1. AMBIL v.
COMELEC obtained the 2​nd highest number of votes, filed with the COMELEC
GR No. 143398 | October 25, 2000 | PARDO |
Review of judgments & final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC
and COA (Rule 64)
By: Kate
Petitioner: Ruperto Ambil, Jr.
Respondent: COMELEC (First Division) and Jose Ramirez
Doctrine:
The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc
may be elevated to the SC is by the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
A decision, order or resolution of a division of the COMELEC must be
reviewed by the COMELEC en banc via a motion for reconsideration
before the final en banc decision may be brought to the SC on certiorari.
The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory.
The exceptions (to the rule in ​certiorari ​cases dispensing with a motion for
reconsideration) do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to
the COMELEC en banc, whose final decision is what is reviewable via
certiorari before the SC.
FACTS:
● (This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction or TRO seeking to nullify the order of the
COMELEC giving notice to the parties of the promulgation of the
resolution on the case entitled Jose Ramirez, Protestant, v. Ruperto
Ambil, Protestee, to prohibit COMELEC from promulgating the
so-called “Guiani ponencia”.)
● Ambil and Ramirez were candidates for the position of Governor,
Eastern Samar during the May 1998 elections. Ramirez, who
an election protest challenging the results.
● On January 27, 2000, Commissioner Guiani prepared and signed a
proposed resolution ​in the case. To such proposed ​ponencia,
Commissioner Desamito dissented, and Commissioner Tancangco
did not vote but “wish[ed] to see both positions, if any, to make her
final decision.”
○ In the meantime, on February 15, 2000, Commissioner
Guiani retired from the service, and Commissioner Javier
was appointed and thereafter assumed office on April 4,
2000.
● On or about February 24, 2000, Ambil and Ramirez received a
purported resolution ​signed by Commissioner Guiani and
Tancangco, with Commissioner Desamito dissenting.
○ The “result” was in favor of Ramirez, who was declared
winner.
○ However, the COMELEC, First Division, declared that the
resolution is a “useless scrap of paper which should be
ignored by the parties ​there being no promulgation of the
Resolution in the instant case.”
● The COMELEC, First Division, issued an order setting the
promulgation of the resolution of the case, to which Ambil filed a
motion to cancel promulgation challenging the validity of the
purported ​Guiani resolution.
○ The COMELEC then postponed the promulgation until the
matter was resolved.
● Commissioners Tancangco and Javier also sent a joint
memorandum to Commissioner Desamito, presiding
Commissioner, stating:
○ “… what is controlling is the date the ponente signed the
questioned Resolution…we recommend that we proceed
with the promulgation of the subject resolution and let the
aggrieved party challenge it through a Motion for
Reconsideration before the Commission ​en banc ​or
through a ​certiorari​ case before the SC.”
 ● The COMELEC, First Division, issued an order ​setting the
​ ​on June 20, 2000.
promulgation of the resolution in the case
○ Without waiting for the promulgation of the resolution,
Ambil interposed the instant petition.
○ He seeks to annul the order setting the promulgation of
the resolution of the case, and prohibiting the COMELEC,
First Division, from promulgating the purported Guiani
resolution, and directing the COMELEC, First Division, to
deliberate anew on the case and to promulgate the
resolution reached in the case after such deliberation.
● Respondent Ramirez filed his comment, admitting that the
proposed resolution of Commissioner Guiani was no longer valid
after his retirement. He also submitted that COMELEC, First
Division, must elevate the protest case to the COMELEC ​en banc
until resolved with finality.
ISSUE: ​Whether the petition for ​certiorari ​to the SC was proper?
HELD: NO.
● The power of the SC to review decisions of the SC is prescribed in
Article IX, Section 7 of the Constitution:
○ “… Unless otherwise provided by this constitution or by
law, any decision, order, or ruling of each commission may
be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof."
○ The Court interpreted this provision to mean ​final orders,
rulings and decisions ​of COMELEC rendered in the
exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. This
decision must be a final decision/resolution of the
COMELEC en banc, not of a division. The SC has no
power to review via certiorari, an interlocutory order or
even a final resolution of a Division of the COMELEC.
