petitioners on the ground
that there was nothing arbitrary about the proceedings in the dismissal of Genove, as the petitioners acted quite
properly in terminating Genove’s employment for his unbelievably nauseating act.
In US vs CEBALLOS, it was clear that the petitioners were acting in the exercise of their official functions
when they conducted the buy-bust operation and thereafter testified against the complainant. For discharging their
duties as agents of the United States, they cannot be directly impleaded for acts imputable to their principal, which
has not given its consent to be sued.
In US vs VERGARA, the contradictory factual allegations in this case need a closer study of what actually
happened. The record was too meager to indicate if the defendants were really discharging their official duties or had
actually exceeded their authority when the incident occurred. The needed inquiry must first be made by the lower
court so it may assess and resolve the conflicting claims of the parties.
THE HOLY SEE, petitioner, vs THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, JR., as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 61 and STARBRIGHT SALES ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to reverse and set side a decision from the RTC of Makati. Petitioner is the
Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City and is represented by the Papal Nuncio in the Philippines.
The petition arose from a controversy regarding a lot, Lot 5-A, of 6,000 square meters located in the Municipality of
Parañaque, registered in the name of the petitioner. Lot 5-A is contiguous to two other lots, 5-B and 5-D. The three
lots were sold to Ramon Licup, who later assigned his rights to the sale to the private respondent, Starbright Sales
Enterprises, Inc., involved in real estate. Informal settlers were squatting in the property, and dispute arose as to who
would evict them. The conflict intensified when the lot was sold to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation by the petitioner. The private respondent filed a complaint before the RTC of Makati against the
petitioner and three other defendants: Msgr. Domingo Cirilos, who acted as agent to the sellers, the PRC and
Tropicana. It prayed for: 1) annulment of the Deeds of Sale between petitioner and the PRC on the one hand and
Tropicana on the other; 2) the reconveyance of the lots in question; 3) specific performance of the agreement to sell
between it and the owners of the lots and; 4) damages. The petitioners and Cirilos separately moved to dimiss the
complaint: petitioners for lack of jurisdiction based on soverign immunity from suit and Cirilos for being an
improper party. An opposition to the motion was filed by private respondent. The trial court issued an order denying
the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, reason being that the petitioner can no longer be immune as they entered into a
business contract. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. They then filed a “Motion for Hearing for the Sole Purpose
of Establishing Factual Allegation for Claim of Immunity as a Jurisdic tional Defense,” to facilitate the hearing in its
defense of sovereign immunity. Private respondents opposed the motion as well as the motion for reconsideration.
The trial court ordered the resolution be suspended until after trial on the marits and directing the petitioner to file its
answer. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court. The petitioner invoked its privilege of sovereign
immunity only on its behalf and on behalf of its official representatives, the Papal Nuncio. Eventually, the
Department of Foreign Affairs filed for a Motion of Intervention claiming its legal interest on the outcome of the
case concerning the diplomatic immunity of the petitioner. It stated its adoption upon the claim of the petitioner with
regard to its claim for sovereign immunity from suit. This was opposed by the private respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the Holy See can invoke its right to Sovereign Immunity to suit.
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and the complaint against the petitioner is dismissed.
Reason: Generally, there are two accepted concepts of sovereignty: a) classical or absolute theory, wherein a
sovereign cannot be made as respondent to courts of another sovereign without its consent and; b) restrictive theory,
which puts conditions on when to recognize immunity.
Under the restrictive theory, sovereign immunity is only recognized with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii (or
those in pursuant to governmental functions) . If the act is private or acts jure gestionis (those that are for profit),
then immunity cannot be invoked.
In this case, the petitioner had denied that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of the Lot 5-A were made for
profit. It claimed that it acquired the property for its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. The lot,
allegedly, was acquired by donation from the Archdiocese of Manila for the purpose of building official residence of
Papal Nuncio. However, when the informal settlers refused to leave the property, the petitioner decided to dispose
the property, not for commercial purpose. The DFA intervened as they established in a Memorandum and
Certification the privilege of sovereign immunity of the petitioner, stating that they are a duly accredited diplomatic
mission to the Philippines exempt from local jurisdiction and has title to all rights, privileges and immunities of a
diplomatic mission or embassy in the country. When the plea of immunity has been recognized by the executive
department, such shall be conclusive to courts.
USA v. RUIZ
GR No. L-35645; May 22, 1985FACTS:
Sometime in May 1972, the United States invited the submission of bids for certain
naval projects. Eligio de Guzman & Co. Inc. responded to the invitation and submitted
bids. Subsequently, the company received two telegrams requesting it to confirm its
price. In June 1972, the company received a letter which said that the company did not
qualify to receive an award for the projects. The company then sued the United States
of America and individual petitioners demanding that the company perform the work
on the projects, or for the petitioners to pay damages and to issue a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the petitioners from entering into contracts with third parties
concerning the project.
ISSUE:
1) Do the petitioners exercise governmental or proprietary functions?
2) Does the Court have jurisdiction over the case?
HELD:
The rule of State immunity exempts a State from being sued in the courts of another
state without its consent or waiver. This is a necessary consequence of the principles of
independence and equality of states. However, state immunity now extends only to
governmental acts of the state. The restrictive application of State immunity is proper
only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign. In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of the USA and Philippines which is, indisputably, a function of
the government. As such, by virtue of state immunity, the courts of the Philippines have
no jurisdiction over the case for the US government has not given consent to the filing
of this suit.
Note: Notice to confirm its price is already perfection of contract to bid

LOCKHEED DETECTIVE AND WATCHMAN AGENCY, INC. vs. UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts
The petition is for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Petitioner Lockheed entered into a contract
of security with the University of the Philippines. On 1998, several of the guards assigned to UP
filed a complaint for unpaid wages, 25% overtime pay, premium pay for rest days and special
holidays, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay, night shift differentials, 13th month pay,
refund of cash bond, refund of deductions for the Mutual Benefits Aids System (MBAS), unpaid
wages from December 16-31, 1998, and attorney’s fees. The Labor Arbiter declared UP
solidarily liable. The decision was appealed but sustained by the NLCR, albeit a few
modifications. The parties motion to reconsider were likewise denied. On July 25, 2005, a Notice
of Garnishment 10 was issued to Philippine National Bank (PNB) UP Diliman Branch for the
satisfaction of the award of P12,142,522.69 (inclusive of execution fee). On August 16, 2005,
UP filed an Urgent Motion to Quash Garnishment. UP contended that the funds being subjected
to garnishment at PNB are government/public funds. However, the execution of the garnishment
was carried out. UP elevated their case to the court of appeals. On reconsideration, however, the
CA issued the assailed Amended Decision. It held that without departing from its findings that
the funds covered in the savings account sought to be garnished do not fall within the
classification of public funds, it reconsiders the dismissal of the petition in light of the ruling in
the case of National Electrification Administration v. Morales which mandates that all money
claims against the government must first be filed with the Commission on Audit (COA).
Lockheed appealed this decision to the Supreme Court. Arguing mainly that the NEA case
should not apply and that UP could be both sued and held liable. And that the quashal of
garnishment sought was moot because it had already become fait accompli.
Issue
1. Whether or not the NEA Case applies and the funds be garnished directly bypassing the COA.
2. Whether or not the previous garnishment and withdrawal of funds was fait accompli.
(accomplished fact)
Ruling
1. YES. This Court finds that the CA correctly applied the NEA case. Like NEA, UP is a
juridical personality separate and distinct from the government and has the capacity to sue and be
sued. Thus, also like NEA, it cannot evade execution, and its funds may be subject to
garnishment or levy. However, before execution may be had, a claim for payment of the
judgment award must first be filed with the COA. (Suability does not immediately mean
liability).
2. NO. As to the fait accompli argument of Lockheed, contrary to its claim that there is nothing
that can be done since the funds of UP had already been garnished, since the garnishment was
erroneously carried out and did not go through the proper procedure (the filing of a claim with
the COA), UP is entitled to reimbursement of the garnished funds plus interest of 6% per annum,
to be computed from the time of judicial demand to be reckoned from the time UP filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA which occurred right after the withdrawal of the garnished
funds from PNB
VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No.

L-26400 February 29, 1972
FACTS: Victoria Amigable is the is the registered owner of a lot which, without prior expropriation
proceedings or negotiated sale, was used by the government. Amigable's counsel wrote the President of
the Philippines requesting payment of the portion of her lot which had been expropriated by the
government.
Amigable later filed a case against Cuenca, the Commissioner of Public Highways, for recovery of
ownership and possession of the said lot. She also sought payment for compensatory damages, moral
damages and attorney's fees.
The defendant said that the case was premature, barred by prescription, and the government did not give
its consent to be sued.
ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.
HELD: Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use without going
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may properly maintain a
suit against the government without violating the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit.
The doctrine of immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice to a citizen.
The only relief available is for the government to make due compensation which it could and should have
done years ago. To determine just compensation of the land, the basis should be the price or value at the
time of the taking.
Republic of the Philippines vs.
Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth
Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July
21, 2003
FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption
to office following the EDSA
Revolution, President Corazon
C. Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the
Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its Chairman Jovito R. Salonga,
created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP
personnel, whether in the active
service or retired. Investigations
include the alleged unexplained
wealth
of respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas),
Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.
Evidences showed that respondent
is the owner of a house and lot in
Quezon City as well in Cebu
City. Moreover, equipment and
communication facilities were
found in the premises of
Elizabeth
Dimaano. Aside from the
military equipment, the raiding
team also confiscated
P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars in the house of
Elizabeth Dimaano. Affidavits of
members of the Military Security
Unit disclosed that Elizabeth
Dimaano is the mistress of
respondent Ramas. Dimaano had
no visible
means of income and is supported
by respondent for she was
formerly a mere secretary.
With these, a prima facie case
exists against respondent Ramas
for ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth.
The PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act
No. 1379, known as The Act
for the
Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property (RA No. 1379), against
Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as
co-defendant, in favor of the State.
However, the Sandiganbayan
subsequently dismissed the
complaint because there was an
illegal
search and seizure of the
items confiscated. The first
Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended
Complaint and ordered the return
of the confiscated items to
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while the
second Resolution denied
petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal to SC.
Petitioner claims that the
Sandiganbayan erred in declaring
the properties
confiscated from Dimaanos house
as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the search of
Dimaano’s home was legal.
Held:
NO. It is true that the Bill of
Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative
during an
interregnum (any period during
which a state has no ruler or only a
temporary executive). However,
the
protection accorded to individuals
in International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant)
and
the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the
interregnum.
Wheno constitution or Bill of
Rights existed, directives and
orders issued by government
officers
were valid so long as these officers
did not exceed the authority
granted on them. The raiding team
seized
the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items
not included in the search warrant.
Dimaano was also not present
during the raid (only Dimaano's
cousins witnessed the raid).
Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary
government had the duty to insure
that no one
shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or
correspondence.
The Declaration provides in its
Article 17(2) that no one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Thus, the revolutionary
government is obligated under
international law to observe
the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.
21, 2003
FACTS:
AFP
wealth
Philippine Army.
Elizabeth
P2,870,000.00 and
no visible
wealth.
for the
illegal
Amended
while the
Reconsideration.
the properties
Issue:
Held:
during an
the
and
interregnum.
officers
seized
that no one
correspondence.
the rights of
individuals under the Declaratio
21, 2
21, 2003
FACTS:
AFP
wealth
Philippine Army.
Elizabeth
P2,870,000.00 and
no visible
wealth.
for the
illegal
Amended
while the
Reconsideration.
the properties
Issue:
Held:
during an
the
and
interregnum.
officers
seized
that no one
correspondence.
the rights of
individuals under the Declaration
21, 2003
FACTS:
AFP
wealth
Philippine Army.
Elizabeth
P2,870,000.00 and
no visible
wealth.
for the
illegal
Amended
while the
Reconsideration.
the properties
Issue:
Held:
during an
the
and
interregnum.
officers
seized
that no one
correspondence.
the rights of
individuals under the Declaration.
21, 2
21, 2003
FACTS:
AFP
wealth
Philippine Army.
Elizabeth
P2,870,000.00 and
no visible
wealth.
for the
illegal
Amended
while the
Reconsideration.
the properties
Issue:
Held:
during an
the
and
interregnum.
officers
seized
that no one
correspondence.
the rights of
21, 2003
FACTS:
AFP
wealth
Philippine Army.
Elizabeth
P2,870,000.00 and
no visible
wealth.
for the
illegal
Amended
while the
Reconsideration.
the properties
Issue:
Held:
during an
the
and
interregnum.
officers
seized
that no one
correspondence.
the rights of
Republic of the Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003
FACTS:
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the EDSA Revolution, President CorazonC. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on GoodGovernment
(PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Accordingly, the
PCGG, through its Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-GraftBoard (AFP Board) tasked to
investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFPpersonnel, whether in the active
service or retired. Investigations include the alleged unexplained wealthof respondent Major General
Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas), Commanding General of the Philippine Army.Evidences showed that
respondent is the owner of a house and lot in Quezon City as well in CebuCity. Moreover, equipment
and communication facilities were found in the premises of ElizabethDimaano. Aside from
the military equipment, the raiding team also confiscated P2,870,000.00 and$50,000 US Dollars
in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano. Affidavits of members of the Military SecurityUnit disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent Ramas. Dimaano had no visiblemeans of income and is
supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.With these, a prima facie case exists
against respondent Ramas for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.The PCGG filed a petition for
forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379, known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property (RA No. 1379), against Ramas and impleaded Dimaano as co-defendant, in favor of
the State.However, the Sandiganbayan subsequently dismissed the complaint because there was an illegal
search and seizure of the items confiscated. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
AmendedComplaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while thesecond Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.Hence, this appeal to SC.
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the propertiesconfiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the search of Dimaano’s home was legal.
Held: NO. It is true that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during an interregnum (any period during which a state has no ruler or only a temporary
executive). However, the protection accorded to individuals in International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration)
remained in effect during the interregnum. When no constitution or Bill of Rights existed,
directives and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not
exceed the authority granted on them. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure
receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant.Dimaano was also not
present during the raid (only Dimaano's cousins witnessed the raid).Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no oneshall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.The
Declaration provides in its Article 17(2) that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.
Thus, the revolutionary government is obligated under international law to observe
the rights ofindividuals under the Declaration
the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner's witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team
confiscated.
The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per
se,[53] and they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized
them.
:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, BIENVENIDO R. TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R.
SANTIAGO, respondents.
G.R. No. 90478 November 21, 1991
FACTS: The case was commenced on July 21, 1987 by the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. The complaint which initiated the
action was denominated one "for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages," and was
avowedly filed pursuant to Executive Order No. 14 of President Corazon C. Aquino. After having been
served with summons, Tantoco, Jr. and Santiago, instead of filing their answer, jointly filed a "Motion to
Strike Out Some Portions of the Complaint and For Bill of Particulars of Other Portions." The PCGG
filed an opposition thereto, and the movants, a reply to the opposition. Tantoco and Santiago then
presented a "motion for leave to file interrogatories under Rule 25 of the Rules of Court" of which the
PCGG responded by filing a motion. On March 18, 1988, in compliance with the Order of January 29,
1988, the PCGG filed an Expanded Complaint of which the Sandiganbayan denied with a Resolution.
Tantoco and Santiago then filed an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco
and Santiago filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated "Interrogatories to Plaintiff," and on
August 2, 1989, an "Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"' as well as a Motion for Production and
Inspection of Documents. The Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended Interrogatories and granted the
motion for production and inspection of documents respectively. PCGG filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Resolution of August 25, 1989, it also filed an opposition to the Amended
Interrogatories. Tantoco and Santiago filed a reply and opposition. After hearing, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated two (2) Resolutions. Hence, this present petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON PETITIONER CAN OBJECT TO THE INTERROGATORIES SERVED ON IT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH RULE 25 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
2. WON SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN ORDERING FOR THE PRODUCTION AND
INSPECTION OF SPECIFIED DOCUMENTS AND THINGS ALLEGEDLY IN THE
POSSESSION OF PCGG.
HELD:
1. No. The State is, of course, immune from suit in the sense that it cannot, as a rule, be sued
without its consent. But it is axiomatic that in filing an action, it divests itself of its sovereign
character and sheds its immunity from suit, descending to the level of an ordinary litigant . The
PCGG cannot claim a superior or preferred status to the State, even while assuming to represent
or act for the State.
2. No. The Court gives short shrift to the argument that some documents sought to be produced and
inspected had already been presented in Court and marked preliminarily as PCGG's exhibits, the
movants having in fact viewed, scrutinized and even offered objections thereto and made
comments thereon. Obviously, there is nothing secret or confidential about these documents. No
serious objection can therefore be presented to the desire of the private respondents to have
copies of those documents in order to study them some more or otherwise use them during the
trial for any purpose allowed by law.
Republic vs. Villasor (Consti1)
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City of Manila, the Clerk of
Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International Construction
Corporation, respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts:
 The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, Gavino Unchuan
and International Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by Respondent Hon.
Guillermo P. Villasor.. confirming the arbitration award in the amount of 1,712,396.4
 Pursuant to the said declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. And for
the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff served notices of garnishment with several banks, specially
on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans
Bank received the same notice of garnishment.
 The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public funds duly appropriated and allocated
for the payment of pensions of retireees, pay and allowances of military and civillian personnel and for
maintenance and operations of AFP.
 Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess jurisdiction amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP, hence the
notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:
 Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held:
 No
Ratio:
 What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution.
When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does not thereby also consent to the execution of the
judement against it, as such execution will require another waiver.
Note: You cannot give as payment money that are already appropriated and allocated because it will be
against public policy
Philippine National Bank v. Judge Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, 15 June 1978

10JAN
Second Division
[FERNANDO, Acting C.J.]
FACTS: The petitioner Philippine National Bank filed this certiorari and prohibition proceeding against
respondent Judge Javier Pabalan who issued a writ of execution, followed thereafter by a notice of
garnishment of the funds of respondent Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration, deposited with it,
on the fundamental constitutional law doctrine of non-suability of a state, it being alleged that such
funds are public in character.
ISSUE: Can the funds of Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration deposited with the petitioner be
garnished?
HELD: YES.
HELD:
It is well-settled that when the government enters into commercial business, it
abandons its sovereign capacity and is to be treated like any other corporation.
Petitioner cannot set a bar to the garnishment for funds of public corporations which
can sue and be sued, as is the case of PVTA, are not exempt from garnishment.
Note: PNB is only a depository bank in this case

PVTA is an agent of Phil, an incorporated agency with its charter it can be sued and sue.
PNB filed the complaint in behalf of PVTA
Bermoy v PNC
By Unknown - April 26, 2014
Facts: On July 6, 1954, (24) twenty four employees from its dormitory known
as Normal Hall of the Philippine Normal College, filled an action in the COF of
Manila against the PNC for the recovery of salary differentials and overtime pay.
The Solicitor General on behalf of the defendant answers and denies the latter
liability. The court ordered it dismissed before the case was tried on the merits,
on the ground that neither one of the defendants was a corporation or a
juridical entity with capacity to be sued. The plaintiffs took an appeal to
Supreme Court, alleging that it was an error to dismiss their case on the ground
that, R.A. No. 416 took effect July, 1949 converted PNS to PNC, thus created a
Board of Trustees to administer the affairs as a corporation under section 13 of
the amended Act 1455 (Corporate Law), with the power “to sue and to be sued
in any court.”
Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued.
Held: The state has already given the consent by investing the college with
express power to be sued in the court. The act Authorizes the College to be
sued is also made clear in Section 6, where it is provided that “all process
against the Board of Trustees shall be served on the President or Secretary
thereof”. The order appealed from is re revoked and the case remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings. No cost
Republic of the Philippines vs Domingo

GR 175299
Facts of the Case

Alberto A. Domingo filed a Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages 5 against the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), he entered into seven contracts with the
DPWH Region III for the lease of his construction equipment to said government agency.6 The lease
contracts were allegedly executed in order to implement the emergency projects of the DPWH
Region. After the completion of the projects, Domingo claimed that the unpaid rentals of the DPWH
Region III amounted to ₱6,320,163.05. Despite repeated demands, Domingo asserted that the
DPWH Region III failed to pay its obligations. Domingo was, thus, compelled to file the above case
for the payment of the ₱6,320,163.05 balance, plus ₱200,000.00 as moral and compensatory
damages, ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and ₱200,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
From the evidence presented by [Domingo], testimonial and documentary, it was convincingly
proven that [Domingo] is entitled to the relief prayed for.
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Annulment of Judgment with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. 18 The petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 78813. The Republic argued that it was not impleaded(made liable to the case) as
an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 333-M-2002. The seven contracts sued upon in the trial
court stated that they were entered into by the Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director and/or
Project Manager of the DPWH Region III for and in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, which
purportedly was the real party to the contract. Moreover, the Republic averred that, under the law,
the statutory representatives of the government for purposes of litigation are either the Solicitor
General or the Legal Service Branch of the Executive Department concerned. Since no summons
was issued to either of said representatives, the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the
Republic
Issue:
1. W/N the DPWH Region 3 was an extension of the Republic of Philippines
2. W/N the proper service of summons was served to the Republic of Philippines
Ruling:
1. Yes, A regional office of the DPWH is part of the composition of the department itself and is
therefore, not an entity that is altogether separate from the department, and DPWH being an
unincorporated agency has no separate juridical entity, any suit filed against it is necessarily an
action against the government
2. No, the Complaint for Specific Performance with Damages filed by Domingo specifically named as
defendant the DPWH Region III. As correctly argued by the Republic, the DPWH and its regional
office are merely the agents of the former (the Republic), which is the real party in interest, Thus, as
mandated by Section 13, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, the summons in this case should have been
served on the OSG.
BUREAU OF PRINTING v. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, GR No.

