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Roald Amundsens Turning Points and Tumbl
Roald Amundsens Turning Points and Tumbl
in Times of Crisis
Abstract
We identify four key rhetorical features which are salient to contemporary leaders,
especially where risk-taking and pioneering are prerequisites for a successful
outcome: dramatic ‘identity stories,’ symbolic turning points, commitment to freedom of
choice and consensus, and competitive ‘counterstories.’ We believe this narrative
approach to the study of the drama of organizational life offers a meaningful
glimpse into the mind of a great leader in times of crisis. Upon review, we
discover the full range of challenges we all face, when we odyssey bravely into
uncharted territories.
Key Words
Crisis
Dramatic
Leadership
Rhetoric
Turning Points
Introduction
Great leaders and explorers are emulated when they suit us, and overlooked
when they do not. Fifty to 100 years ago, characterized by world war and
national sacrifice, Englishman Robert Falcon Scott seemed to fit the bill. More
recently, fellow countryman and Antarctic explorer Ernest Shackleton’s
achievements—putting the highest premium on loyalty and survival—resonate
more powerfully than ever before. But the explorer who actually won the race
to the South Pole in 1911, Norwegian Roald Amundsen, has yet to capture
similar prominence and recognition in the academic and popular literature on
organizational leadership.
3
The story of The Last Place on Earth1 is about the great race between British and
Norwegian Antarctic expeditions in 1911-19122—under the rival commands of
polar explorers Robert Falcon Scott and Roald Amundsen—to be first to the
South Pole. Amundsen’s innovations in physical and confluent cognitive-
emotional adaptations, teamwork, and rhetoric, are exemplars of leadership
worthy of further exploration and revival.
The rhetoric of leadership in times of crisis must create identification for, and
with, a worthy goal of achievement. The protagonist in this ‘identity story’
invariably announces his or her goal as something new and different—but at
the same time embodying values and themes from a more stable, less turbulent
past. The leader should also make the case that undertaking so noble a task
will not be easy. It will be a competitive struggle for high stakes; not
determined by any one individual, but decided by free will and a commitment
to teamwork. All who risk their lives in the cause are to have a discretionary
voice in matters of importance to the entire team. “We are all captains,”
Amundsen had posted on the saloon wall of his ship the Fram, “we are all
crew.”
Everyone can relate to crisis. The word itself denotes a turning point, from
Greek, krisis ‘decision.’ The general sense of a ‘decisive point,’ in English, dates
back to the early 17th century. Dramatic crises often produce lessons of
fortitude and renewal that captures our attention and concern. These are the
“three uses of the knife,” American dramatist David Mamet writes about, the
decisive turning points at each turn of a three-act play. Most of us gain
reassurance and resolve from hearing tales about how crisis and failure do not
condemn one to failure, but offer hope. As we shall see in the case of Roald
Amundsen, it’s the getting up again that counts.
Leaders who inspire success bore from difficult circumstances often use
identity stories to bring about dramatic change. We all have heroes to look up
to in this regard. For example, business leaders might point to Arthur
Martinez’s rescue of Sears from oblivion. Sony’s Akio Morita and Apple’s
Steve Jobs each made excellent use of their mistakes and learned from them
how to turnaround their company’s fortunes. For this inquiry, we direct our
attention to the profound, and too often neglected, story of the first persons to
the ends of the Earth. However long ago and far away these events may appear
at first, we find in the rhetoric of Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen—the
focus of our study throughout the remainder of this essay—a compelling
narrative perspective lacking in the routine filing of business reports and self-
congratulatory memoires of a current crop of politicians, bankers, and media
celebrities.
Although we distinguish each of these features for the sake of analysis, in terms
of rhetorical action, they occur confluently as a synergy of affects. (1)
Dramatically structured “identity stories” (Gardner, 1995), are those that embody
shared values, mutual goals, and values followers can relate to and identify
with; (2) Symbolically presented turning points, are stories and communications
embodied in celebratory rituals, themes, and symbols (e.g. emblems of courage
and endurance in the face of adversity); (3) Commitment to freedom of choice and
consensus in making important decisions affecting the entire team; and (4)
Competitive “counterstories” (Gardner, 1995), used to compete with rival identity
stories—each vying for the attention and commitment of followers.