● The mode by which a decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en
banc may be elevated to the SC is by the special civil action of
certiorari under Rule 64, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
○ Rule 65, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, requires that there be no appeal, or any plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. A motion for reconsideration is a plain and adequate
remedy provided by law. Failure to abide by this
procedural requirement constitutes a ground for dismissal
of the petition.
○ In like manner, a decision, order or resolution of a division
of the COMELEC must be reviewed by the COMELEC en
banc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en
banc decision may be brought to the SC on certiorari. The
pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is
mandatory ​(pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 3 of the
Constitution).
● IN THIS CASE, the case is an election protest within the original
jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division. Ambil did not ask for a
reconsideration of the division’s resolution/final decision, as there
was no resolution or decision to speak of because there was yet no
promulgation, which was still scheduled on June 20, 2000.
○ Under the Constitution, a party to an election case within
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in division can not
dispense with the filing of a motion for reconsideration of a
decision, resolution or final order of the Division of the
COMELEC because the case would not reach the
COMELEC en banc without such motion for
reconsideration having been filed and resolved by the
Division.
● The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with a motion
for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the
exceptions do not apply to election cases where a motion for
reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the
case to the COMELEC en banc, whose final decision is what is
reviewable via certiorari before the SC.
 ● The dissenting Justice erred in relying on ​Kho v. COMELEC ​to
support the proposition that resort to the SC from a resolution of a
COMELEC Division is allowed.
○ In that case, the COMELEC ​denied ​the prayer of petitioner
for the ​elevation of the case to en banc ​because the
orders of admission were mere ​interlocutory orders. T ​ he
SC declared the First Division’s order to be void for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion tantamount to
lack of jurisdiction.
○ Hence, the aggrieved party ​had no choice b ​ ut to seek
recourse in the SC. Such important factor is not present in
this case.
● If Ambil was afraid that the Guiana resolution would be
promulgated, he should have sought reconsideration of such
patently void resolution and thereby the case would be elevated to
the Commission ​en banc.
○ In any case, that resolution was not promulgated and the
signature of the clerk of court was a forgery.
● Consequently, the filing of the instant petition before the SC was
premature. Ambil failed to exhaust adequate administrative
remedies available before the COMELEC.
● This is the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A motion
for reconsideration then is a pre-requisite to the viability of a special
civil action for certiorari, unless the party who avails of the latter can
convincingly show that his case falls under any of the following
exceptions to the rule:
○ (1) when the question is purely legal,
○ (2) where judicial intervention is urgent,
○ (3) where its application may cause great and irreparable
damage,
○ (4) where the controverted acts violate due process,
○ (5) failure of a high government official from whom relief is
sought to act on the matter, and seeks when the issue for
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot.
WHEREFORE, the Court dismisses the petition for prematurity.

ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION (Just in case Atty. asks)

● The so-called Guiani resolution is void for the following reasons:

○ A final decision/resolution becomes binding only after it is
promulgated and not before. Accordingly, one who is no
longer a member of the Commission at the time the final
decision/resolution is promulgated cannot validly take part
in that resolution/decision.
○ The COMELEC, First Division, disclaimed the resolution
for being a “useless scrap of paper” there being no
promulgation of the resolution in the case.
● Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a
pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him.
 2. Cagas vs COMELEC
GR No. 194139 | Jan 24, 2012 | Bersamin, J | Should be final, and not
interlocutory, COMELEC order
By: Aliya Ambray
Petitioner: Douglas Cagas
Respondent: COMELEC and Claude Bautista
Doctrine: ​The COMELEC En Banc shall decide motions for
reconsideration only of “decisions” of a Division. ​In​terlocutory
orders may not be resolved by the COMELEC En Banc. An order
is final in nature if it completely disposes of the entire case. But
if there is something more to be done in the case after its
issuance, that order is interlocutory​. The exception is when an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of COMELEC does not
appear to be specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC En Banc may sit
and consider.
