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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
even ”and“ in another ”are not concluded from what one is
in the process of demonstrating, but from what we have demonstrated
previously 1 . Because theologians make a lot of
gods of the lowest rank from the highest, and many
[gods] more venerable from the closest [gods]; the
theologies are full of such kinship. So from the third
maintainer proceeds, as limiting, the teletarch who has extremes
moths, while the teletarch who has beginning, middle and end
proceeds from the second [maintainer], as a sum proceeds
of a totality, and the teletarch corresponding to the figure proceeds from the
third 2 [maintainer] itself, or rather both at the same time: because,
as it has ends, it proceeds from the third 3
[maintainer] itself, and, as a medium, it proceeds from
second; and it is absolutely certain that it also proceeds from
same predicates: of the limited insofar as it has ends, and of the
everything, insofar as it is the middle. We will see that another time.
How does [Parmenides] make something only come from
limited and not also unlimited, then only at all and
not also parts? It is firstly because he names
this whole order according to the best term of the opposition, and
it is then because what has ends has been produced from
at all according to the ownership of the parties.
[II.6 * .b 3 . Answer to the third question] 4
Third, in this order, as in the one above,
there are three conclusions 5 . Already, in the top, the number three
appeared in several ways, and especially with the three numbers
that [Parmenides] seems to unite in the unity of the whole; and, in truth,
thanks to these three numbers he brings into existence the three triads,
after having arranged the pure number in the middle, according to otherness 6 . Good
of course, in the case of this [order], let us assume that it brings together the
three conclusions in the triad of Teletarchs, as
1-6. See Additional Notes, p. 151.
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THE INTELI.IGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM xm
II.42. Second series of twelve questions (p. 30.19-32.5) and answers
(p. 32.6-49.7).
1) Why does the number start from the 1st
order
intelligible-intellectual? Because the intelligible world, which precedes
this order is transcendent even to everyone by a
supreme undifferentiation and by its status as an analogue of the "
unique of all ”. It does not number with any of the diacosms that
follow it and the first of which introduces otherness, the cause of
specific distinction of number. According to the Chaldaic Oracles,
the divine series (σειραί) begin there. More usually we
let them proceed from Γ “Beyond doubled” (Zeus, 3 rd
order intellectual). However, why not consider analogically
in the intelligible the summit (a-being), mediety (all and parts), the
termination (unlimited plurality) as a series? However, it is
in the intelligible-intellectual that the Iynges, the Maintainers and the
Teletarchs (especially with the weekly decrease in these
last) more properly constitute series (p. 32.6- 35.26).
2) How does the procession of beings need numbers? There
has no number or procession of distinct properties in
intelligible for the following reasons: - each intelligible order
is all (the 1 st as one, the 2 'as everything, the 3' as a sum); -
these orders do not proceed as three, but are unified to
the extreme; - even if in the 3 e intelligible to draft a
procession of unity in plurality, this order still remains
undivided, because it is rather the cause of division than division; it's here "
source of sources ”, or source of the complete worlds series.
When to the world archic (hypercosmic), azone
(hypercosmic- encosmic), and zone (encosmic), they unfold
from the sources of principalities, that is to say from the
so-called universal sources that are Hecate and Zeus demiurge (2 nd and 3 rd
intellectual orders). Each of these worlds is a divine plurality
divided. Now, "since the series, the divisions and the processions by
species defined as
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XIV
NOTICE
hundred from the top of the intelligible-intellectuals ” l , the
number, which has its procession there, provides the proceeding
discrete character, their specific diversity and their correlations
(p. 36.1-40.17).
3) Why is the procession carried out by division in
intelligible-intellectual? Because: - the division is relative to
union, and composition to distinction; - the division
preserves the specific identity, while the composition
change the species; - the intelligible gives birth to the parts inside
at all, the intelligible-intelligent generates its products
outside of its own nature (p. 40.18-41.14).
4) How is it that the 1st intelligible-intellectual order is h
both generator and unifier? Because opposites don't
are what they are only in the simultaneity of their opposition and
that the procession towards the multiple has meaning only in the
context of the return to one (p. 41.15-42.8).
5) For what reason is the number feminine, as well as the
notice Proclus? Because what is monadic in essence is
find divided by number, in the same way as the seed
paternal is divided by the mother. Pythagorean opinions,
Orphic, Chaldaic. Note that, among the deities
feminine, only the Orphic Night has the privilege of reigning; of this
actually, there is something masculine about it too. On the other hand, this
order which is monad before being number is, therefore, masculine
before being feminine (p. 42.9-43.8).
6) How does the number have something unspeakable? Is this
because it is unlimited? - No, because it is not unlimited in itself-
same, but by participation, as well as by participation he
is also limited. Is it because of its effectiveness in the practices
mysterious? No, because he has this efficiency in common with all
other sacred symbols. Is it because he is one? No, this
character not belonging to him exclusively. But it is by
the number that the gods are differentiated in this order which is
that of the sym-
1. Ibid., P. 38.22-39.2.
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THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM
hidden bolts (συνθήματα); it is by the number that any form is the
paradigm of what proceeds from it, because the number has the nature of a
hidden symbol, and the hidden symbol has the nature of being a shape
unitary. The number is manifest as a number, but it is
hidden insofar as it envelops the property of the god (pp. 43.9-44.19).
7) Is the “supracelestial” place (Phaedrus, 247 c 3) appropriate for
number? This place "without contact, without figure and without color" ( Phèdre ,
247 c 6-7) suits this order of hidden symbols and, just as
everything springs from this place to return to it, everything, through the mediation of
number, both stands out from the monad and returns to it in
remaining in the number (p. 44.20-45.10).
