Administrative procedure in Rule Making Power

GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 205357               September 2, 2014

PONENTE: Peralta

TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits

FACTS:

            The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section 9 (a) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates and political
parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty (120) minutes and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such restrictive regulation
on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the people’s right to suffrage as well as their
right to information relative to the exercise of their right to choose who to elect during the forth coming
elections

                Section 9 (a) provides for an “aggregate total” airtime instead of the previous “per station” airtime for
political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC approval for candidates’ television
and radio guestings and appearances.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates freedom of
expression, of speech and of the press.

HELD:

                YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on “aggregate-based” airtime limits is unreasonable and
arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political parties to reach out and
communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for imposing the “aggregate-based” airtime limits –
leveling the playing field – does not constitute a compelling state interest which would justify such a
substantial restriction on the freedom of candidates and political parties to communicate their
ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-
cut basis for the imposition of such a prohibitive measure.

                It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time limits on
broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many islands. There are also a
lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the country. Accordingly, for a national
candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as possible, then it might also be necessary that he
conveys his message through his advertisements in languages and dialects that the people may more readily
understand and relate to. To add all of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of
such candidate to express himself – a form of suppression of his political speech.

Amendment and Repeal

Republic of the Philippines vs Express Telecommunications company

Fact: Bayantel filed an application with the NTC for a Certificate of Public Convenience or Necessity (CPCN) to
install, operate and maintain a digital Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS) with prayer for a
Provisional Authority (PA). Shortly thereafter the NTC issued directing all interested applicants for nationwide
or regional CMTS to file their respective applications before the Commission and prior to the issuance of any
notice of hearing by the NTC with respect to Bayantel’s original application, Bayantel filed an urgent ex-parte
motion to admit an amended application. the notice of hearing issued by the NTC with respect to this amended
application was published in the Manila Chronicle. Copies of the application as well as the notice of hearing
were mailed to all affected parties. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on the amended application. But
before Bayantel could complete the presentation of its evidence, the NTC grant of two (2) separate Provisional
which resulted in the closing out of all available frequencies for the service being applied for by herein
applicant, and in order that this case may not remain pending for an indefinite period of time, ordered
ARCHIVED without prejudice to its reinstatement if and when the requisite frequency becomes available. NTC
issued Memorandum re-allocating five (5) megahertz (MHz) of the radio frequency spectrum for the expansion
of CMTS networks. Bayantel filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Revive Case, citing the availability of new frequency
bands for CMTS operators, the NTC granted BayanTel’s motion to revive the latter’s application and set the
case for hearings. Extelcom filed an Opposition praying for the dismissal of Bayantel’s application which was
denied for lack of merit. Extelcom filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition,which
was granted. Petitioner filed MR but subsequently denied by the CA. Hence, the NTC filed the instant
petition. adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Issue: Whether the 1993 Revised Rules of the NTC is operative and should be applied to the Respondent even
with the absence of Publication Requirement? adrianantazo.wordpress.com

Held: No, publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which should be
published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation, publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non
before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect. The Rules of Practice and Procedure of the NTC fall
squarely within the scope of these laws, as explicitly mentioned in the case Tañada v. Tuvera. which is clear and
categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely
internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Hence, the 1993
Revised Rules should be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation before it can
take effect. Even the 1993 Revised Rules itself mandates that said Rules shall take effect only after their
publication in a newspaper of general circulation. In the absence of such publication, therefore, it is the 1978
Rules that governs. 

VII. quasi Judicial Powers

Definition and Nature
1987 Constitution, Art. 8, Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

Isidro Cariño vs The Commission on Human Rights (204 SCRA 483)

FACTS: On September 17, 1990, some 800 public school teachers in Manila did not attend work and decided to
stage rallies in order to air grievances. As a result thereof, eight teachers were suspended from work for 90
days. The issue was then investigated, and on December 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Isidro Cariño ordered the
dismissal from the service of one teacher and the suspension of three others. The case was appealed to the
Commission on Human Rights. In the meantime, the Solicitor General filed an action for certiorari regarding
the case and prohibiting the CHR from continuing the case. Nevertheless, CHR continued trial and issued a
subpoena to Secretary Cariño. ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has the power to try and decide and determine
certain specific cases such as the alleged human rights violation involving civil and political rights. HELD: No.
The CHR is not competent to try such case. It has no judicial power. It can only investigate all forms of human
rights violation involving civil and political rights but it cannot and should not try and decide on the merits and
matters involved therein. The CHR is hence then barred from proceeding with the trial.

