COMELEC v. CRUZ G.R No. 186616.

November 20, 2009

FACTS
We resolve in this Decision the constitutional challenge, originally filed before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, Branch 128 (RTC), against the following highlighted portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 (entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991"):
Sec. 2. Term of Office. – The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after
the effectivity of this Act shall be three (3) years.
No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position: Provided, however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.
The RTC granted the petition and declared the challenged proviso constitutionally infirm. The present
petition, filed by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), seeks a review of the RTC decision.
ISSUES
1. retroactive application of RA 7160
2. no involvement of any constitutional standard
3. equal protection clause
4. one subject one title
HELD
1. Our first point of disagreement with the respondents and with the RTC is on their position that a
retroactive application of the term limitation was made under RA No. 9164. Our own reading shows
that no retroactive application was made because the three-term limit has been there all along as early
as the second barangay law (RA No. 6679) after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was continued
under the LGC and can still be found in the current law. We find this obvious from a reading of the
historical development of the law.
The first law that provided a term limitation for barangay officials was RA No. 6653 (1988); it
imposed a two-consecutive term limit. After only six months, Congress, under RA No. 6679 (1988),
changed the two-term limit by providing for a three-consecutive term limit. This consistent imposition
of the term limit gives no hint of any equivocation in the congressional intent to provide a term
limitation. Thereafter, RA No. 7160 – the LGC – followed, bringing with it the issue of whether it
provided, as originally worded, for a three-term limit for barangay officials. We differ with the RTC
analysis of this issue.
These Title II provisions are intended to apply to all local elective officials, unless the contrary is
clearly provided. A contrary application is provided with respect to the length of the term of office
under Section 43(a); while it applies to all local elective officials, it does not apply to barangay
officials whose length of term is specifically provided by Section 43(c). In contrast to this clear case of
an exception to a general rule, the three-term limit under Section 43(b) does not contain any exception;
it applies to all local elective officials who must perforce include barangay officials.
An alternative perspective is to view Sec. 43(a), (b) and (c) separately from one another as
independently standing and self-contained provisions, except to the extent that they expressly relate to
one another. Thus, Sec. 43(a) relates to the term of local elective officials, except barangay officials
whose term of office is separately provided under Sec. 43(c). Sec. 43(b), by its express terms, relates to
all local elective officials without any exception. Thus, the term limitation applies to all local elective
officials without any exclusion or qualification.
Either perspective, both of which speak of the same resulting interpretation, is the correct legal import
of Section 43 in the context in which it is found in Title II of the LGC.1avvphi1
To be sure, it may be argued, as the respondents and the RTC did, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section
43 are the general law for elective officials (other than barangay officials); and paragraph (c) is the
specific law on barangay officials, such that the silence of paragraph (c) on term limitation for
barangay officials indicates the legislative intent to exclude barangay officials from the application of
the three-term limit. This reading, however, is flawed for two reasons.
First, reading Section 43(a) and (b) together to the exclusion of Section 43(c), is not justified by the
plain texts of these provisions. Section 43(a) plainly refers to local elective officials, except elective
barangay officials. In comparison, Section 43(b) refers to all local elective officials without exclusions
or exceptions. Their respective coverages therefore vary so that one cannot be said to be of the same
kind as the other. Their separate topics additionally strengthen their distinction; Section 43(a) refers to
the term of office while Section 43(b) refers to the three-term limit. These differences alone indicate
that Sections 43(a) and (b) cannot be read together as one organic whole in the way the RTC suggested.
Significantly, these same distinctions apply between Sec. 43(b) and (c).
Second, the RTC interpretation is flawed because of its total disregard of the historical background of
Section 43(c) – a backdrop that we painstakingly outlined above.
All these inevitably lead to the conclusion that the challenged proviso has been there all along and does
not simply retroact the application of the three-term limit to the barangay elections of 1994.
2. A public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a "[P]ublic office is a
public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an expectancy
of holding a public office
we find no merit in the respondents’ retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not
provide for the retroactive application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA
No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before; and (2) the constitutional challenge based on
retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.
3.The law can treat barangay officials differently from other local elective officials because the
Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials with respect to
length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that
while the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it
left the length of term and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for
determination by Congress through legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize
substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the Constitution itself allows a non-uniform
treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
we find no merit in the respondents’ retroactivity arguments because: (1) the challenged proviso did not
provide for the retroactive application to barangay officials of the three-term limit; Section 43(b) of RA
No. 9164 simply continued what had been there before; and (2) the constitutional challenge based on
retroactivity was not anchored on a constitutional standard but on a mere statutory norm.
4. First, the title of RA No. 9164, "An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataang Elections, amending Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991," states the law’s general subject matter – the amendment of the LGC to
synchronize the barangay and SK elections and for other purposes. To achieve synchronization of the
barangay and SK elections, the reconciliation of the varying lengths of the terms of office of barangay
officials and SK officials is necessary. Closely related with length of term is term limitation which
defines the total number of terms for which a barangay official may run for and hold office. This
natural linkage demonstrates that term limitation is not foreign to the general subject expressed in the
title of the law.
Second, the congressional debates we cited above show that the legislators and the public they
represent were fully informed of the purposes, nature and scope of the law’s provisions. Term limitation
therefore received the notice, consideration, and action from both the legislators and the public.
Finally, to require the inclusion of term limitation in the title of RA No. 9164 is to make the title an
index of all the subject matters dealt with by law; this is not what the constitutional requirement
contemplates.
We find, under these settled parameters, that the challenged proviso does not violate the one subject-
one title rule

BANAT v. COMELEC. G.R No. 179271. July 8, 2009

FACTS
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC
counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.6
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives
Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its
petition because "[t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in
the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that
is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." 7 There were no intervenors in
BANAT’s petition before the NBC. BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections, namely:
Buhay Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC),
Gabriela’s Women Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives (APEC), A
Teacher, Akbayan! Citizen’s Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers Party (BUTIL),
Cooperative-Natco Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural Concerns (ARC),
and Abono.
Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC, acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-72, which declared the additional seats allocated to the appropriate parties.
Acting on BANAT’s petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007,
which reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)],
ISSUES
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections?
RULING
The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation — the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including
those elected under the party list;
 Second, the two percent threshold — only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are "qualified" to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit — each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one "qualifying" and two additional
seats;
Fourth, proportional representation— the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed "in proportion to their total number of votes."19
However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term
"proportional representation," this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of
additional seats to party-list organizations
1. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section
11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it
mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the
number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in
the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives.
2. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may
occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
3. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the
additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent
threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution and prevents the attainment of "the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or
group interests in the House of Representatives."
4.In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional
seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat
allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed
seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining
available seats corresponds to a party’s share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one
party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We
distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the
three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.
5. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the
reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups.33 In defining a "party" that participates in
party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended
that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections.