Gonzales, Phillip Joshua D.

Metran
V
Paredes
79 Phil 819
Facts:
National Airports Corp
V.
Teodoro
91 PHIL 203
Facts:
The National Airports Corporation was abolished by Executive Order No. 365 and to take
its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration was created. Before the abolition, the Philippine
Airlines, Inc. paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245 as fees for landing and parking
on Bacolod Airport. These fees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol Subdivision,
Inc. which owned the land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport, and the owner
commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., in 1951 to recover the above amount. The Philippine Airlines, Inc. countered with
a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation, which by that time had been
dissolved, and served summons on the Civil Aeronautics Administration. The third party plaintiff
alleged that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the fees claimed by the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration should be regarded as engaged in
private functions and therefore subject to suit?

Ruling:
Yes. The Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under the category of a private entity.
Although not a body corporate it was created, like the National Airports Corporation, not to
maintain a necessary function of government, but to run what is essentially a business, even if
revenues be not its prime objective but rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the
travelling public. It is engaged in an enterprise which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of
state, may, more than the construction of public roads, be undertaken by private concerns.
Philrock
V.
Board of Liquidators
180 SCRA 171
Facts:
 PHILROCK filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, a complaint against
the Board of Liquidators for Specific Performance or Revaluation with Damages, praying that
the defective rock pulverizing machinery which it purchased from REPACOM be replaced with
a new one in good and operable condition according to the specifications of their contract.
The RTC decided in favor of PHILROCK. The Solicitor General, in behalf of the State,
filed a notice of appeal on the ground that the payment for damages are public funds, hence,
exempt from attachment and execution. Nevertheless, the RTC judge issued a Writ of Execution.
Subsequently the Board of Liquidators filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Court
of Appeals where the Court of Appeals set aside the Writ of Execution by the RTC. Hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not Board of Liquidators, may be sued and held liable as litigators of
REPACOM?
Ruling:
No. The Board of Liquidators is a government agency under the direct supervision of the
President of the Republic created by EO 372, dated November 24, 1950. Pursuant to PDs Nos.
629 and 635-A, it is tasked with the specific duty of administering the assets and paying the
liabilities of the defunct REPACOM. It was not created for profit or to engage in business.
Hence, when a suit is directed against said unincorporated government agency which, because it
is unincorporated, possesses no juridical personality of its own, the suit is against the agency's
principal, the State.
Republic
V.
Feliciano
G.R No. 70853
Facts:
On January 22, 1970, respondent Feliciano filed a complaint with the then Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur against the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Land
Authority, for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. By reason that
President Ramon Magsaysay issued a proclamation No. 90 reserving lands for settlements
purposes which happen to include respondent’s land.
Issue:
Whether or not doctrine of non-suability of the state applies in this case?
Ruling:
Yes. The doctrine of non-suability of the State has proper application in this case. The
plaintiff has impleaded the Republic of the Philippines as defendant in an action for recovery of
ownership and possession of a parcel of land, bringing the State to court just like any private
person who is claimed to be usurping a piece of property. A suit for the recovery of property is
not an action in rem, but an action in personam.
Mobil Phil Exploration
v.
Custom Arraste Service
18 SCRA 1220
Facts:

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad on S.S. "Leoville" sometime in
November of 1962, consigned to Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., Manila. The shipment
arrived at the Port of Manila and was discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service,
the unit of the Bureau of Customs then handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs
Arrastre Service later delivered to the broker of the consignee three cases only of the shipment.

Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc., filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the
Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs to recover the value of the undelivered
case in the amount of P18,493.37 plus other damages.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that not being persons
under the law, defendants cannot be sued.

