in Numenius and Plotinus

Being
Some Points of Comparison

DOMINIC J. O'MEARA

n his Vita Plotini (17,1-6), Porphyry tells us that "when the people
Greece began to say that Plotinus was appropriating the
< from
ideas of Numenius, and Trypho the Stoic and Platonist told
Amelius, the latter wrote a book to which we gave the title 'On the
Difference between the Doctrines of Plotinus and Numenius' "(trans.
Armstrong). Whilst this evidence cautions us against making rap-
prochements between Plotinus and Numenius which overlook the
differences between their respective doctrines, it also encourages us
to compare these doctrines, and research has in fact brought to light
Numenian material in the Enneads of Plotinus. Without going into a
discussion of the results of this research', this article will propose
further possible points of comparison, with respect in particular to
certain accounts of true Being in Plotinus and Numenius, and suggest
that these might provide additional indications of Numenian in-
fluence in Plotinus' thought. The account of Being given by Plotinus
in Enneads VI 4, ch. 2 and VI 5, ch. 3 will first be examined, in re-
lation in particular to the use made in these texts of Plato's Payrne-
nides. A comparison will then be proposed between an aspect of the
Plotinian account and Being as described by Numenius, this leading
to a brief discussion of the possibility that Numenius may not only
have influenced the account of Being given in Enneads VI 4 and 5,
but may also have provided a precedent to Plotinus' use of the Par-
menides in these works.

Plotinus treatsin Enneads VI 4 and 5 of the problem of "integral

omnipresence", that is the question of how intelligible being (true
Being) can be present in a multiplicity of sensible objects without
thereby suffering division and fragmentation. This issue had been
raised in the first part of Plato's Parmenides, and Enneads VI 4 and 5
seem to refer to 'the Paymenides in relation both to the problem of
integral omnipresence and to that part of its solution based on an

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exposition of the integrity of Being, an exposition using aspects of
the description of the second hypothesis, the "One that is", in the
second part of the Platonic dialogue2. E. R. Dodds has of course
shown that the latter use of the Parmenides is not uncommon in Plo-
tinus, the Platonic hypotheses being taken by Plotinus as expressions
of the various hypostases or levels of reality3. Recalling (and adding to)
the textual parallels adduced by Dodds and others, we will set forth
briefly the use made in Enneads VI 5, ch. 3 and VI 4, ch. 2 of the
Parmenides, in the description of the integrity of Being.
Plotinus says of Being in VI 5,3,3-7: mvcxyx-nxuro 9zov asi TE

ToSs 7cpoc'vcxL E:(X '7c'

oc',ro5. uWith this we may compare a
description of the "One that is" of the Paymenides : £«Tqxi Trou,

Èv 't'0 &'1 Ev However, whilst asserting the iden-

tity with itself of Being, from which there is no secession, Plotinus
sees Being, paradoxically, as present also in others: s? o5v
I«u<06 cx.1ho
6xov A similar paradox is

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put forward in relation to the "One that is" in the Parmenides :
ouv e v ðÀov This suggestion is rejected;
only by division can the "One that is" be present at
the one time in all parts of being (Paym. 144c 8-d 4). Plotinus, however,
holds to both the integrity of Being and its presence in others, and
gives a solution to the paradox which, whilst making omnipresence
possible, enables him to avoid dividing the identical unity of Being
ev x«1 Tau'ro v I in which there is no
"fluxion" or movement out from itself which would imply its dis-
persall. Being remains whole in itself: oaov OV,
I The same emphasis, in the language
«4<1
of the Paymenides, on the integral perfection of Being8, in which there
is no movement outwards, no abandoning of this integrity, is found
in Ennead VI 4, ch. 2 : Being does not "leave itself ", but rather that
in which it is present partakes of it by moving towards it, by finding
Being in its integrity, "in itself"9.
It is apparent from these similarities of word and phrase in Enneads
VI 4, 2 and VI 5,3 and in the Paymenides that despite a disparity in
philosophical contexts (and hence the differing meanings and functions
carried by these words and phrases), Plotinus finds in the Paymenides'
treatment of the "One that is" expressions of his thesis of the integrity
in itself of Being, an integrity unmarred by any movement away
or dispersal in Being. Plotinus is not, properly speaking, directly
quoting from the Paymenides, nor is he providing in any sense a
commentary on the dialogue. His selective and adaptive use of the
Platonic text in the expression of his own argument can be regarded

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however as constituting a certain reading or interpretation of the
dialogue, an interpretation guided primarily, it would seem, by his
particular preoccupations, namely his doctrine of the integrity of
Being as an identity in, with, or by itself of Being, an identity un-
broken by any movement outwards, and his desire to reconcile with
this integrity the omnipresence of Being.