Megaworld Globus Asia vs DSM

Relative to the construction of a condominium project called "The Salcedo Park," located at H.V. dela Costa St.,
Salcedo Village, Makati City, the project owner, Megaworld, entered into three separate contracts with DSM
Construction, namely: (1) Contract for Architectural Finishing Works; (2) Contract for Interior Finishing
Works; and (3) Contract for Supply and Installation of Kitchen Cabinets and Closets.
The Letter of Award for Architectural Finishing Works provides that the period for commencement and
completion shall be twelve months, from August 1, 1997 to July 31, 1998. However, on February 21, 2000,
representatives of both Megaworld and DSM Construction entered into an Interim Agreement whereby they
agreed on a new schedule of the turnover of units from the 26 th floor to the 40th floor, which was the last of the
contracted works.

Because of the differences that arose from the billings, DSM Construction filed on August 21, 2002,
a Complaint before the CIAC for compulsory arbitration,

On March 28, 2001, the parties signed before the members of the Arbitral Tribunal the Terms of
Reference12 (TOR) where they setforth their admitted facts,13 respective documentary evidence,14 summary of
claims15 and issues to be resolved by the tribunal.16 After presenting their evidence in the form of affidavits of
witnesses,17 the parties submitted their respective memoranda/draft decisions.18

On October 19, 2001, the Arbitral Tribunal promulgated its Decision dated September 28, 2001,
awarding P62,760,558.49 to DSM Construction and P9,473,799.46 to Megaworld.19

On February 14, 2002, the Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision21 affirming that of the Arbitral Tribunal.
The court pointed out that only questions of law may be raised before it on appeal from an award of the
CIAC.22 That pronouncement notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals proceeded to review the decision of the
Arbitral Tribunal and found the same to be amply supported by evidence. 23

Issue:

Ruling :
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but finality when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

SSS vs Gloria delos santos

Gloria elevated her claim to the Social Security Commission (SSC). On February 12, 2001, she filed a petition to
claim death benefits, with a prayer that she be declared the rightful beneficiary of the deceased Antonio. 3

The SSC motu proprio impleaded Cirila as respondent in the case, it appearing that she was another claimant
to the death benefits of Antonio. Upon receipt of the summons, Cirila moved to dismiss the petition of Gloria.
She argued that Gloria had no personality to sue because the latter is neither a dependent nor a beneficiary of
Antonio, as evidenced by the E-4 form accomplished and submitted by him when he was still alive. Gloria had
also remarried an American citizen in the US. And that she, Cirila, was the true and legal wife of Antonio.

Cirila likewise reasoned out that the authority to determine the validity of the two marriages of Antonio lay
with the regular courts. Since Gloria had already filed for settlement of the intestate estate of Antonio before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the petition she filed with the SSC should be considered as forum shopping.

Gloria opposed the motion to dismiss. She contended that her marriage to Larry Constant was not the
subsequent marriage contemplated under the Social Security Law (SS Law) 4 that would disqualify her as a
beneficiary; that the decree of divorce issued by a foreign state involving Filipino citizens has no validity and
effect under Philippine law. 

The SSC added that since the marriage of Antonio to Cirila was void, the latter was likewise not a qualified
beneficiary. The fruit of their union, May-Ann, was considered as an illegitimate child and qualified as a
secondary beneficiary. May-Ann was entitled to 50% of the share of the legitimate children of Antonio in
accordance with Section 8(k) of the SS Law.8 However, considering that the legitimate children of Antonio have
reached the age of majority, May-Ann is the only remaining qualified beneficiary and was thus entitled to 100%
of the benefit.

The CA agreed with the SSC in its determination that the marriage of Gloria and Antonio subsisted until his
death and the subsequent marriages contracted by both of them were void for being bigamous. But contrary to
findings of the SSC, the CA found that being the legal wife, Gloria was entitled by law to receive support from
her husband. 

Issue:
The controversy revolves on who between respondent Gloria, the first wife who divorced Antonio in the US, or
Cirila, the second wife, is his primary beneficiary entitled to claim death benefits from the SSS.
Ruling

The divorce was obtained by respondent Gloria while she was still a Filipino citizen and thus covered by the
policy against absolute divorces. It did not sever her marriage ties with Antonio.

However, although respondent was the legal spouse of the deceased, We find that she is still disqualified to
be his primary beneficiary under the SS Law. She fails to fulfill the requirement of dependency upon her
deceased husband Antonio.

