1 Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) v. CA (sorry mahaba yung digest) Under Sec.
Under Sec. 2(13) of the “Introductory Provisions” of the Administrative Code of 1987, a GOCC
G.R. No. 155650
July 20, 2006
By: ​ALLAUIGAN
Topic: ​ Municipal Corporation: Fiscal Autonomy and Self-Reliance
Petitioner: ​MIAA
Respondent: ​CA, City of Parañaque, City of Mayor of Parañaque, et al.
Ponente:​ Carpio, J.
FACTS
● MIAA operates the NAIA Complex in Paranaque under EO 903, known as Revised
Charter of the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA Charter). As operator of
NAIA, MIAA administers the land, improvements and equipment within the NAIA
Complex.
● The MIAA charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600 hectares of land, including the
runways and buildings under the then Bureau of Air Transportation. Such charter also
provides that no portion of the land transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through
sale or any other mode unless specifically approved by the President of the Philippines.
● In 1997, the Office of the Gov’t Corporate Counsel (OGCC) opined that the 1991 LGC had
withdrawn the exemption from real estate tax granted to MIAA under Sec. 21 of EO 903.
● Thus, MIAA negotiated with and paid part of the real estate tax due Respondent City of
Paranaque (the City). Thereafter, MIAA received from the City Final Notices of Real
Estate Tax Delinquency in the total amount of P624.5M for the taxable years 1992 to
2001.
● As MIAA failed to pay the tax delinquency, the City issued notices and warrants of levy
on the MIAA land and buildings.
● On April 9, 2001, the OGCC clarified its previous opinion. It then opined that Sec. 21 of
the MIAA Charter, in conjunction with Sec. 206 of the LGC, exempted MIAA from real
estate tax.
● Thus, MIAA filed with the CA a petition for prohibition and injunction, seeking to
restrain the City from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for
public sale the airport land and buildings. CA dismissed the case for having been filed
out of time.
● Meanwhile, the City published notices in two issues of the Philippine Daily Inquirer; and
posted them at various public places in the city in January 2003. The notices announced
the public auction sale of the MIAA land and buildings on February 7, 2003.
● The day before the public auction, MIAA filed with the SC an Urgent Ex-Parte and
Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The SC thus
issued a TRO effective immediately. The City was ordered to cease and desist from
publicly auctioning the properties.
ISSUE: ​W/N​ ​MIAA is exempt from paying real estate taxes. ​(YES)
HELD:
First, ​MIAA is not a government-owned or -controlled corporation (GOCC​), ​but an
instrumentality of the national government and thus exempt from local taxation. Second,
the real properties of MIAA were owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax.
1. MIAA is not a GOCC but a government instrumentality
must be “organized as a stock or non-stock corporation.” MIAA is not a stock corporation
because it has no capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting
shares.
MIAA is also not a nonstock corporation because it has no members. Sec. 87 of the
Corporation Code defines a nonstock corporation as "one where no part of its income is
distributable as dividends to its members, trustees or officers." ​A non-stock corporation
must have members. Even assuming that its sole member was the government, this fact
did not make MIAA a nonstock corporation. Although nonstock corporations could not
distribute any part of their income to their members, Sec. 11 of the MIAA Charter
mandated MIAA to remit 20% of its annual gross operating income to the national
treasury. ​Moreover, Sec. 88 of the Corp Code provided that nonstock corporations were
“organized for charitable, religious, educational, professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal,
literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and
like chambers.” ​Being a public utility, MIAA had not been organized for any of these
purposes, but for the operation of the Manila international and domestic airports for
public use.
With that, MIAA is a ​government instrumentality ​vested with corporate powers. Under Sec.
2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code, instrumentality is defined as
follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department
framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate
powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter.
When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality
does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a
stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality exercising not
only governmental but also corporate powers.
Thus, MIAA may exercise the governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority,
and the levying of fees and charges. At the same time, it may exercise “all the powers of a
corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with
the provisions of the MIAA Charter.”
Also, when the law makes a government instrumentality operationally autonomous, the
instrumentality remains part of the National Government machinery although not integrated
with the department framework. The MIAA Charter expressly states that transforming MIAA
into a "separate and autonomous body" will make its operation more "financially viable.
Being a government instrumentality, petitioner falls under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code, which states:
“SEC. 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless
otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays shall not extend to the levy of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
“(o​) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and
instrumentalities and local government units.”
Sec. 133 (o) recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national
government. A tax is never presumed. The law imposing it must be expressed in clear
language. ​This rule applies with greater force when local governments seek to tax national
government instrumentalities.
Besides, there is no reason for local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities for rendering essential public services to local inhabitants. ​The only
exception is when the legislature has clearly intended, for sound and compelling policy
considerations, to tax government instrumentalities for the delivery of essential public
services. The law empowering local governments to tax national government
instrumentalities must be couched in explicit language. Any doubt about whether this power
exists must be resolved against local governments.
2. The subject real properties are owned by the Republic, thus exempt from real estate
tax
The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore
owned by the State or the Republic, in accordance with Article 420 of the Civil Code. The
properties mentioned under Art. 420 -- like “roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State” -- are owned by the State. ​The term “ports” includes seaports and
airports.
Furthermore, the airport land and ​buildings are devoted to public use, because they are
used by the public for international and domestic travel and transportation. The fact that
MIAA collects terminal fees and other charges from the public does not remove the “public
use” character of the properties. Those fees, often termed “user’s tax,” are collected only
from the members of the public who actually use a public facility, instead of from all of them
including those who never use it. A user’s tax is more equitable -- a principle of taxation
mandated by the Constitution.
As such, properties of public dominion including, as discussed earlier, ​the MIAA land and
buildings -- were outside human commerce. The Court had also ruled that properties of
public dominion, being outside human commerce, could not be the subjects of an auction
sale. They were not subject to levy, encumbrance or disposition through public or private
sale. Any encumbrance or levy on the execution or auction sale of any property of public
dominion was void for being contrary to public policy. Hence, City of Parañaque could not
foreclose and compel the auction sale of petitioner’s 600-hectare runway for nonpayment of
real estate tax.
Before MIAA could encumber its land and buildings, the President first had to withdraw them
from public use, in accordance with Sections 83 and 88 of the Public Land Law -- or
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which “remains to this day the existing general law governing
the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral
lands.”
Furthermore, MIAA is a mere trustee of the Republic. The transfer of the airport land and
buildings from the Bureau of Air Transportation to MIAA was not meant to transfer beneficial
ownership of these assets from the Republic to MIAA. The purpose was merely to reorganize
a division in the Bureau of Air Transportation into a separate and autonomous body. The
Republic remained the beneficial owner of the properties and the sole owner of MIAA itself.
Sec. 234 (a) of the LGC exempts from real estate tax any “​[r]eal property owned by the
Republic of the Philippines.” This exemption should be read in relation to Section 133(o) of
the same Code. Section 234 (a) of the Local Government Code further states that real
property owned by the Republic ​loses its tax exemption only if the “beneficial use thereof
has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” ​In this case, MIAA,
as a government instrumentality, was not a taxable person under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code. Thus, even assuming that the Republic had granted it the beneficial use of
the airport facilities, that fact did not make them subject to real estate tax.
However, portions of the MIAA properties that had been leased to private entities were not
exempt from real estate tax. In regard to those entities, MIAA had granted to a taxable
person, for a certain consideration, the beneficial use of the land area involved. That
property was therefore subject to real estate tax.
This part can be skipped
Refutation of Minority’s Arguments ​(included in the Dissenting opinions of TInga, Callejo and
Austria-Martinez)
1. The minority asserts that MIAA is not exempt from real estate tax because Sec. 193 of
the LGC of 1991 withdrew the tax exemption of "all persons, whether natural or
juridical" upon the effectivity of the Code. ​The minority then asserts that since MIAA
is a juridical person, it is not exempt from real estate tax since as mentioned above,
the LGC withdrew the tax exemptions on juridical persons.
This argument is flawed. As provided in Sec. 133 (o) of LGC, local governments cannot impose
any kind of tax on national government instrumentalities like the MIAA. Local governments
are devoid of power to tax the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities.
On the theory that MIAA is juridical person. Such theory violates Sec. 133 (o) of LGC (as
mentioned above). Section 133(o) does not distinguish between national government
instrumentalities with or without juridical personalities. Where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish. Thus, Section 133(o) applies to all national government
instrumentalities, with or without juridical personalities. The determinative test whether
MIAA is exempt from local taxation is not whether MIAA is a juridical person, but whether it
is a national government instrumentality under Section 133(o) of the Local Government
Code.
Moreover, Sec. 133 of the LGC starts with the saving clause "[u]nless otherwise provided in
this Code." This means that unless the LGC grants an express authorization, local
governments have no power to tax the national government, its agencies and
instrumentalities. The saving clause in Sec. 133 refers to the exception to the exemption in
Section 234(a) of LGC, which makes the national government subject to real estate tax when
it gives the beneficial use of its real properties to a taxable entity.
Under Section 234(a) of the LGC, real property owned by the Republic is exempt from real
estate tax. The exception to this exemption is when the government gives the beneficial use
of the real property to a taxable entity. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) is
the only instance when the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities are
subject to any kind of tax by local governments. The exception to the exemption applies only
to real estate tax and not to any other tax. ​The justification for the exception to the
exemption is that the real property, although owned by the Republic, is not devoted to
public use or public service but devoted to the private gain of a taxable person.
2. Next, the minority asserts that since Section 133 precedes Section 193 and 234 of the
LGC, the later provisions prevail over Section 133.
This is also an error for the minority.
First​, there is no conflict between Sections 133 and 193 since Sec. 193 expressly admits its
subordination to other provisions of the Code when Sec. 193 states ​"[u]nless otherwise
provided in this Code." ​By its own words, Sec. 193 admits the superiority of other provisions
of the Local Government Code that limit the exercise of the taxing power in Sec. 193.
Second, ​Sec. 133 is entitled "Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government
Units." Sec. 133 limits the grant to local governments ​of the power to tax, and not merely the
exercise of a delegated power to tax.
Since, Sec. 133 prescribes the "common limitations" on the taxing powers of local
governments, ​Sec. 133 logically prevails over Sec. 193 which grants local governments such
taxing powers. By their very meaning and purpose, the "common limitations" on the taxing
power prevail over the grant or exercise of the taxing power.
If the taxing power of local governments in Section 193 prevails over the limitations on
such taxing power in Section 133, then local governments can impose any kind of tax on
the national government, its agencies and instrumentalities — a gross absurdity.
3. The minority also contends that GOCCs should apply only to corporations organized
under the Corporation Code, the general incorporation law, and not to corporations
created by special charters. The minority sees no reason why government
corporations with special charters should have a capital stock.
Again, the contention of the minority is seriously flawed.
First, ​GOCC under the Admin Code does not distinguish between one incorporated under the
Corporation Code or under a special charter. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.
Second, C ​ ongress has created through special charters several government-owned
corporations organized as stock corporations. Prime examples are the Land Bank of the
Philippines and the Development Bank of the Philippines.
Third, T​ he government-owned or controlled corporations created through special charters
are those that meet the two conditions prescribed in Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution. ​The first condition is that the government-owned or controlled corporation
must be established for the common good. The second condition is that the
government-owned or controlled corporation must meet the test of economic viability​.
Section 16, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be
created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to
the test of economic viability.
The Constitution expressly authorizes the legislature to create "GOCCs" through special
charters ​only if these entities are required to meet the twin conditions of common good and
economic viability.
The test of economic viability applies only to GOCCs that perform economic or commercial
activities and need to compete in the market place. Being essentially economic vehicles of
the State for the common good—meaning for economic development purposes—these
GOCCs with special charters are usually organized as stock corporations just like ordinary
private corporations.
In contrast, government instrumentalities vested with corporate powers and performing
governmental or public functions need not meet the test of economic viability. These
instrumentalities perform essential public services for the common good, services that every
modern State must provide its citizens. These instrumentalities need not be economically
viable since the government may even subsidize their entire operations. These
instrumentalities are not the “GOCCs” referred to in Sec.16, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
Here, MIAA need not meet the test of economic viability because the legislature did not
create MIAA to compete in the market place. MIAA does not compete in the market place
because there is no competing international airport operated by the private sector.
MIAA performs an essential public service as the primary domestic and international airport
of the Philippines. MIAA derives its revenues principally from the mandatory fees and
charges MIAA imposes on passengers and airlines. The terminal fees that MIAA charges every
passenger are regulatory or administrative fees and not income from commercial
transactions.
RULING​: WHEREFORE, we ​GRANT the petition​. We SET ASIDE the assailed Resolutions of the
Court of Appeals of 5 October 2001 and 27 September 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 66878. We
DECLARE the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority
EXEMPT from the real estate tax imposed by the City of Parañaque. We declare VOID all the
real estate tax assessments, including the final notices of real estate tax delinquencies, issued
by the City of Parañaque on the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International
Airport Authority, except for the portions that the Manila International Airport Authority has
leased to private parties. We also declare VOID the assailed auction sale, and all its effects, of
the Airport Lands and Buildings of the Manila International Airport Authority.
Tinga Dissenting Opinion
In his Dissenting Opinion, Tinga lamented the fact that the majority had “veered wildly
off-course [with blind but measured rage], shattering statutes and judicial precedents left
and right in order to protect the precious Ming vase that is the Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA).” He claimed that the majority Decision had overturned “at least one dozen
precedents,” if not “all previous jurisprudence regarding local government taxation vis-a-vis
government entities x x x.”
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos​, the leading case on the power of
local governments to impose realty taxes upon GOCCs and government instrumentalities,
should have been applied. The parties in ​Mactan and in the present case were similarly
situated. Both petitioners were airport authorities operating under similarly worded charters;
they were the owners of airport properties; they were owned by the State, and their
respective charters denied their absolute right to dispose of their properties without the
prior approval of the President.
According to him, the majority Decision, while being obviously inconsistent with ​Mactan​, did
not even bother to explain why the ruling in that earlier case was wrong. ​Mactan had ruled
that the prohibition on taxing the national government, its agencies, and instrumentalities --
as provided under Section 133 of the Local Government Code (LGC) -- was qualified only by
Sections 232 and 234.
Accordingly, the only relevant exemption now applicable to these bodies was that provided
under Section 234(o) on “real property owned by the Republic or any of its political
subdivisions except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or
otherwise, to a taxable person.”
The LGC’s express withdrawal of previously granted exemptions did not make any distinction
as to whether the exempt person was a governmental entity or not. Besides, under Section 2
(10) and (4) of the Administrative Code, a GOCC may be an instrumentality or agency of the
national government. Thus, there actually was no point in the majority’s assertion that MIAA
was not a GOCC.
MIAA a GOCC
Moreover, the law that governs the definition of a corporation created by Congress is the
legislative charter of that entity. If the legislative enactment defines an entity as a
corporation, then it is a corporation even if the Corporation or the Administrative Code
seemingly provides otherwise. Thus, an entity created by law as a corporation remains as
such, even though it has no capital structure or members that would make it either a stock or
a nonstock corporation under the Corporation Code. The long-standing rule is that the
legislative charter of a government corporation prevails, in case of conflict between it and
the Corporation or the Administrative Code.
The MIAA Charter is replete with provisions that indubitably classify it as a GOCC. MIAA may
acquire and possess property, incur obligations, and bring civil or criminal actions. It has the
power to contract in its own name and to acquire title to real or personal property. Likewise,
it may exercise a panoply of corporate powers and possess all the trappings of a corporate
personality, like a corporate name, a corporate seal, and bylaws.
GOCCs Subject to Local Taxation
Sections 133 and 234(a) of the LGC ensure that the Republic or its political subdivisions shall
not be subjected to any form of local government taxation, except realty taxes if the
beneficial use of the property owned has been granted to a taxable entity or person for
consideration. Section 133 likewise assures that government instrumentalities -- like GOCCs
-- may not be arbitrarily taxed by LGUs, since the former can be subjected to local taxation if
covered by a specific proviso in the LGC.
One such proviso is Section 137 which, as the Court found in National Power
Corporation,[14] permits the imposition of a franchise tax on businesses enjoying a franchise,
even if they are GOCCs. And, as the Court acknowledged in ​Mactan​, Section 232 provides
another exception to the taxability of instrumentalities. This provision authorizes LGUs to
“levy an annual ad valorem tax on real property such as land, building, machinery, and other
improvements not hereafter specifically exempted.” The specific exemptions are provided by
Section 234.
All Tax Exemptions Withdrawn by the Local Government Code
The Dissent stressed that, according to Section 193 of the LGC unless otherwise provided, all
tax exemptions enjoyed by all persons -- whether natural or juridical, including GOCCs -- were
deemed withdrawn upon the effectivity of the LGC. Since the provision spoke of the
withdrawal of tax exemptions of persons, it followed that the exemptions previously enjoyed
by MIAA -- which was definitely a (juridical) person -- were deemed withdrawn upon the
advent of the Local Government Code. Consequently, Section 21 of EO 903, which had
granted tax exemption to MIAA, was rendered ineffectual by Section 193 of the LGC.
Airport Land and Buildings Owned by MIAA
The majority asserted that since the properties of MIAA were owned by the Republic of the
Philippines, they were covered by the exemption under Section 234 of the LGC.
Sections 3 and 22 of the MIAA charter, however, explicitly transferred ownership of the
airport land and buildings from the State or Republic to MIAA. Nothing in the Civil Code or
the Constitution prohibited the State from transferring ownership of a property of the public
dominion to an entity that it similarly owned. In addition, there was no provision in the MIAA
charter expressly stating that these properties were to be held in trust.
Also, Justice Tinga pointed out the ultimate irrelevance of the claim that the beneficial
ownership of MIAA remained, not with it, but with the government. According to Section
234(a) of the LGC, he said, among those exempted from paying real property taxes were
“[r]eal property owned by the [Republic] x x x except when the beneficial use thereof has
been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” In the context of Section
234(a), the identity of the beneficial owner of the properties was not determinative of
whether the exemption availed. It was the identity of the beneficial user of the property
owned by the Republic or its political subdivisions that was crucial. If the latter was a taxable
person, then the exemption would not lie.
Only National and Local Governments Exempt from Realty Tax
Nonetheless, opined Justice Tinga, Section 234(f) exempted properties owned by the
Republic or its political subdivisions from realty taxation. The obvious question, he stressed,
was what comprised “the Republic of the Philippines.” He believed that the key to
understanding the scope of “the Republic” was the phrase “political subdivisions.”
Under the Constitution, political subdivisions are defined as “the provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays.” In correlation, the Administrative Code of 1987 defines “local
government” as a term referring to “the political subdivisions established by or in accordance
with the Constitution.”
These political subdivisions are those engaged in the exercise of sovereign functions and are,
accordingly, exempt. The same can be said generally of the national government, which is
similarly exempt.
MIAA a Proprietary Agency
MIAA, however, performs proprietary functions. The State’s operation of an airport facility
may be imbued with public interest, but it is by no means indispensable or obligatory on the
part of the national government. Notably, the Constitution authorizes private persons to
exercise “public service” functions, as it allows them to operate public utilities in the country.
There is no prohibition against the government taxing itself, and there is nothing obscene
about allowing government entities to exercise proprietary functions and to be taxed for the
purpose of raising the coffers of LGUs. On the other hand, noxious is the proposition that the
government or the instrumentalities it owns are above the law and may refuse to pay a
validly imposed tax. MIAA or any similar entity engaged in the exercise of proprietary, not
sovereign, functions cannot avoid the adverse effects of tax evasion, simply by claiming that
it is imbued with some of the attributes of government.
Disposition of MIAA Properties
In any event, despite the fact that Respondent City of Parañaque ineluctably had the power
to impose real property taxes over MIAA, an equally relevant statutory limitation on this
power had to be fully upheld. Section 3 of the MIAA charter stated that “[a]ny portion of the
[lands transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and administration of the MIAA]
shall not be disposed through sale or through any other mode unless specifically approved by
the President of the Philippines.”
In the present case, nothing in the Local Government Code -- even with its wide grant of
powers to LGUs -- could be deemed to have repealed the prohibition under Section 3, which
effectively foreclosed one of their possible remedies in the collection of delinquent real
property taxes. While it withdrew all previous local tax exemptions of the MIAA and other
natural and juridical persons, the LGC did not similarly withdraw any previously enacted
prohibitions on properties owned by GOCCs, agencies, or instrumentalities. The LGU simply
had to find another way to collect the taxes due from MIAA.
Conclusion
Justice Tinga summed up his points thus:
“1) Mactan and a long line of succeeding cases have already settled the rule that under the
Local Government Code, enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate of local autonomy,
all natural and juridical persons, even those GOCCs, instrumentalities and agencies, are no
longer exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption. The only
exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the Local Government
Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.
“2) Under the Local Government Code, particularly Section 232, instrumentalities, agencies
and GOCCs are generally liable for real property taxes. The only exemptions
therefrom under the same Code are provided in Section 234, which include real property
owned by the Republic of the Philippines or any of its political subdivisions.
“3) The subject properties are owned by MIAA, a GOCC, holding title in its own name. MIAA,
a separate legal entity from the Republic of the Philippines, is the legal owner of the
properties, and is thus liable for real property taxes, as it does not fall within the exemptions
under Section 234 of the Local Government Code.
“4) The MIAA charter expressly bars the sale or disposition of MIAA properties. As a result,
the City of Parañaque is prohibited from seizing or selling these properties by public auction
in order to satisfy MIAA’s tax liability. In the end, MIAA is encumbered only by a limited lien
possessed by the City of Parañaque.”
*
2. MCIAA V. City of Lapu Lapu
G.R. No. 181756
DATE: June 15, 2015
By: ALVAR
Topic: ​Municipal Corporation ; Fiscal Autonomy and Self Reliance
Petitioner: ​Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
Respondent: ​City of Lapu-Lapu and Elene T. Pacaldo
Ponente: ​Leonardo-De Castro, J.
DOCTRINE: ​When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the
instrumentality does not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is
organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality
exercising not only governmental but also corporate powers. Thus, MIAA exercises the
governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and
charges. At the same time, MIAA exercises "all the powers of a corporation under the
Corporation Law, insofar as these powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this
Executive Order.
FACTS
· Petitioner Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) was created
by Congress on July 31, 1990 under ​Republic Act No. 6958 to “undertake the
economical, efficient and effective control, management and supervision of
the Mactan International Airport in the Province of Cebu and the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City . . . and such other airports as may be established in the
Province of Cebu.”
· It is represented in this case by the Office of the Solicitor General. Respondent
City of Lapu-Lapu is a local government unit and political subdivision, created
and existing under its own charter with capacity to sue and be sued.
Respondent Elena T. Pacaldo was impleaded in her capacity as the City
Treasurer of respondent City.
· Upon its creation, petitioner enjoyed exemption from realty taxes under the
following provision of ​Republic Act No. 6958​:
· Section 14. ​Tax Exemptions. ​— The Authority shall be exempt from realty
taxes imposed by the National Government or any of its political subdivisions,
agencies and instrumentalities: Provided, That no tax exemption herein
granted shall extend to any subsidiary which may be organized by the
Authority.
· On September 11, 1996, however, this Court rendered a decision in
Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Marcos (the 1996 MCIAA ​case)
declaring that upon the effectivity of ​Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local
Government Code of 1991​),petitioner was no longer exempt from real estate
taxes. The Court held:
· Since the last paragraph of Section 234 unequivocally withdrew, upon the
effectivity of the ​LGC​,exemptions from payment of real property taxes granted
to natural or juridical persons, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, except as provided in the said section, and the petitioner is,
undoubtedly, a government-owned corporation, it necessarily follows that its
exemption from such tax granted it in Section 14 of its Charter, ​R.A. No. 6958​,
has been withdrawn. . . . .
· Respondent City issued to petitioner a Statement of Real Estate Tax assessing
the lots comprising the Mactan International Airport in the amount of
P162,058,959.52. Petitioner complained that there were discrepancies in said
Statement of Real Estate Tax as follows:
· (a) [T]he statement included lots and buildings not found in the inventory of
petitioner’s real properties;
· (b) [S]ome of the lots were covered by two separate tax declarations which
resulted in double assessment;
· (c) [There were] double entries pertaining to the same lots; and
· (d) [T]he statement included lots utilized exclusively for governmental
purposes.
· Respondent City amended its billing and sent a new Statement of Real Estate
Tax to petitioner in the amount of P151,376,134.66.
· Petitioner averred that this amount covered real estate taxes on the lots
utilized solely and exclusively for public or governmental purposes such as the
airfield, runway and taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated.
· Petitioner paid respondent City the amount of four million pesos
(P4,000,000.00) monthly, which was later increased to six million pesos
(P6,000,000.00) monthly. As of December 2003, petitioner had paid
respondent City a total of P275,728,313.36.S
· Respondent City Treasurer Elena T. Pacaldo sent petitioner a Statement of
Real Property Tax Balances up to the year 2002 reflecting the amount of
P246,395,477.20.
· Petitioner claimed that the statement again included the lots utilized solely
and exclusively for public purpose such as the airfield, runway, and taxiway
and the lots on which these are built. Respondent Pacaldo then issued Notices
of Levy on 18 sets of real properties of petitioner.
· Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lapu-Lapu City with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Lapu-Lapu
then issued a 72-hour TRO.
· The petition for prohibition sought to enjoin respondent City from issuing a
warrant of levy against petitioner’s properties and from selling them at public
auction for delinquency in realty tax obligations.
· The petition likewise prayed for a declaration that the airport terminal
building, the airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which they are situated
are exempted from real estate taxes after due hearing.
· Petitioner based its claim of exemption on ​DOJ Opinion No. 50​.
· The RTC issued an Order denying the motion for extension of the TRO.
· Respondent City auctioned 27 of petitioner’s properties. As there was no
interested bidder who participated in the auction sale, respondent City
forfeited and purchased said properties. The corresponding Certificates of Sale
of Delinquent Property were issued to respondent City.
· Petitioner claimed before the RTC that it had discovered that respondent City
did not pass any ordinance authorizing the collection of real property tax, a tax
for the special education fund (SEF), and a penalty interest for its
nonpayment.
· Petitioner argued that without the corresponding tax ordinances, respondent
City could not impose and collect real property tax, an additional tax for the
SEF, and penalty interest from petitioner.
· Court of Appeals held that petitioner’s airport terminal building, airfield,
runway, taxiway, and the lots on which they are situated are not exempt from
real estate tax reasoning as follows: Under the Local Government Code (LGC
for brevity), enacted pursuant to the constitutional mandate of local
autonomy, all natural and juridical persons, including government-owned or
controlled corporations (GOCCs), instrumentalities and agencies, are no longer
exempt from local taxes even if previously granted an exemption.
· The only exemptions from local taxes are those specifically provided under the
Code itself, or those enacted through subsequent legislation.
ISSUE:
Whether MCIAA is subject to local and real property taxation
HELD:
No
RULING:
To summarize, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation under Section
2(13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code because it is not organized as
a stock or non-stock corporation. Neither is MIAA a government-owned or controlled
corporation under Section 16, Article XII of the​1987 Constitution because MIAA is not
required to meet the test of economic viability. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested
with corporate powers and performing essential public services pursuant to Section 2(10) of
the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. As a government instrumentality,
MIAA is not subject to any kind of tax by local governments under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code​. The exception to the exemption in Section 234(a) does not apply to MIAA
because MIAA is not a taxable entity under the Local Government Code​. Such exception
applies only if the beneficial use of real property owned by the Republic is given to a taxable
entity.
Finally, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are properties devoted to public use and
thus are properties of public dominion. Properties of public dominion are owned by the State
or the Republic:
“The term “ports . . . constructed by the State” includes airports and seaports. The Airport
Lands and Buildings of MIAA are intended for public use, and at the very least intended for
public service. Whether intended for public use or public service, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are properties of public dominion. As properties of public dominion, the Airport
Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic and thus exempt from real estate tax under
Section 234(a) of the​ Local Government Code​. “
Under Section 2(10) and (13) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code,
which governs the legal relation and status of government units, agencies and offices within
the entire government machinery, MIAA is a government instrumentality and not a
government-owned or controlled corporation. Under Section 133(o) of the Local
Government Code​, MIAA as a government instrumentality is not a taxable person because it
is not subject to “[t]axes, fees or charges of any kind” by local governments. The only
exception is when MIAA leases its real property to a “taxable person” as provided in Section
234(a) of the Local Government Code​, in which case the specific real property leased
becomes subject to real estate tax.

Thus, only portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons like private
parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Parañaque. Under Article 420 of the Civil
Code, the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being devoted to public use, are properties of
public dominion and thus owned by the State or the Republic of the Philippines. Article 420
specifically mentions “ports . . . constructed by the State,” which includes public airports and
seaports, as properties of public dominion and owned by the Republic. As properties of
public dominion owned by the Republic, there is no doubt whatsoever that the Airport Lands
and Buildings are expressly exempt from real estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code​. This Court has also repeatedly ruled that properties of public dominion
are not subject to execution or foreclosure sale.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION
1. Petitioner's properties that are actually, solely and exclusively used for public purpose,
consisting of the airport terminal building, airfield, runway, taxiway and the lots on which
they are situated, EXEMPT from real property tax imposed by the City of Lapu-Lapu.

2. VOID all the real property tax assessments, including the additional tax for the special
education fund and the penalty interest, as well as the final notices of real property tax
delinquencies, issued by the City of Lapu-Lapu on petitioner's properties, except the
assessment covering the portions that petitioner has leased to private parties.

3. NULL and VOID the sale in public auction of 27 of petitioner's properties and the eventual
forfeiture and purchase of the said properties by respondent City of Lapu-Lapu. We likewise
declare VOID the corresponding Certificates of Sale of Delinquent Property issued to
respondent City of Lapu-Lapu.