FACTS:
● Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial
race for the province of Davao del Sur
● Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral protest alleging fraud,
anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election
laws, rules and resolution
● The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division
● In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make
the requisite cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a
detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of
● The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative
defences
● Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC
En Banc
● Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely
interlocutory, could not be elevated to the COMELEC En Banc
● The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying Cagas’
motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for
certiorari before the Supreme Court
ISSUE: ​W/N the Supreme Supreme Court has the power to review on
certiorari an interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
HELD​: NO
RATIO:
● Petition DENIED
● Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 the 1987 Constitution
confers on the Court the power to review any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final decision or
resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC
● The Court has no power to review on certiorari an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of the
COMELEC
● There is no question that the Court has to take cognizance of the
petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First
Division of the special affirmative defenses of Cagas
● The proper remedy is for Cagas is to wait for the COMELEC First
Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result
should aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative
defenses to the COMELEC En Banc along with the other errors
committed by the Division upon the merits
● It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which
is when an interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was
issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission on
Elections. However, the said case has no application because the
COMELEC First Division had the competence to determine the lack
of detailed specifications of the acts or omissions complained of as
required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,
and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the
protest
 ● Accordingly, petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit
3. Tecson v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 161434/161634/161824 / March 3, 2004 /Vitug,​ J.
Topic: Rule 64 ROC
Petitioners: 1​st​ – Maria Tecson and Felix Desiderio; 2​nd​ – Zoilo Velez; 3rd
– Victorino Fornier
Respondents: 1​st​ – COMELEC, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (FPJ) and
Victorino Fornier; 2​nd​ – FPJ; 3​rd​ – COMELEC and FPJ
Emergency Recit​: 2003 – FPJ filed CoC for President. Fornier filed petition
to cancel before COMELEC. COMELEC dismissed. Fornier filed Rule 64
petition assailing dismissal by COMELEC.
Doctrine: Decisions of COMELEC in disqualifications may be reviewed by
the SC per Rule 64 on certiorari under Rule 65. Specifically provided for in
the Constitution, and affirmed by the power of judicial review vested in the
SC.
Facts:
1. FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for President under Koalisyon
ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino Party in 2003. Represented himself as a
natural born citizen, born in Manila in 1939.
2. Victorino Fornier filed a petition with COMELEC to disqualify FPJ,
alleging the latter’s parents were foreigners – FPJ’s mom (Bessie
Kelley Poe) was American, and his father (Allan Poe) was a
Spanish national, being the son of a Spanish subject (Lorenzo
Pou). Even if father was Filipino, FPJ was an illegitimate child, so
citizenship would not have been transmitted. Fornier’s proof: FPJ’s
father had a 1​st marriage (Paulita Poe y Gomez) before marriage to
his mom; even if no prior marriage, FPJ’s parents were wed a year
after his birth.
3. FPJ presented 22 documentary pieces of evidence to rebut the
claim.
4. COMELEC dismissed the petition. Fornier filed MR which was
denied. Filed Rule 64 petition assailing the COMELEC’s decision.
Issue: W/N SC has the power to review decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases
Held:​ Yes.
Election code provides in Sec. 69 that any interested party may file a verified
petition under Sec. 78 to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64, in an action for certiorari under
Rule 65. Sec. 7, Art. IX of the 1987 Constitution reads:
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case
or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision,
order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty
days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Sec. 1, Art. VIII also provides that judicial power is vested in the SC which
is the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government.
To rule in the contrary would be a gross denial to the people of their
fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on
who could or should be elected to occupy the highest position in the land.
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –
1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.
Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez,
Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.,
Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.
2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.
Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in
SPA No. 04-003.
Additional notes (the following is merely a summary by SC; please read
full text for in depth discussion of the substantial issues, which includes
DNA tests, review of possible history of Poe’s family, etc.):
The petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 were directly elevated
to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity. The primary jurisdiction
of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the elections
are held.
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his
certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate
his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or
not there has been material misrepresentation, which must not only be
material, but also deliberate and willful.

It is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a

natural-born citizen, which depended on whether or not his father had also
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before
death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F.
Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
 4. ZOILO ANTONIO ​VELEZ​,​ ET AL. ​v. ​RONALD ALLAN KELLEY ​POE
G.R. No. 161634​ | ​MARCH 3, 2004​ | ​VITUG, ​J​.
