1L-M5

Constitutional Law 1

Case Digests for Final Term

Article VI - The Legislative Department

No. Case Assigned Case Digest

Student
1 Tatad vs. Secretary of Abatayo Topic under consideration: Sec. 1, Art. 6 — The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Energy, G.R. No. 124360, Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
November 5, 1997 reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.

Facts: The petitioners are challenging the constitutionality of RA 8180 or the Downstream Oil
Deregulation Act of 1996. They contend that Section 15 of the the Act violates the Constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation. Section 15 provides that “the DOE shall, upon approval of the
president, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later than March 1997. As
far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the World Market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable…”

The petitioners argue that the phrases “as far as practicable,” “decline of crude oil prices in the World
Market,” and “when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable,” are ambivalent
and unclear.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 15 of the Oil Deregulation Act violates the constitutional prohibition on
the undue delegation of legislative powers.

HELD: No, Sec. 15 of RA 8180 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative powers.

Jurisprudence teaches that a delegation of power is valid when it passes the completeness test, where
the law is complete in itself so that the delegate has nothing more left to do and decide other than to
implement it; and the sufficient standard test where there must be enough guidelines to limit the
boundaries of the delegate’s authority.

In the present case, the Court ruled that the law passes both the completeness and sufficient standard
test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start
at the end of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason.
Thus, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to
the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end of March 1997. Section 15 lays
down the standard to guide the judgment of the President — he is to time it as far as practicable when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the
exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.

Petitioners contend that the words "as far as practicable," "declining" and "stable" should have been
defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn
submission deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words are well settled and
cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence. Webster defines "practicable" as meaning possible to
practice or perform, "decline" as meaning to take a downward direction, and "stable" as meaning firmly
established.25 The fear of petitioners that these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion
that will run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the validity of similar, if not
more general standards in other cases.

Thus, Section 15 of RA 8180 does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power.
.
2 Datu Michael Kida vs. Acosta
Senate, G.R. No. 196271,
October 18, 2011
THE FACTS
Several laws pertaining to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) were enacted by
Congress. Republic Act (RA) No. 6734 is the organic act that established the ARMM and scheduled the
first regular elections for the ARMM regional officials. RA No. 9054 amended the ARMM Charter and
refined the basic ARMM structure. It also reset the regular elections for the ARMM regional officials to
the second Monday of September 2001.
RA No. 9140 further reset the first regular elections to November 26, 2001. It likewise set the plebiscite
to ratify RA No. 9054, which was successfully held on August 14, 2001. RA No. 9333 reset for the third
time the ARMM regional elections to the 2nd Monday of August 2005 and on the same date every 3
years thereafter.
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have been held on August 8, 2011.
COMELEC had begun preparations for these elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for
the various regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was enacted, resetting
the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to coincide with the regular national and local elections of
the country.
RA No. 10153 originated in the House of Representatives as House Bill No. 4146, which the House
passed on March 22, 2011 with 191 (of the 285) Members voting in its favor. The Senate adopted its
own version, Senate Bill No. 2756, on June 6, 2011. 13 (of the 23) Senators voted favorably for its
passage. On June 7, 2011, the House of Representative concurred with the Senate amendments and on
June 30, 2011, the President signed RA No. 10153 into law.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the petitioners assailed the
constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the requirement of a supermajority vote [at least 2/3 of all members of Congress] for
amendments or revisions to RA No. 9054 violate Sections 1 and 16(2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and the corollary doctrine [prohibiting] irrepealable laws.
2. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with
national and local elections.
3. Whether or not by granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and executive offices.
4. Whether or not ARMM regional officials should be allowed to remain in their respective positions
until the May 2013 elections since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits
regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover capacity.

RULING:
1.NO, the passage of RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 DOES NOT require a supermajority vote and a
plebiscite. Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 has to be
struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by requiring more than what
the Constitution demands.

Section 16(2), Article VI of the Constitution provides that a “majority of each House shall constitute a
quorum to do business.” In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to conduct business
and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally sufficient to enact laws or approve
acts.