L-15751, 1961-01-28
Facts:
The action in question was upon complaint of the respondent Bureau of Printing Employees
Association (NLU)... against herein petitioners Bureau of
Printing,... The complaint alleged that Serafin Salvador and Mariano Ledesma have been
engaging in unfair labor practice by interfering with,... or coercing the employees of the
Bureau of Printing, particularly the members of the complaining association, in the exercise
of their right to self-organization and discriminating in regard to hire and tenure of their
employment in order to discourage them from pursuing their... union activities.
the petitioners... denied the charges of unfair labor practices attributed to them and, by way
of affirmative defenses, alleged, among other things, that respondents... were suspended
pending result of an administrative investigation against them for breach of Civil Service
rules and regulations; that the Bureau of Printing has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued;... that said Bureau of Printing is not an industrial concern engaged for the purpose of
gain but is an agency of the Republic performing governmental functions.
Issues:
Whether or not the BOP can be sued
Ruling:
Clearly, while the Bureau of Printing is allowed to undertake private printing jobs, it cannot
be pretended that it is thereby an industrial... or business concern. The additional work it
executes for private parties is merely incidental to its function, and although such work may
be deemed proprietary in character, there is no showing that the employees performing said
proprietary function are separate and distinct... from those employed in its general
governmental functions.
Indeed, as an office of the Government, without any corporate or juridical personality, the
Bureau of Printing cannot be sued
Any suit, action or proceeding against it, if it were to produce any effect, would actually be a
suit, action or... proceeding against the Government itself, and the rule is settled that the
Government cannot be sued without its consent, much less over its objection.
Said administrative charges are for insubordination,... grave misconduct and acts prejudicial
to public service committed by inciting the employees of the Bureau of Printing to walk out
of their jobs against the order of the duly constituted officials.
Under the law, the Heads of Departments and Bureaus are authorized to institute... and
investigate administrative charges against erring subordinate
SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, GR No. 179918, 2010-09-08

Facts:
This case is about a question of jurisdiction over an action against a petroleum contractor,
whose pipeline operation has allegedly driven the fish away from coastal areas, inflicting
loss of earnings among fishermen.
On December 11, 1990 petitioner Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. (Shell) and the
Republic of the Philippines entered into Service Contract 38 for the exploration and
extraction of petroleum in northwestern Palawan.
Shell discovered natural gas in the
Camago-Malampaya area and pursued its development... of the well under the Malampaya
Natural Gas Project.
This entailed the construction and installation of a pipeline from Shell's production platform
to its gas processing plant in Batangas.
The pipeline spanned 504... kilometers and crossed the Oriental Mindoro Sea.
respondents Efren Jalos, Joven Campang, Arnaldo Mijares, and 75 other individuals (Jalos,
et al) filed a complaint for damages[1] against Shell before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),... Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
claimed that they were all subsistence fishermen from the coastal barangay of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro whose livelihood was adversely affected by the construction and operation
of Shell's natural gas pipeline.
alos, et al claimed that their fish catch became few after the construction of the pipeline.
As a result, their average net income per month fell
They said that "the pipeline greatly affected biogenically... hard-structured communities
such as coral reefs and led [to] stress to the marine life in the Mindoro Sea."
Instead of filing an answer, Shell moved for dismissal of the complaint.
It alleged that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action, as it is a "pollution case"
under Republic Act (R.A.) 3931, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) 984 or the
Pollution Control
Law.
Under these statutes, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) has primary jurisdiction over
pollution cases and actions for related damages
Shell also claimed that it could not be sued pursuant to the doctrine of state immunity
without the State's consent.
Moreover, said Shell, the complaint failed to state a cause of action since it did not specify
any actionable wrong or particular act or omission on Shell's part that could have caused
the alleged injury to Jalos, et al.
RTC dismissed the complaint.
t ruled that the action was actually pollution-related, although denominated as one for
damages. The complaint should thus be brought first before the PAB (Pollution
Adjudication Board), the government agency vested with jurisdiction over... pollution-related
cases.
Jalos, et al assailed the RTC's order through a petition for certiorari[6] before the Court of
Appeals (CA).
In due course, the latter court reversed such order and upheld the jurisdiction of the RTC
over the action.
The CA also rejected Shell's assertion that the suit was actually against the State. It
observed that the government was not even impleaded as party defendant.
The CA also held that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable wrong
Jalos, et al invoked their right to fish the sea and earn a living, which Shell had the
correlative obligation to respect.
Shell moved for reconsideration of the CA's decision but the same was denied.
Issues:
Whether or not the suit is actually against the State and is barred under the doctrine of state
immunity.
Ruling:
Shell claims that it cannot be sued without the State's consent under the doctrine of state
immunity from suit. But, to begin with, Shell is not an agent of the Republic of the
Philippines
It is but a service contractor for the exploration and... development of one of the country's
natural gas reserves.
Consequently, Shell is not an agent of the Philippine government, but a provider of services,
technology and financing[31] for the Malampaya Natural Gas Project.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition and REVERSES the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV 82404 dated November 20, 2006. Respondent Efren Jalos, et al's
complaint for damages against Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. in Civil
Case P-1818-03 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro is
ordered DISMISSED without prejudice to its refiling with the Pollution Adjudication Board or
PAB.
Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme
FACTS:
A passenger jeepney, a sand truck and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union collided. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died. The heirs of Baniña filed a complaint for damages
against the owner and driver of the jeepney, who, in turn, filed a Third Party Complaint
against the Municipality and its dump truck driver, Alfredo Bislig. Municipality filed its
answer and raised the defense of non-suability of the State. After trial, the court ruled in
favor of the plaintiffs and ordered Municipality and Bislig to pay jointly and severally the
heirs of Baniña.
ISSUES:
1.Are municipal corporations suable?

2. Is the Municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions?
Tort- a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm.
Tort
HELD:
1. Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they
are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of
such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.
2. Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence
to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by
them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it
can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities
to be sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was
not acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover.
In this case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his
way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San
Fernando's municipal streets." In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the
regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed. Hence, the driver of the dump
truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.
Decision of the lower court modified. Petitioner municipality was absolved of any
liability.
Merritt vs Government of the Philippine

Islands
FACTS: Merrit was riding a motorcycle along Padre Faura Street when he was bumped
by the ambulance of the General Hospital. Merrit sustained severe injuries rendering
him unable to return to work. The legislature later enacted Act 2457 authorizing Merritt
to file a suit against the Government in order to fix the responsibility for the collision
between his motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital, and to determine
the amount of the damages, if any, to which he is entitled. After trial, the lower court
held that the collision was due to the negligence of the driver of the ambulance. It then
determined the amount of damages and ordered the government to pay the same.
ISSUES:
1. Did the Government, in enacting the Act 2457, simply waive its immunity from suit or
did it also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
2. Is the Government liable for the negligent act of the driver of the ambulance?
HELD:
1. By consenting to be sued a state simply waives its immunity from suit. It does not
thereby concede its liability to plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It merely gives a remedy to
enforce a preexisting liability and submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to
its right to interpose any lawful defense.
2. Under the Civil Code, the state is liable when it acts through a special agent, but not
when the damage should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained
to do the act performed. A special agent is one who receives a definite and fixed order
or commission, foreign to the exercise of the duties of his office if he is a special
official. This concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an employee of the
acting administration and who on his own responsibility performs the functions which
are inherent in and naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law and the
regulations. The driver of the ambulance of the General Hospital was not a special
agent; thus the Government is not liable.
G.R. Nos. 147036-37
Petitioner Organizations vs Executive Secretary
ABAD, J.:
These are consolidated petitions to declare unconstitutional certain
presidential decrees and executive orders of the martial law era relating to
the raising and use of coco-levy funds.
The Facts and the Case
On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260[1] that

established a Coconut Investment Fund (CI Fund) for the development of
the coconut industry through capital financing.[2] Coconut farmers were to
capitalize and administer the Fund through the Coconut Investment
Company (CIC)[3] whose objective was, among others, to advance the
coconut farmers' interests. For this purpose, the law imposed a levy of
P0.55 on the coconut farmer's first domestic sale of every 100 kilograms of
copra, or its equivalent, for which levy he was to get a receipt convertible
into CIC shares of stock.[4]
About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or on

August 20, 1973 President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
(P.D.) 276,[5] which established a Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
(CCS Fund), to address the crisis at that time in the domestic market for
coconut-based consumer goods. The CCS Fund was to be built up through
the imposition of a P15.00-levy for every first sale of 100 kilograms of
copra resecada.[6] The levy was to cease after a year or earlier provided the
crisis was over. Any remaining balance of the Fund was to revert to the CI
Fund established under R.A. 6260.[7]
A year later or on November 14, 1974 President Marcos issued P.D. 582,
[8]
creating a permanent fund called the Coconut Industry Development
Fund (CID Fund) to channel for the ultimate direct benefit of coconut
farmers part of the levies that they were already paying. The Philippine
Coconut Authority (PCA) was to provide P100 million as initial capital of
the CID Fund and, thereafter, give the Fund at least P0.20 per kilogram of
copra resecada out of the PCA's collection of coconut consumers
stabilization levy. In case of the lifting of this levy, the PCA was then to
impose a permanent levy of P0.20 on the first sale of every kilogram of
copra to form part of the CID Fund.[9] Also, under P.D. 582, the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), then owned by the Government, was to receive on
deposit, administer, and use the CID Fund.[10] P.D. 582 authorized the PNB
to invest the unused portion of the CID Fund in easily convertible
investments, the earnings of which were to form part of the Fund.[11]
In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755[12] which approved the

acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of the coconut farmers to
enable such bank to promptly and efficiently realize the industry's credit
policy.[13] Thus, the PCA bought 72.2% of the shares of stock of First United
Bank, headed by Pedro Cojuangco.[14] Due to changes in its corporate
identity and purpose, the bank's articles of incorporation were amended in
July 1975, resulting in a change in the bank's name from First United Bank
to United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB).[15]
On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,[16] the Coconut

Industry Code, which consolidated and codified existing laws relating to the
coconut industry. The Code provided that surpluses from the CCS Fund
and the CID Fund collections, not used for replanting and other authorized
purposes, were to be invested by acquiring shares of stock of corporations,
including the San Miguel Corporation (SMC), engaged in undertakings
related to the coconut and palm oil industries.[17] UCPB was to make such
investments and equitably distribute these for free to coconut farmers.
[18]
These investments constituted the Coconut Industry Investment Fund
(CIIF). P.D. 961 also provided that the coconut levy funds (coco-levy funds)
shall be owned by the coconut farmers in their private capacities.[19] This
was reiterated in the PD 1468[20] amendment of June 11, 1978.
In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699,[21] suspending the collections

of the CCS Fund and the CID Fund. But in 1981 he issued P.D.
1841[22] which revived the collection of coconut levies. P.D. 1841 renamed
the CCS Fund into the Coconut Industry Stabilization Fund (CIS Fund).[23]
This Fund was to be earmarked proportionately among several
development programs, such as coconut hybrid replanting program,
insurance coverage for the coconut farmers, and scholarship program for
their children.[24]
In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order

(E.O.) 312,[25] establishing a Sagip Niyugan Program which sought to
provide immediate income supplement to coconut farmers and encourage
the creation of a sustainable local market demand for coconut oil and other
coconut products.[26] The Executive Order sought to establish a P1-billion
fund by disposing of assets acquired using coco-levy funds or assets of
entities supported by those funds.[27] A committee was created to manage
the fund under this program.[28] A majority vote of its members could
engage the services of a reputable auditing firm to conduct periodic audits.
[29]
At about the same time, President Estrada issued E.O. 313,[30] which created
an irrevocable trust fund known as the Coconut Trust Fund (the Trust
Fund). This aimed to provide financial assistance to coconut farmers, to
the coconut industry, and to other agri-related programs.[31] The shares of
stock of SMC were to serve as the Trust Fund's initial capital.[32] These
shares were acquired with CII Funds and constituted approximately 27% of
the outstanding capital stock of SMC. E.O. 313 designated UCPB, through
its Trust Department, as the Trust Fund's trustee bank. The Trust Fund
Committee would administer, manage, and supervise the operations of the
Trust Fund.[33] The Committee would designate an external auditor to do
an annual audit or as often as needed but it may also request the
Commission on Audit (COA) to intervene.[34]
To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission

on Good Government, the Office of the Solicitor General, and
other government agencies to exclude the 27% CIIF SMC shares from Civil
Case 0033, entitled Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr.,
et al., which was then pending before the Sandiganbayan and to lift
the sequestration over those shares.[35]
On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

ordered the suspension of E.O.s 312 and 313.[36] This notwithstanding, on
March 1, 2001 petitioner organizations and individuals brought the present
action in G.R. 147036-37 to declare E.O.s 312 and 313 as well as Article III,
Section 5 of P.D. 1468 unconstitutional. On April 24, 2001 the other sets of
petitioner organizations and individuals instituted G.R. 147811 to nullify
Section 2 of P.D. 755 and Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s 961 and 1468 also
for being unconstitutional.
The Issues Presented

The parties submit the following issues for adjudication:
Procedurally
1. Whether or not petitioners' special civil actions of certiorari under

Rule 65 constituted the proper remedy for their actions; and
2. Whether or not petitioners have legal standing to bring the same to

court.
On the substance
3. Whether or not the coco-levy funds are public funds; and
4. Whether or not (a) Section 2 of P.D. 755, (b) Article III, Section 5 of P.D.s
961 and 1468, (c) E.O. 312, and (d) E.O. 313 are unconstitutional.
The Rulings of the Court
First. UCPB questions the propriety of the present petitions

for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 on the ground that there are
no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal or board or before a government
official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions.[37] UCPB
insists that the Court exercises appellate jurisdiction with respect to issues
of constitutionality or validity of laws and presidential orders.[38]
But, as the Court previously held, where there are serious allegations that a
law has infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but the
duty of the Court to look into such allegations and, when warranted, uphold
the supremacy of the Constitution.[39] Moreover, where the issues raised
are of paramount importance to the public, as in this case, the Court has the
discretion to brush aside technicalities of procedure.[40]
Second. The Court has to uphold petitioners' right to institute these petitions. The
petitioner organizations in these cases represent coconut farmers on whom the burden
of the coco-levies attaches. It is also primarily for their benefit that the levies were
imposed.
The individual petitioners, on the other hand, join the petitions as taxpayers. The Court
recognizes their right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.[41] This so-called taxpayer's suit is based on
the theory that expenditure of public funds for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act is a misapplication of such funds.[42]
Besides, the 1987 Constitution accords to the citizens a greater participation in the

affairs of government. Indeed, it provides for people's initiative, the right to information
on matters of public concern (including the right to know the state of health of their
President), as well as the right to file cases questioning the factual bases for the
suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus or declaration of martial law. These
provisions enlarge the people's right in the political as well as the judicial field. It grants
them the right to interfere in the affairs of government and challenge any act tending to
prejudice their interest.
Third. For some time, different and conflicting notions had been formed as to the
nature and ownership of the coco-levy funds. The Court, however, finally put an end to
the dispute when it categorically ruled in Republic of the Philippines v.
COCOFED[43] that these funds are not only affected with public interest; they are, in
fact, prima facie public funds. Prima facie means a fact presumed to be true unless
disproved by some evidence to the contrary.[44]
The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support
a proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing
powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general.
The COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) treated
them as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public
character.[45]
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes
and can only be used for public purpose
Fourth. Petitioners in G.R. 147811 assert that Section 2 of P.D. 755 above is void and
unconstitutional for disregarding the public character of coco-levy funds.
BAYAN MUNA VS. ROMULO
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
Bayan Muna vs Romulo

G. R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011
Facts:
Petitioner Bayan Muna is a duly registered party-list group established to represent the
marginalized sectors of society. Respondent Blas F. Ople, now deceased, was the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs during the period material to this case. Respondent
Alberto Romulo was impleaded in his capacity as then Executive Secretary.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
“the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal
jurisdictions.” The serious crimes adverted to cover those considered grave under
international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and crimes
of aggression.
In 2003, via Exchange of Notes with the US government, the RP, represented by
then DFA Secretary Ople, finalized a non-surrender agreement which aimed to
protect certain persons of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits
that might be brought against them in international tribunals.
RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:

1. For purposes of this Agreement, “persons” are current or former Government
officials, employees (including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one
Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the
express consent of the first Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any
purpose, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or
expelled to a third country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security
Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

Philippines to a third country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of
that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the

[USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that
person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the
Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one
party notifies the other of its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this
Agreement shall continue to apply with respect to any act occurring, or any allegation
arising, before the effective date of termination.
In response to a query of then Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the
non-surrender agreement, Ambassador Ricciardone replied in his letter of October 28, 2003
that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and
consent of the US Senate.
In this proceeding, petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding
and ratifying the Agreement and prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least
declared as without force and effect.
Issue: Whether or not the RP-US NON SURRENDER AGREEMENT is void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at variance with universally
recognized principles of international law.
Ruling: The petition is bereft of merit. (No merit)
Validity of the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement
Petitioner, we believe, labors under the erroneous impression that the Agreement would
allow Filipinos and Americans committing high crimes of international concern to escape
criminal trial and punishment. This is manifestly incorrect. Persons who may have
committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted and punished in the
Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before the ICC, assuming,
for the nonce, that all the formalities necessary to bind both countries to the Rome Statute
have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement contextually prohibits is the surrender
by either party of individuals to international tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of
the other party, which may desire to prosecute the crime under its existing laws. With the
view we take of things, there is nothing immoral or violative of international law concepts in
the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction pursuant to the non-surrender
agreement over an offense considered criminal by both Philippine laws and the Rome
Statute. Rome Statute expressly recognizes the primary jurisdiction of states, like the RP,
over serious crimes committed within their respective borders, the complementary
jurisdiction of the ICC coming into play only when the signatory states are unwilling or
unable to prosecute.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care
Association of the Philippines vs. Duque III
(Austria-Martinez, October 9, 2007)
Nature:
Special Civil Action in the Supreme Court. Certiorari
Petitioner:
Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines
Respondents:
DOH Sec. Francisco Duque III, DOH Undersecretaries Dr. Ethelyn Nieto,D r . M a r g a r i t a
Galon, Atty. Alexander Padilla and Dr. Jade
D e l M u n d o ; a n d A s s t . Secretaries Dr. Mario Villaverde, Dr. David Lozada and Dr.
Nemesio Gako
Facts:
-
Executive Order No. 51 (The Milk Code - TMC) was issued by Pres. Aquino on Oct.28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to her under the Freedom Constitution.
(1)
One of the preambular clauses of TMC – the law seeks to give effect to Article11 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substituttes (ICMBS),a code adopted by the
WHA (World Health Assembly) in 1981.
-
In 1990, the Philippine ratified the International Convention on the Rights of theChild. Art. 24
of the instrument mandates that States should take measure todiminish infant
mortality and should ensure that all segments of society areinformed of the advantages
of breastfeeding.- F r o m 1 9 8 2 – 2 0 0 6 , t h e W H A a d o p t e d s e v e r a l
r e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should
bee n s u r e d t h a t n u t r i t i o n a n d h e a l t h c l a i m s a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d f o r b r e a s t m i l k
substitutes.
-
May 15, 2006 – DOH issues the assailed RIRR (Revised Implementing Rules andRegulations of
E.O. 51 or A.O. No. 2006-0012) which was to take effect on July 7,2006. – The RIRR imposes
a ban on all advertisements of breastmilk substitutes-June 28, 2006 – Petitioner filed the
present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO or
Writ of Preliminary injunction.- A u g u s t 1 5 , 2 0 0 6 – t h e C o u r t i s s u e d a R e s o l u t i o n
g r a n t i n g t h e T R O , e n j o i n i n g t h e respondents from implementing the assailed RIRR.-
Petitioner assails the RIRR for going beyond the provisions
o f T M C t h e r e b y amending and expanding the coverage of the said law.
-
DOH meanwhile contends that the RIRR implements not only TMC but also various
international instruments regarding infant and young child nutrition. They posit that the said
international instruments are deemed part of the law of the land and therefore may be
implemented by the DOH in the RIRR.
Issue:
W/n the RIRR is unconstitutional?
Sub-issue(s):
W/n the RIRR is in accord with TMC? W/n
p e r t i n e n t i n t e r n a t i o n a l agreements entered into by the Philippines are part of the law of the
land and may thusbe implemented through an RIRR, if so, is the RIRR in accord with
such internationalagreements?Note: I focused on the parts on international law. The
other matters (in case ma’am asks) are at the bottom of the digest.
Held:
No. However what may be implemented is the RIRR based on the Milk Code which in
turn is based on the ICMBS as this is deemed part of the law of the land. Theother WHA
Resolutions however cannot be imposed as they are not deemed part of the law of the land.
Espina vs Zamora
September 21, 2010
law already in effect for almost a decade
FACTS
• Constitutionality of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000
• Assailed as in breach of the constitutional mandate for the development of a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos
• On March 7, 2000 President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law Republic Act (R.A.) 8762, also
known as the Retail Trade Liberalization Act of 2000. It expressly repealed R.A. 1180, which
absolutely prohibited foreign nationals from engaging in the retail trade business
• the law runs afoul of Sections 9, 19, and 20 of Article II of the Constitution which enjoins the State
to place the national economy under the control of Filipinos to achieve equal distribution of
opportunities, promote industrialization and full employment, and protect Filipino enterprise against
unfair competition and trade policies.
• One of the counter of the respondents is petitioners have no legal standing to file the petition. They
cannot invoke the fact that they are taxpayers since R.A. 8762 does not involve the disbursement of
public funds. Nor can they invoke the fact that they are members of Congress since they made no
claim that the law infringes on their right as legislators.
Issues:
1. Whether or not petitioner lawmakers have the legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of
R.A. 8762; and
2. Whether or not R.A. 8762 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
1 Yes, Here, there is no clear showing that the implementation of the Retail Trade Liberalization Act
prejudices petitioners or inflicts damages on them, either as taxpayers 4 or as legislators.5 Still the
Court will resolve the question they raise since the rule on standing can be relaxed for nontraditional
plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when as in this case the public interest so
requires or the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.6
2 No. In other words, while Section 19, Article II of the 1987 Constitution requires the development of
a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipino entrepreneurs, it
does not impose a policy of Filipino monopoly of the economic environment. The objective is simply
to prohibit foreign powers or interests from maneuvering our economic policies and ensure that
Filipinos are given preference in all areas of development.
Here, to the extent that R.A. 8762, the Retail Trade Liberalization Act, lessens the restraint on the
foreigners’ right to property or to engage in an ordinarily lawful business, it cannot be said that the
law amounts to a denial of the Filipinos’ right to property and to due process of law. Filipinos
continue to have the right to engage in the kinds of retail business to which the law in question has
permitted the entry of foreign investors
In sum, petitioners have not shown how the retail trade liberalization has prejudiced and can
prejudice the local small and medium enterprises since its implementation about a decade ago.
IBP vs. Zamora G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
IBP vs. Zamora
G.R. No.141284, August 15, 2000
Facts:
• In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and
carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint
visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression.
• At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a temporary
restraining order seeking to nullify on constitutional grounds the order of President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the "Marines") to join the Philippine
National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the metropolis.
• Letter of Instruction 02/2000 (the "LOI") which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols,
1
called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership
2
of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not petitioner has legal standing
(1) Whether or not the President’s factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review
(2) Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on
civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP
Held:
1The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of standing in this case. In the case at bar, the
IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the
Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while
undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case
2.The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines. So there is only a
political question
We now address the Solicitor General’s argument that the issue involved is not susceptible to review by
the judiciary because it involves a political question, and thus, not justiciable.
As a general proposition, a controversy is justiciable if it refers to a matter which is appropriate for court
review. It pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognized by
22
law. Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional cases
brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases wherein the Court
hesitates to rule on are "political questions." The reason is that political questions are concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a particular act or measure being assailed.
Moreover, the political question being a function of the separation of powers, the courts will not normally
interfere with the workings of another co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts
to step in to uphold the law and the Constitution.
3.
The Court disagrees to the contention that by the deployment of the Marines, the civilian task of law enforcement is “militarized” in
violation of Sec. 3, Art. II of the Constitution. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The local police forces
are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP
Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. The real
authority in the operations is lodged with the head of a civilian institution, the PNP, and not with the military. Since none of the
Marines was incorporated or enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to civilian position to speak of. Hence,
the deployment of the Marines in the joint visibility patrols does not destroy the civilian character of the PNP .
BAYAN v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY RONALDO ZAMORA, GR No. 138570, 2000-10-10
Facts:
On March 14, 1947, the Philippines and the United States of America forged a Military
Bases Agreement which formalized... the use of installations in the Philippine territory by
United States military personnel. To further strengthen their defense and security...
relationship, the Philippines and the United States entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty on
August 30, 1951. Under the treaty, the parties agreed to respond to any external armed
attack on their territory, armed forces, public vessels, and aircraft.
In view of the impending expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement in 1991, the
Philippines and the United States negotiated for a possible extension of the military bases
agreement. On
1991, the Philippine Senate rejected the proposed RP-US Treaty of
Friendship, Cooperation and Security which, in effect, would have extended the presence of
US military bases in the Philippines.
With the expiration of the RP-US Military Bases Agreement, the periodic military exercises
conducted between the two... countries were held in abeyance.
Notwithstanding, the defense and security relationship between the Philippines and the
United States of America continued pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty.
On... the United States panel, headed by US Defense Deputy Assistant Secretary for Asia
Pacific Kurt Campbell, met with the Philippine panel, headed by Foreign Affairs
Undersecretary Rodolfo Severino Jr., to exchange notes on "the complementing strategic
interests of... the United States and the Philippines in the Asia-Pacific region." Both sides
discussed... the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA for brevity).
Thereafter, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved the VFA, which was respectively
signed by public respondent Secretary Siazon and Unites States
Ambassador Thomas Hubbard on
1998.
1998
, President
Estrada, through respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ratified the VFA.
the President, acting through respondent Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, officially
transmitted to the Senate... the Instrument of Ratification, the letter of the President... nd the
VFA,... for concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
On May 3, 1999, the Committees submitted Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 recommending
8
the concurrence of the Senate to the VFA and the creation of a Legislative Oversight Committee to
oversee its implementation. Debates then ensued.
On May 27, 1999, Proposed Senate Resolution No. 443 was approved by the Senate, by a two-
thirds (2/3) vote of its members. Senate Resolution No. 443 was then re-numbered as Senate
9
Resolution No. 18. 10
1999, the VFA officially entered into force after an Exchange of Notes between respondent
Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Hubbard.
The VFA, which consists of a Preamble and nine (9) Articles, provides for the mechanism
for regulating the circumstances and conditions under which US Armed Forces and defense
personnel may be present in the Philippines
Petitioners argue that Section 25, Article XVIII is applicable... considering that the VFA has
for its subject the presence of foreign military troops in the Philippines.
Respondents, on the contrary, maintain that Section 21, Article VII should apply inasmuch
as the VFA is not a basing arrangement but an agreement which involves merely the...
temporary visits of United States personnel engaged in joint military exercises.
Issues:
Do petitioners have legal standing as concerned citizens, taxpayers, or legislators to
question the constitutionality of the VFA?
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Article VII or of Section 25, Article
XVIII of the Constitution?
Does the VFA constitute an abdication of Philippine sovereignty?
Are Philippine courts deprived of their jurisdiction to hear and try offenses committed by US
military personnel?
Is the Supreme Court deprived of its jurisdiction over offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua or higher?... whether or not the requirements of Section 25 were complied with
when the Senate gave its concurrence to the VFA.
Ruling:
A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show
"not only that the law is invalid, but also that he has sustained or in is in immediate, or
imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not...
merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way." He must show that he has been, or
is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully entitled, or that he is
about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute complained...
of.
inasmuch as no public funds raised by taxation are involved in this case, and in the absence
of any allegation by petitioners that public funds are being misspent or illegally expended,...
petitioners, as taxpayers, have no legal standing to assail the legality of the VFA.
Similarly, Representatives Wigberto Tañada, Agapito Aquino and Joker Arroyo, as
petitioners-legislators, do not possess the requisite locus standi to maintain the present suit.
In the same vein, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) is stripped of standing in
these cases.
the IBP lacks the legal capacity to bring this suit in the absence of a board resolution from
its Board of Governors... authorizing its National President to commence the present action.
Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the constitutional significance of
the issues raised in the petitions, this Court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes
aside the procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions
The 1987 Philippine Constitution contains two provisions requiring the concurrence of the
Senate on treaties or international agreements. Section 21, Article VII, which herein
respondents invoke, reads:
"No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate."
Section 25, Article XVIII, provides:
"After the expiration in 1991 of the Agreement between the Republic of the Philippines and
the United States of America concerning Military Bases, foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly... concurred in by
the senate and, when the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by
the people in a national referendum held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the
other contracting State."
Section 21, Article VII deals with treatise or international agreements in general, in which
case, the concurrence of at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the Members of the Senate is
required to make the subject treaty, or international agreement, valid and binding on the
part of... the Philippines.
All treaties or... international agreements entered into by the Philippines, regardless of
subject matter, coverage, or particular designation or appellation, requires the concurrence
of the Senate to be valid and effective.
In contrast, Section 25, Article XVIII is a special provision that applies to treaties which
involve the presence of foreign military bases, troops or facilities in the Philippines.
the concurrence of the Senate is only one of the requisites to render... compliance with the
constitutional requirements and to consider the agreement binding on the Philippines.
Section 25, Article XVIII further requires that "foreign military bases, troops, or facilities"
may be allowed in the Philippines only by virtue of a treaty duly concurred... in by the
Senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national referendum held for that
purpose if so required by Congress, and recognized as such by the other contracting state.
concurrence of the Senate is mandatory to comply with the strict constitutional
requirements.
Undoubtedly, Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities, should apply in the instant case.
Section 25, Article XVIII disallows foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the country,
unless the following conditions are sufficiently met, viz: (a) it must be under a treaty; (b) the
treaty must be duly concurred in by the Senate and, when so... required by congress,
ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum; and (c)
recognized as a treaty by the other contracting state.
As to the matter of voting, Section 21, Article VII particularly requires that a treaty or
international agreement, to be valid and effective, must be concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all the members of the Senate. On the other hand, Section 25, Article XVIII...
simply provides that the treaty be "duly concurred in by the Senate."
As noted, the "concurrence requirement" under Section 25, Article XVIII must be construed
in relation to the provisions of Section 21, Article VII. In a more particular language, the
concurrence of the Senate contemplated under Section 25, Article XVIII means that at
least... two-thirds of all the members of the Senate favorably vote to concur with the treaty-
the VFA in the instant case.
Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an
executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty.
To be sure, as long as the VFA possesses the elements of an... agreement under
international law, the said agreement is to be taken equally as a treaty.
Thus, in international law, there is no difference between treaties and executive agreements
in their binding effect upon states concerned, as long as the negotiating functionaries have
remained within their powers.
International law continues to make... no distinction between treaties and executive
agreements: they are equally binding obligations upon nations.
In our jurisdiction, we have recognized the binding effect of executive agreements even
with... out the concurrence of the Senate or Congress.
The records reveal that the United States Government, through Ambassador Thomas C.
Hubbard, has stated that the United States government has fully committed to living up to
the terms of the VFA.
For as long as the united States of America accepts or... acknowledges the VFA as a treaty,
and binds itself further to comply with its obligations under the treaty, there is indeed
marked compliance with the mandate of the Constitution.
Worth stressing too, is that the ratification, by the President, of the VFA and the
concurrence of the Senate should be taken as a clear an unequivocal expression of our
nation's consent to be bound by said treaty, with the concomitant duty to uphold the
obligations and... responsibilities embodied thereunder.
In our jurisdiction, the power to ratify is vested in the President and not... in the legislature.
The role of the Senate is limited only to giving or withholding its consent, or concurrence, to
the ratification.
With the ratification of the VFA, which is equivalent to final acceptance, and with the
exchange of notes between the Philippines and the United States of America, it now
becomes obligatory and incumbent on our part, under the principles of international law, to
be bound by the... terms of the agreement.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petitions are hereby
DISMISSED.
LIM VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (G.R. NO. 151445 APRIL
11, 2002)
Lim v. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 151445 April 11, 2002
J. De Leon Jr.
Facts: Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started
arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in “Balikatan 02-1.” These so-called
“Balikatan” exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In
theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense
agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951.
Prior to the year 2002, the last “Balikatan” was held in 1995. This was due to the paucity of any formal agreement
relative to the treatment of United States personnel visiting the Philippines. In the meantime, the respective
governments of the two countries agreed to hold joint exercises on a reduced scale. The lack of consensus was
eventually cured when the two nations concluded the Visiting Forces Agreement (V FA) in 1999.
On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and
prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February
11, 2002.
Issue: Whether or not Balikatan 02-1 in accordance with the VFA is valid.
Held: Yes. The holding of “Balikatan 02-1” must be studied in the framework of the treaty antecedents to which the
Philippines bound itself. The first of these is the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT, for brevity). The MDT has been
described as the “core” of the defense relationship between the Philippines and its traditional ally, the United States.
Its aim is to enhance the strategic and technological capabilities of our armed forces through joint training with its
American counterparts; the “Balikatan” is the largest such training exercise directly supporting the MDT’s
objectives. It is this treaty to which the V FA adverts and the obligations there under which it seeks to reaffirm.
The lapse of the US-Philippine Bases Agreement in 1992 and the decision not to renew it created a vacuum in
USPhilippine defense relations, that is, until it was replaced by the Visiting Forces Agreement. It should be recalled
that on October 10, 2000, by a vote of eleven to three, this Court upheld the validity of the VFA. The V FA provides
the “regulatory mechanism” by which “United States military and civilian personnel [may visit] temporarily in the
Philippines in connection with activities approved by the Philippine Government.” It contains provisions relative to
entry and departure of American personnel, driving and vehicle registration, criminal jurisdiction, claims,
importation and exportation, movement of vessels and aircraft, as well as the duration of the agreement and its
termination. It is the VFA which gives continued relevance to the MDT despite the passage of years. Its primary
goal is to facilitate the promotion of optimal cooperation between American and Philippine military forces in the
event of an attack by a common foe.
The first question that should be addressed is whether “Balikatan 02-1” is covered by the Visiting Forces
Agreement. To resolve this, it is necessary to refer to the V FA itself: Not much help can be had therefrom,
unfortunately, since the terminology employed is itself the source of the problem. The VFA permits United States
personnel to engage, on an impermanent basis, in “activities,” the exact meaning of which was left undefined. The
expression is ambiguous, permitting a wide scope of undertakings subject only to the approval of the Philippine
government. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that United States
personnel must “abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any
political activity.” All other activities, in other words, are fair game.
We are not left completely unaided, however. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which contains
provisos governing interpretations of international agreements, state:
SECTION 3.
INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES
Article 31
General rule of interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith ill accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the tenus of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its
preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of
the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and
accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the party .
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its
provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding
its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.
Article 32
Supplementary means of interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd unreasonable.

