Heirs of Margarita Prodon vs. Heirs of Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina On November 5, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, 6 finding untenable the
clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 170604               September 2, 2013
HEIRS OF MARGARITA PRODON, PETITIONERS,  Maximo Alvarez in favor of defendant Margarita Prodon has been
vs.
HEIRS OF MAXIMO S. ALVAREZ AND VALENTINA CLAVE,
REPRESENTED BY REV. MAXIMO ALVAREZ,
JR., RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a written
document are the subject of the inquiry. In an action for quieting of title
based on the inexistence of a deed of sale with right to repurchase that
purportedly cast a cloud on the title of a property, therefore, the Best
Evidence Rule does not apply, and the defendant is not precluded from
presenting evidence other than the original document.
The Case
This appeal seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on
August 18, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
judgment rendered on November 5, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 35, in Manila in Civil Case No. 96-78481 entitled Heirs of
Maximo S Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo S.
Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo Alvarez, Jr. v.
Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City of Manila
dismissing the respondents’ action for quieting of title. 2
Antecedents
In their complaint for quieting of title and damages against Margarita
Prodon,3 the respondents averred as the plaintiffs that their parents, the
late spouses Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave, were the
registered owners of that parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 84797 of the Register of Deeds of Manila; that their
parents had been in possession of the property during their lifetime; that
upon their parents’ deaths, they had continued the possession of the
property as heirs, paying the real property taxes due thereon; that they
could not locate the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. 84797, but the
original copy of TCT No. 84797 on file with the Register of Deeds of
Manila was intact; that the original copy contained an entry stating that
the property had been sold to defendant Prodon subject to the right of
repurchase; and that the entry had been maliciously done by Prodon
because the deed of sale with right to repurchase covering the property did
not exist. Consequently, they prayed that the entry be cancelled, and that
Prodon be adjudged liable for damages.
The entry sought to be cancelled reads:
ENTRY NO. 3816/T-84797 - SALE W/ RIGHT TO REPURCHASE IN
FAVOR OF: MARGARITA PRODON, SINGLE, FOR THE SUM
OF P120,000.00, THE HEREIN REGISTERED OWNER RESERVING
FOR HIMSELF THE RIGHTS TO REPURCHASE SAID PROPERTY FOR
THE SAME AMOUNT WITHIN THE PERIOD OF SIX MONTH (sic)
FROM EXECUTION THEREOF. OTHER CONDITION SET FORTH IN
(DOC. NO. 321, PAGE 66, BOOK NO. VIII OF LISEO A. RAZON,
NOT.PUB. OF MANILA)
DATE OF INSTRUMENT - SEPT. 9, 1975
DATE OF INSCRIPTION - SEPT. 10, 1975,
AT 3:42 P.M.4
In her answer,5 Prodon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had
executed on September 9, 1975 the deed of sale with right to repurchase;
that the deed had been registered with the Register of Deeds and duly
annotated on the title; that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been granted
six months from September 9, 1975 within which to repurchase the
property; and that she had then become the absolute owner of the
property due to its non-repurchase within the given 6-month period.
During trial, the custodian of the records of the property attested that the
copy of the deed of sale with right to repurchase could not be found in the
files of the Register of Deeds of Manila.
plaintiffs’ contention that the deed of sale with right to repurchase did not
exist. It opined that although the deed itself could not be presented as
evidence in court, its contents could nevertheless be proved by secondary
evidence in accordance with Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
upon proof of its execution or existence and of the cause of its
unavailability being without bad faith. It found that the defendant had
established the execution and existence of the deed, to wit:
In the case under consideration, the execution and existence of the
disputed deed of sale with right to repurchase accomplished by the late
adequately established by reliable and trustworthy evidences (sic).
Defendant Prodon swore that on September 9, 1975 she purchased the
land covered by TCT No. 84747 (Exhibit 1) from its registered owners
Maximo S. Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave (TSN, Aug. 1, 1997, pp.5-7);
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase was drawn and prepared by
Notary Public Eliseo Razon (Ibid., p. 9); and that on September 10, 1975,
she registered the document in the Register of Deeds of Manila (Ibid.,
pp.18-19).
The testimony of Margarita Prodon has been confirmed by the Notarial
Register of Notary Public Eliseo Razon dated September 10, 1975 (Exhibit
2), and by the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds of Manila
(Exhibit 4).
Page 66 of Exhibit 2 discloses, among others, the following entries, to wit:
"No. 321; Nature of Instrument: Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase;
Name of Persons: Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Alvarez (ack.); Date
and Month: 9 Sept." (Exhibit 2-a).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, also reveals the following data, to wit:
‘Number of Entry: 3816; Month, Day and Year: Sept. 10, 1975; Hour and
Minute: 3:42 p.m.; Nature of Contract: Sale with Right to Repurchase;
Executed by: Maximo S. Alvarez; In favor: Margarita Prodon; Date of
Document: 9-9-75; Contract value: 120,000.’ (Exhibit 4-a). Under these
premises the Court entertains no doubt about the execution and existence
of the controverted deed of sale with right to repurchase. 7
The RTC rejected the plaintiffs’ submission that the late Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. could not have executed the deed of sale with right to repurchase
because of illness and poor eyesight from cataract. It held that there was
no proof that the illness had rendered him bedridden and immobile; and
that his poor eyesight could be corrected by wearing lenses.
The RTC concluded that the original copy of the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been lost, and that earnest efforts had been exerted to
produce it before the court. It believed Jose Camilon’s testimony that he
had handed the original to one Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao, but that he could
not anymore retrieve such original from Atty. Lacanilao because the latter
had meanwhile suffered from a heart ailment and had been recuperating.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the respondents assigned the following errors, namely:
A.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE DUE
EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE
WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS BEEN DULY PROVED BY THE
DEFENDANT.
B.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE PIECES OF
EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE DEFENDANTS AS PROOFS OF THE
DUE EXECUTION AND EXISTENCE OF THE QUESTIONED DEED OF
SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE.
C.
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
QUESTIONED DEED OF SALE WITH RIGHT TO REPURCHASE HAS
BEEN LOST OR OTHERWISE COULD NOT BE PRODUCED IN COURT
WITHOUT THE FAULT OF THE DEFENDANT.
D.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN REJECTING THE
PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIM THAT THEIR FATHER COULD NOT HAVE
EXECUTED THE QUESTIONED DOCUMENT AT THE TIME OF ITS
ALLEGED EXECUTION.8
On August 18, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, reversing
the RTC, and ruling as follows:
The case of the Department of Education Culture and Sports (DECS) v. evidence because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the loss or destruction
Del Rosario in GR No. 146586 (January 26, 2005) is instructive in of the deed.
resolving this issue. The said case held:
In fine, the Court finds that the secondary evidence should not have been
"Secondary evidence of the contents of a document refers to evidence admitted because Margarita Prodon failed to prove the existence of the
other than the original document itself. A party may introduce secondary original deed of sale and to establish its loss.
evidence of the contents of a written instrument not only when the
original is lost or destroyed, but also when it cannot be produced in court, xxxx
provided there is no bad faith on the part of the offeror. However, a party
must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the Regional Trial
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to
Court of Manila, Branch 35 in Civil Case No. 96-78481 is hereby
the court proof of loss or other satisfactory explanation for non-
REVERSED and a new one entered ordering the cancellation of Entry No.
production of the original instrument. The correct order of proof is as
3816/T-84797 inscribed at the back of TCT No. 84797 in order to remove
follows: existence, execution, loss, contents, although the court in its
the cloud over plaintiff-appellants’ title.
discretion may change this order if necessary."
SO ORDERED.9
It is clear, therefore, that before secondary evidence as to the contents of a
document may be admitted in evidence, the existence of [the] document
must first be proved, likewise, its execution and its subsequent loss. The heirs of Margarita Prodon (who meanwhile died on March 3, 2002)
filed an Omnibus Motion for Substitution of Defendant and for
Reconsideration of the Decision,10 wherein they alleged that the CA erred:
In the present case, the trial court found all three (3) prerequisites ha[ve]
(a) in finding that the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary
been established by Margarita Prodon. This Court, however, after going
evidence had not been complied with; (b) in concluding that the late
through the records of the case, believes otherwise. The Court finds that
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been physically incapable of personally executing
the following circumstances put doubt on the very existence of the alleged
the deed of sale with right to repurchase; and (c) in blaming them for not
deed of sale. Evidence on record showed that Maximo Alvarez was
recovering the property, for not paying the realty taxes thereon, and for
hospitalized between August 23, 1975 to September 3, 1975 (Exhibit "K").
not transferring the title in their names.
It was also established by said Exhibit "L" that Maximo Alvarez suffered
from paralysis of half of his body and blindness due to cataract. It should
further be noted that barely 6 days later, on September 15, 1975, Maximo On November 22, 2005, the CA issued itsresolution, 11 allowing the
Alvarez was again hospitalized for the last time because he died on substitution of the heirs of Margarita Prodon, and denying their motion
October of 1975 without having left the hospital. This lends credence to for reconsideration for its lack of merit.
plaintiffs-appellants’ assertion that their father, Maximo Alvarez, was not
physically able to personally execute the deed of sale and puts to serious Hence, the heirs of Margarita Prodon (petitioners) have appealed to the
doubt [on] Jose Camilion’s testimony that Maximo Alvarez, with his wife, Court through petition for review on certiorari.
went to his residence on September 5, 1975 to sell the property and that
again they met on September 9, 1975 to sign the alleged deed of sale Issues
(Exhibits "A" and "1"). The Court also notes that from the sale in 1975 to
1996 when the case was finally filed, defendant-appellee never tried to
In this appeal, the petitioners submit the following as issues, namely: (a)
recover possession of the property nor had she shown that she ever paid
whether the pre-requisites for the admission of secondary evidence had
Real Property Tax thereon. Additionally, the Transfer Certificate of Title
been complied with; (b) whether the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been
had not been transferred in the name of the alleged present owner. These
physically incapable of personally executing the deed of sale with right to
actions put to doubt the validity of the claim of ownership because their
repurchase;and (c) whether Prodon’s claim of ownership was already
actions are contrary to that expected of legitimate owners of property.
barred by laches.12

Moreover, granting, in arguendo, that the deed of sale did exist, the fact of
its loss had not been duly established. In De Vera, et al. v Sps. Aguilar (218
SCRA 602 1993), the Supreme Court held that after proof of the execution of
the Deed it must also be established that the said document had been lost
or destroyed, thus:
"After the due execution of the document has been established, it must
next be proved that said document has been lost or destroyed. The
destruction of the instrument may be proved by any person knowing the
fact. The loss may be shown by any person who knew the fact of its loss, or
by anyone who had made, in the judgment of the court, a sufficient
examination in the place or places where the document or papers of
similar character are usually kept by the person in whose custody the
document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made any
other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the
instrument is indeed lost.
However, all duplicates or counterparts must be accounted for before
using copies. For, since all the duplicates or multiplicates are parts of the
writing itself to be proved, no excuse for non-production of the writing
itself can be regarded as established until it appears that all of its parts are
unavailable (i.e. lost, retained by the opponent or by a third person or the
like).
In the case at bar, Atty. Emiliano Ibasco, Jr., notary public who notarized
the document testified that the alleged deed of sale has about four or five
original copies. Hence, all originals must be accounted for before
secondary evidence can be given of any one. This[,] petitioners failed to
do. Records show that petitioners merely accounted for three out of four
or five original copies." (218 SCRA at 607-608)
Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
1.
Best Evidence Rulewas not applicable herein
We focus first on an unseemly error on the part of the CA that, albeit a
harmless one, requires us to re-examine and rectify in order to carry out
our essential responsibility of educating the Bench and the Bar on the
admissibility of evidence. An analysis leads us to conclude that the CA and
the RTC both misapplied the Best Evidence Rule to this case, and their
misapplication diverted the attention from the decisive issue in this action
for quieting of title. We shall endeavor to correct the error in order to turn
the case to the right track.
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court embodies the Best Evidence
Rule, to wit:
Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;

In the case at bar, Jose Camilion’s testimony showed that a copy was given
to Atty. Anacleto Lacanilao but he could not recover said copy. A perusal
of the testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion had
exerted sufficient effort to recover said copy. x x x
xxxx
The foregoing testimony does not convince this Court that Jose Camilion
had exerted sufficient effort to obtain the copy which he said was with
Atty. Lacanilao. It should be noted that he never claimed that Atty.
Lacanilao was already too sick to even try looking for the copy he had. But
even assuming this is to be so, Jose Camilion did not testify that Atty.
Lacanilao had no one in his office to help him find said copy. In fine, this
Court believes that the trial court erred in admitting the secondary
(b) When the original is in the custody or under control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time and the fact sought to be established from them is only
the general result of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office.
The Best Evidence Rule stipulates that in proving the terms of a written
document the original of the document must be produced in court. The
rule excludes any evidence other than the original writing to prove the
contents thereof, unless the offeror proves: (a) the existence or due
execution of the original; (b) the loss and destruction of the original, or the
reason for its non-production in court; and (c) the absence of bad faith on
the part of the offeror to which the unavailability of the original can be
attributed.13
The primary purpose of the Best Evidence Rule is to ensure that the exact
contents of a writing are brought before the court, 14 considering that (a)
the precision in presenting to the court the exact words of the writing is of
more than average importance, particularly as respects operative or
dispositive instruments, such as deeds, wills and contracts, because a
slight variation in words may mean a great difference in rights; (b) there is
a substantial hazard of inaccuracy in the human process of making a copy
by handwriting or typewriting; and (c) as respects oral testimony
purporting to give from memory the terms of a writing, there is a special
risk of error, greater than in the case of attempts at describing other
situations generally.15 The rule further acts as an insurance against
fraud.16 Verily, if a party is in the possession of the best evidence and
withholds it, and seeks to substitute inferior evidence in its place, the
presumption naturally arises that the better evidence is withheld for
fraudulent purposes that its production would expose and defeat. 17Lastly,
the rule protects against misleading inferences resulting from the
intentional or unintentional introduction of selected portions of a larger
set of writings.18
But the evils of mistransmission of critical facts, fraud, and misleading
inferences arise only when the issue relates to the terms of the writing.
Hence, the Best Evidence Rule applies only when the terms of a writing
are in issue. When the evidence sought to be introduced concerns external
facts, such as the existence, execution or delivery of the writing, without
reference to its terms, the Best Evidence Rule cannot be invoked. 19 In such
a case, secondary evidence may be admitted even without accounting for
the original.
This case involves an action for quieting of title, a common-law remedy for
the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or
proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact,
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to
said title. In such an action, the competent court is tasked to determine
the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants to place
things in their proper place and to make the one who has no rights to said
immovable respect and not disturb the other. The action is for the benefit
of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over
the property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any
desired improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property. For an
action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (a) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to
or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (b) the deed,
claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy.20
The action for quieting of title may be based on the fact that a deed is
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable. The terms of the writing
may or may not be material to an action for quieting of title, depending on
the ground alleged by the plaintiff. For instance, when an action for
quieting of title is based on the unenforceability of a contract for not
complying with the Statute of Frauds, Article 1403 of the Civil Code
specifically provides that evidence of the agreement cannot be received
without the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents. There is then
no doubt that the Best Evidence Rule will come into play.
It is not denied that this action does not involve the terms or contents of
the deed of sale with right to repurchase. The principal issue raised by the
respondents as the plaintiffs, which Prodon challenged head on, was
whether or not the deed of sale with right to repurchase, duly executed by
the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr., had really existed. They alleged in the
complaint that:
xxxx
9. Such entry which could have been maliciously and deliberately done by
the defendant Margarita Prodon created cloud and [is] prejudicial to the
title of the property subject matter of this case, since while it is apparently
valid or effective, but in truth and in fact it is invalid, ineffective or
unenforceable inasmuch that the instrument purporting to be a Deed of
Sale with right of repurchase mentioned in the said entry does not exist. 21
xxxx
On her part, Prodon specifically denied the allegation, averring in her
answer that "sometime [o]n September 9, 1975, deceased Maximo S.
Alvarez lawfully entered into a Contract of Sale with Right to Repurchase,
object of which is the titled lot located at Endaya Street, Tondo, Manila, in
favor of defendant."22 In the pre-trial order, the RTC defined the issue to
be tried as "[w]hether or not the alleged document mentioned in the said
entry is existing, valid or unenforceable," 23 and did not include the terms
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase among the issues.
Apparently, the parties were fully cognizant of the issues as defined, for
none of them thereafter ventured to present evidence to establish the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase. In the course of the
trial, however, a question was propounded to Prodon as to who had signed
or executed the deed, and the question was objected to based on the Best
Evidence Rule. The RTC then sustained the objection. 24 At that point
began the diversion of the focus in the case. The RTC should have
outrightly overruled the objection because the fact sought to be
established by the requested testimony was the execution of the deed, not
its terms.25 Despite the fact that the terms of the writing were not in issue,
the RTC inexplicably applied the Best Evidence Rule to the case and
proceeded to determine whether the requisites for the admission of
secondary evidence had been complied with, without being clear as to
what secondary evidence was sought to be excluded. In the end, the RTC
found in its judgment that Prodon had complied with the requisites for the
introduction of secondary evidence, and gave full credence to the
testimony of Jose Camilon explaining the non-production of the original.
On appeal, the CA seconded the RTC’s mistake by likewise applying the
Best Evidence Rule, except that the CA concluded differently, in that it
held that Prodon had not established the existence, execution, and loss of
the original document as the pre-requisites for the presentation of
secondary evidence. Its application of the Best Evidence Rule naturally led
the CA to rule that secondary evidence should not have been admitted, but
like the RTC the CA did not state what excluded secondary evidence it was
referring to.
Considering that the Best Evidence Rule was not applicable because the
terms of the deed of sale with right to repurchase were not the issue, the
CA did not have to address and determine whether the existence,
execution, and loss, as pre-requisites for the presentation of secondary
evidence, had been established by Prodon’s evidence. It should have
simply addressed and determined whether or not the "existence" and
"execution" of the deed as the facts in issue had been proved by
preponderance of evidence.
Indeed, for Prodon who had the burden to prove the existence and due
execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase, the presentation of
evidence other than the original document, like the testimonies of Prodon
and Jose Camilon, the Notarial Register of Notary Eliseo Razon, and the
Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds, would have sufficed even
without first proving the loss or unavailability of the original of the deed.
2.
Prodon did not preponderantly establish the existence and due execution
of the deed of sale with right to repurchase
The foregoing notwithstanding, good trial tactics still required Prodon to
establish and explain the loss of the original of the deed of sale with right
to repurchase to establish the genuineness and due execution of the
deed.26 This was because the deed, although a collateral document, was the
foundation of her defense in this action for quieting of title. 27 Her inability
to produce the original logically gave rise to the need for her to prove its
existence and due execution by other means that could only be secondary
under the rules on evidence. Towards that end, however, it was not
required to subject the proof of the loss of the original to the same strict
standard to which it would be subjected had the loss or unavailability been
a precondition for presenting secondary evidence to prove the terms of a
writing.
A review of the records reveals that Prodon did not adduce proof sufficient
to show the lossor explain the unavailability of the original as to justify the
presentation of secondary evidence. Camilon, one of her witnesses,
testified that he had given the original to her lawyer, Atty. Anacleto
Lacanilao, but that he (Camilon) could not anymore retrieve the original
because Atty. Lacanilao had been recuperating from his heart ailment.
Such evidence without showing the inability to locate the original from
among Atty. Lacanilao’s belongings by himself or by any of his assistants
or representatives was inadequate. Moreover, a duplicate original could
have been secured from Notary Public Razon, but no effort was shown to
have been exerted in that direction.
In contrast, the records contained ample indicia of the improbability of the
existence of the deed. Camilon claimed that the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr.
had twice gone to his residence in Meycauayan, Bulacan, the first on
September 5, 1975, to negotiate the sale of the property in question, and
the second on September 9, 1975, to execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase, viz:
Q: Do you also know the deceased plaintiff in this case, Maximo Alvarez,
Sr. and his wife Valentina Clave, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
Q
A
Q: Under what circumstance were you able to know the deceased plaintiff
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and his wife?