SO ORDERED.

3. Pimentel, Jr. v. Ochoa
G.R. NO. 195770
July 17, 2012
ANG, CEDRIC
TOPIC: ​FISCAL AUTONOMY AND SELF-RELIANCE
PETITIONER: ​AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., SERGIO TADEO and NELSON ALCANTARA
RESPONDENT: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA and SECRETARY CORAZON
JULIANO-SOLIMAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE and DEVELOPMENT (DSWD)
PONENTE: PERLAS-BERNABE, ​J.
FACTS:
● In 2007, the DSWD embarked on a poverty reduction strategy with the poorest of
the poor as target beneficiaries.
● It is dubbed as "Ahon Pamilyang Pilipino," it was pre-pilot tested in the
municipalities of Sibagat and Esperanza in Agusan del Sur; the municipalities of
Lopez Jaena and Bonifacio in Misamis Occidental, the Caraga Region; and the cities
of Pasay and Caloocan ​upon the release of the amount of P50 Million Pesos under a
Special Allotment Release Order (SARO) issued by the Department of Budget and
Management.
● On July 16, 2008, the DSWD issued AO 16, series of 2008, setting the implementing
guidelines for the project renamed "Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program"
(4Ps/CCTP), which provides cash grants to extreme poor households to allow the
members of the families to meet certain human development goals.” Eligible
households selected from priority target areas are granted health and education
benefits for a total annual subsidy of P15k.
● AO 16 also institutionalized a coordinated inter-agency network among DepEd,
DOH, DILG, the National Anti-Poverty Commission (NAPC) and LGUs. DSWD as
lead implementing agency “oversees and coordinates the implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of the program” while the LGU is responsible for the
availability of health and education supply, and providing technical assistance for
the Program implementation, among others.
● DSWD executed MOAs with each participating LGUs to outline the obligation of
both parties during the 5-year implementation period.
● Congress then provided funding for the project as follows: P298K in 2008, P5
Billion in 2009, P10 Billion in 2010, and P21 Billion in 2011.
ISSUE: W/N the 4Ps budget allocation under the DSWD violates Article II, Sec. 25 and Article
X, Sec. 3 of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Sec. 17 of the LGC of 1991 by providing for
the recentralization of the National Government in the delivery of basic services already
devolved to the LGUs
RULING:
NO
● The LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of central government powers
on the matter of providing basic facilities and services. The national government
is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation
of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.
● The petitioners argued that the manner by which 4Ps is implemented is
questionable. It is the LGU’s responsibility to deliver social welfare, agriculture, and
health care services. Giving DSWD full control over the identification of
beneficiaries and the manner by which services are to be delivered or
conditionalities are to be complied with would have enhanced its delivery of basic
services. This results in the "recentralization" of basic government functions”,
which is contrary to the precepts of local autonomy and the avowed policy of
decentralization.
● The court ruled that Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving
the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The Constitution declares
it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments ( Sec 3, Sec 14
Art 10 1987 Constitution). To fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful
autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities, Section 17 LGC
vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities. However, par (c) of Sec 17 provides a categorical exception
of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.
o D​ecentralization of administration - when the central
government delegates ​administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and make local governments ‘more responsive and
accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as
self-reliant communities.’ The President exercises ‘general
supervision’ over them, but only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law.’ He has no control over their
acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with
his own.
o Decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political
power in favor of LGUs declared to be autonomous. The
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and
shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities. This amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to the
 central authorities but to its constituency.
● It is thus clear that the LGC does not imply a complete relinquishment of
central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and
services. The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand
in the formulation and implementation of national development programs
especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs
concerned.
● Ganzon v. Court of Appeals - while it is through a system of decentralization that
the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government
structure, the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local
government units into "mini - states." With local autonomy, the Constitution did
nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of
partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local
government units."
LAWS
Sec 3, Sec 14 Art 10 1987 Constitution:
Section 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall
provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization xxx
Section 14. The President shall provide for regional development councils or
other similar bodies composed of local government officials, regional heads
of departments and other government offices, and representatives from
non-governmental organizations within the regions for purposes of
administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units
therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region.
Section 17 of the LGC:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall xxx discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices ​devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall
likewise xxx discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary to xxx
provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the National
Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent
executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not
covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services.
4 MANDANAS v OCHOA
G.R. No. 199802 July 03, 2018
By: BACLAO
Topic: ​FISCAL AUTONOMY AND SELF RELIANCE
Petitioners: ​CONGRESSMAN HERMILANDO I. MANDANAS; MAYOR EFREN B. DIONA; MAYOR
ANTONINO A. AURELIO; KAGA WAD MARIOILAGAN;BARANGAY CHAIR PERLITO MANALO;
BARANGA Y CHAIR MEDEL MEDRANO;BARANGAY KAGA WAD CRIS RAMOS; BARANGA Y
KAGA WAD ELISA D. BALBAGO, and ATTY. JOSE MALVAR VILLEGAS
Respondents: ExCUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.; SECRETARY CESAR PURISIMA,
Department of Finance; SECRETARY FLORENCIO H. ABAD, Department of Budget and
Management; COMMISSIONER KIM JACINTO-HENARES, Bureau of Internal Revenue; and
NATIONAL TREASURER ROBERTO TAN, Bureau of the Treasury
Ponente: ​BERSAMIN , J.
FACTS:
● One of the key features of the 1987 Constitution is its push towards decentralization of
government and local autonomy. Local autonomy has two facets, the administrative and
the fiscal.
● Fiscal autonomy means that local governments have the power to create their own
sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the national taxes released by
the National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in accordance
with their own priorities.
● Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC), guarantees
the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs which provides that:
SECTION 284. Allotment of Internal Revenue Taxes. - Local government units shall have a
share in the national internal revenue taxes based on the collection of the third fiscal year
preceding the current fiscal year as follows:
(a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code, thirty percent (30%); (b) On the second
year, thirty-five percent (35%); and
(c) On the third year and thereafter, forty percent (40%).xxx
● The share of the LGUs, heretofore known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has
been regularly released to the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations
 of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the basis of the actual collections of the National
Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
● Mandanas, et al. allege herein that certain collections of NIR Ts by the Bureau of Customs
(BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs) and documentary stamp taxes
(DSTs) - have not been included in the base amounts for the computation of the IRA; that
such taxes, albeit collected by the BOC, should form part of the base from which the IRA
should be computed because they constituted NIRTs; that, consequently, the release of
the additional amount of ₱60,750,000,000.00 to the LGUs as their IRA for FY 2012 should
be ordered; and that for the same reason the LGUs should also be released their unpaid
IRA for FY 1992 to FY 2011, inclusive, totaling ₱438,103,906,675.73.
● Several respondents, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), urged the
dismissal of the petitions upon procedural and substantive considerations.
● On the substantive considerations, the OSG avers that Article 284 of the LGC is consistent
with the mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution to the effect that the
LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes;
ISSUE: ​Is Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X
of the 1987 Constitution? (​YES) ​Can the LGUs’ just share in the national taxes be
automatically released without the need of an appropriation? ​YES
HELD:
1. There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in percentages of
the national taxes (i.e.,30%, 35% and 40% stipulated in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of
Section 284 ). Yet, Section 6, supra, mentions national taxes as the source of the just share
of the LGUs while Section 284 ordains that the share of the LG Us be taken from national
internal revenue taxes instead.
● Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional
lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The phrase
national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive
than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such, Congress has actually departed
from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base
from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis
non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should be no departure). Equally
impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy
in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.
● Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just share of the LGUs in
the national taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the LGC), Congress cannot disobey the express
mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution for the just share of the LGUs to
be derived from the national taxes. The phrase as determined by law in Section 6 follows
and qualifies the phrase just share, and cannot be construed as qualifying the succeeding
phrase in the national taxes. The intent of the people in respect of Section 6 is really that
the base for reckoning the just share of the LGUs should include all national taxes. To read
Section 6 differently as requiring that the just share of LGUs in the national taxes shall be
determined by law is tantamount to the unauthorized revision of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution commands that the just share of the LGUs in
national taxes shall be automatically released to them. The term automatic connotes
something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory; and, in the context of this case, the
LGUs are not required to perform any act or thing in order to receive their just share in the
national taxes.
● Section 6 does not mention of appropriation as a condition for the automatic release of
the just share to the LGUs. This is because Congress not only already determined the just
share through the LGC's fixing the percentage of the collections of the NIRTs to constitute
such fair share subject to the power of the President to adjust the same in order to
manage public sector deficits subject to limitations on the adjustments, but also explicitly
authorized such just share to be "automatically released" to the LGUs in the proportions
and regularity set under Section 285 of the LGC without need of annual appropriation.
● The 1987 Constitution is forthright and unequivocal in ordering that the just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes shall be automatically released to them. With Congress having
established the just share through the LGC, it seems to be beyond debate that the
inclusion of the just share of the LGUs in the annual GAAs is unnecessary, if not
superfluous. Hence, the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes shall be released to
them without need of yearly appropriation.
TOPIC-RELATED DISCUSSION: AUTONOMY
● Local governments are the bodies politic established by law partly as agencies of the State
to assist in the civil governance of the country. Their chief purpose has been to regulate
and administer the local and internal affairs of the cities, municipalities or districts.
● Judge John F. Dillon of the State of Iowa in the United States of America enunciated in
Merriam v. Moody's Executors the rule of statutory construction that came to be
oft-mentioned as Dillon's Rule, to wit: [A] municipal corporation(local government)
possesses and can exercise the following powers and no others: First, those granted in
express words; second, those necessarily implied or necessarily incident to the powers
expressly granted; third, those absolutely essential to the declared objects and purposes of
the corporation-not simply convenient but indispensible; fourth, any fair doubt as to the
existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporation-against the
existence of the powers.
● The formulation of Dillon's Rule has since undergone slight modifications. The word fairly
was added to the second proviso; the word absolutely was deleted from the third proviso;
and the words reasonable and substantial were added to the fourth proviso
● The modified Dillon's Rule has been followed in this jurisdiction, and has remained despite
both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution mandating autonomy for local
governments.
● Local governments owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy.
● There remains no question that Congress possesses and wields plenary power to control
and direct the destiny of the LGUs, subject only to the Constitution itself, for Congress, just
like any branch of the Government, should bow down to the majesty of the Constitution,
which is always supreme.
● The 1987 Constitution limits Congress' control over the LGUs by ordaining in Section 25 of
its Article II that: "The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments." The
autonomy of the LGUs as thereby ensured does not contemplate the fragmentation of the
Philippines into a collection of mini-states, 16 or the creation of imperium in imperio.
● The grant of autonomy simply means that Congress will allow the LGUs to perform certain
functions and exercise certain powers in order not for them to be overly dependent on the
National Government subject to the limitations that the 1987 Constitution or Congress
may impose.
● The constitutional mandate to ensure local autonomy refers to decentralization
● In its broad or general sense, decentralization has two forms in the Philippine setting,
namely: the decentralization of power and the decentralization of administration.
● The ​decentralization of power involves the abdication of political power in favor of the
autonomous LGUs as to grant them the freedom to chart their own destinies and to shape
their futures with minimum intervention from the central government. This amounts to
self-immolation because the autonomous LGUs thereby become accountable not to the
central authorities but to their constituencies.
● On the other hand, the decentralization of administration occurs when the central
government delegates administrative powers to the LGUs as the means of broadening the
base of governmental powers and of making the LGUs more responsive and accountable in
the process, and thereby ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and
more effective partners in the pursuit of the goals of national development and social
progress. This form of decentralization further relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs so that it can concentrate on national concerns.
● Two groups of LGUs enjoy decentralization in distinct ways. The decentralization of power
has been given to the regional units (namely, the Autonomous Region for Muslim
Mindanao [ARMM] and the constitutionally-mandated Cordillera Autonomous Region
[CAR]).
● The other group of LGUs (i.e., provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays) enjoy the
decentralization of administration.
● The distinction can be reasonably understood. The provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays are given decentralized administration to make governance at the local levels
more directly responsive and effective. In turn, the economic, political and social
developments of the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic
growth and development.
● In contrast, the regional autonomy of the ARMM and the CAR aims to permit determinate
groups with common traditions and shared social-cultural characteristics to freely develop
their ways of life and heritage, to exercise their rights, and to be in charge of their own
affairs through the establishment of a special governance regime for certain member
communities who choose their own authorities from within themselves, and exercise the
jurisdictional authority legally accorded to them to decide their internal community affairs.
● The decentralization of power in favor of the regional units is not unlimited but involves
only the powers enumerated by Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and by the
acts of Congress.
● Based on the delineation, decentralization can be considered as the decision by the central
government to empower its subordinates, whether geographically or functionally
constituted, to exercise authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making by
subnational units, and is typically a delegated power, whereby a larger government
chooses to delegate authority to more local governments.
● Political decentralization or devolution occurs when there is a transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources from the central government to the LOU s for the
performance of certain functions. It is a more liberal form of decentralization because
there is an actual transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to grant greater
autonomy to the LGUs in cognizance of their right to self-government, to make them
self-reliant, and to improve their administrative and technical capabilities. It is an act by
which the National Government confers power and authority upon the various LGUs to
perform specific functions and responsibilities. It encompasses reforms to open
sub-national representation and policies to "devolve political authority or electoral
capacities to sub-national actors. " Section 16 to Section 19 of the LGC characterize
political decentralization in the LGC as different LGUs empowered to address the different
needs of their constituents. In contrast, devolution in favor of the regional units is more
expansive because they are given the authority to regulate a wider array of subjects,
including personal, family and property relations.
● Administrative decentralization or deconcentration involves the transfer of functions or
the delegation of authority and responsibility from the national office to the regional and
local offices. Consistent with this concept, the LGC has created the Local School Boards,
the Local Health Boards39 and the Local Development Councils, and has transferred some
of the authority from the agencies of the National Government, like the Department of
Education and the Department of Health, to such bodies to better cope up with the needs
of particular localities.
● Fiscal decentralization means that the LGUs have the power to create their own sources of
revenue in addition to their just share in the national taxes released by the National
Government. It includes the power to allocate their resources in accordance with their
own priorities.
● Fiscal decentralization emanates from a specific constitutional mandate that is expressed
in several provisions of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, specifically: Section 5; Section 6;
and Section 7.
● Fiscal decentralization under the Constitution been formalized from Section 128 to Section
133 of the LGC. To implement the LGUs' entitlement to the just share in the national taxes,
Congress has enacted Section 284 to Section 288 of the LGC. Congress has further enacted
Section 289 to Section 294 of the LGC to define the share of the LGUs in the national
wealth.
● This is limited by Congress in subjecting the LGUs' power to tax to the guidelines set in
Section 130 of the LGC and to the limitations stated in Section 133 of the LGC. The concept
of local fiscal autonomy does not exclude any manner of intervention by the National
Government in the form of supervision if only to ensure that the local programs, fiscal and
otherwise, are consistent with the national goals.
5. REPUBLIC v. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN
G.R. No.170867 and 185941
DATE: ​4 December 2018
By: ​Ju
Topic: ​Municipal Corporation: Fiscal Autonomy and Self Reliance
G.R. No.170867
Petitioner: ​REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY RAPHAEL P.M. LOTILLA,
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), MARGARITO B. TEVES, SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE (DOF), AND ROMULO L. NERI, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM)
Respondent: ​PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR
ABRAHAM KAHLIL B. MITRA
G.R. No. 185941
Petitioner: ​BISHOP PEDRO DULAY ARIGO, CESAR N. SARINO, DR. JOSE ANTONIO N.
SOCRATES, PROF. H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR
Respondent: ​HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, EDUARDO R. ERMITA, HON. ENERGY SECRETARY
ANGELO T. REYES, HON. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES, HON. BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY ROLANDO D. ANDAYA, JR., HON. PALAWAN GOVERNOR JOEL T.
REYES, HON. REPRESENTATIVE ANTONIO C. ALVAREZ (1st District), HON. REPRESENTATIVE
ABRAHAM MITRA (2nd District), RAFAEL E. DEL PILAR, PRESIDENT AND CEO, PNOC
EXPLORATION CORPORATION
Ponente:​ Tijam, J.
FACTS:
● On December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic or National
Government), through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service
Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines,
Incorporated (collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of
petroleum operations in the area known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore
northwest of Palawan.
● Exploration of the area led to the drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
reservoir ​about 80 kilometers ​from the main island of Palawan and 30 kms from
the platform. The Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty
percent (40%) of the National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It
argued that since the reservoir is located within its territorial jurisdiction, it is
entitled to said share under Section 290 of the Local Government Code. The
National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were
approximately 80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the province and is within the national territory of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Palawan is entitled to 40% share in the proceeds of the Project? (Is the
reservoir within the territorial jurisdiction of Palawan so that it is entitled to such
share?) ​NO
2. Whether the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy Applicable in the Philippines? ​NO
HELD:
FIRST ISSUE
● The Local Government Code does not define the term "territorial jurisdiction."
Provisions therein, however, indicate that territorial jurisdiction refers to the LGU's
territorial boundaries. In the creation of municipalities, cities and barangays, the
Local Government Code uniformly requires that the territorial jurisdiction of these
government units be "properly identified by metes and bounds:
o The intention, therefore, is to consider an LGU's territorial jurisdiction as
pertaining to a physical location or area as identified by its
boundaries. That "territorial jurisdiction" refers to the LGU's territorial
boundaries is a construction reflective of the discussion of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution who referred to the local government as the
"locality" that is "hosting" the national resources and a "place where God
chose to locate His bounty."
o It is also consistent with the language ultimately used by the
Constitutional Commission when they referred to the national wealth as
those found within (the LGU's) respective areas.
o By definition, "area" refers to a particular extent of space or surface or
a ​geographic​ region.
● The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local
unit of government cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for
they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ​ultra vires​.​
● Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local government units
will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately
will prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to be avoided by the
Local Government Unit in requiring that the land area of a local government unit
must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with technical descriptions​. Clearly,
therefore, a local government's territorial jurisdiction cannot extend beyond the
boundaries set by its organic law.
● Territorial jurisdiction is defined, not by the local government, but by the law that
creates it; it is delimited, not by the extent of the LGU's exercise of authority, but
by physical boundaries as fixed in its charter.
● Since it refers to a demarcated area, the term "territorial jurisdiction" is evidently
synonymous with the term "​territory​." In fact, "territorial jurisdiction" is defined
as the limits or territory within which authority may be exercised.
● The parties all agree that the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located in the
continental shelf. If the marginal sea is not included in the LGU's territory, with
 more reason should the continental shelf, located miles further, be deemed
excluded therefrom. An LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers to its territorial
boundaries or to its territory. The territory of LGUs, in turn, refers to their land
area, unless expanded by law to include the maritime area. Accordingly, only the
utilization of natural resources found within the land area as delimited by law is
subject to the LGU's equitable share under Sections 290 and 291 of the Local
Government Code.
● Furthermore, the Court examined the organic law creating municipalities of
Palawan and found that the municipalities of Palawan do not include the
continental shelf where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is concededly located. In
fact, with the exception of Kalayaan, which includes the seabed, the subsoil and the
continental margin as part of its demarcated area, the municipalities are either
located within an island or are comprised of islands.
SECOND ISSUE
● Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy is A doctrine of constitutional law which gives
priority to the application of a federal statute where those terms conflict with the
operation of a provincial statute. (In this case, if there is a conflict between the
claim of federal government and the coastal state over the natural resources found
in the area of the coastal state, the claim of the Federal Government is given
priority.)
● There are several reasons why the foregoing doctrine cannot be applied to this
case.
o First​, the U.S. does not appear to have an equitable sharing provision
similar to Section 7, Article X of the 1987 Constitution.
o Second,​ the Philippines is not composed of states that were previously
independent nations.
o Third,​ the resolution of these cases does not necessitate distinguishing
between ​dominium​ and ​imperium​ since neither determines the LGU's
entitlement to the equitable share under Section 7 of Article X.
o Fourth,​ the Court is not called upon to determine who between the
Province of Palawan and the National Government has the paramount or
dominant right to explore or exploit the natural resources in the marginal
sea or beyond.
o Fifth​, adjudication of these cases does not entail upholding the dominion
of the National Government over a political subdivision since ownership
of the natural resources is concededly vested in the State.
o Sixth,​ it is settled that dominion over national wealth belongs to the State
under the regalian doctrine. Ownership of the subject reservoir,
therefore, is a nonissue and what simply needs to be determined is
whether said resource is located within the area or territorial jurisdiction
of the Province of Palawan.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 170867 is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Palawan, Branch 95 in Civil Case No. 3779
is ​REVERSED and ​SET ASIDE​. The Court declares that under existing law, the Province of
Palawan is not entitled to share in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas
project. The Petition in G.R. No. 185941 is ​DENIED​.​ ​SO ORDERED.
6. Batangas CATV v CA
GR 138810 / Sept 29,2004
MJB
Topic​: ​Local Autonomy & National Accountability
Petitioner: ​Batangas CATV
Respondent:​ CA & Sangguniang Panglunsod and Batangas City Mayor
Ponente: ​Sandoval - Gutierrez
FACTS:
● On July 28, 1986, respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution No. 210
granting petitioner a permit to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas
City.
o Section 8 of the Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its
subscribers the maximum rates specified therein, “​provided, however, that
any increase of rates shall be subject to the approval of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod​.
● Sometime in November 1993, petitioner increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to
P180.00 per month.
● As a result, respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit
unless it secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to
Resolution No. 210.
● Respondent argues that Resolution was enacted pursuant to Sec. 177 (c) & (d) of BP 337
(LGC of 1983) which authorizes LGUs to regulate businesses and is in the nature of a
contract between Petitioner and Respondent.
● Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for injunction
alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod ​has no authority to regulate the
subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive Order No. 205,
the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole authority to regulate
the CATV operation in the Philippines​.
ISSUE: ​Whether a local government unit (LGU) regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators within its territorial jurisdiction? - NOPE
RULING:
● The resolution is an enactment of an LGU acting only as agent of the national legislature.
There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate CATV.
● Whatever authority the LGUs had before, the same had been withdrawn when
President Marcos issued PD 1512 terminating all franchises, permits or certificates for
the operation of CATV system previously granted by local governments.
● Today, pursuant to Sec. 3 of EO 436 only persons, associations, partnerships,
corporations or cooperatives granted a Provisional Authority or Certificate of Authority
by the NTC may install, operate and maintain a cable television system or render cable
television service within a service area.
● It is clear that in the absence of constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities
have no power to grant franchises.
● Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the
obligation of a contract does not extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a
municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires.
● The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the
State to LGUs.
● Through this, LGUs may prescribe regulations to protect the lives, health, and property
of their constituents and maintain peace and order within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
o Accordingly, we have upheld enactments providing, for instance, the
regulation of gambling, the occupation of rig drivers, the installation and
operation of pinball machines, the maintenance and operation of cockpits, the
exhumation and transfer of corpses from public burial grounds, and the
operation of hotels, motels, and lodging houses as valid exercises by local
legislatures of the police power under the general welfare clause.
● Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the general
welfare clause.
● This is primarily because the CATV system commits the indiscretion of crossing public
properties. (It uses public properties in order to reach subscribers.)
● The physical realities of constructing CATV system the use of public streets, rights of
ways, the founding of structures, and the parceling of large regions allow an LGU a
certain degree of regulation over CATV operators. This is the same regulation that it
exercises over all private enterprises within its territory.
● But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause, we cannot
sustain Resolution No. 210.
● We are convinced that respondents strayed from the well-recognized limits of its power.
The flaws in Resolution No. 210 are:
o (1) it violates the mandate of existing laws and
o (2) it violates the States deregulation policy over the CATV industry.
● The apparent defect in Resolution No. 210 is that it contravenes E.O. No. 205 and E.O.
No. 436 insofar as it permits respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod to usurp a power
exclusively vested in the NTC, i.e., the power to fix the subscriber rates charged by CATV
operators.
● The fixing of subscriber rates is definitely one of the matters within the NTCs exclusive
domain.
● it is appropriate to stress that where the state legislature has made provision for the
regulation of conduct, it has manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be
fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot
regulate the same conduct.
● Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall
be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in
violation of the said law.
o It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status
and subordinate to the laws of the state.
o An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide
application is universally held to be invalid.
o ​The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which
infringe the spirit of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state.
o ​In every power to pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied
restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
o "The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene
a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national
government.
o Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by
Congress as the national lawmaking body.
o The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher
than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their
power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the
statute.
o 'Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights
wholly from the legislature.
o It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy.
o As it may destroy, it may abridge and control.
o Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the right, the legislature
might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great a folly and
so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in
the State, and the corporation could not prevent it.
May Contention sila na yung RA 7160 (Local Government Code) na repealed EO 205
● No basis to conclude that RA 7160 repealed EO 205 either expressly or impliedly, The
repealing clause in RA7160 mentions specific law or parts which are repealed (EO 205 is
not one of them)
Regarding Deregulation
● Deregulation is the reduction of government regulation of business to permit freer
markets and competition.
● Oftentimes, the State, through its regulatory agencies, carries out a policy of
deregulation to attain certain objectives or to address certain problems. In the field of
telecommunications, it is recognized that many areas in the Philippines are still
unserved or underserved.
● Thus, to encourage private sectors to venture in this field and be partners of the
government in stimulating the growth and development of telecommunications, the
State promoted the policy of deregulation.
 expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among others, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and
self-reliant, scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents,
maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants."​
 

NOTES: YOU CAN JUST SKIP THIS PART ( JUST IN CASE LANG)
HISTORY
Review of pertinent laws and jurisprudence on w/n a LGU can regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction.
● Marcos - PD 1512​: Granted an exclusive franchise to Sining Makulay, Inc. to
operate CATV system anywhere in the Philippines. It also terminated all permits for
the operation of CATV system previously granted by LGUs. ​(LOL SOBRANG
MONOPOLIZED)
● Marcos - LOI No. 894​: Vested upon the Chairman of the Board of Communications
direct supervision over the operations of Sining Makulay, Inc.
● Marcos - EO 546​: NTC was created and its functions entailed issuing certificates for
the operation of communications utilities and services, and fixing rates.
● Cory Aquino - EO 205​: Mandated NTC to grant certificates of authority to CATV
operators and to issue the IRR.
● Ramos -EO 436​: Restated NTC’s regulatory terms more definitively: “The regulation
and supervision of the cable television industry in the Philippines shall remain
vested ​solely ​with the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC). “

Powers ng NTC
a. Determination of rates,
b. Issuance of "certificates of authority,
c. Establishment of areas of operation,
d. Examination and assessment of the legal, technical and financial qualifications of
applicant operators,
e. Granting of permits for the use of frequencies,
f. Regulation of ownership and operation,
g. Adjudication of issues arising from its functions,
h. Other similar matters
● Within these areas, the ntc reigns supreme as it possesses the exclusive power to
regulate — a power comprising varied acts, such as "to x, establish, or control; to
adjust by rule, method or established mode; to direct by rule or restriction; or to
subject to governing principles or laws.