5
One of the rhetorical lessons Amundsen learned from previous explorers such
as countryman Dr. Fridtjof Nansen was how to dress geographical exploration
in the cloak of its immense value to science. These core values, goals, and
attitudes inherent in scientific exploration were crucial to promoting the
Norwegian expedition. Science sells—then—as now. In the newspaper
Aftenposten, a leading exponent of the new popular journalism of its time,
Amundsen outlined his first plot:
Great leaders are prodigious storytellers who take a story that has been latent,
but muted or neglected in the culture, and bring a new twist to that identity
story for a new audience of followers. Leaders revive stories and reactivate
themes from one place and past, on to another stage from which to build new
ventures.
Rumors of Glory
In the meantime, while Roald Amundsen was hard at work on his preparations
for his North Polar journey, in Christiana (later renamed Oslo), his brother
and business manager, Leon relayed the news that American Dr. Frederick
Cook had claimed to reach the geographic North Pole in 1908. Another
American explorer, Robert Peary, disputed Cook’s contention. Peary claimed
to have been first to plant the Stars and Stripes of the United States at the
North Pole in 1909. Actually, there remain strong doubts that either explorer
accomplished this feat.4 Regardless, after hearing of Cook’s contention,
Amundsen decided to postpone his secret plans for the North. To get finance,
he inferred, you needed a coup. Few are ever convinced by a boring story—
however well reasoned the logic of it.
Fearing his benefactors would withdraw their support for another Arctic
journey—now that the North Pole had apparently fallen—Amundsen secretly
decided to solve the problem of the South Pole, before venturing north again.
Although Amundsen remained publicly committed to further exploration of the
North Polar Basin, he privately revealed to his brother Leon, his secret plan to
take the South Pole along the way.
7
After Peary claimed to have reached the North Pole on April 6th 1909, one year
after Frederick Cook, Amundsen was asked for his opinion of this feat in an
interview with the New York Times. Here he suggested that:
This begs the question: what’s been left undone? Here we see the embodiment
of a competitive counterstory in Amundsen’s rhetoric. He is, in effect, dramatically
setting the stage. To Roald Amundsen, whether or not either Frederick Cook
or Robert Peary actually reached 90 degrees of latitude in the North was
irrelevant. It was the claim itself that counted. What was there left to claim?
With the question of the North Pole settled in the public consciousness—if
Amundsen were to succeed in rousing interest for his own enterprise—nothing
remained for him as an explorer other then to solve the mystery of the “last
place on Earth.” That he looked once again for new worlds to conquer was
entirely in keeping with the explorer’s character. So too, was his cunning as an
expeditionary competitor.
Volte-Face
Robert Falcon Scott, relieved by Ernest Shackleton’s misfortune5—soon after
announced his plan to retrace Shackleton’s march from McMurdo Sound, up
through the Beardmore Glacier, and on to the Polar Plateau—thus completing
the last 100 miles to the South Pole. Unbeknownst to Scott, Amundsen had
decided to blaze a completely new trail from the Bay of Whales through the
unexplored terrain 400 miles to the east of the British base in McMurdo Sound.
No one had ever attempted a landing on the dangerous Ross Ice Barrier in the
Bay of Whales before. Amundsen would be the first.
Officially setting out as if to make his way to the North Polar Basin via Cape
Horn around the southern tip of Argentina,6 the Norwegian expedition left
Christiana on June 3rd, 1910. On board Fram, Amundsen gave the order to
pull anchor and set sail. However, he had yet to tell his crew the truth about
their itinerary. He waited until the ship was “beyond recall” before making the
announcement. There were sound reasons for Amundsen’s having kept secret.
For one thing, he was still heavily in debt from his trip through the North West
Passage and knew if there were to be any chance of repaying his debtors, a
spectacular triumph would be needed.
8
Once the news had gotten through that the North Pole had fallen to Cook, then
Peary, promises were taken back and contracts torn up. Had Amundsen
sought to finance the expedition North himself, it would have meant
bankruptcy and effectively ended his career as an explorer. And if the
Norwegian government had gotten wind of his aim to take the South Pole
instead of the North, they may have repossessed the ship, since the money
given for one purpose had been used for another.
On the morning of September 6th 1910, Fram arrived near the Island at
Madeira (off the coast of Casablanca), and anchored in Funchal Roads for
repairs. Safeguards were finally completed on September 9th. It was then that
Amundsen sprang his surprise and finally told his crew the expedition’s true
aim. All hands were called on deck. Amundsen had a map of the Antarctic
unfurled and hung on the mainmast as he spoke to the crew. Fortunately, Lt.
Frederick Gjertsen had the presence of mind to put down Amundsen’s exact
words as the great secret was disclosed.
There are many things on board which you have regarded with
mistrustful or astonished eyes, for example the observation house and all
the dogs…what I will say is this—it is my intention to sail Southwards,
land a party on the Southern continent, and try to reach the South Pole
(Huntford, 1979: 286).
At first there was a hush, broken only by the sound of the creaking Fram
pulling on her anchor chain. Most of the men stood stunned. Oscar Wisting,
who was one of the crew with Amundsen on the North West Passage, later
wrote of the occasion: “[Amundsen] used ‘we’ and ‘ours’ … it was not his
expedition but ours; we were all companions and all had the same common
goal.” In the end, the entire crew agreed to go. Writing in the third person,
Amundsen entered these notes in his journals: “With men like these I don’t
think Amundsen will deserve any credit for reaching the Pole. He ought to be
thrashed if he doesn’t” (Amundsen, 1912).
This is the symbolic turning point of the first act. Instead of going north, as
planned, Amundsen turned in the opposite direction—to take a prize he and the
crew of the Fram might then leverage to support their northern journey as well.
Despite the straightforwardness of his message, this was a moment of crisis for
the Norwegian captain. In short concise sentences—straight to the point—
Amundsen explained how he had deceived them and why, using roughly the
same argument he had in his letter to Dr. Nansen. He spoke prosaically,
underplaying the emotion. He denied this was so much a change in plan as
merely an extended detour.
9
On board Fram, Amundsen continued to explain to his crew that their success
in the South would be a question of more than simply beating the British to the
finishing post. The winners were not necessarily those who won the race, he
said, but those who got the headlines first. Another counterstory. Everyone
knew that the Norwegians were better skiers than the Englishmen, he told
them.
Illustrating his points on the map like some professor at the blackboard,
Amundsen candidly revealed his plan for winning the race to the South Pole
and for coming out alive with the news. Reminiscent of Shakespeare’s Henry
V’s speech at the battle of Agincourt, he ended by saying that anyone who
wanted to could leave with passage paid home. The choice was theirs. Then
came the stone cold moment when each individual was asked, one by one, if he
would agree to this new plan. Members of the crew had precisely defined roles
to play, he told them, before giving them one hour in which to write their
letters.
For The Last Place on Earth film adaptation of Roland Huntford’s historical
biography of Scott and Amundsen, director Ferdinand Fairfax and
screenwriter Trevor Griffith relied heavily on the journal entries of several of
the men who stood on deck that day, as well as details from a letter Amundsen
had sent to Fridtjof Nansen. In it, Amundsen explains how, once the news that
the North Pole had fallen; he was forced to revise his goals. Rather than giving
up his Northern ambitions, Amundsen recognized that he had to rouse public
interest in a “Race to the South Pole,” if he were to realize his overall aims. In
closing he said:
The use of counterstory declares, ‘We are who we are, not them.’ And the notion
that ‘the prize will be ours, not theirs’ punctuates the competitive spirit assigned
to this dramatic turning point. The Norwegian newspapers were gracious in
allowing Amundsen to speak directly to the public at large:
Fram sets her course South for the Antarctic Regions to take part in the
fight for the South Pole. At first glance this will appear to many to be a
change in the original plan…however…[It] is only an extension of the
Expedition’s plan; not an alteration. Alone I have taken this decision;
alone I bear the responsibility (Huntford, 1979: 305).