Certiorari Under Rule 64, in Relation to Rule 65
Author: KDJ
PETITIONERS:
1. Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. (in G.R.
161434);
2. Zoilo Antonio Velez (in this case, G.R. 161634); and
3. Victorino X. Fornier (in G.R. 161824)
RESPONDENTS:
1. Victorino X. Fornier (in G.R. 161434 / SP 04-003)
2. Commission on Elections (in G.R. 161434 and in G.R. 161824)
3. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe or “​FPJ​”
DOCTRINE: ​Rule 64 is not a proper remedy in an election contest, because the
Supreme Court may only have jurisdiction over such cases by virtue of the PET
after the election.
SUMMARY: ​These three consolidated cases question the citizenship of FPJ, who
is running for President. After the first case was denied, subsequent cases were
filed questioning the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by virtue of the remedy in
question.
FACTS:
1. On 31 December 2003, FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for the
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the forthcoming
national elections.
a. In his CoC, FPJ, represented himself to be a natural-born
Filipino.
2. Thereafter, three separate petitions were filed against FPJ which all
sought his disqualification in the said race for presidency.
a. In the first case (G.R. 161824), Victorino X. Fornier, initiated a
petition to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
candidacy alleging that FPJ made material misrepresentations
in his CoC by claiming he is a natural-born Filipino.
i. COMELEC (3​RD Division) dismissed the case for lack of
merit. MR was filed but was denied (by COMELEC En
Banc).
ii. Fornier before the SC then:
1. Assailed the decision of the COMELEC
before the SC under Rule 64, in relation to
Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Procedure
2. Invoking Sec. 78 in connection with Sec. 52
of the Omnibus Election Code
b. In the subsequent cases (G.R. 161434 and 161634), which both
challenged the earlier decision of COMELEC, Tecson, Velez, et
al.
i. They invoked Art. VII, Sec. 4(7) of the 1987
Constitution, assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of earlier case
(Fornier’s case) which reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall
be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of
the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose."
ii. They argued that:
1. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution,
electoral protests, are outside the
jurisdiction of the SC; and;
2. COMELEC has jurisdiction on such cases by
virtue of R.A. 1793
ISSUE: ​W/N the Court acquires jurisdiction over the case upon filing of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, ​NO – the case was filed
prematurely, there being no electoral protest

RULING:
1. The case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity,
a. Petitions in the cases involved both having been directly
elevated before the Supreme Court, in its capacity as the only
tribunal to resolve a Presidential and Vice Presidential election
contest under the Constitution.
b. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be
invoked only after, not before, the elections are held. (pag may
nanalo na)
2. In the case at bar, the petitioners invoked the provisions of Art VII,
Section 4, Par. 7 of the 1987 Constitution, wherein they assailed the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003
and thus urged the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they
directly instituted before it.
3. As provided for by the Constitution, the Supreme Court, sitting en banc,
shall be the sole judge of all ​contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose."
a. The provision herein provided is an innovation of the 1987
Constitution.
b. The omission in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution to designate
any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare
in Lopez vs. Roxas, as not being justiciable controversies or
disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President.
c. Such lapse prompted the Congress to create RA 1793, “An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to
Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and Vice President Elect of the Philippines and
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same”.
d. Such act designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
4. However, it is contemplated that, the characterization of “contest” is in
reference to post-election scenario.
a. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have
one objective in view, to dislodge the winning candidate from
office. Such is supported in the premise, as provided for by the
Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal:
i. Rule 12. ​Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the President or Vice-President
of the Philippines.
ii. Rule 13. ​How Initiated. - An election contest is
initiated by the filing of an election protest or a
petition for quo warranto against the President or
Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo
warranto shall not include an election protest.
iii. Rule 14. ​Election Protest. - Only the registered
candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the
President or the Vice-President, as the case may be,
by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days
after the proclamation of the winner.
b. The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal
over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and
not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo
warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office. ​In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only
a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election
protest. This rule again presupposes a post-election scenario.
5. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined
by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include
 cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are
held.
DISPOSITION: ​Petitions, ​DISMISSED​.
SEPARATE OPINION (​Davide, C.J.)
1. Both the petitions of Tecson and Velez invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court as provided for in the last paragraph of Section 4 of Article VII of
the Constitution, and raise the issue of the ineligibility of a candidate for
President on the ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines.
a. The actions contemplated in the said provision of the
Constitution are post-election remedies, namely, regular
election contests and quo warranto.
b. The petitioner should have, instead, resorted to pre-election
remedies, such as those prescribed in Section 68
(Disqualifications), in relation to Section 72; Section 69
(Nuisance candidates); and Section 78 (Petition to deny course
to or cancel a certificate of candidacy), in relation to Section 74,
of the Omnibus Election Code, which are implemented in Rules
23, 24 and 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
c. These pre-election remedies or actions do not, however, fall
within the original jurisdiction of this Court.
2. Upon the other hand, this Court has jurisdiction over Fornier’s petition
(G.R. No. 161824) under Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,
which provides:
a. Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or
resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision
or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the rules of the Commission or by
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by this
Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari
by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
b. This Court can also take cognizance of the issue of whether the
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the challenged resolution
in COMELEC SPA No. 04-003 by virtue of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution
DISSENTING OPINION (Carpio, ​J​):
1. To hold that the Court acquires jurisdiction to determine the qualification
of a candidate for President only after the elections would lead to an
absurd situation. The Court would have to wait for an alien to be elected
on election day before he could be disqualified to run for President.
a. If the case is not decided immediately after the election, an
alien who wins the election may even assume office as
President before he is finally disqualified. Certainly, this is not
what the Constitution says when it provides that "[N]o person
may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines."
2. The clear and specific language of the Constitution prohibits the election
of one who is not a natural-born citizen.
3. Thus, the issue of whether a candidate for President is a natural-born
Philippine citizen must be decided before the election.

5.Reblora vs AFP
GR No. 195842 | June 18, 2013 | Perez, J. | Review of Judgments and
Final Orders or Resolutions of the COMELEC and the COA.
By: Monch
Petitioner: Roberto B. Reblora
Respondent: Armed Forces of the Philippines
Doctrine: Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable
by this Court, not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is
the present petition, but thru a special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements the mandate of Section
7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on this.
FACTS​: -The petitioner is a retired Captain of the Philippine Navy. He was
born on 22 May 1944.
-Prior to entering military service, the petitioner rendered civilian government
service as a Barrio Development Worker at the Department of the Interior
and Local Government (DILG) from 6 January 1969 to 20 July 1974.
-On 21 May 1973, the petitioner entered military service as a Probationary
Ensign in the Philippine Navy. He was called to active duty effective 26
August 1974.
-On 25 January 1996, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) officially
confirmed the incorporation of petitioner’s civilian government service at the
DILG with his length of active service in the military pursuant to Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1638, as amended by PD No. 1650.
-On 22 May 2003, at the age of 59 and after a total of thirty-four (34) years of
active service, the petitioner was compulsorily retired from the military by
virtue of General Order No. 142. He was, at that time, already ranked as a
Commander in the Philippine Navy.
-After his retirement, petitioner claimed retirement benefits under Section 17
of PD No. 1638.
-The AFP granted petitioner’s claim of retirement benefits and immediately
paid the latter the sum of ₱722,297.16 as advance lump sum.
-In computing for petitioner’s retirement benefit, however, the AFP did not
include petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG. The AFP only
considered petitioner’s actual military service i.e., covering the period
between 21 May 1973 up to 22 May 2003 or a period of only thirty (30)
years.
-The petitioner disagreed with computation of the AFP​. He insisted that
the computation of his retirement benefit should include the period of his
civilian government service at the DILG immediately before he entered
military service, i.e. from 6 January 1969 up to 20 May 1973, or for a total of
four (4) years and five (5) months. It is argued that the computation of the
AFP does not reflect the true length of his military service of thirty-four (34)
years and that it is, in fact, a full four (4) years short. Petitioner thus claims
that he is entitled to ₱135,991.81 in additional retirement benefit.
-After an unsuccessful bid to obtain a favorable legal opinion from the AFP
Judge Advocate General, the petitioner requested assistance from the COA
for the collection of his claimed additional retirement benefit.
COA decision:
-In substance, the COA agreed with the petitioner that his civilian service at
the DILG should and ought to be included as part of his active service in the
military for purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No.
1638. ​However, since his civilian service should be included as part of his
active service in the military, the COA opined that petitioner should also
have been considered as compulsorily retired on 22 May 2000 and not on 22
May 2003.
-The COA explained that as of 22 May 2000, petitioner has already
reached the age of fifty-six (56) with a total of thirty-one (31) years in
active service, inclusive of his four years in the DILG, which fulfilled
the conditions for compulsory retirement under Section 5(a) of PD No.
1638, as amended.17 Verily, the COA found that, applying the
provisions of PD No. 1638 as amended, petitioner was not actually
underpaid but was rather overpaid his retirement benefit in the amount
of ₱77,807.16.
Aggrieved, petitioner questioned the Decision and Resolution of the COA ​via
the present Rule 45 petition​ before this Court.
ISSUE​: WoN the petition will prosper?
HELD​: NO.
RATIO​: PETITION DENIED
-This Court can very well dismiss the instant petition on account of it being
the ​wrong remedy.
-Decisions and resolutions of the COA are reviewable by this Court,
not via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, as is the present petition,
but thru a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Section 2 of Rule 64, which implements
the mandate of Section 7 of Article IX-A of the Constitution, is clear on
this:
Section 2. Mode of Review.—A judgment or final order or resolution
of the Commission on Electionsand the Commission on Audit may
be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on
certiorari under Rule 65, except as hereinafter provided.
-The distinction between an appeal under Rule 45 and a special civil action
under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 could not be anymore overstated in
remedial law—the most profound of which, arguably, is the difference of one
to the other with respect to the permissible scope of inquiry in each. ​Indeed,
by restricting the review of judgments or resolutions of the COA only
thru a special civil action for certiorari before this Court, the
Constitution and the Rules of Court precisely limits the permissible
scope of inquiry in such cases only to errors of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. Hence, unless tainted with grave abuse of
discretion, simple errors of judgment committed by the COA cannot be
reviewed—even by this Court.
-That is where the present petition patently fails. It alleges neither grave
abuse of jurisdiction nor any jurisdictional error on the part of the COA. It, in
fact, contented itself with imputations of errors on the part of the COA and
the AFP as to how they interpreted or applied PD No. 1638 to the petitioner’s
case. For all intents and purposes, the present petition is, on that account,
an improper invocation of this Court’s power of review over the judgments
and resolutions of the COA.
(NON SCA ISSUE but still relevant. Sir will most likely ask this part.)
-Nevertheless, even if this Court should take a liberal appreciation of the
present petition as one that is filed under Rule 65, such petition would still
fail. We have taken an extra step and scoured the established facts vis-à-vis
the allegations of the instant petition in search of any vestiges of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the COA, but we found none. What we did
find, on the other hand, is that the assailed COA Decision and Resolution
was rendered in accord with law.
-In the assailed Decision and Resolution, ​the COA correctly held that for
purposes of computing his retirement benefits under PD No 1638, as
amended, petitioner should have been considered compulsorily retired
as of 22 May 2000 per Section 5(a) of the same law. This is so because it
was on 22 May 2000 that petitioner reached the age of fifty-six (56) after a
total of thirty-one (31) years in active service—fulfilling thereby the
conditions for compulsory retirement under the said section. ​In coming up
with such a conclusion, the COA most certainly reckoned the
beginning of petitioner’s active service in the military from his stint as
civilian worker at the DILG.
-The inclusion of petitioner’s civilian government service at the DILG in the
computation of his length of active service in the military, on the other hand,
is only but proper in light of Section 3 of PD No. 1638, as amended.