8) If Parmenides together compose the substantial number and the
unit number, will not the common number be formed of elements
non-comparable? No, this number remains formed of monads
comparable, in so far as they are all composed (p. 45.11-20).
9) Why, according to the Chaldaic Oracles, the hidden symbols and
sacred manifestos in this order, and why were they named
Iynges and Nights? In the intelligible, there are already sacred symbols,
but completely unified and invisible, not different from the gods
same. Here, the sacred symbols manifest themselves more
transparent, between themselves and vis-à-vis the gods. In the sense of
rise, it is here that the peak of intellect culminates
give way to intelligible, unitary and mystical epopty, on this
summit "without contact, without figure and without color". This summit of
the intelligible-intellectual order is suggested by the Night cone
orphic, which the cone of the number looks like, from its base
particular until its monadic summit. The Oracles appoint
Iynge this order, either by derivation of the theoretical instrument,
used to evoke and release the gods, either in derivation of the verb
iyzô whose pronunciation imitates divine transport (p. 45.21-47.13).
10) Why are there several Iynges and several Nights, if the
number is all synchronous and nocturnal? We have already answered
this question, by answering the
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XVI
NOTICE
first in this series (cf. p. 34.18-35.4). However,
"Let us repeat that the source-god of the Iynges is a plurality,
as the Oracles state and they clearly state it in the
case of the Teletarchs, and that is also a plurality the channel
principal which tilts below them ” l . Moreover, the
summits of the Iynges are also a numerical triad whose
elements are distinct (p. 47.14-22).
11) Prior to the substantial number and the unit number must
be the pure or unique number, which, according to Proclus, is the number
from otherness. If this number precedes the unit number, the otherness
should it not also be prior to one? "We answer that
one too is mixed with otherness, insofar as it is a monad and
is no longer [simply] one, and from the fact that after the intelligible the
father is simply being, but having in himself a
own power and act ” 2 . As for the gods who proceed
of the paternal intellect, "according to subsistence they are one, according to
power they added to otherness, and according to the act they are
substantial and project being, although some are
substantialized rather according to one, others according to otherness,
others according to the being ” 3 (p. 48.1-20).
12) What is the nature of the 1st order of intelligible-intellectuals
? In his Commentary, Proclus gave each class in this
order the same extension up to the "unlimited number", but in
specifying the re by one, 2 e by otherness, 3 e by being. Then,
in Platonic Theology, he attributed to each a
different extension, the l rï going to the triads (Farm., 143 b
3- d 7), the 2 nd until the species of the number ( Parm ., 143 e 1-
144
a 2) 3 e to unlimited (Parm., 144 2-6).
Damascius considers more satisfactory the solution of the Commentary
(p. 48.21-49.7).
1. Ibid., P. 47.14-17.
2. Ibid., P. 48.6-9.
3. Ibid., P. 48.16-20.
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THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM
XVII
II.4
3.
Third series of twelve questions (p. 49.8-51.16) and
answers (p. 51.17-68.10).
1) Why did the Pythagoreans call shapes numbers?
Stuff that the numbers are the models of the shapes, which are
distinct from each other and generating their numbers
clean, like monads (p. 51.17-24).
2) Why do souls ascend to the "supracelestial place"
in the Phaedrus and until the Good in the Republic? Because the
souls trace their divided thought back to discrete plurality, in
seeing in the "supracelest place" justice, wisdom, science,
one apart from the others. Then, by folding the division back on itself,
they tend towards the single idea of the Good and the pure intelligible (p.
52.1-22).
3) If the first otherness is at most in the 1st order
intelligible-intellectual, isn't this more differentiated than the orders
who follow him? Now, Proclus also says that the first number is that
who has the most character of one. How are these proposals
reconcilable? Where otherness is at its maximum according to property, it
is at least according to differentiation. This is the case with shapes
unified and at the same time hyperbolically self-subsisting. This is
also the case of the first number which is number at the highest degree,
while being the least differentiated (p. 52.23-53.19).
4) Why did Parmenides characterize surviving life by
otherness and not through movement and rest? It does not characterize,
not, through them, the intermediate life (2 e intelligible-intellective order)
which nevertheless corresponds to the * celestial revolution ” (“ Phèdre, 247 cl),
but he does it by the whole and the parts, and he reserves the movement and the
rest 2 e intellective order. The first otherness is the principle
generator and discriminator of begetters and begotten ones. His
role is not to delimit them as genres do. None
can therefore be substituted for it. This admitted, why did Parmenides
did he not appeal to the kinds of being for character-
Page 7
XVIII
NOTICE
risking life, but in the number, in the whole and in the parts, in the figure?
Yet movement and rest are conceived by Proclus as
subsisting in action, and thus appear to suit life
remaining. - a - At first glance, we could characterize the
diacosms by the genres of the Sophist: the intelligible by being, the
life through movement and rest, intellect through identity and
otherness (second). But as a result of being and previously
to the last four genera, which are well suited to the intellect, it
there are also others, more venerable, which characterize by
therefore what comes before the intellect: these are the number, the
all and the parts, the figure. - β - These genera are suitable for
life by their division, their partition, their feminine character. -
γ - Their nature corresponds to the ongoing differentiation of the
life, which is situated between the undifferentiated being and the intellect
fully differentiated. - 8 - We must distinguish the movement
like procession of all things starting from one in the
number, and at all in parts (this movement is suitable for
life), and movement as a genre, which applies to things
already differentiated. - e - While movement and rest are
in act in the intellective substance (which is established according to
act), they are not yet manifest in life (established
depending on the power). Where there is no deed yet, there is no
of movement and rest, if not in the form of a tiny
pulsation. - ζ - It is through psychic life that we
are inclined to identify life and movement. - η -
Parmenides deals here only with henads, and under the aspect of the only
subsist. - Θ - The distinction of number ( 1st intelligible-
intellective) of the whole and the parts (2 e intelligible-intellective) of
Figure (3 e intelligible- intellective), the intellectual hypostasis in
oneself and in another, are the phases through which the
unitary substance is differentiated and finally ends in itself;
movement and rest are then the acts of this substance. - i
- We could also consider the movement and the
rest as equal to everything, but as divided entirely,
in terms of number, first in one
Page 8
THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM
and many, then in all and parts, finally in the beginning,
middle and end. - κ - The first otherness contains everything implicitly
in herself; through her femininity and fertility, she is also restful and
movement (p. 53.20-59.7).
