IV.

PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION

Law Construed as a Whole

a. Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 196271, 196305, 197221, 197280, 197282, 197392 &
197454 (Resolution), 28 February 2012, 683 PHIL 198-238

FACTS: We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu Michael Abas Kida, et
al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R.
No. 197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Basari
Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo
Macalintal in G.R. No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Almarim Centi
Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280;
(f) the manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et al. in G.R. No. 197280;
and (g) the very urgent motion to issue clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order
(TRO) is still existing and effective.

These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we upheld the constitutionality of
Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No.
10153 postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
(which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of
May 2013 and recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily
assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.

Issues: (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections?

(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA No. 10153 have to comply with the
supermajority vote and plebiscite requirements?

(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?

(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in ARMM?

(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and representative
nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices?

(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the President’s supervisory powers
over autonomous regions?

Held: YES. Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections

The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the synchronization of national
and local elections. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the
national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:

Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the
second Monday of May, 1987.
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area.

Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and the local officials first elected
under this Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.

Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining the highest number of votes
shall serve for six years and the remaining twelve for three years.

The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political subdivisions of the State under
the heading “Local Government” indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider
autonomous regions as one of the forms of local governments.

NO. A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule for only the first ARMM
elections;11 it does not provide the date for the succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for
the date of the regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do not amend RA No.
9054 since these laws do not change or revise any provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the
ARMM elections subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely filled the gap
left in RA No. 9054.

We reiterate our previous observations:

This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the date of succeeding ARMM
elections to legislative discretion – finds support in ARMM’s recent history.

To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the ARMM elections. The First
Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even
fix the specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012
were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change
or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.
Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.

The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on March 31, 2001, provided that the
first elections would be held on the second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed
RA No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also scheduled
the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to
approve RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date of the
ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified through a plebiscite.

From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to treat the laws which fix the
date of the subsequent ARMM elections as separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only
acted consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without requiring compliance with
the amendment prerequisites embodied in Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054.12
(emphases supplied)
YES. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers of
the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local officials
can occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM officials are also local
officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It,
therefore, becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from
acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend
the three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three
years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be
extended by holdover by Congress.

Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover provisions in various laws. One
significant difference between the present case and these past cases is that while these past cases all
refer to electivebarangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of office are not explicitly
provided for in the Constitution, the present case refers to local elective officials – the ARMM
Governor, the ARMM Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly – whose
terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.

Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and there had been statutory basis for
it (namely Section 7, Article VII of RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary exists; it cannot apply where
such contrary intent is evident.

Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has made it clear that it wants
to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary
legislative powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and this
Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and not this
Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the
legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.

NO. COMELEC has no authority to hold special elections

Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) is
sufficiently empowered to set the date of special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution
has merely empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election. Although the legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Bilang [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections to another
date, this power is confined to the specific terms and circumstances provided for in the law.
Specifically, this power falls within the narrow confines of the following provisions:

Section 5. Postponement of election. – When for any serious cause such as violence, terrorism, loss or
destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a
nature that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become impossible in any
political subdivision, the Commission, motu proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested
party, and after due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded equal opportunity
to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a date which should be reasonably close to the
date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty
days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to
elect.

Section 6. Failure of election. – If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other
analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting, or after the voting and during
the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such
election results in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election
would affect the result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election
not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the date of
the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days
after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
[emphases and underscoring ours]

YES. The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in nature. Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution describes in broad strokes the extent of this power, thus:

YES. We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153 not in a vacuum, but within
the context it was enacted in. In the first place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections with the national and local
elections. To do this, Congress had to postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date,
leaving it with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in the intervening period,
between the expiration of the term of those elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office –
twenty-one (21) months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on May 13, 2013.

In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible solutions open to Congress to
address the problem created by synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office
after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for special elections to be held, and
shorten the terms of those to be elected so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13,
2013; or (c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment powers and in line with
his power of supervision over the ARMM, can appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in
the ARMM regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have already established the
unconstitutionality of the first two options, leaving us to consider the last available option.

In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to respond to the adjustment that
synchronization requires. Given the context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by synchronizing the ARMM elections
with the national and local elections. In other words, “given the plain unconstitutionality of providing
for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional possibilities for lengthening or shortening the
term of the elected ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for a fixed and
specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution
– an unconstitutional or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?
b. Claudio v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos. 140560 & 140714, 4 May 2000, 387 PHIL 405-442

DOCTRINE:

To what doctrine is the case related and how is it explained. Makesure that this is related to the topic.

QUICK FACTS

One to two liner facts.

FACTS:

LGU concerned: Pasay City Position of person/s involved: Mayor of Pasay City Contested
Law/Ordinance: Jovito O. Claudio (Claudio) was duly elected mayor of Pasay City in the May 11,1998
elections. Sometime in May 1999, the chairs of several barangays in Pasay City gathered for the
purpose of convening the Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) and to file a petition for recall against
Mayor Claudio for loss of confidence. On May 29, 1999, 1,073 members of the PRA composed of
barangay chairs, kagawads, and sangguniang kabataan chairs of Pasay City, adopted Resolution No.
01, S-1999 recalling Claudio as mayor for loss of confidence. The petition for recall was filed on July 2,
1999 and copies of the petition were in public areas throughout the City. Claudio filed an opposition
against the petition alleging, among others, that the petition for recall was filed within one year from
his assumption into office and therefore prohibited. He argued that the PRA was convened within the
1 year prohibited period as provided by Section 74 of the Local Government Code. The COMELEC,
however, granted the petition for recall ruling that recall is a process which starts with the filing of the
petition for recall and since the petition was filed exactly one year and a day after Claudio's
assumption of office, the petition was filed on time. Thereafter, COMELEC set the date of the recall
elections on April 15, 2000. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

WoN the petition for recall was filed within the proper period provided for by Section 74 of the Local
Government Code

HELD:

Yes. SC Affirmed COMELEC

The limitations in Section 74 apply to the exercise of the power of recall (i.e.the recall election itself)
which is vested with the registered voters of the LGU. It does not apply to the preparatory processes
to such exercise of recall such as the proceedings of the PRA.

RATIO:

Recall as used in Section 74 refers to the election itself

We can agree that recall is a process which begins with the convening of thepreparatory, recall
assembly or the gathering of the signatures at least 25% of the registered voters of a local government
unit, and then proceeds to the filing of a recall resolution or petition with the COMELEC, the
verification of such resolution or petition, the fixing of the date of the recall election, and the holding
of the election on the scheduled date.

However, as used in paragraph (b) of § 74, "recall" refers to the election itself by means of which
voters decide whether they should retain their local official or elect his replacement.

Section 69 of the Local Government Code provides that "the power of recall...shall be exercised by the
registered voters of a local government unit to which the local elective official belongs." Since the
power vested on the electorate is not the power to initiate recall proceedings but the power to elect
an official into office, the limitations in §74 cannot be deemed to apply to the entire recall
proceedings. In other words, the term "recall" in paragraph (b)refers only to the recall election,
excluding the convening of the PRA and the filing of a petition for recall with the COMELEC, or the
gathering of the signatures of at least 25 % of the voters for a petition for recall. Anything steps prior
to recall election itself are merely preliminary steps for the purpose of initiating a recall. The
limitations in §74 apply only to the exercise of the power of recall which is vested in the registered
voters. It is this - and not merely, the preliminary steps required to be taken to initiate a recall - which
paragraph (b) of §74 seeks to limit by providing that no recall shall take place within one year from
the date of assumption of office of an elective local official.