Not many words were needed before everyone could see where the
wind lay…I briefly explained the extended plan, as well as my reasons
for keeping it secret until this time. Now and again I had to glance at
their faces. At first, as might be expected, they showed the most
unmistakable signs of surprise; but this expression swiftly changed, and
before I had finished they were all bright with smiles. I was now sure of
the answer I should get when I finally asked each man whether he was
willing to go on, and as the names were called, every single man had his
“Yes” ready (Amundsen, 1912: I: 129-130).
The commitment to freedom of choice and consensus appears with a question. “Who is
coming?” Amundsen asked. And all responded. Amundsen knew to address
each individual’s sense of identity in the group—as well as help each of the
crew to frame future options for themselves. Not only is all action dressed in
rhetoric but according to Harvard Business School professors Robert Eccles
and Nitin Nohira, rhetoric itself is a kind of organizational action. In their
view, leaders use words to frame a particular picture of the world—allowing for
the situation and identities of the participants (Eccles & Nohira, 1992: 43).
This model of leadership makes out that the primary motivation of each person
11
in the organization is to discover and establish one’s own unique identity in the
undertaking.
Amundsen could see that the men were suspicious—so he came clean—and let
them know clearly what was happening now, as well as what was likely to
happen in future. Emphasizing what their personal options were allowed the
crew to focus on how to help the expedition, rather than obsess over any
lingering doubts or concerns. Finally, in keeping step toward a common aim,
the crew of the Fram set sail for a landing on the southern continent of
Antarctica.
The sun had disappeared and the dark southern winter set in; Amundsen
wanted to celebrate the equinox in style. Demonstrating a positive attitude in
the face of the crisis and turning points inspires faith, so Roald Amundsen was
careful on such occasions as the mid-winter break in Antarctica—at the
Norwegian base camp ‘Framheim,’ in the Bay of Whales—to dramatize small
victories and celebrate them as ritual events. Such optimism creates energy and
allows us to mark our progress each step of the way.
In the film version of The Last Place on Earth, the character of Adolph
Lindstrom, the expedition cook and Amundsen’s closest confidant on the trip, is
depicted having prepared a white-glazed cake in the form of the Ross Ice
Barrier and Polar Plateau. The cake provides a vivid symbolic image of their
journey up the Transantarctic glaciers, and on to the Pole. Amundsen used the
occasion to create a vision of what was possible for them all to achieve.
Amundsen was also careful to insert the counterstory of their British rivals into
the mix—reminding his men that they were in a competitive race, and should
take nothing for granted.
risks. “Besides,” he reminds them again, “there’s no use in taking the Pole if we
can’t get the word out” (Griffith, 1985).
Amundsen was worried too that there was a crisis of command stirring in his
own camp. Veteran Arctic explorer, Hjalmar Johansen’s dormant challenge to
Amundsen’s experience and credibility was a troubling and constant concern.
Johansen considered himself a more experienced Polar traveler. He made this
plain by correcting and even contradicting his Captain’s authority—which
Amundsen saw as a deliberate affront to his leadership. There appeared to be a
crisis brewing between these two seasoned men, which would before long
explode at the turning point of the second act.
At Framheim, the Norwegians were camped for one year prior to the final
assault on the Pole. They made their preparations in the warmest seasons—
laying out depots of provisions along the hundreds of miles of Ice Barrier—
knowing full well the weight they would have to bear on the long haul to the
Pole and back next summer. Everyone in the expedition had vital primary, as
well as secondary-supportive, roles to play in establishing a team environment.
Amundsen thought this alignment of expertise would permit the group to
function as a “little Republic,” instead of having individual specialists
occasionally working at cross-purposes.
Amundsen’s concerns over the dangers of being beaten to the post by the
British were often expressed in the form of comparisons with their competitors.
For example, on July 11th 1910, Amundsen entered in his diary:
The English have loudly and openly told the world that skis and dogs
are unusable in these regions and that fur clothes are rubbish…but
when people decide to attack the methods which have brought the
Norwegians into the leader class as polar explorers…one must be
allowed…to show the world that it is not only luck that brought us
through with the help of such means, but calculation and understanding
of how to use them (Huntford, 1979: 375).
False Start
By the end of August, just a week to the start of the final Polar assault, the
temperature sunk to below 55 degrees of frost (Celsius). On Friday,
September 8th 1911, the Norwegians left their base at Framheim heading south.
Then the cold weather counter-attacked. By Monday, less than 40 miles out on
the Barrier, the thermometer sank to minus 60 degrees. The winds were
gusting to 90 mph and the men had to build Inuit-style igloos to wait out the
storm. The next day the liquid in the compasses froze solid. Amundsen put the
decision to his men and, using consensus to reach all decisions on key matters,
was persuaded by the moral authority of his comrades to retreat.
Later that evening, Amundsen called the men one at a time into the kitchen
where, under pledge of secrecy, he got a declaration of loyalty and a
commitment to accept his judgment come what may. In his diary, Amundsen
defended his actions by reminding himself that, despite the fiasco of their false
start on the Ice Barrier, the Norwegians had gotten their food and fuel supplies
up to their depot at 80 degrees latitude. Although the false start had set them
back by three weeks, the Norwegian team actually profited by the delay.
The retreat had exposed certain weaknesses in their equipment and these were
subsequently corrected during their second layover at Framheim. In fact, these
14
Once the Norwegians were up through the mountain climb and on to the
unbroken plane of the Antarctic Ice Cap, a whiteout enveloped the forerunners
in thick fog and snowfall. Amundsen dismissed this difficulty with the remark,
“Traveled completely blind…nonetheless we have done our daily 20 miles past
the 88th parallel.” The Norwegians did not lay the usual depot, but wanted to
first break Ernest Shackleton’s record and get within 97 miles of the Pole. On
December 8th Amundsen, who was leading, turned to hear a hearty cheer from
his men. There was no gloating over a fallen rival. Amundsen’s admiration for
Shackleton’s bravery was illimitable. However, as he came to the end of the
race that had begun 16,000 miles behind on the fjord outside his home, the
sensation he felt was now “bittersweet.” In his diary, Amundsen wrote:
We did not pass that spot without according our highest tribute of
admiration to the man, who—together with his gallant companions—
had planted his country’s flag so infinitely nearer to the goal than any of
his precursors. Sir Ernest Shackleton’s name will always be written in
the annals of Antarctic exploration in letters of fire (Amundsen, 1912:
II: 114).
Accordingly, innovative leaders take a story that has been latent in the
audience, and bring a new twist to those themes that have already existed, but
had been neglected over time. Leaders tell stories about themselves, the groups
to which they belong, where they were coming from, where they were headed,
and about what was to be struggled against and dreamed about (Gardner,
1995: 14). The way to get change in an organization is the same way you get
growth in an individual—by having a new kind of narrative that serves to focus
and crystallize meanings for all involved.
On December 15th 1911, Helmar Hanssen, who was as usual leading with his
non-magnetic sledge and compass, called back for Amundsen to go up into the
lead, with an estimated eight miles to go to the Pole. Hanssen had no wish to
be first to the Pole. That honor belonged to the leader of the expedition. “I can
hear the axle creaking,” remarked an excited Olav Bjaaland. At three o’clock
p.m. the men cried, “Halt!” and they all shook hands.
Each man took part in the act of planting the Norwegian flag. “It was not,”
said Amundsen, “the privilege of one man, it was the privilege of all those who
risked their lives…Thus we plant thee, beloved Flag, at the South Pole, and
give the plain on which it lies the name King Haakon VII’s Plateau.” Later he
reflected:
I had decided that we would all take part in the historic event; the act
itself of planting the flag…It was the only way I could show my
companions my gratitude here at this desolate and forlorn place…Five
roughened, frostbitten fists it was that gripped the post, lifted the
fluttering flag on high and planted it together as the very first at the
Geographic South Pole. [One] soon gets out of the habit of protracted
ceremonies in those regions (Amundsen, 1912: II: 122).