It is clear from the foregoing that the cardinal rule of interpretation must involve an examination of the text, which is
presumed to verbalize the parties’ intentions. The Convention likewise dictates what may be used as aids to deduce
the meaning of terms, which it refers to as the context of the treaty, as well as other elements may be taken into
account alongside the aforesaid context. As explained by a writer on the Convention , The Commission’s proposals
(which were adopted virtually without change by the conference and are now reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the
Convention) were clearly based on the view that the text of a treaty must be presumed to be the authentic expression
of the intentions of the parties; the Commission accordingly came down firmly in favour of the view that ‘the
starting point of interpretation is the elucidation of the meaning of the text, not an investigation ab initio into the
intentions of the parties’. This is not to say that the travaux preparatoires of a treaty , or the circumstances of its
conclusion, are relegated to a subordinate, and wholly ineffective, role. As Professor Briggs points out, no rigid
temporal prohibition on resort to travaux preparatoires of a treaty was intended by the use of the phrase
‘supplementary means of interpretation’ in what is now Article 32 of the Vienna Convention. The distinction
between the general rule of interpretation and the supplementary means of interpretation is intended rather to ensure
that the supplementary means do not constitute an alternative, autonomous method of interpretation divorced from
the general rule.
The Terms of Reference rightly fall within the context of the VFA.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
LAUREL, J.:
Facts:

The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved to recommend to
the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along the following for a period of one
year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940 recommended to the
Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works the adoption of
thethemeasure proposed in the resolution aforementioned in pursuance of the provisions of theCo
mmonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes said Director with the approval from the
Secretary of the Public Works and Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to
regulate and control the use of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval of the
recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission with
modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations on August
10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced and
caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are
not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not
only of their owners but of the riding public as well.
Issues:
1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents pursuant to the provisions
of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful inference with legitimate business or
trade and abridged the right to personal liberty and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security
of all the people?
Held:
1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on
national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was inspired by
the desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare
lies at the bottom of the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the
general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order
to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the
government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not
be made to prevail over authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority
be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox lies
in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of insuring its
preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy,” but the
humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that
justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social
justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of
measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all
persons, and of bringing about “the greatest good to the greatest number.”
Gallant MARITIME SERVICES, INC. and MARLOW NAVIGATION CO.,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
The petitioner, Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, was hired by Gallant
Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)-approved Contract of
Employment.
During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a

downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998. The downgrade is contrary to
the Chief Officer post that he initially signed up for. (with higher salary rate).
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines
on May 26, 1998.
Petitioner’s employment contract was for a period of 12 months, but at the time of his
repatriation he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract,
leaving an unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days. He then
filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive
dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of US$26,442.73
LA Decision – Declaring the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him
monetary benefits. As to the benefits, the LA based his computation on the salary
period of three months only
Petitioner appealed to the NLRC citing that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are
entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts
Respondents also appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to

question the finding of the LA that petitioner was illegally dismissed.
NLRC – The NLRC corrected the LA’s computation of the lump-sum salary awarded
to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Motion was denied.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional
challenge against the subject clause.
CA- Dismissed petitioner’s motion due to technicality. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling
on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
Petitioner raised these main grounds to the Supreme Court:
1. CA erred to not acknowledge the constitutional issues raised by the petitioner

on the constitutionality of said law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily
limits payment of the award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3)
months
The law in question is Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042 – Migrant Workers Act, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment

without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall
be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve
percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less.
The Arguments of Petitioner
Petitioner contends that the subject clause is unconstitutional because
(1) it unduly impairs the freedom of OFWs to negotiate for and stipulate in their
overseas employment contracts a determinate employment period and a fixed salary
package and
(2) It also impinges on the equal protection clause, for it treats OFWs differently from
local Filipino workers (local workers) by putting a cap on the amount of lump-sum
salary to which OFWs are entitled in case of illegal dismissal, while setting no limit to
the same monetary award for local workers when their dismissal is declared illegal;
that the disparate treatment
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the
Constitution on non-impairment of contracts?
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1,Article III of the
Constitution, and Section 18,Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a
protected sector
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary
package he will receive is not tenable.
Section 10, Article III of the Constitution provides:
“No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.”
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted have
only a prospective operation, and cannot affect acts or contracts already perfected.
As to laws already in existence, their provisions are read into contracts and deemed a
part thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in
application to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of
the parties thereto.
2. YES. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor
sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and
welfare.
Such rights are not absolute. To be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to the purposes
of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and 4) it applies equally to
all members of the class.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional

provisions translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be
equally enjoyed by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should
be borne by them in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws
which is enjoyed by, or spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines vs. Honorable Secretary of Agrarian
Reform
G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989
Petitioner: Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines

Respondent: Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform
Facts: These are consolidated cases which involve common legal, including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures such as P.D. No. 27, E.O. No.
228, Presidential Proclamation No. 131, E.O. No. 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79777
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia
of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that
no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. G.R. No. 79310
G.R. No. 79310
This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. They
contend that taking must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation as it is
traditionally understood, i.e., with money and in full, but no such payment is contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229.
G.R. No. 79744
The petitioner argues that E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are violative of the constitutional provision
that no private property shall be taken without due process or just compensation.
G.R. No. 78742
Petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree.
Issue:
Whether or not CARL violates due process because landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just compensation, in contravention of a well- accepted
principle of eminent domain
Held:
NO. The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment of the just compensation. Jurisprudence on
this settled principle is consistent both here and in other democratic jurisdictions.
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a
family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him
unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers'
cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to
be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.
Hacienda Luisita Incorporated vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, et al.,
Download full case digest (with efficient paper rule)
Facts:
The SC en banc voted 11-0 dismissing the petition filed by HLI Affirm with
modifications the resolutions of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC for brevity)
revoking Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI for brevity) Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject land in HL under compulsory coverage of the CARP of the government.
Thereafter, the SC voting 6-5 averred that there are operative facts that occurred in the
premises. The SC there at declared that the revocation of the SDP shall, by application of the
operative fact principle, give the 5296 qualified Farmworkers Beneficiaries (FWBs for brevity)
to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or choose actual land distribution.
Considering the premises, DAR immediately scheduled a meeting regarding the effects of their
choice and therefrom proceeded to secret voting of their choice.
The parties, thereafter, filed their respective Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
SC’s decision.
Issue:
1) Whether or not operative fact doctrine is applicable in the said case.
2) Whether or not Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 unconstitutional.
3) Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999, since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the
SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989, and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell
their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the
lands or not?
4) Whether or not qualified FWBs shall be entitled to the option of remaining as stockholder be
reconsidered.
Ruling:
1) Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the instant case. The court ruled that the doctrine is not
limited only to invalid or unconstitutional law but also to decisions made by the president or
the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws, especially if the said
decisions produced acts and consequences that must be respected. That the implementation of
PARC resolution approving SDP of HLI manifested such right and benefits favorable to the
FWBs;
2) The SC said that the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of R.A. 6657 is not the lis mota of the case and it
was not raised at the earliest opportunity and did not rule on the constitutionality of the law;
3) The SC ruled that it has not yet lapsed on May 10, 1999, and qualified FWBs are not allowed to
sell their land interest in HL to third parties; That the start of the counting of the prohibitive
period shall be ten years from the issuance and registration of the Emancipation Patent (EP for
brevity) or Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA for brevity), and considering that the
EPs and CLOAs have not yet been issued, the prohibitive period has not started yet.
4) The SC ruled in the affirmative, giving qualified FWBs the option to remain as stockholder
YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option
to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control
[over the subject lands] given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted
that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the
holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely,
control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at
least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI
stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares
(590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares
needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]
The SC PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al., The
6,296 original FWBs shall forfeit and relinquish their rights over the HLI shares of stock issued
to them in favor of HLI. The HLI Corporate Secretary shall cancel the shares issued to the said
FWBs and transfer them to HLI in the stocks and transfer book. The 4,206 non-qualified FWBs
shall remain as stockholders of HLI.
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, petitioner v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, respondent
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003
Facts:
Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. She has been
living with Quilapio, a man who is not her husband, for more than twenty five years and
had a son with him as well. Respondent’s husband died a year before she entered into
the judiciary while Quilapio is still legally married to another woman.
Complainant Estrada requested the Judge of said RTC to investigate respondent.

According to complainant, respondent should not be allowed to remain employed
therein for it will appear as if the court allows such act.
Respondent claims that their conjugal arrangement is permitted by her religion—the

Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and the Bible Trace Society. They allegedly
have a ‘Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness’ under the approval of their congregation.
Such a declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple
to legalize their union.
Issue:
Whether or Not the State could penalize respondent for such conjugal arrangement.
Held:
No. The State could not penalize respondent for she is exercising her right to freedom
of religion. The free exercise of religion is specifically articulated as one of
the fundamental rights in our Constitution. As Jefferson put it, it is the most inalienable
and sacred of human rights. The State’s interest in enforcing its prohibition cannot be
merely abstract or symbolic in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh a free
exercise claim. In the case at bar, the State has not evinced any concrete interest in
enforcing the concubinage or bigamy charges against respondent or her partner. Thus
the State’s interest only amounts to the symbolic preservation of an unenforced
prohibition. Furthermore, a distinction between public and secular morality and
religious morality should be kept in mind. The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to
public and secular morality.
The Court further states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality
approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the
Free Exercise Clause. This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
Assuming arguendo that the OSG has proved a compelling state interest, it has to
further demonstrate that the state has used the least intrusive means possible so that the
free exercise is not infringed any more than necessary to achieve the legitimate goal of
the state. Thus the conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized for it constitutes
an exemption to the law based on her right to freedom of religion.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To
buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their
decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuisance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion
by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is
not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.
Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, “the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We thus find that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a
secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended
to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.
Imbong v. Ochoa (G.R. No. 204819)
Facts:
The increase of the country’s population at an uncontrollable pace led to the executive
and the legislative’s decision that prior measures were still not adequate. Thus,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modern family
planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples’ right to
reproductive health be achieved. Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement
measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women’s health
and population control.
Shortly after, challengers from various sectors of society moved to assail the
constitutionality of RH Law. Meanwhile, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect. The Court then issued a Status Quo Ante Order enjoining the
effects and implementation of the assailed legislation.
Petitioners question, among others, the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, prescribing the one subject-one title
rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood,
the assailed legislation violates the constitutional standards of due process by
concealing its true intent – to act as a population control measure. On the other hand,
respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure, and that
the concepts of “responsible parenthood” and “reproductive health” are both interrelated
as they are inseparable.
Issue:
Whether or not RH Law violated the one subject-one title rule under the Constitution
Ruling: NO
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as
principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards
the reduction of the country’s population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing products. As stated
earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and
the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family planning
products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modern, however,
are clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy. For said reason, the manifest
underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country. The
Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners’ contention that the whole idea of contraception
pervades the entire RH Law.
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule.
In Cawaling, Jr. v. COMELEC, it was written: It is well-settled that the “one title-one
subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive
enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of
the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a
liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.”
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
“reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated and germane to
the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights
of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the
right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and make
decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible

parenthood” which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human
development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that
Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
The Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect
to certain provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Status Quo Ante
Order issued by the Court is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No.
10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
Alcuaz vs. PSBA, 161 SCRA 7 (1988) G.R.

