[CASE DIGEST] Pobre v. Defensor-Santiago (A.C. No.

7399)
August 25, 2009 | A.C. No. 7399

Antero J. Pobre, complainant

Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, respondent

FACTS:

In one of her privilege speeches before the Senate, Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered
the following remarks: 

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my
middle years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the
position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in a different
environment than in a Supreme Court of idiots. x x x

Her speech came as a response to the decision of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) declaring
that only sitting members of the Supreme Court can be nominated for the impending vacancy
of the CJ post. Consequently, nominees who were not incumbent members of the Court,
including Sen. Defensor-Santiago, were automatically disqualified. 

Private complainant Antero J. Pobre filed the instant petition before the Court, contending
that the lady senator's utterances amounted to a total disrespect towards then CJ Panganiban
and a direct contempt of Court. Accordingly, he wanted disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions to be taken against Sen. Defensor-Santiago.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not there is a ground for Sen. Defensor-Santiago to be disbarred or subjected to

disciplinary action by the Court for her questioned speech.

HELD:

No, the Court sided with Sen. Defensor-Santiago's defense that she should be afforded
parliamentary immunity from suit pursuant to Section 11, Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution,
which section states in part that "no [Senator] x x x shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof."
Although there was no express admission on the part of the lady senator that she did indeed
say those words, there was no categorical denial either, which the Court ultimately regarded
as an implied admission. 

Despite the dismissal of the letter-complaint, the Court heavily chastised the lady senator for
indulging in "insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities." In fact, her excuse that her
questioned speech was a prelude to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC struck the Court as
being a mere afterthought in light of the controversy her utterances had managed to stir. 

Still, the Court held  that parliamentary immunity is essential because without it, the
parliament or its equivalent would "degenerate into a polite and ineffective forum." However,
it should be noted that "[l]egislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge
of of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good."
GUDANI VS SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the “Chain of
Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court Martial
proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President
has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and
affirmed that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability
of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on
executive privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The President’s prerogatives as
commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear
before Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congress’s right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners
testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its
pronouncement today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members
of the armed forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief
Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
SENATE VS ERMITA
G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006 [Executive Privilege and the Congress' Power of Inquiry]

FACTS:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, on
the issues of "Gloriagate" wiretapping of the President, electoral fraud and the fertilizer scam
issues.
PGMA then issued EO No. 464 which took immediately.
Section 1 of the EO 464 requires all department heads to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either House of Congress. Section 2(a) enumerates some
confidential or classified information which are covered by the executive privilege. Section 2(B)
enumerates those who are covered by the said order. Section 3 requires all the public official
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the president prior to appearing before
either House of Congress.

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO 464 contravenes the Congress' power of inquiry.

RULING:

The petitions are partially granted. Sections 1 and 2(a) are valid. Sections 2(b) and 3 are
declared Void.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the
Constitution which reads:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be
deduced from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive
with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and
those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of
government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would
be incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who
are the most familiar with and informed on executive operations.

The power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the necessity of information
in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials on the operation
of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of reasoning,
Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.

Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the
power of inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this
term figures prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its
preambular clauses, and in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for
determining the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to
the promulgation of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best understood in
light of how it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.

Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold

information from the public, the courts, and the Congress." Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the
right of the President and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from
Congress, the courts, and ultimately the public."

Whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to
certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked
to justify it and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive official are exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being
executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemption indicates that the
presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of
these provisions separately.

Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also
Section 3, the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the
department heads’ possession of any information which might be covered by executive
privilege. In fact, in marked contrast to Section 3 vis-à-vis Section 2, there is no reference to
executive privilege at all. Rather, the required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on
Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on what has been referred to as the question hour.

Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section
22 of Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis-à-vis
Section 21 which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation."

A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour.
While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory
nature of such appearance during the question hour in the present Constitution so as to
conform more fully to a system of separation of powers. That department heads may not be
required to appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is
rendered powerless to elicit information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the
absence of a mandatory question period, the need to enforce Congress’ right to executive
information in the performance of its legislative function becomes more imperative.
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should
not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that
may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour,
the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation
of powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the
inquiry in which Congress requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21,
the appearance is mandatory.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to
the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent
discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate
the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.

When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact
that they are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
— the President on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress
except through the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the
executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is
sanctioned by a long-standing custom.

By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of
inquiry. Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each
member thereof is exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal
autonomy and the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the
provision of said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of
construction that issuances must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render
it constitutional.

The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on
their part.

Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid

of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration
is broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the
PNP, and all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices
designated in the same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the
PNP, and the National Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."

The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President.
Given the title of Section 2 — "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" —, it is
evident that under the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this
provision is intended to be based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
The Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege actually
covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is
properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of
persons.