In stressing, in his use of the Paymenides, the identity in itself of

Being in Enneads VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 3, Plotinus does not allow any
disruption of this identity: there can be no movement outwards of
Being, no splitting up or dispersal of Beinglo. There can be no "depar-
ture from itself" in Being (oux ÉrJ.u't'ou) 11.Although
"departure from itself" does not appear in the Parmenides12, there is
evidence that precisely in this metaphorical sense, is by no
means uncommon in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition. It is
found in the Cratylus (439 e), where, in describing "Beauty itself",
Plato says: Ei 3è: eXd ExEGxod TO ocuro E6T6, 't"ou't'6 ye
oc'uro5 L3érJ.ç; Again,
in the Republic (II, 380 d 5-e 1), questioning this time the notion
that God assumes different forms, Plato asks § &7tÀouvTE Elva? [sc.

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67c' &nou ; Finally we may refer to the "receptacle" of the Timaeus,
*
which Plato states (50 b 6-8): TauTOV«4zQv eXd 7tpoap"fJ't'Éov'
concerning

"Departure" reappears in Aristotle, in the De anima (I 3, 406 b 11-14)

for example, where it is thought that if soul does not move herself j5ey
accidens, M'V O'ua'taq, and the word continues to be used
afterwards in a similar way in the Aristotelian tradition. As possible
antecedents therefore to the Being of Plotinus which does not "depart
from itself" we find God, Beauty and the "receptacle" (in Plato),
and perhaps soul (in Aristotle), which are said not to "depart" from
their particular "form" or being.
Closer however to Plotinus, in the sense that (i) the "departure"
in question concerns true Being generally 6v), rather than the Form
of Beauty or God, and that (ii) this "departure" is specifically a depar-
ture "from itself" (rather than from the subject's particular form or
nature), is a passage in a fragment surviving from Numenius' account
of true Being in the second book of his work On the Goodls. It will be
convenient for the purposes of comparison to juxtapose the Numenian
passage with the opening lines of Plotinus Enn. VI 5, 3.

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 (Numenius Fr. 8 = Fr. 17 L.)16 (Plotinus Enn. VI 5,3,1-3)
The comparison of these two passages (which are not necessarily
related on a close textual level) reveals certain points of similarity.
In both, a description of Being in general is given, in which the
Platonic doctrine of the unchanging identical existence of intelligible
being" is complemented by the denial of departure from itself in Being.
The condition of remaining identical is paralleled by that of remaining
in oneself, and as there is no change in the identical existence of
Being, so Being does not depart from itself.
The Numenian passage may be further explicated in this sense by
reference to other fragments surviving from the second book of On
the Good and preceding in that book the passage quoted above. In
Fr. 5 (Fr. 14 L.), Being is characterized by its eternal identity of
existence (a's't x«T« There can be no change or movement in
this identity of existence, and such is the identity of existence of
Being that Being does not "depart" from this identity, nor can it be
compelled to do so by another: ilv«i 3è &7tÀouvxon «va?aoic?TOV xai £v
x'rJ.t £81xo4«iov ucp
hépou Numenius remains close here in expression
and thought to Plato: Being maintains an unchanging identical exis-
tence, a sameness of form from which it does not depart. The phrase

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 however, becomes in Fr. 8
a transition providing a close parallel to Plotinus' expression
in its particular formulation and in its application to Being generally.
It may be felt, however, that there is nothing particularly significant
in the similarities between Numenius Fr. 8 and Being in Plotinus Enn.
VI 5, 3. In both passages, an item of traditional Platonism is involved,
Plotinus and Numenius merely providing variations on a theme
found already in the lines which we have quoted from the Cyatylus
and the Republic. That both Numenius and Plotinus refer to Being in
general (rather than to the Beautiful of the Cyatylus, or to the God
of the Republic) is not particularly surprising, as both happen to be
using the Being/Becoming contrast of the Timaeus20. As for "departure
from itself" in Numenius and Plotinus, the distinction between
this reflexive use of the metaphor of departure and the usage found in
Plato (departure from one's particular form or being) seems unimpor-
tant, as both usages are closely related in meaning, and the passage
from one to the other is easily made 21. Nevertheless, although the
similarities between Numenius and Plotinus may not appear in them-
selves as remarkable, seeming little else than a coincidence of variations
on a traditional theme, these variations may be seen, with equal
probability, as indications that Numenius influenced, by his particular
presentation of a traditional concept, the way in which Plotinus
formulated that concept. What is involved is not so much a specifically
Numenian conception adopted by Plotinus, as a Numenian presen-
tation of a Platonic dogma which influenced in turn Plotinus' presen-
tation of that dogma. The likelihood of this being true (rather than
there being merely an unimportant coincidence of variations on a
theme) is reinforced by the consideration that the Numenian passage
is not an isolated text coinciding with a Plotinian phrase, but forms
part of the extensive account of Being given by Numenius in the
second book of his 0,?t the Good, an account which, in another respect,
is thought to have probably influenced Plotinus22.

The denial of "departure from itself" in Being in Enn. VI 5, 3 forms

part of a context in which Plotinus makes much use of the Paymenides

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(above pp. 120-123) in the expression of the integrity of Being, an iden-
tity in itself unimpaired by any movement outwards. If an element of
this account of Being can be related, as we have proposed, to the
Numenian treatment of Being, the possibility arises that Numenius'
influence may have extended perhaps also to the use made by Plo-
tinus of the Paymenides in his description of Being. Examination of
what remains of the second book of Numenius' On the Good seems at
first to indicate that there may be grounds for finding in Numenius
a precedent to the Plotinian reading of the Paymenides in Enneads
VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 3. In Fr. 5 (14 L.), Numenius deals with Being in
relation to Time, and to Change and iuovement. Fr. 6(15 L.), an extract
taken from a later section in the second book of On the Good23, relates
to the Name of the incorporeal existence which is Being. The structure
of this treatment of Being, allowance being made for the missing
material between Frr. 5 and 6 and for the fragmentary nature of the
surviving passages, may be compared possibly to the structure of the
argument in the Paymenides, where the One is treated successively
under such headings as: Whole/Part, Place, Change and Moroement,
Identity/Difference, Likeness/Unlikeness, Equality/Inequality, Time,
Name and Knowledge24. If Numenius does indeed treat of Being in
terms of Time, Change and Movement, Name, all headings suggested
by the Paymenides, the Numenian fragments, in the details of their
treatment, do not however show an immediate relationship with the
corresponding sections of the Parmenides. Thus, concerning Being in
relation to Change and Movement, Numenius uses a classification of
movement closer to an Aristotelian classification than to that suggested
by the Payrnenides25. Similarly, on the subject of Being and Time, the

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Numenian account seems to use sources other than the Parmenides2s.
It might be felt, however, that Numenius drew from a variety of
sources, and that the absence of detailed use of the Parmenides in
the few fragments that have survived does not preclude the possibility
that the Platonic dialogue was present in other parts of On the Good.
To conclude, therefore, we do not feel, despite certain similarities,
that the evidence we have permits us to consider Numenius as pro-
viding, in his treatment of Being, a reading of the Paymenides which
constituted a precedent to Plotinus' own reading and use of the dialogue
in Enneads VI 4, 2 and VI 5, 327. However, it is suggested that a
Numenian formulation of Platonic ontology, in which identity of
existence in Being is shown as an identity in itself of Being from which
there is no "departure", reappears in Plotinus' presentation of the
integrity of Being in Enneads VI 4 and 5, the Numenian account
furnishing also perhaps a point of view which influenced Plotinus in
his use of the Parmenides in these works. More generally, we may feel
justified in attributing to this possible Numenian influence at least
part responsibility for that rather static sameness with which Plo-

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tinus sometimes endows Being, an existence which appears elsewhere
in the Enneads as a dynamic and diversified intelligible world"'.

The Catholic University o f America, Washington D.C.

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