The proceedings of the PRA do not constitute the exercise of recall

It is the power to recall and not the power to initiate recall that the Constitution gave to the people. A
recall resolution "merely sets the stage for the official concerned before the tribunal of the people so
he can justify why he should be allowed to continue in office. [But until] the people render their
sovereign judgment, the official concerned remains in office. Thus, the preliminary proceedings of the
PRA do not produce a decision by the electorate on whether the local official concerned continues to
enjoy the confidence of the people, then, the prohibition in paragraph (b) against the holding of a
recall, except one year after the official's assumption of office, cannot apply to such proceedings.

Purpose of the one year prohibitory period against the exercise of recall

The purpose of the first limitation is to provide a reasonable basis for judging the performance of an
elective local official. Hence, in this case, as long as the election is held outside the one-year period,
the preliminary proceedings to

initiate a recall can be held even before the end of the first year in office of a local official.

Including the convening of the PRA as part of recall restricts right of speech and assembly

Third, to construe the term "recall" in paragraph (b) as including the convening of the PRA for the
purpose of discussing the performance in office of elective local officials would be to unduly restrict
the constitutional right of speech and of assembly of its members. The people cannot just be asked on
the day of the election to decide on the performance of their officials. The crystallization and
formation of an informed public opinion takes time. To hold, therefore, that the first limitation in
paragraph (b) includes the holding of assemblies for the exchange of ideas and opinions among
citizens is to unduly curtail one of the most cherished rights in a free society. Indeed, it is wrong to
assume that such assemblies will

always eventuate in a recall election. To the contrary, they may result in the expression of confidence
in the incumbent.

The phrase regular local election does not include the campaign period

Claudio contends that the date April 15, 2000 also falls within the second prohibition under Section 74
of the Local Government Code arguing that the phrase "regular local elections" in paragraph (b) does
not only mean "the day of the regular local election" which, for the year 2001 is May 14, but the
election period as well. Hence, he contends that beginning March 30, 2000, no recall election may be
held. The contention is untenable. First there is nothing in the law that shows the campaign period is
included for purposes of computing the prohibitory period. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation
would severely limit the period during which a recall election may be held. Actually, because no recall
election maybe held until one year after the assumption of office of an elective local official,
presumably on June 30 following his election, the free period is only the period from July 1 of the
following year to about the middle of May of the succeeding year. This is a period of only nine months
and 15 days, more or less. To construe the second limitation in paragraph (b) as including the
campaign period would reduce this period to eight months. Such an interpretation must be rejected,
because it would devitalize the right of recall which is designed to make local government units" more
responsive and accountable."
c. Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, 30 June 2009, 609 PHIL 245-259

FACTS:

This case is a petition for the reversal of the decision on the suspension of the criminal proceeding
filed by the petitioner in the MTC for the ground that there is a presence of prejudicial question with
respect to the civil case belatedly filed by the respondent.

The petitioner appealed to RTC but denied Dreamwork, through its President, and Vice -President,
filed a Complaint Affidavit against Janiola for violation of BP 22 at the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Las Piñas City.

Correspondingly, the former also filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent with the MTC, entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S. Janiola. On September 20,
2006, Janiola instituted a civil complaint against petitioner for the rescission of an alleged
construction agreement between the parties, as well as for damages.

Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings in the Criminal Case for the ground
that private respondent claim that the civil case posed a prejudicial question against the criminal case.
Petitioner opposed the Respondent’s Motion to Suspend criminal proceeding based on juridical
question for the following grounds:

(1) there is no prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the
bouncing checks were issued is a separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private
respondent violated BP 22; and

(2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a prejudicial question is
that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus, this element is missing in this case, the criminal case
having preceded the civil case.

The MTC granted the Respondents Motion to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioner appealed the Orders to
the RTC but denied the petition. Hence, this petition raised.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the MTC or RTC Court erred in its discretion to suspend proceedings in Criminal Case
on the basis of “Prejudicial Question “, with respect to the Civil Case belatedly filed.

HELD:

This petition must be granted, pursuant to SEC. 7.Elements of prejudicial question.

The elements of a prejudicial question are:

(a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the subsequent criminal action; and

(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that which must precede the
criminal action and which requires a decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal
action. The civil action must be instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.

In this case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan ahead of the complaint in Civil Case
filed by the State with the RTC. Thus, no prejudicial question exists. The Resolution of the Civil Case Is
Not Determinative of the Prosecution of the Criminal Action. Even if the trial court in the civil case
declares that the construction agreement between the parties is void for lack of consideration, this
would not affect the prosecution of private respondent in the criminal case. The fact of the matter i s
that private respondent issued checks that were subsequently dishonored for insufficient funds. It is
this fact that is subject of prosecution under BP 22.Therefore, it is clear that the second element
required for the existence of a prejudicial question, is absent. Thus, no prejudicial question exists.
Presumption of Justice (Article 10, Civil Code)

Article 10: In case of doubt in the interpretation, or application of Laws, it is presumed that the law
making body intended right and justice to prevail.

a. Aces Philippines Cellular Satellite Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 226680, 30
August 2022

Are satellite services provided by a non-resident foreign satellite operator taxable in the Philippines?

Yes, said the Supreme Court in Aces Philippines Cellular Satellite Corporation v. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 226680, 30 August 2022).

Getting down to brass tacks, the case involved two parties—Aces Philippines (a subsidiary of PLDT)
and Aces International Limited, a company incorporated in Bermuda (Aces Bermuda). Through a
couple of agreements, Aces Bermuda provided satellite services to Aces Philippines, wherein Aces
Bermuda sold satellite communications time to Aces Philippines, which in turn, became the exclusive
distributor of these satellite communications time to its subscribers in the Philippines. For the satellite
communications time it uses, Aces Philippines would then pay Aces Bermuda satellite air time fees.

The satellite services revolved around the “Aces System,” which consisted of satellites, terminals, and
gateways. The satellite was orbiting in outer space and, upon instructions from its control center,
would receive, switch, amplify, and transmit radio signals from terminals and to gateways in the
Philippines.

Aces Bermuda owned the satellite in question, along with its control center in Indonesia. Aces
Philippines owned the gateway facilities inside the Philippines which received the calls and routed
them to local subscribers.

In uber-simplified language, it was essentially a two-step process:

The satellite receives and beams signals from space, upon instructions from its control center in
Indonesia (Step 1),

The Philippine gateway receives the signals and routes it to its local subscribers (Step 2).

In 2007, the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) audited and subsequently assessed Aces Philippines for
unpaid withholding taxes, essentially claiming that the satellite air time fees received by Aces
Bermuda, a non-resident foreign corporation, were taxable in the Philippines.

Aces Philippines argued that Aces Bermuda’s income from satellite air time fee payments was sourced
outside the Philippines for two reasons:

The act of transmission (Step 1), which takes place in outer space, was the income-producing activity,
and Aces Bermuda did not own or have machinery, equipment, or computers in the Philippines,
through which calls would reach and be received within the Philippines (since these were owned by
Aces Philippines).
The Supreme Court disagreed with both arguments.