In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may
be read as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which
is, in the judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The
Court shall thus proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.

Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is
"covered by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement
effectively bars the appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the
President. The proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than
that the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.

Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office,
authorized by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in
possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then
becomes the basis for the official’s not showing up in the legislative investigation.

In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of
office authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is
privileged, and that the President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration,
however, even without mentioning the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied
claim that the information is being withheld by the executive branch, by authority of the
President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is an implied claim of privilege.

Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that
it sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of
privilege authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining
the ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an
implied claim of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as
demonstrated by the letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim
authorized by Section 3 of E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis
thereof (e.g., whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets,
closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.). While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information
that are covered by the privilege under the challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to
which among them is being referred to by the executive. The enumeration is not even
intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what is included in the phrase
"confidential or classified information between the President and the public officers covered
by this executive order."

The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per
se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for
the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has
not given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the
withholding of information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely
frustrates the power of inquiry of Congress.

In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines
that a certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
President’s authority and has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before
Congress, subject only to the express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the
appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow the President to authorize claims of
privilege by mere silence.

It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which,
in his own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable
time to inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the
privilege. This is necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with
fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege.
If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary
invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to
appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.

The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the
consent of the President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of
public officials appearing in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be
respected by Congress is an echo from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that
"[t]he rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."

In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for
implied claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such
authorization is partly motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not
change the infirm nature of the authorization itself.
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
KAPUNAN, J.:
 Facts: 
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte in 1995, providing that her residence in the place
was seven (7) months.

On March 23, 1995, Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a petition for cancellation and
disqualification with the COMELEC charging Marcos as she did not comply with the
constitutional requirement for residency as she lacked the Constitution’s one-year residency
requirement for candidates for the House of Representative.

In her Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, the petitioner changed seven months to
since childhood under residency. Thus, the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner’s proclamation
showing that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the
First District of Leyte. The COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing
that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest
number of votes.

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, Marcos claimed that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board
of Canvassers.

Issue: 
Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte to satisfy the one
year residency requirement to be eligible in running as representative.

Held:
Yes. The court is in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte.

Residence is synonymous with domicile which reveals a tendency or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a
candidate’s qualifications for the election to the House of Representatives as required by the
1987 Constitution.

An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in
different places. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by Motejo lacks the degree of
persuasiveness as required to convince the court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in
favor of a domicile of choice indeed incurred. It cannot be correctly argued that Marcos lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos.

It can be concluded that the facts supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to
run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner’s various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile.

Having determined that Marcos possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run for a
seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC’s questioned
resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May11, and May 25 are set aside. Provincial Board of
Canvassers is directed to proclaim Marcos as the duly elected Representative of the First
District of Leyte
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 221697      March 8, 2016
x–––––––––––––––––––––––x
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners,
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.
  G.R. No. 221698-700
PEREZ, J.:
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a newborn
infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the parental care and
custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and his wife, she has been
reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling Certificate and Certificate of
Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley (aka
Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her adoption.
The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she applied
and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and pursuing
a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She graduated in 1991
from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines and the
U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding. She gave birth
to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines to
support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth to her
youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months, she rushed
back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death, the petitioner
and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 2005 and
immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit; acquired property where she and
her children resided.
In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to RA No.
9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a sworn petition to
reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative citizenship on behalf of
her three children which was granted. She registered as a voter; secured Philippine passport;
appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB after executing an affidavit of
Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice Consul of the USA and was issued a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in 2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator for the
2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question “Period of
residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the highest number of
votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. In
her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that her residence in the
Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to her COC an “Affidavit Affirming
Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and sworn to before a notary public in Quezon
City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since
she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos.  The COMELEC
en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was in want of citizenship and
residence requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified
as a candidate for Presidency.  Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-
born citizenship issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen.

Held: 
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no restrictive

language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already impliedly so
recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties, adhering
to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in which the
foundling is found.

 
Tañada, et al., v. Angara, et al., G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997

DECISION
(En Banc)

PANGANIBAN, J.:

I.      THE FACTS

 Petitioners Senators Tañada, et al. questioned the constitutionality of the concurrence

by the Philippine Senate of the President’s ratification of the international Agreement
establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO).  They argued that the WTO Agreement
violates the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally
produced goods.” Further, they contended that the “national treatment” and “parity
provisions” of the WTO Agreement “place nationals and products of member countries on the
same footing as Filipinos and local products,” in contravention of the “Filipino First” policy of
our Constitution, and render meaningless the phrase “effectively controlled by Filipinos.”

II.    THE ISSUE

Does the 1987 Constitution prohibit our country from participating in worldwide trade
liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a global economy that is
liberalized, deregulated and privatized?