No. 76353
Fact: Petitioners are all bona fide students of the Respondents, while respondents, are the
Philippine School of Business Administration (hereinafter referred to as PSBA) Quezon City. As
early as March 22, 1986, the students of the respondent school and the respondent PSBA, Q.C.
had already agreed on certain matters which would govern their activities within the school. In
spite of the above-stated agreement, petitioners felt the need to hold dialogues. Among others
they demanded the negotiation of a new agreement, which demand was turned down by the
school, resulting in mass assemblies and barricades of school entrances. “Subsequently
dialogues proved futile.” Finally, petitioners received uniform letters from respondents giving
them 3 days to explain why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction
on their direct participation and/or conspiring with others in the commission of tumultuous and
anarchic acts which was answered by the counsel for the students in a reply letter. During the
regular enrollment period, petitioners and other students similarly situated were allegedly
blacklisted and denied admission for the second semester. President of the Student Council filed
a complaint with the Director of the MECS against the PSBA for barring the enrollment of the
Student Council Officers and student leaders. Simultaneously on the same date, the student
council wrote the President, Board of Trustees, requesting for a written statement of the school’s
decision regarding their enrollment. Another demand letter was made by Counsel for the
students Atty. Alan Romulo Yap, also to the President, Board of Trustees, to enroll his clients
within forty-eight (48) hours. All these notwithstanding, no relief appeared to be forthcoming,
hence this petition. Respondents filed their manifestation and motion stating that pursuant to
this court’s order the school authorities created a special investigating committee to conduct an
investigation, which submitted a report with recommendations. Respondents adopted the
recommendations of the Committee and prayed that the case be dismissed for having become
moot. In the resolution the motion of petitioners to compel respondents to readmit or re-enroll
herein petitioners was denied except in the case of three (3) student petitioners cleared by the
investigating committee and who had been recommended to be readmitted or re-enrolled. The
Court further resolved to require respondent school to show cause why it should not be
adjudged in contempt for refusing to reinstate the intervenors-faculty members in the interim
which the Respondents filed the manifestation informing this Court that they did not refuse to
reinstate the intervenors/faculty members; that they were in fact actually reinstated in
compliance with the Court’s temporary mandatory order. Hence, the motion for contempt
should be dismissed. Adrian Avilado Antazo
Issue: Whether there has been deprivation of due process for petitioners who have been barred
from re-enrollment and for intervenors teachers whose services have been terminated as faculty
members, on account of their participation in the demonstration or protest charged by
respondents as “anarchic” rallies, and a violation of their constitutional rights of expression and
assembly. Adrian Avilado Antazo
Held: No, According to the minimum standards laid down by the Court to meet the demands of
procedural due process are:Adrian Avilado Antazo
(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against
them;Adrian Avilado Antazo
(2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel,
if desired:Adrian Avilado Antazo
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them;Adrian Avilado Antazo
(4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf and
(5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated
by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
First, both students and teachers were given three (3) days from receipts of letter to explain in
writing why the school should not take / mete out any administrative sanction on them in view
of their participation in the commission of tumultuous and anarchic acts on the dates stated.
Second, The records show that a letter was sent by Atty. Alan Rollo Yap, in behalf of all PSBA
students to the President of the School Mr. Juan D. Lim, explaining why said students are not
guilty of the charges filed against them. Similarly, a faculty member of the PSBA filed as answer
in a letter to the same President of the school, where he denied the charges against him.Adrian
Avilado Antazo
Third to fifth was conducted in the investigation conducted by the committee. which after
careful scrutiny of the Report and Recommendation of the Special Investigating Committee
shows it does not fall under any of the above exceptions. On the contrary, it is readily apparent
that the investigation conducted was fair, open, exhaustive and adequate. Accordingly, there
appears to be no cogent reason to disturb the finding of said committee and as manifested by
the respondents, the report of said committee has virtually rendered this petition moot and
academic
UNIVERSITY OF PHILIPPINES v. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON +
257 Phil. 580
BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order,
seeking to annul the Orders of respondent Judge dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 in Civil case No.
1748-R entitled, "UP College Baguio High School Foundation, Inc., et al., v. The University of the
Philippines, et al., "restraining petitioners from implementing the decision of the Board of Regents to
phase out the UP College Baguio High School (UPCBHS) and the Memorandum of petitioner Dean
Patricio Lazaro directing the principal of UPCBHS not to accept new incoming freshmen for the school
year 1989-1990.
Sometime in 1972, the UP Board of Regents approved the establishment of UPCBHS as an integral part of
the graduate program in education to serve, among others, as a laboratory and demonstration school for
prospective teachers. Provided, however, that UPCBHS must be self-supporting and should not entail any
subsidy from the budget of the UP.
In 1978, the Board of Regents provided for the establishment of a Division of Education in UP
College Baguio (UPCB) which shall be composed of a Department of Professional Education and a High
School Department. However, the Department of Professional Education was never organized, although
the High School Department has been in continuous operation.
In 1981, the Committee to Review Academic Program recommended the abolition of the UPCBHS. In
1985, the Program Review Committee likewise asked the UPCB to look into the viability of its secondary
education program on account of limited financial resources plus the fact that UPCBHS failed to serve
as a laboratory school for teacher training program as UPCB does not offer programs in
Education. Subsequently, various discussions were held on the proposed phase-out of the UPCBHS.
On January 30, 1989, the UP Board of Regents approved the proposed phase-out of UPCBHS on the
grounds, inter alia, that only an insignificant number of UPCBHS graduates qualified for admission and
actually enrolled in UPCB and that UPCBHS is not serving as a laboratory or demonstration school for
prospective teachers much less a self-supporting unit. Subsequently, petitioner Dean
Patricio Lazaro issued a memorandum directing the UPCBHS Principal not to accept new incoming high
school freshmen for the school year 1989-1990.
On May 25, 1989, respondent UP College Baguio High School Foundation Inc., represented by its
president, filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Br. VI, presided by respondent Judge
against herein petitioners, for Injunction with preliminary preventive and mandatory injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, docketed as Civil Case No. 1748-R, alleging
among others, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the UPCBHS is without legal
basis and unconstitutional.
Thereafter, respondent Judge issued the assailed Orders restraining petitioners from implementing the
Board's decision to phase out UPCBHS and the memorandum of Dean Patricio Lazaro. Petitioners'
motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 1748-R was denied by respondent Judge.
Hence, this petition.
On June 27, 1989, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the implementation of the
assailed orders of respondent Judge.
Petitioners contend, among other things, that the decision of the UP Board of Regents to phase out the
UPCBHS is an exercise of academic freedom guaranteed by the constitution (Art. XIV, Sec. 5, par. 2).
Respondents, on the other hand, take issue not with the exercise of academic freedom but rather on the
right to quality education (Art. XIV, Sec. 1) and free public secondary education (Art. XIV, Sec. 2, par. 2)
mandated by the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 6655, otherwise known as "Free Public Secondary
Education Act of 1988". Respondents contend that the abolition of the UPCBHS would be violative of said
rights.
The conflict of the present petition pits the concept of academic freedom as against the right to free public
secondary education. Art. XIV, Section 2 [2] of the Constitution, provides: "The State shall establish and
maintain a system of free public education in the elementary and high school levels. Without limiting the
right of natural parents to rear their children, elementary education is compulsory for all children of
school age." On the other hand, Art. XIV, Section 5 [2], provides: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in
all institutions of higher learning."
Is secondary public education demandable in an institution of higher learning such as the University of
the Philippines?
We rule in the negative.
It is beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedom -- the
institutional kind.
In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the
Court had occasion to note the scope of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution as follows:
"(I)t is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this
boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right. It decides for itself
its aims and objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save
possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy
certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision is not to be construed in a
niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.
xxx xxx xxx
" 'It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,
experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the 'four essential freedoms' of a
university --- to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it
shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study'" (Underscoring supplied; citing Sinco, Philippine
Political Law, 491, (1962) and the concurring opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Sweezyv. New
Hampshire (354 US 234 [1957]).
Rep. Act No. 6655, otherwise known as the "Free Public Secondary Education Act of 1988," includes in its
coverage state colleges and universities (SCUs) offering secondary courses. Respondents contend that
since a secondary course is being offered in UPCB, petitioners cannot unilaterally
withdraw therefrom, otherwise, the said Act would be nothing but a mere nullity for all
other SCUs. Besides, respondents contend, petitioners already recognized the applicability of Rep. Act
No. 6655 when they implemented the same at the UPCBHS for School Year 1988-89 and petitioners'
assertion that UPCBHS was established only if it would be "self-supporting and should not entail any
subsidy from the budget of UP" is but a lame excuse.
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that UPCBHS was established subject to a number
of conditionalities, e.g., it must be self-supporting, it can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can
serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for prospective teachers, failing in which the University
can order its abolition on academic grounds, specially where the purposes for which it was established
was not satisfied.
Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter (Act No. 1870 [1908], as
amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education. Section 2 of said Act
states that "the purpose of said University shall be to provide advanced instruction in literature,
philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical training."
It is apparent that secondary education is not the mandated function of the University of the Philippines;
consequently, the latter can validly phase out and/or abolish the UPCBHS especially so when the
requirements for its continuance have not been met, Rep. Act No. 6655 to the contrary
notwithstanding. The findings of facts by the Board of Regents which led to its decision to phase out the
UPCBHS must be accorded respect, if not finality. Acts of an administrative agency within their areas of
competence must not be casually overturned by the courts. It must be emphasized that UPCBHS was
established as a component of the tertiary level, i.e., the teacher/training program. As it turned out
however, the latter program was not viable in UPCB thereby necessitating the phasing out of UPCBHS,
the rationale being its reasons for existence no longer exists. On this score, UPCBHS differs from the
other UP high schools in Iloilo, Diliman, Cebu and Los Baños. The latter schools serve as laboratory
schools for the College of Education in said areas, whereas, in Baguio, there is no College of Education.
A careful perusal of Rep. Act No. 6655 could not lend respondents a helping hand either. Said Act
implements the policy of the State to provide free public secondary education (Sec. 4) and vests the
formulation of a secondary public education curriculum (Sec. 5), the nationalization of public secondary
schools (Sec. 7) and the implementation of the rules and regulations thereof (Sec. 9) upon the Secretary of
the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). Rep. Act No. 6655 complements Sec. 2 (2),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates that the State shall establish and maintain a system of
free public secondary education. However, this mandate is not directed to institutions of higher learning
like UP but to the government through the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS). As an
institution of higher learning enjoying academic freedom, the UP cannot be compelled to provide for
secondary education. However, should UP operate a high school in the exercise of its academic freedom,
Rep. Act No. 6655 requires that the students enrolled therein "shall be free from payment of tuition and
other school fees."
In view of the foregoing, respondents do not have a clear legal right to UP secondary education.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to Grant the petition. The assailed Orders of respondent Judge
dated May 25, 1989 and June 14, 1989 are hereby Set Aside and respondent Judge is ordered to Dismiss
Civil Case No. 1748-R. Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports is requested to make arrangements with the other high schools in Baguio City for purposes of
accommodating the students herein affected. The temporary restraining order issued is made permanent.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and
represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the
government.
ISSUE:
Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced
and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF

MANILA BAY, GR Nos. 171947-48, 2008-12-18
Facts:
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once brimming with
marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different contact recreation activities, but
now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly because of the abject official... indifference of people
and institutions that could have otherwise made a difference.
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of Manila Bay filed
a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite against several government
agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of... the Manila
Bay.
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect of petitioners in
abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of, among others:
(1) Respondents' constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law... water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay
showed that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most probable
number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90... prescribed as a safe level for
bathing and other forms of contact recreational activities, or the "SB" level, is one not exceeding 200
MPN/100 ml.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
The CA Sustained the RTC
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code concern themselves
only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the government
agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning operations of a specific
polluted portion or portions of the body of water concerned.
respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g) as delimiting the application of Sec.
20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup operations for accidental spills only.
Issues:
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT OF
PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under the headings,
Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a cleanup in general or are they
limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution incidents? And... second, can petitioners be
compelled by mandamus to clean up and rehabilitate the Manila Bay?
Ruling:
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial duty.[8] A ministerial
duty is one that "requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment."
We agree with respondents
While the implementation of the MMDA's mandated tasks may entail a... decision-making process,
the enforcement of the law or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in
nature and may be compelled by mandamus.
The MMDA's duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924 creating
the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDA's waste disposal services to
include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and implementation of policies,
standards, programs and projects for proper and sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the
establishment and operation of sanitary land fill and related... facilities and the implementation of
other alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste.
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act
(RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec.
42 which provides the minimum operating requirements that each site operator shall... maintain in
the operation of a sanitary landfill.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear, categorical, and
complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each agency/petitioner under the law. We
need not belabor the issue that their tasks include the cleanup of the Manila
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA v. EDGARDO ANGARA, GR No. 118295, 1997-05-02
Facts:
To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War,
plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political
body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The
first was the
World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged
and later developing countries; the second, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) which
was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International Trade Organization
(ITO), which... was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral
protectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a
variety of reasons, including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF
and
WB, never took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute... settlement.
Philippines joined WTO as a founding member
Issues:
does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization?
Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated
and privatized?
Ruling:
Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down general
principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and understood
in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with
the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of
Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through the WTO
than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries.
WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more lenient treatment, giving their
domestic industries some protection from the rush of foreign competition.
Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a "self-reliant and independent national
economy"[35] does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services.
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business or
enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies should
be pampered with a total proscription of foreign competition.
Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies
Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events. They
should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner v GSIS, respondent (DIGEST)
G.R. No. 122156; February 3, 1997
TOPIC: Non-Self Executing v Self Executing Constitutional Provisions
FACTS:
The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell through public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued
and outstanding shares of the Manila Hotel (MHC).
In a close bidding, two bidders participated: Manila Prince Hotel Corporation (MPHC), a Filipino corporation, which
offered to buy 51% of the MHC at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its
hotel operator, which bid for the same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of
petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder and the execution of the contracts, the MPHC
matched the bid price in a letter to GSIS. MPHC sent a manager’s check to the GSIS in a subsequent letter, which
GSIS refused to accept. On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the
matching bid, MPHC came to the Court on prohibition and mandamus.
Petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has
been identified with the Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects the
vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture.
Respondents assert that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle
and policy since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s).
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of the Constitution, particularly Article XII Section 10, are self-executing.
RULING:
Yes. Sec 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
A provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Article II of the 1987 Constitution, is usually
not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of
supplementary or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it grants
may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are
treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and
practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law.
In fine, Section 10, second paragraph, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From
its very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation.
La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. Vs Ramos

Natural Resources and Environmental Laws
G.R. No. 127882; January 27, 2004
FACTS:
This petition for prohibition and mandamus challenges the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995), its implementing rules and regulations and
the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated March 30, 1995 by the
government with Western Mining Corporation(Philippines) Inc. (WMCP).
Accordingly, the FTAA violated the 1987 Constitution in that it is a service contract and is
antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural resources, because they allowed
foreign control over the exploitation of our natural resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino
nation.
ISSUE:
What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
HELD:
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical
agreements as well as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.
Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that
the State retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify
plans and actions of the contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is
exercised by the board of directors of a private corporation, the performance of managerial,
operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be delegated to subordinate
officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control of the
business.
RAMIREZ VS. VDA DE RAMIREZ
G.R. NO. L-27952 FEBRUARY 15, 1982
ABAD SANTOS, J.
PARTIES OF THE CASE:

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS, ADMINISTRATRIX
(PETITIONER-APPELLEE)
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., OPPOSITORS, JORGE AND ROBERTO RAMIREZ
(LEGATEES, OPPOSITORS- APPELLANTS)
KEYWORD: USUFRUCT LAND IN FAVOR OF A FOREIGNER AS STATED IN THE FILIPINO’S WILL
FACTS: JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, A FILIPINO NATIONAL, DIED IN SPAIN ON DECEMBER 11, 1964, WITH ONLY HIS
WIDOW (A FRENCH NATIONAL LIVING IN PARIS) AS COMPULSORY HEIR. HIS WILL WAS ADMITTED TO PROBATE BY
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH X, ON JULY 27, 1965 BY MARIA LUISA PALACIOS WHO
WAS APPOINTED ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE. THE PRINCIPAL BENEFICIARIES ARE AS FOLLOWS: HIS WIDOW
MARCELLE DEMORON DE RAMIREZ; HIS TWO GRANDNEPHEWS ROBERTO AND JORGE RAMIREZ; AND HIS
COMPANION WANDA DE WROBLESKI.
ON JUNE 23, 1966, THE ADMINISTRATRIX SUBMITTED A PROJECT OF PARTITION AS FOLLOWS: THE PROPERTY OF
THE DECEASED IS TO BE DIVIDED INTO TWO PARTS. ONE PART SHALL GO TO THE WIDOW 'EN PLENO DOMINIO" IN
SATISFACTION OF HER LEGITIME; THE OTHER PART OR "FREE PORTION" SHALL GO TO JORGE AND ROBERTO
RAMIREZ "EN NUDA PROPRIEDAD." FURTHERMORE, ONE THIRD (1/3) OF THE FREE PORTION IS CHARGED WITH
THE WIDOW'S USUFRUCT AND THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS (2/3) WITH A USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF WANDA (AN
AUSTRIAN LIVING IN SPAIN).
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF A USUFRUCT OVER REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES IN FAVOR OF WANDA
WROBLESKI, WHO IS AN ALIEN, VIOLATES SECTION 5, ARTICLE III OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
HELD: NO. IT IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
RATIO: THE APPELLANTS CLAIM THAT THE USUFRUCT OVER REAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE IN FAVOR OF
WANDA IS VOID BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST THE ACQUISITION OF LANDS
BY ALIENS.
THE 1935 CONSTITUTION WHICH IS CONTROLLING PROVIDES AS FOLLOWS:
SEC. 5. SAVE IN CASES OF HEREDITARY SUCCESSION, NO PRIVATE AGRICULTURAL LAND SHALL BE

TRANSFERRED OR ASSIGNED EXCEPT TO INDIVIDUALS, CORPORATIONS, OR ASSOCIATIONS QUALIFIED TO
ACQUIRE OR HOLD LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN IN THE PHILIPPINES. (ART. XIII.)
THE COURT A QUO UPHELD THE VALIDITY OF THE USUFRUCT GIVEN TO WANDA ON THE GROUND THAT THE
CONSTITUTION COVERS NOT ONLY SUCCESSION BY OPERATION OF LAW BUT ALSO TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION.
WE ARE OF THE OPINION THAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION WHICH ENABLES ALIENS TO ACQUIRE PRIVATE
LANDS DOES NOT EXTEND TO TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION FOR OTHERWISE THE PROHIBITION WILL BE FOR
NAUGHT AND MEANINGLESS. ANY ALIEN WOULD BE ABLE TO CIRCUMVENT THE PROHIBITION BY PAYING MONEY
TO A PHILIPPINE LANDOWNER IN EXCHANGE FOR A DEVISE OF A PIECE OF LAND.
THIS OPINION NOTWITHSTANDING, WE UPHOLD THE USUFRUCT IN FAVOR OF WANDA BECAUSE A USUFRUCT,
ALBEIT A REAL RIGHT, DOES NOT VEST TITLE TO THE LAND IN THE USUFRUCTUARY AND IT IS THE VESTING OF
TITLE TO LAND IN FAVOR OF ALIENS WHICH IS PROSCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
Gamboa v. Teves
(Case Digest)
MissIdea Uncategorized August 10, 2014 1 Minute
Gamboa v. Teves etal., GR No. 176579, October 9, 2012
Facts:
The issue started when petitioner Gamboa questioned the indirect sale
of shares involving almost 12 million shares of the Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) owned by PTIC to First Pacific.
Thus, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from
30.7 percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the total common
shareholdings of foreigners in PLDT to about 81.47%. The petitioner
contends that it violates the Constitutional provision on filipinazation of
public utility, stated in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40%. Then, in 2011, the court ruled the case in
favor of the petitioner, hence this new case, resolving the motion for
reconsideration for the 2011 decision filed by the respondents.
Issue: Whether or not the Court made an erroneous interpretation of the

term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision?
Held/Reason: The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing

its State policy of developing an economy ‘effectively controlled’ by
Filipinos. Asserting the ideals that our Constitution’s Preamble want to
achieve, that is – to conserve and develop our patrimony , hence, the
State should fortify a Filipino-controlled economy. In the 2011 decision,
the Court finds no wrong in the construction of the term ‘capital’ which
refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with full beneficial
ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in the
election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective
control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.
Agan vs PIATCO GR No
155001 05 May 2003
11 WEDNESDAYMAR 2015
POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Petitioners filed instant petitions for prohibition seeking to prohibit the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA) and the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) and its Secretary from implementing the following agreements
executed by the Philippine Government through the DOTC and the MIAA and the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO): (1) the Concession Agreement signed on
July 12, 1997, (2) the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated November 26,
1999, (3) the First Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession Agreement dated
August 27, 1999, (4) the Second Supplement to the Amended and Restated Concession
Agreement dated September 4, 2000, and (5) the Third Supplement to the Amended and
Restated Concession Agreement dated June 22, 2001 (collectively, the PIATCO Contracts).
Issue: Whether or not petitioning employees has legal standing to raise validity of the
PIATCO contracts?
Decision: Petition granted and contracts declared null and void. Petitioner’s have direct and
substantial interest to protect by reason of the implementation of the PIATCO contracts.
They stand to lose their source of livelihood, a property right which is protected by the
Constitution. Subsisting agreements between MIA and petitioners stand to be terminated by
the PIATCO contracts. The financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO contract to
petitioners is legitimate interests sufficient to give them legal standing to file the petition.
PPA vs Mendoza
Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. 177597,
(2008)
6/20/2020
0 COMMENTS

ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress can delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces
FACTS: On August 28, 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create
provinces under Section 19 of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201
creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. On May 10, 2007, the COMELEC issued
Resolution 7902 renaming the legislative district combining the said provice with Cotabato as
"Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City." Sema, here petitioner, questioned the
Resolution combining the Shariff Kabunsuan and Cotabato CIty into a single legislative district.
DECISION: Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to

the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, SC declares VOID Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating
the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. COMELEC Resolution 7902 is VALID.
RATIO DECIDENDI: SC ruled that Section 19, RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void. Only Congress can create provinces
and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of
legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution.
League of Cities v. Comelec
24 SEP
League of Cities v. Comelec
Action:
These are consolidated petitions for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of
Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treñas assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood
Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.
Fact:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities.
However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took
effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing
the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100
million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,
“the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal
Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009
the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to
approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities
filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a
common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also
approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June
2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the President’s signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.
Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the
share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same
amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issue:
The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
Held:
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective,
not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became
law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a
city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair
and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA
9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort
to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage
of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government
Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not
extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection
clause.
CAS E DI GEST: AM BI L VS
S ANDI GANBAYAN; AP ELADO VS.
PEOP LE
7:54 AM
G.R. No. 175457; July 6, 2011

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175482

ALEXANDRINO R. APELADO, SR vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
Eastern Samar Governor Ruperto Ambil and Provincial warden Alexandrino Apelado were
found guilty before the Sandiganbayan for violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after Governor Ambil, conspiring
with Apelado, ordered the release of then criminally-charged and detained mayor Francisco
Adalim and had the latter transferred from the provincial jail to the the governor’s residence.
Issues:
1.)Whether or not the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over a suit where one of the 2 accused
has a Salary Grade classified to be cognizable before the lower courts.
2.)Whether or not the transfer of the detainee, who was a mayor, by the governor was a
violation in contemplation of Sec3(e) of RA 3019 in relation to sec2(b) of the same act.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the suit where one of the 2 accused held a position
with a classification of Salary Grade 27. Only when none of the numerous accused occupies a
position with a salary grade “27” or higher can exclusive jurisdiction befall in the lower courts.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Ambil as provincial governor and so as with Apelado for
being a co-principal in the perpetration of the offense although he had a salary grade of 22.
The power of control and supervision granted to by the Local Government Code
and Administrative Code of 1917 does not include nor permit the usurpation of power duly
vested before the courts. Facts showed that transfer by Ambil of Adalim was attended by
evident bias and badfaith. Section 3(e) still applies to the case at hand even if the act was not
one relative to the “granting of licenses and concessions”. The provision was meant to include
officers with such duty to the list already enumerated therein and not necessarily to provide
exclusivity. Furthermore, the fact that Andalim, as the reciepient of the benefit, was a public
officer, did not preclude application. The act employs the phrase “private party”, which is more
comprehensive in scope to mean either a private person or a public officer acting in a private
capacity to protect his personal interest.
Thus the verdict by the SAndiganbayan, finding the accused guilty of violating RA 3019 was
proper.
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October
18, 2011
DECISION
BRION, J.:
I. THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted
by Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled
the first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to the second Monday of September 2001. RA
No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third
time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3 years
thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8,
2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of
candidacies for the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and
local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
II. THE ISSUES:
1. Does the 1987 Constitution mandate the synchronization of elections [including the ARMM elections]?
2. Does the passage of RA No. 10153 violate the three-readings-on-separate-days rule under Section 26(2),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution?
3. Is the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Supreme Court] DISMISSED the petitions and UPHELD the constitutionality of RA No.

10153 in toto.]
1. YES, the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of elections.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to synchronize national and
local elections, the clear intent towards this objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions
(Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional Commission, by
deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization
of elections. The Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of the constitutional mandate to hold
synchronized national and local elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the
following elections.
In this case, the ARMM elections, although called “regional” elections, should be included among
the elections to be synchronized as it is a “local” election based on the wording and structure of the
Constitution.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the synchronization of
elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-readings-on-separate-days

requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate can become laws
they must pass through three readings on separate days, is subject to the EXCEPTION when the
President certifies to the necessity of the bill’s immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, explained the effect of the President’s certification of necessity in the following manner:
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of reading the
bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment,
etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed
three readings on separate days and [ii] it has been printed in its final form and distributed three days before it is
finally approved.
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to certify the necessity of the immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM
elections with the national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the President’s certification
exempted both the House and the Senate from having to comply with the three separate readings
requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to Congress in order to
resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM officials in the interim [in order to achieve
synchronization in the 2013 elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to remain
in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the synchronized elections assume office; (2)
hold special elections in the ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
[2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President to appoint OICs, [their
respective terms to last also until those elected in the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
3.1. 1st option: Holdover is unconstitutional since it would extend the terms of office of the incumbent
ARMM officials
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the Constitution . This
provision states:
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. [emphases ours]
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and bound by the three-year
term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.

If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another term mandated by Congress, the
net result is for Congress to create a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This view –
like the extension of the elective term – is constitutionally infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly
what it cannot do directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term of the incumbents.
Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be
illusory. Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the occupant of the position for
the new term. This is effectively an act of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence, holdover – whichever way it is viewed – is
a constitutionally infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.
Even assuming that holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis
for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054) in the past, we have to remember that the rule of
holdover can only apply as an available option where no express or implied legislative intent to the
contrary exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the intention of
suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054 by completely removing this
provision. The deletion is a policy decision that is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the
exercise of its plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or
expediency of legislation, except where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion
results.
3.2. 2nd option: Calling special elections is unconstitutional since COMELEC, on its own, has no
authority to order special elections.
The power to fix the date of elections is essentially legislative in nature. [N]o elections may be
held on any other date for the positions of President, Vice President, Members of Congress and local
officials, except when so provided by another Act of Congress, or upon orders of a body or officer to
whom Congress may have delegated either the power or the authority to ascertain or fill in the details in
the execution of that power.
Notably, Congress has acted on the ARMM elections by postponing the scheduled August 2011
elections and setting another date – May 13, 2011 – for regional elections synchronized with the
presidential, congressional and other local elections. By so doing, Congress itself has made a policy
decision in the exercise of its legislative wisdom that it shall not call special elections as an adjustment
measure in synchronizing the ARMM elections with the other elections.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can act to the contrary by
ordering special elections instead at the call of the COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this
call without thereby supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure, the Court
is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and void for being unconstitutional or for
having been exercised in grave abuse of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is
merely to annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of Congress nor to
mandate what Congress itself should have done in the exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be extended through a
holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that
the Constitution itself commands. This is what will happen – a term of less than two years – if a call for
special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is achieved, the result is at the cost of a
violation of an express provision of the Constitution.