This is the ultimate turning point in this identity story. Standing at the geographic
South Pole all directions face north. The north is on every horizon. The sun
appears to revolve directly overhead and never sets. And here the image of five
roughened, frostbitten fists planting the flag together reinforces the symbolic
significance of the event. Yet, no sooner had the ceremony ended; Amundsen
quickly reminded everyone of the counterstory, “Comrades, this is a cold place.
And we have much work to do before we rest” (Griffith, 1985). Then they set
about making camp.
After a few hours sleep, the men put about making certain of the Pole. When
the position was fixed, they set out to “box” the Pole and make absolutely
certain of their contention. All four navigators—all but ski champion Olav
Bjaaland—countersigned each other’s navigation books. This was by
implication a rebuke to Cook and Peary, who had only themselves to prove
16
their prior claims to the North Pole. The Norwegians left a tent, some
discarded equipment, letters for Norwegian King Haakon, and one addressed
to Robert Falcon Scott who, as Amundsen remarked, “I must assume will be
first to visit the place after us,” asking him to forward his letter for his Majesty.
Amundsen could not know that the British were still struggling over 300 miles
and more than a month behind.
The goal was reached, the journey ended. I cannot say—though I know
it would sound much more effective—that the object of my life was
attained. I had better be honest and admit straight out that I have never
known any man to be placed in such a diametrically opposite position to
the goal of his desires as I was at that moment. The regions around the
North Pole—well, yes, the North Pole itself—had attracted me from
childhood, and here I was at the South Pole. Can anything more topsy-
turvy be imagined? (Amundsen, 1912: II: 121).
The rhetoric of leadership requires that leaders continually point the way ahead
to the next horizon. And as each new horizon appears, the goal itself continues
to tumble away from view. The Norwegians had arrived at the South Pole
healthy and in good spirits. They had extra fuel and plenty of food for men and
dogs left over. They could not know the comparatively dire circumstances
faced by their British rivals in this regard. Scott and his men were more than a
month behind the Norwegians. When asked what they should do with the
17
surplus food and fuel, Amundsen decided to take it with them, reasoning that
they might still need it to get back.
Speaking from the mathematical end of the Earth, Amundsen voiced another
reminder to his men—that they hadn’t won the race until they’d gotten back
first with the news. The challenge of each leadership identity story remains in
perpetual motion, with each counterstory, in a never-ending fluidity of
challenge and response. For example, in the screenplay dialogue at the Pole
includes the following statement by Amundsen:
For those who think we have already won, let me say this: the British
will be here, perhaps soon. They don’t give up easily. And, if we should
make the mistake of letting them reach the telegraph first, the issue of
priority might become quite confused. And…. we still have business at
the other end of the earth, remember? We are a long way from home.
Shall we go? (Griffith, 1985).
It was on the return route through the Transantarctic Mountains that the final
act begins. The Norwegians knew where they were headed, but not where they
were exactly. This was a serious state of affairs, because their next depot lay at
the edge of Devil’s Glacier. The terrain they referred to as “the devil’s
ballroom,” was broken by tumbling ice falls that cut off a proper view of their
surroundings. The Norwegians were quite lost and, rather than thrash about
for a depot of dog carcasses they might not find, the men agreed by consensus
to head straight for the Ice Barrier as quickly as they could. They had food and
fuel enough in reserve for the men, but were drastically short of food for their
dogs. Then somebody recognized the ridge; the team got their bearings,
reached the depot, and loaded their sledge for home.
18
Now, with the wind at their backs, the Barrier became a racecourse. With
lighter loads the Norwegians quickened their pace and arrived at Framheim two
weeks earlier than expected, after a total journey of 1860 miles in just 99 days.
Amundsen’s men now grasped the value of his planning and foresight. On
Friday, January 26th 1912, the men and dogs careered down across the ice of
the Bay of Whales to Framheim, ‘the home of the Fram.’
On January 30th the Norwegians shut the door to their hut for the very last
time and put to sea. On March 7th the Tasmanian coast was finally raised and
Fram anchored in Hobart. A little knot of spectators had gathered on the
waterfront, and Amundsen went ashore alone to the telegraph. “Treated as a
tramp,” the explorer noted in his diary. Amundsen and his crew had arrived in
Tasmania and announced to the world that they had reached the South Pole,
and returned safely from the journey. In actual fact, the Norwegians were
fitter and stronger than they had been when they first stepped on to the
Southern continent. And thus ended the last classic journey of terrestrial
discovery—before the extraterrestrial journeys to the Moon.