Local Government Code - Section 16

SECTION 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
 7. League of Provinces of the Philippines v. DENR
GR. No. 175368 | April 11, 2013
LB
Topic​: ​Local Autonomy & National Accountability
Petitioner: ​League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated
under the Local Government Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including
the Province of Bulacan
Respondent:​ DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes
Ponente: ​Sandoval - Gutierrez
OTHER PARTIES:
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) – applicant for a Financial
and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau,
Regional Office No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) – applicants for Quarry Permit; filed before the
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) – applicant for Exploration Permit; filed
before the PENRO of Bulacan
FACTS:
● Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998, MGB-RO
denied Golden Falcon’s application for FTAA for failure to secure the required area
clearances from the Forest Management Sector and Lands Management Sector of
the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).
● On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed
with the PENRO of Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same
area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden
Falcon’s appeal on July 16, 2004.
● AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit
covering the same subject area on September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights
resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons applying for
quarry permits – the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcon’s
application became open to other permit applications from other parties
● On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB
Director Ramos stated that the denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final
on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after Golden Falcon received the order of denial
of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to
permit applications only on that date.
● Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the
issue, stating that the subject area became open for new applications on the date
of the first denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-RO’s order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order
of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April 29
order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.
● Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications
for quarry permit, now apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining
permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of Bulacan recommended to the
Governor the approval of said applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the
small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.
● The ​DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the
governor’s issuance of small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB
Director Ramos that the area was open to mining location only on August 11, 2004
(15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit filed
on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed
to mining location. On the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area
was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its application was valid. The
small-scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No.
7076 and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942
because the area was never proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining
program.
● The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying
that that this is not an action of one province alone, but the collective action of all
provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not only benefit one
province, but all provinces and all local governments. It also contended that:
● Sec. 17 of the LGC, Sec. 24 of the People’s Small Scale Mining Act, and
DENR AO 9640 did not explicitly confer upon respondents DENR and
DENR Sec. the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void or cancel the
permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale mining contracts
entered into by the PMRB.
● Section 17 (b)(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and Section
24 of R.A. No. 7076, which confer upon respondents DENR and the DENR
Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the Constitution
states that the President (and Executive Departments and her alter-egos)
has the power of supervision only, not control, over acts of the local
government units, and grants the local government units autonomy
under Art. X, Sec. 4.
● The relationship between the President and the Provinces or respondent
DENR, as the alter ego of the President, and the Province of Bulacan is
one of executive supervision, not one of executive control. The term
"control" has been defined as the power of an officer to alter or modify
or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of
his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,
while the term "supervision" is the power of a superior officer to see to it
that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law.
● Respondent DENR Secretary went beyond mere executive supervision
and exercised control when he nullified the small-scale mining permits
granted by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan
ISSUE:
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive
control, not merely supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR
Secretary substituted the judgment of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the
Small-Scale Mining Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of
control, are unconstitutional, as the Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts)
has the power of supervision only, not control over acts of LGUs.
RULING:
1. The quasi-judicial function of the DENR Secretary can neither be equated with
"substitution of judgment" of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining Permits
nor "control" over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights ● Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is
of AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law. granted by three statutes: (1) R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2)
● The decision of the DENR Secretary, declaring that the Application for Exploration R.A. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of 1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or
Permit of AMTC was valid and may be given due course, and canceling the the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the Provincial Governor, emanated from the ○ Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
power of review granted to the DENR Secretary under R.A. No. 7076 and its subordinate officer had done in the performance of his/her duties and to
Implementing Rules and Regulations. substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision is the
○ The DENR Secretary's power to review and, therefore, decide, in this power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
case, the issue on the validity of the issuance of the Small-Scale Mining function in accordance with law.
Permits by the Provincial Governor as recommended by the PMRB, is a
quasi-judicial function, which involves the determination of what the law 2. The assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are
is, and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to not unconstitutional.
the matter in controversy and, on the basis thereof and the facts ● Beltran v. The Secretary of Health: The fundamental criterion is that all reasonable
obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights. doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. Every law
○ The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under R.A. No. 7076 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it
and its Implementing Rules and Regulations to the extent necessary in must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
settling disputes, conflicts or litigations over conflicting claims. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. Those who
● Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Administrative Code of 1987 provides petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly
that the DENR is, subject to law and higher authority, in charge of carrying out the establish the basis therefor. Otherwise, the petition must fail.
State's constitutional mandate, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, to ● In this case, the Court finds that the grounds raised by petitioner to challenge the
control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of constitutionality of Section 17 (b )(3)(iii) of the Local Government Code of 1991 and
the country's natural resources. Section 24 'of R.A. No.7076 failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said
○ Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining law in the provinces is provisions of law.
made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under  
the Local Government Code of 1991, while the People's Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 provides that the People's Small-Scale Mining
Program is to be implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination
with other concerned local government agencies.
● Indeed, Section 4, Article X (Local Government) of the Constitution states that
"[t]he President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local
governments," and Section 25 of the Local Government Code reiterates the same.
General supervision by the President means no more than seeing to it that laws are
faithfully executed or that subordinate officers act within the law.
● The Court has clarified that the constitutional guarantee of ​local autonomy in the
Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of
government authority. ​It does not make local governments sovereign within the
State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to
limitations like following national policies or standards, and those provided by
the Local Government Code, as the structuring of local governments and the
allocation of powers, responsibilities, and resources among the different local
government units and local officials have been placed by the Constitution in the
hands of Congress38 under Section 3, Article X of the Constitution.
● It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate
to control and supervise the exploration, development and utilization of the
country’s natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, b(3)(III) of the
LGC. Hence, ​the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the provincial
government is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The
LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial government the enforcement of the
small-scale mining law.
 8 Province of Rizal v Executive Secretary
GR No 129546
December 13, 2005
Boligor
Topic: ​Local Autonomy and Decision Making
Petitioner: ​PROVINCE OF RIZAL, MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MATEO, PINTONG BOCAUE
MULTIPURPOSE COOPERATIVE, CONCERNED CITIZENS OF RIZAL, INC., ROLANDO E.
VILLACORTE, BERNARDO HIDALGO, ANANIAS EBUENGA, VILMA T. MONTAJES, FEDERICO
MUNAR, JR., ROLANDO BEÑAS, SR., ET AL., and KILOSBAYAN, INC.
Respondent: ​EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT & NATURAL
RESOURCES, LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS &
HIGHWAYS, SECRETARY OF BUDGET & MANAGEMENT, METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
Ponente: ​Peralta, ​J.
Summary: ​Parts of Marikina Watershed were to be used as dumpsite ground for the garbage
crisis plaguing Metro Manila. The lands were set aside by the Office of the President Ramos
through Proclamation No. 365. The petitioners opposed this since the creation of the
dumpsite under the territorial jurisdiction would compromise the health of their
constituents. The dumpsite was then closed. However, President Estrada re-opened the
dumpsite.
Facts: ​(long case)
● November 17 1988: Respondent DPWH and DENR Secretaries and the Governor of
the Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA).
○ There, DENR agreed to allow the utilization by MMC of its land property
(located in San Mateo) as a sanitary landfill site and DPWH shall
commence the construction of said dumpsite upon signing of the
agreement.
● February 7, 8, 10 1989: The ​Sangguniang Bayan o ​ f San Mateo wrote Gov. Elfren
Cruz of the MMC, Sec. Fiorello Estuar of the DPWH, the Presidential Task Force on
Solid Waste Management, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, and Sec.
Fulgencio Factoran, Jr, pointing out that it had recently passed a Resolution
banning the creation of dump sites for Metro Manila within its jurisdiction. They
asked to suspend and temporarily hold in abeyance the operations for San Mateo
landfill Dumpsite.
● Turns out, the land was part of the Marikina Watershed Reservation Area and
owned by DENR.
● May 31 1989: The Forest Officers of DENR-IV Rizal Province submitted a
Memorandum, recommending that the MMC Dumping Site be stopped and
discouraged without any delay.
○ It submitted another Investigation Report stating that the dumping site is
without concurrence of the Provincial Governor, Rizal Province and
without any permit from DENR who has functional jurisdiction over the
Watershed Reservation.
○ There was also no permit issued to MMC to utilize the land for dumping
purposes.
● February 19 1990: The DENR through Undersecretary Roque granted the Metro
Manila Authority or MMA (formerly MMC) an Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) for the operation of the dumpside.
● Less than six months after the issuance of the ECC, the dumpsite operation was
suspended by Undersecretary Roque. Through a letter addressed to DPWH
Secretary:
○ “Upon site investigation conducted by Environmental Management
Bureau staff on development activities at the San Mateo Landfill Site, it
was ascertained that ground slumping and erosion have resulted from
improper development of the site…. In view of this, we are forced to
suspend the Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) issued until
appropriate modified plans are submitted and approved by this Office for
implementation.”
● June 21 1993: the Acting Mayor of San Mateo, Enrique Rodriguez, Jr., Barangay
Captain Dominador Vergara, and petitioner Rolando E. Villacorte, Chairman of the
Pintong Bocaue Multipurpose Cooperative (PBMC) wrote then President Fidel V.
Ramos also expressed their objections to the continued operation of the MMA
dumpsite.
● Despite the various objections and recommendations raised by the government
agencies aforementioned, the Office of the President, through Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres, signed and issued Proclamation No. 635 on 28 August 1995,
"Excluding from the Marikina Watershed Reservation Certain Parcels of Land
Embraced Therein for Use as Sanitary Landfill Sites and Similar Waste Disposal
Under the Administration of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority."
○ The subject lands were now excluded from the Marikina Watershed
Reservation for the purpose of developing it as a sanitary landfill and
other related waste disposal facilities.
● The petitioners filed before the CA a civil action for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus with application for TRO. However, this was denied.
● On 05 January 1998, while the appeal was pending, the petitioners filed a Motion
for Temporary Restraining Order, pointing out that the effects of the El Niño
phenomenon would be aggravated by the relentless destruction of the Marikina
Watershed Reservation.
 ○ The petitioners reiterated their prayer that respondent MMDA be
temporarily enjoined from further dumping waste into the site
● On 28 January 1999, the petitioners filed a Motion for Early Resolution,19 calling
attention to the continued expansion of the dumpsite by the MMDA that caused
the people of Antipolo to stage a rally and barricade the Marcos Highway to stop
the dump trucks from reaching the site for five successive days
● As a result, MMDA officials, headed by then Chairman Jejomar Binay, agreed to
abandon the dumpsite after six months.
● On 19 July 1999, then President Joseph E. Estrada, taking cognizance of the gravity
of the problems in the affected areas and the likelihood that violence would erupt
among the parties involved, issued a Memorandum ordering the closure of the
dumpsite
● On 11 January 2001, President Estrada directed Department of Interior and Local
Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA Chairman Binay to reopen the San
Mateo dumpsite "in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in
Metro Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation epidemic."
● Claiming the above events constituted a "clear and present danger of violence
erupting in the affected areas," the petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for
Restraining Order, the Court then issued a TRO
● Although petitioners did not raise the question that the project was not consulted
and approved by their appropriate Sanggunian, the court took it into consideration
since a mere MOA does not guarantee the dump site’s permanent closure.
○ On 20 July 1999, the Presidential Committee on Flagship Programs and
Projects and the MMDA entered into a MOA with the Provincial
Government of Rizal, the Municipality of San Mateo, and the City of
Antipolo, whereby the latter agreed to an extension for the use of the
dumpsite until 31 December 2000, at which time it would be
permanently closed.
○ Despite this agreement, President Estrada directed Department of
Interior and Local Government Secretary Alfredo Lim and MMDA
Chairman Binay to reopen the San Mateo dumpsite on 11 January 2001,
"in view of the emergency situation of uncollected garbage in Metro
Manila, resulting in a critical and imminent health and sanitation
epidemic;" our issuance of a TRO on 24 January 2001 prevented the
dumpsite’s reopening.
Issue: ​Whether prior consultation and prior approval is required before implementation of
the dump site project? YES.
● The Local Government Code (LGC) gives to local government units all the necessary
powers to promote the general welfare of their inhabitants.
● The circumstances under which Proclamation No. 635 was passed also violates Rep.
Act No. 7160, or the Local Government Code.
● Contrary to the averment of the respondents, Proclamation No. 635, which was
passed on 28 August 1995, is subject to the provisions of the Local Government
Code, which was approved four years earlier, on 10 October 1991.
○ Section 2(c) of the said law declares that it is the policy of the state " to
require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's
organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any
project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions."
Likewise, Section 27 requires prior consultations before a program shall
be implemented by government authorities and the prior approval of the
sanggunian ​is obtained.
● During the oral arguments at the hearing for the temporary restraining order,
Director Uranza of the MMDA Solid Waste Management Task Force declared
before the Court of Appeals that they had conducted the required consultations.
However, he added that "this is the problem, sir, the officials we may have been
talking with at the time this was established may no longer be incumbent and this
is our difficulty now. That is what we are trying to do now, a continuing dialogue."
○ The ambivalent reply of Director Uranza was brought to the fore when, at
the height of the protest rally and barricade along Marcos Highway to
stop dump trucks from reaching the site, ​all ​the municipal mayors of the
province of Rizal openly declared their full support for the rally and
notified the MMDA that they would oppose any further attempt to dump
garbage in their province.
● The municipal mayors acted within the scope of their powers, and were in fact
fulfilling their mandate, when they did this.
○ Section 16 allows every local government unit to "exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers
necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective
governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the
general welfare," which involve, among other things, "promoting health
and safety, enhancing the right of the people to a balanced ecology, and
preserving the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. "
● In ​Lina , Jr. v. Paño​, the Court held that Section 2 (c), requiring consultations with
the appropriate local government units, should apply to national government
projects affecting the environmental or ecological balance of the particular
community implementing the project.
● Section 27 of the Code should be read in conjunction with Section 26 thereof.
Section 26 reads:
○ SECTION 26. Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance
of Ecological Balance. It shall be the duty of every national agency or
 government-owned or controlled corporation authorizing or involved in
the planning and implementation of any project or program that may
cause pollution, climatic change, depletion of non-renewable resources,
loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover, and extinction of animal or
plant species, to consult with the local government units,
nongovernmental organizations, and other sectors concerned and explain
the goals and objectives of the project or program, its impact upon the
people and the community in terms of environmental or ecological
balance, and the measures that will be undertaken to prevent or
minimize the adverse effects thereof.
● Thus, ​the projects and programs mentioned in Section 27 should be interpreted
to mean projects and programs whose effects are among those enumerated in
Section 26 and 27, to wit, those that: (1) may cause pollution; (2) may bring about
climatic change; (3) may cause the depletion of non-renewable resources; (4) may
result in loss of crop land, range-land, or forest cover; (5) may eradicate certain
animal or plant species from the face of the planet; and (6) other projects or
programs that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in
the locality where these will be implemented​. Obviously, none of these effects will
be produced by the introduction of lotto in the province of Laguna.
● We reiterated this doctrine in the recent case of ​Bangus Fry Fisherfolk v. Lanzanas​,
where we held that there was no statutory requirement for the ​sangguniang bayan
of Puerto Galera to approve the construction of a mooring facility, as Sections 26
and 27 are inapplicable to projects which are not environmentally critical.
● Moreover, Section 447, which enumerates the powers, duties and functions of the
municipality, grants the ​sangguniang bayan ​the power to, among other things,
"enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of th(e)
Code." These include:
○ (1) Approving ordinances and passing resolutions to ​protect the
environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger
the environment​, such as dynamite fishing and other forms of
destructive fishing, illegal logging and smuggling of logs, smuggling of
natural resources products and of endangered species of flora and fauna,
slash and burn farming, ​and such other activities which result in
pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes, or of
ecological imbalance​;
○ (2) Prescribing reasonable limits and restraints on the use of property
within the jurisdiction of the municipality, ​adopting a comprehensive
land use plan for the municipality, reclassifying land within the
jurisdiction of the city, subject to the pertinent provisions of this Code,
enacting integrated zoning ordinances in consonance with the approved
comprehensive land use plan, subject to existing laws, rules and
regulations; establishing fire limits or zones, particularly in populous
centers; and regulating the construction, repair or modification of
buildings within said fire limits or zones in accordance with the provisions
of this Code;
○ (3) Approving ordinances which shall ensure the efficient and effective
delivery of the basic services and facilities as provided for under Section
17 of this Code, and in addition to said services and facilities, …​providing
for the establishment, maintenance, protection, and conservation of
communal forests and watersheds, tree parks, greenbelts, mangroves,
and other similar forest development projects ….and, subject to existing
laws, establishing and providing for the maintenance, repair and
operation of an efficient waterworks system to supply water for the
inhabitants and ​purifying the source of the water supply​; regulating the
construction, maintenance, repair and use of hydrants, pumps, cisterns
and reservoirs; ​protecting the purity and quantity of the water supply of
the municipality ​and, for this purpose, ​extending the coverage of
appropriate ordinances over all territory within the drainage area of
said water supply and within one hundred (100) meters of the reservoir,
conduit, canal, aqueduct, pumping station, or watershed used in
connection with the water service; and regulating the consumption, use
or wastage of water."
● Under the Local Government Code, therefore, two requisites must be met before
a national project that affects the environmental and ecological balance of local
communities can be implemented: prior ​consultation ​with the affected local
communities, and prior ​approval ​of the project by the appropriate ​sanggunian​.
Absent either of these mandatory requirements, the project’s implementation is
illegal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 41330, dated 13 June 1997, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining
order issued by the Court on 24 January 2001 is hereby made permanent.
 8. SJS v. Lim
GR 198836 / November 25, 2014
BJ
Topic​: ​Local Autonomy & National Accountability
Petitioner: ​SJS Officers
Respondent:​ Mayor Alfredo Lim
Ponente: ​Perez
FACTS:
● On 12 October 2001, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by oil
companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell) and Department of Energy for the creation
of a Master Plan to address and minimize the potential risks and hazards posed by
the proximity of communities, business and offices to Pandacan oil terminals
without affecting security and reliability of supply and distribution of petroleum
products.
● On 20 November 2001, the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod (SP) enacted Ordinance No.
8027 which reclassifies the land use of Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas
from Industrial II to Commercial I.
● Owners and operators of the businesses affected by the reclassification were given
six (6) months from the date of effectivity to stop the operation of their businesses.
It was later extended until 30 April 2003.
● On 4 December 2002, a petition for mandamus was filed before the Supreme Court
(SC) to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
● Unknown to the SC, the oil companies filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila an action to annul Ordinance No. 8027 with application for writs of
preliminary prohibitory injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction. The same
was issued in favor of Chevron and Shell. Petron, on the other hand, obtained a
status quo on 4 August 2004.
● On 16 June 2006, Mayor Jose Atienza, Jr. approved Ordinance No. 8119 entitled
“An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning
Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and
Amendment thereto”. This designates Pandacan oil depot area as a Planned Unit
Development/Overlay Zone.
● On 7 March 2007, the SC granted the petition for mandamus and directed Mayor
Atienza to immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027. It declared that the objective
of the ordinance is to protect the residents of manila from the catastrophic
devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan
Terminals.
● The oil companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) on the 7 March 2007
Decision. The SC later resolved that Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and that it
was not impliedly repealed by Ordinance No. 8119 as there is no irreconcilable
conflict between them.
● SC later on denied with finality the second MR of the oil companies.
● On 14 May 2009, during the incumbency of Mayor Alfredo Lim (Mayor Lim), the SP
enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The Industrial Zone under Ordinance No. 8119 was
limited to Light Industrial Zone, Ordinance No. 8187 appended to the list a Medium
and a Heavy Industrial Zone where petroleum refineries and oil depots are
expressly allowed.
● Petitioners Social Justice Society Officers, Mayor Atienza, et.al. filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 8187. Their
contentions are as follows:
- It is an invalid exercise of police power because it does not promote the
general welfare of the people
- It is violative of Section 15 and 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution as
well as health and environment related municipal laws and international
conventions and treaties, such as: Clean Air Act; Environment Code; Toxic
and Hazardous Wastes Law; Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human
relations; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; and Convention on the
Rights of the Child
- The title of Ordinance No. 8187 purports to amend or repeal Ordinance
No. 8119 when it actually intends to repeal Ordinance No. 8027
● On the other hand, the respondents Mayor Lim, et.al. and the intervenors oil
companies contend that:
- The petitioners have no legal standing to sue whether as citizens,
taxpayers or legislators. They further failed to show that they have
suffered any injury or threat of injury as a result of the act complained of
- The petition should be dismissed outright for failure to properly apply the
related provisions of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and/or the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases relative to the appropriate
remedy available
- The principle of the hierarchy of courts is violated because the SC only
exercises appellate jurisdiction over cases involving the constitutionality
or validity of an ordinance under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution
- It is the function of the SP to enact zoning ordinance without prior
referral to the Manila Zoning Board of Adjustment and Appeals; thus, it
may repeal all or part of zoning ordinance sought to be modified
- There is a valid exercise of police power
● On 28 August 2012, the SP enacted Ordinance No. 8283 which essentially amended
the assailed Ordinance to exclude the area where petroleum refineries and oil
depots are located from the Industrial Zone. The same was vetoed by Mayor Lim.
ISSUE: ​WON Ordinance No. 8187 is unconstitutional in relation to the Pandacan Terminals
RULING:
1. Yes. In striking down the contrary provisions of the assailed Ordinance relative to
the continued stay of the oil depots, the SC followed the same line of reasoning
used in its 7 March 2007 decision, to wit:
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting
a sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and general
welfare of the residents of Manila. The ​Sanggunian was impelled to take
measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals.
Towards this objective, the ​Sanggunian ​reclassified the area defined in
the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
 The following facts were found by the Committee on Housing,
Resettlement and Urban Development of the City of Manila
which recommended the approval of the ordinance:

(1) The depot facilities contained 313.5 million liters of highly

flammable and highly volatile products which include
petroleum gas, liquefied petroleum gas, aviation fuel,
diesel, gasoline, kerosene and fuel oil among others;
(2) The depot is open to attack through land, water and air;
(3) It is situated in a densely populated place and near
Malacañang Palace; and
(4) In case of an explosion or conflagration in the depot, the
fire could spread to the neighboring communities.

The Ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life,

security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a
particular class. The depot is perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a
representation of western interests which means that it is a terrorist
target. As long as there is such a target in their midst, the residents of
Manila are not safe. It therefore becomes necessary to remove these
terminals to dissipate the threat.”

The same best interest of the public guides the present decision. The
Pandacan oil depot remains a terrorist target even if the contents have been
lessened. In the absence of any convincing reason to persuade the Court that the
life, security and safety of the inhabitants of Manila are no longer put at risk by the
presence of the oil depots, the SC holds that the Ordinance No. 8187 in relation to
the Pandacan Terminals is invalid and unconstitutional.

For, given that the threat sought to be prevented may strike at one point
or another, no matter how remote it is as perceived by one or some, the SC cannot
allow the right to life be dependent on the unlikelihood of an event. Statistics and
theories of probability have no place in situations where the very life of not just an
individual but of residents of big neighbourhoods is at stake.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION

1. Ordinance No. 8187 is declared unconstitutional and invalid with respect to the
continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals.
2. The incumbent mayor of the City of Manila is ordered to cease and desist from
enforcing Ordinance No. 8187 and to oversee the relocation and transfer of the oil
terminals out of the Pandacan area
3. The oil companies shall, within a non-extendible period of forty-five (45) days,
submit to the RTC Manila, Branch 39 an updated comprehensive plan and
relocation schedule, which relocation shall be completed not later than six (6)
months from the date the required document is submitted.
 10 Mosqueda v Philippine Banana Export Growers
G.R. No. 189185
DATE: August 16, 2016
By: ​Casas
Topic: ​ Local Autonomy and Decision Making
Petitioner: ​WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN
ALCOMENDRAS, CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND
LEDEVINA ADLAWAN
Respondent: ​PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC., DAVAO
FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Ponente:​ , J. Bersamin
FACTS
● Davao Mayor Duterte approved ordinance no. 0309-07. Pursuant to Section 5 of
the ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three
months thereafte
● The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its
members, namely: Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (PBGEA, ​et al.​), filed their petition in the RTC to
challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of
provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the
unreasonable exercise of police power; violated the equal protection clause;
amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of law; and lacked
publication pursuant] to Section 511​ ​of Republic Act No. 7160 (​Local Government
Code)​ .
● RTC declared the ordinance valid and constitutional.
o City of Davao had validly exercised police power​ ​under the General
Welfare Clause of the ​Local Government Code​; But RTC said the 3 month
transition period should be extended.
● CA Reversed.​ The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of
protecting the public and the environment against the harmful effects of aerial
spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of all
forms of substances, on the other. It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-meter
buffer zone within and around the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07 constituted taking of property without due process because
the landowners were thereby compelled to cede portions of their property without
just compensation; that the exercise of police power to require the buffer zone was
invalid because there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was
obnoxious to the public welfare; and that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was
unconstitutional because of the absence of a separability clause.
ISSUE: W/N City of Davao exceeded its authority in enacting the ordinane? Yes.
HELD:
LGC discussion (you can skip):
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and
occupations in order to promote the general welfare.​ ​Such legislative powers spring from the
delegation thereof by Congress through either the ​Local Government Code​ or a special law.
The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of the ​Local Government Code​ embodies the
legislative grant that enables the local government unit to effectively accomplish and carry
out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain local autonomy.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the ​general legislative
power​ and the ​police power proper​. General legislative power refers to the power delegated
by Congress to the local legislative body, or the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod​ in the case of
Dayao City,​ ​to enable the local legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations.
This power is limited in that the enacted ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the
power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge the powers and duties legally conferred
to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the other hand, authorizes the local
government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the health and safety,
prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local government
unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to
their exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the
ordinance. The City of Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote
the general welfare, specifically the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be
construed, however, as a valid license for the City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems
fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line separates authority to enact
legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
Discussion on topic:
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the
City of Davao performed an ​ultra vires​ act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao
could act only as an agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect
the will of its principal. In Batangas ​CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals​:
Where the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has
manifested its intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and
that a municipality, under its general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In ​Keller vs.
State​, it was held that: ​"
Where there is no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to
adopt ordinances regulating certain matters which are specifically covered by a
general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts to regulate the
subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be
rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature
has appropriated the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding
throughout the State​." A reason advanced for this view is that such ordinances are
in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations
shall be exercised by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a
resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and
subordinate to the laws of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of
 general character and statewide application is universally held to be invalid. The
principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal authorities,
under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit
of a state law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to
pass ordinances given to a municipality, there is an implied restriction that the
ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered by the
jurisdiction of the FPA, which has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum
Circular No. 02, Series of 2009​, entitled ​Good Agricultural Practices for Aerial Spraying of
Fungicide in Banana Plantations​. While Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying in
banana plantations within the City of Davao, Memorandum Circular No. 02 seeks to regulate
the conduct of aerial spraying in banana plantations​ ​pursuant to Section 6, Presidential
Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP).
Memorandum Circular No. 02 covers safety procedures,​ ​handling​ ​and
post-application, including the qualifications of applicators,​ ​storing of fungicides, safety and
equipment of plantation personnel,​ ​all of which are incompatible with the prohibition against
aerial spraying under Ordinance No. 0309-07.
balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant
scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity
and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and
order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Other issues discussed by the CA:
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive in view of
the engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial spraying to
truck-mounted boom spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection
Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a) of the ordinance - which defined the term ​aerial spraying​ -
did not make reasonable distinction between the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of
liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the different classes of pesticides or
fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that could be beneficial and
could enhance agricultural production.

Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its
delegated authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must
be struck down also for being an ​ultra vires​ act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Davao City.

We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right to
regulate activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of
the ​Local Government Code​ to promote the general welfare of the people through
regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances that conform with the policy directions of the
National Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this test as it contravenes the
specific regulatory policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a nationwide scale of
the National Government, through the FPA.

WHEREFORE​, the Court ​DENIES​ the consolidated petitions for review on ​certiorari​ for their
lack of merit; ​AFFIRMS​ the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No.
01389-MIN. declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 ​UNCONSTITUTIONAL​; ​PERMANENTLY
ENJOINS​ respondent City of Davao, and all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its
authority, from enforcing and implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ​ORDERS​ the
petitioners to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Notes:

Sec. 16. ​General Welfare​. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local
government units shall ensure and support among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a

11. City of Batangas v. Philippine Shell Petroleum
G.R. No. 195003
June 7, 2017
By: CHING
Topic: Local Autonomy and Decision-Making
Petitioner: City of Batangas, represented by Hon. Severina Vilma Abaya, in her
Capacity as City Mayor of Batangas
Respondent: Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation and Shell Philippines Exploration
B.V.
Ponente: Caguioa, J.
FACTS:
● Batangas City is a local government unit created by virtue of its charter (RA 5495).
Under RA 5496, Batangas City constitutes a political body corporate, and is
endowed with powers which pertain to a municipal corporation. The ​Sangguniang
Panlungsod​ is the legislative body of Batangas City.
● The ​Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted the Assailed Ordinance which requires heavy
industries operating along the portions of Batangas Bay within the territorial
jurisdiction of Batangas City to construct desalination plants to facilitate the use of
seawater as coolant for their industrial facilities.
● The Assailed Ordinance was approved by the city mayor.
● Philippine Shell Petroleum Corporation (PSPC) filed against Batangas City and the
Sangguniang Panlungsod ​a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of the Assailed
Ordinance.
● PSPC argued that the Assailed Ordinance:
○ constitutes an invalid exercise of police power as it failed to meet the
substantive requirements for validity;
○ contravenes the Water Code of the Philippines and encroaches upon the
power of the National Water Resources Board to regulate and control the
Philippines’ water resources;
○ unduly singles out heavy industries and holds them solely accountable for
the loss of water and destruction of aquifers without basis, resulting in
the deprivation of their property rights without due process of law.
● On the procedural aspect, PSPC contended that the Assailed Ordinance:
○ was not posted or published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province, nor were public hearings or consultations involving concerned
parties conducted thereon;
○ has no records of being forwarded to the ​Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Province of Batangas after it was approved by the city mayor as
required by Sec. 56 of the LGC.
● According to Batangas City:
○ the rationale of the Assailed Ordinance is to stop PSPC and other
industries similarly situated from relying “too much” on ground water as
coolants for their machineries, and alternatively promote the use of
seawater for such purpose, considering that fresh ground water is a
“perishable commodity.”
○ countered that the "regulation or prohibition" on the use of ground
water is merely incidental to the main purpose of the Assailed Ordinance,
which is to compel heavy industries such as PSPC to construct
desalination plants. Hence, provisions having regulatory and prohibitive
effect may be taken out of the Assailed Ordinance without entirely
impairing its validity.
● Further Batangas City argues that:
○ the Assailed Ordinance had been published in Dyaryo Veritas, a
newspaper of general circulation in the area;
○ a joint public hearing on the Assailed Ordinance had in fact been
conducted by the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod and ​Sangguniang
Panlalawigan​, where PSPC was duly represented.
○ since PSPC and SPEX, along with other concerned heavy industries,
essentially question the former' s authority to regulate and prohibit the
use of fresh ground water, they should have first referred their
grievances to NWRB by filing a complaint for adjudication on the
threatened revocation of their existing water permits.
● RTC declared the Assailed Ordinance null and void. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: W/N the enactment of the Assailed Ordinance constitutes a valid exercise of its
police power?
RULING:
● No. By enacting the Assailed Ordinance, Batangas City acted in excess of the
powers granted to it as an LGU, rendering the Assailed Ordinance ​ultra vires​.
● In order for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate
powers of the concerned LGU to enact, but must also be passed in accordance with
the procedure prescribed by law. Moreover, substantively, the ordinance:
○ must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
○ must not be unfair or oppressive;
○ must not be partial or discriminatory;
○ must not prohibit, but may regulate trade;
○ must be general and consistent with public policy;
○ must not be unreasonable.
● Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. As an
inherent attribute of sovereignty, police power primarily rests with the State. In
furtherance of the State's policy to foster genuine and meaningful local autonomy,
the national legislature delegated the exercise of police power to local government
units (LGUs) as agents of the State. Such delegation can be found in Sec. 16 of LGC
which embodies the general welfare clause.
● Since LGUs exercise delegated police power as agents of the State, it is incumbent
upon them to act in conformity to the will of their principal, the State. Necessarily,
therefore, ordinances enacted pursuant to the general welfare clause may not
subvert the State's will by contradicting national statutes.
● The privilege to appropriate and use water is one which is exclusively granted and
regulated by the State through water permits issued by the NWRB. Once granted,
 these water permits continue to be valid save only for reasons spelled out under
the Water Code itself.
● Therefore, the Assailed Ordinance effectively contravenes the provisions of the
Water Code as it arrogates unto Batangas City the power to control and regulate
the use of ground water which, by virtue of the provisions of the Water Code,
pertains solely to the NWRB.
● Consequently, since it has been established (by the lower court decision) that
Batangas City did not have factual basis to justify the purpose of the Assailed
Ordinance, Batangas City cannot invoke the presumption of validity. The
presumption of validity ascribed to an ordinance prevails only in the absence of
some factual foundation of record sufficient to overthrow the assailed issuance.
● In this case, the presumption of validity ascribed to the Assailed Ordinance had
been overturned by documentary and testimonial evidence showing that no
substantial diminution in the supply of ground water in the TabangaoMalitam
watershed had occurred in the last three (3) decades, and that no threat of
depletion of ground water resources in said watershed existed.
DISPOSITIVE: WHEREFORE, ​premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is
DENIED. The Decision dated May 25, 2010 and Resolution dated December 30, 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 90373 are​ AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
NOTE: While the Assailed Ordinance has been struck down as invalid, the
pronouncements hereunder should not be misconstrued by heavy industries to be carte
blanche to abuse their respective water rights at the expense of the health and safety of the
inhabitants of Batangas City.
12. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec
G.R. No. 176951 & 177499
November 18, 2008
By:​ ​De Leon
Topic: ​ Creation and Alteration of Local Government Units
Petitioner: ​LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer
Respondent: ​COMELEC; different municipalities
Ponente:​ Carpio, J.
DOCTRINE: . The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code.
FACTS:
During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities
into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into
cities.
During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which
took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code
by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from
P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain "the mad rush"
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue
Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted
Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement
in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th
Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution
No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29
as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate
again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills.
The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.
On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate
also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was
passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates
from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters
in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities
into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because
more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under
Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
ISSUE: ​Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (Yes)
HELD:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. ​The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government
Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a
municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.
The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a
city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. ​The clear intent
of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must
follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government
Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code
violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. ​This took effect on 30
June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009​, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
I​n enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities,
even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009​.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including
the Cityhood Laws.
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there
can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not
receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or
more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law,
are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since
the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government
Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in
violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL
the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398,
9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. SO ORDERED.
12. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec
G.R. No. 176951 & 177499
December 21, 2009
By:​ ​De Leon
Topic: ​ Creation and Alteration of Local Government Units
Petitioner: ​LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer
Respondent: ​COMELEC; different municipalities
Ponente:​ Velasco, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via
either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the
said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local
government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible,
the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an
amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as
efficaciously as it may reduce the same.
Facts:
Respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the
issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let
alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration. By
Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration.
A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its
"Resolution" dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents’
"Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that
new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents’ "Motion for Reconsideration"
dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated
December 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case.
By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is
DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to
overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009.

The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution
boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is
limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion
for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality
of a law or like issuances.
The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied
the initial motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon"
betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of
November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for
reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters
and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws.
And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009
Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the
Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote,
should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or
invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured.
SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. – Where the court en banc is equally divided
in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on,
and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the
court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand
affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.
A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC – x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the
Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of
a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion.
If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied.
But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted
provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that
the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually
took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To
repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected
in the April 28, 2009 Resolution––a 6-6 deadlock.
Issue: ​Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (No)
Held:
By constitutional design and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create
political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character. But even without any
constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or
alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent
case, Sema v. COMELEC. The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless
provides for the creation of LGUs, thus:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the
approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable
indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC
of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these
indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless,
the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the
cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in
the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution. – Petitioners’ posture ​does not persuade.
The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use
of the term "barrio" in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the
phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and the addition of the modifier "directly" to the
word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the
1973 Constitution, which reads:
Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected.
It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the
aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since
Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the
lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability
for their creation. ​Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the
clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay
stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria.
Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject
provision, explains:
Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to
create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal
corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was
obscured by Cardona v. ​Municipality of Binangonan. Pelaez v. Auditor General
subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the
authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature."
Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in
order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature-involving as it does, the adoption of
means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities." Pelaez
was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But
since division in effect creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger
in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also
legislative in nature.
Section 10 Art. X of the 1987 Constitution, which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes
further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger,
abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x x
subject to "criteria established in the local government code," thereby declaring these
actions properly legislative, ​but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or
substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in
a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC,
the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of
1991. Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, ​had the framers of the 1987
Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they
would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the
enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.
Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a
consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, single-subject enactment, impose the said
verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government
code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of
uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law,
adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may
reduce the same.
In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from
PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is
no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a
particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the
exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.
Petitioners’ theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any
other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical
conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a
way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do
not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument
for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws.
Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the
Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the
cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the
cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final
analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10,
Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.
It is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood
laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not
only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws
from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to
exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws.
Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute.
In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the
Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in
the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature. In fact, any interpretation that
runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.
Dispositive Portion: ​WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs’ Motion for Reconsideration dated June
2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that
Respondents’ ‘Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009’ and ‘Motion
for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
Dated November 18, 2008’ Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated
May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November
18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must
accordingly be RECALLED.
The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood
laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407,
9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL. SO
ORDERED.
12. League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec
G.R. No. 176951 & 177499
August 24, 2010
By:​ ​De Leon
Topic: ​ Creation and Alteration of Local Government Units
Petitioner: ​LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National
President JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREÑAS, CITY OF
CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREÑAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer
Respondent: ​COMELEC; different municipalities
Ponente:​ Velasco, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE: The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in
the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government
Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the
criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a
city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws.
Facts:
On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the
subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the
equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority
vote, denied the respondents’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the
Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents’ second motion for
reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory
and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.
However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional
and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008
Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21
December 2009.
Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and
accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws
unconstitutional.
Issue: ​Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution (Yes)
Held:
Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:
No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
The Constitution is clear. ​The creation of local government units must follow the criteria
established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local
Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local
Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the
conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other
law, like the Cityhood Laws.
The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political
units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local
Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income
requirement from ₱20 million to ₱100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30
June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any
municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the ₱100 million income requirement.
Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.
In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities,
even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009.
The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent
municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. ​To be valid, such
exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law,
including the Cityhood Laws.
RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009
pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x." ​RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. Considering the Legislature’s primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities
wanting to be converted into cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the
creation of cities. To repeat, ​RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government
Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous;
not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. ​RA 9009 amended Section 450
of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the
creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is
clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet
the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law.
Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created
x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This
provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is​, all the criteria for the creation of cities
must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood
Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an
exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section
450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. ​Clearly, the Cityhood Laws
contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.
Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not
cripple Congress’ power to make laws. ​In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending
the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009​. Indisputably,
the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislature’s law-making power.
The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "no x x x city x x x
shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government
code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the
challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision
and REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood
Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405,
9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.
We NOTE petitioners’ motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009. SO ORDERED.
12. League of Cities v COMELEC
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AUG 24, 2010 RESOLUTION
G.R. No. 176951
February 15, 2011
By: Laya
Same Topic, Petitioners and Respondents. But Ponente here is J. Bersamin
This case is a continuation… see timeline.
Here, Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated Aug 24, 2010.
From here on out arguments raised by Petitioners and Respondents remain the same.
TIMELINE:
DATE DECISION
18 NOV 2008 SC En Banc declared the Cityhood laws UNCONSTITUTIONAL by a majority vote

31 MAR 2009 FIRST Motion for Reconsideration DENIED by a majority vote
28 APR 2009 SECOND Motion for Reconsideration DENIED by split vote 6-6 (NOTE: this rendered the
18 NOV 2008 decision final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries on 21
MAY 2009.
Note: Judgments or final orders become final after 15 days. But here within the 15 days,
respondents filed a Motion to Amend Resolution dated 28 APR 2009 and a Motion For
Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second MR of the Decision dated 18 Nov 2008’.
These motion essentially assailed the tie vote. That’s why the court was able to issue 21
Dec 2009 Resolution.
21 DEC 2009 SC En Banc REVERSED the 18 NOV 2008 decision and declared the Cityhood laws
CONSTITUTIONAL
24 AUG 2010 REINSTATED 18 NOV 2008 Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
15 FEB 2011 Present case
​RULING​: CITYHOOD LAWS ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. Mostly reiterated 21 DEC 2009 DECISION.
It does not violate Sec. 10, Art. X because…
1. INTENT OF THE FRAMERS
● While RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, Congress was fully aware of the pending bills of
several municipalities including the municipalities covered by the Cityhood Laws.
● During the Interpellation of Senator Frank Drilon of Senator Pimentel:
o Drilon asked if the proposed bills pending must also comply with the 100M
requirement. To this Pimentel said no because it would be unfair for 9009 to be given
retroactive effect.
o Drilon asked Pimentel if he should include a statement to the effect that they are
excluded in the bill of 9009. Pimentel said that it was not necessary to include a
provision because the present interpellation forms part of the interpretation of the
bill. Plus 9009 has no retroactive clause so the pending cityhood bills will not be
affected.
● Clearly Congress intended that the pending cityhood bills would not be covered by the new
and higher income requirement of 100M.
● Even if we were to ignore the above quoted exchange between then Senate President Drilon
and Senator Pimentel, there is still grounds to exempt the municipalities from the 100M
requirement BECAUSE these municipalities are centers of trade and commerce, points of
convergence of transport, rich havens of agricultural, mineral, and other natural resources,
and flourishing tourism spots.
● Distinctive traits of each municipality:
o Batac, Ilocos Norte – biggest municipality in the 2​nd district, 2​nd largest and most
progressive town in the province, and natural convergence point for neighboring
towns to conduct trade. It’s a growing metropolis.
o El Salvador, Misamis Oriental – center of the Cagayan-Iligan Industrial Corridor and
home to industrial companies and corporations.
o Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte – largest of 11 municipalities in the province. It is where
trade, commerce, and industry takes place. It is the capital as well.
o Borongan, Eastern Samar – Capital of Eastern Samar and the development of the
province will depend to a certain degree on the urbanization of Borongan.
o Lamitan, Basilan – Center of commerce and the seat of the Sultanate of the Yakan
people of Basilan. The source of its income is agro-industrial (copra, rubber, coffee)
o Catbalogan, Samar – socio-economic capital of Samar. Hosts banks, telecommunication
facilities.
o Bogo, Cebu – 5-time winner nationwide in the clean and green program. Met the
income, population and area requirements.
o Tandag, Surigao del Sur – 350 year old capital of the province. Also the province’s
trade, finance, and government center.
o Bayugan, Agusan del Sur – 1​st class municipality; met population requirement. Center
of trade and commerce, has the most developed infrastructure and facilities in the
entire province.
o Carcar, Cebu – manufacturing industry, agricultural farming, fishing and prawn
industry, and thousands of large and small commercial establishments contributing to
the bulk of economic activities in the municipality.
o Guihulngan, Negros Oriental – 2​nd highest population in the province. Because of the
Tanon Strait which provides good fishin grounds, it has the potential to grow
commercially. Its strategic location brought about by its existing linkage networks and
the major transportation corridors traversing the municipality has established
Guihulngan as the center of commerce and trade.
o Tayabas, Quezon – Politico-cultural center. Rich in culture, heritage and trade.
o Tabuk, Kalinga – main hub of commerce and trade, and a cultural center. Rich in
customs and traditions of the different municipalities in the province.
2. The enactment of the Cityhood laws is an exercise by Congress of its Legislative Power
● The enactment of the Cityhood Laws is an exercise by Congress of its legislative power.
Legislative power is the authority, under the Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and
repeal them. Unless limited by the Constitution, either expressly or impliedly, legislative
power embraces all subjects, and extends to matters of general concern or common interest.
● The LGC is a creation of Congress through its law-making powers. Congress has the power to
alter or modify it as it did when it enacted R.A. No. 9009.
● Undeniably, R.A. No. 9009 amended the LGC. But it is also true that, in effect, the Cityhood
Laws amended R.A. No. 9009 through the exemption clauses found therein. Since the
Cityhood Laws explicitly exempted the concerned municipalities from the amendatory R.A.
No. 9009, such Cityhood Laws are, therefore, also amendments to the LGC itself.
● For this reason, we reverse the November 18, 2008 Decision and the August 24, 2010
Resolution on their strained and stringent view that the Cityhood Laws, particularly their
exemption clauses, are not found in the LGC.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration of the “Resolution” dated August 24, 2010, dated and filed
on September 14, 2010 by respondents Municipality of Baybay, et al. is GRANTED. The Resolution dated
August 24, 2010 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Cityhood Laws—Republic Acts Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391,
9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491—are declared
CONSTITUTIONAL.
AD CAUTELAM MR of the 15 FEB 2011 Decision.
G.R. No. 176951
April 12, 2011
By: Laya
Petitioners filed an Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration of the 15 Feb 2011 Resolution.
TIMELINE:
DATE DECISION
 This MR seeks the reversal of the 12 APRIL 2011 Resolution which denied the Ad Cautelam MR. And the
18 NOV 2008 SC En Banc declared the Cityhood laws UNCONSTITUTIONAL by a majority vote Ad Cautelam MR sought the reconsideration of the 15 Feb 2011 Resolution.

31 MAR 2009 FIRST Motion for Reconsideration DENIED by a majority vote
28 APR 2009 SECOND Motion for Reconsideration DENIED by split vote 6-6 (NOTE: this
rendered the 18 NOV 2008 decision final and executory and was recorded in the
Book of Entries on 21 MAY 2009.
Note: Judgments or final orders become final after 15 days. But here within the 15
days, respondents filed a Motion to Amend Resolution dated 28 APR 2009 and a
Motion For Leave to File and to Admit Attached ‘Second MR of the Decision dated
18 Nov 2008’. These motion essentially assailed the tie vote. That’s why the court
was able to issue 21 Dec 2009 Resolution.
21 DEC 2009 SC En Banc REVERSED the 18 NOV 2008 decision and declared the Cityhood laws
CONSTITUTIONAL
So this is really a second motion for reconsideration which raises the same issues.
The Court has firmly held that a second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading, and only for
extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only after an express leave has been first obtained may a second
motion for reconsideration be entertained. The restrictive policy against a second motion for
reconsideration has been re-emphasized in the recently promulgated Internal Rules of the Supreme
Court, whose Section 3, Rule 15 states:
Section 3. Second motion for reconsideration. - The Court shall not entertain a second motion for
reconsideration, and any exception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest of justice by the
Court en banc upon a vote of at least two-thirds of its actual membership. There is reconsideration "in
the higher interest of justice" when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous, but is likewise
patently unjust and potentially capable of causing unwarranted and irremediable injury or damage to the
parties. A second motion for reconsideration can only be entertained before the ruling sought to be
reconsidered becomes final by operation of law or by the Court's declaration.

24 AUG 2010 REINSTATED 18 NOV 2008 Decision declaring the Cityhood Laws Considering that the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration merely rehashes the issues previously put
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. forward, particularly in the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, the Court, having already passed
upon such issues with finality, finds no need to discuss the issues again to avoid repetition and
15 FEB 2011 MR filed and Granted. declared Cityhood Laws CONSTITUTIONAL . redundancy.

WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of
12 APR 2011 Present Case.
the Resolution of 12 April 2011 and the attached Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12
April 2011; grants the respondents' Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011; and directs the
Clerk of Court to forthwith issue the Entry of Judgment in this case.
RULING​: ​Reiteration of 15 FEB 2011 Decision.
No further pleadings or submissions by any party shall be entertained.
Only addition: We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws
not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave ____________________________________________________________________________
these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no 13. NAVARRO v. ERMITA
less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing
G.R. No. 180050. February 10, 2010
the certain collective wisdom of Congress.
Topic: Creation and Alteration of LGUs
WHEREFORE, the Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration (of the Decision dated 15 February 2011) is By: Hernandez
denied with finality.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 12 APRIL 2011 RESOLUTION Petitioners: RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, and RENE O. MEDINA
MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JDUGMENT Respondents: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, representing the
G.R. No. 176951
June 28, 2011 President of the Philippines; Senate of the Philippines, represented by the SENATE
Laya PRESIDENT; House of Representatives, represented by the HOUSE SPEAKER;
FACTS:
GOVERNOR ROBERT ACE S. BARBERS, representing the mother province of Surigao
We hereby consider and resolve: del Norte; GOVERNOR GERALDINE ECLEO VILLAROMAN, representing the new
(a) the petitioners' Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 12 April Province of Dinagat Islands
2011, attached to which is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated 12 April 2011 (Motion
For Reconsideration), praying that the resolution of April 12, 2011 be reconsidered and set aside; and Ponente: PERALTA, J
(b) the respondents' Motion for Entry of Judgment dated May 9, 2011.
Important Laws:
HELD:​ MR DENIED. MOTION FOR ENTRY OF JUDGMENT GRANTED.
Constitution, Article X — Local Government
SEC. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, exceptin accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
LGC, Title IV, Chapter I
SEC. 461. Requisites for Creation. — (a) A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites: ​cHaCAS
(i) a contiguous territory of at leasttwo thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as
certified by the National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall
not reduce the land area, population, and income of the original unit or units at the
time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general
fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non- recurring income
Facts:
1. Petitioners Rodolfo G. Navarro, Victor F. Bernal, and Rene O. Medina filed
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to
nullify Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9355, otherwise known as An Act Creating
the Province of Dinagat Islands, for being unconstitutional.
2. They allege that the creation of the Dinagat Islands as a new province, if
uncorrected, perpetuates an illegal act of Congress, and unjustly deprives
the people of Surigao del Norte of a large chunk of its territory, Internal
Revenue Allocation and rich resources from the area.
3. The mother province of Surigao del Norte was created and established
under R.A. No. 2786 on June 19, 1960. The province is composed of three
main groups of islands: (1) the Mainland and Surigao City; (2) Siargao
Island and Bucas Grande; and (3) Dinagat Island, which is composed of
seven municipalities, namely, Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo, Loreto,
San Jose, and Tubajon.
4. On April 3, 2002, the Office of the President, through its Deputy Executive
Secretary for Legal Affairs, advised the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Surigao del Norte of the deficient population in the proposed
Province of Dinagat Islands.
5. In July 2003, the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a
special census, with the assistance of an NSO District Census Coordinator,
in the Dinagat Islands to determine its actual population in support of the
house bill creating the Province of Dinagat Islands.
6. The special census yielded a population count of 371,576 inhabitants in the
proposed province.
7. The NSO, however, did not certify the result of the special census.
8. On July 30, 2003, Surigao del Norte Provincial Governor Robert Lyndon S.
Barbers issued Proclamation No. 01, which declared as official, for all
purposes, the 2003 Special Census in Dinagat Islands showing a population
of 371,576.
9. The Bureau of Local Government Finance certified that the average annual
income of the proposed Province of Dinagat Islands for calendar year 2002
to 2003 based on the 1991 constant prices was P82,696,433.23. The land
area of the proposed province is 802.12 square kilometers.
10. On August 14, 2006 and August 28, 2006, the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively, passed the bill creating the Province of
Dinagat Islands. It was approved and enacted into law as R.A. No. 9355 on
October 2, 2006 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
11. On December 2, 2006, a plebiscite was held in the mother Province of
Surigao del Norte to determine whether the local government units
directly affected approved of the creation of the Province of Dinagat
Islands into a distinct and independent province comprising the
municipalities of Basilisa, Cagdianao, Dinagat, Libjo (Albor), Loreto, San
Jose, and Tubajon.
12. The result of the plebiscite yielded 69,943 affirmative votes and 63,502
negative votes.
13. On December 3, 2006, the Plebiscite Provincial Board of Canvassers
proclaimed that the creation of Dinagat Islands into a separate and distinct
province was ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite.
14. On January 26, 2007, a new set of provincial officials took their oath of
office following their appointment by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
 Another set of provincial officials was elected during the synchronized
national and local elections held on May 14, 2007.
15. On July 1, 2007, the elected provincial officials took their oath of office;
hence, the Province of Dinagat Islands began its corporate existence.
16. Petitioners contended that the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands
under R.A. No. 9355 is not valid because it failed to comply with either the
population or land area requirement prescribed by the Local Government
Code.
17. Petitioners prayed that R.A. No. 9355 be declared unconstitutional, and
that all subsequent appointments and elections to the new vacant
positions in the newly created Province of Dinagat Islands be declared null
and void.
18. They also prayed for the return of the municipalities of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the return of the former districts to the mother
Province of Surigao del Norte.
Issues:
1. W/N R.A. No. 9355 complied with the requirements of Section 461 of the
Local Government Code in creating the Province of Dinagat Islands
2. W/N the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands is an act of
gerrymandering
Held:
ISSUE 1
ISSUE 2:
1. No, although it complied with income requirement in the LGC, it failed to
comply with land area or population requirement.
2. R.A. No. 9355 expressly states that the Province of Dinagat Islands
"contains an approximate land area of eighty thousand two hundred
twelve hectares (80,212 has.) or 802.12 sq. km., more or less, including
Hibuson Island and approximately forty-seven (47) islets . . . ." R.A. No.
9355, therefore, failed to comply with the land area requirement of 2,000
square kilometers.
3. The Province of Dinagat Islands also failed to comply with the population
requirement of not less than 250,000 inhabitants as certified by the NSO.
Based on the 2000 Census of Population conducted by the NSO, the
population of the Province of Dinagat Islands as of May 1, 2000 was only
106,951.
4. Although the Provincial Government of Surigao del Norte conducted a
special census of population in Dinagat Islands in 2003, which yielded a
population count of 371,000, the result was not certified by the NSO as
required by the Local Government Code. Moreover, respondents failed to
prove that with the population count of 371,000, the population of the
original unit (mother Province of Surigao del Norte) would not be reduced
to less than the minimum requirement prescribed by law at the time of the
creation of the new province
5. To reiterate, when the Dinagat Islands was proclaimed a new province on
December 3, 2006, it had an official population of only 106,951 based on
the NSO 2000 Census of Population. Less than a year after the
proclamation of the new province, the NSO conducted the 2007 Census of
Population. The NSO certified that as of August 1, 2007, Dinagat Islands
had a total population of only 120,813, which was still below the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants.
6. In fine, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the
population requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.
7. The Constitution clearly mandates that the creation of local government
units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code.
Any derogation of or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local
Government Code violates Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
8. Hence, R.A. No. 9355 is unconstitutional for its failure to comply with the
criteria for the creation of a province prescribed in Sec. 461 of the Local
Government Code.
1. "Gerrymandering" is a term employed to describe an apportionment of
representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair advantage to the
party in power. Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission, defined "gerrymandering" as the formation of one legislative
district out of separate territories for the purpose of favoring a candidate
or a party.​ ​The Constitution proscribes gerrymandering, as it mandates
each legislative district to comprise, as far as practicable, a contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory.
2. As stated by the Office of the Solicitor General, the Province of Dinagat
Islands consists of one island and about 47 islets closely situated together,
 without the inclusion of separate territories. It is an unsubstantiated
allegation that the province was created to favor Congresswoman Glenda
Ecleo-Villaroman.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Republic Act No. 9355,
otherwise known as [An Act Creating the Province of Dinagat Islands], is hereby
declared unconstitutional. The proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and
the election of the officials thereof are declared NULL and VOID. The provision in
Article 9 (2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code
of 1991 stating, "The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
province is composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared NULL and VOID.
___________________________________________________
In case he asks of the cases quoted in the decision:
TAN v. COMELEC:
In Tan v. COMELEC, petitioners therein filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose
of stopping the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite scheduled on January 3,
1986. Since the Court was in recess, it was unable to consider the petition on time.
Petitioners filed a supplemental pleading, averring that the plebiscite sought to be
restrained by them was held as scheduled, but there were still serious issues raised
in the case affecting the legality, constitutionality and validity of such exercise
which should properly be passed upon and resolved by the Court.
At issue in Tan was the land area of the new Province of Negros del Norte, and the
validity of the plebiscite, which did not include voters of the parent Province of
Negros Occidental, but only those living within the territory of the new Province of
Negros del Norte.
The Court held that the plebiscite should have included the people living in the area
of the proposed new province and those living in the parent province. However, the
Court did not direct the conduct of a new plebiscite, because the factual and legal
basis for the creation of the new province did not exist as it failed to satisfy the land
area requirement; hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, creating the new Province of
Negros del Norte, was declared unconstitutional. The Court found that the land
area of the new province was only about 2,856 square kilometers, which was below
the statutory requirement then of 3,500 square kilometers. ​HAaECD
Respondents in Tan insisted that when the Local Government Code speaks of the
required territory of the province to be created, what is contemplated is not only
the land area, but also the land and water over which the said province has
jurisdiction and control. The respondents submitted that in this regard, the
marginal sea within the three mile limit should be considered in determining the
extent of the territory of the new province.
____________________________________________________________________
________
RESOLUTION: G.R. No. 180050. April 12, 2011
Movant-Intervenors: CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO T. MATUGAS, HON. SOL T.
MATUGAS, HON. ARTURO CARLOS A. EGAY, JR., HON. SIMEON VICENTE G.
CASTRENCE, HON. MAMERTO D. GALANIDA, HON. MARGARITO M. LONGOS, and
HON. CESAR M. BAGUNDOL
Ponente: Nachura
Doctrine​: But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be
created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area
requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the
local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city,
respectively. ​This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the
creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated
under Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR.
Summary​: The movant intervnors in this case are the elected officials who will be
affected once the Resolution reverting Dinagat province as part of Surigao del
Norte. The Court reverses its ruling in the previous case by ruling that the creation
of Dinagat Province falls under the exception provided for under the LGC-IRR. The
court held that there was legislative intent to exempt potential provinces from the
land area requirement under the LGC if such consists of two islands. Aside from this,
the Court found that Dinagat was capable of sustaining itself as a province.
Relevant Law:
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities. — (a) Requisites for Creation — A municipality
shall not be created unless the following requisites are present:
 pursued and protected in any other proceeding since their rights would be
(i) foreclosed if the May 12, 2010 Resolution would attain finality.

(ii) (iii)
Issue:
Income — An average annual income of not less than Two Million Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P2,500,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive
Held:
years based on 1991 constant prices, as certi ed by the provincial treasurer. The
average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income;
1. It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the
Population — which shall not be less than twenty five thousand (25,000) creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient
inhabitants, as certified by NSO; and administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their
constituents.
Land area — which must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square 2. The criteria prescribed by the LGC, i.e., income, population and land area,
kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises are all designed to accomplish these results.
two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the 3. In this light, Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative
proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on which of them
jurisdiction of a municipality sought to be created shall be properly identified by should enjoy preferential consideration.
metes and bounds. 4. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local government
units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear
FACTS​:
intent of the framers of the LGC.
5. With the formulation of the LGC-IRR, which amounted to both executive
1. Main Facts are the same as original decision.
and legislative construction of the LGC, the many details to implement the
2. Simply put, movants-intervenors' election to their respective offices would
LGC had already been put in place, which Congress understood to be
necessarily be annulled since Dinagat Islands will revert to its previous
impractical and not too urgent to immediately translate into direct
status as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte and a
amendments to the LGC​.
special election will have to be conducted for governor, vice governor, and
6. But Congress, recognizing the capacity and viability of Dinagat to become a
House of Representatives member and Sangguniang Panlalawigan member
full-fledged province, enacted R.A. No. 9355, following the exemption from
for the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte.
the land area requirement, which, with respect to the creation of
3. Moreover, as residents of Surigao del Norte and as public servants
provinces, can only be found as an express provision in the LGC-IRR.
representing the interests of their constituents, they have a clear and
7. In effect, pursuant to its plenary legislative powers, Congress breathed
strong interest in the outcome of this case inasmuch as the reversion of
fresh and blood into that exemption in Article 9 (2) of the LGC-IRR and
Dinagat as part of the First Legislative District of Surigao del Norte will
transformed it into law when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island
affect the latter province such that: (1) the whole administrative set-up of
Province of Dinagat.
the province will have to be restructured; (2) the services of many
8. Further, the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 9355 was filed and
employees will have to be terminated; (3) contracts will have to be
favorably voted upon in both Chambers of Congress.
invalidated; and (4) projects and other developments will have to be
9. Such acts of both Chambers of Congress definitively show the clear
discontinued. In addition, they claim that their rights cannot be adequately
legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land
area requirement, with respect to the creation of a province when it
consists of one or more islands, as expressly provided only in the LGC-IRR.
 Thereby, and by necessity, the LGC was amended by way of the enactment
of R.A. No. 9355.
10. What is more, the land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of
a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot
become a province, taking into account its average annual income of
P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, as certified by the Bureau of
Local Government Finance, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province.
11. The delivery of basic services to its constituents has been proven possible
and sustainable.
12. Rather than looking at the results of the plebiscite and the May 10, 2010
elections as mere fait accompli circumstances which cannot operate in
favor of Dinagat's existence as a province, they must be seen from the
perspective that Dinagat is ready and capable of becoming a province.
13. This Court should not be instrumental in stunting such capacity.

___________________________________________________

W/N the movant-intervenors have locus standi (YES)

1. It cannot be denied that movants-intervenors will suffer direct injury in the

event their Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment dated October 29,
2010 is denied and their Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File and to
Admit Intervenors' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated
May 12, 2010 is denied with finality.
2. Indeed, they have suficiently shown that they have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that if the May 12, 2010 Resolution be
not reconsidered, their election to their respective positions during the
May 10, 2010 polls and its concomitant effects would all be nullified and
be put to naught.
 14. Umali vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 203974
April 22, 2014
Labasan
____________________________________________________________________________
________________
Topic: ​Creation and Alteration of Local Government Units
Petitioner​: Aurelio Umali
Respondent​: Commission on Elections, Julius Cesar Vergara, and the City Government of
Cabanatuan
Ponente​: Velasco, Jr.,
J.​_________________________________________________________________________
FACTS​:
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City passed Resolution No.
183-2011, requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a
component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding to
the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012,
proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the
qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of
1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the assailed Minute Resolution
No. 12-0797, for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from
component city to highly-urbanized city, only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City
should participate in the said plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija, filed a Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, maintaining that the proposed conversion in question will necessarily and
directly affect the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that Section 453 of
the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. He
argues that while the conversion in question does not involve the creation of a new or the
dissolution of an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the people of
the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in a plebiscite whenever there is a
material change in their rights and responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used
in Sec. 453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified voters of the units
directly affected by the conversion and not just those in the component city proposed to be
upgraded. Petitioner Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse effects
of the Cabanatuan City’s conversion and how it will cause material change not only in the
political and economic rights of the city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius Cesar Vergara, city
mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not
apply to conversions, which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific
provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified voters of Cabanatuan
City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private respondent pointed out that when Santiago City
was converted in 1994 from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant to
Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the registered voters of the
then municipality of Santiago.
COMELEC rule against petitioner maintaining that Cabanatuan City is merely being converted
from a component city into an HUC and that the political unit directly affected by the
conversion will only be the city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU, and that no boundaries
will be altered. The conversion would merely reinforce the powers and prerogatives already
being exercised by the city, with the political unit’s probable elevation to that of an HUC as
demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the LGC. Thus, the
participation of the voters of the entire province in the plebiscite will not be necessary.
ISSUE​: Whether or not Nueva Ecija should be included in the plebicit not only those in
Cabanatuan City.
RULING​: Yes.
"Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in the plebiscite, what
should primarily be determined is whether or not the unit or units that desire to participate
will be "directly affected" by the change.
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution should be the basis for
determining the qualified voters who will participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue.
Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. – No province, city, municipality, or barangay may
be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and
subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political
units directly affected.
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly affected" necessarily
encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the
registered voters in the province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to support their claim that only
the City of Cabanatuan should be allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. – It shall be the
duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within thirty (30) days
after it shall have met the minimum requirements prescribed in the immediately
preceding Section, upon proper application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite
by the qualified voters therein.
Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453 as referring only to the
registered voters in the city being converted, excluding in the process the voters in the
remaining towns and cities of Nueva Ecija.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a determination on
whether or not the requirements under Sec. 4521 of the LGC are complied with. The
provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a
component city as highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on
certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatory language
"shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of a plebiscite for purposes
of conversions once the requirements are met. No further legislation is necessary before the
city proposed to be converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification, as
the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is the very LGC.

The plebiscite requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to
conversions as well.
While conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution we
nevertheless observe that the conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial
alteration of boundaries.

15 Miranda v Sandiganbayan
G.R. No. 154098
DATE: July 27, 2005
By: ​LIM
Topic: ​ Municipal Corporations; E. Supervision over, and discipline of local officials
Petitioner: ​JOSE C. MIRANDA
Respondent: H​ON. SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, SEC. JOSE D. LINA, in his
capacity as Secretary of the DILG, and FAUSTINO DY, JR. in his capacity as Governor of the
Province of Isabela
Ponente:​ Puno, J.
SUMMARY: ​The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda then the mayor of Santiago
City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months for alleged violations the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Subsequently, then Vice
Mayor Amelita S. Navarro filed a Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. Vice Mayor
Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of usurpation of authority or
official functions. Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his
lawyer and in good faith. Mayor Miranda’s counter-affidavit also stated that he left the
mayoralty post after “coercion” by the Philippine National Police. Miranda contended that
under Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code, local elective officials could not be
preventively suspended for a period beyond 60 days.
SC held that Miranda may be subject to suspension beyond 60 days. The preventive
suspension under Section 63 of the Local government code merely serves as a cap for the
president, governor, or mayor in imposing excessively long preventive suspensions. The
Ombudsman is not mentioned in the said provision and was not meant to be governed
thereby.
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
● The Ombudsman placed petitioner Jose C. Miranda (Mayor Miranda) then the
mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, under preventive suspension for six months from
25 July 1997 to 25 January 1998 for alleged violations of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees
● Subsequently, then Vice Mayor Amelita S. Navarro (Vice Mayor Navarro) filed a
Complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) on 1 December 1997
which was docketed as OMB-1-97-2312 for giving directives, performing functions
of mayor despite Navarro’s request to desist from doing so, and in spite of the
order of Department of Interior and Local Government directing him to cease from
reassuming position.
● Vice Mayor Navarro contended that Mayor Miranda committed the felony of
usurpation of authority or official functions under Art. 177 of the RPC.
● Mayor Miranda asserted that he reassumed office on the advice of his lawyer and
in good faith. He contended that under Section 63(b) of the Local Government
Code, local elective officials could not be preventively suspended for a period
beyond 60 days. He also averred that, on the day he reassumed office, he received
a memorandum from DILG Undersecretary Manuel Sanchez instructing him to
vacate his office and he immediately complied with the same. Mayor Miranda's
counter-affidavit also stated that he left the mayoralty post after "coercion" by the
Philippine National Police.
● Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information against Mayor Miranda
for violation of Article 177 of the RPC, penalizing usurpation of authority.
● Subsequently, the prosecution filed an amended Information with the
Sandiganbayan, to which the petitioner interposed a negative plea.
● On 28 November 2001, the prosecution filed before the Sandiganbayan a motion to
suspend Mayor Miranda pendente lite based on Section 13 of Republic Act No.
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
● Miranda opposed the motion on the ground that the offense of usurpation of
authority or official functions under Article 177 of the RPC is not embraced by
Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 which only contemplates offenses enumerated under
R.A. No. 3019, Title VII, Book II of the RPC or which involve "fraud upon
government or public funds or property."
● In a Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the Sandiganbayan ​preventively suspended
Mayor Miranda from office for 90 days
● Miranda's motion for reconsideration was denied in the Sandiganbayan's
Resolution dated 17 June 2002. Hence, the present petition assailing the
Sandiganbayan's orders of preventive suspension.
ISSUE:
(1) whether Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 applies only to fraudulent acts involving public funds
or property; and (no)
(2) whether local elective officials could be suspended for a period beyond 60 days (yes)
HELD:
(1)
● The Sandiganbayan properly construed Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 as covering two
types of offenses: (1) any offense involving fraud on the government; and (2) any
offense involving public funds or property. Contrary to the submission of the
petitioner, nothing in R.A. No. 3019 evinces any legislative intent to limit Section 13
only to acts involving fraud on public funds or property. The phrase "any offense
involving fraud upon government or public funds or property" is clear and
categorical. To limit the use of "government" as an adjective that qualifies "funds"
is baseless. The word "public" precedes "funds" and distinguishes the same from
private funds. To qualify further "public funds" as "government" funds, as
petitioner claims is the law's intent, is plainly superfluous. We are bound by the
rule that a statute should be construed reasonably with reference to its controlling
purpose and its provisions should not be given a meaning that is inconsistent with
its scope and object. R.A. No. 3019, commonly known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, should be read to protect the State from fraud by its own officials.
● Accused's acts therefore in assuming the duties and function of the Office of the
Mayor despite his suspension from said office resulted to a clear disruption of
office and worst, a chaotic situation in the affairs of the government as the
employees, as well as the public, suffered confusion as to who is the head of the
Office. This actuation of herein accused constitutes fraud which in general sense is
deemed to comprise anything calculated to deceive, including all acts, omissions,
and concealment involving a breach of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence
justly reposed, resulting in damage to another or by which an undue and
unconscious advantage is taken of another (37 Am. Jur. 2d 19 at Sec. 19). Hence,
the act complained of against accused herein falls in the catchall provision "x x x or
for any offense involving fraud upon government x x x."
(2)
 ● Section 63(b) of the Local Government Code provides for preventive
suspension for a period of 60 days imposed by the president, governor, or
mayor.
● Section 63 of the Local Government Code, was only meant as a cap on the
discretionary power of the President, governor and mayor to impose
excessively long preventive suspensions. The Ombudsman is not mentioned in
the said provision and was not meant to be governed thereby. Indeed, the
reason is not hard to distill. The President, governor and mayor are political
personages. As such, the possibility of extraneous factors influencing their
decision to impose preventive suspensions is not remote. The Ombudsman,
on the other hand, is not subject to political pressure given the independence
of the office which is protected by no less than the Constitution.
● Section 63 of the Local Government Code does not govern preventive
suspensions imposed by the Ombudsman, which is a constitutionally created
office and independent from the Executive branch of government
● The six-month period of preventive suspension imposed by the Ombudsman
was indubitably within the limit provided by its enabling law. This enabling law
has not been modified by the legislature.
● The Ombudsman Act of 1989 requires that the Ombudsman determine: (1)
that the evidence of guilt is strong; and (2) that any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression, or grave misconduct or neglect in the
performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal from the service;
or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DISMISSED there being no showing that the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing its Resolution of 4 February 2002,
preventively suspending the petitioner for 90 days. SO ORDERED.
Notes:
Local Government Code
SECTION 63. Preventive Suspension. -
(a) Preventive suspension may be imposed:
(1) By the President, if the respondent is an elective official of a province, a highly urbanized
or an independent component city;
(2) By the governor, if the respondent is an elective official of a component city or
municipality; or
(3) By the mayor, if the respondent is an elective official of the barangay.
(b) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when the
evidence of guilt is strong, and given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that
the continuance in office of the respondent could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to
the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence: Provided, That, any single
preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond sixty (60) days:
Provided, further, That in the event that several administrative cases are filed against an
elective official, he cannot be preventively suspended for more than ninety (90) days within a
single year on the same ground or grounds existing and known at the time of the first
suspension.
(c) Upon expiration of the preventive suspension, the suspended elective official shall be
deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against
him, which shall be terminated within one hundred twenty (120) days from the time he was
formally notified of the case against him. However, if the delay in the proceedings of the case
is due to his fault, neglect, or request, other than the appeal duly filed, the duration of such
delay shall not be counted in computing the time of termination of the case.
16 CAMARINES NORTE V. GONZALES
G.R. No. 185740
DATE:​ July 23, 2013
By: ​Osorio
Topic: ​Supervision over, and discipline of, local officials
Petitioner: ​THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF CAMARINES NORTE, represented by
GOVERNOR JESUS O. TYPOCO, JR.
Respondent: ​BEATRIZ O. GONZALES
Ponente:​ Brion
DOCTRINE:
Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or employee shall not be
suspended or dismissed except for cause, as provided by law and after due process.
It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in the nature of the
office held.
FACTS:
● Gonzales was appointed as the provincial administrator of the Province of
Camarines Norte by then Governor Roy A. Padilla, Jr. on April 1, 1991.
○ Her appointment was on a permanent capacity.
● An administrative case was filed against her for gross insubordination, this was
later on captioned as Administrative Case No. 001.
● After Gonzales submitted her comment, an Ad Hoc Investigation Committee found
her guilty of the charges against her, and recommended to Governor Pimentel that
she be held administratively liable.
● On September 30, 1999, Governor Pimentel adopted the Ad Hoc Investigation
Committees recommendation and dismissed Gonzales.
● On appeal, the CSC modified Governor Pimentel’s decision finding Gonzales guilty
of insubordination and suspending her for six months. This decision was appealed
by Governor Pimentel, which the CSC denied.
● The CSC then issued Resolution No. 002245, which directed Gonzales
reinstatement.
● Governor Pimentel reinstated Gonzales as provincial administrator on October 12,
2000, but terminated her services the next day for lack of confidence.
● He then wrote a letter to the CSC reporting his compliance with its order, and
Gonzales subsequent dismissal as a confidential employee.
 ● The CSC responded through Resolution No. 030008, which again directed Gonzales
reinstatement as provincial administrator.
○ It clarified that while the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act
No. RA 7160) made the provincial administrator position coterminous
and highly confidential in nature, this conversion cannot operate to
prejudice officials who were already issued permanent appointments as
administrators prior to the new laws effectivity.
● According to the CSC, Gonzales has acquired a vested right to her permanent
appointment as provincial administrator and is entitled to continue holding this
office despite its subsequent classification as a coterminous position.
● Gonzales wrote the CSC alleging that Governor Jesus O. Typoco, Jr., Camarines
Nortes incumbent governor, refused to reinstate her.
● The CSC responded with Resolution No. 061988,which ordered Gonzales
reinstatement to the provincial administrator position, or to an equivalent position.
● Thus, the petitioner, through Governor Typoco, filed a petition for review before
the CA, seeking to nullify the CSCs Resolution No. 030008 and Resolution No.
061988.
● The CA supported the CSCs ruling. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition before the SC.
○ In its present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner argues that
the provincial administrator position has been converted into a highly
confidential, coterminous position by RA 7160. Hence, Gonzales no
longer enjoyed security of tenure to the position she held prior to RA
7160s enactment.
○ Gonzales, on the other hand, retorted that the conversion of the position
should not be retroactively applied to her, as she is a permanent
appointee.
ISSUE:
WON, Gonzales should be reinstated as the provincial administrator
HELD:
No. CA decision was reversed
Nature of the Provincial Admin Position
● Congress has reclassified the provincial administrator position as a primarily
confidential, non-career position.
● Congress’ reclassification of the provincial administrator position in RA 7160 is a
valid exercise of legislative power that does not violate Gonzales security of tenure.
Security of Tenure
● Both the CA and the CSC ruled in favor of the latter, and gave premium to Gonzales
original permanent appointment under the old LGC. They posit that Gonzales
acquired a vested legal right over her position from the moment she assumed her
duties as provincial administrator. Thus, she cannot be removed from office except
for cause and after due hearing; otherwise such removal would amount to a
violation of her security of tenure.
● The arguments presented by the parties and ruled upon by the CA reflect a
conceptual entanglement between the nature of the position and an employees
right to hold a position.
● These two concepts are different.
○ “The nature of a position may change by law according to the dictates of
Congress. The right to hold a position, on the other hand, is a right that
enjoys constitutional and statutory guarantee, but may itself change
according to the nature of the position.”
● In the current case, Congress, through RA 7160, did not abolish the provincial
administrator position but significantly modified many of its aspects.
● It is now a primarily confidential position under the non-career service tranche of
the civil service.
● This change could not have been aimed at prejudicing Gonzales, as she was not the
only provincial administrator incumbent at the time RA 7160 was enacted.
○ Rather, this change was part of the reform measures that RA 7160
introduced to further empower local governments and decentralize the
delivery of public service.
● Thus, Gonzales’ permanent appointment as provincial administrator prior to the
enactment of RA 7160 is immaterial to her removal as provincial administrator.
● For purposes of determining whether Gonzales termination violated her right to
security of tenure, the nature of the position she occupied at the time of her
removal should be considered, and not merely the nature of her appointment at
the time she entered government service.
○ Security of tenure in public office simply means that a public officer or
employee shall not be suspended or dismissed except for cause, as
provided by law and after due process.
○ It cannot be expanded to grant a right to public office despite a change in
the nature of the office held.
○ In other words, the CSC might have been legally correct when it ruled
that the petitioner violated Gonzales right to security of tenure when she
was removed without sufficient just cause from her position, but the
situation had since then been changed.
● In fact, Gonzales was reinstated as ordered, but her services were subsequently
terminated under the law prevailing at the time of the termination of her service;
i.e., she was then already occupying a position that was primarily confidential and
had to be dismissed because she no longer enjoyed the trust and confidence of the
appointing authority.
● Thus, ​Gonzales termination for lack of confidence was lawful. She could no longer
be reinstated as provincial administrator of Camarines Norte or to any other
comparable position.
● This conclusion, however, is without prejudice to Gonzales entitlement to
retirement benefits, leave credits, and future employment in government service.
DISPOSITIVE:​:
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition, and REVERSE and SET
ASIDE the Decision dated June 25, 2008 and the Resolution dated December 2, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 97425.

#17 La Carlota City vs. Rojo
GR NO. 181367
Date: April 24, 2012
By: JCPP
Petitioners:​ La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, represented by its Mayor, Hon. Jeffrey Ferrer
and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental, represented by its
Vice-Mayor, Hon. Demie John C. Honrado
Respondents: ​Atty. Rex Rojo
Ponente: Carpio, J.
iFACTS:
● Then Vice Mayor Jalandoon of La Carlota City appointed Atty. Rojo who had just
tendered his resignation as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod the day preceding
such appointment as Sangguniang Panlungsod Secretary (status is permanent)
● Next day, VM Jalandoon submitted Rojo’s appointment papers to CSC Negros
Occidental Filed Office (CSCFO-Negros Occidental) for attestation
● CSSCFO wrote Jalandoon to inform him of the infirmities the office found on the
appointment documents
o Chairman of Personnel Selection Board and HR Managament Officer did
not sign the certififations
● Due to failure to comply with the directive, CSCFO considered the appointment of
Rojo permanently recalled/withdrawn
● Jalandoon brought the matter to CSC Regional Office 6 in Iloilo through appeal and
averred that:
o Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City refused to affix
his signature on Rojo’s appointment documents but still transmitted
them to CSCFO which shall be construed that the appointment was
complete and regular and that it complied with pertinent requirements
of a valid appointment
● Meanwhile, City of La Carlota represented by newly elected Mayor Ferrer and
Sangguniang Panlungsod represented by the newly elected VM Honrado
(petitioners) intervened and argued that:
o Jalandoon is not the real party in interest in the appeal but Rojo who
should be considered to have waived his right to appeal from the
disapproval of his appointment
o Appointment was made within period of election ban
o Resignation of Rojo as member of Sangguniang Panlungsod is ineffective
having not complied with provision on quorum under Sec. 28(d) RA 7160
● CSCO Regional Office reversed and set aside CSCFO’s ruling
● CA denied the petition and affirmed CSCO’s decision
ISSUE: W/N respondent’s appointment as sanggiang panlungsod secretary was issued
contrary to existing civil service rules and regulations – No, there was substantial
compliance with the appointment requirements
HELD/RATIO :
● A quorum of the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod​ should be computed based on the total
composition of the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod​. In this case, the ​Sangguniang
Panlungsod​ of La Carlota City, Negros Occidental is composed of the presiding
officer, ten (10) regular members, and two (2) ex-officio members, or a total of
thirteen (13) members.
● A majority of the 13 "members" of the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod​, or at least seven
(7) members, is needed to constitute a quorum to transact official business. Since
seven (7) members (including the presiding officer) were present on the 17 March
2004 regular session of the ​Sangguniang Panlungsod​, clearly there was a quorum
such that the irrevocable resignation of respondent was validly accepted.
● The ​Perez ​case cited in the Dissenting Opinion was decided in 1969 prior to the
1987 Constitution, and prior to the enactment of RA 7160 or the Local Government
Code of 1991. In fact, the ​Perez​ case was decided even prior to the old Local
Government Code which was enacted in 1983
● In ruling that the vice-mayor is not a constituent member of the municipal board,
the Court in the ​Perez ​case relied mainly on the provisions of Republic Act No. 305
(RA 305) creating the City of Naga and the amendatory provisions of Republic Act
No. 2259 (RA 2259) making the vice-mayor the presiding officer of the municipal
board
● Under RA 2259, the vice-mayor was the presiding officer of the City Council or
Municipal Board in chartered cities. ​However, RA 305 and 2259 were silent on
whether as presiding officer the vice-mayor could vote​. Thus, the applicable laws
in ​Perez​ are no longer the applicable laws in the present case.
● On the other hand, the 2004 case of ​Zamora v. Governor Caballero​, in which the
Court interpreted Section 53 of RA 7160 to mean that the entire membership must
be taken into account in computing the quorum of the​Sangguniang Panlalawigan,​
was decided under the 1987 Constitution and after the enactment of the Local
Government Code of 1991
● In stating that there were fourteen (14) members of the ​Sangguniang
Panlalawigan​ of Compostela Valley, the Court in ​Zamora​ clearly included the Vice-
Governor, as presiding officer, as part of the entire membership of
the ​Sangguniang Panlalawigan ​which must be taken into account in computing the
quorum
● On the issue that respondent’s appointment was issued during the effectivity of the
election ban, the Court agrees with the finding of the Court of Appeals and the Civil
Service Commission that since the respondent’s appointment was validly issued on
18 March 2004, then the appointment did not violate the election ban period
which was from 26 March to 9 May 2004
● Indeed, the Civil Service Commission found that despite the lack of signature and
certification of the Human Resource Management Officer of La Carlota City on
respondent’s appointment papers, respondent’s appointment is deemed effective
as of 18 March 2004 considering that there was substantial compliance with the
appointment requirements, thus, records show that Atty. Rojo’s appointment was
transmitted to the CSC Negros Occidental Field Office on March 19, 2004 by the
office of Gelongo without his certification and signature at the back of the
appointment. Nonetheless, records show that the position to which Atty. Rojo was
appointed was published on January 6, 2004
● Qualifications of Atty. Rojo were deliberated upon by the Personnel Selection
Board on March 5, 2004, attended by Vice Mayor Jalandoon as Chairman and Jose
Leofric F. De Paola, SP member and Sonia P. Delgado, Records Officer, as members
● Records likewise show that a certification was issued by Vice Mayor Jalandoon, as
appointing authority, that the appointment was issued in accordance with the
limitations provided for under Section 325 of RA 7160 and the said appointment
was reviewed and found in order pursuant to Section 5, Rule V of the Omnibus
Rules Implementing Executive Order No. 292. Further, certifications were issued by
the City Budget Officer, Acting City Accountant, City Treasurer and City Vice Mayor
 that appropriations or funds are available for said position. Apparently, all the
requirements prescribed in Section 1, Rule VIII in CSC Memorandum Circular No.
15, series of 1999, were complied with.
● Clearly, the appointment of respondent on 18 March 2004 was validly issued
considering that: (1) he was considered resigned as ​Sangguniang
Panlungsod​ member effective 17 March 2004; (2) he was fully qualified for the
position of ​Sanggunian​ Secretary; and (3) there was substantial compliance with
the appointment requirements.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 14 September 2007 Decision and the 18
January 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01377.
SO ORDERED.
18 VICENCIO v VILLAR
G.R. No. ​182069
DATE: July 03, 2012
By: ​TANADA
Topic: ​ Organizational Structure
Petitioner: ARNOLD D. VICENCIO
Respondent: HON. REYNALDO A. VILLAR and HON. JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR., in their
capacity as Acting Chairman and Commissioner, respectively, of the Hon. Commission on
Audit, and ELIZABETH ZOSA
Ponente: SERENO​ , J.
DOCTRINE: ​t​here is no inherent authority on the part of the city vice-mayor to enter into
contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike that provided for the city mayor.
Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the city was strictly
circumscribed by the ordinance granting it.
FACTS
1. On 30 October 2003, the City Council or the Sangguniang Panglungsod ng Malabon
(SPM), presided over by Hon. Benjamin Galauran, then acting Vice-Mayor, adopted
and approved City Ordinance No. 15-2003 (see notes)
● "An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice-Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay
Yambao, to Negotiate and Enter into Contract for Consultancy Services
for Consultants in the Sanggunian Secretariat Tasked to Function in their
Respective Areas of Concern x x x."
2. On 9 December 2003 and 1 March 2004, the City of Malabon, represented by Hon.
Galauran, entered into separate Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms.
 Jannette O. Vijiga, Mr. Meynardo E. Virtucio​4 ​and Mr. Hernando D. Dabalus (2003
Consultancy Contracts).
3. Subsequently, during the May 2004 elections, petitioner was elected City
Vice-Mayor of Malabon.
4. To complement the manpower requirements of the existing Sanggunian
Secretariat, petitioner deemed it necessary to hire the services of consultants with
the end view of augmenting and upgrading its performance capability for the
effective operation of the legislative machinery of the city.
● Petitioner thus wrote a letter dated 19 July 2004 to Atty. Danilo T. Diaz ,
the City Legal Officer of Malabon, inquiring as to whether it was still
necessary for the SPM to ratify a newly entered contract of consultancy
services between it and the candidate for the consultancy position. ​Atty.
Diaz then responded to the said inquiry through a letter dated 26 July
2004, which categorically stated that ratification was no longer
necessary, provided that the services to be contracted were those
stipulated in the ordinance.
5. On 21 January 2005, the SPM adopted City Ordinance No. 01-2005 entitled "An
Ordinance Appropriating Funds to Cover the Various Expenditures and Activities of
the Local Government of Malabon City for the Period from January 01, 2005 to
December 31, 2005."
6. On 1 February 2005, petitioner, representing the City Government of Malabon City,
 entered into Contracts for Consultancy Services with Ms. Jennifer S. Catindig​8 ​and
 Atty. Rodolfo C. delos Santos (2005 Consultancy Contracts).​9 ​On 11 February 2005,
another Contract for Consultancy Services was entered into between Mr. Marvin T.
Amiana and the city government.
7. On 19 December 2005, Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2005-12-019
was issued by Ms. Atenie F. Padilla, Supervising Auditor of the City Auditor’s Office,
Malabon City, disallowing the amount of three hundred eighty-four thousand nine
hundred eighty pesos (P384,980) for being an improper disbursement. The AOM
disclosed the following pertinent findings:
● City Ordinance No. 15-2003 dated October 30, 2003 was used as basis of
authority in hiring consultants. Analysis of the said City Ordinance
revealed that it specifically authorized the former Vice-Mayor, Hon. Mark
Allan Jay G. Yambao to enter into a contract for consultancy services in
the Sangguniang Secretariat covering the period June to December 2003
only. Said ordinance does not give authority to the incumbent City
Vice-Mayor Arnold D. Vicencio to hire consultants for CY 2005.
CONTENTIONS:
8. Petitoner contended that he had the authority to enter into the consultancy
contracts pursuant to Ordinance No. 15-2003. As the ordinance was ambiguous,
there was a need to interpret its provisions by looking into the intent of the law. He
also manifested that the Ombusdman had dismissed the administrative and
criminal Complaints which held that while Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically
mentions then Vice-Mayor Yambao, the intent in passing the law may not be
 ignored. It was the intention of the city council to authorize the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into consultancy contracts, and not Vice-Mayor Yambao only.
9. Respondent filed their Comment, in which they averred that Ordinance No.
15-2003 specifically authorized the expenditure of funds for the compensation of
consultants only from June to December 2003. Thus, the contracts for consultancy
entered into in 2005 were contrary to the ordinance cited and were therefore void
for being unauthorized and bereft of any legal basis.
ISSUE: WON THE CONSULTANCY CONTRACTS ENETERED INTO IN 2005 WAS VALID? ​NO
BECAUSE THE 2003 CONSULTANCY CONTRACT WAS LIMITED TO THAT YEAR ONLY AND WAS
NOT INTENDED TO BE CONTINUOUS. HENCE, PET AS VM HAS NO AUTOMATIC AUTHORITY TO
ENTER INTO ANOTHER CONSULATNCY CONTRACT AND HIS POWER IS LIMITED BY THE
IMPLEMENTING ORDINANCE
RULING:
(See ​NOTES​ for the powers and duties of a Vice Mayor)
10. Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the following are
the powers and duties of a city vice-mayor​.
Under this provision, ​t​here is no inherent authority on the part of the city
vice-mayor to enter into contracts on behalf of the local government unit, unlike
that provided for the city mayor. Thus, the authority of the vice-mayor to enter into
contracts on behalf of the city was strictly circumscribed by the ordinance granting
it.
11. In this case, Ordinance No. 15-2003 specifically authorized Vice-Mayor Yambao to
enter into contracts for consultancy services. As this is not a power or duty given
under the law to the Office of the Vice-Mayor, Ordinance No. 15-2003 cannot be
construed as a "continuing authority" for any person who enters the Office of the
Vice-Mayor to enter into subsequent, albeit similar, contracts.
12. Ordinance No. 15-2003 is clear and precise and leaves no room for
interpretation.​1âwphi1​ It only authorized the then City Vice-Mayor to enter into
consultancy contracts in the specific areas of concern. Further, the appropriations
for this particular item were limited to the savings for the period June to December
2003. This was an additional limitation to the power granted to Vice-Mayor
Yambao to contract on behalf of the city. The fact that any later consultancy
contract would necessarily require further appropriations from the city council
strengthens the contention that the power granted under Ordinance No. 15-2003
was limited in scope. Hence, petitioner was without authority to enter into the
2005 Consultancy Contracts. (Please see notes for the full info Ordinance No.
15-2003)
DISPOSITIVE​: ​WHEREFORE​, the Commission on Audit Decision dated 4 January 2008 is
hereby ​AFFIRMED​.
NOTES​:
Re: Power of VM
Under Section 456 of R.A. 7160, or the Local Government Code, the following are the powers
and duties of a city vice-mayor:
(a) The city vice-mayor shall:
(1) Be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlungsod and sign all warrants
drawn on the city treasury for all expenditures appropriated for the operation of
the sangguniang panlungsod;
(2) Subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, appoint all officials and
employees of the sangguniang panlungsod, except those whose manner of
appointment is specifically provided in this Code;
(3) Assume the office of the city mayor for the unexpired term of the latter in the
event of permanent vacancy as provided for in Section 44, Book I of this Code;
(4) Exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the city mayor in
cases of temporary vacancy as provided for in Section 46, Book I of this Code; and
(5) Exercise such other powers and perform such other duties and functions as may
be prescribed by law or ordinance.
(b) The city vice-mayor shall receive a monthly compensation corresponding to Salary Grade
twenty-eight (28) for a highly urbanized city and Salary Grade twenty-six (26) for a
component city, as prescribed under R.A. No. 6758 and the implementing guidelines issued
pursuant thereto.
Re: Copy of ​Ordinance No. 15-2003
City Ordinance No. 15-2003
An Ordinance Granting Authority to the City Vice Mayor, Hon. Jay Jay G. Yambao, to
Negotiate, and Enter into a Contract for Consultancy Services in the Sanggunian Secretariat
Tasked to Function in their Respective Areas of Concern, as Aforementioned, To Wit:
(1) A Legal Consultant
(2) A Consultant on Education Affairs and
(3) A Management Consultant
That said consultants shall be paid/compensated at the rate of Twenty Two Thousand Pesos
(P22,000.00) each, per month, effective upon approval of this ordinance subject to the usual
accounting and auditing procedures, rules and/or regulations;
That the source of funds for appropriations thereof shall be made available for expenditures
to be earmarked for payment/compensation for said consultants, covering the period from
June to December of 2003, thereby authorizing further the City Vice Mayor to effect the
necessary funding thereof, pursuant to the pertinent provision, aforecited, in Chapter 4, ● In May 2004, Synchronized National and Local Elections, Mariano Morales (Boking) ran
Section 336 of R.A. 7160; as candidate for Mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga for term commencing July 1, 2004 to
June 30, 2007. Prior thereto or on January 5, 2004, he filed his Certificate of Candidacy
That copies of this ordinance be furnished all concerned for their information and guidance. (COC).
● On January 10, 2004, petitioners filed with COMELEC 2​nd Division to cancel Boking’s COC
Adopted: October 30, 2003 on the ground that he was elected and had served three previous consecutive terms as
mayor of Mabalacat.
o They alleged that his candidacy violated Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution and
Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160, also known as LGC.
● Boking, in his answer admitted that he was elected mayor of Mabalacat for the term
commencing July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 (1st term) and July 1, 2001 to June 30, 2004
(third term). He served the second term from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 only as a
"caretaker of the office" or as a "de facto officer due to the following reasons:
o He was not validly elected for the second term 1998 to 2001 since his
proclamation as mayor was declared void by the RTC.
o He was preventively suspended by the Ombudsman in an anti-graft case
● COMELEC 2​nd Division found that Boking is disqualified to run for the position of
municipal mayor on the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms.
Thus, his COC was cancelled.
● Boking filed an MR with the COMELEC en banc. The latter granted Boking’s MR.
o It ruled that since the RTC Decision declared Boking’s proclamation void, his
discharge of the duties in the Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat is that of a de
facto o cer or a de facto mayor.
o Therefore, his continuous service for three consecutive terms has been
severed.
● Thus, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari

G.R. No. 170577

● After Boking was proclaimed the duly elected mayor, Anthony Dee “Dee” also a
candidate for mayor, filed with the RTC a petition for quo warranto against Boking.
● Dee alleged that Boking having served as mayor for three consecutive terms, is ineligible
to run for another term or 4th term.
● Boking raised the same defenses he raised in GR 167591 (RTC declared it void and
20 RIvera III v. COMELEC anti-graft case)
● RTC dismissed Dee’s petition on the ground that Boking did not serve the three-term
G.R. No. 167591/​ ​170577 limit since he was not the duly elected mayor of Mabalacat, but it was Dee who was
May 9, 2007 declared winner in the May 1998 elections for the term 1998 to 2001
By: ​ALLAUIGAN ● Dee interposed an appeal to COMELEC 1​st​ Division.
Topic: ​ Term Limits and Recall o He alleged that Boking violated the three-term limit rule when he ran for
Petitioner: ​Atty. Venancio Rivera and Atty. Normandick de Guzman/ Anthony Dee re-election (fourth time) as mayor in the 2004 elections. Consequently, his
Respondent: ​COMELEC and Mariano “Boking” Morales/ COMELEC and Mariano “Boking” proclamation as such should be set aside.
Morales ● COMELEC 1​st Division dismissed said appeal. It held that Boking cannot be deemed to
Ponente:​ Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. have served as mayor during the term 1998 to 2001 since his proclamation was declared
void by the RTC. He only served as a caretaker, thus, his service during that term should
DOCTRINE: ​For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two not be counted.
conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected ● Thus, Dee filed a MR with COMELEC en banc. The latter however affirmed the decision.
for three (3) consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully ● From the two cases, it is undisputed that Boking was elected as mayor for 4 consecutive
served three (3) consecutive terms. terms. a) July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1998 b) July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001 c) July 1, 2001 to
June 30, 2004 d) July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007.
FACTS
G.R. No. 167591 ISSUE:
 1. W/N Boking has already served his 3 consecutive terms? ​(YES)
2. Who should take his position. ​(VICE MAYOR)
HELD:
1.This was already resolved in ​Ong v. Alegre​, which provided the ff:
For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, two conditions or
requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three (3)
consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully served three
(3) consecutive terms.
In the said case, Francis Ong was elected and assumed the duties of the mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for three consecutive terms. But his proclamation as mayor in the
May 1998 election was declared void by the RTC its Decision dated July 4, 2001. As ruled by
this Court, his service for the term 1998 to 2001 is for the full term. Clearly, the three-term
limit rule applies to him. Indeed, there is no reason why this ruling should not also apply to
Boking who is similarly situated.
In this case, Boking was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee
ousting Boking as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
Sec. 8 Article X of the Constitution can not be more clear and explicit —
The term of the office of elected local officials . . . , shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. . . .
On the other hand, Sec. 43 (b) of RA 7160 (LGC) clearly states that:
No local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. . . .
Thus, Boking is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have
been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years.
Boking maintains that he served his second term (1998 to 2001) only as a "caretaker of the
office" or as a "de facto officer." Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution is violated and its
purpose defeated when an official serves in the same position for three consecutive terms.
Whether as "caretaker" or "de facto" officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the
prerequisites of the office which enables him "to stay on indefinitely". Thus, he should be
promptly ousted from the position of mayor of Mabalacat.
Having found Boking ineligible, his COC should be cancelled. The effect of such cancellation,
as provided under RA 6646​, is that such candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted.
Thus, Boking not being a candidate, the votes cast for him SHOULD NOT BE COUNTED and
must be considered stray votes.
2.Since Boking is DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as mayor of Mabalacat, the instant
petition for quo warranto has become moot under G.R. No. 170577.
The question now is whether it is the vice-mayor or petitioner Dee who shall serve for the
remaining portion of the 2004 to 2007 term.
This was already answered in ​Labo v. COMELEC​. The SC ruled that a second place candidate
cannot be proclaimed as a substitute winner, thus:
The rule, therefore, is: ​the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
As consequence of the ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested office has occurred.
This should now be filled by the vice-mayor in accordance with Section 44 of the Local
Government Code, to wit:
Sec. 44. Permanent vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor and
Vice-Mayor. – (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the
vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
RULING​: WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 167591 is GRANTED. Respondent Morales'
Certificate of Candidacy dated December 30, 2003 is cancelled. In view of the vacancy in the
Office of the Mayor in Mabalacat, Pampanga, the vice-mayor elect of the said municipality in
the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections is hereby declared mayor and
shall serve as such for the remaining duration of the term July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. The
petition in G.R. No. 170577 is DISMISSED for being moot.
21. Dizon V. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182088
DATE: January 30, 2009
By: ALVAR
Topic: ​Term Limits and Recall
Petitioner: ​Robert L. Dizon
Respondent: ​Commission on Elections and Marino P. Morales
Ponente: ​Carpio , J.
DOCTRINE: ​For purposes of determining the resulting disqualification brought about by the
three-term limit, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same
number of times. There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the
disqualification: (1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms
in the same local government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
FACTS
· Roberto L. Dizon, a resident and taxpayer of Mabalacat, Pampanga, filed a
case with the COMELEC to disqualify Marino P. Morales, the incumbent mayor
of Mabalacat on the ground that the latter was elected and had fully served
three previous consecutive terms in violation of Section 43 of the Local
Government Code.
· Dizon alleged that Morales was municipal mayor in 1995, 1998, 2001 and
2004.
· Thus, Morales should not have been allowed to have filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on March 2007 for the same position and same municipality.
· Morales, on the other hand, contended that he is still eligible and qualified to
run as mayor of Mabalacat because he was not elected for the said position in
the 1998 elections.
· He averred that the COMELEC en banc affirmed the decision of the RTC
declaring Anthony D. Dee as the duly elected Mayor of Mabalacat in the 1998
elections.
· Thus, he was not elected for the said position in the 1998 elections. His term
should be reckoned from 2001.
· He added that his election in 2004 is only for his second term.
· COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Morales and denied the petition.
· It took judicial notice of SC’s ruling in the Rivera case promulgated on May 9,
2007 where it was held that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat in
1995, 1998 and 2001 (notwithstanding the RTC Decision in an electoral protest
case that the then proclamation of Morales was void).
· The SC ruled in that case that Morales violated the three-​term limit under
Section 43 of the LGC.
· Hence, Morales was considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections, and this
failure to qualify for the 2004 elections is a gap and allows him to run again for
the same position in 2007 elections.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the period served by Morales in the 2004-​2007 term (although he was ousted
from his office as Mayor on May16, 2007) should be considered his fourth term – No
2. Whether the 2007-​2010 term of Morales is his 5th term - No
HELD / RULING:
1. NO. In our decision promulgated on 9 May 2007, this Court unseated Morales during his
fourth term. We cancelled his Certificate of Candidacy dated 30 December 2003. This
cancellation disqualified Morales from being a candidate in the May 2004 elections. The
votes cast for Morales were considered stray votes.
Both Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code
state that the term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, shall be three
years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
There should be a concurrence of two conditions for the application of the disqualification:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
In the ​Rivera case​, we found that Morales was elected as mayor of Mabalacat for four
consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007. We disqualified
Morales from his candidacy in the May 2004 elections because of the three-term limit.
Although the trial court previously ruled that Morales’ proclamation for the 1998-2001 term
was void, there was no interruption of the continuity of Morales’ service with respect to the
1998-2001 term because the trial court’s ruling was promulgated only on 4 July 2001, or after
the expiry of the 1998-2001 term.
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from office with
respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time
short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service.
Our decision in the Rivera case was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective
immediately. The next day, Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice
mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short it may seem to
Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not hold office for the
full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. (4th term)
2. Dizon claims that the 2007-2010 term is Morales’ fifth term in office. NO. Morales
occupied the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the following periods:
1995-1998
1998-2001
2001-2004
2004-2007.
However, because of his disqualification, Morales was not the duly elected mayor for the
2004-2007 term. Neither did Morales hold the position of mayor of Mabalacat for the full
term. Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007 because he was
ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Morales’ occupancy of the
position of mayor of Mabalacat from 2004-2007 cannot be counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit. Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007 to 30 June 2007
served as a gap for purposes of the three-term limit rule. Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30
June 2010 term is effectively Morales’ first term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. We AFFIRM the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections En Banc dated 14 February 2008 as well as the Resolution of the Commission on
Elections’ Second Division dated 27 July 2007. SO ORDERED.
 22. Montebon v. Commission on Elections official, the non-performance of which exposes said official to possible
G.R. No. 180444 administrative and criminal charges of dereliction of duty and neglect in the
April 8, 2008 performance of public functions. It is therefore more compulsory and obligatory
ANG rather than voluntary.
TOPIC: TERM LIMITS
PETITIONER: FEDERICO T. MONTEBON and ELEANOR M. ONDOY ● In this case, a permanent vacancy occurred in the office of the vice-mayor due to
RESPONDENT: COMMISSION ON ELECTION and SESINANDO F. POTENCIOSO, JR the retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza. Montebon, being the highest ranking
PONENTE: YNARES-SANTIAGO, ​J.​: municipal councilor, succeeded him in accordance with law.

FACTS: ● Thus, Montebon's assumption of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an

involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor, resulting in an
● Petitioners Montebon and Ondy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. were candidates interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 term. It cannot be deemed to have
for municipal councilor of the Municipality of Tuburan, Cebu for the 2007 National been by reason of voluntary renunciation because it was by operation of law
and Local Elections.
● On April 30, 2007, petitioners and other candidates for municipal councilor filed a
petition for disqualification against respondent with the COMELEC alleging that
respondent Potencioso Jr. had been elected and served three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 thus, he is proscribed
from running for the same position in the 2007 elections as it would be his fourth
consecutive term.
● Respondent alleged that ​during his second term, he succeeded and assumed the
position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired

● The COMELEC First Division denied the petition for disqualification ruling that
respondent's assumption of office as vice-mayor should be considered an
interruption in the continuity of his service. His second term having been
involuntarily interrupted, respondent should thus not be disqualified to seek
reelection as municipal councilor.

● On appeal, the COMELEC En Banc upheld the ruling of the First Division.

ISSUE: ​W/N Montebon's assumption to the vice-mayoralty position considered an

involuntary severance or interruption?

RULING:

● Yes. Succession in local government offices is by ​operation of law​. Section 44 of

Republic Act No. 7160, provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of
the vice mayor, ​the highest ranking Sanggunian​ member shall become vice mayor.
● The legal successor is not given any option under the law on whether to accept the
vacated post or not. Section 44 of the Local Government Code makes no exception.
Only if the highest-ranking councilor is permanently unable to succeed to the post
does the law speak of alternate succession. Under no circumstances can simple
refusal of the official concerned be considered as permanent inability within the
contemplation of law. Essentially therefore, the successor cannot refuse to assume
the office that he is mandated to occupy by virtue of succession. He can only do so
if for some reason he is permanently unable to succeed and occupy the post
vacated.

● Thus, ​succession by law to a vacated government office is characteristically not

voluntary since it involves the performance of a public duty by a government
 23 BOLOS v COMELEC
G.R. No. 184082 March 17, 2009
By: BACLAO
Topic: ​TERM LIMITS AND RECALL
Petitioner:​ NICASIO BOLOS, JR.
Respondent:​ THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES CINCONIEGUE
Ponente: ​PERALTA , J.
FACTS:
● For three consecutive terms, petitioner was elected to the position of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the Barangay Elections held in 1994, 1997 and 2002.
● In May 2004, while sitting as the incumbent Punong Barangay of Barangay Biking,
petitioner ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol and won. He assumed office as
Municipal Councilor on July 1, 2004, leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the
full term of the Sangguniang Bayan position, which was until June 30, 2007.
● Thereafter, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay of Barangay
Biking, Dauis, Bohol in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections.
● Respondent Rey Angeles Cinconiegue, the incumbent Punong Barangay and candidate for
the same office, filed before the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification of petitioner
as candidate on the ground that he had already served the three-term limit. Hence,
petitioner is no longer allowed to run for the same position in accordance with Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution and Section 43 (b) of R.A. No. 7160.
● Cinconiegue contended that petitioner’s relinquishment of the position of Punong
Barangay in July 2004 was voluntary on his part, as it could be presumed that it was his
personal decision to run as municipal councilor in the May 14, 2004 National and Local
Elections. He added that petitioner knew that if he won and assumed the position, there
would be a voluntary renunciation of his post as Punong Barangay.
● Petitioner answered that by reason of his assumption of office as Sangguniang Bayan
member, his remaining term of office as Punong Barangay, which would have ended in
2007, was left unserved. He argued that his election and assumption of office as
Sangguniang Bayan member was by operation of law; hence, it must be considered as an
involuntary interruption in the continuity of his last term of service.
● Petitioner contends that he is qualified to run for the position of Punong Barangay in the
October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections since he did not serve
continuously three consecutive terms. He admits that in the 1994, 1997 and 2002
Barangay elections, he was elected as Punong Barangay for three consecutive terms.
Nonetheless, while serving his third term as Punong Barangay, he ran as Municipal
Councilor of Dauis, Bohol, and won. On July 1, 2004, he assumed office and, consequently,
left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law. He averred that he served the full
term as member of the Sangguniang Bayan until June 30, 2007. On October 29, 2007, he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Punong Barangay and won. Hence, the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in disqualifying him as a candidate for Punong Barangay since
he did not complete his third term by operation of law.
● COMELEC FIRST DIVISION: ruled that petitioner’s relinquishment of the office of Punong
Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol, as a consequence of his assumption of office as
Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, on July 1, 2004, was a voluntary renunciation
of the Office of Punong Barangay.
● COMELEC en banc: ​Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied
ISSUE: ​whether or not there was voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay by
petitioner when he assumed office as Municipal Councilor so that he is deemed to have fully
served his third term as Punong Barangay, warranting his disqualification from running for
the same position in the October 29, 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
HELD:
● The three-term limit for elective local officials is contained in Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
● The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in
accordance with the exigencies of public service. The discussions in the Constitutional
Commission showed that the term of office of barangay officials would be "[a]s may be
determined by law," and more precisely, "[a]s provided for in the Local Government
Code."6 Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code provides that barangay officials are
covered by the three-term limit, while Section 43(c) thereof states that the term of office
of barangay officials shall be five (5) years. The cited provisions
● Socrates v. Commission on Elections held that the rule on the three-term limit, embodied
in the Constitution and the Local Government Code, has two parts:
● The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three
consecutive terms. The clear intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the
three-term limit rule.
● The second part states that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not
interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent is that involuntary severance from
office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the service
before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service
or consecutive terms.
● After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate reelection disqualifying petitioner from being a candidate for Punong Barangay in the October 29,
for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same 2007 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.
office following the end of the third consecutive term.
● The second part of the rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of DISPOSITIVE PORTION: ​WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The COMELEC Resolutions
the Constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary dated March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
renunciation of office and at the same time respect the people’s choice and grant their costs. SO ORDERED
elected official full service of a term.
● The Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same
government post; and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
● The Court agrees with the COMELEC that there was voluntary renunciation by petitioner of
his position as Punong Barangay.
● Nicasio Bolos, Jr.’s relinquishment of the office of Punong Barangay of Biking, Dauis, Bohol,
as a consequence of his assumption to office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis,
Bohol, on July 1, 2004, is a voluntary renunciation.
● As conceded even by him, respondent (petitioner herein) had already completed two
consecutive terms of office when he ran for a third term in the Barangay Elections of 2002.
When he filed his certificate of candidacy for the Office of Sangguniang Bayan of Dauis,
Bohol, in the May 10, 2004 [elections], he was not deemed resigned. Nonetheless, all the
acts attending his pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and
readiness to give up his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher elective office,
for it was very unlikely that respondent had filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
Sangguniang Bayan post, campaigned and exhorted the municipal electorate to vote for
him as such and then after being elected and proclaimed, return to his former position. He
knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he
held, and he intended to forego of it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
● Indeed, petitioner was serving his third term as Punong Barangay when he ran for
Sangguniang Bayan member and, upon winning, assumed the position of Sangguniang
Bayan member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as Punong Barangay which the
Court deems as a voluntary renunciation of said office.
● Petitioner erroneously argues that when he assumed the position of Sangguniang Bayan
member, he left his post as Punong Barangay by operation of law; hence, he did not fully
serve his third term as Punong Barangay.
● The Court held that it could not be deemed to have been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by operation of law.
● In this case, petitioner did not fill in or succeed to a vacancy by operation of law. He
instead relinquished his office as Punong Barangay during his third term when he won and
assumed office as Sangguniang Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which is deemed a
voluntary renunciation of the Office of Punong Barangay.
● In fine, the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolutions dated March 4, 2008 and August 7, 2008,