In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds (2/3) of the
Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately, in order to effectively
amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher than what the Constitution requires
for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or
repeal the laws it had passed. The Court’s pronouncement in City of Davao v. GSIS on this subject best
explains the basis and reason for the unconstitutionality: Moreover, it would be noxious anathema to
democratic principles for a legislative body to have the ability to bind the actions of future legislative
body, considering that both assemblies are regarded with equal footing, exercising as they do the same
plenary powers. Perpetual infallibility is not one of the attributes desired in a legislative body, and a
legislature which attempts to forestall future amendments or repeals of its enactments labors under
delusions of omniscience.
Thus, while a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is constitutionally obnoxious because it significantly
constricts the future legislators’ room for action and flexibility.

2. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and
local elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which states that the first elections of Members of the
Congress under this Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The first local
elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the President, which may be simultaneous with
the election of the Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members of the city or
municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the Constitution during the
deliberation, through Davide could not have expressed their objective more clearly that there will be
a single election in 1992 for all elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms of elective
officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.

3. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates the President shall appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said offices until the officials duly elected
in the May 2013 elections shall have qualified and assumed office. The above-quoted provision did
not change the basic structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision
clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government when it recognizes the offices
of the ARMM regional government and directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices
to perform the functions pertaining to the said offices.

4. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses the intent of the framers
of the Constitution to categorically set a limitation on the period within which all elective local
officials can occupy their offices. It is established that elective ARMM officials are also local officials;
they are, thus, bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore,
becomes irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective officials from acting in
a holdover capacity. Short of amending the Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the
three-year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term of three years
 for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the Constitution, and cannot be extended
by holdover by Congress.
3 Social Justice Society vs. Balane Social Justice Society vs. Dangerous Drugs Board
Dangerous Drugs Board, Topic: Qualifications
G.R. No. 161658, FACTS
November 3, 2008
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and
regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized
national and local elections.

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004
elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December
23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a (1) natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, (2) on the day of the
election, is at least thirty - five years of age, (3) able to read and write, (4) a registered voter, and (5) a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency.

He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant,
among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for
senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress
or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

ISSUE
WoN Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, sought to be implemented under COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, imposes an additional
 qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?

HELD
YES. Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, sought to be implemented under COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, imposes an additional
qualification for candidates for senator.

NO. The Congress cannot enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by
the Constitution.

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which
circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive constitutional
limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.

If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also
without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution

The Court declared Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 as unconstitutional as it effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution.
● Sec. 36(g) requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the
validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and,
if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect.
● The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall
enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test."
● Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up
under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

4 SEMA vs. COMELEC, G.R. Buencaloloy Sema v Comelec July 16, 2008
No. 177597, July 16, 2008
 Facts:
On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to
create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No.
201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in
the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides:
Later, three new municipalities were carved out of the original nine municipalities constituting Shariff
Kabunsuan, bringing its total number of municipalities to 11. Thus, what was left of Maguindanao were
the municipalities constituting its second legislative district. Cotabato City, although part of
Maguindanao’s first legislative district, is not part of the Province of Maguindanao.
On 6 February 2007, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City passed Resolution No. 3999
requesting the COMELEC to “clarify the status of Cotabato City in view of the conversion of the First
District of Maguindanao into a regular province” under MMA Act 201.
Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department
under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007, provides in pertinent parts:
Considering the foregoing, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to adopt the
recommendation of the Law Department that pending the enactment of the appropriate law by
Congress, to maintain the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First
Legislative District of Maguindanao.
On 10 May 2007, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 7902, subject of these petitions, amending
Resolution No. 07-0407 by renaming the legislative district in question as “Shariff Kabunsuan Province
with Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City).”

Issue:
(1) whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is
constitutional; and
(2) if in the affirmative, whether a province created by the ARMM Regional Assembly under
MMA Act 201 pursuant to Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is entitled to one representative in the
House of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for such province.