Respondent herself admits that she left the conjugal abode on two (2) separate occasions, to live with two
different men. The first was in 1965, less than one year after their marriage, when she contracted a second
marriage to Domingo Talens. The second time she left Antonio was in 1983 when she went to the US, obtained
a divorce, and later married an American citizen.

In fine, these uncontroverted facts remove her from qualifying as a primary beneficiary of her deceased
husband.

DOLE PHILIPPINES INC. V. ESTEVA

(Nature of quasi-judicial power)
ISSUE/S: WON the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.

HELD:
YES. The DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.

It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of a
quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been described by this Court in the following manner –
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid
down by the law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the
performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial
functions the administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action and
exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in
the proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise quasi-judicial power, at least,
to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor standards provisions of the Code and other labor
legislation. He can issue compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders. As
evidence of the importance and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE Secretary, Article 128 of
the Labor Code, as amended, further provides –

ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power. –

xxxx
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or otherwise render ineffective the
orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted
under this article, and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or restraining
order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the enforcement orders issued in accordance
with this article.

The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of DOLE Undersecretary Trajano,
dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that CAMPCO was engaging in labor-only contracting. Such
finding constitutes res judicata in the case filed by the respondents with the NLRC.

It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered
pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as well to the judicial and
quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as
to the judgments of courts having general judicial powers. The orderly administration of justice requires that
the judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules
and regulations, so as to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in the
Philippine justice system, without which there would be no end to litigations.

Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of judgment." This Court has
previously clarified the difference between the two –

Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of res judicata in actions in
personam. to wit:
"Effect of judgment. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or judge of the Philippines,
having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same
thing and under the same title and in the same capacity;

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have
been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."

Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior judgment," whereas, Section
49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."

There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment was rendered, and the
second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
When the three identities are present, the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute
bar to the subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered and the second
case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of parties but there is no identity of cause of
action, the judgment is conclusive in the second case, only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
"conclusiveness of judgment."

The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the one applicable to the case at bar.
DISTINGUISHED FROM QUASI-LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS

CASE DIGEST : Lupangco VS CA

G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988 LUPO L. LUPANGCO, RAYMOND S. MANGKAL, NORMAN A. MESINA,
ALEXANDER R. REGUYAL, JOCELYN P. CATAPANG, ENRICO V. REGALADO, JEROME O. ARCEGA,
ERNESTOC. BLAS, JR., ELPEDIO M. ALMAZAN, KARL CAESAR R. RIMANDO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, respondent.

Facts On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued
Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all those applying for admission to
take the licensure examinations in accountancy
No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or
any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similars institutions
during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day.
Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the
Rules and Regulations of the Commission
On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in
accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others
similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injuction with a prayer
with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from
enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitution.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution

In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined
the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be
unconstitutional
Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, filed with the Court of Appeals

Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: It is not Constitutional.

the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is "to preserve the integrity and
purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional
infirmities
The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without
any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the respondent PRC
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they
should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful
steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to
make use of their faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their
freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth

Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or
bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions
from them, as a basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges and duties resulting in a
decision or order which applies to a specific situation .  This does not cover rules and regulations of general
applicability issued by the administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions
like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to preserve the integrity of
licensure examinations.

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS

Ang Tibay vs. CIR (G.R. No. L-46496)

Facts:
Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers. There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to
temporarily lay off members of the National Labor Union. According to the Union however, this was merely a
scheme to systematically terminate the employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It
claims that Ang Tibay is guilty of unjust labor practice because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against
the National Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly
sympathetic to the employer. The Court of Industrial Relation decided the case and elevated it to the Supreme
Court, but a motion for new trial was raised by the NLU. But the Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the said
motion. 

The motion for new trial was raised because according to NLU, there are documents that are so inaccessible to
them that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations. That these documents, which NLU have now attached as
exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered therein.

Issue:
WON the union was denied due process by CIR.

Held:
To begin with the issue before us is to realize the functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court whose
functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more
an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a
mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when
its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only
exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and
employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or disputes arising
between, and/ or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
and regulates the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
SC had the occasion to point out that the CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound
by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.

The fact, however, that the CIR may be said to be free from rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not
mean that it can in justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and
essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are
cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the record and
disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and facts
of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the parties
to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

SC said there was a failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved due to failure to receive all relevant
evidence. Thus, the motion for a new trial was granted and the entire record of this case is remanded to the
CIR.

Disciplinary Board, LTO vs Gutierrez

In administrative proceedings, as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the
opportunity to explain one's side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of. 'To be heard' does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may also be heard
thru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process."
This was extensively discussed in Vivo v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation 31 as follows:

The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process.
The essence of due process is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense,
for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of procedure are not
strictly applied. Ledesma v. Court ofAppeals [(565 Phil. 731, 740 [2007])] elaborates on the well-established
meaning of due process in administrative proceedings in this wise:

x xx Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an
opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of
the action or ruling complained of

A reading of the Show Cause Memorandum issued by the LTO shows that Gutierrez was directed to explain
why no disciplinary action should be taken against her.1âwphi1 The latter then duly complied therewith by
submitting her letter-reply pursuant thereto. Evidently, Gutierrez was accorded her right to procedural due
process when she was given an opportunity to be heard before the LTO found a prima facie case against her,
which thus, necessitated the issuance of the Formal Charge. In fact, even after the issuance of a Formal Charge,
the LTO continued to respect Gutierrez's right to procedural due process as it allowed her to file an Answer to
refute the charges of Gross Insubordination, Refusal to Perform Official Duties, and Conduct Prejudicial to the
Best Interest of the Service against her.

Cudia vs PMA
 In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty

AM No. 10-10-4-SC

Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano
del Castillo as its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds
but most notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and
articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations
making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works.  The authors and their purportedly plagiarized
articles are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens published in 2009 in
the Yale Journal of International Law; 2) Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in Internation
Law published by the Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3) Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape
as an International Crime published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in 2006.
Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the Supreme Court spread over the media and the original
authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by
issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37
faculty members.   In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of
relief from those “comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.” 
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as
one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the
Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be
promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial
system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the
resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words used
were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for such alleged violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein that
their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity
and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing
on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from
Justice del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article.
Furthermore, the respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of
expression as citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

Issue:

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case before this
Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic freedom as a defense in
an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure the Court or influence the outcome of a
case or degrade the courts.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type hearing. We
have held that:

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings,
an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, hence, a party cannot
feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to present his side. A formal or trial
type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are
satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.

JUDICIAL REVIEW
De lima vs Reyes
Facts:

r. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega), also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio
shows in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio Wagwagan
Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. 5 After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B.
Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr.
Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad (Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah"
R. Noel, Jr.6

On February 6, 2011, Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the
National Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes
(former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. 7

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No: 0918 creating a special
panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. T

On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued the Resolution 11 dismissing
the Affidavit-Complaint.
n September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of
investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service and due process" 1
On March 12, 2012, the Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the
filing of informations on all accused, including former Governor Reyes
On March 19, 2013, the Court of Appeals, in a Special Division of Five, rendered the Decision 26 declaring
Department Order No. 710 null and void and reinstating the First Panel's Resolutions dated June 8, 2011 and
September 2, 2011.
According to the Court of Appeals, the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when she
issued Department Order No. 710 and created the Second Panel.
Petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority when she issued Department Order
No. 710. They argue that her issuance was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial function that
could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition.

Issue:
Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the scope of a petition
for certiorari or prohibition; 

Held:

Under the Rules of Court, a writ of certiorari is directed against "any tribunal, board or officer exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions."50 A quasi-judicial function is "the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold
hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature."51 Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if it renders
awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same effect as the judgment of
a court.52
In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The
prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." 53 As such, the
prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

This court dismissed the petition on the ground that petitions for certiorari and prohibition are directed on]y to
tribunals that exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The issuance of the department order was a purely
administrative or executive function of the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform
functions similar to that of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency:

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a quasi-judicial
office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. Nor does the DOJ
exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor on the finding of
probable cause in any case.

However, even when an administrative agency does not perform a judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial
function, the Constitution mandates the exercise of judicial review when there is an allegation of grave abuse of
discretion.
In ascertaining whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in his determination of the existence of probable cause, the party seeking the writ of
certiorari must be able to establish that the Secretary of Justice exercised his executive power in an arbitrary
and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of discretion must be so patent
and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law. Grave abuse of discretion is not enough; it must amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Excess of jurisdiction signifies that he had jurisdiction over the case, but (he) transcended the same or acted
without authority.

Imbong vs Ochoa
JAMES M. IMBONG AND LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., EXECUTIVE Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department
of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports
and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
FACTS:

          Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as
the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), challengers from various sectors
of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court
now faces the controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-in-intervention.