The Income-Producing Activity

For its first argument, Aces Philippines claimed that the income-producing activity was Step 1 or the
receipt and beaming of satellite signals—which all happen outside the Philippines, since the satellite is
in outer space and its control center was in Indonesia. Aces Philippines argued that the income-
producing activity terminated once the control centers in Indonesia provide information to the
satellite as to which gateway in the Philippines the call shall be routed to. And since those all happen
outside the Philippines, then it’s not taxable here.

To this, the Supreme Court disagreed. For the Court, the income-producing activity was the entire
process, ending in Step 2 or the gateway’s receipt of the call as routed by the satellite. And as the
gateways were in the Philippines, then it was taxable in the Philippines.

The Court reasoned that the income-generating activity took place only upon the gateway’s receipt of
the call in the Philippines for two reasons.
Only when the gateway receives the call was the service completed or delivered, and

The inflow of economic benefits from the Philippines to Aces Bermuda.

On the Court’s reasoning on the completion of service, it stated that the different steps in the Aces
System should not be taken piece-meal and in isolation because everything was inter-connected
based on the agreements between Aces Bermuda and Aces Philippines. Aces Bermuda undertook to
provide satellite communication time to Aces Philippines, and it could only do so by the gateway’s
receipt of the call here in the Philippines.

On the inflow of economic benefits, the Court noted that the satellite air time fees accrued only when
the satellite air time was delivered (i.e. upon the gateway’s receipt of the call) to Aces Philippines.
This accrual of fees signified the inflow of economic benefits: since Aces Philippines and its end-users
who benefited from the Aces System were here, then the income-generating activity were situated
here as well.

Non-ownership of Facilities in the Philippines

Note that Aces Philippines argued that it owned the gateway facilities in the Philippines, not Aces
Bermuda, and therefore, any income from these gateway facilities could not be attributed to Aces
Bermuda.
To this, the Supreme Court said, it didn’t matter who owned the facilities because these were
constructed primarily to serve the needs and requirements of the Aces System. Without these
facilities, the entire system would be for naught. The income generation, the Court said, was
dependent on the operations of these facilities in the Philippines, regardless if it was owned or not by
the foreign entity.

In ruling for the taxability of Aces Bermuda, the Court also brushed aside Aces Philippines’ numerous
tax references (such as a BIR Ruling to another taxpayer, similar cases decided abroad, and OECD
commentaries on satellites) as simply not having the force of law in the Philippines. Interestingly,
these very tax references have been used by tax practitioners in requesting rulings from the CIR—
some of which have been granted by the CIR.

It will be interesting how this case will affect the taxation of similar businesses of foreign non-
resident corporations which have some sort of presence here in the Philippines, through say, the
internet. The case seems to broaden the reach of the BIR, similar to the 1987 case of CIR v. British
Overseas Airways Corporation (G.R. No. L-65773).
How far will the interpretation of “inflow of economic benefits” go? Will it consider the streaming
services of foreign non-resident corporations (which are consumed and paid by Filipino viewers) as
income sourced within the Philippines and therefore taxable? To which situations and items in
Section 42 (A) of the Tax Code will the interpretation apply to—will it be limited to the performance
of services or to the others as well?

And if foreign non-resident corporations need not own actual property in the Philippines to be taxed,
how will this affect how cross-border businesses and deals are structured in the future? We may have
to read the stars—or at least the satellites—to find out.
iii. Construction Consistent with the Constitution

Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. Nos. 133640, 133661 & 139147, 25 November 2005, 512 PHIL 560-
589

Fact: Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April
2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood
donation and by regulating blood banks in the country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by respondent
Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides Phase-out of
Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2)
years after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the
Secretary.” Section 23 of Administrative Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The
Department shall effect the phasing-out of all commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years,
extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to
extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and demand and
public safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out of
commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995,
constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The
phase-out period was extended for two years by the DOH. Hence, petitioners were granted by the
Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood bank only until May 27, 1998. On May
20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a petition for
certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the
aforementioned Act and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Issue: Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause
enshrined in the Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing
blood banks in a manner that is not germane to the purpose of the law.

Held: No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:

One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons
and as a medical service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly
encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter treats blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the
purpose of the law, that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting
voluntary blood donation and treating blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather
than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out of commercial blood banks based on the
fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood supply from paid blood
donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-
sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system. Three, the Legislature intended for the
general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar circumstances of
the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.

b. Benguet Management Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 153571, 18 September 2003, 458 PHIL
204-216)

Facts:

1.Benguet Management Corporation (BMC) and Keppel Bank Philippines, Inc. (KBPI), acting as trustee
of the other respondent banks, entered into a Loan Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture (MTI)
whereby BMC, in consideration of the syndicated loan of P190,000,000.00,constituted in favor of KBPI
a mortgage on several lots located in Alaminos, Laguna and Iba,Zambales.

2. On September 28, 2001, for failure of BMC to pay in full the installments due on the Loan
Agreement and Mortgage Trust Indenture, , KBPI filed an application 4 for extra-judicial foreclosure of
mortgage before the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Iba,Zambales.

3.On February 6, 2002, despite several contention from BMC, KBPI’s application for extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgage was found to be sufficient in form and substance, and was granted.

4.Hence, BMC filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals

5.In its Resolution dated April 5, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied BMC’s prayer to restrain the
consolidation of title in the name of KBPI

6. BMC filed a motion for reconsideration claiming, among others, that Section 47 of the General
Banking Act (Republic Act No. 8791), which reduced the period of redemption for extra-judicially
foreclosed properties of juridical persons from one year to — "until, but not after, theregistration of
the certificate of foreclosure sale . . . which in no case shall be more than three(3) months after
foreclosure, whichever is earlier," is unduly discriminatory and therefore unconstitutional.

7.On May 28, 2002, the Court of Appeals denied BMC’s motion for reconsideration. 22 Hence, BMC
filed the instant petition, raising the issue among others that the new law (General Banking Law of
2000) abrogating the right to one-year redemption period of corporate mortgagors is
unconstitutional.

Issue:Whether or not the General Banking Law of 2000 is Constitutional

HELD:

The resolution of the constitutionality of Section 47 of the General Banking Act (Republic Act No.8791)
is not the very lis mota of the controversy.1. Anent the constitutional issue raised by BMC, we have
repeatedly held that the constitutionality of a law may be passed upon by the Court, where there is an
actual case and that the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary in deciding the
controversy.2.

In this case, the resolution of the constitutionality of Section 47 of the General Banking Act(Republic
Act No. 8791) which reduced the period of redemption of extra-judicially foreclosed properties of
juridical persons is not the very lis mota of the controversy. BMC is not asserting a legal right for
which it is entitled to a judicial determination at this time inasmuch as it may not even be entitled to
redeem the foreclosed properties. Until an actual controversy is brought to test the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 8791, the presumption of validity, which inheres in every statute, must be
accorded to it.

iv. Construction to Render Provision Effective

a. Francisco Jr. v House of Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, 10 Nov. 2003

Facts: An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Asociate Justices was
filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed by The House Committee on Justice on 22 October 2003 for
being insufficient in substance. On 23 October 2003, Representative Gilbert Teodoro and Felix
Fuentabella filed a new impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. Thus arose the instant
petitions against the House of Representatives et al, most of which contend that the filing of the
second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of Section 5, Article XI
of the Constitution, “no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more
than once within the period of one year.” Senator Aquilino Pimintel Jr, filed a Motion to Intervene,
stating that the consolidated petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court and that the
sole power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment court be recognized and
upheld pursuant to the provision of Article XI of the Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to determine the validity
of the second impeachment complaint pursuant to Article XI of the Constitution.