When they went to our house, sir.
When was this specifically?
A: Sometime the first week of September or about September 5, 1975, sir.
Q: What was the purpose of the spouses Maximo and Valentina in meeting
you on that date?
A: They were selling a piece of land, sir.
xxxx
Q: At the time when the spouses Maximo Alvarez, Sr. and Valentina Clave
approached you to sell their piece of land located at Endaya, Tondo,
Manila, what document, if any, did they show you?
A: The title of the land, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that on the first week of September or September 5, 1975
spouses Maximo and Valentina approached you at the time, what did you
tell the spouses, if any?
A: I asked them to come back telling them that I was going to look for a
buyer, sir.
xxxx
Q: You said that you told the spouse[s] Alvarez to just come back later and
that you will look for a buyer, what happened next, if any?
A: I went to see my aunt Margarita Prodon, sir.
Q an instrument is inscribed in the records of the Register of Deeds and
A: What did you tell your aunt Margarita Prodon?
I convinced her to buy the lot.
ATTY. REAL
Q: What was the reply of Margarita Prodon, if any?
A: She agreed, provided that she should meet the spouses, sir.
Q: After Margarita Prodon told you that[,] what happened next, if any?
A: I waited for the spouses Alvarez to bring them to my aunt, sir.
Q: Were you able to finally bring the spouses before Margarita Prodon?
A: Valentina Clave returned to our house and asked me if they can now sell
the piece of land, sir.
Q: What did you tell Valentina Clave?
A the property was further convincing evidence demonstrating that the late
Q: We went to the house of my aunt so she can meet her personally, sir.
And did the meeting occur?
WITNESS
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. REAL
Q: What happened at the meeting?
A: I told Valentina Clave in front of the aunt of my wife that they, the
spouses, wanted to sell the land, sir.
Q: What was the reply of your aunt Margarita Prodon at the time?
A: That Valentina Clave should come back with her husband because she
was going to buy the lot, sir.28
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had suffered from "[h]igh grade fever, accompanied
by chills, vomiting and cough productive of whitish sticky sputum;"had
been observed to be "conscious" but "weak" and "bedridden" with his
heart having "faint" sounds, irregular rhythm, but no murmurs; and his
left upper extremity and left lower extremity had suffered 90% motor
loss.34 Truly, Prodon’s allegation that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase had been executed on September 9, 1975 could not command
belief.
The second is that the annotation on TCT No. 84797 of the deed of sale
with right to repurchase and the entry in the primary entry book of the
Register of Deeds did not themselves establish the existence of the deed.
They proved at best that a document purporting to be a deed of sale with
right to repurchase had been registered with the Register of Deeds. Verily,
the registration alone of the deed was not conclusive proof of its
authenticity or its due execution by the registered owner of the property,
which was precisely the issue in this case. The explanation for this is that
registration, being a specie of notice, is simply a ministerial act by which
annotated on the dorsal side of the certificate of title covering the land
subject of the instrument.35 It is relevant to mention that the law on land
registration does not require that only valid instruments be registered,
because the purpose of registration is only to give notice. 36
By the same token, the entry in the notarial register of Notary Public
Razon could only be proof that a deed of sale with right to repurchase had
been notarized by him, but did not establish the due execution of the deed.
The third is that the respondents’ remaining in the peaceful possession of
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not execute the deed of sale with right to
repurchase. Otherwise, Prodon would have herself asserted and exercised
her right to take over the property, legally and physically speaking, upon
the expiration in 1976 of the repurchase period stipulated under the deed,
including transferring the TCT in her name and paying the real property
taxes due on the properly. Her inaction was an index of the falsity of her
claim against the respondents.
In view of the foregoing circumstances, we concur with the CA that the
respondents preponderantly, proved that the deed of sale with right to
repurchase executed by the late Maximo Alvarez, Sr. did not exist in fact.

The foregoing testimony could not be credible for the purpose of proving WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August
the due execution of the deed of sale with right to repurchase for three 18, 2005 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 58624 entitled Heirs
reasons. of Maximo S. Alvarez and Valentina Clave, represented by Rev. Maximo
Alvarez, Jr. v. Margarita Prodon and the Register of Deeds of the City
The first is that the respondents preponderantly established that the late Manila; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been in and out of the hospital around the time
that the deed of sale with right to repurchase had been supposedly SO ORDERED.