3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM OICs in the interim is valid.
The above considerations leave only Congress’ chosen interim measure – RA No. 10153 and the
appointment by the President of OICs to govern the ARMM during the pre-synchronization period
pursuant to Sections 3, 4 and 5 of this law – as the only measure that Congress can make. This choice
itself, however, should be examined for any attendant constitutional infirmity.
At the outset, the power to appoint is essentially executive in nature, and the limitations on or
qualifications to the exercise of this power should be strictly construed; these limitations or qualifications
must be clearly stated in order to be recognized. The appointing power is embodied in Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution, which states:
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers of the armed
forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments,
agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can appoint. These are:
First, the heads of the executive departments; ambassadors; other public ministers and consuls; officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, from the rank of colonel or naval captain; and other officers whose appointments are
vested in the President in this Constitution;
Second, all other officers of the government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law;
Third, those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; and
Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.
Since the President’s authority to appoint OICs emanates from RA No. 10153, it falls under the
third group of officials that the President can appoint pursuant to Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Thus, the assailed law facially rests on clear constitutional basis.
If at all, the gravest challenge posed by the petitions to the authority to appoint OICs under
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 is the assertion that the Constitution requires that the ARMM executive and
legislative officials to be “elective and representative of the constituent political units.” This requirement
indeed is an express limitation whose non-observance in the assailed law leaves the appointment of OICs
constitutionally defective.
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional problem is more apparent
than real and becomes very real only if RA No. 10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes
the elective and representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however, does not in any
way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No. 9054) sets outs in terms of structure of
governance. What RA No. 10153 in fact only does is to “appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the
Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative Assembly who
shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013
elections shall have qualified and assumed office.” This power is far different from appointing elective
ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption to office of the officials elected in the
May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA No. 10153, in fact,
provides only for synchronization of elections and for the interim measures that must in the meanwhile
prevail. And this is how RA No. 10153 should be read – in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is purely and simply an interim
measure responding to the adjustments that the synchronization requires.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR

Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian
Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and mandamus as
citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act
No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its
implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The petitioners assail certain provisions of the
IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s
ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources
therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the IPRA, there
is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources
within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral
domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the
natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants of
the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small scale utilization of these
resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept
of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from the State. However, the
right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited
form of ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
Chavez vs PCGG
G.R. No. 130716. December 9, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information and the correlative duty of
the state to disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national interest, demands that
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s
task of recovering the Marcoses’ ill-gotten wealth. He claims that any compromise on the
alleged billions of ill-gotten wealth involves an issue of “paramount public interest,” since it
has a “debilitating effect on the country’s economy” that would be greatly prejudicial to the
national interest of the Filipino people. Hence, the people in general have a right to know
the transactions or deals being contrived and effected by the government.
Respondents, on the other hand, do not deny forging a compromise agreement with the
Marcos heirs. They claim, though, that petitioner’s action is premature, because there is no
showing that he has asked the PCGG to disclose the negotiations and the
Agreements. And even if he has, PCGG may not yet be compelled to make any disclosure,
since the proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements have not become effective and
binding.
Issues: Whether the constitutional right to information may prosper against respondents’

argument that the “should be disclosed” proposed terms and conditions of the Agreements
are not yet effective and binding
Held: Yes.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent upon
the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible
owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth, subject to some of the following recognized
restrictions: (1) national security matters and intelligence information, (2) trade secrets and
banking transactions, (3) criminal matters, and (4) other confidential information.
RICARDO VALMONTE, et al. vs.
FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.. G.R. No.
74930 February 13, 1989 Right to
Information; Mandamus; GSIS Law; “public
concern” and “public interest”
OCTOBER 18, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to
information and pray that respondent be directed:
(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election
thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or
(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans;
and/or
(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
Such request was on the premise that Art. IV, Sec. 6 of the Constitution provides
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be
afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
The Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied to such letter, however, not having yet received the
reply of the Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for
failure to receive a reply, “(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary
within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest.”
Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the
defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted
housing loans by the GSIS. Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor
General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties
were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for
decision.
In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among
which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies, hence, petitioners have no cause
of action.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
2. Whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be
done, in pursuance of their right to information
3. Whether petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS
RULING:
1. YES.
Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the
courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law.
The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity
to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is
involved.
The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to
information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its
Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies is warranted.
The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred
by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can
become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated.
The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to
protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to
such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing
legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to
check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is
not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures
that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government’s monopolizing pertinent information.
2. YES.
Before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of “public interest” or “public
concern,” and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil
Service Commission]
The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms “public interest” and “public concern”. As
observed in Legazpi:
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. “Public concern” like “public interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of
interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure “clean” loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs.
Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of
various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged
borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus
proceedings, viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence may be invoked only by the person whose
privacy is claimed to be violated.
Respondent asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS are private in nature
and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which
guarantees “(a)ccess to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions” only.
First of all, the “constituent — ministrant” dichotomy characterizing government function has long been
repudiated. In ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices, the Court
said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business,
discharges the same function of service to the people.
Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not
justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are
nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations,
whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is
convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by
special legislation are within the ambit of the people’s right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional
policy of transparency in government dealings.
3. YES.
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject
to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination,
to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the
records may be insured
The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., “to furnish
petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-
Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.”
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to “access to
official records,” the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to
prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined,
clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to
perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
clear and specific.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to
prepare the list requested.
The petition was granted and respondent General Manager of the GSIS was ordered to allow petitioners
access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa,
as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not
incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.
Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Abelardo T. Domondon, Jose A. Gangan and Violeta J. Josef, Respondents,
G.R. No. 165036; 5 July 2010 Hazel Ma. C. Antolin, Petitioner vs. Antonieta Fortuna-Ibe, Respondent, G.R. No.
175705; 5 July 2010 Facts: Hazel Ma. C. Antolin (Petitioner) failed the Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
Licensure Exam she took in October 1997. Convinced she deserved to pass the Exam, she wrote to the Board
of Accountancy (Board), requesting that her answer sheets be re-corrected. She was shown her answer
sheets but since these showed only shaded marks, she was unable to determine why she failed the Exam.
Consequently, she asked the Board for copies of the questionnaire, her answer sheets, the answer keys and
an explanation of the grading system (collectively, the Examination Papers). Her request was denied on two
grounds: (1) Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994,
only allowed access to her answer sheets, and reconsideration of the result of her examination can be made
only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of the answer sheets, or malfeasance; and (2) the Board
was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than the answer sheets) by Section 20, Article IV
of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994. The Board later informed her that her exam was investigated and
no mechanical error was found in the grading. Petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages, with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction, against the Board and its members before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), praying that the Board provide her with all documents that would show whether the Board
fairly administered the exam and correctly graded her answers, and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate
of registration as a CPA. She later amended her Petition to clarify that she only wanted access to the
documents requested, not recorrection of her exam, deleting in the process her original prayer for issuance
of a certificate of registration as CPA. Petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA Licensure Exam and took her oath
as a CPA. Consequently, the RTC denied her application for mandatory injunction for being moot. She
amended her Petition a second time to implead the PRC and to ask, in addition to access to the documents
she had requested, that if warranted, appropriate revisions in the October 1997 Exam results be made by the
Board and the PRC. The RTC considered the matter moot and dismissed the petition. On her motion,
however, the RTC reconsidered the dismissal, holding that her passing of the subsequent CPA examination
did not render the petition moot because the relief “and if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as Certified Public Accountant” was deleted from the original petition. As regards whether she
had the constitutional right to have access to the documents she requested, the RTC resolved to let the
parties first adduce evidence, and to have PRC air its side of the case. The RTC also ordered the PRC to
preserve and safeguard the questionnaire, petitioner’s answer sheets, and the answer keys for the October
1997 CPA Licensure Exam. When their motion for reconsideration was denied, respondents brought the case
to the Court of Appeals (CA) which set aside the RTC’s decision and ordered the dismissal of the case
because: (1) the petition was mooted when petitioner passed the May 1998 CPA exam; (2) Section 20, Article
IV of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994, constituted a valid limitation on her right to information and
access to government documents; (3) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because she
merely sought review of her failing marks; (4) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the
respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; and (5) she
failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before seeking
judicial intervention. Petitioner, thus, brought the matter to the Supreme Court. Issues: (1) Whether or not
petitioner may seek judicial intervention to compel the re-correction of her examination; (2) Whether or not
petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies; (3) Whether or not the case was mooted by
petitioner’s passing the May 1998 CPA Licensure Examination; and (4) Whether or not petitioner has the
constitutionalright to have access to the Examination Papers. Held: (1) Any claim for re-correction or revision
of petitioner’s 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. In AgustinRamos vs. Sandoval[G.R. No.
84470, February 2, 1989 (Minute Resolution)], where therespondent Judge was questioned for dismissing
therein petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional
Regulation Commission to re-correct their ratings, the Supreme Court held that “(t)he function of reviewing
and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and
arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and
mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of thewrit of mandamus.” For a writ of mandamus to issue, the
applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding
duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear. No such clarity exists here. And
despite petitioner’s assertion that she did not demand re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second
Amended Petition and her prayer that respondents “make the appropriate revisions on the results of her
examination” belied this claim. (2) Like the claimants in Agustin, petitioner’s remedy from the Board’srefusal
to release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Under Section 5(c) of
Presidential Decree No. 223, the PRC has the power to review and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and
regulations, orders and decisions of the various professional Boards, including the results of their licensure
examinations, and the decisions of the Boards on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless
appealed to the PRC within 30 days from promulgation. Contrary’s to petitioner’s claim, this power is not
limited to administrative investigations but encompassesrequests for documents. And since the PRC itself
issued the resolution (PRC Resolution No. 338) questioned by petitioner, it was in the best position to resolve
questions addressed to its area of expertise. One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is
thewell-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of
non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other
departments. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions,
among which is when only a question of law is involved. Whether or not petitioner had a constitutional right
to demand access to the Examination Papers was one such question of law which cannot be resolved with
finality by the administrative officer. (3) An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value. In this
jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information
and may seek its enforcement by mandamus. And since every citizen possesses the inherent right to be
informed by the mere fact of citizenship, petitioner’s belated passing of the CPA Board Exams did not
automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers had become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly,
the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case would be repeated,
warranted review. (4) Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute; it is
limited to “matters of public concern” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law”
(Section 7, Article III, 1987 Constitution). Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to
“transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law” (Sec. 28,
Art. II, 1987 Constitution). The Court has always grappled with the meanings of “public interest” and “public
concern” which “embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary
citizen,” and which are, in the final analysis, up to the courts to determine on a case by case basis [Legaspi v.
Civil Service Commission, 234 Phil. 521, 535 (1987)]. National board examinations such as the CPA Board
Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would
understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure
that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical,
these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further
improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting. The Court, nonetheless, realizes that
there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the
exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties
in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that
require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. The PRC, however, had not
been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for
keeping the Examination Papers confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may
impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be
ventilated, the Court deemed it best to remand the case to the RTC for further proceedings.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
24 SEP
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to reclaim areas of Manila Bay
with the Construction and Development Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D. 1084, tasked with
developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.
1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered
into an agreement that all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA. It was followed
by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA
covering the three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a Thai-Philippine
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI
entered the JVA which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when
Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously
known as the “mother of all scams”).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of preliminary
injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing
the JVA. Following these events, under President Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an
Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the stipulations in the
(Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint venture
agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these
lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership
limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the
public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such classification and declaration only
after PEA has reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In
their present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce
of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares111 of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the reclaimed
lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer needed for public service. Still,
the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Brenda Nazareth vs Hon. Reynaldo Villar, et al
G.R. No. 188635
Facts:
Nazareth, the Regional Director of the Department of Science and Technology in the Region IX, has approved the
release of Magna Carta benefits to the covered officials and employees commencing 1998, 1999, and 2001. The
said appropriation has no provision in the GAA, which means that it has not been officially approved yet.
Issue:
Whether or not the release of the Magna Carta funds for 1998, 1999, and 2001 qualified officials and employees
legal and valid.
Held:
It is not valid but the officials and employees do not have to reimburse the disallowed allowance. According to
Section 25 (5) Article IV of the Constitution, the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional
Commissions are authorized to transfer appropriations to augment any item in the GAA for their respective
offices in their respective appropriations. The power to augment cannot be used to fund
non-existent provisions in the GAA
When the statute itself enumerates the exceptions to the application of the general rule, the exceptions are strictly
but reasonably construed. The exceptions extend only as far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provision rather than the exceptions. Where the general rule is
established by a statute with exceptions, none but the enacting authority can curtail the former. Not even the
courts may add to the latter by implication, and it is a rule that an express exception excludes all others, although it
is always proper in determining the applicability of the rule to inquire whether, in a particular case, it accords with
reason and justice.
The appropriate and natural office of the exception is to exempt something from the scope of the general words of
a statute, which is otherwise within the scope and meaning of such general words. Consequently, the existence of
an exception in a statute clarifies the intent that the statute shall apply to all cases not excepted. Exceptions are
subject to the rule of strict construction; hence, any doubt will be resolved in favor of the general provision and
against the exception. Indeed, the liberal construction of a statute will seem to require in many circumstances that
the exception, by which the operation of the statute is limited or abridged, should receive a restricted
construction.
DEMETRIA V ALBA
13 MAR
G.R. No. 71977 | February 27, 1987 | J. Fernan

Facts:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)—as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers—on the primary grounds that
Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch in its
performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition has become
moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution by the
Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration was enacted in pursuant
thereof), which states that “No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,
however, the President…may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations
law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.”
Issue:
1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional
2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act
Held:
1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by empowering
the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the Executive Department
to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations Act, without any regard as
to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item. It not only disregards
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to naught.
Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.
2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to
say that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority,
the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.
Disciplinary Action Against Atty. Wenceslao Laureta and Contempt Preoceedings Against Eva Maravilla
Illustre GR No 68635 12 March 1987
09MondayMar 2015
POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

≈ LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Eva Maravilla-Ilustre sent letters to Justices Andres R. Narvasa, Ameurfina M.
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division.
Ilustre using contemptuous language claimed that members of the court rendered unjust
decision on the case GR 68635: Eva Maravilla Ilustre vs. Intermediate Appellate Court.
Ilustre claimed that the Court acted unjustly when Justice Pedro Yap failed to inhibit himself
from participating when in fact he is a law-partner of the defense counsel Atty Sedfrey
Ordonez. On 27 October 1986, the Court en banc reviewed the history of the case and
found no reason to take action, stating that Justice Yap inhibited himself from the case and
was only designated as Chairman of First Division on 14 July 1986 after the resolution of
dismissal was issued on 14 May 1986. Petitioner again addressed letters to Justices
Narvasa, Herrera and Cruz with a warning of exposing the case to another forum of justice,
to which she made true by filing an Affidavit-Complaint to Tanodbayan (Ombudsman) on 16
Decemeber 1986. Atty. Laureta himself reportedly circulated copies of the Complaint to the
press. Tanodbayan dismissed petitioner’s Complaint
Issue:
Decision: Eva Maravilla Ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao Laureta is
found guilty of grave professional misconduct and is suspended from the practice of law
until further Orders.
Resolutions of the Supreme Court as a collegiate court, whether en banc or division, speak
for themselves and are entitled to full faith and credence and are beyond investigation or
inquiry under the same principle of conclusiveness of enrolled bills of the legislature. The
supremacy of the Supreme Court’s judicial power is a restatement of the fundamental
principle of separation of powers and checks and balances under a republican form of
government such that the three co-equal branches of government are each supreme and
independent within the limits of its own sphere. Neither one can interfere with the
performance of the duties of the other.
METROBANK V. TOBIAS (G.R. NO. 177780; JANUARY 25, 2012)
CASE DIGEST: METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by ROSELLA A.
SANTIAGO,Petitioner,v. ANTONINO O. TOBIAS III, Respondent. (G.R. No. 177780; January 25, 2012).
FACTS: Tobias opened a savings/current account for and in the name of Adam Merchandising, his frozen
meat business. Six months later, Tobias applied for a loan from METROBANK, which in due course
conducted trade and credit verification of Tobias that resulted in negative findings. The property
consisted of four parcels of land located in Malabon City, Metro Manila.
His loan was restructured to 5-years upon his request. Yet, after two months, he again defaulted. Thus,
the mortgage was foreclosed, and the property was sold to METROBANK as the lone bidder.
When the certificate of sale was presented for registration to the Registry of Deeds of Malabon, no
corresponding original copy of TCT No. M-16751 was found in the registry vault. Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) concluded that TCT No. M-16751 and the tax declarations
submitted by Tobias were fictitious. PAOCTF recommended the filing against Tobias of a criminal
complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents under paragraph 2 (a) of Article 315, in
relation to Articles 172(1) and 171(7) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Malabon ultimately charged Tobias with estafa through falsification
of public documents. Tobias filed a motion for reinvestigation, which was granted. Nonetheless, on
December 27, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Malabon still found probable cause against Tobias, and
recommended his being charged with estafa through falsification of public document. Tobias appealed
to the DOJ and then Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez issued a resolution directing
the withdrawal of the information filed against Tobias. On November 18, 2005, Secretary of Justice Raul
M. Gonzalez denied METROBANK's motion for reconsideration. Hence, METROBANK challenged the
adverse resolutions. METROBANK maintains that what the Secretary of Justice did was to determine the
innocence of the accused, which should not be done during the preliminary investigation; and that the
CA disregarded such lapse.
ISSUE: Did the CA err in dismissing METROBANK's petition?HELD: Under the doctrine of separation of

powers, the courts have no right to directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Executive Branch of the Government.
The settled policy is that the courts will not interfere with the executive determination of probable
cause for the purpose of filing an information, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. That abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal
to perform a duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law, such as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.
In this regard, we stress that a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of
probable cause is not part of a trial. At a preliminary investigation, the investigating prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice only determines whether the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. Probable cause refers to facts and circumstances that engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof. There is no definitive
standard by which probable cause is determined except to consider the attendant conditions; the
existence of probable cause depends upon the finding of the public prosecutor conducting the
examination, who is called upon not to disregard the facts presented, and to ensure that his finding
should not run counter to the clear dictates of reason.
We do not lose sight of the fact that METROBANK, a commercial bank dealing in real property, had the
duty to observe due diligence to ascertain the existence and condition of the realty as well as the validity
and integrity of the documents bearing on the realty. Its duty included the responsibility of dispatching
its competent and experienced representatives to the realty to assess its actual location and condition,
and of investigating who was its real owner. Yet, it is evident that METROBANK did not diligently
perform a thorough check on Tobias and the circumstances surrounding the realty he had offered as
collateral. As such, it had no one to blame but itself. Verily, banks are expected to exercise greater care
and prudence than others in their dealings because their business is impressed with public interest.
Their failure to do so constitutes negligence on its part. DENIED.
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NGARA VS ELECTORAL COMMISSION GR NO. L-45081, July 15, 1936
Doctrine: The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains
not through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct
that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The
Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of check and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government.
FACTS:
In the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor,were candidates voted for the position of member of the
National Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas. The provincial board of canvassers,
proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect of the National Assembly for the said district, for having
received the most number of votes. On November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office.
Respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a “Motion of Protest” against the
election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the
election of said position be nullified/
Petitioner Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral
Commission a “Motion to Dismiss the Protest”, alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National
Assembly was adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period
during which protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid
resolution has for its object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that
the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period
Respondent Pedro Ynsua, filed an “Answer to the Motion of Dismissal” alleging that there is no legal or
constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest against the election of a member of the
National Assembly after confirmation.
The Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on January 23, 1936,
denying herein petitioner’s “Motion to Dismiss the Protest.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and if in the affirmative
2. WON the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous
confirmation of such election by resolution of the National Assembly
RULING:
1. Yes. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional organ,
created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be
interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is
beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government,
and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between department
powers and agencies of the government are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justifiable and
appropriate cases.
In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to
determine the conflict of authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to
decline to take cognizance of the controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were
left undecided and undetermined, would not a void be thus created in our constitutional system which
may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire framework? To ask these questions is to answer
them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our constitutional system. Upon
principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted facts of the present
case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant
to the Electoral Commission as “the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.”
MANUEL B. JAPZON VS COMELEC and JAIME S. TY
G.R. NO. 180088
January 19, 2009
FACTS: Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for Mayor of the Municipality
of Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the elections of May 14, 2007. Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Ty
on the ground of material misrepresentation.
Japzon averred that:

1. Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, born in what was then Pambujan Sur, Hernani Eastern
Samar (now Gen. Macarthur, Easter Samar) to a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
2. Ty migrated to the USA, became a citizen thereof, and resided therein for the last 25 years.
3. Ty falsely represented in his COC that he was a resident of Gen. Macarthur for one year prior to
elections, and was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country.
4. While Ty may have applied for reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, he never actually
resided Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of 1 year immediately preceding the date of
election as required under the Local Government Code.
5. Ty continued traveling to the USA and comporting himself as a US citizen even after filing his
COC and taking his Oath of Allegiance.
6. He failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required by RA No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention
and Reacquisition Act of 2003).
Ty responded to wit:
1. He was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a
naturalized American citizen. However, prior to filing his COC, he already filed with the
Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California, USA, an application for the
reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship.
2. He executed an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before the Vice Consul of
the Philippine Consulate
3. He applied for and was issued a Philippine passport indicating that his residence in the
Philippines was at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
4. He personally secured his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) in Gen. Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
5. He was registered as a voter at Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
6. He executed on 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship.
Ty won the elections and was proclaimed Mayor of Gen Macarthur by the BOC in the interim.
The COMELEC found that Ty complied with all the requirements of RA 9225 and dismissed the petition.
Evidence revealed that Ty executed an Oath of Allegiance in the USA and a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007, in compliance with R.A. No. 9225. There was no material
misrepresentation in his COC. Although Ty has lost his domicile when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen,
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and subsequent acts proved that he has been a resident of
Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for at least 1 year prior to elections as stated in
his COC.
COMELEC went on to explain that the term residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation
as referring to dwelling or habitation, but rather to domicile or legal residence or the place where a party
actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any
given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired
by every person at birth until the same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
Japzon’s motion for reconsideration was denied, in the same manner as his petition with the COMELEC
En Banc failed.
The COMELEC En Banc held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains foreign citizenship, and
subsequently renounces the same, constitutes acts of repatriation and hence becomes qualified to run as a
candidate for any local post.