Decision: The second impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Constitution.

Applying the principles of constitutional construction, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution
is to be interpreted as a whole, the said provision should function to the full extent of its substance
and form and its terms, in conjunction with all other provisions of the Constitution. Pursuant to
Section 1 Article VIII of the Constitution, “the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court.”
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on part of any branch of the
government. The courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the
government as well as its officers , this is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment.

The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.

b. Lluz v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 172840, 7 June 2007, 551 PHIL 428-447

FACTS:

Private respondent was a candidate for the post of punong barangay of Barangay 2, Población,
Catubig, Samarin the 15 July 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections. In his
certificate of candidacy, private respondent misrepresented himself as a certified public accountant
(CPA) as his profession or occupation. Private respondent won in the elections. Thus, he was charged
for an election offense before the COMELEC. In his Answer, private respondent argued that he could
not be held liable for an election offense because his alleged misrepresentation of profession was not
material to his eligibility as a candidate.

ISSUE:

Is an alleged misrepresentation of profession or occupation on a certificate of candidacy punishable as

an election offense under Section 262 in relation to Section 74 of B.P. 881?

HELD:

No elective office, not even the office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, requires a
certain profession or occupation as a qualification. For local elective offices including that of punong
barangay, Republic Act No. 7160 (R.A. 7160) or the Local Government Code of 1991 prescribes only
qualifications pertaining to citizenship, registration as a voter, residence, and language. Section 39 of
R.A. 7160 states: x x x profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office,
misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation. Certainly, in a situation
where a candidate misrepresents his or her profession or occupation in the certificate of candidacy,
the candidate may not be disqualified from running for office under Section 78 as his or her certificate
of candidacy cannot be denied due course or canceled on such ground.
Week 6- Legislative Policies and Presumptions; Liberal and Strict Construction
i. Penal Laws
a. Causing v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 199139, 9 September 2014, 742 PHIL 539-557
Facts:
On January 1, 1993, Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
On May 28, 2010, Mayor Biron issued Memorandum No. 12, Series of 2010,[2] which reads:
Office Order No. 12
Series of 2010
MRS. ELSIE S. CAUSING
Municipal Civil Registrar
LGU Barotac Nuevo

Exigencies of service so requiring, you are hereby detailed at the Office of the Municipal Mayor
effective upon receipt of this Order and shall likewise receive direct orders from the undersigned as to
particular functions our office may require from time to time.

On the same date, Mayor Biron also issued Office Order No. 13 detailing Catalina V. Belonio (Belonio),
another municipal employee, to the office of the Local Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo to
assume the functions and duties as Local Civil Registrar-designate effective... upon receipt of the
order.

On June 1, 2010, Mayor Biron issued to Causing Memorandum No. 17, Series of 2010, and
Memorandum No. 17-A, Series of 2010,... In view of the foregoing issuances by Mayor Biron, Causing
filed the complaint-affidavit dated June 8, 2010 in the Office of the Regional Election Director, Region
VI, in Iloilo City, claiming that Office Order No. 12 dated May 28, 2010 issued by Mayor Biron ordering
her detail... to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election period and without
prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and violative of Section 1, Paragraph A, No. 1, in
connection with Section 6 (B) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009,... In his counter-
affidavit,[7] Mayor Biron countered that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to
closely supervise the performance of her functions after complaints regarding her negative behavior
in dealing with her co-employees and with... the public transacting business in her office had been
received;[8] that as the local chief executive, he was empowered to take personnel actions and other
management prerogatives for the good of public service; that Causing was not being stripped of her...
functions as the Municipal Civil Registrar; that she was not transferred or detailed to another office in
order to perform a different function; and that she was not demoted to a lower position that
diminished her salary and other benefits.[

Hence, this petition for certiorar

Issues:

Causing submits that Office Order 12 and Office Order 13 were gross violations of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8737, Series of 2009, that implemented Section 261 (g), (h), and (x) of the Omnibus
Election Code; that the prohibition contained in said provisions covered any... movement during the
election period, whether it was by reassignment, appointment, promotion, or demotion, regardless of
rank, level or salary of the affected personnel; that her detail to the Office of the Mayor was a clear
case of personnel movement prohibited by... law;

In addition, Causing claims that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the findings of PES Doronilla to the effect that there was no probable cause to hold Mayor
Biron liable for violating the Omnibus Election Code; and that the

COMELEC En Banc totally disregarded a crucial piece of evidence the existence of Office Order No. 13
that had ordered the detail of Belonio as the Local Civil Registrar-designate.

Ruling:

Procedural Issue:

Causing did not file a motion for reconsideration... before filing the petition for certiorari

Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution states that unless otherwise provided by the Constitution or
by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Court on certiorari by
the aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy... thereof. For this reason, the Rules of Court
(1997) contains a separate rule (Rule 64) on the review of the decisions of the COMELEC and the
Commission on Audit.[27] Rule 64 is generally identical with certiorari under Rule 65,[28] except as to
the period of the filing of the petition for certiorari, that is, in the former, the period is 30 days from
notice of the judgment or final order or resolution sought to be reviewed but, in the latter, not later
than 60 days from notice of the... judgment, order or resolution assailed.

The well-established rule is that the motion for reconsideration is an indispensable condition before
an aggrieved party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. The filing of the motion for reconsideration before... the resort to certiorari will lie is intended
to afford to the public respondent the opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to
it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case.[

The rule is not absolute, however, considering that jurisprudence has laid down exceptions to the
requirement for the filing of a petition for certiorari without first filing a motion for reconsideration,
namely: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where... the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by
the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is
an... urgent necessity for the resolution of the question, and any further delay would prejudice the
interests of the Government, or of the petitioner, or the subject matter of the petition is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be... useless; (e) where the
petitioner was deprived of due process, and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal
case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent, and the granting of such relief by the trial court is
improbable; (g) where the... proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h)
where the proceeding was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved.

A perusal of the circumstances of the case shows that none of the foregoing exceptions was applicable
herein. Hence, Causing should have filed the motion for reconsideration, especially because there was
nothing in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that precluded the filing of the... motion for
reconsideration in election offense cases.[32]

Accordingly, the petition must be dismissed.

b. Quimvel y Braga v. People, G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017, 808 PHIL 889-1000

Facts:

AAA, who was seven years old at the time of the incident, is the oldest among the children of XXX and
YYY. XXX worked as a household helper in Batangas while YYY was a Barangay Tanod who derived
income from selling vegetables. AAA and her siblings, BBB and CCC, were then staying with YYY in
Palapas, Ligao City.

At around 8 o'clock in the evening of [July 18,] 2007, YYY went out of the house to buy kerosene since
there was no electricity. While YYY was away, Quimvel arrived bringing a vegetable viand from AAA's
grandfather. AAA requested Quimvel to stay with them as she and her siblings were afraid. He agreed
and accompanied them. AAA and her siblings then went to sleep. However, she was awakened when
she felt Quimuel's right leg on top of her body. She likewise sensed Quimvel inserting his right hand
inside her panty. In a trice, she felt Quimvel caressing her private part. She removed his hand.

Quimvel was about to leave when YYY arrived. She asked him what he was doing in his house.
Quimvel replied that he was just accompanying the children. After he left, YYY and his children went
back to sleep.

On [July 29,] 2007, XXX arrived from Batangas. Later in the evening while XXX was lying down with her
children, she asked them what they were doing while she was away. BBB told her that Quimvel
touched her Ate. When XXX asked AAA what Quimvel did to her, she recounted that Quimvel laid
down beside her and touched her vagina.

Upon hearing this, XXX and YYY went to the Office of the Barangay Tanod and thereafter to the police
station to report the incident. Afterwards, they brought AAA to a doctor for medical examination.

As expected, Quimvel denied the imputation hurled against him. He maintained that he brought the
ducks of AAA' s grandmother to the river at 7 o'clock in the morning, fetched it and brought it back at
AAA's grandmother's place at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of [July 18,] 2007. After that, he rested. He
said that he never went to AAA's house that evening. When YYY confronted and accused him of
touching AAA, he was totally surprised. Even if he denied committing the crime, he was still detained
at the Barangay Hall. He was then brought to the police station for interrogation. Eventually, he was
allowed to go home. He did not return to the house of AAA's grandmother to avoid any untoward
incidents.

Lending credence to AAA' s straightforward and categorical testimony, the Regional Trial Court
rendered its Judgment finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness. The CA rendered its assailed Decision affirming, with modification, the Judgment of
the trial court.

Issue:

Whether or not assuming without admitting that he is guilty hereof, he may be convicted only of acts
of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and in relation to Sec. 5(b) of RA
7610.

Held:

Yes. Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is
neither exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of
RA 7610, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in
prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."

Section 5 of RA 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are committed on a child
already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the acts of
lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstance that the
child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." (emphasis supplied)
Contrary to the exposition, the very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of RA 7610 does not
require that the victim suffer a separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act
complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a
violation of Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 occurs even though the accused committed sexual abuse against the
child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No.
35509 finding petitioner Eduardo Quimvel y Braga also known as Eduardo/Edward Quimuel y Braga
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of acts of lasciviousness is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
ii. Tax Laws
a. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc., G.R. No. 183505, 26 February 2010,
627 PHIL 581-605

FACTS: Respondents SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (SM Prime) and First Asia Realty Development
Corporation (First Asia) are domestic corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Republic of the Philippines. Both are engaged in the business of operating cinema houses, among
others.

Simply put, the issue in this case is whether the gross receipts derived by operators or proprietors of
cinema/theater houses from admission tickets are subject to VAT. AEIHaS

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner argues that the enumeration of services subject to VAT in Section 108 of the NIRC is not
exhaustive because it covers all sales of services unless exempted by law. He claims that the CTA erred
in applying the rules on statutory construction and in using extrinsic aids in interpreting Section 108
because the provision is clear and unambiguous. Thus, he maintains that the exhibition of movies by
cinema operators or proprietors to the paying public, being a sale of service, is subject to VAT.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents, on the other hand, argue that a plain reading of Section 108 of the NIRC of 1997 shows
that the gross receipts of proprietors or operators of cinemas/theaters derived from public admission
are not among the services subject to VAT. Respondents insist that gross receipts from
cinema/theater admission tickets were never intended to be subject to any tax imposed by the
national government. According to them, the absence of gross receipts from cinema/theater
admission tickets from the list of services which are subject to the national amusement tax under
Section 125 of the NIRC of 1997 reinforces this legislative intent. Respondents also highlight the fact
that RMC No. 28-2001 on which the deficiency assessments were based is an unpublished
administrative ruling.

ISSUE: WON THE RESPONDENT IS SUBJECT TO VAT.

HELD: NO. It is the legislative intent not to impose VAT on persons already covered by the amusement
tax. This holds true even in the case of cinema/theater operators taxed under the LGC of 1991
precisely because the VAT law was intended to replace the percentage tax on certain services. The
mere fact that they are taxed by the local government unit and not by the national government is
immaterial. The Local Tax Code, in transferring the power to tax gross receipts derived by
cinema/theater operators or proprietor from admission tickets to the local government, did not
intend to treat cinema/theater houses as a separate class. No distinction must, therefore, be made
between the places of amusement taxed by the national government and those taxed by the local
government. EIAScH

To hold otherwise would impose an unreasonable burden on cinema/theater houses operators or

proprietors, who would be paying an additional 10% VAT on top of the 30% amusement tax imposed
by Section 140 of the LGC of 1991, or a total of 40% tax. Such imposition would result in injustice, as
persons taxed under the NIRC of 1997 would be in a better position than those taxed under the LGC of
1991. We need not belabor that a literal application of a law must be rejected if it will operate
unjustly or lead to absurd results. Thus, we are convinced that the legislature never intended to
include cinema/theater operators or proprietors in the coverage of VAT.

The repeal of the Local Tax Code by the LGC of 1991 is not a legal basis for the imposition of VAT on
the gross receipts of cinema/theater operators or proprietors derived from admission tickets. The
removal of the prohibition under the Local Tax Code did not grant nor restore to the national
government the power to impose amusement tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors.
Neither did it expand the coverage of VAT. Since the imposition of a tax is a burden on the taxpayer, it
cannot be presumed nor can it be extended by implication. A law will not be construed as imposing a
tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. As it is, the power to impose amusement
tax on cinema/theater operators or proprietors remains with the local government. IDSaTE

Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 28-2001 is invalid

Considering that there is no provision of law imposing VAT on the gross receipts of cinema/theater
operators or proprietors derived from admission tickets, RMC No. 28-2001 which imposes VAT on the
gross receipts from admission to cinema houses must be struck down. We cannot overemphasize that
RMCs must not override, supplant, or modify the law, but must remain consistent and in harmony
with, the law they seek to apply and implement.

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to discuss whether RMC No. 28-2001 complied with the
procedural due process for tax issuances as prescribed under RMC No. 20-86.

Rule on tax exemption does not apply

Moreover, contrary to the view of petitioner, respondents need not prove their entitlement to an
exemption from the coverage of VAT. The rule that tax exemptions should be construed strictly
against the taxpayer presupposes that the taxpayer is clearly subject to the tax being levied against
him. The reason is obvious: it is both illogical and impractical to determine who are exempted without
first determining who are covered by the provision. Thus, unless a statute imposes a tax clearly,
expressly and unambiguously, what applies is the equally well-settled rule that the imposition of a tax
cannot be presumed. In fact, in case of doubt, tax laws must be construed strictly against the
government and in favor of the taxpayer.
b. National Power Corporation v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, 9 April 2003, 449 PHIL 233-262

FACTS: Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation created under Commonwealth

Act No. 120, as amended.

For many years now, petitioner sells electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City, posting a
gross income of P107,814,187.96 in 1992.7 Pursuant to section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92,8 the
respondent assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808,606.41, representing 75% of 1%
of the latter’s gross receipts for the preceding year.

Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that the respondent has no authority to impose
tax on government entities. Petitioner also contended that as a non-profit organization, it is
exempted from the payment of all forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with sec. 13 of
Rep. Act No. 6395, as amended.

The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding that petitioner pay the assessed tax due,
plus surcharge. Respondent alleged that petitioner’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by
section 193 of the LGC, which reads as follows:

«Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax
exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical,
including government owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives
duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions,
are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code.»

RTC upheld NPC’s tax exemption. On appeal the CA reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that
section 193, in relation to sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew the exemptions
granted to the petitioner.

ISSUE: W/N the respondent city government has the authority to issue Ordinance No. 165-92 and
impose an annual tax on «businesses enjoying a franchise

HELD: YES. Taxes are the lifeblood of the government, for without taxes, the government can neither
exist nor endure. A principal attribute of sovereignty, the exercise of taxing power derives its source
from the very existence of the state whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public
interest and common good. The theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from
necessity;32 without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare
and well-being of the people.
Section 137 of the LGC clearly states that the LGUs can impose franchise tax «notwithstanding any
exemption granted by any law or other special law.» This particular provision of the LGC does not
admit any exception. In City Government of San Pablo, Laguna v. Reyes,74 MERALCO’s exemption
from the payment of franchise taxes was brought as an issue before this Court. The same issue was
involved in the subsequent case of Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna.75 Ruling in favor of
the local government in both instances, we ruled that the franchise tax in question is imposable
despite any exemption enjoyed by MERALCO under special laws, viz:

«It is our view that petitioners correctly rely on provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC to
support their position that MERALCO’s tax exemption has been withdrawn. The explicit language of
section 137 which authorizes the province to impose franchise tax ‘notwithstanding any exemption
granted by any law or other special law’ is all-encompassing and clear. The franchise tax is imposable
despite any exemption enjoyed under special laws.

Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By stating that unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all
persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except
(1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3) non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code, the obvious
import is to limit the exemptions to the three enumerated entities. It is a basic precept of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as
expressed in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. In the absence of any provision
of the Code to the contrary, and we find no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption or
incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly intended to be withdrawn.

Reading together sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, we conclude that under the LGC the local
government unit may now impose a local tax at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual
receipts for the preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its territorial
jurisdiction. The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing law or charter is
clearly manifested by the language used on (sic) Sections 137 and 193 categorically withdrawing such
exemption subject only to the exceptions enumerated. Since it would be not only tedious and
impractical to attempt to enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax exemptions or
privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit general, withdrawal of such exemptions or
privileges. No more unequivocal language could have been used.»76 (emphases supplied)

Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and
support myriad activities of the local government units for the delivery of basic services essential to
the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the
people. As this Court observed in the Mactan case, «the original reasons for the withdrawal of tax
exemption privileges granted to government-owned or controlled corporations and all other units of
government were that such privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax
treatment of similarly situated enterprises.» With the added burden of devolution, it is even more
imperative for government entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or otherwise,
by paying taxes or other charges due from them.
c. Republic v. City of Parañaque, G.R. No. 191109, 18 July 2012, 691 PHIL 476-497

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
195,Paranaque City (RTC), which ruled that petitioner Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is a
government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), a taxable entity, and, therefore, not exempt
from payment of real property taxes. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government corporation
created by virtue of P.D. No. 1084 toprovide a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of
lands, and the administration andoperation of lands belonging to, managed and/or operated by, the
government with the object of maximizing their utilization and hastening their development
consistent with public interest. On October 26, 2004, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
E.O. No. 380 transforming PEA into PRA, which shall perform all the powers and functions of the PEA
relating to reclamation activities.

By virtue of its mandate, PRA reclaimed several portions of the foreshore and offshore areas of
Manila Bay,including those located in Parañaque City. Parañaque City Treasurer issued Warrants of
Levy on PRA’s reclaimed properties based on the assessment for delinquent real property for tax
years 2001 and 2002. PRA claimed that it is not a GOCC under the Administrative Code, nor is it a
GOCC under Section 16, Article XII of the 1987Constitution because it is not required to meet the test
of economic viability. It is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and
performing an essential public service. It insists that it may not be classified as a non-stock
corporation because it has no members and it is not organized for charitable, religious, educational,
professional, cultural, recreational, fraternal, literary, scientific, social, civil service, or similar
purposes, like trade, industry, agriculture and like chambers as provided in Section 88 of the
Corporation Code. Thus, PRA insists that, as an incorporated instrumentality of the National
Government, it is exempt from payment of real property tax except when the beneficial use of the
real property is granted to a taxable person. PRA claims that based on Section 133(o) of the LGC, local
governments cannot tax the national government which delegate to local governments the power to
tax.

Issue: Whether or not Philippine Reclamation Authority (PRA) is an incorporated instrumentality of

the national government and is, therefore, exempt from payment of real property tax under sections
234(a) and 133(o) of Republic Act 7160?

Held: Yes it is a Government Instrumentality. In the case at bench, PRA is not a GOCC because it is
neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation. It cannot be considered as a stock corporation because
although it has a capital stock divided into no par value shares as provided in Section 7 4 of P.D. No.
1084, it is not authorized to distribute dividends, surplus allotments or profits to stockholders. PRA is
a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers and performing an essential public
service pursuant to Section 2(10) of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code. Being an
incorporated government instrumentality, it is exempt from payment of real property tax. Many
government instrumentalities are vested with corporate powers but they do not become stock or
non-stock corporations, which is a necessary condition before an agency or instrumentality is deemed
a GOCC. The fundamental provision above authorizes Congress to create GOCCs through special
charters on two conditions: 1) the GOCC must be established for the common good; and 2) the GOCC
must meet the test of economic viability. In this case, PRA may have passed the first condition of
common good but failed the second one - economic viability. Undoubtedly, the purpose behind the
creation of PRA was not for economic or commercial activities. Clearly, respondent has no valid or
legal basis in taxing the subject reclaimed lands managed by PRA. On the other hand, Section 234(a)
of the LGC, in relation to its Section 133(o), exempts PRA from paying realty taxes and protects it from
the taxing powers of local government units. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code states that
real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines (the Republic) is exempt from real property tax
unless the beneficial use thereof has been granted to a taxable person. Section 133 of the Local
Government Code states that "unless otherwise provided" in the Code, local governments cannot tax
national government instrumentalities. In this case, there is no proof that PRA granted the beneficial
use of the subject reclaimed lands to a taxable entity. There is no showing on record either that PRA
leased the subject reclaimed properties to a private taxable entity. WHEREFORE, the petition is
GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 195, Parañaque City, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
d. Medicard Phils., Inc. v. CIR, G.R. No. 222743, 5 April 2017
FACTS: MEDICARD is a health maintenance organization (HMO) that provides prepaid health and
medical insurance coverage to its clients. Individuals enrolled in its health care programs pay an
annual membership fee and are entitled to various preventive, diagnostic and curative medical
services provided by duly licensed physicians, specialists, and other professional technical staff
participating in the group practice health delivery system at a hospital or clinic owned, operated or
accredited by it.

MEDICARD filed it first, second, and third quarterly VAT Returns through Electronic Filing and
Payment System (EFPS) on April 20, July 25, and October 25, 2006, respectively, and its fourth
quarterly VAT Return on January 25, 2007.