5) What does primary alterity oppose? She does not object to
an identity, but to one who is everything according to one; it is so, at the state
distinct, the plurality of everything. Thanks to her, nothing distinct is
dispersed, but everything is captured by the structure of the number. Otherness
first is thus at the origin of the very identity, that is to say of
the union which proceeds at the same time as the distinction (pp. 59.8-17).
6) How can Proclus say: " the whole was masculine in
intelligible, while the feminine is analogous to otherness ” 1 ? In
the intelligible, there is also the feminine, but dominated by the masculine,
while in the intelligible-intellectual, there is dominated masculine
by the feminine (p. 59.18-60.5).
7) Admit here genres of being, how is this different from this
that we do, if it is only beside the kinds of being, we
let us admit a unitary otherness and properties of henads? We
let us call genera of being the substantial genera, not the properties
unitary according to which the substantial forms proceed. These
genera, these forms and their henads are divisible into elements;
but the pairs (συζυγίαι, Parm., 143 d 6), such as being- otherness,
being-one, un-otherness (cf. Parm., 143 c 1-2), are complete worlds,
indivisible. Analogously to the latter, the genres in relation
to species want to be taken for complete diacosms.
However, a predominant part is not enough to constitute the
whole of a diatom. So we must think that the property which
specifies a diacosm in its entirety is anterior to the predominant
nance of the genus in relation to its species (p. 60.6-61.9).
8) If the number is formed from one, from otherness and from being, in what
are these constituents comparable, is it because they are all
different, or because each is
1. Ibid., P. 50.16-17.
Page 9
XX
NOTICE
a ? This is because everyone is one, and as a monad he
constitutes a triad (p. 61.10-17).
9) What is the pure number which, together with one, produces the number
unitary, and joined to being the substantial number? This is the number of
otherness. Now, we conceive of number either as a property,
either as a substance. When Parmenides distributes the number
and in one and in being, he distributes it as a property
belonging to each; if he seems to neglect the number of
otherness is that he has already produced it with property (p. 61.18-
62.6).
10) If one, otherness and being are in each other,
so that each is a triad, how are the three numbers of one,
of otherness and being are they not in each of these three
monads? While it is true that each monad is a triad,
nevertheless the number of each monad is one (p. 62.7-20).
11) How does Parmenides demonstrate the substantial number?
If the number is participable, then the parts of the number are participable
also by so many parts of the being. From which of
three monads does this participable number proceed? From
three as one, so that he himself is unique, in
being simultaneously trimorphic, as unitary, as having
undergone otherness and substantial comnie (p. 62.21-64.19).
12) How does Parmenides demonstrate the unit number? If he
there is a plurality of parts of the substance, it is impossible
that each is a part of the substance and yet is
ούδέν, “not even one”. It is about a set, that is,
say part of one, which attaches itself by participation to a
part of the substance; which amounts to saying that what is not
in a substrate is not even one. In this case, how
admit the existence of independent henads? None of the
answers given by Proclus do not break the dilemma: either
each part of the substance is a a set, or
she is what is not even one. According to Damascius, the
contrary to what is not even one, it is the being suspended
one, both in its totality and in each of its parts; but he
It is enough that a part of being is
Page 10
THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM
not even one, so that the "not even one", that is to say the nothing , has
reason to be. One must therefore be, and be present in being, and
that one is participable. But "it is certainly not possible that one,
joint to the totality of the substance, or also joint of the same
way to each of its parts ” 1 . The henad of the world cannot
be present in the same way in the sun. It is therefore necessary that
Universal henads proceed into more particular henades. Mon
participable is divisible. This is the unit number. " The number
is in one itself, although according to otherness, and by nature it is
linked, as we know, to the being attached [to one], insofar as this being is not
in one » 2 (p. 64.20-68.10).
II.4
4 . Ten notes on the letter of the text (p. 68.11-77.2).
1) On Parrn., 143 a 4-6: "Ιθι δή καί τηδε ίτι. - Πή; - Ουσίας
φαμεν μετέχειν το έν, διο εστιν; - Ναί. - Καί διά ταΰτα δή τό £ ν δν
πολλά έφάνη ("Let's go this side again. - Which one? - We
let us say that one participates in substance and that by that it is? - Yes.
- And it is precisely for this that the one-being appeared several ”).
Should we explain here the reason given by Plato, as Proclus the
fact, by invoking either the analogy of the 1st intelligible-intellectual with the 1st
intelligible, needing procession from 3 e intelligible (the plurality
unlimited)? According to Damascius, the explanation must be sought above all
on the side of the first otherness which constitutes the one and the being as
numbers, after one has been made plurality by its participation of the
substance (p. 68.11-69.12).