executed on September 9, 1975. The records manifested that he had been
admitted to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City on several
occasions, and had then been diagnosed with the serious ailments or
conditions, as follows:

Period of confinement Diagnosis

March 31 - May 19, • Prostatitis, chronic

1975 • Arteriosclerotic heart disease
• Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• CFC III29

June 2- June 6, 1975 • Chest pains (Atrial Flutter)

• Painful urination (Chronic prostatitis) 30

August 23-September • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

3, 1975 • Congestive heart failure, mild
• Atrial fibrillation
• Cardiac functional capacity III-B31

September 15-October • Arteriosclerotic heart disease

2, 1975 • Atrial fibrillation
• Congestive heart failure
• Pneumonia
• Urinary tract infection
• Cerebrovascular accident, old
• Upper GI bleeding probably secondary to stress
ulcers32

The medical history showing the number of very serious ailments the late
Maximo Alvarez, Sr. had been suffering from rendered it highly
improbable for him to travel from Manila all the way to Meycauayan,
Bulacan, where Prodon and Camilon were then residing in order only to
negotiate and consummate the sale of the property. This high
improbability was fully confirmed by his son, Maximo, Jr., who attested
that his father had been seriously ill, and had been in and out of the
hospital in 1975.33 The medical records revealed, too, that on September
12, 1975, or three days prior to his final admission to the hospital, the late

Normallah A. Pacasum vs. People of the Philippines
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 180314               April 16, 2009
NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, Petitioner,  August and September 2000 would be paid. Upon inspection of the
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to set aside the
Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 27483 promulgated on 7
August 2007 which found petitioner Normallah A. Pacasum guilty of
Falsification under Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, and
its Resolution2 dated 22 October 2007 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and Motion for New Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered
Evidence.
On 2 May 2002, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with
Falsification of Public Documents, defined and punished under paragraph
1 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about August 22-23, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in Cotabato City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the accused NORMALLAH A. PACASUM, a high
ranking public official being the Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense
in relation thereto, taking advantage of her official position, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsified her Employee
Clearance3 submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of
Laura Y. Pangilan, the Supply officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for the purpose
of claiming her salary for the months of August and September 2000. 4
On 29 May 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking that
she be given the opportunity to file her counter-affidavit during a
preliminary investigation in order that her right to due process would not
be violated.5 Petitioner further filed an Urgent Motion for Preliminary
Investigation and/or Reinvestigation with a Prayer to Recall or Defer
Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.6
On 4 May 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for
preliminary investigation/reinvestigation decreeing that petitioner was
not deprived of the opportunity to be heard before the Office of the
Ombudsman as she had waived her right to be heard on preliminary
investigation.7
On 16 June 2004, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. 8 Thereafter, pre-trial conference was held and
the Sandiganbayan issued a Pre-Trial Order. 9 The parties did not enter any
admission or stipulation of facts, and agreed that the issues to be resolved
were as follows:
1. Whether or not accused Normallah Pacasum, being then the
Regional Secretary of the Department of Tourism in the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Cotabato City,
falsified her Employee Clearance, which she submitted to the
Office of the Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao, by imitating the signature of Laura Y.
Pangilan, the Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM, for purposes
of claiming her salary for the months of August and September
2000;
2. Whether or not the accused took advantage of her official
position in order to commit the crime charged. 10
The prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Subaida K.
Pangilan,11 former Human Resource Management Officer V of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM); Laura Y. Pangilan,
former Supply Officer of the Department of Tourism, ARMM; 12 and
Rebecca A. Agatep,13 Telegraph Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City.
Subaida K. Pangilan (Pangilan) testified that she was a retired government
employee and formerly a Human Resource Management Officer V of the
ARMM which position she held from May 1993 to 28 May 2003. As such,
one of her duties was to receive applications for clearance of Regional
Secretaries of the ARMM. She explained that an Employees Clearance was
a requirement to be submitted to the Office of the Regional Director by
retiring employees, employees leaving the country or those applying for
leave in excess of thirty days. The person applying for clearance shall get a
copy of the employees clearance and shall accomplish the same by having
the different division heads sign it.
Mrs. Pangilan disclosed that she knew the accused-petitioner - Norma
Pacasum - to be the former Regional Secretary of the Department of
Tourism (DOT), ARMM. She narrated that in the year 2000, petitioner
submitted the original of an Employees Clearance to her office in
compliance with the memorandum14 dated 8 August 2000 issued by
Governor Nur Misuari, directing all officers and employees to clear
themselves of property and money accountabilities before their salaries for
Employees Clearance, she noticed that the signature of Laura Pangilan
(Laura) contained in said document was not hers. She said Laura Pangilan
was her daughter-in-law, and that the latter’s signature was very familiar
to her. Mrs. Pangilan immediately photocopied 15 the original Employees
Clearance with the intention of sending the same to her daughter-in-law
for the purpose of having the latter confirm if the signature on top of her
name in the Employees Clearance was hers. There being no messenger
available, she instead called up Laura to come to her office to verify the
signature. Laura, whose office was only a walking distance away, came and
inspected the clearance, and denied signing the same. After she denied
that she signed the clearance, and while they were conversing, the bearer
of the Employees Clearance took said document and left.
Mrs. Pangilan said she did not know the name of the person who took the
original of the Employee Clearance, but said that the latter was a niece and
staff member of the petitioner. She said that all the signatures 16appearing
in the Employees Clearance were all genuine except for Laura’s signature.
The next witness for the prosecution was Laura Y. Pangilan, the person
whose signature was allegedly imitated. Laura testified that presently she
was holding the position of Human Resource Management Officer II of the
Department of Tourism - ARMM. Prior to said position, she was the
Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM from 1994 to January 2001. As such,
she issued memorandum receipts (MR) to employees who were issued
government property, and received surrendered office properties from
officers and employees of the DOT - ARMM. She said she knew the
accused, as she was their Regional Secretary of the DOT - ARMM.