Upon finding some discrepancies between MEDICARD’s Income Tax Returns (ITR) and VAT Returns,
the CIR issued a Letter Notice (LN) dated September 20, 2007. Subsequently, the CIR also issued a
Preliminary Assessment Notice (PAN) against MEDICARD for deficiency VAT. MEDICARD received CIR’s
FAN dated December 10, 2007 for allegedly deficiency VAT for taxable year 2006 including penalties.

MEDICARD filed a protest arguing, among others, that that the services it render is not limited merely
to arranging for the provision of medical and/or hospitalization services but include actual and direct
rendition of medical and laboratory services. On June 19, 2009, MEDICARD received CIR’s Final
Decision denying its protest. The petitioner MEDICARD proceeded to file a petition for review before
the CTA.

The CTA Division held that the determination of deficiency VAT is not limited to the issuance of Letter
of Authority (LOA) alone and that in lieu of an LOA, an LN was issued to MEDICARD informing it if the
discrepancies between its ITRs and VAT Returns and this procedure is authorized under Revenue
Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 30-2003 and 42-2003. Also, the amounts that MEDICARD earmarked
and eventually paid to doctors, hospitals and clinics cannot be excluded from the computation of its
gross receipts because the act of earmarking or allocation is by itself an act of ownership and
management over the funds by MEDICARD which is beyond the contemplation of RR No. 4-2007.
Furthermore, MEDICARD’s earnings from its clinics and laboratory facilities cannot be excluded from
its gross receipts because the operation of these clinics and laboratory is merely an incident to
MEDICARD’s line of business as an HMO.

MEDICARD filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to the
CTA en banc.

CTA en banc partially granted the petition only insofar as 10% VAT rate for January 2006 is concerned
but sustained the findings of the CTA Division.
ISSUES:

Is the absence of the Letter of Authority fatal?

Should the amounts that MEDICARD earmarked and eventually paid to the medical service providers
still form part of its gross receipts for VAT purposes?

RULING:

Yes. The absence of the LOA violated MEDICARD’s right to due process. An LOA is the authority given
to the appropriate revenue officer assigned to perform assessment functions. Under the NLRC, unless
authorized by the CIR himself or by his duly authorized representative, through an LOA, an
examination of the taxpayer cannot ordinarily be undertaken. An LOA is premised on the fact that the
examination of a taxpayer who has already filed his tax returns is a power that statutorily belongs
only to the CIR himself or his duly authorized representatives. In this case, there is no dispute that no
LOA was issued prior to the issuance of a PAN and FAN against MEDICARD. Therefore, no LOA was
also served on MEDICARD.
No. The VAT is a tax on the value added by the performance of the service by the taxpayer. It is, thus,
this service and the value charged thereof by the taxpayer that is taxable under the NLRC.
iv. Rules of Court
a. Office of the Court Administrator v. Garong, A.M. No. P-99-1311, 15 August 2001, 415 PHIL 220-229

Facts: 1. Respondent Alberto V. Garong, Court Interpreter III of the Regional Trial Court of
Calapan City, Mindoro, Branch 40, was charged with frustrated homicide and was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide.
2. The judgment of the trial court was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in a Decision promulgated on
August 9, 1996, 2 and the same became final on November 15, 1996, for which Entry of Judgment was
accordingly made.
3. On June 1, 1999, the OCA filed a formal Administrative Complaint against respondent praying for
his dismissal from the service by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude.
4. On September 23, 1999, respondent filed a Manifestation With Motion To Dismiss, praying that the
Court’s Resolution dated July 5, 1999 be recalled and the administrative case be dismissed for lack of
cause of action averring, among others, that as early as March 5, 1999, he had already been
contesting the validity and due execution of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February
24, 1999, which directed the Entry of Judgment in the criminal case against him.
5. Court of Appeals concluded that respondent was not properly served with notice of the
decision against him. Consequently, the entry of judgment was premature and, therefore, void.
Respondent’s period to file a motion for reconsideration should be counted from the date he actually
received a copy of the decision. Moreover, the notice of judgment should have been sent to
respondent’s counsel of record’s new address, and the sending of the same to counsel’s old
address was improper and invalid. For this reason, respondent’s period to file motion for
reconsideration from said decision could not have commenced to run.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct to declare the period to file motion for
reconsideration based on the validity of the notice of decision. Held: The proceedings in the
administrative complaint is hereby

HELD IN ABEYANCE pending the final outcome of his appeal. 1. Rules prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, are absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict
compliance with such rules is mandatory and imperative. 18 Nevertheless, procedural rules were
conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of the rules would hinder rather
than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to the latter. Pursuant to this,
Rule 1, Section 6, 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states that: SECTION 6. Construction. —
These rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding 2. It is but just, therefore, that
respondent be given every opportunity to defend himself and to pursue his appeal. To do otherwise
would be tantamount to a grave injustice. A relaxation of the rules, considering the particular
circumstance prevailing in this case is justified. 22 Where personal liberty is involved, a democratic
society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is less important to reach an unshakable
decision than to do justice.
b. Cabrera v. Ng, G.R. No. 201601, 12 March 2014, 729 PHIL 544-552

Facts:

Felix Ng (respondent) filed a complaint for sum of money with the RTC against the petitioner and her
husband Marionilo Cabrera (spouses Cabrera), alleging that the latter issued to him the following: (1)
Metrobank Check No. 0244694 dated June 30, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-One Thousand Pesos
(₱31,000.00); (2) Metrobank Check No. 0244674 dated August 9, 2002 for the amount of Thirty-Eight
Thousand Seventy-Four Pesos and Seventy-Six Centavos (₱38,074.76); and (3) Metrobank Check No.
0244745 dated August 15, 2005 for Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱2,500,000.00). That
when presented for payment, the said checks were all dishonored as the accounts from which they
had been drawn were already closed.
The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of the respondent. On August 8, 2007, the spouses Cabrera
received a copy of the RTC Decision dated August 7, 2007. On August 14, 2007, the spouses Cabrera
filed with the RTC a motion for reconsideration, which they set for hearing on August 17, 2007. On
even date, the spouses Cabrera sent a copy of their motion for reconsideration to the respondent thru
registered mail; it was actually received by the respondent on August 21, 2007. The said motion for
reconsideration, however, was not heard on August 17, 2007 as the new acting presiding judge of the
said court had just assumed office. On August 28, 2007, the RTC issued a notice, which set the said
motion for reconsideration for hearing on September 25, 2007.
On September 20, 2007, the respondent filed an opposition to the motion for reconsideration filed by
the spouses Cabrera. The respondent alleged that the said motion for reconsideration is a mere scrap
of paper since it violated the three-day notice requirement. The respondent pointed out that the
spouses Cabrera sent to him a copy of their motion for reconsideration, which was set for hearing on
August 17, 2007, via registered mail on August 14, 2007; that he actually received a copy thereof only
on August 21, 2007 – four days after the scheduled hearing thereon.
The RTC issued an Order which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the spouses Cabrera.
The RTC pointed out that the spouses Cabrera violated Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, which
mandates that every motion required to be heard should be served by the movant in such a manner
as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three days before the date of hearing. the Decision
was appealed to the CA which was subsequently denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether the Rules of Court must be construed strictly.
Held: No, the three-day notice requirement is not a hard and fast rule. When the adverse party had
been afforded the opportunity to be heard, and has been indeed heard through the pleadings filed in
opposition to the motion, the purpose behind the three-day notice requirement is deemed realized. In
such case, the requirements of procedural due process are substantially complied with.