2) On Parm., 143 b 2-3: ... εϊπερ μή ουσίας (cod. Pl. T, instead of
ούσία cod. Pl. B) τό ëv, άλλ 'ώς êv ούσίας μετέσχεν ("... if it is true
that one is not part of the substance, but has participated in the
substance, like a '), in which case one will have to be other than the
substance (this is the otherness of the one and of the substance, which
characterizes
1. Ibid., P. 67.3-5.
2. Ibid., P. 67.26-68.2.
Page 11
XXII NOTICE
the 1st intelligible-intellectual). But already, in the intelligible, one
involved substance; should we understand that one and the being
were already distinct? Damascius examines the aporia and he shows
that in the intelligible the participant and the participant, not yet
cross-distinguished, are one, in the sense of a community,
while in the intelligible-intellectual, they form a duality
distinct, formally, one, from a participant, the other, from
ticipated, otherness being in between (p. 69.13-70.8).
3) On Parm., 143 c 4, 7: άμφοτέρω. How by this word ("
one and the other ”), does Parmenides (in Plato) show the
number two? This word means the connection of a thing and a
other, which are in themselves separate; this connection is, at this
title, a number, because the number unites. This number here is a
determined dyad (that of one and of being), and it is from
from her that Parmenides went to the pure digital dyad (p.
70.9- 71.20).
4) On Parm., 143 d 2-5: “Ω S 'άν δύο ήτον, έστι τις μηχανή
μή ούχ έκάτερον αύτοϊν £ ν είναι; - Ούδεμία ... ("But where there is
has both, is there some way that in him each of the two
terms is not one? - No... "). Why, after having
constituted the dyad, does Parmenides dissociate it into one and one? According to
Proclus is because the 1 st
intelligible-intellectual is by
discriminating nature; but, according to Damascius, it is because
Parmenides prepares, from there, the elements of the triad (p.
71.21-72.6).
5) On Parm., 143 e 5-7: Τί δέ; τριών δντων καί δίς οντων καί
δυοϊν δντων καί τρις δντων, ούκ ανάγκη τρία τε δίς είναι καί δίς
τρία; *cod. Pl. Τ+ ("So, being posed three and twice, then two
and three times, don't we necessarily have two times three and two
times three? "). As Parmenides had just declared: " being posed
two ", shouldn't he have concluded: * three times two"? After
Proclus, Damascius seeks the reasons for this apparent
expression abnormality (p. 72.7-73.3).
6) On Parm., 144 a 4: Εί άρα εστιν εν, ανάγκη καί άριθμόν
είναι ("If therefore one is, there is also necessarily a number").
Why this consequence? Because
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THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM xxm
the being or the substance in which one participates is also several (p. 73.4-
20).
7) On Parrn., 144 b 1-2: ΈπΙ πάντα άρα πολλά οντα ή ούσία
νενέμηται καί ούδενός άποστατεί των δντων ("To all the plurality
beings, therefore, the substance has been shared and it is not
keeps away from any of them ”). How to hear that? The
substance is common to all beings, from the point of view of
participation, but it precedes all, from the point of view of
subsistence. Beings are its parts, as numbers are
are of the number, and the henads of the one (p. 74.1-14).
8) On Parm., 144 c 4-5: Άλλ 'εΐπερ γε, οϊμαι, εστιν, άνάγκη αύτο
άεί, ώσπερ άν ή, εν γέ τι είναι ("But, if it is true, as I believe,
that every part [of the substance] is, it is a necessity that it
is always at least some one, insofar as it is ”).
Why this addition " as far as it is"? "Because, of
even that it is at least some one, so it is; because without
one, she is not even ”(pp. 74.15-75.17).
9) On Parm., 144 c 5: εν γέ τι. What does the "at least some
one ”and the addition of “ some ”? Is this the opposite of "nothing" or "
not even something ”(Porphyry)? Or is it the one participating
as opposed to the imparticable one (Syrianus)? Or, better, one
defined who comes after the pure one (Jamblique)? The latter concep-
tion has the preferences of üamascius, but it is further refined by
him: the " some one" means "the something as one"
according to the number, with the deictic connotation of "this" (p. 75.18-
76.21).
10) On Parm., 144 c 7: πρόσεστιν (“adds to”); 144 d 4:
πάρεστιν ("is present at"); 144 e 1: ούκ απολείπεται ("is not
deprived of ") ; 144 c 7: ούκ άπολειπόμενον. What is the subject of these
verbs? It is not the one who is in the participation, but the one
separable and fragmented, which coexists with the parts of the substance
(p. 76.22-77.2).
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XXIV
NOTICE
II.
5. Of the middle order of intelligible-intellectuals (p.
77.3-92.3; Parm., 144 e 3-145 a 4).
II.
5 1 . Series of ten questions (p. 77.5-78.9) and
answers (pp. 78.10-86.11).
1) What is the common essence and the specific essence of
intelligible, intelligible-intellectual, intellectual ? The
entirely intelligible diacosm , it is the un-being unified in its
manence. In its first order, it is absolutely undifferentiated,
in its 2 th order, it starts to differentiate into any and
parts; 3 in its e order, it is differentiated in the sense that it is
generator of intelligible plurality which, however, is still
unified. The entire intelligible-intellectual diacosm is the
procession of the one and the being, which are in the process of differentiating
in the 1 * 'order with the projection of the numerical distinction
within the union, in the 2 th order with the projection of the
continuity of the whole within the differentiation of the parts, in
the 3rd order with the recall, in the whole, of the parts which
flow. The entire intellectual diacosm is conversion which follows the differentiation with,
in the 1st order, the conversion substantial, in the 2 nd vital conversion into 3 e the
intellectual conversion (pp. 78.10-79.11).
2) Why is there a disambiguation only between the 2 nd order
intelligible-intellective and 2 e intelligible order, not between
other orders, while the analogy is exercised in all? The cause of
homonymy is not here analogy, for the notion of everything in the
2 e intelligible order and in the intelligible-intellective diacosme
differs completely. In the 1 st case, this is the entire
strict (with two parts), in the 2 nd of the totality-sum (with
Three parties). The cause of the disambiguation is rather in the
property which brings together the parts identically (p. 79.12-
80.20).
3) How do the two totalities, the intelligible and the intelligible
intellective, are they different? Is the first
anhomeomer, the second homeomer? As Proclus says, their
difference is that the first is the
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THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM
XXV
the totality of the one-being in its union, and the second the totality of the one
and to be so in their separation. The first is both
homeomer and anhomeomer, the second is also both, but it
is more homeomer than anhomeomer (p. 80.21-81.7).
4) Why is the number anterior to the whole and the parts, and the
feminine to masculine? After the union of the intelligible was to be
show first the distinction of the parts, introduced by the
number ( 1st intelligible-intellectual order of a feminine nature), then the
continuity of the whole and the parts, which unifies these parts without destroying
their distinction (2 e intelligible order of intellective-male nature)
(p. 81.8-82.4).
5) What are the main characteristics of each order?
They all have in common the power to produce everything and everything
call back. But the 1 st produces everything, as a principle of the procession of the
number, and it recalls everything, as a unifier. The 2 nd produces everything,
as a divider, and it recalls everything, as a maintainer; 3 e
produced as a processional principle of the beginning, of the
middle and end, and it recalls everything as perfector (figure).
Damascius completes the description of these functions by
commenting (p. 82.5-83.10).
6) Is it true that the intelligible diacosm is specified by its 1 st
order, and the intellective diacosme by his 3 e ? Yes, because V un-being (1 st
intelligible order) is everywhere in the intelligible diacosm; the whole and
the parties (2 nd intelligible-intellectual order) is everywhere in the
intelligible-intellectual diacosm: in an anticipated mode in the
number under a director mode in the 2 e order under a mode
completed in 3 e ; finally, the identical and the different (3rd order
intellectual) is everywhere in the intellectual diacosm: in a
anticipated in the 1 st (in oneself and in another) and more still
in the 2 nd (in motion and at rest). This is because the
character of an entire diacosm is determined in two ways, namely
by its essence expressed by its 1st order, or by the rank of this
whole diacosm in the set of other diacosms. If this
diacosm is prime (intelligible), the
Page 15
XXVI
NOTICE
character of its rank is identical to that of its essence,
determined by the 1 st order (the one-being); if this diacosm is
intermediary (the intelligible-intellectual), his character, which is
hold the extremes together, manifests itself more in
its intermediate order where it is redoubled (vital life); if this
diacosm is third (the intellectual), its character, which is
to convert to the principle, manifests itself more in its
third order where it is redoubled (intellectual) (p. 83.11-
84.13).
7) Why does Plato, after having separated one from the being, let
then be aside to take care of only one? As well as
well seen Proclus, Parmenides is a theogony. Being is not
excluded, but integrated into the purpose of one. This does not prevent the
distinction between the unit number and the substantial number.
Damascius adds that Plato, by linking to one the verb "is",
maintains the presence of being (p. 84.14-85.2).
8) Why does Parmenides no longer speak of being from
this intermediate order? According to Proclus, it may be because
that in the re hypothesis negations produced with regard to
one start from what corresponds to this order (all
and parts), but this answer is not correct (these negations
begin, in fact, with that of the multiple), and it is
inadequate in relation to the subject. More relevant is the following
: Plato's silence on the subject of being is explained because it is
of the one subsisting as one that are stated the whole and the
parts, as was the number; being therefore always remains
involved, without the need to express it. But Damascius
prefers to speak of the progressive erasure of Γ un-being, after
intelligible: in the intermediate order of the diacosm
intelligible-intellectual, he stands in the middle between presence and
absence; in the 3rd order, where the intellectual already predominates, it is
completely ignored (p. 85.3-23).
9) Why are the predicates “ one and many”, “limited and unlimited?
Which specify the extreme orders of the intelligible-intellectuals are
do they find in the intermediate order? It is precisely because
that one of this order which
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THE INTELLIGIBLE-INTELLECTIVE DIACOSM XXVII
is the link of extremes, also unites, under the mode of the whole, the
properties that are found on both sides (p. 86.1-
6).
10) How is it that the intermediate order (center of life)
is not qualified by eternity and is said to be " maintainer"? By
that eternity, although it preserves the order of the parts,
includes neither the anterior nor the posterior (p. 86.7-11).
II.
5 2 . Seven notes on the letter of the text (p. 86.12-92.3).
1) On Parm., 144 e 3-145 a 3. Is it necessary, with Proclus, to make
start the 2 * intelligible-intellectual order in 144 e 8: Καί μήν 6τι
γε δλου τα μόρια μόρια, πεπερασμένοι άν εϊη κατά το δλον τό ëv; ("
Now, since the parts are part of a whole, the one, conceived
after all, should it be limited? "). Dainascius believes that
must start this order from 144 e 3-5 : To èv άρα αύτό
κεκερματισμένον ύπό τής ούσίας πολλά τε καί άπειρα τό πλήθός έστιν
("So, one in itself, fragmented by substance, is several and
unlimited according to the plurality ”). One of the reasons he gives is that a
and several, concluded as predicates of the one in itself in Parm., 145 a
2-3 with all and parts, limited and unlimited, are not really included
in 2 e intelligible-intellective order if that order begins
Parm., 144 e 3-5 which is also the conclusion of the 1st intelligible order-
intellectual (p. 86.12- 87.16).