ISSUE: Did the COMELEC err in its ruling by disregarding the parameters for the acquisition of a new
domicile of choice and residence? Did the COMELEC err in refusing to cancel Ty’s COC and to declare
Japzon as the duly elected Mayor?
HELD: No
Japzon’s arguments:
1. When Ty became a naturalized American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin.
2. Ty did not establish his residence in Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar, just because he reacquired
his Philippine citizenship. He failed to prove that he established a new domicile of choice.
3. Ty did not become a resident of Gen. Macarthur by merely executing the Oath of Allegiance
under Republic Act No. 9225.
4. Ty did not meet the one-year residency requirement for running as mayor.
5. Japzon is the only placer in the elections and should be declared as the duly elected mayor.
Ty’s arguments:
1. COMELEC already found sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the Gen
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, 1 year prior to the local elections. Findings of fact of the COMELEC
are binding on the Court.
2. Even if Ty is indeed disqualified from running, Japzon as the second placer cannot take his place.
OSG’s position:
Ty failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. He was unable to prove that he intended to remain
in the Philippines for good and make it his new domicile. The OSG still prays for the dismissal of the
petition considering that Japzon cannot be declared the duly elected Mayor even if Ty is found to be
disqualified.
RATIO: Ty was a natural-born Filipino. Even if he left to work in the USA and eventually became an
American citizen, he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic before the Vice Consul in Los Angeles, California in accordance with RA No. 9225. He then,
became a dual citizen. It was only on March 19, 2007 that he renounced his American citizenship before a
notary public and became a pure Philippine citizen again.
RA No 9225 imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship;
nor does it mention any effect of reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the current
residence of the natural-born Filipino. Citizenship and residence are independently treated in RA No
9225. Residency only becomes relevant when the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship runs for
public office. He must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
Ty complied with the second requirement when he personally executed a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship on March 19, 2007 before a notary public. By the time he filed his COC on March 28, 2007, he
had already effectively renounced his American citizenship.
Under Section 39 of the Local Government Code (RA No 7160), it is required that an elective
official be a resident of the independent component cities, component cities, or municipalites
where he intends to be elected for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Ty admitted that he became a naturalized American citizen, which meant he must have abandoned Gen
Macarthur, Eastern Samar as his domicile of origin and transferred to the USA as his domicile of choice.
His reacquisition of Philippine citizenship had no impact on his residence/domicile. He did not
necessarily regain his domicile in Gen. Macarthur, but merely had the option to establish his domicile of
choice therein. The length of his residence shall be determined from the time he made it his domicile of
choice and shall not retroact to the time of his birth.
Under Papandayan Jr., vs COMELEC, it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor. The principle
of animus revertendi has been used to determine whether a candidate has an intention to return to the
place where he seeks to be elected. Thus, it is important to determine whether there has been an
abandonment of his former residence. Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice his
profession does not constitute loss of residence.
In order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There
must be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
The COMELEC found that Ty had been a resident of Gen Macarthur 1 year prior to the elections. Factual
findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, are binding and conclusive on the SC, most
especially since the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC on a level higher that other
administrative organs.
Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice became apparent when, immediately after reacquiring
his Philippine citizenship on October 2, 2005, he applied for a Philippine passport indicating his address
at A. Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, Gen Macarthur, Eastern Samar. He paid his community tax,
securing CTCs and stating his address in Gen Macarthur. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as
a voter on July 17, 2006 in the same town. He has also been bodily present in the municipality since his
arrival on May 4, 2006. His trips abroad are further manifestations of his animus manendi and animus
revertendi. Even with his trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in Gen Macarthur, for at least 9
of the 12 months preceding the local elections.
There is nothing wrong in an individual changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as
long as he is able to prove that he has effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the
period required by law. Ty has proven that he had established residence/domicile a little over a year prior
to the local elections, in which he ran for Mayor and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA v. COMELEC, GR No. 191938, 2010-10-19
Facts:
(Acting on a Motion for Reconsideration) On the critical question of whether Mitra
deliberately misrepresented his Aborlan residence to deceive and mislead the people
of the Province of Palawan, we found that Mitra did not. In fact, Mitra adduced
positive evidence of transfer of residence which the private respondents’ evidence
failed to sufficiently controvert. Specifically, the private respondents’ evidence
failed to show that Mitra remained a Puerto Princesa City resident.
648 Phil. 165

In this regard, we took note of the "incremental moves" Mitra undertook to establish
his new domicile in Aborlan, as evidenced by the following: (1) his expressed intent
to transfer to a residence outside of Puerto Princesa City to make him eligible for a
provincial position; (2) his preparatory moves starting in early 2008; (3) the
transfer of registration as a voter in March 2009; (4) his initial transfer through a
leased dwelling at Maligaya Feedmill; (5) the purchase of a lot for his permanent
home; and (6) the construction of a house on the said lot which is adjacent to the
premises he was leasing pending the completion of his house. Thus, we found that
under the situation prevailing when Mitra filed his COC, there is no reason to infer
that Mitra committed any misrepresentation, whether inadvertently or deliberately, in
claiming residence in Aborlan. We also emphasized that the COMELEC could not even
present any legally acceptable basis (as it used subjective non-legal standards in
its analysis) to conclude that Mitra’s statement in his COC concerning his residence
was indeed a misrepresentation. In sum, we concluded that the evidence in the present
case, carefully reviewed, showed that Mitra indeed transfered his residence from
Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
BRION, J
While it is undisputed that Mitra’s domicile of origin is Puerto Princesa City, Mitra
adequately proved by substantial evidence that he transferred by incremental process
to Aborlan beginning 2008, and concluded his transfer in early 2009. As our Decision
discussed and as repeated elsewhere in this Resolution, the private respondents
failed to establish by sufficiently convincing evidence that Mitra did not
effectively transfer, while the COMELEC not only grossly misread the evidence but
even used the wrong considerations in appreciating the submitted evidence.
Issue: Whether or not Mitra effectively transferred his domacille to Aborlan
Ruling:
Yes.
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CASE DIGEST: MACQUILING V. COMELEC

G.R. No. 195649 : July 2, 2013
CASAN MACODE MACQUILING, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO Y CAGOCO, AND LINOG G. BALUA.
Respondents.
SERENO, J.:
FACTS:
This Resolution resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent on

May 10, 2013 and the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20,
2013.
We are not unaware that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May
2010 elections has already ended on June 30, 2010. Arnado, therefore, has
successfully finished his term of office. While the relief sought can no longer be
granted, ruling on the motion for reconsideration is important as it will either
affirm the validity of Arnados election or affirm that Arnado never qualified to
run for public office.
Respondent failed to advance any argument to support his plea for the reversal of
this Courts Decision dated April 16, 2013. Instead, he presented his
accomplishments as the Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and reiterated
that he has taken the Oath of Allegiance not only twice but six times. It must be
stressed, however, that the relevant question is the efficacy of his renunciation of
his foreign citizenship and not the taking of the Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines. Neither do his accomplishments as mayor affect the
question before this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a dual citizen can run for a local elective position?
POLITICAL LAW: dual citizens ineligible for local public office
Indeed, there is no doubt that Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code
disqualifies those with dual citizenship from running for local elective positions.
There is likewise no doubt that the use of a passport is a positive declaration that
one is a citizen of the country which issued the passport, or that a passport proves
that the country which issued it recognizes the person named therein as its
national.
It is unquestioned that Arnado is a natural born Filipino citizen, or that he

acquired American citizenship by naturalization. There is no doubt that he
reacquired his Filipino citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and that he renounced his American citizenship. It is also indubitable
that after renouncing his American citizenship, Arnado used his U.S. passport at
least six times.
If there is any remaining doubt, it is regarding the efficacy of Arnados

renunciation of his American citizenship when he subsequently used his U.S.
passport. The renunciation of foreign citizenship must be complete and
unequivocal. The requirement that the renunciation must be made through an
oath emphasizes the solemn duty of the one making the oath of renunciation to
remain true to what he has sworn to. Allowing the subsequent use of a foreign
passport because it is convenient for the person to do so is rendering the oath a
hollow act. It devalues the act of taking of an oath, reducing it to a mere
ceremonial formality.
The dissent states that the Court has effectively left Arnado "a man without a
country".On the contrary, this Court has, in fact, found Arnado to have more than
one. Nowhere in the decision does it say that Arnado is not a Filipino citizen.
What the decision merely points out is that he also possessed another citizenship
at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be
interfered with by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of said agencies, or unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by
substantial evidence.They are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
and are binding upon this Court, unless it is shown that the administrative body
had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence before it to such an
extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been properly
appreciated.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First Division found that

Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his American
citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that
Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Arnados
claim that he only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his
Philippine passport was not yet issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that
Arnado was able to prove that he used his Philippine passport for his travels on
the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010, 31 March 2010, 16 April
2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the
certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January
2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado arrived in the Philippines using his U.S.
Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein that his nationality is USA-
American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record provided by the
Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport
four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009,
upon departure on 29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these
incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because
to his knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his
use."This conclusion, however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that
his Philippine passport was issued on 18 June 2009. The records show that he
continued to use his U.S. passport even after he already received his Philippine
passport. Arnados travel records show that he presented his U.S. passport on 24
November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These facts were
never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the

facts that the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Arnado obtained
his Philippine passport. Arnados continued use of his U.S. pass
Aldaba vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188078, January 25, 2010
Facts: This case is an original action for Prohibition to declareunconstitutional, R.A. 9591 which creates a legislative
district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan. Allegedly, the R.A. violates the minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district in a city. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented
in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act through House Bill 3162 (later converted to
House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by
Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population threshold of
250,000 for a city to meritrepresentative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, “Án act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos, Bulacan”
is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least 250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 isunconstitutional for being violative of Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds
that, as required by the 1987 Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional
Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was declared without legal effect
because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to issue the Certification based on the following statements
supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135 as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official by the Nat’l Statistics
Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying officer, in which case, the
Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the Certification issued by Director
Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the Malolos population of
223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August 1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative reappointment is to
equalize the population and voting power among districts.
Mariano Jr. vs. COMELEC
Facts:
RA 7854 is “An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati in Into a Highly

Urbanized City xxx”. Sec 52 thereof provides that Makati, upon
conversion into a Highly Urbanized City, shall have at least two
legislative districts xxx. The petitioners contend, among others, that the
reapportionment cannot be made by a special law (it can only be made
by a general reapportionment law), and that Makati’s population xxx
stands at only 450k hence it allegedly violates Art VI, Sec 5(3) of the
Constitution.
Issues:
(1) May Sec 52 of RA 7854, a special law, make reapportionment of the

legislative districts?
(2) Does Sec 53 of RA 7854 violate Art VI, Sec 5 (3) of the Constitution?
Held:
(1) Yes. As thus worded [in Art VI, Sec 5(1)], the Constitution did not
preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment law. This is exactly what was done
by Congress in enacting RA 7854 and providing an increase in Makati’s
legislative district.
(2) No. Art VI, Sec 5(3) provides that a city with a population of at least
250k shall have at least one representative. Even granting that the
population of Makati xxx stood at 450k, its legislative district may still be
increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of 250k.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY v. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD
NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty. Laserna v. DDB and PDEA), regarding the
constitutionality of RA 9165(c), (d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise
known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of
candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and
private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will
determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found
positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or
termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service
Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations for the
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims
that Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for
senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship,
(2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected
as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as
it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks
to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one,
the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection
clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for
infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right
against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates
for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition
to those laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate
the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates
for senator. NO, Congress CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while paragraphs (f) and (g)
are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g) violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable
searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause.
RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the aforementioned
facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean,
obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a
condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution
completes the chain with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of
his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at
the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the
challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of
little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927,
in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following
wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of
the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the
constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative
enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations
which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of
the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating
rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to
what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process
of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the
Constitution.
GR NO. 170338
PETITIONERS Virgilio O. Garcillano
RESPONDENTS House of Representatives
A Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction, seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
SUMMARY. This case is about the infamous “Hello Garci” tape which involves Virgilio O. Garcillano
and the former president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due
process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of
his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
MAIN DOCTRINE. As of Art. 2 of the New Civil Code (NCC), laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines. The Rules of Procedure posted on the Senate website and the pamphlets
available at the Senate does not follow the Tanada vs Tuvera ruling.
FACTS
 On June 8, 2005, Senator Francis G. Escudero delivered a privileged speech entitled, “Tale of Two
Tapes and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on Public
Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information and Communications
Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees.
 Several versions of the wiretapped conversations emerged.
 The recordings contain conversations regarding the manipulation of the 2004 presidential election
results in favor of Macapagal-Arroyo.
 On July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia
and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation.
 Garcillano filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He prayed to the court that the illegally
obtained recordings be restrained from being used by the respondent, House of Representatives (HOR).
The House discussion regarding the issue abruptly stopped afterwards.
 Two years after, the then senator, Panfilo Lacson, roused the issue with his privileged speech, “The
Lighthouse that Brought Darkness.” He promised to provide the public "the whole unvarnished truth –
the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the
perceived willingness of telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.
 Sen. Miriam Defensor- Santiago delivered a privileged speech regarding that the Constitution bans the
use possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP),
the Philippine National Police or other government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public
officials.
 On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired justices of the Court
of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main
that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.
 Intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of ISAFP, alleges violation of his right to due process
considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the investigation.
ISSUE
1. WON the publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation
through the Senate’s website and pamphlets, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
HELD
No. According to Article 2 of the New Civil Code (NCC), laws shall take effect after 15 days following
the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided. In the case at bar, the Senate did not comply with the
publication requirements as stated in Tanada vs Tuvera.
The Senate claims that they have the Rules of Procedure available in both online and as a pamphlet (They
are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates
internet web page), but their invocation of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce
Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely recognizes the
admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.
The Court also ruled that by not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of
legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm. That is because the Senate
that published the Rules of Procedure on 1995 and 2006 are different from the current Senate.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello
Garci" tapes.
NOTES
 This is the case involving the infamous “Hello Garci” tapes.

 G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275 were consolidated together.
 It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they have different
objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in the House and their subsequent
inclusion in the committee reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
 Since we are focusing on Art. 2 of the NCC, we will focus on Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, the intervenor.
 R.A. No. 4200 - AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER
RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
 The Court deemed G.R. No 170338 as moot and academic because the recordings have been played
already in the House and were heard by its members.
 The Senate subsequently caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take
judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be
prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees,
because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 180050 Case Digest

G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor Bernal and Rene Medina
vs Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita
Facts:
April 3, 2002, the Office of the President advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Surigao del Norte to
deficient population in the propsed Province of Dinagat Islands.
Consequently, Prov. Gov't. of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census with the assistance of the
NSo District Census Coordinator to determine the population of Dinagat. The census yield 371,576
inhabitants. NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.
Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual income of Dinagat was 82M . The
land area is 802.12 sqkm.
Later, Congress passed the bill for the creation of the Province of Dinagat which was approved by then
President GMA. Then a plebiscite was ratified and approved by the majority. Consequently, new set of
provincial officials took their oath of office following their appointment by PGMA, another set were then
elected in the election later.
Petitioners aver that they are taxpayers and residents of the Province of Surigao del Norte, they are
Vice-gov and members of the provincial board. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a
new province is an illegal act of Congress and unjustly deprives the people of Surigao del Norte a large
chunk of its territory, IRA and rich resources from the area.
They also claim that the creation is not valid because it failed to comply with the population and land
area requirement.
Ruling:
Petition is granted. SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. -- (a) A province may be created if it has an average
annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos
(P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office:
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed
herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special
funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
The requirements for the creation of a province contained in Sec. 461 of the Local Government Code are
clear, plain and unambiguous, and its literal application does not result in absurdity or injustice. Hence,
the provision in Art. 9(2) of the IRR exempting a proposed province composed of one or more islands
from the land-area requirement cannot be considered an executive construction of the criteria
prescribed by the Local Government Code. It is an extraneous provision not intended by the Local
Government Code and, therefore, is null and void.
R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands "contains an approximate land area
of eighty thousand two hundred twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including
Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets x x x."33 R.A. No. 9355, therefore, failed to
comply with the land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers.
The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population requirement of not less than
250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO. Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the
NSO, the population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only 106,951.
Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a special census of population in
Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the
NSO as required by the Local Government Code.34 Moreover, respondents failed to prove that with the
population count of 371,000, the population of the original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte)
would not be reduced to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province.
Petitioners contend that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of gerrymandering on
the ground that House Bill No. 884 excluded Siargao Island, with a population of 118,534 inhabitants,
from the new province for complete political dominance by Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-Villaroman.
This is unsubstantiated.
"Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so

contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative district
out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate or a party. The Constitution proscribes
gerrymandering, as it mandates each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat Islands consists of one island and
about 47 islets closely situated together, without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an
unsubstantiated allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda Ecleo-
Villaroman.
HERMIE M. HERRERA v. COMELEC, GR No. 131499, 1999-11-17
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside Resolution No. 2950 promulgated on November 3,
1997 by respondent Commission on Elections, which amended its Resolution Nos. 2379, 2396 and 2778
on the districting and adjustment of Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Panglungsod seats in connection
with the May 11, 1998 elections, on the alleged ground of grave abuse of discretion tainting the same.
In view of the addition of the two (2) new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag, to the Province of
Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province subdivided into two
provincial districts. Conformably, on March 25, 1996, it passed
Resolution No. 68 requesting the Commission on Elections to bring about the desired division.
On October 3, 1996, guided by the result of the consultative meetings, the Provincial Election Supervisor
issued a Memorandum recommending the division of the Province of Guimaras into two (2) provincial
districts.
On April 30, 1997, the Bureau of Local Government Finance of the Department of Finance issued
Memorandum Circular No. 97-1 reclassifying several provinces including the Province of Guimaras,
which was reclassified from fifth class to fourth class province.
In line with such reclassification, the Commission on Elections issued, on November 3, 1997, the
Resolution No. 2950 under attack, which allotted eight (8) Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to the
Province of Guimaras, dividing it into two provincial districts
Issues:
Petitioners question the manner in which the province was so divided into districts, pointing out that: 1)
the districts do not comprise a compact, contiguous and adjacent area; 2) the "consultative meeting"
upon which the districting was based did not express the true sentiment... of the voters of the province;
3) the apportionment of the province into two districts is not equitable, and 4) there is disparity in the
ratio of the number of voters that a Board Member represents.
Petitioners aver that the apportionment of the Province of Guimaras into two districts is not equitable
due to disproportionate representation. It is claimed that the districting embodied in Resolution No.
2950 results in a disparity of representation in that, in the first... district, there is a ratio of one board
member per 18,739 voters while in the second district, the ratio is one board member per 14, 050
voters.
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention is untenable. Under R.A. 7166 and Comelec Resolution No. 2313, the basis for
division into districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number
of listed or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus,... Comelec did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for the districting is the
number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based on the official 1995 Census of
Population as certified to by Tomas
P. Africa, Administrator of the National Statistics Office.
Petitioners' asseveration is equally erroneous. Under Comelec Resolution No. 2950, the towns of
Buenavista and San Lorenzo were grouped together to form the first district and the second district is
composed of the municipalities of Jordan, Nueva Valencia and Sibunag. R.A. 7166... requires that each
district must cover a compact, contiguous and adjacent territory. "Contiguous" and/or "adjacent" means
"adjoining, nearby, abutting, having a common border, connected, and/or touching along boundaries
often for considerable distances."[3]
Not even a close perusal of the map of the Province of Guimaras is necessary to defeat petitioners'
stance. On its face, the map of Guimaras indicates that the municipalities of Buenavista and San
Lorenzo are "adjacent" or "contiguous". They touch along boundaries and are... connected throughout
by a common border. Buenavista is at the northern part of Guimaras while San Lorenzo is at the east
portion of the province. It would be different if the towns grouped together to form one district were
Buenavista and Nueva Valencia or Buenavista and
Sibunag. In that case, the districting would clearly be without any basis because these towns are not
contiguous or adjacent. Buenavista is at the north while Nueva Valencia and Sibunag are at the southern
and southeastern part of the province, respectively.
Premises studiedly considered in proper perspective, the Court is of the irresistible conclusion, and so
finds, that the respondent Comelec did not gravely abuse its discretion when it issued Resolution No.
2950.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit the petition under consideration is hereby DISMISSED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Tobias vs. Abalos
Zsa RT Case Brief, Constitutional Law, Constitutional Law, Political and International Law, Political and

International Law November 1, 2020 2 Minutes
GR L-114783, 239 SCRA 106 [Dec 8, 1994]
COMPOSITION of the House of Representatives – Art VI, Sec 5. Constitution did not preclude Congress from
increasing its membership by ordinary legislation. – Art VI, Sec 5 (1). 250k is the minimum required population of a
city to have more than one legislative district. – Art VI, Sec 5 (3).
Facts:
Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. RA 7675 was enacted which in effect
converted the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized City and divided the legislative district of
Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts. Petitioners as taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong assail
the constitutionality of the RA contending it is contrary to Secs 5(1), 5(4), 26(1) and 26(2) of Art VI of the
Constitution.
Issues:
(1) Is RA 7675 contrary to Art VI, Sec 5(1) of the Constitution?
(2) Is it contrary to Sec 5(4) of the same?

(3) Is it contrary to Sec 26(1)?
(4) Is it contrary to Sec 26(2)?
Held:
(1) No. To the argument that the RA resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Reps beyond that
provided in Art VI, Sec 5(1) is thus contrary to the same, the court found no merit. The Constitution clearly
provides that the present composition of the House of Reps may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates
through legislative enactment.
(2) No. To the argument that the RA in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Art VI, Sec 5(4), it was held bordering on the absurd. It was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains
to itself.
(3) No. To the argument that the division of Mandaluyong and San Juan into 2 separate districts was not
sufficiently embraced in the title contrary to Art VI, Sec 26(1), the Court held in the negative. The creation of a
separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its
conversion into a highly urbanized city, but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion xxx. Thus, the
title necessarily includes the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction
of the one title-one subject rule has been invariably adopted so as not to cripple legislation. It should be given
practical rather than technical construction; it sufficiently complies with the rule if the title expresses the general
subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject.
(4) No. To the argument that there is no mention in the RA of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan
had each attained the minimum requirement of 250k inhabitants provided in Sec 5(3), Art VI of the Constitution to
justify their separation, the Court held that the reason does not suffice. The Act enjoys the presumption of having
passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of
the minimum requirements of the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, It is not required that
all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of
said laws.
CASE DIGEST] Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)
April 2, 2013 | G.R. No. 203766
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent
FACTS:
In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280 groups and
organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list elections. However, 52 of these
groups were subsequently disqualified by COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and
accredited as political parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention that said
groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
that their nominees were indeed members of the sectors they were seeking to represent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from participating in the May 2013
elections.
HELD:
No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC in its earlier rulings
(Bagong Bayani vs Comelec, Banat)
However, since the Court adopts new parameters in the qualification of the party-list system, thereby
abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand
to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and to participate in the coming elections, under the new parameters
prescribed in this Decision
Atong Paglaum v. Comelec | Government | Politics (scribd.com)
Case Digest: Banat v Comelec, GR 179271 (2009)
6/20/2020
0 COMMENTS
FACTS: Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives
provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal group of
COMELEC’s national board of canvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was approved by
the COMELEC en banc, and declared further in a resolution that the winning party list will be resolved
using the Veterans ruling. BANAT then filed a petition before the SC assailing said resolution of the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: (1) Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives provided in Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the
Constitution mandatory or is it merely a ceiling?
(2)Is the 2% threshold and “qualifier” votes prescribed by the same Sec 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional.
DECISION: Dismissed
RATIO DECIDENDI: 1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20%
allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5
of Art VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more then 20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Sec 11(b)
of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the -broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.”
11b of RA 7941:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes
cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total
number of votes : Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by vote of 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating in
the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
How shall additional seats be allocated-
proportional representation- the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations.
Bantay Republic Act vs Comelec
DOCTRINE:
Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in herein petitions. As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in
the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of
the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
FACTS:
There are 2 consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus involved in this case. In the first petition,
petitioners Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal Reforms (UP-LR) assail the
various Comelec resolutions accrediting private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the
forthcoming party-list elections on May 14, 2007 without simultaneously determining whether or not
their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the “Party-List
System Act” and belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sector each seeks to represent. In
the second petition, petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan
Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution 07-0724 effectively denying their request for the release or
disclosure of the names of the nominees of the fourteen (14) accredited participating party-list groups
mentioned in petitioner Rosales‘ previous letter-request.
On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to
govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under
the party-list system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto,
a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941
and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the
nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the
nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees.
Petitioner Rosales sent a letter to Director Alioden Dalaig od the Comelec‘s Law Department requesting
a list of that groups‘ nominees. Another letter was sent but to no avail. Thereafter, Manila Bulletin
carried the front-page banner headline “COMELEC WON‘T BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES”, with the
following sub-heading: “Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented.”
On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and
as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter8 to the Comelec formally requesting action and
definitive decision on Rosales‘ earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list
nominees. Unknown to Rosales et,al. was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 virtually
declaring the nominees‘ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales‘ basic disclosure
request.
ISSUE:
WON Comelec is correct in refusing to disclose the names of the nominees of party-list organizations
HELD:
Insofar as the disclosure issue is concerned, the petitions are impressed with merit.
Assayed against the non-disclosure stance of the Comelec and the given rationale therefor is the right to
information enshrined in the self- executory15 Section 7, Article III of the Constitution. Complementing
and going hand in hand with the right to information is another constitutional provision enunciating the
policy of full disclosure and transparency in Government. We refer to Section 28, Article II of the
Constitution.
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information and its companion right of access to
official records are not absolute. As articulated in Legaspi, supra, the people‘s right to know is limited to
“matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law.
The terms “public concerns” and “public interest” have eluded precise definition. But both terms
embrace, to borrow from Legaspi, a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know,
either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally whet the
interest of an ordinary citizen. At the end of the day, it is for the courts to determine, on a case to case
basis, whether or not at issue is of interest or importance to the public.
If, as in Legaspi, it was the legitimate concern of a citizen to know if certain persons employed as
sanitarians of a health department of a city are civil service eligibles, surely the identity of candidates for
a lofty elective public office should be a matter of highest public concern and interest.
As may be noted, no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-
list groups subject of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
The Comelec‘s reasoning that a party-list election is not an election of personalities is valid to a point. It
cannot be taken, however, to justify its assailed non-disclosure stance which comes, as it were, with a
weighty presumption of invalidity, impinging, as it does, on a fundamental right to information. While
the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its
nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
In all, we agree with the petitioners that respondent Comelec has a constitutional duty to disclose and
release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions.
MILAGROS E. AMORES v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,