Thirty-four days after the Norwegians cantered up to the Pole with their dogs,
the British team discovered the Norwegian flags and dog tracks. By this time
(January 17, 1912), Scott and his companions were suffering from both
physical and mental distress. Lt. Lawrence Oates’ feet had turned gangrenous
from frostbite, and the British were almost certainly in the throes of scurvy-
driven madness and fatigue. Petty Officer Edgar Evans died on February 16th
and Lt. Oates committed suicide on March 21st.
Of the three men remaining, Captain Robert Falcon Scott, Dr. Edward Wilson,
and Lt. Henry Bowers, came to within 11 miles of One Ton Depot. With their
supplies almost completely gone and their camp buried in a fierce blizzard, they
lay in their tent for nine days until the last of their food and fuel gave out on
March 30, 1912. They had carried 30 pounds of scientific rock samples with
19
them from their discoveries. The same amount of seal meat might have saved
them from disaster.
The many uses of dramatic history and the rhetoric of leadership are not only
subjects of interest to historians and philosophers—they concern us all.
Turning point identity stories are relevant at the cutting edge of exploration in
any business, government, industry, or institution. This is the reason why we
study the rhetoric of leadership—so we might reexamine our habits of mind
and reevaluate our primary assumptions about the nature of human enterprise
in all its forms.
All leadership involves the dramatic use of rhetoric to carry the weight of
meaning beyond the words themselves. Every organization has its own
narrative patterns for understanding dramatic action. We believe it is
important that leaders and followers adopt a rhetorical stance to get things
done in organizations. We begin our approach by appreciating the immense—
yet mysteriously invisible—power that dramatically structured forms of identity
stories and counterstories can have in shaping our lives and institutions.
Notes
1
The title of the book, The Last Place on Earth, by biographer Roland Huntford (and
film by director Ferdinand Fairfax), was named for the fact that in 1911, the South
Pole was the last geographical place on Earth to be discovered.
2
Amundsen and his team reached the South Pole on December 15th 1911, and
returned safely. Scott and his team reached the Pole a month later, on January 17th,
1912, but perished on their return. The last of the British cohort died in their tent just
11 miles short of “One Ton” depot of food and fuel which, if it had been placed where
it was originally intended, would have approximated the point at which they starved to
death in a blizzard, still hundreds of miles from their base camp in McMurdo Sound.
3The terms ‘identity story’ and ‘counterstory’ were introduced by Harvard professor,
Howard Gardner, and explained in detail in his book, Leading Minds, 1995.
4 Both Frederick Cook and Robert Peary’s timetables raise serious doubts about
either claim. Furthermore, even American Admiral Richard Byrd’s claim to have
reached the North Pole by aircraft on May 9, 1926 has its detractors. According to
newly uncovered records from his flight discovered in the mid-1980s, an oil leak in one
of his engines forced Byrd to turn back 150 miles short of his target. Thus, the true
record once again goes to Roald Amundsen, who floated over the North Pole in the
airship Norge three days after Byrd’s failed attempt. Roald Amundsen—first person to
both Poles.
6 The Panama Canal was not yet open one hundred years ago, and so the route to the
North Pole or the South, meant going round South America first. If one were to
attempt going north to the Pole from Europe, the ice pack and Arctic currents would
carry you away from your target, not towards it.
21
References
Amundsen, R. (1912) First published and translated from the Norwegian by A.G.
Chater. The South Pole. London: John Murray; New York: New York University
Press, 2001.
Eccles, R. and Nohira, N. (1992) Beyond the Hype: Rediscovering the Essence of Management.
Cambridge: Harvard Business School Press.
Griffith, T. (1995) The Last Place on Earth (Motion Picture Screenplay). London:
Renegade Productions.
Huntford, R. (1979) The Last Place on Earth. New York: The Modern Library.