692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Liang vs. People

*
G.R. No. 125865. January 28, 2000.

JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.

International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity; Courts; Due

Process; Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face a communication
from the Department of Foreign Affairs that a

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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particular person is covered by any immunity; Due process is a right of the

accused as much as it is of the prosecution.—Courts cannot blindly adhere
and take on its face the communication from the DFA that petitioner is
covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio
dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution, the
latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be noted that due process
is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged
utterances requires for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be
presented at the proper time. At any rate, it has been ruled that the mere
invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping
of the charges.
Same; Same; Same; Criminal Law; Slander; Slandering a person
could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement between the Asian
Development Bank and the Republic of the Philippines because our laws do
not allow the ccmmission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty.—Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission of a
crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The imputation of
theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It is well-settled
principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with
malice or in bad faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It
appears that even the government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor
General, does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary
investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC—
being purely a statutory right, it may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law.—On the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary investigation is not
a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC such as the one at bar.
Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be invoked
only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is
clear that no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the
7

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694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Liang vs. People

jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation

does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the
information or otherwise render it defective.

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 160.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles for
petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioner is an economist working with the Asian Development

Bank (ADB). Sometime in 1994, for allegedly uttering defamatory
words against fellow ADB worker Joyce Cabal, he was charged
before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Mandaluyong City
with two counts of grave oral defamation docketed as Criminal
Cases Nos. 53170 and 53171. Petitioner was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the MeTC. After fixing petitioner’s bail at
P2,400.00 per criminal charge, the MeTC released him to the
custody of the Security Officer of ADB. The next day, the MeTC
judge received an “office of protocol” from the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that petitioner is covered by immunity
from legal process under Section 45 of the Agreement between the
ADB and the Philippine Government regarding the Headquarters of
the ADB (hereinafter Agreement) in the country. Based on the said
protocol communication that petitioner is immune from suit, the
MeTC judge without notice to the prosecution dismissed the two
criminal cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration which
was opposed by the DFA. When its motion was denied, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City which set aside the MeTC
rulings and ordered the latter court to enforce the warrant of arrest it
earlier issued. After the motion for reconsideration was denied,
petitioner

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Liang vs. People

elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review arguing that
he is covered by immunity under the Agreement and that no
preliminary investigation was held before the criminal cases were
filed in court.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
First, courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the
communication from the DFA that petitioner is covered by any
immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is covered
by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in
courts. In receiving ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio
dismissing the two criminal cases without notice to the prosecution,
the latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be noted that
due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the
prosecution. The needed inquiry in what capacity petitioner was
acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires for its resolution
evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time.1 At
any rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity
2
clause does not ipso facto result in the dropping of the charges.
Second, under Section 45 of the Agreement which provides:

“Officers and staff of the Bank including for the purpose of this Article
experts and consultants performing missions for the Bank shall enjoy the
following privileges and immunities:
 immunity from legal process with respect to acts performed by
a.) them in their official capacity except when the Bank waives the
immunity.”

the immunity mentioned therein is not absolute, but subject to the

exception that the act was done in “official capacity.” It is therefore
necessary to determine if petitioner’s case falls within the ambit of
Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the
chance to rebut the DFA protocol

________________

1 See United States v. Guinto, 182 SCRA 644 (1990).

2 Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282 (1991).

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Liang vs. People

and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting

evidence, should it so desire.
Third, slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the
immunity agreement because our laws do not allow the commission 3
of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty. The
imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official
functions. It is well-settled principle of law that a public official may
be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice or4 in bad faith or
beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that
even the government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General,
does not support the stand taken by petitioner and that of the DFA.
Fourth, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a
diplomatic agent, assuming petitioner is such, enjoys immunity from
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state except in the case of an
action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised
by the diplomatic
5
agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions. As already mentioned above, the commission of a crime
is not part of official duty.
Finally, on the contention that there was no preliminary
investigation conducted, suffice it to say that preliminary
investigation is not a matter of 6 right in cases cognizable by the
MeTC such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right,
preliminary investigation
7
may be invoked only when specifically
granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that no
preliminary investigation is required in cases

_______________
 3 M.H. Wylie v. Rarang, 209 SCRA 357, 368 (1992).
4 Shauf v. CA, 191 SCRA 713 (1990); Ammos v. Phil. Veterans Affairs Office, 174
SCRA 214 (1989); Dumlao v. CA, 114 SCRA 247 (1982).
5 Section 31, 1 (c); See also Minucher v. CA, 214 SCRA 242 (1992).
6 See Del Rosario, Jr. v. Bartolome, 270 SCRA 645 (1997).
7 People v. Abejuela, 38 SCRA 324 (1971).

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Liang vs. People
8
falling within the jurisdiction of the MeTC. Besides, the absence of
preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction nor
does it impair
9
the validity of the information or otherwise render it
defective.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Notes.—In Public International Law, when a state or

international agency wishes to plead sovereign or diplomatic
immunity in a foreign court, it requests the Foreign Office of the
state where it is sued to convey to the court that said defendant is
entitled to immunity. In the United States, the procedure followed is
the process of “suggestion,” where the foreign state or the
international organization sued in an American court requests the
Secretary of State to make a determination as to whether it is entitled
to immunity. If the Secretary of State finds that the defendant is
immune from suit, he, in turn, asks the Attorney General to submit
to the court a “suggestion” that the defendant is entitled to immunity.
In the Philippines, the practice is for the foreign government or the
international organization to first secure an executive endorsement
of its claim of sovereign or diplomatic immunity. But how the
Philippine Foreign Office conveys its endorsement to the courts
varies. (Holy See, The vs. Rosario, Jr., 238 SCRA 524 [1994])
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the

________________

8 Section 1, Rule 112, Rules of Criminal Procedure.

9 People v. Gomez, 117 SCRA 72 (1982); People v. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961).
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Liang vs. People

government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is

recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the government
as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the
claim of immunity upon appropriate suggestion by the principal law
officer of the government, the Solicitor General or other officer
acting under his direction. (Lasco vs. United Nations Revolving
Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681 [1995])

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