          The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUES:
 After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined
them to the following principal issues:

1. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1.  Power of Judicial Review
2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule

2. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

1. Right to Life
2. Right to Health
3. Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4. The Family
5. Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6. Due Process
7. Equal Protection
8. Involuntary Servitude
9. Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10. Autonomy of Local Governments / ARMM

RULING:

1. Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the
Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
1.  The petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather
than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.
Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this
Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate
to decide. “judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers
and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition
and maintenance of the boundaries of authority and control between them. Jurisprudence is replete with
the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz :

(a) there must be an actual case or controversy;

(b) the petitioners must possess locus standi;

(c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.

2. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken
judicial duty. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the
same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have
already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident
that the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. When an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Villafuerte vs Robredo

Issue:
Whether or not the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy
enshrined in the Constitution and the LGC.
Held:
It is well-settled that the Court’s exercise of the power of judicial review requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.23

The respondent claims that there is yet any actual case or controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial
review. He contends that the mere expectation of an administrative sanction does not give rise to a justiciable
controversy especially, in this case, that the petitioners have yet to exhaust administrative remedies available. 24

The Court disagrees. Citing the case of  La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos,
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion. The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be overemphasized. At the time of filing of the
instant petition, the respondent had already implemented the assailed memorandum circulars. In fact, on May
26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10, 2011 27 from
the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on the observation of the
audit team
Judicial Review

MACAILING, ET AL VS. ANDRADA, ET AL

Facts:
A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs, settlers thereon occupying
four hectares each, and Salvador Andrada (later substituted by his heirs), sales applicant of a bigger parcel,
which includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. 

The District Land Officer of Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor, excluded the four parcels of land claimed by
plaintiffs. The Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs
"shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who should include them proportionately in the new
application to be filed by them respectively."chanrobles virtual law library

Appeal having been taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the latter, on October 27,
1956, in turn reversed the Director of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants
sought reconsideration. On May 30, 1957, the Secretary denied. 

Defendants moved once more to reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the reconsideration,
ruled that his judgment in the case "had long become final and executory," and said: "Upon a
review of the records, we found that the decision sought to be reconsidered in the present
motion had long become final and executory. Consequently, this Office has no more
jurisdiction to entertain the said motion." The Secretary categorically stated that the case was
"considered a closed matter insofar as this Office is concerned

Issue:

They raised the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary.

Defendants appealed direct to this Court.

(Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessarily imply that it is unavailable)
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for such judicial
review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable.
Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No
general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is
that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are still available

The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads: "Courts of First Instance
shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue
writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective
provinces and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court." Complementary thereto is Section 4, Rule
65, Rules of Court,4 providing that: "The petition may be filed ... if it relates to the acts or omissions of an
inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in a Court of First instance having jurisdiction
thereof."

Citing several cases, even if the action done is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI, "The Preliminary
injunction that may be granted by a court of first instance under said Section 2 [Rule 58] is, in its application,
co-extensive with the territorial boundaries of the province or district in which the said court sits

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Nazareno vs CA
The only issue involved in this petition is whether or not petitioners exhausted administrative remedies before
having recourse to the courts.

The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land situated in Telegrapo, Puntod, Cagayan de Oro City. Said land
was formed as a result of sawdust dumped into the dried-up Balacanas Creek and along the banks of the Cagayan
river.

Upon the denial of the late Antonio Nazareno's motion for reconsideration, petitioners Desamparado Vda. de
Nazareno and Leticia Tapia Nazareno, filed a case before the RTC, Branch 22 for annulment of the following: order
of investigation by respondent Gillera, report and recommendation by respondent Labis, decision by respondent
Hilario, order by respondent Ignacio affirming the decision of respondent Hilario and order of execution by
respondent Palad. The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies which resulted in
the finality of the administrative decision of the Bureau of Lands.

The CA contends For the failure of Antonio Nazareno to appeal to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, the present case does not fall within the exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also held that there was no showing of oppressiveness in the manner in which the orders were issued
and executed..

Having determined that the subject land is public land, a fortiori, the Bureau of Lands, as well as the Office of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources have jurisdiction over the same in accordance with the Public Land
Law. Accordingly, the court a quo dismissed petitioners' complaint for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
which ruling the Court of Appeals affirmed.

However, this Court agrees with petitioners that administrative remedies have been exhausted.