24. Aldovino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 184836
DATE: ​23 December 2009
By: ​Ju
Topic: ​ Municipal Corporation: Term Limits and Recall
Petitioner: ​Simon B. Aldovino, Jr. Danilo B. Faller and Ferdinand N. Talabong
Respondent: ​Commission on Elections and Wilfredo F. Asilo
Ponente:​ Brion J.
DOCTRINE:
The preventive suspension of an elected public official does not constitute an interruption of
the official’s term of office for purposes of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution
FACTS:
● Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms. During his 3​rd
term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in
relation with a criminal case he then faced. . This Court, however, subsequently
lifted the Sandiganbayan’s suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the
functions of his office and finished his term.
● In the next election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position.
Aldovino petitioned to have Asilo’s certificate of candidacy denied or cancelled on
the ground that he had been elected and had ​served for three terms​; his candidacy
for a 4​th term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code).
● The COMELEC’s Second Division ruled in Asilo’s favour. It reasoned out that the
three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for
the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.
The COMELEC en banc r​ efused to reconsider the Second Division’s ruling. Hence,
this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether ​preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the
three-term limit rule, which would allow him to run for a 4​th​ term
2. Whether ​preventive suspension is considered ​involuntary renunciation as
contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160
HELD:
● Asilo’s third term was not interrupted by the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive
suspension. The Constitutional ​limitation refers to the term​, ​not to the service
that a public official may render.
● The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which
the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
● According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an office may
be held. Upon expiration of the officer’s term, unless he is authorized by law to
holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public officer must ipso facto cease.
In the law of public officers, the most and natural frequent method by which a
public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the terms for which he was
elected or appointed
● Preventive suspension is ​not an interruption of the three-term limit. The
“​interruption​” of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit
rule is one that involves no less than the ​involuntary loss of title to office. The
elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however
short, for an effective interruption to occur.
● Preventive suspension is – by its very nature – the exact opposite of voluntary
renunciation; it is involuntary and temporary, and involves only the actual delivery
of service, not the title to the office. But ​temporary inability or disqualification to
exercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, ​should not be
considered an effective interruption of a term because it ​does not involve the loss
of title to office​; the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred from
exercising the functions of his office.
o The ​best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the
absence of a permanent replacement and the ​lack of the authority to
appoint one​ since ​no vacancy exists​.
o Many reasons exist that may temporarily prevent an elective office
holder from exercising the functions of his office in the way that
preventive suspension does. A serious extended illness, inability through
force majeure, or the enforcement of a suspension as a penalty, to cite
some involuntary examples, may prevent an office holder from exercising
the functions of his office for a time ​without forfeiting title to office​.
o Let it be noted that a preventive suspension is easier to undertake than
voluntary renunciation, as it does not require relinquishment or loss of
office even for the briefest time. It merely requires an easily fabricated
administrative charge that can be dismissed soon after a preventive
suspension has been imposed. In this sense, recognizing preventive
suspension as an effective interruption of a term can serve as a
circumvention more potent than the voluntary renunciation that the
Constitution expressly disallows as an interruption.
Voluntary renunciation​.
● Voluntary renunciation is an example and standard of what does not constitute an
interruption. In the context of the three-term limit rule, such loss of title is not
considered an interruption because it is presumed to be purposely sought to avoid
the application of the term limitation. In the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission, Mr. Davide explained to Mr. Maambong that “voluntary renunciation”
meant abandonment is voluntary; In other words, the official cannot circumvent
the restriction by merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
“Voluntary renunciation” is more general than abandonment and resignation. The
framers’ intent apparently was to close all gaps that an elective official may seize to
defeat the three-term limit rule.
DISPOSITION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we ​GRANT the petition and accordingly NULLIFY the
assailed COMELEC rulings. The private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared DISQUALIFIED
to run, and perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth term. Costs
against private respondent Asilo. SO ORDERED.
NOTES:
Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections​:​ Involuntary severance from office when a term had
been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment by COMELEC is an interruption. It is
severance from office​, or ​loss of title​, that ​renders the three-term limit rule inapplicable​.
TALAGA v. COMELEC
GR 196804 & GR 197015 / Oct 9,2012
MJB
Topic:​ Term of office
Petitioner​: Mayor Barbara Talaga (196804) & Philip Castillo (197015)
Reposndent: COMELEC & Roderick Alcala (196804) & COMELEC Barbara Ruby Talaga and
Roderick Alcala ( 197015)
Ponente:​ Bersamin,J
NOTE: THIS IS A LONG CASE SORRY FOR THE LONG DIGEST ​☹ - MADAMING SEPARATE
OPINIONS MGA JUSTICES -) - NASA PAGE 3 ng RULING YUNG UNDER OUR TOPIC,BUT ALSO
CHECK J.BRION OPINION (Important)
SUMMARY: This is a consolidated case concerning disqualification of a substitute who was
proclaimed the winner of a mayoralty election, and the ascertainment of who should assume
the office following the substitute’s disqualification. Ramon Talaga and Phillip Castillo both
filed a COC for the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be scheduled in the 2010 national and
local elections. Castillo filed with Comelec a petition seeking the denial of due course or
cancellation of COC of Ramon for having already served 3 consecutive terms as City Mayorof
Lucena. Comelec First Division issued a Resolution declaring Ramon disqualified to run.
Following the ruling of SC in Aldovino Jr. v. Comelec, Ramon filed an ex​parte manifestation of
withdrawal of his pending MR. On the same day, Barbara Talaga filed her own COC for Mayor
of Lucena City in substitution of Ramon. Comelec en banc, acting on Ramon’s manifestation,
declared the Comelec First Division’s Resolution final and executory. On election day, the
name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots but the votes cast in his favor were counted
in favor of Barbara as his substitute candidate, resulting in Barbara being ultimately credited
with 44,099 votes as against Castillo’s 39,615 votes. Castillo filed a petition for annulment of
proclamation with the Comelec and contends that with Ramon being a disqualified candidate
and Barbara having filed her COC beyond the allowed period, he should be considered as the
one who got the highest number of votes in the elections. SC held that the declaration of
Ramon’s disqualification rendered his COC invalid; hence, he was not a valid candidate to be
properly substituted by Barbara. As to Castillo’s assertion, SC held that the Labo doctrine on
the rejection of the second placer applies to him such that being the candidate obtaining the
second highest number of votes for the contested office, he could not assume the office
despite the disqualification of the first placer because the he was “not the choice of the
sovereign will. Therefore, SC held that it is the elected Vice Mayor (Alcala, intervenor in this
case) who must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent vacancy in
the office.
DOCTRINE: ​No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he
was elected. The objective of imposing the three​term limit rule was to avoid the evil of a
single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
Focus of consolidated cases:Disqualification of a substitute who was proclaimed the winner
of a mayoralty election, and the ascertainment of who should assume the office following
the substitute’s disqualification.
FACTS:
● In 2009, Ramon Talaga ang Phillip Castillo filed their Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Mayor of Lucena City to be scheduled in the 2010 national and local
elections. Ramon, the official candidate of Lakas-Kampi-CMD, declared in his COC that
he was eligible for the office he was seeking to be elected to.
● 4 days later, Castillo filed with Comelec a petition seeking the denial of due course or
cancellation of COC of Ramon for having already served 3 consecutive terms as City
Mayorof Lucena.
● He alleged that Ramon, despite knowing that he had been elected and had served 3
consecutive terms (2001, 2004, 2007, without interruption, except the preventive
suspension imposed upon him from Oct. 13, 2005 to Nov. 14, 2005 and from Sept. 4,
2009 to Oct. 30, 2009 pursuant to Sandiganbayan resolution in a criminal case) as Mayor
of Lucena City, still filed his COC for same position in the 2010 elections.
o *Castillo is the incumbent Vice Mayor of the City of Lucena, and now
running for City Mayor under Liberal Party.
● Ramon countered that that the Sandiganbayan had preventively suspended him from
office during his 2​nd and 3​rd terms; and that the three term limit rule did not then apply
to him pursuant to the prevailing jurisprudence to the effect that an involuntary
separation from office amounted to an interruption of continuity of service for purposes
of the application of the three​term limit rule.
● In the meantime, on Dec. 23, 2009, SC promulgated the ruling in Aldovino, Jr. v.
Comelec, holding that preventive suspension, being a mere temporary incapacity, was
not a valid ground for avoiding the effect of the three​term limit rule. Thus, on Ramon
filed in the COMELEC a Manifestation with Motion to Resolve, taking into account the
intervening ruling in Aldovino.
o Ramon contended that when he filed his COC, the rule that ‘where the
separation from office is caused by reasons beyond the control of the
officer—i.e. involuntary—the service of term is deemed interrupted’ has
not yet been overturned by the new ruling of the SC,
▪ therefore, there was no misrepresentation his part as would
constitute a ground for the denial of due course to and/or the
cancellation of his COC at the time he filed the same.
o Pursuant, however, to the new ruling of the SC in respect of the issue on
the three term limitation, Ramon acknowledges that he is now
disqualified to run for the position of Mayor of Lucena City having served
3 (albeit interrupted) terms as Mayor of Lucena City prior to the filing of
his COC for the 2010 elections.
● Notwithstanding his express recognition of his disqualification to run as Mayor of
Lucena City in the 2010 elections, Ramon did not withdraw his COC.
● Acting on Ramon’s Manifestation, the Comelec First Division issued a Resolution on April
19, 2010 declaring Ramon disqualified to run for Mayor of Lucena City for the 2010
elections.
● Initially, Ramon filed an MR against this Resolution. Later on, however, he filed at 9:00
a.m. of May 4, 2010 an Ex​parte Manifestation of Withdrawal of the Pending MR. At 4:30
p.m. on the same date, Barbara Talaga filed her own COC for Mayor of Lucena City in
substitution of Ramon, attaching thereto the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance
(CONA) issued by Lakas​Kampi​CMD, the party that had nominated Ramon.
● Comelec En Banc, acting on Ramon’s Ex parte Manifestation of Withdrawal, declared
the Comelec First Division’s Resolution final and executory.
● On election day on May 10, 2010, the name of Ramon remained printed on the ballots
but the votes cast in his favor were counted in favor of Barbara as his substitute
candidate, resulting in Barbara being ultimately credited with 44,099 votes as against
Castillo’s 39,615 votes.
● Castillo promptly filed a petition in the City Board of Canvassers (CBOC) seeking the
suspension of Barbara’s proclamation.
● It was only on May 13, 2010 when the Comelec En Banc, upon the recommendation of
its Law Department, gave due course to Barbara’s COC and CONA through Resolution
No. 8917, thereby including her in the certified list of candidates.
● Consequently, the CBOC proclaimed Barbara as the newly​elected Mayor of Lucena City.
● Castillo filed a Petition for Annulment of Proclamation with the Comelec. He alleged that
Barbara could not substitute Ramon because his COC had been cancelled and denied
due course; and Barbara could not be considered a candidate because the Comelec En
Banc had approved her substitution 3 days after the elections; hence, the votes cast for
Ramon should be considered stray.
● In her Comment on the Petition for Annulment of Proclamation, Barbara maintained the
validity of her substitution. She countered that the Comelec En Banc did not deny due
course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, despite a declaration of his disqualification, because
there was no finding that he had committed misrepresentation, the ground for the
denial of due course to or cancellation of his COC. She prayed that with her valid
substitution, Sec. 12 of RA No. 9006 applied, based on which the votes cast for Ramon
were properly counted in her favor.
● Roderick Alcala, the duly elected Vice Mayor of Lucena City, sought to intervene,
positing that he should assume the post of Mayor because Barbara’s substitution had
been invalid and Castillo had clearly lost the elections.
● Comelec Second Division dismissed Castillo’s petition and Alcala’s
petition​in-intervention. It held that:
o Having been disqualified only, Ramon was rightly substituted by Barbara.
As such, the votes for Ramon cannot be considered as stray votes but
should be counted in favor of Barbara since the substituted and the
substitute carry the same surname —Talaga, as provided in Sec. 12 of RA
No. 9006.
o There is no provision in the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) or any election
laws for that matter which requires that the substitution and the COC of
the substitute should be approved and given due course first by the
Commission or the Law Department before it can be considered as
effective. All that Section 77 of the OEC as implemented by Section 13 of
Resolution No. 8678 requires is that it should be filed with the proper
office.
▪ The respondent is correct when she argued that in fact even
the BEI can receive a COC of a substitute candidate in case the
cause for the substitution happened between the day before
the election and mid​day of election day. Thus, even if the
approval of the substitution was made after the election, the
substitution became effective on the date of the filing of the
COC with the CONA.
● Acting on Castillo and Alcala’s respective motions for reconsideration, the Comelec En
Banc issued the assailed Resolution dated May 20, 2011 reversing the Comelec Second
Division’s ruling. It pointed out that:
o (a) Said resolution did not attain finality for being issued without a
hearing as a mere incident of the Comelec’s ministerial duty to receive
the COCs of substitute candidates;
o (b) Resolution No. 8917 was based on the wrong facts; and
o (c) Ramon’s disqualification was resolved with finality only on May 5,
2010, the Comelec En Banc concluded that Barbara could not have
properly substituted Ramon but had simply become an additional
candidate who had filed her COC out of time; and held that Vice Mayor
Alcala should succeed to the position pursuant to Section 44 of the LGC.
ISSUE: Whether the substitution of Barbara as candidate for the position of Mayor of
Lucena City in lieu of her husband Ramon was valid – NO.
RULING: Petition dismissed. Resolution issued on May 20, 2011 by the Comelec En Banc
affirmed.
Existence of a valid COC is a condition sine qua non for a valid substitution
● The filing of a COC within the period provided by law is a mandatory requirement for
any person to be considered a candidate in a national or local election. This is clear
from Section 73 of the OEC:
o Section 73. Certificate of candidacy.—No person shall be eligible for any
elective public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy
within the period fixed herein.
o Section 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy.—The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy
for the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for
Member of the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its
component cities, highly urbanized city or district or sector which he
seeks to represent; the political party to which he belongs; civil status; his
date of birth; residence; his post office address for all election purposes;
his profession or occupation; that he will support and defend the
Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of
candidacy are true to the best of his knowledge.
● The evident purposes of the requirement for the filing of CoCs and in fixing the time
limit for filing them are:
o (a) to enable the voters to know, at least 60 days prior to the regular
election, the candidates from among whom they are to make the choice;
and
o (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes
cast.
 ● If the law does not confine to the duly registered candidates the choice by the
voters, there may be as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes may
be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as a mark to identify the votes in
favor of a candidate for another office in the same election.
● Accordingly, a person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he seeks to assume,
followed by the timely filing of such declaration, constitute a valid COC that render the
person making the declaration a valid or official candidate.
● There are 2 remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race.
One is through a petition for disqualification and the other through a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court differentiated the two
remedies in Fermin v. Commission on Elections:
o petition for disqualification – can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the
OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC
▪ some grounds: prohibited acts of candidates, and the fact of a
candidate’s permanent residency in another country when that
fact affects the residency requirement of a candidate
▪ effect: a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely
prohibited to continue as a candidate
▪ a candidate who is disqualified under Section 68 can be validly
substituted pursuant to Section 77 because he remains a
candidate until disqualified
o petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC (Sec. 78) – can only be
grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false
▪ some grounds: nuisance candidates under Section 69 of the
OEC; and material misrepresentation under Section 78 of the
OEC
▪ effect: the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due
course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if
he/she never filed a COC
▪ a person whose CoC has been denied due course or cancelled
under Section 78 cannot be substituted because he is not
considered a candidate
● Because of these differences, the following circumstances may result from the granting
of the petitions:
o A candidate may not be qualified to run for election but may have filed a
valid COC
o A candidate may not be qualified and at the same time may not have
filed a valid COC
o A candidate may be qualified but his COC may be denied due course or
cancelled
● In the event that a candidate is disqualified to run for a public office, or dies, or
withdraws his COC before the elections, Section 77 of the OEC provides the option of
substitution:
o Section 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or
withdrawal.—If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, ​an official candidate of a registered or accredited political
party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person
belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political
party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office
affected in accordance with the preceding sections not later than
mid​day of the day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or
disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid​day of election day, said certificate may be filed with any board of
election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate,
or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
● Considering that a cancelled COC does not give rise to a valid candidacy, there can be no
valid substitution of the candidate under Section 77 of the OEC. It should be clear, too,
that a candidate who does not file a valid COC may not be validly substituted, because a
person without a valid COC is not considered a candidate in much the same way as any
person who has not filed a COC is not at all a candidate.
● Likewise, as in this case, a candidate who has not withdrawn his COC (Ramon) in
accordance with Section 73 of the OEC may not be substituted. A withdrawal of
candidacy can only give effect to a substitution if the substitute candidate submits
prior to the election a sworn COC as required by Section 73 of the OEC.
Declaration of ​Ramon’s ​disqualification rendered his COC invalid​; hence, he was not a valid
candidate to be properly substituted
● SC concurs with the conclusion of the Comelec En Banc that the Castillo petition (2​nd
case) was in the nature of a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC under Sec.
78 of the OEC.
o Fermin v. Comelec: The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the
CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the
candidate made a material representation that is false, which may relate
to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is running for.
o Sec. 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for
public office. If the candidate subsequently states a material
representation in the COC that is false, the COMELEC is empowered to
deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
● The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the COC under Section 78 involves a
finding not only that a person lacks a qualification but also that he made a material
representation that is false. In Mitra v. Comelec, the Court stressed that there must
also be a deliberate attempt to mislead.
o Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy.—A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required
under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than 25 days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later
than fifteen days before the election.
● The false representation under Section 78 must likewise be a “deliberate attempt to
mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.”
Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to the would​be candidate’s qualifications for public office.
● [TOPIC] ​To be sure, the cause of Ramon’s ineligibility (i.e., ​the three​term limit) is
enforced both by the Constitution and statutory law.
o Article X, Section 8 of the 1987 Constitution: The term of office of
elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was
elected.
o Section 43. Term of Office.—(a) x x x
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective
official concerned was elected.
● The objective of imposing the three​term limit rule was “to avoid the evil of a single
person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a
result of a prolonged stay in the same office.”
● Aldovino, Jr. v. Comelec: The framers of the Constitution specifically included an
exception to the people’s freedom to choose those who will govern them in order to
avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular
territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office.
● AS APPLIED: To accord with the constitutional and statutory proscriptions, Ramon was
absolutely precluded from asserting an eligibility to run as Mayor of Lucena City for
the 4​th consecutive term. Resultantly, his COC was invalid and ineffectual ab initio for
containing the incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his eligibility to
run.
● The invalidity and inefficacy of his COC made his situation even worse than that of a
nuisance candidate because the nuisance candidate may remain eligible despite
cancellation of his COC or despite the denial of due course to the COC pursuant to
Section 69 of the OEC.
● Ramon himself specifically admitted his ineligibility when he filed his Manifestation
with Motion. That sufficed to render his COC invalid, considering that for all intents
and purposes the COMELEC’s declaration of his disqualification had the effect of
announcing that he was no candidate at all.
● A non​candidate like Ramon had no right to pass on to his substitute. As ​Miranda v.
Abaya aptly put it: ​Even on the most basic and fundamental principles, it is readily
understood that the concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person
to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of somebody who does not
exist or who never was.
● The Court has no other choice but to rule that in all the instances enumerated in
Section 77 of the OEC, the existence of a valid certificate of candidacy seasonably filed
is a requisite sine qua non.
● A disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid
and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all.
o If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section
77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to allow the so​called “substitute” to
file a “new” and “original” certificate of candidacy beyond the period for
the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of
the law, an act abhorred by our Constitution.
Granting without any qualification of petition filed by Castillo (2​nd case) manifested Comelec’s
intention to declare Ramon disqualified and to cancel his COC
● That the Comelec made no express finding that Ramon committed any deliberate
misrepresentation in his COC was of little consequence in the determination of whether
his COC should be deemed cancelled or not.
● Miranda v. Abaya: The specific relief that the petition prayed for was that the COC “be
not given due course and/or cancelled.” The Comelec categorically granted “the
petition” and then pronounced—in apparent contradiction—that Miranda was
“disqualified.” The Court held that the Comelec, by granting the petition without any
qualification, disqualified Miranda and at the same time cancelled Miranda’s COC.
o The crucial point here was that the Comelec actually granted the
particular relief of cancelling or denying due course to the COC prayed for
in the petition by not subjecting that relief to any qualification.
● SC held that Miranda v. Abaya applies in this case. ​Although Castillo’s petition
specifically sought both the disqualification of Ramon and the denial of due course to
or cancellation of his COC, the Comelec categorically stated in the Resolution that it
was granting the petition. Despite the Comelec making no finding of material
misrepresentation on the part of Ramon, its granting of Castillo’s petition without
express qualifications manifested that the COMELEC had cancelled Ramon’s COC
based on his apparent ineligibility.
● The Resolution dated April 19, 2010 became final and executory because Castillo did not
move for its reconsideration, and because Ramon later withdrew his motion for
reconsideration filed in relation to it.
Who should assume the office of Mayor of Lucena City?
​Elected Vice Mayor must succeed and assume the position of Mayor due to a permanent
vacancy in the office
● Castillo: Submits that the ​doctrine on the rejection of the second​placer espoused in
Labo, Jr. v. Comelec should not apply to him because Ramon’s disqualification became
final prior to the elections. Instead, he cites Cayat v. Comelec:
o Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer have one common essential condition—the disqualification
of the candidate had not become final before the elections. This essential
condition does not exist in the present case.
o The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment
before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
▪ Section 6 of RA No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987):
Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted
for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the
winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant
or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever
the evidence of his guilt is strong.
 Relying on the pronouncement in Cayat, Castillo asserts that he was
entitled to assume the position of Mayor of Lucena City for having
obtained the highest number of votes among the remaining qualified
candidates.
● SC: It would seem, then, that the date of the finality of the Comelec resolution declaring
Ramon disqualified is decisive.
o Section 10, Rule 19 of the Comelec’s Resolution No. 8804: A decision or
resolution of a Division becomes final and executory after the lapse of 5
days following its promulgation unless a motion for reconsideration is
seasonably filed.
o Section 8, Rule 20 of Resolution No. 8804: The decision of the Comelec En
Banc becomes final and executory 5 days after its promulgation and
receipt of notice by the parties.
● In this case:
o Comelec First Division declared Ramon disqualified through its Resolution
dated April 19, 2010, the copy of which Ramon received on the same
date
o Ramon filed an MR on April 21, 201057 in accordance with Section 7 of
Comelec Resolution No. 8696, but withdrew the motion on May 4,
2010,59 ostensibly to allow his substitution by Barbara
o On his part, Castillo did not file any motion for reconsideration. Such
circumstances indicated that there was no more pending matter that
could have effectively suspended the finality of the ruling in due course.
o Hence, the Resolution dated April 19, 2010 could be said to have attained
finality upon the lapse of 5 days from its promulgation and receipt of it by
the parties. This happened probably on April 24, 2010.
o Despite such finality, the Comelec En Banc continued to act on the
withdrawal by Ramon of his motion for reconsideration through the May
5, 2010 Resolution declaring the April 19, 2010 Resolution of the Comelec
First Division final and executory.
● SC cannot agree with Castillo’s assertion that with Ramon’s disqualification becoming
final prior to the May 10, 2010 elections, the ruling in Cayat was applicable in his favor.
Barbara’s filing of her COC in substitution of Ramon significantly differentiated this case
from the factual circumstances obtaining in Cayat.
o Rev. Fr. Cayat was disqualified on April 17, 2004, and his disqualification
became final before the May 10, 2004 elections. Considering that no
substitution of Cayat was made, Palileng, Sr., his rival, remained the only
candidate for the mayoralty post in Buguias, Benguet.
o In contrast, ​after Barbara substituted Ramon, the May 10, 2010
elections proceeded with her being regarded by the electorate of
Lucena City as a bona fide candidate. To the electorate, she became a
contender for the same position vied for by Castillo, such that she stood
on the same footing as Castillo.
o Such standing as a candidate negated Castillo’s claim of being the
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes, and of being
consequently entitled to assume the office of Mayor.
● Castillo could not assume the office for he was only a second placer. Labo, Jr. should
be applied:
o The candidate obtaining the second highest number of votes for the
contested office could not assume the office despite the disqualification
of the first placer because the second placer was “not the choice of the
sovereign will.
● The only time that a second placer is allowed to take the place of a disqualified
winning candidate is when two requisites concur:
o (a) the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
disqualified; and
o (b) the electorate was fully aware in fact and in law of that candidate’s
disqualification as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety but the electorate still cast the plurality of the votes in favor
of the ineligible candidate.
Under this sole exception, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise
or throwing away their votes, in which case the eligible candidate with the
second highest number of votes may be deemed elected.
​BUT the exception did not apply in favor of Castillo simply because the
second element was absent. The electorate of Lucena City were not the least
aware of the fact of Barbara’s illegibility as the substitute. In fact, the
Comelec En Banc issued the Resolution finding her substitution invalid only
on May 20, 2011, or a full year after the elections.
Barbara was properly disqualified from assuming the position of Mayor of Lucena City
● Comelec En Banc properly disqualified Barbara from assuming the position of Mayor of
Lucena City. To begin with, ​there was no valid candidate for her to substitute due to
Ramon’s ineligibility​.
● Also, ​Ramon did not voluntarily withdraw his COC before the elections in accordance
with Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code.
● Lastly, ​she was not an additional candidate for the position of Mayor of Lucena City
because her filing of her COC on May 4, 2010 was beyond the period fixed by law.
Indeed, she was not, in law and in fact, a candidate.
● A permanent vacancy in the office of Mayor of Lucena City thus resulted, and such
vacancy should be filled pursuant to the law on succession defined in Section 44 of the
LGC:
o Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor,
Vice​Governor, Mayor, and Vice​Mayor.―If a permanent vacancy occurs
in the Office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice​mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
J. Velasco’s Concurring Opinion:
● Section 77 of the OEC is clear that before a substitution of candidates for an elective
position could be validly done, the official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party should die, withdraw or must be disqualified for any cause. In the present
case, the records will show that at the time Barbara filed her COC, there was still no
ground for substitution since the judgment on Ramon’s disqualification had not yet
attained finality.
● The finality of the judgment of the Comelec is reckoned from the date of the
promulgation and not from the date of receipt of the resolution, decision or
order—which is the standard rule in non​election related cases.
TOPIC: J. Brion’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion​: Castillo is entitled to assume office
(see last bullet) BUT note the discussion on the three-term rule
● Concurs with the ponencia’s conclusion that Barbara never validly substituted Ramon,
and, therefore, she never became a candidate who can be validly voted for in the May
2010 elections. The ponencia considers Barbbara’s substitution as invalid because
Ramon’s COC contains an “incurable defect consisting in his false declaration of his
eligibility to run” for a fourth consecutive term. The ponencia considers the COC of a
three​term candidate as invalid, warranting its cancellation.
● BUT dissent with the reasoning of the ponencia. Dissent based on the following
grounds:
o the violation of the three​term limit rule is a unique but proper ground
for disqualification and not for the cancellation of a COC under Section
78 of OEC
o the petition filed by Castillo against Ramon was based on the three​term
limit rule and, hence, was a petition for disqualification, but no
effective disqualification ever took place since Ramon never qualified to
serve for a fourth term
o since Barbara did not validly substitute Ramon and Ramon opted to exit
out of the election race (although through an erroneous mode of asking
for a ruling disqualifying him), neither of the two can be considered
candidates and the votes cast in their favor should be considered stray;
thus, Castillo should be proclaimed as Mayor of Lucena City
The COC and the qualifications​
​for its filing
● Section 73 of the OEC makes the filing of the COC a condition sine qua non for a person
to “be eligible for any elective public office”—i.e., to be validly voted for in the elections.
Section 76 of the OEC makes it a “ministerial duty” for a Comelec official “to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy” filed.
● A citizen must not only possess the requirements under Comelec Resolution No. 8678;
he must positively represent in his COC application that he possesses them. Any falsity
on these requirements constitutes a material misrepresentation that can lead to the
cancellation of the COC.
● Notably, Section 74 of the OEC does not require any negative qualification except only
as expressly required therein. Neither does Section 74 require any statement that the
would​be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification specifically
enumerated by law. Notably, Section 74 does not require a would​be candidate to state
that he has not served for three consecutive terms in the same elective position
immediately prior to the present elections.
The concept of disqualification and its effects.
● Anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general rules of eligibility
applicable to all citizens may be deprived of the right to be a candidate or may lose the
right to be a candidate (if he has filed his COC) because of a trait or characteristic that
applies to him or an act that can be imputed to him as an individual, separately from the
general qualifications that must exist for a citizen to run for a local public office.
Notably, the breach of the three​term limit is a trait or condition that can possibly
apply only to those who have previously served for 3 consecutive terms in the same
position sought immediately prior to the present elections.
● A unique feature of ​“disqualification” is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it ​refers only
to a “candidate,” not to one who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for
disqualification do not apply to a would​be candidate who is still at the point of filing his
COC. This is the reason why no representation is required in the COC that the would​be
candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification. ​The time to hold a person
accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after attaining the status of a
candidate, with the filing of the COC.
Distinctions among cancellation of COC, a disqualification case, and a quo warranto petition
cancellation of COC disqualification case quo warranto petition
ground​: essentially lack of grounds​: traits, grounds to oust an elected
eligibility under the characteristics or acts of official from his office:
pertinent constitutional disqualification, individually ineligibility and disloyalty
and statutory provisions on applicable to a candidate, to the Republic of the
qualifications or eligibility Philippines
for public office
governing provisions: governing provisions: governing provisions:
Sections 78 and 69 of the Sections 68 and 12 of the Section 253 of the OEC and
OEC OEC; Section 40 of LGC Rules of Court as to the
1991; Section 8, Article X of procedures
the Constitution
As to the period for filing
● The ​period to file a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC depends on the
provision of law invoked. If the petition is filed under ​Section 78 of the OEC, the petition
must be filed ​within 25 days from the filing of the COC. However, if the petition is
brought under ​Section 69 of the same law, the petition must be filed ​within 5 days from
the last day of filing the COC.
● The period to file a disqualification case ​is at any time before the proclamation of a
winning candidate, as provided in Comelec Resolution No. 8696. ​The three​term limit
disqualification, because of its unique characteristics, does not strictly follow this time
limitation. ​At the very least, it should follow the temporal limitations of a quo
warranto petition which must be filed within 10 days from proclamation. ​The
constitutional nature of the violation, however, argues against the application of this
time requirement; the rationale for the rule and the role of the Constitution in the
country’s legal order dictate that a petition should be allowed while a consecutive
fourth​termer is in office.
As to the effects of a successful suit
● A “candidate” whose COC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be
substituted for lack of a COC, to all intents and purposes. Similarly, a successful quo
warranto suit results in the ouster of an already elected official from office; substitution,
for obvious reasons, can no longer apply.
● A candidate who was simply disqualified is merely prohibited from continuing as a
candidate or from assuming or continuing to assume the functions of the office;
substitution can thus take place before election under the terms of Section 77 of the
OEC. However, ​a three​term candidate with a valid and subsisting COC cannot be
substituted if the basis of the substitution is his disqualification on account of his
three​term limitation. Disqualification that is based on a breach of the three​term limit
 rule cannot be invoked as this disqualification can only take place after election where
the three​term official emerged as winner. As in a quo warranto, any substitution is
too late at this point.
As to the effects of a successful suit on the right of the second placer in the elections
● In a COC cancellation proceeding, the law is silent on the legal effect of a judgment
cancelling the COC and does not also provide any temporal distinction. Given, however,
the formal initiatory role a COC plays and the standing it gives to a political aspirant, the
cancellation of the COC based on a finding of its invalidity effectively results in a vote for
an inexistent “candidate” or for one who is deemed not to be in the ballot. Although
legally a misnomer, the “second placer” should be proclaimed the winner as the
candidate with the highest number of votes for the contested position. This same
consequence should result if the cancellation case becomes final after elections, as the
cancellation signifies non​candidacy from the very start, i.e., from before the elections.​
 served for three continuous terms.
TOPIC: Violation of the tree-term limit rule
Is the rule an eligibility requirement or a disqualification? ​ - disqualification
● The question of whether the three​term limit rule is a matter of “eligibility” that must
be considered in the filing of a COC translates to the need to state in a would​be
candidate’s COC application that he is eligible for candidacy because he has not served
for three consecutive terms immediately before filing his application. The wording of
Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, however, does not justify this requirement as
Section 8 simply sets a limit on the number of consecutive terms an official can serve.
It does not refer to elections, much less does it bar a three​termer’s candidacy.
● Section 74 of the OEC does not expressly require a candidate to assert the
non​possession of any disqualifying trait or condition, much less of a candidate’s
observance of the three​term limit rule. In fact, the assertion of a would​be candidate’s
eligibility, as required by the OEC, could not have contemplated making a three​ term
candidate ineligible for candidacy since that disqualifying trait began to exist only later
under the 1987 Constitution.
● That the prohibited fourth consecutive term can only take place after a three​term
local official wins his fourth term signifies too that the prohibition (and the resulting
disqualification) only takes place after elections. This circumstance supports the view
that ​the three term limit rule does not at all involve itself with the matter of
candidacy; it only regulates service beyond the limits the Constitution has set. Thus,
the legally sound view is not to bar a three​termer’s candidacy for a fourth term if the
three​term limit rule is the only reason for the bar​. In these lights, ​the three​term limit
rule—as a bar against a fourth consecutive term—is effectively a disqualification
against such service rather than an eligibility requirement.
Should a petition under the three​term limit rule be allowed only after the four​term official has
won on the theory that it is at that point that the Constitution demands a bar? – ​NO, because
of the special nature and characteristics of the three​term limit rule—i.e., the constitutional
breach involved, filing of petition before election is allowed
● J. Brion, however, take the view that the petition does not need to be immediately
acted upon and can merely be docketed as a cautionary petition reserved for future
action if and when the three​term local official wins a fourth consecutive term. If the
parties proceed to litigate without raising the prematurity or lack of cause of action as
objection, a ruling can be deferred until after the cause of action accrues; if a ruling is
entered, then any decreed disqualification cannot be given effect and implemented
until a violation of the three​term limit rule occurs.
As applied
Castillo’s petition is properly a petition for disqualification against Ramon for possessing
some grounds
for disqualification ​ in contrast with the ponencia’s conclusion that Castillo’s petition is one
for the cancellation or denial of due course of Ramon’s COC
● Castillo’s allegations simply articulate the fact that Ramon had served for 3 consecutive
terms and the legal conclusion that the three​term limit rule under the Constitution and
LGC disqualifies him from running for a fourth consecutive term. Under these
allegations, Castillo’s petition cannot come within the purview of Section 78 of the OEC;
Ramon’s status as a three​term candidate is a ground to disqualify him (as precautionary
measure before elections) for possessing a ground for disqualification under the
Constitution and the LGC, specifically, for running for the same office after having
Barbara’s substitution of Ramon is invalid not because Ramon’s COC was cancelled but
because of its non​conformity with the conditions required by Section 77 of the OEC
● Whether Ramon’s manifestation recognizing his disqualification can be considered a
withdrawal – ​NO, it cannot be so considered a withdrawal. Withdrawal and
disqualification are separate grounds for substitution under Section 77 of the OEC and
one should not be confused with the other.
● BUT J. Brion does not also recognizes that there was an effective disqualification that
could have been the basis for a Section 77 substitution. As repeatedly discussed
above, the constitutional prohibition and the disqualification can only set in after
election, when a three​term local official has won for himself a fourth term.
● ​Quite obviously, Ramon—without realizing the exact implications of the three​term limit
rule—opted for a disqualification as his mode of exit from the political scene. This is an
unfortunate choice as he could not have been disqualified (or strictly, his disqualification
could not have taken effect) until after he had won as Mayor in the May 2010
elections—too late in time if the intention was to secure a substitution for Barbara.
Additionally, there was no way that Ramon could have won as he had opted out of the
race, through his acceptance of an ineffectual disqualification ruling, in favor of his wife,
Barbara.
With a fatally flawed substitution, Barbara was never a candidate
● In view of the invalidity of Ruby’s substitution, her candidacy was fatally flawed and
could not have been given effect. Her CoC, standing by itself, was filed late and cannot
be given recognition. Without a valid CoC, either by substitution or by independent
filing, she could not have been voted for, for the position of Mayor of Lucena City. Thus,
the election took place with only one valid candidate standing—Castillo—who should
now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor.
● The ponencia’s reasoning would have been sound had Barbara been a candidate, who
for one reason or another simply cannot assume office. The harsh legal reality
however is that she never was and never became a candidate—a status which must be
present before the doctrine of rejection of second placer may apply—either through
the ordinary method of filing within the period allowed by law or through the
extraordinary method of substitution. Barbara’s status is comparable to (or even
worse than) a candidate whose COC was cancelled after the elections. The
cancellation of a COC signifies non​candidacy from the very start, i.e., before the
elections, which entitles the “second placer” to assume office. The same result should
obtain in this case (Castillo, not Alcala is entitled to assume office).
● From the perspective of Vice Mayor Alcala’s intervention, Ruby did not validly assume
the mayoralty post and could not have done so as she was never a candidate with a
valid CoC. Thus, the petition of Vice​Mayor Alcala should have failed.
J. Abad’s Dissenting Opinion: the terms during which an elected official was preventively
suspended should not be counted for purposes of applying the three​term limit
● There are two remedies available to prevent a candidate from running in an election: a
petition for disqualification, and a petition to deny due course to or cancel a COC. J.
Abad disagrees with the majority holding that, in resolving the case before it, the
Comelec had in fact denied due course to and cancelled Ramon’s CoC. While Castillo
denominated his petition as one to deny due course to or cancel Ramon’s COC, and
prayed for such remedies, the basic rule is that the nature of an action is governed by
the allegations in the petition, not by its caption or prayer. We cannot rely simply on the
fact that the Comelec resolution granted the petition without making any qualifications.
A closer reading of the resolution will show that Ramon was merely being disqualified
for having served three consecutive terms.
● Castillo points out that by filing a COC for mayor after he had already served three
consecutive terms, Ramon actually misrepresented the fact of his eligibility for that
office, knowing that it was not the case. But this argument is unavailing because ​at the
time Ramon filed his COC the Comelec’s official stand, supported by SC’s decision in
Borja, Jr. v. Comelec, was that the terms during which an elected official was
preventively suspended should not be counted for purposes of applying the three​term
limit. It was only on December 23, 2009, nearly a month after Ramon filed his COC,
that the SC reversed in Aldovino, Jr. v. Comelec, the election body’s official stand.
Thus, it cannot be said that Ramon knowingly misrepresented his eligibility when he
filed his CoC.
● Concern regarding J. Brion’s view on the applicability of the three​term limit rule as a
ground for disqualification.
o In his separate opinion, Justice Brion opines that a candidate who has
already served three consecutive terms can only be disqualified after he
has been proclaimed as the winner for a fourth term. His theory is that
the Constitution merely prohibits an official from serving more than three
consecutive terms; it does not prohibit him from running for a fourth
term.
o J. Abad: ​Such an interpretation, however, would cause confusion in the
polls and make a mockery of the election process. It robs qualified
candidates of the opportunity of being elected in a fair contest among
qualified candidates. The candidacy of one who has already served
three consecutive terms is worse than that of a nuisance candidate.
o Election laws should be interpreted in such a way as to best determine
the will of the electorate, not to defeat it. The SC has on occasion upheld
the disqualification of candidates who have already served three
consecutive terms from running for another. Indeed, in Aldovino, penned
by no other than Justice Brion himself, the dispositive portion read: “The
private respondent Wilfredo F. Asilo is declared ​disqualified to run​, and
perforce to serve, as Councilor of Lucena City for a prohibited fourth
term.”
J. Mendoza’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion: Castillo should be proclaimed the
Mayor-elect of Lucena City
● A person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 cannot
be treated as a candidate at all. A candidate disqualified by final judgment before an
election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted.
● A candidate whose COC has been cancelled or denied due course cannot be
substituted. ​As Ramon was never a candidate at all, his substitution by Barbara was
legally ineffectual.
● Castillo should have been proclaimed Mayor​elect of Lucena City. As there was no valid
substitution, Castillo, the candidate with the highest number of votes is entitled to be,
and should have been, proclaimed as the duly elected mayor. The reason is that he is
the winner, not the loser. He was the one who garnered the highest number of votes
among the recognized legal candidates who had valid COCs. Castillo was not the
second placer; he was the first placer.
● Granting arguendo that Castillo was the second placer, the doctrine would still not
apply. Labo and the other cases applying the doctrine on the rejection of the second
placer have one common essential condition—the disqualification of the candidate had
not become final before the elections. In this case, the cancellation of Ramon’s CoC
because of his disqualification became final before the May 10, 2010 National and Local
Elections. In addition, the electorate was conscious of the circumstances surrounding
Ramon’s candidacy and subsequent disqualification but still voted for him, thus, the said
votes could only be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.
J. Reyes’ Separate Opinion: ​dismiss the petition
● The petition must be treated as one for disqualification since the ground used to
support the same, i.e. the violation of the three​term limit, is a disqualifying
circumstance which prevents a candidate from pursuing his candidacy.
● The grounds for disqualification pertain to acts committed by an aspiring local servant,
or to a circumstance, status or condition which renders him unfit for public service.
Possession of any of the grounds for disqualification forfeits the candidate of the right to
participate in the electoral race notwithstanding the fact he has all the qualifications
required under the law for those seeking an elective post. ​The violation of the
three​term limit is a circumstance or condition which bars a candidate from running for
public office. It is thus a disqualifying circumstance which is properly a ground for a
petition for disqualification.
 26. Abundo v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 201716, January 8, 2013
LB
Topic​:Term Limits and Recall
Petitioner: MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR.
Respondent:​ COMELEC and Ernesto Vega
Ponente: ​Velasco, Jr.
DOCTRINE: The three-term limit rule for elective local officials; Elements. To constitute a
disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted constitutional
and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms;
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
FACTS:
● For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010
national and local elections, Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) vied for the
position of municipal mayor. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged and was
proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly served the
corresponding terms as mayor.
● In the ​2004 electoral derby, however, the municipal board of canvassers initially
proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the
functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres' election and
proclamation.
● Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting ​May 9, 2006 until the
end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007​, or for a period of a little over one
year and one month. Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and
Torres again opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy
for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres sought the former's
disqualification to run.
● The RTC declared Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in
the 2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, mayor. To the RTC,
the one year and 6 months service constitutes a complete and full service of
Abundo’s term as mayor. In its Resolution, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
Second Division affirmed the decision of RTC, which affirmed by COMELEC en banc.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Abundo has consecutively served for three terms; or, stated
differently, whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an
elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an
election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
2. Whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three
three-year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundos
mayoralty.
RULING:
1. No.
● The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007
term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to
serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually
declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
● The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found
in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of
Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991
● To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting
consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the
official merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession
under the LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of
the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated
under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service
cannot be counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the
official runs again for the same position he held prior to his assumption of
the higher office, then his succession to said position is by operation of
law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and
who did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term,
but later won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of
the officials service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end
of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent
officials continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective
officers continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected
during the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising
the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and
assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election
protest and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what
would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the
protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption
need not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the
3-year term; an interruption for any length of time, provided the cause is
involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of service (Socrates,
citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office,
then his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption
since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full
service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term
limits because the nullification of his proclamation came after the
expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
● The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
"monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from breeding
 "proprietary interest in their position" but also to "enhance the people's freedom ● In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30,
of choice." 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that
he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to
2. Yes. The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July the same nor serve the functions of the said elective office. The reason is simple:
2004-June 2007 term. during that period, title to hold such office and the corresponding right to assume
● There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed ● Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until June 30, 2007 or only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected
for a period of a little over one year and one month. candidate in the May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one
● The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected month. Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while Abundo officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
was declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered ● The declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local elected
by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was
term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007 declared winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term,
term. Abundo’s full term has been substantially reduced by the actual service rendered
○ On the other hand, ​temporary inability or disqualification to exercise by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the
the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007
considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not term.
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from
holding office; ​the office holder, while retaining title, is simply barred
from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided by law Petition is PARTLY GRANTED.
● A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals, means, in a legal sense, "a fixed
and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an
office."
○ It also means the "time during which the officer may claim to hold office
as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which the several
incumbents shall succeed one another."
○ It is the period of time during which a duly elected official has title to and
can serve the functions of an elective office.
○ From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected
officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the first year of
said term.
● Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent
actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption
of Abundos continuity of service. ​An involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the
context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one term for purposes of
counting the three-term threshold.
○ The word ​interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or
suspension.To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent When the
Constitution and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is
to the obstruction to the continuance of the service by the concerned
elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving
a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office.
○ On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea of waiver
or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon,
decline or resign.
○ Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would
thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the office and to cut short
the service of the term the concerned elected official is entitled to.
 Ruing:
27 Alabania v COMELEC
June 6, 2017
GR No 226793
Boligor
Topic: ​Term Limits and Recall
Petitioner: ​Sofroni Albania
Respondent: ​COMELEC and Edgardo Tallado
Ponente: ​Peralta, ​J.
Facts:
● In the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, respondent Edgardo A. Tallado
and Jesus O. Typoco were both candidates for the position of Governor in
Camarines Norte.
● Typoco was proclaimed as the winner.
● Respondent questioned Typoco's proclamation by filing with the COMELEC, a
petition for correction of a manifest error. This was granted. He then assumed the
position of Governor of Camarines Norte from March 22, 2010 to June 30, 2010,
the end of the 2007-2010 term.
● Respondent ran again in the 2010 and 2013 National and Local Elections where he
won and served as Governor of Camarines Norte, respectively.
● On October 16, 2015, respondent filed his Certificate of Candidacy as Governor of
Camarines Norte in the May 9, 2016 National and Local elections
● On November 13, 2015, petitioner, a registered voter of Poblacion Sta. Elena,
Camarines Norte, filed a petition for respondent's disqualification on the ground
that he violated the three term limit I rule under Section 43 of RA No 7160,
otherwise known as the ​Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC); a​ nd respondent's
suspension from office for one year without pay, together with its accessory
penalties, after he was found guilty of oppression and grave abuse of authority in
the Ombudsman's Order dated October 2, 2015.
● On April 22, 2016, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for being
filed out of time.
● Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC ​En Banc, ​which
dismissed the same in a Resolution dated August 24, 2016.
● Dissatisfied, petitioner filed a petition for ​certiorari .​
Issue: ​Whether Respondent is disqualified to run as governor on the ground of violation of
the term limit under RA 7160 and his suspension from office for 1 year for being guilty of
grave abuse of authority?
● The grounds for disqualification of a candidate are found under Sections 12 and 68
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code of the Philippines, as well as Section 40 of the Local Government
Code, which respectively provide:
○ SEC. 12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense
for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen
months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to
be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary
pardon or granted amnesty.
○ The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed
removed upon the declaration by competent authority that said insanity
or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of
five years from his service or sentence, unless within the same period he
again becomes disqualified.
○ SEC. 68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism
to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any, elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of a
foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided
for in the election laws.
○ SECTION 40. Disqualifications - The following persons are disqualified
from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentence by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case; .
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance
to the Republic;
 (d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired
the right to reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after
the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
● Petitioner filed the petition for disqualification of respondent on the grounds that
he allegedly violated the three-term limit rule provided under the Constitution and
the LGC; and that he was suspended from office as a result of an administrative
case.
○ However, a reading of the grounds enumerated under the above-quoted
provisions for a candidate's disqualification does not include the two
grounds relied upon by petitioner.
○ Thus, the COMELEC Second Division was correct when it found that the
petition was not based on any of the grounds for disqualification as
enumerated in the foregoing statutory provisions.
● Respondent's suspension from office is indeed not a ground for a petition for
disqualification as Section 40 (b) clearly speaks of removal from office as a result of
an administrative offense that would disqualify a candidate from running for any
elective local position. In fact, the penalty of suspension cannot be a bar to the
candidacy of the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications
for the office as provided under Section 66(b) of R.A. No. 7160, to wit:
○ SEC. 66. Form and Notice of Decision.
(b) The penalty of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired
term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months for every
administrative offense, nor shall said penalty be a bar to the candidacy of
the respondent so suspended as long as he meets the qualifications for
the office.
● While the alleged violation of the three-term limit rule is not a ground for a petition
for disqualification, however, the COMELEC Second Division found that it is an
ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to deny due course to or to
cancel a Certificate of Candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, hence considered
the petition as such.
● Since the petition filed was a petition to deny due course to or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy, such petition must be filed within 25 days from the time of
filing of the COC, as provided under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
However, as the COMELEC found, the petition was filed beyond the reglementary
period, and dismissed the petition for being filed out time. The COMELEC En Banc
affirmed such dismissal.
● The three-term limit rule is embodied in Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution,
to wit:
○ Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no
such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected which is restated in Section 43 of the Local
Government Code, thus:
○ Section 43. Term of Office. -
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official
concerned was elected.
● Section 74 of the OEC provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state that the
person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated therein and that he
is eligible for said office. The word "eligible" in Section 74 means having the right to
run for elective public office, that is, having all the qualifications and none of the
ineligibilities to run for the public office. And We had held that a violation of the
three-term limit rule is an ineligibility which is a proper ground for a petition to
deny due course to or to cancel a COC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code, to wit:
● Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The
petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and
hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election.
● As the petition filed is indeed a petition under Section 78 of the OEC, the filing of
the same must comply with the period prescribed therein, i.e., the filing of the
same must be made not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy.
● In this case, respondent filed his COC for Governor of Camarines Norte for the 2016
elections on October 16, 2015, and he had 25 days therefrom to file the petition for
denial of due course or cancellation of COC on the ground of violation of the
three-term limit rule, which fell on November 10, 2015. However, the petition was
filed only on November 13, 2015 which was already beyond the period to file the
same; thus, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the COMELEC in
dismissing the petition for being filed out of time.
● Two conditions must concur for the application of the disqualification of a
candidate based on violation of the three-term limit rule, which are: (1) that the
 official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post, and (2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
● Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time - three years -
during which an official has title to office and can serve. Appari v. Court of Appeals,
a Resolution promulgated on November 28, 2007, succinctly discusses what a term
connotes, as follows:
○ The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of
time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office.
According to Mechem, the term of office is the period during which an
office may be held. Upon expiration of the officer's term, unless he is
authorized by law to holdover, his rights, duties and authority as a public
officer must ipso facto cease. In the law of public officers, the most and
natural frequent method by which a public officer ceases to be such is by
the expiration of the terms for which he was elected or appointed.
● While respondent ran as Governor of Camarines Norte in the 2007 elections, he did
not win as such. It was only after he filed a petition for correction of manifest error
that he was proclaimed as the duly elected Governor. He assumed the post and
served the unexpired term of his opponent from March 22, 2010 until June 30,
2010.
○ Consequently, he did not hold the office for the full term of three years
to which he was supposedly entitled to. Thus, such period of time that
respondent served as Governor did not constitute a complete and full
service of his term. The period when he was out of office involuntarily
interrupted the continuity of his service as Governor.
○ As he had not fully served the 2007-2010 term, and had not been elected
for three consecutive terms as Governor, there was no violation of the
three-term limit rule when he ran again in the 2016 elections.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution dated August 24, 2016 of the
Commission on Elections En Banc is hereby AFFIRMED.
 28. Goh v. Bayron
GR 212584 / November 25, 2014
BJ
Topic​: ​Term Limits and Recall
Petitioner: ​Alroben J. Goh
Respondent:​ Bayron and COMELEC
Ponente: ​Carpio
FACTS:
● March 2014: Goh filed petition against Mayor Bayron dues to loss of trust and
confidence for his gross violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
● COMELEC promulgated Reso. 9864 which found the recall petition sufficient in
form and substance BUT suspended the funding of any and all recall petitions until
the issue of re: recall petitions is resolved.
● April 2014: Mayor Bayron prayed for the dismissal of the recall petition for lack of
merit.
● COMELEC in turn promulgated Reso. 9882 regarding the recall petition against
Mayor Bayron
● Resolution 9864: affirmed the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy
Executive Director (ODEDO). ODEDO found petition for recall of Mayor Bayron
(mayor of Puerto Princessa), sufficient in for and substance.
o Suspended the proceedings – Financial Services Dept raised an issue to
the funding of the entire recall process.
Resolution 9882: suspended any proceeding related to the recall, because it does not
have an appropriation under the 2014 GAA and the GAA likewise did not provide
COMELEC with legal authority to commit public funds to the recall process.
ISSUE: W/N the COMELEC committed GADALEJ in saying that 2014 GAA does not provide
the line item appropriation to allow the COMELEC to perform its constitutional mandate of
conducting recall elections –YES
RULING:
COMELEC’S Fiscal Autonomy
● The Constitution (Sec. 2 par.1, Art. IX-C) expressly proved the COMELEC with the
power to enforce all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
COMELEC’S Alleged Lack of Authority to Augment the Recall Elections fr Savings
COMELEC’s 2014 Budget in GAA
● Goh: calims that the 2014 GAA provided for an appropriation for the conduct of
recall elections (showed 2014 GAA breakdown)
o COMELEC personnel admitted to the existence of a contingency fund for
the lawful conduct of recall elections thru Atty. Alarkon, Acting Director
III of the COMELEC’s FSD stated that the specifics of their MFO (major
final output) budget is for ...” conduct and supervision of elections,
referenda, recal and plebiscites xxx”
o Cited online news article which quoted COMELEC Spokesperson James
Jimenez saying that the lack of budget should not be an issue because
they always have standby funds for recall, plebiscite, etc.
o Letter from the Rep. Ungab, Chairman of HOR’s committee in
Appropriations which states that the 2014 budget of the COMELEC
amounts to 2.7 million of which Php 1.4 million is appropriated for the
conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall and plebiscites.
● COMELEC: the amount which Goh was referring to is actually for Personnel Services
under the Program “regulation of elections”
● Court ruled that the 2014 GAA expressly provides for a line item appropriation for
the conduct and supervision of recall elections which is found in the Programs
category, which COMELEC admits in Reso. 9882 which they referred to as a line
item for “Conduct and supervision of elections, referenda, recall votes, and
plebiscites”.
● Recall of elections is a constitutional function of the COMELEC, thus, when they
receive budget appropriation for their “Current Operating Expenditure”, such
appropriation also includes an appropriation for its constitutional functions which
includes recall elections.
● Socrates v. COMELEC: recall elections were conducted even without appropriation
in 2000 GAA
o Thus, Court cannot accept COMELEC’s reason because in the Socrates v.
Comelec the commission was ableto hold recall elections despite not
having a line item under the 2000 GAA.
● COMELEC expressly admitted in Reso. 9882 that it has budget for the recall
elections.
o COMELEC’s admission is valid and considered as a specific amount for a
specific purpose.
o Court stated that purpose may be specific even if it is broken down into
different related sub-categories of the same natur.
o Purpose of appropriation is still specific – to fund elections, which also
includes even if not expressly stated, not just regular elections but also
recall elections.
● COMELEC did not dispute in their resolution that they did not have savings but they
stated that they did not have the authority to augment savings for the funding of
recall elections.
o Justified this claim by citing provisions in the 2014 GAA:
 ▪ That the COMELEC is authorized to use savings to cover actual
deficiencies incurred for the current year
▪ Augmentation implies the existence in this act of a program,
activity, or project with an appropriation which upon
implementation or subsequent evaluation of needed resources
is determined to be deficient.
o Commissioner Guia: the limitation in the augmentation of the GAA
established a clash between COMELEC’s constitutional mandate and
power of the Congress to appropriate public funds, can only be avoided
to through curative legislation.
● Court ruled that there is no clash bet COMELEC and Congress.
o 2014 GAA provides for a line item appropriation for the COMELEC’s
power to have recall elections
o And since, COMELEC has admitted that there are no more funds for the
“Conduct and supervision... of recall cotes..” to conduct an actual recall –
established an ACTUAL DEFICIENCY, which in turn allows for the exercise
of augmentation.
WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.PARTIALLY REVERSE and SET ASIDE Reso. 9864 insofar as it
directed the suspension of any and all proceedings in the recall petitions. REVERSE AND SET
ASIDE Reso. 9882 and DIRECT COMELEC to immediately carry out the recall elections of
Mayor Bayron.
IMPORTANT NOTES
RESOLUTION 9882
● Power of Recall – may be exercised by registered voters of a local govt unit to
which the local official belongs
o LIMITATIONS:
▪ Any elective official may be subject to recall election only once
during his term of office
▪ No recall shall take place within one year fr the date of the local
official’s assumption of office.
o Achievability of the recall proceedings DEPENDS on the availability of
funds at the disposal of COMELEC
● COMELEC ruled that it cannot proceed with the recall because it does not have an
appropriation or legal authority to commit funds for the said purpose.
● All expenses incident to Recall elections hall be for the account of the Commission
o Sec. 75 of LGC – All expenses incident to recall elections shall be borne by
the COMELEC.
o COMELEC is mandated to shoulder ALL expenses regarding the conduct
of recall elections.
o Sec 75 also requires that the GAA to include contingency funds at the
disposal of the COMELEC for recall elections.
● COMLEC does not have an appropriation or line item budget to serve as a
contingency fund for the conduct of recall elections under the 2014 GAA
o While the commission has a line item for the “Conduct and supervision of
election, referenda,, recall votes and plebiscites” under the Program
category it cannot be considered as “an appropriation made by law” as
required by the Consti
o BUDGET’S 2 MAJOR CATEGORIES
▪ Programs – group of activities necessary for the performance of
a major purpose for which a govt agency is established, basic
maintenance of the agency’s administrative operations.
▪ Projects – special agency undertakings which are to be carried
out within a definite time frame.
▪ Budget under Program is intended to finance the regulary
day-to day activities of the Commission. While budget under
Project is intended to fund the special activities of the
Commission which are NOT carried out on aregular basis.
▪ Thus, it is illegal to proceed with an activity under Project while
using the funds intended for the Program category. Only when
there is valid augmentation can the funds from the Program
category be used by the Commission to proceed with activities
under the Project category.
● Augmentation is not possible
o No line item for Recall under the 2014 GAA
o 3 Requisites for valid exercise of power to augment:
▪ There must be a law authorizing the Chairman to augment
▪ There must be a deficient existing line item in the gen
appropriations law to be augmented
▪ There must be savings on the part of the Commission
While there is a law which authorizes the Chairman to augment
there is no existing line item in the Comission’s budget.
● Personal and Criminal Liabilities for violation of the GAA and the RPC
● Conduct of Recall elections may adversely affect the Comissions’s preparation for
the 2016 National and Local elections
● Solution is the enactment of a law that will appropriate funds for the conduct of
recall elections
●