2) On Parm., 144 e 3-5 (text cited in § 1). Why the
beginning of 2 nd
intelligible-intellectual order is it also the
conclusion of the 1st ? Because the 2 nd is the link of intelligibles-
intellectuals, and that, as such, its conclusion (Parm., 145 a 2-3: “One
so who is will be, I think, one and many, all and parts, limited and
unlimited plurality ") also introduced at the beginning of 3 e
intelligible-intellectual: "limited and having extremes", Parm., 145
a 4-5, which is a corollary of this conclusion. So in the
average are the extremes and in the extremes the average (p. 87.17-
88.19).
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XXVIII
NOTICE
3) On Parm., 144 e 3-7: Why the first part of this
text (144 e 3-5, text cited above in § 1) seems redoubled
in the second part (144 e 5-7: Where μόνον άρα τό Ôv Sv πολλά
έστιν, άλλά καί αυτό τό Sv ύπό τοϋ δντος διανενεμημένον πολλά
άνάγκη είναι ("So, not only is the one-being several,
but still the one in itself distributed by being is necessarily
many ") ? In fact, the first part expresses the
fragmentation of the one in itself by the substance, and the second the
distribution of unitaries and substantial term by term (p.
89. Ι- ΙΟ).
4) On Parm., 144 e 4: πολλά τε καί άπειρα; 145 a 3: δλον
καί μέρη (μόρια); 144 e 8-9: πεπερασμένον ... κατά τό βλον.
Why this interlacing of predicates: "many, unlimited", "
whole and parts ", * limited ... according to the whole"? It is the sign of the
mutual connection that prevails in the middle order of
intelligible-intellectual (pp. 89.11-16).
5) On Parm., 145 a 1: περιέχον ("enveloping"). In which
meaning Did Plato say that the limiting is "enveloping"? Not
in the particular sense of "what encloses", as Proclus believes,
but in the sense of the whole which envelops its parts - in what way it
is transcendent - and keeps them together - in what way it
is coordinated (p. 90.1-91.13).
6) On Parm., 144 e 3-5, 144 a 5-6, 144 a 6-7: In these three
texts, why does Parmenides admit the unlimited before limiting it? In
fact, the limiting always accompanies the unlimited, even if it is
not always named. In Parm.,
145 1, it is openly designated to announce the 3 th order
intelligible-intellectual (Parm., 145 a 4) who is perfector, in
being a factor of delimitation and completion (p. 91.14-22).
7) On Parm., 145 a 2: τό £ v άρα Ôv ... ("one therefore who is").
Why this formulation, not just τό EV dv ( "one
who is ”or“ the one-being ”), as in the intelligible? According to
Damascius, the particle άρα ("therefore") marks the gap that
introduced here between one and being (p. 92.1-3).
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
in Phaedrus 1 , this one because souls ascend towards this
order to take part in the banquet and feast 2 , for this is the
demiurgic food. As for Orpheus, he does not transmit to us
only one of the two 3 :
To Zeus they [the Cyclops] gave thunder and procured
lightning,
and he adds that they taught the arts to Athena and Hephaestos 4 ;
Orpheus does not appear to attribute telestic [perfection] to
Cyclops 5 , unless however we interpret
hieratic 6 thunder, lightning and lightning 7 . To the Chaldeans, the
gods 8
especially taught [perfection]
telestic which is the property of this order, and they show it
as presiding over initiations (τελετών) 9 , <privilege> to
extend to all perfection (τελειότητα). Plato, for his part,
simultaneously indicates, in this passage 10 , the set of two
species, because, thanks to these conclusions, he sketches the perfection
pure (indeed, the figure is, according to Oracle 11 , <the source> of
[sacred] signs) as well as the specified perfection of each,
which projects its brilliance through its own contours.
[Il.ô'.b 5 . Answer to the fifth question ] 12
Fifth, the [so-called] "custodian" property 13 provides the
guard for another, and she has it with this other of whom she is
[the Guardian]. Because the character [known as] "perfector" comes under the
leader and guardian character rests with the subordinate. For this
reason, this last character does not constitute a diacosm
proper, and it appears in the totality of the intermediate order,
as this order unites the extremes and makes one what is
Split. This is above all the common lot of Maintainers, as
that they
1-12. See Additional Notes, p. 152-153.
13. Φρουρητική ϊδιότης, the "guardian * property" is described by Proclus,
El. Theol., § 154. It is identical to the property "mainteneuse"
(συνεκτική), as Damascius explains below. This property has its
sits in the second intelligible-intellectual order, at the center par excellence of
all the intelligible and all the intellectual.
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
envelop all things in themselves, and hold them
together. So the gods say: He gave his fulgurations to keep the luminaries, in
mixing in the Maintainers a particular ardor
[to force 1 .
Likewise, Ouranos in Orpheus wants to be "the protector and the
guardian of all things ” 2 . The Phoenicians and the Egyptians
establish the character of "guardian" in that order.
[II.6 1 .b 6 . Answer to the sixth question] 3 How then
conceive of the three conclusions? This is the sixth question.
[Proclus], it is true, had in view only scattered intuitions.
It is better, as is done with the substance, to divide the
perfection in three ways, in his mania, in his procession and in
his conversion 4 . According to its mania, perfection has for symbol
hidden 5 from having extremities (for the substance that remains has
for character to take root in its own top); according to his
procession, perfection has the character of being a beginning,
middle and end (because the procession which is divided into these three degrees
is the one that is the most complete); and, according to his conversion, the
perfection has the character of being the figure, because the figure
retains the procession, makes it converge towards its own origin, and,
if it is true that it is a limiting which encloses 6 , it gratifies the
substance of conversion to itself. And, of these three
perfections, the first teletarch grants the favor of the
first, the second the favor of the second and the third
the favor of the third.