As borne out by the administrative findings, the controverted land is public land, being an artificial accretion of
sawdust. As such, the Director of Lands has jurisdiction, authority and control over the same, as mandated under
Sections 3 and 4 of the Public Land Law (C.A. No. 141) which states, 

Administrative remedies exhausted; Regional Director of Bureau of Lands’ decision entered for and by authority of the
Director of Lands Administrative remedies have been exhausted in the present case. It would be incongruous to appeal
the decision of the Regional Director of the Bureau of Lands acting for and by the authority of the Director of the Bureau
of Lands to an Officer-In-Charge of the Bureau of Lands.

Undersecretary of Department of Agricultural and Natural Resources has authority to review decisions or orders of
the Director of lands with respect to public lands under the administration of the Bureau and the Department

ARLIN OBIASCA VS. JEANE BASALLOTE

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, where
the enabling statute indicates a procedure for administrative review and provides a system of administrative appeal or
reconsideration, the courts will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to
and the appropriate authorities have been given an opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the
administrative forum. In Orosa v. Roa, the Court ruled that if an appeal or remedy obtains or is available within the
administrative machinery, this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts. While the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to certain exceptions, these are not present in this case.
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE
M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,

vs.
 COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY,
ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.

G.R. No. 205728               January 21, 2015

PONENTE: Leonen

TOPIC: Right to expression, right to political speech, right to property

FACTS:

                On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten
feet (10′) in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first
tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012
or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin
contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a
check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark. The electoral candidates were classified
according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law.
Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising “Team Patay,”
while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

                Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any
candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013
elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
that election.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the size limitation and its reasonableness of the tarpaulin is a political
question, hence not within the ambit of the Supreme Court’s power of review.

Held:

The Court ruled that the present case does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is
no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through the expanded jurisdiction granted to
this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution..

                The concept of a political question never precludes judicial review when the act of a
constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental individual or collective right. Even assuming
arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the
tarpaulin in question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
                Also the Court said that in our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a
truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether there are
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are,
then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government
properly acted within such limits.

                A political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed
limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally
imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny and review of this
court.

                In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any
instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny. It does not fall squarely into any
doubt that a political question brings.

EXEMPTION
REPUBLIC vs. CARLITO LACAP

Issue: RESPONDENT FAILED TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; AND

Held:
The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail of all the means
afforded him by administrative processes.29 The issues which administrative agencies are authorized to decide
should not be summarily taken from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency
the opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation. 30

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction; that is,
courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of the
administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by the administrative tribunal, where the question
demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services
of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact

Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the corollary doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which
are based on sound public policy and practical considerations, are not inflexible rules. There are many accepted
exceptions, such as:
(a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
(b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction;
 (c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant;
(d) where the amount involved is relatively small so as to make the rule impractical and oppressive;
 (e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice;
(f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
(g) when its application may cause great and irreparable damage;
(h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
(i) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot;
(j) when there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
(k) when strong public interest is involved; and,
(l) in quo warranto proceedings. 
Exceptions (c) and (e) are applicable to the present case.

Notwithstanding the legal opinions of the DPWH Legal Department rendered in 1993 and 1994 that payment to a
contractor with an expired contractor’s license is proper, respondent remained unpaid for the completed work
despite repeated demands. Clearly, there was unreasonable delay and official inaction to the great prejudice of
respondent.

The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of justice. Exhaustion of administrative
remedies does not apply, because nothing of an administrative nature is to be or can be done. 36 The issue does not
require technical knowledge and experience but one that would involve the interpretation and application of law.

Vigilar vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 180388, Jan. 18,

2011 Immunity from Suit
DECEMBER 4, 2017

FACTS:

Aquino was invited by DPWH to a bidding for the construction of a dike by bulldozing a part of the Porac River
at Barangay Ascomo-Pulungmasle, Guagua, Pampanga. Aquino was subsequently awarded the “Contract of
Agreement” by the said government agency.

By 9 July 1992, the project was duly completed by respondent, who was then issued a Certificate of Project
Completion dated 16 July 1992. However, claimed that PhP1,262,696.20 was still due him, but petitioners
refused to pay the amount. He thus filed a Complaint for the collection of sum of money with damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga. Petitioners, for their part, set up the defense that the Complaint
 was a suit against the state; that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies; and that the “Contract of
Agreement” covering the project was void for violating Presidential Decree No. 1445, absent the proper
appropriation and the Certificate of Availability of Funds.

The trial court ruled in favor of the respondent. Petitioners (DPWH) then appealed the case before the CA
which ruled in their favor, declaring the contract null and void ab initio but ordered compensation to Aquino for
worked delivered, subject to Commission on Audit rules. Unsatisfied with the CA’s decision, Petitioners then
raised the issue before the Supreme Court seeking complete dismissal of the case without paying Aquino any
money.

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
OF RESPONDENT TO EXHAUST ALL ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

Held:

Firstly, petitioners claim that the Complaint filed by respondent before the Regional Trial Court was done without
exhausting administrative remedies. Petitioners aver that respondent should have first filed a claim before the
Commission on Audit (COA) before going to the courts. However, it has been established that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction are not ironclad rules. In Republic of
the Philippines v. Lacap,9 this Court enumerated the numerous exceptions to these rules

The government project contracted out to respondent was completed almost two decades ago. To delay the
proceedings by remanding the case to the relevant government office or agency will definitely prejudice respondent.
More importantly, the issues in the present case involve the validity and the enforceability of the "Contract of
Agreement" entered into by the parties. These are questions purely of law and clearly beyond the expertise of the
Commission on Audit or the DPWH.

the Court finds that the contractor should be duly compensated for services rendered, which were for the benefit of
the general public. To deny the payment to the contractor of the two buildings which are almost fully completed and
presently occupied by the university would be to allow the government to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
another. Justice and equity demand compensation on the basis of quantum meruit.

CASE DIGEST: Commissioner of Customs v. Navarro, G.R. No. L-33146

(77 SCRA 264)
Concept: Doctrine of Prior Resort

Facts:

·      The Commissioner of Customs and the Collector of Customs in their exhaustive and scholarly petition for certiorari,
filed on February 11, 1971, was on the jurisdictional issue. It sought to nullify and set aside order of respondent Judge
Pedro C. Navarro dated January 4, 1971, issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by private respondents
Juanito S. Flores and Asiatic Incorporated the importers of 1,350 cartons of fresh fruits, restraining petitioners from
proceeding with the auction sale of such perishable goods. Classified as non-essential consumer commodities, they
were banned by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 289, 294 and 295 as prohibited importation or importation contrary to law
and thus made subject to forfeiture proceedings by petitioner Collector of Customs pursuant to the relevant sections of
the Tariff and Customs Code.

·      In a detailed and specific fashion, petitioners pointed out how violative was the assumption of jurisdiction by
respondent Judge over an incident of a pending seizure and forfeiture proceeding which, as held in a number of
 decisions, was a matter falling within the exclusive competence of the customs authorities. The persuasive character
of the petition is thus evident, resulting in this Court issuing on February 15, 1971 a resolution requiring respondents to
file an answer and at the same time issuing a writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for by petitioners to prevent the
challenged order of respondent Judge from being implemented. Instead of preparing an answer, they just submitted a
manifestation stating that "after an intensive and serious study of the merit of the case, the respondents have decided
to abandon its interest in the case.

Issue: W/ON Custom has Jurisdiction

Held: Yes. jurisdiction of the customs authorities is exclusive was made clear in Pacis v. Averia, decided in 1966. This
Court, speaking through Justice J. P. Bengzon, realistically observed: "This original jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, when exercised in an action for recovery of personal property which is a subject of a forfeiture proceeding in
the Bureau of Customs, tends to encroach upon, and to render futile, the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs in
seizure and forfeiture proceedings." The court "should yield to the jurisdiction of the Collector of Customs."

The controlling principle was set forth anew in Ponce Enrile v. Vinuya, decided in 1971. Thus: "The prevailing
doctrine is that the exclusive jurisdiction in seizure and forfeiture cases vested in the Collector of Customs
precludes a court of first instance from assuming cognizance over such a matter.

CASE DIGEST: Industrial Enterprises, Inc. vs CA G.R. No. 88550 (184

SCRA 462) Case Digest
Concept: Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Facts:

·       Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Bureau of Energy Development (BED), for the
exploration of two coal blocks in Eastern Samar. IEI asked the Ministry of  Energy for another to contract for the additional three coal
blocks.

·       IEI was advised that there is another coal operator, Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI and MMIC signed a
Memorandum of Agreement on which IEI will assign all its rights and interests to MMIC.

·       IEI filed for rescission of the memorandum plus damages against the MMIC and the Ministry of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the
RTC of Makati, alleging that MMIC started operating in the coal blocks prior to finalization of the memorandum. IEI prayed for that
the rights for the operation be granted back.

·       Philippine National Bank (PNB) pleaded as co-defendant because they have mortgages in favor of MMIC. It was dismissed

·       Oddly enough, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus is President of both IEI and MMIC.

·       RTC ordered the rescission of the memorandum and for the reinstatement of the contract in favor of IEI.