The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper
where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party
and has not deprived the court of its authority. Indeed, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides
that the Rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, and courts must avoid their strict and rigid application
which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.

c. William Go Que Construction v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 191699, 19 April 2016, 785 PHIL 117-132
Facts:

Private respondents filed complaints[7] for illegal dismissal against petitioner William Go Que
Construction and/or William Go Que (petitioner) before the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC)... petitioner averred that private respondents were hired as project employees, and were
informed of the specific period or phase of construction wherein their services were needed.
Sometime in May 2006, petitioner learned that some workers were getting excess and cutting unused
steel bars, and selling them to junk shops, prompting him to announce that he will bring the matter to
the proper authorities. Thereafter, private respondents no longer reported for work, and were
identified by the other workers as the thieves.

petitioner filed a complaint for theft against private respondents and a certain Jimmy Dulman before
the Office of the City Prosecutor... he Labor Arbiter (LA) found petitioner to have illegally dismissed
private respondents, and declared them to be regular employees entitled to reinstatement to their
former positions without loss of seniority rights and backwages.

The LA rejected petitioner's claim that private respondents were contractual or project employees...
petitioner appealed[17] to the NLRC, arguing, among others, that Andales should not have been
included as party litigant, considering the apparent falsification of his signature in the complaint and
Verification[18] attached to their Position Paper,[19] and the fact that he could not be contacted.

the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling, holding that private respondents were validly dismissed
as they stole from petitioner

However, considering petitioner's failure to accord them procedural due process, the NLRC ordered
him to pay each of the private respondents the amount of P5,000.00 as nominal damages... the CA
granted private respondents' motion but noted that the Affidavit of Service[29] and the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[30] contained a defective jurat. Thus, private
respondents were directed to cure the defects within five (5) days from notice.

Petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation[33] before the CA pointing out the variance and
dissimilarities in the signatures of private respondents as appearing in the annexes to their petition
for certiorari.

the CA required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of Non-Forum

Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating competent evidence of their identities.

the CA held that the photocopies of the IDs submitted by Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui, as well as
their Joint-Affidavit[45] attesting to the identity of Andales who was unable to submit his ID, served
as competent evidence of private respondents' identities and cured the defect in the Affidavit of
Service, and Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
petitioner moved for reconsideration,[47] which the CA denied in a Resolution[48] dated February 5,
2010; hence, the instant petition.

Issues:

whether or not the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the petition for
certiorari before it on the ground of non-compliance with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure states that "[a] pleading is verified by an affidavit that
the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records." "A pleading required to be verified which x x x lacks a
proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading.

not being documents of identification issued by an official agency, the photocopies of the IDs[64] of
private respondents Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui from La Vista Association, Inc., R.O. Barra
Builders & Electrical Services, and St. Charbel Executive Village, respectively, do not constitute
competent evidence of their identities under Section 12 (a), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial
Practice.

Tellingly, the notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping[67] attached

to private respondents' petition before the CA did not state whether they presented competent
evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known to the notary public, and, thus, runs
afoul of the requirements of verification and certification against forum shopping... non-compliance
with the verification requirement or a defect therein "does not necessarily render the pleading fatally
defective. The court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the
ends of justice may be served thereby."[71] "Verification is deemed substantially complied with when
one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in the complaint or petition
signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are
true and correct."

Here, there was no substantial compliance with the verification requirement as it cannot be
ascertained that any of the private respondents actually swore to the truth of the allegations in the
petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 109427 given the lack of competent evidence of any of their
identities. Because of this, the fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the
allegations in the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in doubt.

Procedural rules must, at all times, be followed, save for instances when a litigant must be rescued
from an injustice far graver than the degree of his carelessness in not complying with the prescribed
procedure.[81] The limited exception does not obtain in this case.
d. Heirs of Gaudiano v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 174247, 21 February 2007, 545 PHIL 311-320

Facts:

Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the April 17 2006 RTC of Cebu denying P motion for extension
of time to file a notice of appeal and declaring its Oct 7 2005 Decision final and executor

R filed before the RTC of Cebu an action for redemption against the P.

RTC Decision

Allowing R to redeem their respective areas of cultivation from the P and directing them to execute
the documents necessary to effect the redemption

P received a copy of the Decision on Dec 21 2005 but instead of filing a notice of appeal, they filled
motion for extension of time to file a notice of Appeal on Jan 4 2006 without assistance of counsel

They claimed that their counsel Atty Villaflor suffered a stroke sometime in the middle of 2005and
that they needed another counsel to represent them

January 13 2006, they filed a notice of appeal through their new counsel Atty Santiago

RTC Cebu issued the assailed order denying the motion

o

This treats defendant’s motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal submitted on
Jan 4 2006
o

Under sec 3 Rule 41, said motion is not allowed

Hence, this Petition for review on certiorari

ISSUE: WON P belated filed of their notice of appeal justifiable WON court correctly denied P motion
for an extension of time to file notice of appeal and in declaring RTC Decision final and executor Held

Lacsamana v IAC
–
SC held that ordinary appeals by mere notice of appeal as in the instant case, no extension to file a
notice of appeal is allowed

The perfection of an appeal within the period and in the manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional and noncompliance with such legal requirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering
the judgment final and executor

The limitation on the period of appeal is not without reason. They must be strictly followed as they
are considered indispensable to forestall or avoid unreasonable delays in the administration of justice,
to ensure an orderly discharge of judicial business, and to put an end to controversies

Though as a general rule, rules or procedures are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to
the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied and are only relaxed in
very exceptional circumstances on equitable considerations, which are not present in the instant case

Being a prohibited pleading , a motion for extension of time to file a notice of appeal is a mere scrap
of paper and its filing does not toll the running of the period to appeal

P filed their notice of appeal within the period prayed for in their motion for extension but beyond
the period to appeal

Sec 2(a) and 3 of Rule 41 clearly provide that decisions of RTC may be appealed by filing a notice of
appeal within 15 days from date of receipt of notice of judgment

The filing of a notice of appeal within the reglementary period is

mandatory

Lapse of 15 days is dismissible under sec 13 Rule 41SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal.
—
Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal to the appellate court, the trial
court may,
motu proprio
or on motion, dismiss the appeal for having been taken out of time or for nonpayment of the docket
and other lawful fees within the reglementary period
.

When no timely appeal, the judgment becomes final and court loses jurisdiction over the case and
ithas no alternative but to order the execution of judgment
Neypes v CA: Court ruled that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied,
there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice

The circumstances in this case do not warrant such relaxation as the stroke of Atty was not proven or
supported with a medical certificate

There is also no evidence showing that their counsel was unable to assist them in filing the notice of
appeal

In fact, the Atty who was supposed to have a stroke filed his withdrawal 5 days after thelapse of
period to appeal

Videogram Regulatory Board v CA: Just as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his/her case
o

When decision becomes final and executor, is tantamount to a disallowance/dismissal of an appeal

and remedy of appeal is not available

Even if the assumption that appeal is available, P should not have directly filed before SC as only
questions of law may be raised

Even if SC considers this as rule 65, it is still dismissible under the hierarchy of courts
Only in special important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the petition
may it be directed straight to SC
The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provision of law

Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must strictly comply with the requirements of the
rules, and failure to do so leads to the loss of the right to appeal

DENIED