1.
Or. Chald., Fr. 82 des Squares (see n. 1, 2 and 3); p. 42 Kroll. The attestation
of this fr. is unique to Damascius.
2. Orphie ., Fr. 113 (see p. 357-358 Kern, note by H. Diels).
3. Cf. supra, p. 93.1.
4.
On mania, procession and conversion, cf. princ., II,
p. 126.9-134.25. These three "activities" mark the phases of all
ontological cycle.
5-6. See Additional Notes , p. 153.
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
[II.6 1 .b 7 . Answer to the seventh question ] *
Let us answer the seventh question that, just as the
third order 2
of intelligibles proceeds in plurality
limitless, this one similarly proceeds in the infinity of figures
rectilinear; and just as up there the whole 3 comes at the head of the
plurality, so in this order comes first what has
ends, from which the three [parts] are joined, because
what has ends also has a middle, and that is the figure;
then, in the same way as the third order from above 4 is,
in the words of Theaetetus 's , the sum of the intelligible, and is
the complete Living, according to the expression of Timaeus 6 , of the same
way this order is middle and ends. And just like that-
ci converts intellective division 7 in all maintainer, likewise this one unites in eternity
the intelligible division; that's why both are celebrated
named "Key" by the gods themselves 8 .
[II -6 * .b 8 . Answer to the eighth question] 9
Eighth. We have already said above, and let's say it again
now, that Parmenides often exhibits the procession which
comes from the antecedent causes 10 , often also that which arises from the
same order 11 , as in this passage, and sometimes the procession
self-constituting as is customary thereafter 12 . Can-
be also must we say that this kind of being is added as already
limited, and that it is projected as a figure, if it is the limiting that
enclosure 13 .
1-7. See Additional Notes, p. 153-154.
8. Or. Chald., Fr. 197 from »Places (p. 65 Kroll). The third intelligible and the
third intelligible-intellectual thus resolve their own division by
conversion to the respective order that precedes each.
9. Cf. supra, p. 93.5.
10. For example, supra, p. 94.7-23.
11. Thus the diversity of rectilinear, round and mixed figures from the
exemplary figure.
12. This will be the case with minds and souls.
13. Cf. supra, p. 90.2, n. 2 (p. 14Θ in Notes compl .); 91.3, n. 1; 98.19.
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
[II.6 1 .b®. Answer to the ninth question ] *
What should we understand by the figure and by the species of
figure? By the figure, we mean the constituency of the
substance in its whole, according to which it is established as
self-defined 2 . This is also why the figure is earlier than
intellect 3 , because the intellect is self-defined as
that it converges 4 towards itself; and each species [of the figure]
is similarly anterior to the intellect, whether round or
rectilinear or mixed, according to the property of each of the gods
give a figure. Because, for what reason the Pythagoreans 5
do they dedicate, as we know, to this one the circle, to that one the
triangle, to this other the square, to yet another one or the other
rectilinear figures, as well as mixed ones, for example
semicircles to Dioscuri 6 ? Philolaus, expert in this field,
often assigns different figures to the same god
according to its different properties. And maybe, to speak in
general, is the round figure common to all gods
intellectuals, as intellectuals, while various figures
rectilinear are specific to each of the different gods according to the
properties of numbers, angles and sides; for example, the
triangle is specific to Athena, the square to Hermes; and again this
this angle of the square, says Philolaus, is peculiar to Rhéa, that one to
Hera, and the others to other deities. In a nutshell, the definition
figures is theological in nature.
[Il.ô'.b 10 . Answer to the tenth question] 1
Let us finally answer the tenth question that, as we
once believed, the figure inscribed in an angle, even
that it does not include 8 , is conceived as a more general figure
; and what we see in a single line,
1. Cf. supra, p. 93.8.
2. Αύτοπερίγραφος appears to be a Damascius hapax .
3. In the order of Platonic predicates, the figure, being the autocir-
conscription of the substance which is anterior to the intellect, is
even, prior to the intellect.
4-8. See Additional Notes, p. 154-155.
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
as well as the spiral which is not enclosing, let us take that,
as for us, for a figure, as we do in theology.
Already, in fact, the Egyptians dedicate the angle to some god;
spiral 1
and many other figures who; are not
enclosing are admitted as figures ^ / thus, among
Egyptians, the one called Tet 2 , which is made up of a single
vertical straight line and three transverse lines resting
on it, one at the top and two following it: in addition,
among the inhabitants of Heliopolis 3 , there is another figure
[open], and among the inhabitants of Gaza 4 another dedicated to
Zeus. What is need to multiply the examples, at the moment
that the gods also, in the Oracles, transmitted a line
unique, "drawn in the form of a curve" 5 , and that they make great use of
of linear figure 6 ? In short, whether it is suitable for the line to have
dice ends and to have beginning, middle and end, why
would this not be precisely the figure that is demonstrated in
from these predicates?
[II.6 2 . Four notes on the letter of the text] [II.6 2 .a. List of
Questions]
Focusing on the letter, let's look for the following.
First, how does [Parmenides] conclude "what has
ends ” 7 from“ limited ”, understood as some
something else; indeed, how to be limited and to have
ends different?
Second, how, from the whole, does he conclude "what
a beginning, middle and end ” 8 , if it is true that the whole
necessarily consists of these factors, as he says? By
thereafter, it seems to prove the same from itself.