Laura recounted that on 9 August 2002, Marie Cris 17 Batuampar, an
officemate and niece of petitioner Pacasum, went to her house with the
Employees Clearance of petitioner. Batuampar requested her to sign in
order to clear petitioner of all property accountabilities. She refused to
sign the clearance because at that time, petitioner had not yet turned over
all the office properties issued to her. A few days later, she was called by
her mother-in-law to go to the latter’s office and inspect the Employees
Clearance submitted by the representative of petitioner. She went to her
mother-in-law’s office and was shown the Employees Clearance of
petitioner. Upon seeing the same, she denied the signature 18 appearing on
top of her name. Thereupon, Marie Cris Batuampar, the representative of
petitioner, took the Employees Clearance and left.
Laura revealed she executed a joint complaint-affidavit 19 dated 28 August
2001 regarding the instant case. She issued a certification 20 with a
memorandum receipt21 dated 23 November 1999, signed22 by petitioner.
The certification attested she did not sign petitioner’s Employees
Clearance because all the office properties issued to petitioner had not
been turned over or returned to the Supply Officer of the DOT - ARMM.
Finally, she said that as of 2 January 2005, her last day as Supply Officer,
petitioner had not returned anything.
The last witness for the prosecution, Rebecca A. Agatep, Telegraph
Operator, Telegraph Office, Quezon City, testified that she had been a
telegraph operator for nineteen years. On 31 May 2005, she was at the
Telegraph Office in Commission on Audit, Quezon City. She received two
telegrams23 for transmissions both dated 31 May 2005. One was addressed
to petitioner and the other to Marie Cris Batuampar. Upon receiving said
documents, she transmitted the documents through telegram. The
telegram addressed to petitioner was received by her relative, Manso
Alonto, in her residence on 1 June 2005, while that addressed to Ms.
Batuampar was transmitted to, and received in, Cotabato City on 1 June
2005.24
On 4 July 2005, the prosecution formally offered 25 its documentary
evidence consisting of Exhibits A, A-1, A-1-a, A-2, A-2-a, A-2-b, A-2-c, A-
2-d, A-2-e, A-2-f, A-2-g, A-3, A-3-1, A-4, A-4-a, A-5, A-6, A-7, A-8, and A-
9, to which the accused filed her objections. 26 The trial court admitted all
the exhibits on 10 August 2005.27
For the defense, petitioner and Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM
Regional Solicitor General, took the stand.
For her defense, petitioner testified that she was appointed by ARMM
Regional Governor Nur Misuari (Gov. Misuari) as Regional Secretary of
the DOT of the ARMM in 1999. She said she was familiar with the
Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov. Misuari directing all
ARMM officers and employees to liquidate all outstanding cash advances
on or before 31 August 2000 in view of the impending expiration of the
Governor’s extended term. At first, she said the memorandum applied to
her, she being a cabinet secretary, but later she said same did not apply to
her because she had no cash advances. Only those with cash advances
were required to get an Employees Clearance before they could receive
their salaries. She then instructed her staff to work on her salary.
Petitioner said she did not know where the original of her Employees
Clearance was. Neither did she know if the signature of Laura Pangilan
therein had been imitated or forged. She likewise said that although the
Employee Clearance was in her name, she did not cause Laura’s signature
to be affixed thereto.
Petitioner disclosed that she was able to get her salary for the month of
August 2000 sometime in said month, because ARMM Executive
Secretary Randolph C. Parcasio told her that she did not need a clearance
before she could get her salary because she was re-appointed. 28
Petitioner explained that she has not seen the original of the subject
Employees Clearance.29 When she first saw the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance, the signature of Laura was not there. She was able
to see the photocopy of the Employees Clearance again after this case had
been filed with the Sandiganbayan, already with the alleged signature of
Laura. Petitioner said it was not she who placed or caused Laura’s
purported signature to be affixed there.
Petitioner added that the memorandum of Gov. Misuari did not apply to
her, because she had no cash advances and she could receive her salary
even without clearance. At that time, she said the Cashier, Accountant and
the Auditor checked her records and found that she had no cash
advances.30 Because she was elsewhere, she instructed her secretary to get
her salary. However, she was informed by her staff that her salary could
not be released because the Office of the Governor required a clearance.
Her staff worked on her clearance, the purpose of which was for the
release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. She
was able to get all the needed signatures except for Laura’s signature. With
the refusal of Laura to sign, her staff went to Executive Secretary Parcasio
and explained the situation.
Petitioner denied receiving a telegram from Asst. Special Prosecutor I
Anna Isabel G. Aurellano ordering her to submit to the Office of the
Special Prosecutor the original of the Employees Clearance of the DOT-
ARMM issued in her name sometime on 22-23 August 2000.
On cross-examination, petitioner said that prior to her receipt of her
salary, she believed that an Employees Clearance was necessary, and for
this reason she had this document prepared by her staff. She said her
Employees Clearance was always in the possession of Marie Cris, her
assistant secretary. It was Marie Cris who showed her the document
twice.31
Atty. Jose I. Lorena, former ARMM Solicitor General, testified that he was
familiar with the Memorandum dated 8 August 2000 issued by Gov.