GR No. 189600, 2010-06-29
Facts:
Via this petition for certiorari, Milagros E. Amores (petitioner) challenges the Decision of
May 14, 2009 and Resolution No. 09-130 of August 6, 2009 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (public respondent), which respectively dismissed...
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto questioning the legality of the assumption of office of
Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list
organization Citizens' Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives,...
In her Petition for Quo Warranto... petitioner alleged that, among other things, private
respondent assumed office without a formal proclamation issued by the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC); he was... disqualified to be a nominee of the youth sector of CIBAC
since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination and acceptance, he was
already 31 years old or beyond the age limit of 30 pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act; and his change of affiliation from CIBAC's youth sector to its
overseas Filipino workers and their families sector was not effected at least six months prior
to the May 14, 2007 elections so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under
Section 15... of RA No. 7941.
As earlier reflected, public respondent, by Decision of May 14, 2009,[3] dismissed
petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto, finding that CIBAC was among the party-list
organizations which the COMELEC had partially proclaimed as entitled to at least... one
seat in the House of Representatives through National Board of Canvassers (NBC)
Resolution No. 07-60 dated July 9, 2007. It also found the petition which was filed on
October 17, 2007 to be out of time, the reglementary period being 10 days from private
respondent's... proclamation.
Issues:
(1) whether petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto was dismissible for having been filed
unseasonably; and (2) whether Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private
respondent.
Ruling:
On the first issue, the Court finds that public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in considering petitioner's Petition for Quo Warranto filed out of time. Its counting
of the 10-day reglementary period provided in its Rules[8] from the... issuance of NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 on July 9, 2007 is erroneous.
To be sure, while NBC Resolution No. 07-60 partially proclaimed CIBAC as a winner in the
May, 2007 elections, along with other party-list organizations,[9] it was by no measure a
proclamation of private respondent himself as required by Section 13 of RA No.
7941.
Considering, however, that the records do not disclose the exact date of private
respondent's proclamation, the Court overlooks the technicality of timeliness and rules on
the merits. Alternatively, since petitioner's challenge goes into private respondent's...
qualifications, it may be filed at anytime during his term.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only
at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire
tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be... seasonably
challenged.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more
than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative
who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed... to continue in office until
the expiration of his term... a nominee who changes his sectoral affiliation within the same
party will only be eligible for nomination under the new sectoral affiliation if the change has
been effected at least six months before the elections.
The Court finds that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the
youth sector or the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007
elections.
The records disclose that private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in
May, 2007, it being stipulated that he was born in August, 1975.[15] Moreover, he did not
change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007,... public respondent
itself having found that he shifted to CIBAC's overseas Filipino workers and their families
sector only on March 17, 2007.[16]
THE ISSUANCE OF SUBSEQUENT RESOLUTIONS BY THE COURT IS SIMPLY AN

EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL POWER UNDER ART. VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION.
THE EXECUTION OF THE DECISION IS BUT AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE

ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTION OF THE COURT.
ASHARY M. ALAUYA V JUDGE CASAN ALI L. LIMBONA

A.M. No. SCC-98-4; March 22, 2011
RENATO C. CORONA
FACTS:
Before the Court is an administrative matter against Judge Casan Ali Limbona, Tenth Shari’a
Circuit Court (10th SCC), Tamparan, Lanao del Sur. This matter is the subject of the
Memorandum/Report of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) allegedly signed by Datu
Ashary M. Alauya (Alauya), Clerk of Court, 10th SSC, Marawi City. The OCA recommended that
Judge Limbona be found guilty of dishonesty and be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other privileges. The SC’s Third Division adopted the recommendation of
OCA.
The OCA through a Memorandum, challenged the act of Judge Limbona in filing a certificate of
candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial
post, in violation of the rule on partisan political activity, and neglect of his duties as a judge for
his failure to report to his station.
Judge Limbona denied that he filed a certificate of candidacy for the May 11, 1998 elections and
claimed that the signatures appearing on the certificate of candidacy were forged. To prove his
point, he submitted the affidavit of Datu Solaiman A. Malambut, DFP’s National President,
admitting sole responsibility for his "honest mistake" and "malicious negligence and act of
desperation" in including the name of Judge Limbona among the party’s list of nominees.
On the first charge, the OCA disbelieved Judge Limbona’s assertion that he did not consent to
the inclusion of his name in the certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC and that his
inclusion was purely due to the carelessness of the person who prepared the certificate.
The OCA, however, found that the second charge of non-performance or neglect of duty (due to
absenteeism) stood unsubstantiated and was, in fact, negated by the joint affidavit of the staff
members of the 10th SCC in Tamparan, Lanao del Sur and the certification of the municipal
mayor vouching for the judge’s leadership, diligence and contribution to the maintenance of
peace and order in the community.
However. with regard to the authenticity ofJudge Limbona’s signature, the NBI found that the
latter indeed signed the certificate of candidacy, thus, validated the OCA’s initial doubts on
Judge Limbona’s avowals of innocence.
ISSUE:
Whether Judge Limbona violated the rule on partisan politics in filing his COC.
RULING:
Yes, Judge Limbona’s filing of COC constitutes a violation on the rule on partisan political
activity.
The 1987 Constitution, Art IX (B) Section 2, par. 4 mandates that "no officer or employee in the
civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan political
campaign."
The Court ruled that the OCA’s recommendation to be well-founded. Judge Limbona committed
grave offenses which rendered him unfit to continue as a member of the Judiciary. When he
was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate of
candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial
post, Judge Limbona violated the law and the rule on partisan politics.
The NBI investigation on the authenticity of Judge Limbona’s signatures on the certificate of
candidacy unqualifiedly established that the judge signed the certificate of candidacy for the
May 1998 elections, thus negating his claim that his signatures were forged. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers himself to
the electorate for an elective post.
For his continued performance of his judicial duties despite his candidacy for a political post,
Judge Limbona is guilty of grave misconduct in office. While the court cannot interfere with
Judge Limbona’s political aspirations, the court cannot allow him to pursue his political goals
while still on the bench.
Hence, there Judge Limbona is no longer fit to continue as member of Judiciary for engaging in
partisan politics.
Lokin vs. COMELEC G.R. Nos. 179431-32, June 22, 2010
FACTS: The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), a duly registered party-list organization,
manifested their intent to participate in the May 14, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
They submitted a list of five nominees from which its representatives would be chosen should CIBAC
obtain the number of qualifying votes. However, prior to the elections, the list of nominees was
amended: the nominations of the petitioner Lokin, Sherwin Tugna and Emil Galang were withdrawn;
Armi Jane Borje was substituted; and Emmanuel Joel Villanueva and Chinchona Cruz-Gonzales were
retained.
Election results showed that CIBAC was entitled to a second seat and that Lokin, as second nominee on
the original list, to a proclamation, which was opposed by Villanueva and Cruz-Gonzales.
The COMELEC resolved the matter on the validity of the amendment of the list of nominees and the
withdrawal of the nominations of Lokin, Tugna and Galang. It approved the amendment of the list of
nominees with the new order as follows:
1. Emmanuel Joel Villanueva
2. Cinchona Cruz-Gonzales
3. Armi Jane Borje
The COMELEC en banc proclaimed Cruz-Gonzales as the official second nominee of CIBAC. Cruz-Gonzales
took her oath of office as a Party-List Representative of CIBAC.
Lokin filed a petition for mandamus to compel respondent COMELEC to proclaim him as the official
second nominee of CIBAC. Likewise, he filed another petition for certiorari assailing Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 alleging that it expanded Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 by allowing CIBAC to change its
nominees.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the controversy;
2. Whether or not Lokin is guilty of forum shopping;
3. Whether or not Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 is unconstitutional and violates the Party-List
System Act; and
4. Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in approving the withdrawal of the nominees of CIBAC and allowing the amendment of the
list of nominees of CIBAC without any basis in fact or law and after the close of polls.
RULING: The Court ruled that it had jurisdiction over the case. Lokin’s case is not an election protest nor
an action for quo warranto. Election protest is a contest between the defeated and the winning
candidates, based on the grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who obtained the
higher number of votes entitling them to hold the office. On the other hand, a special civil action for quo
warranto questions the ineligibility of the winning candidate. This is a special civil action for certiorari
against the COMELEC to seek the review of the resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7
of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioner is not guilty of forum shopping because the filing of the action for certiorari and the action for
mandamus are based on different causes of action and the reliefs they sought were different. Forum
shopping consists of the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively to obtain a favorable judgment.
The Court held that Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was invalid. The COMELEC issued Resolution No.
7804 as an implementing rules and regulations in accordance with the provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code and the Party-List System Act. As an administrative agency, it cannot amend an act of
Congress nor issue IRRs that may enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the law it administers and
enforces. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 provides that: Each registered party, organization or coalition shall
submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less
than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required
number of votes.
A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing
may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate of any elective office or a person who
has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or
alteration of the order of nominees shal be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes
incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the list.
Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list
system shall not be considered resigned.
The above provision is clear and unambiguous and expresses a single and definite meaning, there is no
room for interpretation or construction but only for application. Section 8 clearly prohibits the change of
nominees and alteration of the order in the list of nominees’ names after submission of the list to the
COMELEC. It enumerates only three instances in which an organization can substitute another person in
place of the nominee whose name has been submitted to the COMELEC : (1) when the nominee fies; (2)
when the nominee withdraws in writing his nomination; and (3) when the nominee becomes
incapacitated. When the statute enumerates the exception to the application of the general rule, the
exceptions are strictly but reasonably construed.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 expanded the exceptions under Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 when it
provided four instances by adding “nomination is withdrawn by the party” as statutory ground for
substituting a nominee. COMELEC had no authority to expand, extend, or add anything to law it seeks to
implement. An IRR should remain consistent with the law it intends to carry out not override, supplant
or modify it. An IRR adopted pursuant to the law is itself law but in case of conflict between the law and
the IRR, the law prevails.
The petitions for certiorari and mandamus were granted. Section 13 of Resolution No. 7804 was
declared invalid and of no effect to the extent that it authorizes a party-list organization to withdraw its
nomination of a nominee once it has submitted the nomination to the COMELEC.
CASE DIGEST: ABAYON VS. HRET (G.R. NO. 189466; FEBRUARY 11, 2010)
CASE DIGEST: DARYL GRACE J. ABAYON,Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, PERFECTO C. LUCABAN, JR., RONYL S. DE LA CRUZ and AGUSTIN C. DOROGA, Respondents. G.R. No. 189466;
February 11, 2010.
FACTS: Petitioner Daryl Grace J. Abayon is the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo party-list organization that won a seat in
the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.
Respondents Perfecto C. Lucaban, Jr., Ronyl S. Dela Cruz, and Agustin C. Doroga, all registered voters, filed a petition for
quo warranto with respondent HRET against Aangat Tayo and its nominee, petitioner Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo
was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors.
Petitioner Abayon countered that the COMELEC had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-
sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, woelecmen, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she
belonged to the women sector.
Finally, petitioner Abayon pointed out that respondent HRET had no jurisdiction over the petition for quo warranto since
respondent Lucaban and the others with him collaterally attacked the registration of Aangat Tayo as a party-list
organization, a matter that fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.
On July 16, 2009 respondent HRET issued an order, dismissing the petition as against Aangat Tayo but upholding its
jurisdiction over the qualifications of petitioner Abayon. The latter moved for reconsideration but the HRET denied the
same on prompting Abayon to file the present petition for special civil action of certiorari.
In G.R. 189506, petitioner Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. is the first nominee of the Bantay party-list group that won a seat in the
2007 elections for the members of the House of Representatives. Respondents Reynaldo Lesaca, Jr., Cristina Palabay,
Renato M. Reyes, Jr., Erlinda Cadapan, Antonio Flores, and Joselito Ustarez are members of some other party-list groups.
Shortly after the elections, respondent Lesaca and the others with him filed with respondent HRET a petition for quo
warranto against Bantay and its nominee, petitioner Palparan, alleging that Palparan was ineligible to sit in the House of
Representatives as party-list nominee because he did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that
Bantay represented, namely, the victims of communist rebels, Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUs),
former rebels, and security guards. Lesaca and the others said that Palparan committed gross human rights violations
against marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations.
Petitioner Palparan countered that the HRET had no jurisdiction over his person since it was actually the party-list
Bantay, not he, that was elected to and assumed membership in the House of Representatives. Palparan claimed that he
was just Bantays nominee. Consequently, any question involving his eligibility as first nominee was an internal concern of
Bantay. Such question must be brought, he said, before that party-list group, not before the HRET.
Respondent HRET issued an order dismissing the petition against Bantay for the reason that the issue of the ineligibility
or qualification of the party-list group fell within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to the Party-List System Act.
ISSUE: Does respondent HRET have jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan as
nominees of Aangat Tayo and Bantay party-list organizations, respectively, who took the seats at the House of
Representatives that such organizations won in the 2007 elections?
HELD: HRET has jurisdiction. As this Court also held in Bantay Republic Act or BA-RA 7941 v. Commission on Elections, a
party-list representative is in every sense "an elected member of the House of Representatives." Although the vote cast
in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate
cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives.
Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list
nominees.
In the cases before the Court, those who challenged the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan claim that the
two do not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors that they ought to represent. The Party-List System
Act provides that a nominee must be a "bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent."
It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a
bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize
petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayo and Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and
underrepresented interests that they presumably embody.
Parenthetically, although the Party-List System Act does not so state, the COMELEC seems to believe, when it resolved
the challenge to petitioner Abayon, that it has the power to do so as an incident of its authority to approve the
registration of party-list organizations. But the Court need not resolve this question since it is not raised here and has not
been argued by the parties.
What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as
pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district
representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of
district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee
has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over
election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
Hence, respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against
Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of
petitioners Abayon and Palparan.
LIMKAICHONG VS COMELEC
Posted by kaye lee on 11:32 PM
G.R. No. 178831-32, 30 July 2009 [Citizenship; Naturalization; C.A. No. 473]
FACTS:
Two petitions were consolidated on the issue about the qualifications of Jocelyn Limkaichong to run
for, be elected to, and assume and discharge the position as Representative of the 1st District of
Negros Oriental. The contention of the parties who sought her disqualification is that she is not a
natural-born citizen, hence, she lacks the citizenship requirement in Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In the election that ensued, she was voted for by the constituents of Negros Oriental
and garnered the highest votes. She was eventually proclaimed as the winner and has since
performed her duties and responsibilities as Member of the House of Representatives.
The proponents against Limkaichong's qualification stated that she is not a natural-born citizen
because her parents were Chinese citizens at the time of her birth. They went on to claim that the
proceedings for the naturalization of Julio Ong Sy, her father, never attained finality due to
procedural and substantial defects.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not the citizenship of Limkaichong's parents may be questioned in an election case.
2) Whether or not the HRET should assume jurisdiction over the disqualification case.
3) Whether or not the 10-day prescriptive period under 1998 HRET Rules apply to disqualification
based on citizenship.
RULINGS:
1) No. The proper proceeding in cancelling the naturalization certificate of one person should be in
accordance with Section 18 of CA No. 473. Clearly under the law and jurisprudence, it is the State,
through the Solicitor General or the representative designated by statute, that may question in the
appropriate denaturalization proceeding.
2) Yes. Limkaichong was proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers, she had taken her oath
of office, and she was allowed to officially assume office on July 23, 2007. Accordingly, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, and no longer the COMELEC, should now assume the jurisdiction
over the disqualification case. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and in Section 2509 of
the OEC underscore the exclusivity of the Electoral Tribunal's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to its members.
3) No. The ten-day prescriptive period under the 1998 HRET Rules does not apply to disqualification
based on citizenship, because qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the
officer's entire tenure.
CASE DIGEST: ABUNDO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201716: JANUARY 08, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R.
VEGA,Respondents.
FACTS:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the position of municipal mayor. In both
the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for
his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or
for a period of a little over one year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where
Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy for the
mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the formers disqualification to run.
The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for
the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms.
HELD: The petition is partly meritorious.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Involuntary Interruption of Service
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundos three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004- 2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to,
and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was
eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected official the right to
serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the
mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been substantially reduced by the actual
service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term
of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 term.
Prior to the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position. During the pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising
power or authority. Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be
considered as a rest period or break in his service because prior to the judgment in the election protest,
it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then valid
proclamation.
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326

December 18, 1965
Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836
insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The
provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of
salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article
VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class legislation” because
it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives
them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable
in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are give n a gratuity
which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot
exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate
received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to
further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension benefits
under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not constitute
“forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine
Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely “in the nature of a basis for computing
the gratuity due each retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their
salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which reads
as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by
law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per
diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and from
their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: “No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to
approval of such increase.” In other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the
power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no increase would take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to
the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation “other emoluments”. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term
“other emoluments.”
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received
as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a

part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of
the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22,
1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such
increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.
Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
Freedom of Speech & Debate
Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its Committee on National
Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said
letter alleged that there have been allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP
officers, with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup d’état to place him as the
president. The “planners” allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under their guise and that Jimenez et al
may or may not be aware that they are being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been
published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbang’s statement is libelous. Cabangbang petitioned for the case
to be dismissed because he said that as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the
privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to members of Congress.
Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides “The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech
or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.” The publication of the said letter is not covered
by said expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions,
such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session as
well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties
as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such at the
time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and at
the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said communication
is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez’ action for damages. Although the
letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as “planners”, and that,
having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that “it is of course
possible” that plaintiffs “are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge”. In other
words, the very document upon which plaintiffs’ action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting tools of the planners. The SC
does not think that this statement is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages,
considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest that the
group therein described as “planners” include these two (2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
Osmeña v. Pendatun (G.R. No. L-17144)
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making serious
imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was issued authorizing
the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made against the President, to
summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do so, to require petitioner to show
cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it infringes
his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House. Meanwhile, the Special
Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to defend himself, found the latter
guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and petitioner was suspended from office for
15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the petition, and
defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for speeches
Ruling: NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators or
Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was taken or is
a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the provision has always
been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for their words uttered in
Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Observe that “they shall
not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is indispensably
necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected from the resentment
of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.” It guarantees the
legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions
before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter
disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct for
which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly
behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the matter
depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be depicted in black
and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No. 7399)
August 25, 2009 | A.C. No. 7399
Antero J. Pobre, complainant
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, respondent
FACTS:
In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered the following
remarks:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased,
degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no
longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a
different environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x
Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring that only sitting
members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy of the CJ post. Consequently,
nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court, including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically
disqualified.
Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending that the lady senator's
utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban and a direct contempt of Court.
Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-
Santiago.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to disciplinary action by
the Court for her questioned speech.
HELD:
No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded parliamentary immunity
from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x
x shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof." Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed
say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded as an implied
admission.
Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for indulging in "insulting
rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her questioned speech was a prelude to crafting
remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her
utterances had managed to stir.
Still, the Court held that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the parliament or its equivalent
would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However, it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune
from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for
the public good."
Adaza vs Pacana (G.R. NO. L-68159)
Posted: July 25, 2011 in Case Digests
Singularity of Office/Position
FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the January 30, 1980
elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3,
1980. Pacana was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their
respective terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate
of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the
ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took
his oath of office as Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental
before President Marcos, and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be
the lawful occupant of the governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana
therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the
governor of the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law, and that within the
context of the parliamentary system, as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official
can hold the position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of
Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a governor of the province
simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original
position and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall not hold any other
office or employment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or
member of the cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot invoke common law
practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding
of more than one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to
assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs
afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section
13[2] of which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or
barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence
from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the
Local Government Code.
Liban v. Gordon
G.R. No. 175352, 15 July 2009
FACTS:
Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with this Court a
Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the Senate. Petitioners are
officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter while respondent is
Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines, he was elected
Chairman of the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in the Constitution.
Petitioner filed this instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlled
corporation.
RULING:
The PNRC is not government-owned but privately owned. The vast majority of the thousands of
PNRC members are private individuals, including students. Under the PNRC Charter, those who
contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC are entitled to membership in the PNRC for one
year. PNRC is, thus, a privately owned, privately funded, and privately run charitable organization.
The office of the PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a government-owned or
controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987 Constitution. However, since the
PNRC Charter is void insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation, the PNRC should
incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the Securities and Exchange Commission
if it wants to be a private corporation.
GARCIA v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 198554
July 30, 2012
677 SCRA 750
FACTS: Garcia, tried by the Special General Court Martial NR 2, was charged with and convicted of
violation of the 96th Article of War (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman) and violation of the
97th Article of War (Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline) for failing to disclose all
his assets in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net worth for the year 2003 as required by
RA 3019, as amended in relation to RA 6713.
Garcia, among others, argued that the confirmation issued by the OP directing his two-year detention in a
penitentiary had already been fully served following his preventive confinement subject to Article 29 of
the RPC (Revised Penal Code). He was released on December 16, 2010 after a preventive confinement for
six years and two months. He was initially confined at his quarters at Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
before he was transferred to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP)
Detention Center, and latter to the Camp Crame Custodial Detention Center.
Hence, on September 16, 2011, or a week after the OP confirmed the sentence of the court martial against
him, Garcia was arrested and detained and continues to be detained, for 2 years, at the maximum security
compound of the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa. The OP stated that Art 29 of the RPC is not
applicable in Military Courts for it is separate and distinct from ordinary courts.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Article 29 of the RPC is applicable in Military Courts; and (2) Whether or not
the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause of the 1987 Constitution
RULING: (1) The Court ruled that applying the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
(Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from time of imprisonment), the time within which the
petitioner was under preventive confinement should be credited to the sentence confirmed by the Office
of the President, subject to the conditions set forth by the same law.
The Court held that “the General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as
a criminal court.” As such, certain provisions of the RPC, insofar as those that are not provided in the
Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be supplementary. “[A]bsent any provision as to
the application of a criminal concept in the implementation and execution of the General Court Martial’s
decision, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied. In fact, the
deduction of petitioner’s (Garcia) period of confinement to his sentence has been recommended in the
Staff Judge Advocate Review.”
(2) The Court further held that the application of Article 29 of the RPC in the Articles of War is in
accordance with the Equal Protection Clause of the 1987 Constitution. “The concept of equal justice under
the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals
solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal
Case Digest: Puyat vs. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982)
6/21/2020
0 COMMENTS
FACTS: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held,
one group, the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning
the election. Justice Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered
his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on
Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman could “appear as counsel before any administrative body,”
and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his appearance for
respondent Acero. Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero. Following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez’ purchase, he filed a motion
for intervention in the SEC case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Fernandez’ ownership of the said 10
shares.
ISSUE: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case
without violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution
DECISION: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No. 1747 falls within the ambit of the
prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
RATIO DECIDENDI: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot
be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is
joining the cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of
his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient
circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case. He had
acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them “after the fact” that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo
warranto suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before
the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Acero, but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity
of the objection, he decided, instead, to intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. The Court is constrained to find that there has been an indirect appearance as counsel before
an administrative body, it is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art.
VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the
proceedings in some other capacity.
Case Digest: Avelino vs Cuenco