1. It is several times a question of Ι'έλιξ (the helix or the
helical) in Proclus, In Eucl. See the index of the edition of
Friedlein, su
2-8. See Additional Notes , p. 155-159.
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PARMENID 'S COMMENTARY
Third, how did he not first demonstrate the
figure, but, on the contrary, led the reasoning on
definite figures, saying: "one, being such, will have to
seems to also participate in some figure ” 1 ?
Fourth, [Proclus] investigates why [Parmenides]
did not combine the three conclusions into one, as he did
custom to do so in other passages.
[II.6 2 .b. Four answers, in reverse order] [II.6 2 .b 1 . On Parm.,
145 a 4-b 5]
[Proclus] answers this last question that the division
intellective begins from this order, and that from there it
descends in the continuous series of conclusions, because the gods 2
also make this division on a weekly basis. But, if he is
true that this lack of meeting [of the conclusions] 3 indicates the
plurality and distinction, it is better to
cause to the analogy of unlimited plurality 4 , because it is more platonic
cien. Perhaps the split aspect is also suitable for the sum that
belongs to that order, in which were divided
beginning, end and middle. Perhaps, the length of
conclusions prevented their gathering; and if
[Parmenides] had taken them back as one, he
would have said pretty much the same things. In addition, the
rally is necessary in the final, either because of the
prolixity of the demonstrations, either because of their character
dispersed, as in the case of the prior order of 5 thereto. In
besides, one must think that [Parmenides], in the developments
earlier, did not operate this gathering everywhere.
1. Third conclusion of the third intelligible-intellectual order. Cf.
Parm., 145 b 3-5.
2. Or. Chald., Fr. 194 des Places (p. 17 Kroll).
3. Τοΰτο evokes the absence of a meeting of the three conclusions, which
caught the attention of Proclus, cf. the fourth question above, I. 5.
4. It is undoubtedly a question of the “unlimited plurality” of number (Parm., 144 a
5-7) rather than "unlimited * intelligible plurality (143a 2), because this one has no
not yet undergone otherness.
5. See Additional Notes, p. 159.
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PAKMENID COMMENTARY
[II.6 2 .b 2 . On Parm., 145 b 3-5 ] 1
To the third question, we must answer that [Parmenides] has
also proceed in the same way in negations 2 , and this
perhaps for brevity, either because it manifests the genre by the
making it more knowable by means of species, either because it
indicates that this order is triadic taken as a whole
(because what has ends is understood as having
ends with respect to its midpoint), while the order
prior to this one is dyadic (because each of its conclusions
is a dyad 3 ), and that the first order is monadic (because it is
as a number that we have demonstrated the unit number, the number
of the otherness and the substantial number).
[II.6 2 .b 3 . On Parm., 145 a 5-b i] 4
To the second question, we must answer: it is not in the
same meaning that, in different orders, the
same genera s ; we will see it in the diacosms which
will follow. Here, the whole is understood as a sum;
because the sum, which [Parmenides] also wanted to call totality by
participation, is beginning, middle and end, just as it has
conceived of the totality as consisting, according to the causal mode, of
these three factors. Therefore, it is all of this type that
child, while the sum, which has beginning, end and
middle, is born. Indeed, if the totality consists of these
factors, it is in so far as they are continuous and that they are
parts, while the sum is composed of them, insofar as they are
separate and perfect. Moreover, the whole consists of them, as
prior to them and as their cause, while their
sum is the resulting union; furthermore, as a whole,
this [n '] is all [only] by participation, it is therefore
inferior in its cohesion; therefore, the sum is
direct corresponding of the totality, and perfection that of
continuity. Because, with the decline of first-rank genres
1-5. See Additional Notes, p. 159.
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PARMENIDE COMMENTARY
projections of secondary genres always coexist
rank, and, participating in the former, the subsistence of the
seconds are concentrated 1 . So if the sum is a whole
by participation, it is something perfect 2 according to the
subsistence.
[II.6 2 .b 4 . On Parm., 145 a 4-5] 3
To the first
question, we will answer that the "limited" is, as we
knows, a sort of everything, because the whole, in its totality, is contained
by limiting it, and, in it, limiting it is not distinct from
limited 4 . But what has ends has the character of having
separate limiters 5 ; this is why the environment is in relation
direct with limiters. As for the limited, it is, as we know,
purely limited, not divided into middle and ends. Of
more, the limited is rather substance, while what has
ends is around the stuff. And maybe the limited is-
it also of two kinds: one analogous to the whole, the other to the
sum.
1.
Έγκεντρίζειν, # to concentrate ”, particular meaning in Damascius pointed out
by LSJ. See De princ., II, p. 118.1, η. 1 (pp. 265-266).
2.
Τέλειον, perfect, in the sense of completion, as in all this context of
third order intelligible-intellectual.
3. Cf. supra, p. 101.15.
4. Cf. Parm., 144e 8-145a 1: Καί μήν δτι γε 8λου τά μόρια μόρια,
πεπερασμένον άν εΐη κατά τό δλον τό εν · ή ού περιέχεται ύπό του δλου τά μόρια
; - 'Ανάγκη. - 'Αλλά μήν τό γε περιέχον πέρας Sv εϊη. ("Yet it is of a
everything that the parts are parts, and the one, analogous to the whole, will therefore
be limited;
is it not by the whole that the parts are enveloped? - Necessarily.
- However, what envelopes will be limiting ”).
5. This is the converse of Parm., 145 a 4-5: ”Ap 'οδν ούκ, έπείπερ
πεπερασμένον, καί έσχατα έχον; - 'Ανάγκη. ("Is it not true that, since
is limited, will one have ends? - Necessarily *).