29 Sema v. Commission on Elections
GR No 177597
DATE: July 16, 2008
By: ​Casas
Topic: ​ Local Autonomy and Decision Making
Petitioner: ​Bai Sandra Sema
Respondent: ​COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
Ponente:​ , J. Carpio
FACTS
● The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative
districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of
Cotabato City and eight municipalities. Maguindanao forms part of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act,
Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA
9054)​.​Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s
first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted
against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989.
● On 28 August 2006, ​the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly,
exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054
enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the
Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first
district of Maguindanao. ​MMA Act 201 provides:
o Section 1. The Municipalities of Barira, Buldon, Datu Odin Sinsuat,
Kabuntalan, Matanog, Parang, Sultan Kudarat, Sultan Mastura, and Upi
are hereby separated from the Province of Maguindanao and constituted
into a distinct and independent province, which is hereby created, to be
known as the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
● 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities
constituting Shariff Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11.
Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were the municipalities constituting its second
legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of Maguindanao’s first legislative
district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
● Sangguniang Panlingsod of Cotabato city submitted sought clarification with
COMELEC
● Comelec ruled in its resolution no 07-0407: "maintaining the status quo with
Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of
Maguindanao." Pending enactment of appropriate law by Congress.
● However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated
on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative
district is composed only of Cotabato City because of MMA Act 201.
● On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these
petitions, amending Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in
question as "Shariff Kabunsuan Province with Cotabato City (formerly First District
of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).
● Sema, a candidate for the Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan of Cotabato City
prayed for the nullification of Comelec reso. ​Sema asserted that the COMELEC
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing Resolution No. 7902 which
maintained the status quo in Maguindanao’s first legislative district despite the
COMELEC’s earlier directive in Resolution No. 7845 designating Cotabato City as
the lone component of Maguindanao’s reapportioned first legislative district.​ ​Sema
further claimed that in issuing Resolution No. 7902, the COMELEC usurped
Congress’ power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
ISSUE: ​W/N Congress can validly delegate to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create legislative districts for the House of Representatives? No.
HELD:
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM.
Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to
create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the
Constitution to regional legislative bodies. ​In the present case, the question arises whether
the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that conflicts with the delegation to regional
legislative bodies of the power to create municipalities and barangays, provided Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution is followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is
another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution provides, "Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative" in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, "Any province that may hereafter be created, or any
city whose population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall
be entitled in the immediately following election to at least one Member x x x."
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended
to the Constitution​. ​For the same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more
cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province,
or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a
legislative district.​ Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves
the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000,
the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI
of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. ​Thus, the
power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative
district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create a province or city, it must also validly
delegate at the same time the power to create a legislative district.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly
under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus,
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative organization;
(2) Creation of sources of revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and property relations;
(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
 (8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the
general welfare of the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions,
expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
Neither the framers of the 1987 Constitution in adopting the provisions in Article X on
regional autonomy,​ ​nor Congress in enacting RA 9054, envisioned or intended these
disastrous consequences that certainly would wreck the tri-branch system of government
under our Constitution. Clearly, the power to create or reapportion legislative districts
cannot be delegated by Congress but must be exercised by Congress itself. Even the ARMM
Regional Assembly recognizes this.
The Constitution empowered Congress to create or reapportion legislative districts, not the
regional assemblies. Section 3 of the Ordinance to the Constitution which states, "[A]ny
province that may hereafter be created x x x shall be entitled in the immediately following
election to at least one Member," refers to a province created by Congress itself through a
national law. The reason is that the creation of a province increases the actual membership
of the House of Representatives, an increase that only Congress can decide. Incidentally, in
the present 14th Congress, there are 219​ ​district representatives out of the maximum 250
seats in the House of Representatives. Since party-list members shall constitute 20 percent of
total membership of the House, there should at least be 50 party-list seats available in every
election in case 50 party-list candidates are proclaimed winners. This leaves only 200 seats
for district representatives, much less than the 219 incumbent district representatives. Thus,
there is a need now for Congress to increase by law the allowable membership of the House,
even before Congress can create new provinces.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution.
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of
regional assemblies are limited ​"[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the
provisions of the Constitution and national laws, ​x x x." The Preamble of the ARMM Organic
Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM Government is established "within the framework
of the Constitution." This follows Section 15, Article X of the Constitution which mandates
that the ARMM "​shall be created ​x x x ​within the framework of this Constitution​ ​and the
national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines​."
The present case involves the creation of a local government unit that necessarily involves
also the creation of a legislative district. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of
the creation of municipalities and barangays that does not comply with the criteria
established in Section 461 of RA 7160, as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, because the creation of such municipalities and barangays does not involve the
creation of legislative districts. We leave the resolution of this issue to an appropriate case.
In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to
Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of
the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. ​Only Congress can create provinces and cities
because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative
districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional
Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative​ ​district because the Constitution
mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. ​Moreover, the ARMM
Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district
representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly
operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly
and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Resolution No. 7902 Complies with the Constitution
Consequently, we hold that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902, ​preserving​ the geographic and
legislative district of the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City, is valid as it merely
complies with Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as
Section 1 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution.
WHEREFORE​, we declare Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL
insofar as it grants to the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
the power to create provinces and cities. Thus, we declare ​VOID​ Muslim Mindanao
Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan. Consequently, we rule
that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
Justice Tinga dissenting opinion (ang haba nito):
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the grant of political
autonomy and not just administrative autonomy to these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an
executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and
property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].
Disomangcop further elaborates on the import of political autonomy as it relates to the
ARMM:
[B]y regional autonomy, the framers intended it to mean "meaningful and authentic regional
autonomy." As articulated by a Muslim author, substantial and meaningful autonomy is "the
kind of local self-government which allows the people of the region or area the power to
determine what is best for their growth and development without undue interference or
dictation from the central government."
To this end, Section 16, Article X limits the power of the President over autonomous regions.
In essence, the provision also curtails the power of Congress over autonomous regions.
Consequently, Congress will have to re-examine national laws and make sure that they
reflect the Constitution's adherence to local autonomy. And in case of conflicts, the
underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is the Constitution's desire for genuine
local autonomy.
The diminution of Congress' powers over autonomous regions was confirmed in Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals,wherein this Court held that "the omission (of "as may be provided by law")
signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from Congress and
to break Congress' 'control' over local government affairs."
Unfortunately, the majority gives short shrift to the considerations of local autonomy, even
as such paradigm partakes of a constitutional mandate. If anything, these provisions should
dissuade against a reflexive dismissal of the provisions of the Organic Acts. ​It should be
emphasized that local autonomy cannot be in denigration of the Constitution. It is
repeatedly emphasized within Article X that the grant of local autonomy and the
subsequent exercise of powers by the autonomous government must remain within the
confines of the Constitution. At the same time, if there is no constitutional bar against the
exercise of the powers of government by the autonomous government in Muslim
Mindanao, particularly by the Regional Assembly, then there is no basis to thwart the
constitutional design by denying such powers to that body.
Having laid down the essential constitutional predicates, I shall proceed to dwell on the core
issues raised. May Congress delegate to the Regional Assembly the power to create
provinces? Assuming that such delegation is not barred by the Constitution, may the exercise
of such power by the Regional Assembly give rise to separate legislative districts for such
provinces thus created?
Traditionally, it has been the national legislature which has exercised the power to create
provinces. However, the 1987 Constitution ushered in a new era in devolved local
government rule, and particularly, a regime of local autonomy for Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordilleras. We recognized it in Disomangcop v. Datumanong.
xxx
The majority does not point to any specific constitutional prohibition barring Congress from
delegating to the Regional Assembly the power to create provinces. It does cite though that
Article 460 of the LGC provides that only by an Act of Congress may a province be created,
divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered. However, Republic Act No.
9054, which was passed ten (10) years after the LGC, unequivocally granted to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within
the ARMM.
Any argument that the LGC confines to Congress the creation of provinces is muted by the
fact that ten years after the LGC was enacted by Congress, the same legislative body
conferred on the Assembly that same power within its territorial jurisdiction, thus amending
the LGC to the extent of accommodating these newly-granted powers to the Assembly.
There actually is an obvious unconstitutional dimension to Section 19, albeit one which is not
in point in this case. The provision states in part "[t]hat Regional Assembly may prescribe
standards lower than those mandated by Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code
of 1991, in the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundaries of
provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays." That proviso is squarely inconsistent with
Section 10, Article X, which accords to the LGC the sole criteria for the creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units. Said proviso thus
cannot receive recognition from this Court.
It bears noting that there is no contention presented thus far that the creation of Shariff
Kabunsuan was not in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC, thus this aspect of
unconstitutionality of Rep. Act No. 9054 may not be material to the petitions at bar.
The majority unfortunately asserts that Congress may not delegate to the Regional Assembly
the power to create provinces, despite the absence of any constitutional bar in that respect.
The reasons offered for such conclusion are actually the same reasons it submits why the
Regional Assembly could not create legislative districts, as if the power to create provinces
and the power to create legislative districts were one and the same. In contrast, I propose to
pinpoint a specific constitutional provision that prohibits the Regional Assembly from
creating, directly or indirectly, any legislative district without affecting that body’s delegated
authority to create provinces.
xxx
Republic Act No. 9054 does not empower the Regional Assembly to create legislative
districts, and MMA Act No. 201, which created Shariff Kabunsuan, specifically disavows the
creation of a new district for that province and maintains the old legislative district shared
with Cotabato City. It is the thesis though of the petitioners that following Felwa v. Salas​. ​the
creation of the new province ipso facto established as well an exclusive legislative district for
Shariff Kabunsuan, "by operation of the Constitution."
Congress cannot substitute its own discretion for the standards set forth in Section 5, Article
VI. And should general reapportionment made by Congress violate the parameters set forth
by the Constitution, such act may be invalidated by the Court, as it did in Macias v. COMELEC
Section 5(1), Article VI states that "[t]he House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law". The provision
textually commits that only through a law may the numerical composition of Congress may
be increased or reduced.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision,
Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The
inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be
increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the
increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not
unconstitutional.
xxx
I have already pointed out that when the Constitution specifically designates a particular
function to Congress, only Congress may exercise such function, as the same is
non-delegable. The power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives is
restricted by the Constitution to a law passed by Congress, which may not delegate such
law-making power to the Regional Assembly. If we were to rule that Congress may delegate
the power to increase the composition of the House of Representatives, there would be no
impediment for us to similarly rule that those other specific functions tasked by the
Constitution to Congress may be delegated as well. To repeat, these include gravely
important functions as the enactment of a law defining political dynasties; the enactment of
reasonable conditions relating to full public disclosure of all the State’s transactions involving
public interest; the manner by which Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired; the
date of regular elections for members of Congress; the provision for the manner of conduct
of special elections to fill in congressional vacancies; the authorization of the President to
exercise emergency powers; the prescription of a system for initiative and referendum; the
salaries of the President and Vice-President; and the creation and allocation of jurisdiction of
lower courts.
Considering that all these matters, including the composition of the House of
Representatives, are of national interest, it is but constitutionally proper that only a
national legislature has the competence to exercise these powers. And the Constitution
does textually commit to Congress alone the power to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives.

Accordingly, the petitioners’ position cannot be sustained, as Shariff Kabunsuan cannot

acquire its own legislative district unless Congress itself accedes to the passage of a law
that establishes the same. The contrary position is in denigration of the Constitution, which
limits to Congress alone the non-delegable power to fix or increase the composition of the
House of Representatives. For that, I concur with the result of the majority.