Held:
Section 19, Article VI of Republic Act No. 9054 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it grants to
the Regional Assembly of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao the power to create
provinces and cities. Thus, Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 creating the Province of Shariff
Kabunsuan is void. Consequently, we rule that COMELEC Resolution No. 7902 is VALID.
The creation of any of the four local government units – province, city, municipality or barangay – must
comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed
in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the
Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for
Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units.
However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises
with any provision of the Constitution. But under the Local Government Code, “only x x x an Act of
Congress” can create provinces, cities or municipalities.
The creation of provinces and cities is another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, “Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall
have at least one representative” in the House of Representatives. Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution provides, “Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member x x x.”
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the
same reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative
district.
This textual commitment to Congress of the exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts
is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase in its allowable membership or in its
incumbent membership through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied in a national law.
Only Congress can enact such a law. It would be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to
create or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like Congress. An inferior legislative
body, created by a superior legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior legislative
body.
The creation of a legislative district by Congress does not emanate alone from Congress’ power to
reapportion legislative districts, but also from Congress’ power to create provinces which cannot be
 created without a legislative district. Thus, when a province is created, a legislative district is created by
operation of the Constitution because the Constitution provides that “each province shall have at least
one representative” in the House of Representatives.
It is axiomatic that organic acts of autonomous regions cannot prevail over the Constitution. Section
20, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that the legislative powers of regional assemblies are
limited “[w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national
laws, x x x.” The Preamble of the ARMM Organic Act (RA 9054) itself states that the ARMM
Government is established “within the framework of the Constitution.”
Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces
and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the
Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can
create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation
of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot
create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province
shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a
national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of
the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20,
Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly
and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.
Therefore, only a national law made by the Congress can be considered in the creation of a position for
a representative in the HoR and cannot be made by any other department. No express delegation in the
Constitution was stated thus any implication regarding this matter is non-meritorious.

5 Ang Ladlad vs. COMELEC, Catiel

G.R. No. 190582, April 8, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v COMELEC
2010 Topic: Party-list Representatives

Facts:
• The case deals with the COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization
under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act based on moral
grounds. COMELEC argues that based on the definition of the LGBT sector, Ladlad tolerates immorality
which offends religious beliefs
• Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied
for registration with the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground
that the organization had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed
a Petition5 for registration with the COMELEC.
• Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-
represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender
identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied
with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance
• COMELEC’s refusal is based on the premise that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per se
would benefit the nation as a whole. It also argued that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors
enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941. The COMELEC also claimed that petitioner was "not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed
to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections

Issue: WoN Ang Ladlad LGBT Party should be accredited as a party-list organization

Ruling: Yes.

Article VI, Sec 5(2) of the Constitution provides:

The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by
law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
As the SC ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v COMELEC, the enumeration of marginalized
and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. In addition, the Court also found that there has been no
 misrepresentation. Ladlad is a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines
composed of various LGBT networks. He Court found that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation.

Additional Notes, in case Atty asks:

On COMELEC’s refusal based on immorality (The COMELEC used religion as basis for refusal)

The SC ruled: Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-
establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad

Refusal based on public morals

COMELEC contends that petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth.

The SC ruled: COMELEC has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its
position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably
damage the moral fabric of society. As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list
system.

6 Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, Catorce

G.R. No. 176970
G.R. No. 176970,
December 8, 2008 December 08, 2008
TOPIC
VI. The Legislative BAGABUYO, petitioner v. COMELEC, respondent
Department

2. The House of
Representatives
Facts:
Section 5, Article VI
of the Const On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro’s then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula filed and sponsored House Bill
No. 5859: An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro or
RA No. 9371.

It increased Cagayan de Oro’s legislative district from one to two. For the election of May 2007, CDO’s voters would
be classified as belonging to either the first or the second district, depending on their place of residence. On March 13,2007,
COMELEC promulgated a resolution implementing the said act. Bagabuyo filed a petition at the Supreme Court asking for
the nullification of RA 9371 and Resolution No. 7837 on constitutional grounds. Petitioner argued that COMELEC cannot
implement a law without the commencement of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division and conversion of a local
govt. unit.

Issue:

Whether or not the law, of which pertains to the legislative apportionment of a city, involve the division and
conversion of a local government unit, necessitating a plebiscite

Ruling:

Petition is DISMISSED.

The Court upheld the respondent's arguments saying that such law only increased the representation of CDO in the
House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and alteration of
boundaries under Art. X Sec. 10 requires the commencement of a plebiscite, while legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec.5 need not. There was also no change in CDO’s territory, population, income and
classification.
 Legislative apportionment is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary as the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It is the allocation of seats in a
legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting
power among the districts. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the realignment or change in legislative districts brought
about by changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of representation. RA 9371 does
not have the effect of dividing the City of Cagayan de Oro into two political and corporate units and territories.

Rather than divide the city either territorially or as a corporate entity, the effect is merely to enhance voter
representation by giving each city voter more and greater say, both in Congress and in the Sangguniang Panglunsod. The
City, for its part, now has twice the number of congressmen speaking for it and voting in the halls of Congress. Since the total
number of congressmen in the country has not increased to the point of doubling its numbers, the presence of two
congressmen (instead of one) from the same city is a quantitative and proportional improvement in the representation of
Cagayan de Oro City in Congress.

Additional Information from the Jurisprudence:

The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called a political unit because it
is the basis for the election of a member of the House of Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It
is not, however, a political subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. It can more appropriately
be described as a representative unit that may or may not encompass the whole of a city or a province, but unlike the
latter, it is not a corporate unit. Not being a corporate unit, a district does not act for and in behalf of the people
comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their
national affairs. Unlike a province, which has a governor; a city or a municipality, which has a mayor; and a barangay,
which has a punong barangay, a district does not have its own chief executive. The role of the congressman that it
elects is to ensure that the voice of the people of the district is heard in Congress, not to oversee the affairs of the
legislative district. Not being a corporate unit also signifies that it has no legal personality that must be created or
dissolved and has no capacity to act. Hence, there is no need for any plebiscite in the creation, dissolution or any other
similar action on a legislative district.

The local government units, on the other hand, are political and corporate units. They are the territorial and political
35
subdivisions of the state. They possess legal personality on the authority of the Constitution and by action of the
Legislature. The Constitution defines them as entities that Congress can, by law, create, divide, abolish, merge; or
36
whose boundaries can be altered based on standards again established by both the Constitution and the Legislature.
A local government unit's corporate existence begins upon the election and qualification of its chief executive and a
 37
majority of the members of its Sanggunian.

As a political subdivision, a local government unit is an "instrumentality of the state in carrying out the functions of
38
government." As a corporate entity with a distinct and separate juridical personality from the State, it exercises
special functions for the sole benefit of its constituents. It acts as "an agency of the community in the administration of
39 40
local affairs" and the mediums through which the people act in their corporate capacity on local concerns. In light of
these roles, the Constitution saw it fit to expressly secure the consent of the people affected by the creation, division,
merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of local government units through a plebiscite.

These considerations clearly show the distinctions between a legislative apportionment or reapportionment and the
division of a local government unit. Historically and by its intrinsic nature, a legislative apportionment does not mean,
and does not even imply, a division of a local government unit where the apportionment takes place. Thus, the
plebiscite requirement that applies to the division of a province, city, municipality or barangay under the Local
Government Code should not apply to and be a requisite for the validity of a legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.

7 Aquino III vs. COMELEC, Cumpio-Lada FACTS: Republic Act No. 9716 was signed into law by President Arroyo on 12 October 2009. It
G.R. No. 189793, April 7, took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Manila
2010 Standard, a newspaper of general circulation. In substance, the said law created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring the existing first and
second legislative districts of the province.

Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was estimated to have a
population of 1,693,821, distributed among four (4) legislative districts.

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and second districts of Camarines
Sur were reconfigured in order to create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence,
the first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando
were combined with the second district municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new
second legislative district.
 Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of
the explicit constitutional standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district.The petitioners claim that the
reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as basis for the cited 250,000
minimum population standard.

Issue: W/O RA 9716 is unconstitutional?

Held:

It was ruled that the said act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section
5 (3) of the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative,
with nothing was mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum
population of 250,000 must first be satisfied. In 2007, Camsur had a population of
1,693,821 making the province entitled to 2 additional districts from the present
four. Baed on the formulation of Ordinance, other than the population, the results
of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors were mentioned during
the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.

8 Romualdez-Marcos vs. Daugdaug Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
COMELEC, G.R. No.
119976, September 18, Topic under Consideration: The House of Representatives- Qualifications
1995
Section 6, Article VI: No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of
age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district
in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election.
Facts 1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present
Tacloban City, she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken
up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught
in one of the schools in that city.

2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.

3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her
husband having been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him
and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel,
Manila.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the
exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty
positions successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.

6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the
Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in
1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely
temporary residences.

7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her
certificate of candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and
resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the
Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that
9 Aquino vs. COMELEC, G.R. Gulfan
No. 120265, September FACTS:
18, 1995 On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative for
the new Second Legislative District of Makati City.

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino 2 on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the
Constitution, should be for a period not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections.

On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another certificate of candidacy
amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (l) year and thirteen (13) days, saying that he had
been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year prior to 8 May 1995.

However, COMELEC insists that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City the latter must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice.

ISSUE:

WoN Agapito Aquino meets the residency qualification in order to run as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City.

THESIS:

No, Agapito Aquino has not met the residency qualification in order to run as a candidate for Representative of the
Second District of Makati City.

RULING:

Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,” where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his domicile, is that to which the
Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of election law. The manifest purpose
of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as explained in Gallego vs. Vera is "to
exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the conditions and needs of the community" from
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in that community for electoral gain.

ANALYSIS:

As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he
was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate
indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion,
Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by
petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.

Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of condominium
unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted: The intention not to establish a permanent home in
Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative
of respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove
abandonment of one's original domicile especially since, by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and
respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other "residences"
in Manila or Quezon City.

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon, the
fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with the short
length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of his stated
domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical residence" 27
is not to acquire's new residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second
District of Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile
 under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification — sentimental, actual or otherwise — with
the area, and the suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner's claim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of
Makati.

CONCLUSION:

Thus, Agapito Aquino has not met the residency requirement and should be disqualified as a candidate running for the
position of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati

10 Bengzon vs. Cruz, G.R. No.

142840, May 7, 2001
Linao
BENGSON VS. HRET AND CRUZ
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ

G.R. No. 142840

May 7, 2001

FACTS: The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that “no person shall be a Member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen.”

Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, “rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.”

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.

In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An
Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for
reelection.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.

HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative in the said election.

ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

HELD: petition dismissed

YES

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:

1. by naturalization,

2. by repatriation, and

3. by direct act of Congress

Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:

1. desertion of the armed forces;

2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;

3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,

4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and

5. political economic necessity

Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
 Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

R.A. No. 2630 provides:

Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from the
Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the act
of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.

11 Valles vs. COMELEC, G.R. Nacorda CASE DIGEST

No. 137000, August 9,
CONSTI TOPIC: The legislative department: The House of Representatives: Qualifications
2000

VALLES VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000

FACTS:

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and... came to settle in the Philippines.

After being married to Leopoldo Lopez a Filipino citizen on she has continuously participated in the electoral process
not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. Her election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition
for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor her... alleged Australian citizenship... finding
no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc
dismissed the petition.

During the 1995 local elections, respondent ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental which was contested by
her opponent Francisco Rabat on ground of her citizenship but said petition was dismissed by COMELEC, reiterating
substantially its decision in EPC 92-54. The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when
she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 and question raised by the herein petitioner,
Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336

COMELEC's First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition... petitioner herein has presented no new
evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066. Petitioner theorizes that under the
aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino citizenship.

According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the
mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public office
did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled
with her alleged renunciation of

Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to run
for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded. Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections
erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under consideration

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has
nonetheless renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondent's
application for an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September
19, 1988, and the issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12,
1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled. Since her
renunciation was effective, petitioner's claim that private respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation
holds no water.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez disqualifies her from running as an electoral candidate

RULING:
The Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens
with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: “x x x the phrase ‘dual citizenship’
in R.A. No. 7160, x x x 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, x x x 20 must be understood as referring
to ‘dual allegiance.’ Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification.

The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify
her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship,
it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen. This is so because in the certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines
and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath,
operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein
private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone terminated her
Australian citizenship.

The mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an
Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective
renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. For renunciation
to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express. As held by this court in the
aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent
for an alien certificate of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of
Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively
renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship—she was an Australian
 and a Filipino, as well.

Hence, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was qualified to run as candidate for Philippine elections.

12 Dimaporo vs. Mitra, Rosales Dimaporo v. Mitra

Jr.,G.R. No. 96859, GR 96859, 202 SCRA 779 [Oct 15, 1991]
October 15, 1991 TOPIC: House of Representatives Term of office

Facts. Petitioner incumbent Rep. Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur filed on Jan 15, 1990 for Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the ARMM. Respondent Speaker Mitra and the Sec.
of the House then excluded Dimaporo’s name from its Roll of Members xxx, considering him
permanently resigned from his office upon filing of his Certificate of Candidacy pursuant to the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881) Art IX, Sec 67 which states “any elective official xxx running for any office other
than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for the Pres. and VP shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. Having lost
in the election, Dimaporo expressed his intention “to resume performing” his “duties as elected Member
of Congress” but he failed his bid hence this petition. He argues that Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 is
unconstitutional in that it provides for the shortening of a congressman’s term of office on a ground not
provided for in the Constitution.

Issue. Does Sec 67, Art IX of BP 881 shorten a term of a congressman by means other than that
provided in the Constitution?

Held. No. Dimaporo seems to confuse “term” with “tenure” of office. The term of office prescribed by
the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an
officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances xxx. Under the questioned
provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of candidacy for another office, he
is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure not his term. The term remains xxx. Forfeiture is
automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy for another office
xxx. It is not necessary that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec 13, Art
 VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec 67, Art. IX of BP, Blg. 881, which is
actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec 7(2) of Art VI of the Constitution. Petition
dismissed.
13 Quinto vs. COMELEC, G.R. Uy
No. 189698, December 1, Topic: The Legislative Department (Section 7, Article VI)
2009
Facts:

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners, who held appointive positions in
government and who intended to run in the 2010 elections, assailed Section 4(a) of COMELEC’s
Resolution No. 8678, which deemed appointed officials automatically (ipso facto) resigned from office
upon the filing of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC). Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 is
a reproduction of the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369. The
proviso was lifted from Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Petitioners averred that they should not be deemed ipso facto resigned from their government
offices when they file their CoCs, because at such time they are not yet treated by law as candidates.
They should be considered resigned from their respective offices only at the start of the campaign
period when they are, by law, already considered as candidates. (Section 11 of R.A. No. 8436, as
amended by Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 provides that any person filing his certificate of candidacy
within the period set by COMELEC shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign
period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.) Petitioners further averred that the assailed
provision is discriminatory and violates the equal protection clause in the Constitution.

Representing the COMELEC, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the petition
was premature and petitioners had no legal standing since they were not yet affected by the assailed
provision, not having as yet filed their CoCs. The OSG also argued that petitioners could not avail the
remedy of certiorari since what they were questioning was an issuance of the COMELEC made in the
exercise of its rule-making power. The OSG further averred that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
discretion in phrasing Section 4(a) of its Resolution No. 8678 since it merely copied what was in the law.
The OSG, however, agreed that there is no basis to consider appointive officials as ipso facto resigned
upon filing their CoCs because they are not yet considered as candidates at that time.
Issue:

Whether or not Section 4(a) of COMELEC’s Resolution No. 8678 and the laws upon which it was
based (second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369 and Section 66 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) are unconstitutional?

TRAC:

Yes, the second provision in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, Section
66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 were declared as
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause and for being overbroad.

“In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts
upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the
elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone that there is substantial
distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those occupying elective posts, does not
justify such differential treatment.”

There are 4 requisites for a valid classification that will justify differential treatment between
classes: (a) It must be based upon substantial distinctions; (b) It must be germane to the purposes of
the law; (c) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) It must apply equally to all
members of the class. The differential treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to
those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law. “(W)hether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain.” An
appointive official could wield the same dangerous and coercive influence on the electorate as the
elective official. Both may be motivated by political considerations rather than the public’s welfare, use
their governmental positions to promote their candidacies, or neglect their duties to attend to their
campaign. There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective
ones.

The challenged provision is also overbroad because: (a) It pertains to all civil servants holding
appointive posts without distinction as to whether they occupy high positions in government or not (It
would be absurd to consider a utility worker in the government as ipso facto resigned once he files his
CoC; it is unimaginable how he can use his position in the government to wield influence in the political
world.); and (b) It is directed to the activity of seeking any and all public offices, whether they be
partisan or nonpartisan in character, whether they be in the national, municipal or barangay level.
Congress has not shown a compelling state interest to restrict the fundamental right involved on such a
sweeping scale.