6. PATES V COMELEC
G.R. No. 184915 | 30 June 2009| Brion | Certiorari
By: NEPOMUCENO
Petitioner: ​Nilo T. Pates
Respondent: ​Commission on Elections and Emelita B. Almirante
Doctrine:
Procedurally, the most patent difference between the two – ​i.e., the
exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is Section 3 which
provides for a special period for the filing of petitions for ​certiorari
from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC ​en banc​. The period is 30
days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the 60 days that
Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the filing of
any motion for reconsideration deductible from the originally-granted
30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that Rule 65
provides).
Section 3, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 3. ​Time to file petition.—​The ​petition shall be filed within thirty (30)
days from notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed. The filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration of said
judgment or final order or resolution, if allowed under the procedural rules of
the Commission concerned, shall interrupt the period herein fixed. If the
motion is denied, the aggrieved party may file the petition within the
remaining period, but which shall not be less than five (5) days in any event,
reckoned from notice of denial.
FACTS: ​The following are the material antecedents:
a. February 1, 2008 – The COMELEC First Division issued its
Resolution (assailed in the petition);
b. February 4, 2008 – The counsel for petitioner Nilo T. Pates
(​petitioner​) received a copy of the February 1, 2008 Resolution;
c. February 8, 2008 – The petitioner filed his motion for
reconsideration (​MR​) of the February 1, 2008 Resolution (4 days
from receipt of the February 1, 2008 Resolution)
d. September 18, 2008 – The COMELEC ​en banc issued a Resolution
denying the petitioner’s MR (also assailed in the petition).
e. September 22, 2008 – The petitioner received the COMELEC en
banc Resolution of September 18, 2008
Petitioner filed his petition for certiorari on the final COMELEC Resolution on
October 22, 2008 or two days late which must be filed 30 days from such
notice however it fell on a Saturday (October 18, 2008), as the petitioner
only had the remaining period of 26 days to file his petition, after using up 4
days in preparing and filing his Motion for Reconsideration. His petition was
dismissed.
He insists that the fresh period rule (Neypes v CA) which is applicable to a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 should likewise apply to petitions for
certiorari of COMELEC rulings filed under Rule 64. He asks for Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: ​Whether or not the motion for reconsideration should be granted -
NO
RULING:
As a Matter of Law
No. ​Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that unless otherwise
provided by the Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Court on ​certiorari by the aggrieved party
within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof. For this reason, the Rules of
Court provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically applicable only to
decisions of the COMELEC and the Commission on Audit. This Rule
expressly refers to the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition for
certiorari​, subject to the exception clause except as hereinafter provided.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule.
Rule 64, however, cannot simply be equated to Rule 65 even if it expressly
refers to the latter rule. ​Procedurally, the most patent difference between
the two – ​i.e., the exception that Section 2, Rule 64 refers to – is
Section 3 which provides for a special period for the filing of petitions
for ​certiorari from decisions or rulings of the COMELEC ​en banc​. The
period is 30 days from notice of the decision or ruling (instead of the
60 days that Rule 65 provides), with the intervening period used for the
filing of any motion for reconsideration deductible from the
originally-granted 30 days (instead of the fresh period of 60 days that
Rule 65 provides).
Significantly, the petitioner presented no exceptional circumstance or any
compelling reason to warrant the non-application of Section 3, Rule 64 to his
petition. He failed to explain why his filing was late. Other than his appeal to
history, uniformity, and convenience, he did not explain why we should adopt
and apply the fresh period rule to an election case.
As a Matter of Policy
The reason, as made clear above, is constitutionally-based and is no less
than the importance our Constitution accords to the prompt determination of
election results. This reason far outweighs convenience and uniformity.

Our Liberal Approach

Largely for the same reason and as discussed below, we are not inclined to
suspend the rules to come to the rescue of a litigant whose counsel has
blundered by reading the wrong applicable provision. The Rules of Court are
with us for the prompt and orderly administration of justice; litigants cannot,
after resorting to a wrong remedy, simply cry for the liberal construction of
these rules.
We add that even for this Court, liberality does not signify an unbridled
exercise of discretion. It has its limits; to serve its purpose and to preserve
its true worth, it must be exercised only in the most appropriate cases.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the motion for

reconsideration for lack of merit. Our Resolution of November 11, 2008 is
hereby declared FINAL. Let entry of judgment be made in due course.