Issue:
Whether or not both Customs Arraste Service and Bureau of Customs can invoke state
immunity?
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the Bureau of Customs cannot be sued for recovery of
money and damages involving arrastre services, considering that said arrastre function may be
deemed proprietary, because it is a necessary incident of the primary and governmental function
of the Bureau of Customs. The Court ruled that the fact that a non-corporate government entity
performs a function proprietary in nature does not necessarily result in its being suable. If said
non-governmental function is undertaken as an incident to its governmental function, there is no
waiver thereby of the sovereign immunity from suit extended to such government entity. 
Traders Royal Bank
v.
IAC
G.R No. 68514
Facts:
On April 9, 1981, Traders, a banking institution operating under Philippine laws, entered
into a loan agreement with the NMPC, a government instrumentality tasked with the function of
disseminating government information, programs and policies, represented by Director Gregorio
S. Cendaña, and the PSI, a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws,
represented by its president, Romeo G. Jalosjos.
NMPC and PSI did not make any payments on their obligation and did not comply with
the conditions agreed upon, Hence Traders Royal Bank filed a complaint against NMPC and PSI
to collect the whole amount of P 2,520,000.
Issue:
Whether or not NMPC’s act of entering into a contract means that it voluntarily waived
its immunity from suit?
Ruling:
The universal rule that where the State gives its consent to be sued by private parties
either by general or special law, it may limit claimant’s action `only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution’ and that the power of the Courts ends when the
judgment is rendered, since government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of
execution or garnishment to satisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the corresponding appropriations as
required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to be
paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their legitimate and specific objects,
as appropriated by law. library

There is more reason to apply said doctrine in this case considering that the waiver of non-
suability is only implied and not expressly allowed by statute.
Carmen Festejo
v.
Isaias Fernando
G.R. No. L-5156
Facts:
The defendant, as Director of the Bureau of Public Works, without authority obtained
first from the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, without obtaining first a right of way, and
without the consent and knowledge of the plaintiff, and against her express objection unlawfully
took possession of portions of the three parcels of land described above, and caused an irrigation
canal to be constructed on the portion of the three parcels of land on or about the month of
February 1951 the aggregate area being 24,179 square meters to the damage and prejudice of the
plaintiff.
Festejo demanded the return of the land and its restoration to its former condition. In the
remote event that the portions of land unlawfully occupied and appropriated cannot be returned
to the plaintiff, then to order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P19,343.20 as value
of the portions totalling an area of 24,179 square meters
Issue:
Is Fernando immune from suit for being a public officer?
Ruling:
No. Fernando committed acts outside the scope of his authority when he went outside the
boundaries of the right of way upon plaintiff's land and damaged it or destroyed its former
condition an dusefulness, he must be held to have designedly departed from the duties imposed
on him by law. Hence, If an officer, even while acting under color of his office, exceeds the
power conferred on him by law, he cannot shelter himself under the plea that he is a public agent.
Angel Ministerio
v.
CFI
40 SCRA 464
Facts:
National Government through its authorized representatives took physical and material
possession of it and used it for the widening of the Gorordo Avenue, a national road, Cebu City,
without paying just compensation and without any agreement, either written or verbal. Hence,
Petitioners sought for just compensation to which they are entitled under the Constitution for the
expropriation of their property necessary for the widening of a street. They sue defendants Public
Highway Commissioner and the Auditor General, in their capacity as public officials without
thereby violating the principle of government immunity from suit without its consent.
Issue:
Whether or not defendants are immune from suit?
Ruling:
No. The party that could be adversely affected is government. Hence the defense of non-
suability may be interposed the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts
of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or
officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for the protection of his
rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the
same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the
director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates
or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under
an assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the
constitutional provision that the State may not be sued without its consent. The SC decided that
the lower court’s decision of dismissing the complaint reversed and the case remanded to the
lower court for proceedings in accordance with law.
Municipality of San Fernando
v.
Judge Firme
G.R No. L-52179
Facts:
On December 16, 1965, at about 7 o'clock in the morning of December 16, 1965, a
collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the
Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by
Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and
driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including
Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they
sustained and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damages
against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver, respectively, of
the passenger jeepney, which was docketed Civil Case No. 2183 in the Court of First Instance of
La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union. However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union can enjoy the immunity
from suit.
Ruling:

Yes. The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular
employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. Hence, the death
of the passenger tragic and deplorable though it may be imposed on the municipality no duty to
pay monetary compensation. All premises considered the Court is convinced that the respondent
judge's dereliction in failing to resolve the issue of non-suability did not amount to grave abuse
of discretion. But said judge exceeded his jurisdiction when it ruled on the issue of liability.