6/20/2020
0 COMMENTS

FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court
to declare him the rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a
session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate
President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from
delivering his speech. The SP with his supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn
the session then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of the senate
left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed as the Acting President of the
Senate and was recognized the next day by the President of the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
RATIO DECIDENDI: It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In fine,
all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately
after this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side
with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President
of the Senate, that office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the
majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more
senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about
quorum and for the benefit of all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the
resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow
of a doubt.
Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenco, et al., G.R. No. L-10520, February 28, 1957
10JAN
En Banc
[CONCEPCION, J.]
FACTS: Petitioners pray that a writ of preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents
Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
restraining them from continuing to usurp, intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively
being occupied by them in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him
from paying the salaries of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes,
pending this action. Petitioners likewise prayed that judgment be rendered ousting respondents from the
aforementioned public offices in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and
making the preliminary injunction permanent.
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality,
and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege,
by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct
or control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal
ISSUE: Was the dispute regarding the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal in the nature of a political question that will divest the Court of jurisdiction?
HELD: NO.
[T]he term “political question” connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to “those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide
whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes
in the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen “upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of
votes” in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with “full
discretionary authority” in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power
thereon is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the
legitimate prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
“.. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may
determine whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such
statute has been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights ..” (16 C.J.S., 439).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein.
Abbas vs. SET
Facts:
In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with respondent SET an election contest against 22
senators-elect of the LABAN coalition. All members of the legislative component of the SET at the time
happened to be included in the senators assailed. Later, petitioners filed with SET a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of all senators-members thereof for the reason they are all interested
parties (being respondents therein). SET denied the motion hence this petition. Contending that SET
committed a grave abuse of discretion, petitioners argue that considerations of public policy and the
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass disqualification sought, and propose to
amend the Tribunal’s rules as to permit the contest being decided by only three Members of the
Tribunal.
Issue:
Should the Senators-members be disqualified?
Held:
No. The SET must continue taking cognizance of the case with its current Senators-members. Here is a
situation which precludes the substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues without inviting the same objections to the substitute’s competence. However, the
amendment proposed would, in the context of the situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the
only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain whose disqualification is not sought. It is
unmistakable that the “legislative component” [of the SET] cannot be totally excluded from participation
in the resolution of senatorial election contest without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
Constitution. Thus, the proposed mass disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered, would
leave the Electoral Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or body can
perform. This, to the Court’s mind, is the overriding consideration—that the Tribunal be not prevented
from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the
highest public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its denial of the petition
for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must therefore fail
Robles vs. HRET
Facts:
Robles (protestee) and Santos (protestant), were candidates for the position
of Congressman of the 1st district of Caloocan City. Robles was proclaimed
winner. Santos filed an election protest and prayed for recounting of genuine
ballots. Respondent HRET ordered in favor of Santos and commenced
revision of ballots. Later, Santos filed a Motion to Withdraw Protest which
HRET has not acted upon when he filed again a motion to recall and
disregard it. Robles opposed it; however, HRET granted Santos’ motion to
disregard withdrawal and resolved to continue with revision of the ballots.
Robles instituted this present petition for certiorari praying to restrain HRET.
He contends that HRET lost its jurisdiction over the case when Protestant filed
his Motion to Withdraw Protest, hence HRET acted without jurisdiction when it
ordered resumption of revision of ballots.
Issue:
Does HRET retain the jurisdiction to grant or deny Santos’ Motion to

Disregard Withdrawal Protest after Santos already filed a Motion to Withdraw
Protest beforehand?
Held:
Yes. The mere filing of the Motion to Withdraw Protest on the remaining
uncontested precincts, without any action on the part of HRET did not divest
the latter of jurisdiction xxx if only to insure that the Tribunal retains sufficient
authority to see to it that the will of the electorate is ascertained. Jurisdiction,
once acquired, is not lost upon instance of the parties, and continues until the
case is terminated. To hold otherwise would permit a party to deprive the
Tribunal of jurisdiction already acquired. Where the Court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter, its orders upon all questions pertaining to the cause are
orders within its jurisdiction however erroneous they may be; they cannot be
corrected by certiorari. This rule more appropriately applies to HRET whose
independence as a constitutional body [found in Art VI, sec 17] has time and
again been upheld in many cases.
Bondoc vs. Pineda

Facts:
In the 1987 elections, respondent Pineda of Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

(LDP) was proclaimed winner over rival petitioner Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) for the position of Representative for the 4th District of Pampanga.
Bondoc filed a protest with HRET and was proclaimed winner over Pineda
after revision, reexamination and reappreciation of the ballots. Among the
members of the HRET who voted for proclamation of Bondoc was Rep.
Camasura of the LDP. Declaring Camasura to have committed a complete
betrayal of loyalty to LDP, he was expelled from the party and, upon the
request of LDP, his election to the HRET was rescinded. The promulgation of
Bondoc as winner was then cancelled due to the consequent lack of the
required concurrence of five members of the Tribunal. Hence this petition.
Issue:
May the House of Representatives, at the request of a political party, change

that party’s representation in the HRET?
Held:
No. The Electoral Tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court. To

be able to exercise its exclusive jurisdiction, the tribunal must be independent.
Its jurisdiction xxx is not to be shared by it with the Legislature nor with the
Courts. They must discharge their functions with complete xxx independence
—even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence
“disloyalty to party” and “breach of party discipline” are no valid grounds for
the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Rep. Camasura for
having cast a “conscience vote”, the House of Reps committed a grave abuse
of discretion violative of the Constitution and thus the expulsion is null and
void. To sanction such interference by the House of Reps in the work of the
HRET, would reduce the it to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party
in power
DAZA VS SINGSON
Posted by kaye lee on 12:35 PM
G.R. No. 86344 December 21 1989
FACTS:
The HoR proportionally apportioned its 12 seats in the CoA among several political parties represented in that
chamber in accordance with Art. VI Sec 18. The Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the HoR. 24 members of the Liberal Party joined the LDP, reducing their former party to
only 17 members.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the CoA by withdrawing
the seat occupied by Daza and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On December 5th, the chamber elected a new
set of representatives consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein Luis C. Singson
as the additional member from the LDP.
Daza came to the Supreme Court to challenge his removal from the CoA and the assumption of his seat by the
Singson. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, SC issued a TRO
that same day to prevent both Daza and Singson from serving in the CoA.
Daza contented that he cannot be removed from the CoA because his election thereto is permanent. He claimed that
the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment
because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the question raised by the Daza is political in nature and is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court.
RULING:
No. The Court has the competence to act on the matter at bar. The issue involved is not a discretionary act of the
House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is
the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments.
The term political question refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
Even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Balacuit vs Court of First Instance GR L-38429 30 June 1988
Posted by Rachel Chan in Case Digests, Constitutional Law II

≈ Leave a comment
Facts: The Municipal Board of City of Butuan passed Oridinance No 640 on 21 April 1969,
“penalizing any person , group of persons , entity or engeged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie… to require children between 7-12 years of age to pay full
payment for ticket should only be charged one half.” Petitioners Carlos Balacuit , et al as
managers of theaters assailed the validity and constitutionality of the said ordinance. The court
adjudged in favour of the respondents hence the petition for review. Petitioners contend that
it violates due process clause of the Constitution for being oppressive , unfair , unjust,
confiscatory and an undue restraint of trade.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 640 – prohibiting selling of theatre admission tickets to

children 7-12 y/o at full price is constitutional or not?
Decision: Decision reversed. Ordinance 640 declared unconstitutional. For the assailed

ordinance be held constitutional it must pass the test of police power. To invoke the exercise
the police power, it must be for the interest of the public without interfering with private rights
and adoptive means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and
not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that such regulation must be
within the bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its
provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary interference with the business or
calling subject of regulation. The right of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself and, as such, within the protection of
the due process clause. Hence, the proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their
property in their own way, to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own
advantage, and that any person who did not approve could stay away.
Philippine Long Distance Telephone Co. vs National Telecommunications Commission

190 SCRA 717 [GR No. 88404 October 18, 1990]
Facts: On June 22, 1958, Republic Act No. 2090, was enacted otherwise known as “An Act Granting Felix Alberto
and Company, Incorporated, a franchise to establish radio stations for domestic and transoceanic
telecommunications.” Felix Alberto & Co. Inc. was the original corporate name, which was changed to ETCI with
amendment of the articles of incorporation in 1964. Much later, “CELLCOM Inc.” was the name sought to be
adopted before the Securities and Exchange Commission, but this was withdrawn and abandoned.. On May 13,
1987, alleging urgent public need, ETCI filed an application with public respondent NTC for the issuance of a
certificate of public convenience and necessity to construct, install, establish, operate, and maintain a cellular mobile
telephone system and an alpha numeric paging system in Metro Manila and in the Southern Luzon regions, with
prayer for provisional authority to operate phase A of its proposal within Metro Manila. PLDT filed an opposition
with motion to dismiss, however NTC over ruled it. NTC granted ETC provisional authority to install, operate, and
maintain a cellular mobile telephone system initially in Metro Manila subject to terms and conditions, one of which
is that ETCI and PLDT shall enter into an interconnection agreement for the provision of adequate interconnection
facilities between applicant’s cellular mobile telephone switch and the public switched telephone network and shall
jointly submit such interconnection agreement to the commission for approval ETCI admits that in 1964, the
Albertos, as original owners of more than 40% of the outstanding capital stock sold their holdings to Orbes. In 1968,
the Albertos reacquired the shares they had sold to the Orbes. In 1987, the Albertos sold more than 40% of their
shares to Horacio Yalung. Thereafter, the present stockholders acquired their ETCI shares. Moreover, in 1964, ETCI
had increased its capital stock from Php40,000 to Php360,000; and in 1987, from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000.
Issue: Whether or not the transfers in 1987 of the shares of stock to the new stockholders amount to a transfer of
ETCI’s franchise which needs congressional approval pursuant to RA 2090.
Held: No. Section 10 of RA 2090 is directed to the grantee of the franchise, which is the corporation itself and refers
to a sale, lease or assignment of that franchise. It does not include the transfer or sale of shares of stock of a
corporation by the latter’s stockholders.
The sale of shares of stock of a public utility is governed by another law, in section 20 (h) of the Public Service Act
(CA 146). Pursuant thereto, the public service commission (now NTC) is the government agency vested with the
authority to approve the transfer of more than 40% of the subscribed capital stock of a telecommunications company
to a single transferee.
In other words, transfer of shares of a public utility corporation need only NTC approval, not congressional
authorization. What transpired in ETCI were a series of transfers of shares starting in 1964 until 1987. The approval
of the NTC may be deemed to have been met when it authorized the issuance of the provisional authority to ETCI.
There was full disclosure before the NTC of the transfers. In fact, the NTC order of November 12,1987 required
ETCI to submit its present capital and ownership structure. Further, ETCI even filed a motion before the NTC, dated
November 8, 1987 or more than a year prior to the grant of provisional authority, seeking approval of the increase in
its capital stock from Php360,000 to Php40,000,000 and the stock transfers made by its stockholders.
A distinction should be made between shares of stock, which are owned by stockholders, the sale of which requires
only NTC approval, and the franchise itself which is owned by the corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale or
transfer of which requires congressional sanction. Since stockholders own the shares of stock, they may dispose of
the same as they see fit. They may not, however, transfer or assign the property of a corporation, like its franchise.
In other words, even if the original stockholders had transferred their shares to another group of shareholders, the
franchise granted to the corporation subsists as long as the corporation as an entity, continues to exist. The franchise
is not thereby invalidated by the transfer of shares. A corporation has a personality separate and distinct from that of
each stockholder. It has the right to continuity or perpetual succession.
Velasco vs Villegas
G.R. No. L-24153 February 14, 1983
Facts: In their own behalf and in representation of the other owners of
barbershops in the City of Manila, petitioners challenge the constitutionality
based on Ordinance No. 4964 of the City of Manila, which prohibited the
business of massaging customers of a barber shop. They contend that it
amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due
process of law.
Issue: Whether said ordinance was unconstitutional, and therefore an

improper exercise of police power
Held: No. The attack against the validity cannot succeed. As pointed out in the
brief of respondents-appellees, it is a police power measure. The objectives
behind its enactment are: “(1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee
for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance No. 3659 as
amended by Ordinance 4767, an entirely different measure than the
ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and, (2) in order to forestall
possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers.”
The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based on the
general welfare clause. As far back as U.S. v. Salaveria, 4 a 1918 decision,
this Court through Justice Malcolm made clear the significance and scope of
such a clause, which “delegates in statutory form the police power to a
municipality. As above stated, this clause has been given wide application by
municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of
the case been liberally construed by the courts. Such, it is well to really is the
progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence.”
BRUNO S. CABRERA vs HON. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution No. 158:
•RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of this
province to traffic effective October 31, 1969, and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the
new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to
the respective remaining portion of their properties
•In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was planted to vegetables
in 1977 by Eulogia Alejandro.
•the petitioner filed on December 29, 1978, a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes,
He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in
its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No.
158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid,
•Trial Court- declared road not public but only mere passageway
•Court of Appeals- declared land as a public road
CA of appleas said: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the
approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised
Administrative Code
•Petition to Supreme Court, argument of Cabrera:

the petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because Resolution No. 158 is not an order for the
closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. Control
over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board.
•The petitioner alleges that the closure of the road has especially injured him and his family as they can
no longer use it in going to the national road leading to the old capitol building but must instead pass
through a small passageway. For such inconvenience, he is entitled to damages in accordance with law.
The lower court found the petitioner's allegation of injury and prejudice to be without basis because he
had "easy access anyway to the national road, for in fact the vehicles used by the Court and the parties
during the ocular inspection easily passed and used it, reaching beyond plaintiff's house." However, the
Court of Appeals ruled that the he "was prejudiced by the closure of the road which formerly fronted his
house. He and his family were undoubtedly inconvenienced by the loss of access to their place of
residence for which we believe they should be compensated."
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages?
ruling:
No
“The Constitution does not undertake to guarantee to a property owner the public maintenance of the
most convenient route to his door. The law will not permit him to be cut off from the public thoroughfares,
but he must content himself with such route for outlet as the regularly constituted public authority may
deem most compatible with the public welfare”
Following the above doctrine, we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to damages because the
injury he has incurred, such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the
entire community.
The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general welfare clause. As the trial
judge acutely observed, whatever inconvenience the petitioner has suffered "pales in significance
compared to the greater convenience the new road
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 1987, is AFFIRMED as
above modified, with costs against the petitioner.
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES - CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PROPERTIES G.R. No. 111097 July 20, 1994
FACTS:
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,
including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines.
PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. It leased a portion of a building belonging to
Pryce Properties Corporations, Inc., renovated & equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino during
the Christmas season.
Then Mayor Magtajas together with the city legislators and civil organizations of the City of Cagayan de Oro
denounced such project.
In reaction to this project, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City enacted two (2) ordinances
prohibiting the issuance of a business permit and canceling existing business permit to establishment for the
operation of casino (ORDINANCE NO. 3353) and an ordinance prohibiting the operation of casino and providing
penalty for its violation. (ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93).
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals, where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner.
Court of Appeals declared the ordinances invalid and issued the writ prayed for to prohibit their enforcement. 1
Reconsideration of this decision was denied against petitioners.
Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
WON Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are a valid exercise of police power.
HELD:
NO. The ordinances enacted are invalid. Ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are
merely agents of the National Government. Local Councils exercise only delegated powers conferred by Congress.
The delegate cannot be superior to the principal powers higher than those of the latter. PD 1869 authorized casino
gambling. As a statute, it cannot be amended/nullified by a mere ordinance.
As to petitioners attack on gambling as harmful and immoral, the Court stressed that the morality of gambling is
not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter,
even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own
discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting, and horse-racing. In making such choices,
Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it
been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicability of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the legislative and executive departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches decide,
they are answerable only to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
16AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local
government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled
“An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish,
Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other
Purposes.”
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled
“Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate
Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of
Gambling”, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.
In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through
Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments.
ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has
been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still
exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC’s franchise by reason of the
unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court’s First Division in
said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only
the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC’s possession of a valid
franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its
officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS ) et al. vs.

HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 156052 March 7, 2007
Facts
Ordinance No. 8027 enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Manila reclassified the area from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed to cease and
desist from operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance.
Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called “Pandacan Terminals” of the oil companies
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.
However, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies in which they agreed that “the scaling down of the
Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option.” In the MOU, the oil companies were
required to remove 28 tanks starting with the LPG spheres and to commence work for the creation of
safety buffer and green zones surrounding the Pandacan Terminals. In exchange, the City Mayor and the
DOE will enable the oil companies to continuously operate within the limited area resulting from joint
operations and the scale down program. The Sangguniang Panlungosod ratified the MOU in Resolution
No. 97.
Petitioners pray for a mandamus to be issued against Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and
order the immediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Issue
Whether or not Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid.
HELD
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners. In the present case, Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the
purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general welfare of the
residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect its residents from
catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan depots. Further, the zoning
ordinance which reclassified the area is reasonable and not arbitrary enactment to the oil companies
because they were not prevented nor prohibited from doing business in the city other than the now
reclassified location of the depot where such operations are no longer permitted. The power to establish
zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is derived from the police power itself and is
exercised for the protection and benefit of the residents.
Averring that they shall not be compensated, the Court ruled that property condemned under the
exercise of police power is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and
safety from danger is not a taking.
RULING
Petition is granted.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION

322 SCRA 160
FACTS:
The Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs a request from the United States for the extradition of Mark
Jimenez to the United States pursuant to PD No. 1609 prescribing the
procedure for extradition of persons who have committed a crime in a
foreign country. Jimenez requested for copies of the request and that he
be given ample time to comment on the said request. The petitioners
denied the request pursuant to the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not treaty stipulations must take precedence over an
individual’s due process rights
HELD:
The human rights of person and the rights of the accused guaranteed in
the Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a
contracting party, the doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with a situation where there is a
conflict between a rule of the international law and the constitution.
Efforts must first be made in order to harmonize the provisions so as to
give effect to both but if the conflict is irreconcilable, the municipal law
must be upheld. The fact that international law has been made part of the
law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over municipal law in the municipal sphere. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution.

21, Republic of the Philippines vs.
21, 2003FACTS:Immediately
upon her assumption to office
following the EDSA Revolution,
President CorazonC. Aquino
issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO
No. 1) creating the Presidential
Commission on GoodGovernment
(PCGG) to recover all ill-gotten
wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos. Accordingly,
the PCGG, through its Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP
Anti-GraftBoard (AFP Board)
tasked to investigate reports of
unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices by AFPpersonnel,
whether in the active service or
retired. Investigations include the
alleged unexplained wealthof
respondent Major General
Philippine Army.Evidences
showed that respondent is the
owner of a house and lot in
Quezon City as well in CebuCity.
Moreover, equipment and
ElizabethDimaano. Aside from
the military equipment, the
raiding team also confiscated
P2,870,000.00 and$50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Affidavits of members
of the Military SecurityUnit
disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano
is the mistress of respondent
Ramas. Dimaano had no
visiblemeans of income and is
supported by respondent for she
was formerly a mere
secretary.With these, a prima facie
case exists against respondent
Ramas for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth.The PCGG
filed a petition for forfeiture
under Republic Act No. 1379,
known as The Act for
theForfeiture of Unlawfully
Acquired Property (RA No. 1379),
against Ramas and impleaded
Dimaano asco-defendant, in favor
of the State.However, the
Sandiganbayan subsequently
dismissed the complaint because
there was an illegalsearch and
seizure of the items
confiscated. The first
AmendedComplaint and ordered
the return of the confiscated items
to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano,
while thesecond Resolution denied
Reconsideration.Hence, this appeal
to SC. Petitioner claims that the
the propertiesconfiscated from
Dimaanos house as illegally seized
and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. Issue:Whether or not the
search of Dimaano’s home was
legal.Held: NO. It is true that the
Bill of Rights under the 1973
during aninterregnum (any period
during which a state has no ruler or
only a temporary executive).
However, theprotection accorded
to individuals in International
Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (Covenant) andthe
Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (Declaration) remained in
effect during the interregnum.
officerswere valid so long as these
officers did not exceed the
authority granted on them. The
raiding team seizedthe items
detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not
included in the search
warrant.Dimaano was also not
present during the raid (only
Dimaano's cousins witnessed the
raid).Under Article 17(1) of the
that no oneshall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference
with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence.The Declaration
provides in its Article 17(2) that no
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
his property. Thus, the
revolutionary government is
obligated under international
law to observe the rights
ofindividuals under the
DeclarationRepublic of the
Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan,
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
and Elizabeth Dimaano, G.R. No.
104768. July 21,
2003FACTS:Immediately upon
her assumption to office following
the EDSA Revolution, President
CorazonC. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1)
creating the Presidential
P2,870,000.00 and$50,000 US
was formerly a mere
DeclarationRepublic of the
Philippines vs. Sandiganbayan,
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
and Elizabeth Dimaano, G.R. No.
104768. July 21,
2003FACTS:Immediately upon
her assumption to office following
the EDSA Revolution, President
CorazonC. Aquino issued
Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1)
creating the Presidential
P2,870,000.00 and$50,000 US
was formerly a mere
Declaration
21

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Philippine Bar Association vs Commission on Elections

GR. No. 72915 Dec. 20 1985, 140 SCRA 453

Article VII (Executive Department)

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution. No

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable

During the petitioner’s departure for work, he was constrained to accept a

Respondents also appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) to

Petitioner raised these main grounds to the Supreme Court:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – x x x In case of termination of overseas employment

2. YES. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional

1. Florentino Pilapil insured himself and indicated his child to be his sole beneficiary. He likewise

587 SCRA 79 (2009)

In the evening of 10 Aug 2004, petitioner Eliseo Soriano as host of the

Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling. Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka

Petitioner sought for reconsideration praying that respondent Chairperson

On 27 Sept 2004, the MTRCB issued a decision imposing 3 months

Preventive suspension is not a penalty by itself, being merely a preliminary step

Moreover, the assailed Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) issued by

The Court further held that:

FACTS: The issue started when the Secretary of the Philippine Senate,

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is

CHINA NATIONAL MACHINERY & EQUIPMENT CORP. (GROUP), Petitioner,

ISSUE: Could ATO be sued without the State's consent?

1. USA vs GUINTO (GR No. 76607)

2. USA vs RODRIGO (GR No. 79470)

3. USA vs CEBALLOS (GR No. 80018)

4. USA vs VERGARA (GR No. 80258)

Note: Notice to confirm its price is already perfection of contract to bid

VICTORIA AMIGABLE vs. NICOLAS CUENCA G.R. No.

ISSUE: W/N the appellant may properly sue the government.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD

November 28, 1973

Philippine National Bank v. Judge Pabalan, G.R. No. L-33112, 15 June 1978

Note: PNB is only a depository bank in this case

Issue: Whether or not the PNC as a government corporation can be sued.

Republic of the Philippines vs Domingo

Facts of the Case

BUREAU OF PRINTING v. BUREAU OF PRINTING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, GR No.

SHELL PHILIPPINES EXPLORATION B.V. v. EFREN JALOS, GR No. 179918, 2010-09-08

1.Are municipal corporations suable?

Tort- a civil wrong that causes a claimant to suffer loss or harm.

Merritt vs Government of the Philippine

The Facts and the Case

On June 19, 1971 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 6260[1] that

About a year following his proclamation of martial law in the country or on

In 1975 President Marcos enacted P.D. 755[12] which approved the

On July 14, 1976 President Marcos enacted P.D. 961,[16] the Coconut

In 1980, President Marcos issued P.D. 1699,[21] suspending the collections

In November 2000 then President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order

To implement its mandate, E.O. 313 directed the Presidential Commission

On January 26, 2001, however, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

The Issues Presented