III.   THE RULING

[The Court DISMISSED the petition. It sustained the concurrence of the Philippine Senate

of the President’s ratification of the Agreement establishing the WTO.]

NO, the 1987 Constitution DOES NOT prohibit our country from participating in

worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization and from integrating into a
global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized.

There are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify
the Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement.

[W]hile the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services,
labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the
rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino
enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did not shut out
foreign investments, goods and services in the development of the Philippine economy. While
the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and
investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is  unfair.
                                                                                           
xxx                              xxx                              xxx

[T]he constitutional policy of a “self-reliant and independent national economy” does

not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It contemplates
neither “economic seclusion” nor “mendicancy in the international community.” As explained
by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:
Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly
aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does not
mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the international
community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign control of the national
economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the development of natural resources
and public utilities.

The WTO reliance on “most favored nation,” “national treatment,” and “trade without
discrimination” cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of equality
and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade policy based on
“equality and reciprocity,” the fundamental law encourages industries that are “competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby demonstrating a clear policy against a sheltered
domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the gradual development of robust industries
that can compete with the best in the foreign markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino
enterprises have shown capability and tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free
trade environment, Filipino entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong have demonstrated the
Filipino capacity to grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

xxx                              xxx                              xxx

It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the State
to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos; and to protect
and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally produced goods. But it is
equally true that such principles — while serving as judicial and legislative guides — are not in
themselves sources of causes of action. Moreover, there are other equally fundamental
constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which mandate the pursuit of a “trade
policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on
the basis of equality and reciprocity” and the promotion of industries “which are competitive
in both domestic and foreign markets,” thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too,
the alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is
balanced by the adoption of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations.

That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its
consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it “a part of the law of the land” is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no “patent and gross”
arbitrariness or despotism “by reason of passion or personal hostility” in such exercise. It is not
impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even agree with
petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down Senate
Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave abuse in the exercise of our
own judicial power and duty. Ineludibly, what the Senate did was a valid exercise of its
authority. As to whether such exercise was wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of
judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter between the elected policy makers and the
people. As to whether the nation should join the worldwide march toward trade liberalization
and economic globalization is a matter that our people should determine in electing their
policy makers. After all, the WTO Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be
the political desire of a member.
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M.
ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail
the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:
The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers
for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the
Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other
lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’
chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.
Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that
the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be
declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently
G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With
Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions
of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be
declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of
discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease
and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President
Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:
1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional
provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.
2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910, 116 relating to the Malampaya Funds,
and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social
Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:
1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the
areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions
of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of
powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1)
scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or
step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as
violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed
by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and,
in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional.
IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND
THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM
CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may
be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared
unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME
FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY,
THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE
SAME.
Francisco vs. House of Representatives
TOPIC: Political Question
GR 160261
10 November 2003

Facts: On 28 November 2001, the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings, superseding the previous
House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. On 22 July 2002, the House of
Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct
an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On 2 June 2003,
former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and
other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by House Representatives, and was referred
to the House Committee on Justice on 5 August 2003 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution. The House Committee on Justice ruled on 13 October 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," but voted to dismiss the same on 22 October
2003 for being insufficient in substance. The following day or on 23 October 2003, the second
impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by House
Representatives against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. The second
impeachment complaint was accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment"
signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives. Various petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus were filed with the Supreme Court against the
House of Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI
of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year."
Issue: Whether or not the petitions are plainly premature and have no basis in law or in fact,
adding that as of the time of filing of the petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it.
Held: The court’s power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the question of the
constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Davide is
concerned. The Court found the existence in full of all the requisite conditions for its exercise
of its constitutionally vested power and duty of the judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a provision of the
fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material
which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.

This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits
only the main issue of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief
Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did
not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable
issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Political questions are “those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by
the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government.” It is concerned
with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.

Citing Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional Commissioner: “…The

powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative,
the Executive, and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent
of the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine whether a given law is valid or
not is vested in courts of justice… courts of justice determine the limits of powers of the
agencies and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. The judiciary is the final
arbiter on the question whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but also a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature…” a duty which cannot be
abdicated by the mere specter of the political law doctrine.
The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in
the answer to the question of whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to
examine whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such
limits.

The Court held that it has no jurisdiction over the issue that goes into the merits of the second
impeachment complaint. More importantly, any discussion of this would require this Court to
make a determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a
purely political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the
legislation
[COMPREHENSIVE DIGEST] Belgica v. Executive Secretary
* FACTS: 
HISTORY
In the Philippines, the “pork barrel” (a term of American-English origin) has been commonly
referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature (“Congressional
Pork Barrel”). However, it has also come to refer to certain funds to the Executive. The
“Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works Act of 1922), the
Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos period, the Mindanao
Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund and later the Countrywide Development
Fund (CDF) under the Corazon Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF) under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the Gloria-Macapagal
Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III administrations.

SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE

2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of beneficiaries shall
conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each implementing agency:
PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to projects located in the 4th to 6th class
municipalities or indigents identified under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the
implementing agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within
ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.

All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and scholarships, identified by
a member of the House of Representatives outside of his/her legislative district shall have the
written concurrence of the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or
beneficiary legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by legislators shall be as

follows:

a. For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000)

for soft programs and projects listed under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of
Special Provision No. 1; and

b. For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft programs and projects
listed under Item A and One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects
listed under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1.

Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special Provisions on the
use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the foregoing amounts may be released in
the first semester and the remaining fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second
semester.

4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed once. The
Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local Government, Labor and
Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry are also authorized to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within
the allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following: (i) for infrastructure projects,
realignment is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original
project; (ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original project/scope of
work; and (iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM must be
informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days from approval thereof:
PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund shall be limited within the same
classification of soft or hard programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof:
PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of projects to
be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that the cash has not yet been
disbursed and the funds have been deposited back to the BTr.

Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall be submitted to
the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, for favorable
endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be.

5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents
prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be
released to the implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No. 1
and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.

PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL

The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the Malampaya Fund and
the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund was created as a special fund under Section
8, Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help intensify,
strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and
development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social
Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993 issued in 1985. The
Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and
administered by the Presidential Management Staff through which the President provides
direct assistance to priority programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is
sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR.
 

* ISSUES:
A. Procedural Issues
1.) Whether or not (WON) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and
justiciable controversy

2.) WON the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy subject to
judicial review

3.) WON petitioners have legal standing to sue

4.) WON the 1994 Decision of the Supreme Court (the Court) on Philippine Constitution
Association v. Enriquez  (Philconsa) and the 2012 Decision of the Court on  Lawyers Against
Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and Management (LAMP) bar the re-litigation of
the issue of constitutionality of the “pork barrel system” under the principles of res
judicata  and stare decisis
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
WON the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar to it are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on…

1.) …separation of powers

2.) …non-delegability of legislative power

3.) …checks and balances

4.) …accountability

5.) …political dynasties

6.) …local autonomy

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

WON the phrases:
(a) “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section
8 of PD 910 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and
(b) “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by
the Office of the President of the Philippines” under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD
1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund,
are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power

* HELD AND RATIO:

A. Procedural Issues
No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be
heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial
inquiry, namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the
validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very  lis mota of
the case.
1.) YES. There exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases. The
requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of
the parties on the constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System.” Also, the questions in these
consolidated cases are ripe for adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions
allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya
Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social Fund – are currently
existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners
as a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court dispelled the notion that the issues related thereto had been
rendered moot and academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes
moot when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose
can be served in passing upon the merits. The respondents’ proposed line-item budgeting
scheme would not terminate the controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its
resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget, and not the 2013
PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and
existing. Neither will the President’s declaration that he had already “abolished the PDAF”
render the issues on PDAF moot precisely because the Executive branch of government has
no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence.
Even on the assumption of mootness, nevertheless, jurisprudence dictates that “the ‘moot and
academic’ principle is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in
resolving a case.” The Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:
i.) There is a grave violation of the Constitution: This is clear from the fundamental posture of
petitioners – they essentially allege grave violations of the Constitution with respect to the
principles of separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, checks and
balances, accountability and local autonomy.
ii.) The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved: This is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved – the constitutionality
of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue
to be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well
as a matter of paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a
time when the system’s flaws have never before been magnified. To the Court’s mind, the
coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous whistle-blowers, and
the government’s own recognition that reforms are needed “to address the reported
abuses of the PDAF” demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the
importance of the matter.
It is also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners’ claims as not merely
theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of note is the weight accorded by the Court to the
findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated audit arm of the
government. if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable
controversy in these cases, the Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be
sufficient.
iii.) When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public: This is  applicable largely due to the practical need
for a definitive ruling on the system’s constitutionality. There is a compelling need to
formulate controlling principles relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious resolution of the anticipated disallowance
cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on how public funds
should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
iv.) The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. This is called for by the recognition
that the preparation and passage of the national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an
affair of annual occurrence. The myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain
public funds are spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition
and hence, must not evade judicial review.
2.) YES. The intrinsic constitutionality of the “Pork Barrel System” is not an issue dependent
upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the
system along constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are
incapable of rendering precisely because it is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly,
the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right to exercise judicial power
but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith (Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution).
3. YES. Petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases. Petitioners have come
before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert that
they “dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury.” As taxpayers, they possess
the requisite standing to question the validity of the existing “Pork Barrel System” under
which the taxes they pay have been and continue to be utilized. They are bound to suffer
from the unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers
have been allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or
that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that public funds are wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, as in these cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given
that the issues they have raised may be classified as matters “of transcendental importance,
of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.” The CoA
Chairperson’s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present controversy involves “not
[merely] a systems failure” but a “complete breakdown of controls” amplifies the seriousness
of the issues involved. Indeed, of greater import than the damage caused by the illegal
expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by the
enforcement of an invalid statute.
4.) NO. On the one hand, res judicata states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the
first and second actions, there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action. This required identity is not attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP involved
constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article respectively.
However, the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire “Pork Barrel
System”. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality –
and, thus, hardly a judgment on the merits. Thus, res judicata cannot apply.
On the other hand, the doctrine of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate where
the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward by the parties similarly
situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court. Absent any
powerful countervailing considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Philconsa was a
limited response to a separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of Congress. On the contrary,
the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between the
CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire “Pork Barrel
System” as well as (b) the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a
particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only those related to the area of
project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The complexity of
the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as
a powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis
principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent
constitutional inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare
decisis.  Since the Court now benefits from hindsight and current findings (such as the CoA
Report), it must partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the
post-enactment identification authority of Members of Congress on the guise that the same
was merely recommendatory.
Again, since LAMP  was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any
controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these
cases, stare decisis would not apply.
B. Substantive Issues on the “Congressional Pork Barrel”
1.) YES. At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment authority to
identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel
allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph
of Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013 PDAF
Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2 under the 2013 PDAF
Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in “the various
operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities” and the “regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation
of powers principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature
does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers any role in
the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court must therefore
abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also points out that respondents have failed to
substantiate their position that the identification authority of legislators is only of
recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions of law which
similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in
the implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that informal
practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into the proper phases of
budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
2.) YES. The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which, as settled
in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The power to appropriate must be exercised only through
legislation, pursuant to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and
Insular  Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law  a certain sum from the public revenue for (b)
a specified purpose. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal
lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. Since these two
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given
that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow.
3.) YES. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as a
collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided among individual
legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum allocations and could, after the GAA is
passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion. As
these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA
is passed and hence, outside of the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation
would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative identification
budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget within a budget” which subverts
the prescribed procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President’s power of
item veto. As petitioners aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a)
accepting the entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of
the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national agenda and (b) rejecting
the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article
would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum amount of P24.79 Billion would be
treated as a mere funding source allotted for multiple purposes of spending (i.e.
scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials,
construction of roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and,
therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the
President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays, “limit[ed] state
auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently
auditing the utilization of said Funds.” Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by
line budget or amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency.”

4.) YES. To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators,

who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate. Also, this very same concept of post-
enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that: “…[A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in
any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to intervene in the various
phases of project implementation renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of
their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or
the individual legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in
office. Indeed, while the Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked
to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF for re-election purposes is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.

Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between
legislators and the Executive department, through the former’s post-enactment participation,
may affect the process of  impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics
and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As such, it is
an improper subject of judicial assessment.

5.) NO. Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not self-executing due to
the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In this respect, said provision does not, by
and of itself, provide a judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies
a guideline for legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no standing
law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court must defer
from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative
since it has not been properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to
propagate political dynasties.

6.) YES.  The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies the
avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa, 1994). The gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the
specific interests and peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a
district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a
district representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively
“underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that
even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even the Vice-President –
who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF
conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are
already legally mandated to “assist the corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of
economic and social development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions are essentially
geared towards managing local affairs, their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-
making authority except only when acting as a body.

C. Substantive Issues on the “Presidential Pork Barrel”

YES. Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard
to adequately determine the limits of the President’s authority with respect to the purpose
for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President
wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect,
allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” under the principle of ejusdem
generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be
restricted to – things akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned, is belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular and general class and
hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the general
phrase “for such other purposes” may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the
class it represents, namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes
under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting respondents’ own position that it is limited
only to “energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of
the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya Funds “to
finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the
government,” remains legally effective and subsisting.

Regarding  the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,

indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to [first,] finance the
priority infrastructure development projects and [second,] to finance the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the
Office of the President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the President to spend the
Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities. The first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law does not supply a
definition of “priority infrastructure development projects” and hence, leaves the President
without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of
“infrastructure” is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” must
be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies
independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. As they
are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains
legally effective and subsisting