·       CA reversed the ruling of the RTC, stating that RTC has no jurisdiction over the matter.

Issue: W/ON RTC has jurisdiction?

Held: No. While the action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract cognizable by a civil
court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is
inextricably tied up with the right to develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national program for coal-development
and with the objective of rationalizing the country's over-all coal-supply-demand balance, IEI's cause of action was not merely the
rescission of a contract but the reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision ordering
the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEI's
favor and directed the BED to give due course to IEI's application for three (3) IEI more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling
within the domain of the BED.

In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters
that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a
particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical
matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a
remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. It applies "where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of
the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special competence of an
administrative body, in such case the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its
view" 

Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of what coal areas should be exploited
and developed and which entity should be granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by
the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have
the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even
when apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.

Basiana mining vs Secretary of DENR

Facts of the case:

etitioner BMEC, headed by its President Basiana, applied on July 31, 1997 for a Mineral Production
Sharing Agreement (MPSA) with the DENR for the extraction of nickel and other minerals covering an
area of 6,642 hectares in Tubay and Jabonga, Agusan del Norte, docketed as MPSA (XIII)-00014. 6

Pending approval of its application, BMEC, on April 29, 2000, assigned to Manila Mining Corporation
(Manila Mining) all its rights and interest in MPSA (XIII)-00014, with the latter acknowledging BMEC
as the real and true owner of said application. 7 Manila Mining, in turn, assigned on October 17, 2005,
its rights and interest to SRMI.8 A day after, or on October 18, 2005, Basiana and SRMI executed a
Memorandum of Agreement where SRMI agreed, among others, to undertake technical and
geological tests, exploration and small-scale mining operations of the site subject of MPSA (XIII)-
00014.9 Necessary permits and certificates were then issued by the DENR and the Provincial
Government of Agusan del Norte to SRMI, San R Construction Corporation (San R) and Galeo
Equipment Corporation (Galeo). Consequently, SRMI, using BMEC's application, applied for an MPSA
for the extraction of nickel, iron and cobalt on a 591-ha area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.

On November 24, 2006, the DENR Secretary issued a cease and desist order against the mining
operations due to excess in annual production, maximum capitalization and labor cost to equipment
utilization.

Basiana then filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City on May 15, 2007 for
rescission of contract, abuse of rights and damages against SRMI, 
Subsequently, the Director of the Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGB), on January 10, 2008,
recommended the approval of APSA-000014-XIII filed by SRMI. 14 Thus, BMEC and Basiana filed with
the MGB Panel of Arbitrators (MGB-POA) a petition to deny and/or disapprove and/or declare the
nullity of the application for MPSA and/or cancellation, revocation and termination of MPSA. 15 Pending
resolution of the protest before the MGB-POA, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
DENR Secretary entered into MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII with SRMI for the development and
commercial utilization of nickel, cobalt, iron and other associated mineral deposits in the 572.64-ha
area in Tubay, Agusan del Norte.16

CA Decision dated December

According to the CA, MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII should be stricken down for the reasons that the DENR
Secretary has no authority and jurisdiction to approve SRMI's application pending resolution by the
MGB-POA of the petitioners' protest. 

The CA also found that the petitioners adopted the wrong mode of appeal when it filed a petition for
review before it; nevertheless, it resolved to treat the petition as one for certiorari since it alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DENR Secretary in approving the application despite the
pendency of the petitioners' protest

Ruling of the Court

First, the act of the DENR Secretary in approving SRMI's application and entering into MPSA No. 261-
2008-XIII is not an exercise of its quasi-judicial power; hence, it cannot be reviewed by the CA,
whether by a petition for review under Rule 43 or a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.

Given that it is the DENR Secretary that has the primary jurisdiction to approve and cancel mining
agreements and contract, it is with the DENR Secretary that the petitioners should have sought the
cancellation of MPSA No. 261-2008-XIII, and not with the courts. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction
instructs that if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before resort to the courts is had. 53

For another, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies bars recourse to the courts at the
very first instance.

The doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that resort be first made with the
administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the
controversy may be elevated to a court of justice for review. A premature invocation of a court's
intervention renders the complaint without cause of action and dismissible. 54 (Citations omitted)

The DENR Secretary, no doubt, is under the control of the President; thus, his decision is subject to
review of the latter.55 Consequently, the petitioners should have appealed its case to the Office of the
President under A.O. No. 18, series of 1987,56 instead of directly seeking review by the court. 57