Misuari because the same was the product of consultation among him,
Gov. Misuari and ARMM Executive Secretary Parcasio. He explained that
this memorandum pertained only to outstanding cash advances. He added
that an Employees Clearance was not a requirement and was not sufficient
to comply with the directive contained in the memorandum, because what
was required for the purpose of release of salaries was a credit notice from
the Resident Auditors of the Commission on Audit.
On 16 February 2007, the defense formally offered its documentary
exhibits32 consisting of Exhibits 1 to 5, with sub-markings. The prosecution
objected to the purpose for which Exhibit 1 was offered. The trial court
admitted all the defense exhibits.33
On 7 August 2007, the Sandiganbayan rendered the assailed decision
convicting petitioner of the crime charged in the information. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Normallah
A. Pacasum GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged in
the Information and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and without any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby
sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF prision correccional as
minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as
maximum with the accessories thereof and to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00) with costs against the accused.34
The Sandiganbayan found the signature of DOT-ARMM Supply Officer
Laura Y. Pangilan appearing in the Employees Clearance of petitioner to
have been falsified/forged. It did not give much weight on petitioner’s
defense denying she was the one who actually falsified her Employees
Clearance by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan and that she had
no idea about the alleged falsification, because it was her assistant
secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her clearance and the
one who submitted the said clearance to the Office of the Regional
Governor of the ARMM. The trial court found said denial unsubstantiated
and ruled that while there was no direct evidence to show that petitioner
herself "actually" falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, there
were circumstances that indicated she was the one who committed the
falsification/forgery, or who asked somebody else to falsify/forge the
subject signature in her Employees Clearance. The Sandiganbayan added
that considering it was petitioner who took advantage of and profited from
the use of the falsified clearance, the presumption was that she was the
material author of the falsification. Despite full opportunity, she was not
able to rebut said presumption, failing to show that it was another person
who falsified/forged the signature of Laura Pangilan, or that another
person had the reason or motive to commit the falsification/forgery or
could have benefited from the same.
The Sandiganbayan likewise did not sustain petitioner’s contention that
she did not stand to benefit from the falsification of her Employees
Clearance and from the submission thereof to the Office of the Regional
Governor, because she allegedly had no existing cash advances. She
claimed that an Employees Clearance was not needed to enable her to
draw her salary for the months of August and September 2000 under the
8 August 2000 Memorandum of Gov. Misuari, and that the presumption
that he who benefits from the falsification is presumed to be the author
thereof does not apply to her. The lower court explained that the
aforementioned memorandum applied to petitioner, she being an official
of the ARMM. It said that the applicability of said memorandum to
petitioner was even admitted by her when she, in compliance therewith,
instructed her staff/assistant secretary to work for her Employees
Clearance to enable her to collect her salary for the month of August 2000.
It said that the fact that she (allegedly) had no existing cash advances did
not exempt her from the coverage of the memorandum, because she must
show she had no cash advances and the only way to do this was by
obtaining a clearance.
Petitioner argued that the photocopy of her Employees Clearance had no
probative value in proving its contents and was inadmissible because the
original thereof was not presented by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan
did not agree. It said that the presentation and admission of secondary
evidence, like a photocopy of her Employees Clearance, was justified to
prove the contents thereof, because despite reasonable notices (telegrams)
made by the prosecution to petitioner and her assistant secretary to
produce the original of her Employees Clearance, they ignored the notice
and refused to present the original of said document.
On 21 August 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the Sandiganbayan 35 to which the prosecution filed a
Comment/Opposition.36 Subsequent thereto, petitioner filed a Supplement
to Accused’s Motion for Reconsideration & Motion for New
Trial/Reception of Newly Discovered Evidence. 37 Petitioner prayed that
her motion for new trial be granted in order that the testimony of Marie
Cris Batuampar be introduced, the same being newly discovered evidence.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.38
On 22 October 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit; and the motion
for new trial, because the evidence sought to be presented did not qualify
as newly discovered evidence.39
On 16 November 2007, the instant petition was filed.
In our Resolution40 dated 27 November 2007, respondent People of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), was
required to file its Comment on the petition. 41 After two motions for
extension to file comment on the petition, which were granted by this
Court, the OSP filed its Comment dated 18 February 2008. 42 Petitioner
was required43 to file a Reply to the Comment, which she did on 5 June
2008.44
On 5 August 2008, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition for
review on certiorari and required the parties to submit their respective
memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice. They filed their respective
memoranda on 21 November 2008 and on 5 November 2008. 45
Petitioner assails her conviction arguing that the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in:
I. Finding that petitioner benefited from the alleged falsification,
hence must be deemed the author thereof, when the evidence on
record does not support, but even contradicts, such a conclusion.
 II. Presuming that petitioner had unliquidated cash advances
hence was required under the Misuari Memorandum to submit
her Employee’s Clearance to clear herself of these, when there is
no evidence to that effect and the prosecution even admitted so.
III. Not resolving doubt as to the authenticity of the photocopy of
the allegedly forged Employee’s Clearance, in favor of the
innocence of the Accused.
IV. In short-circuiting the right of the petitioner to present
additional evidence on her behalf, thus denying her due
process.46
Petitioner contends that under the Misuari memorandum dated 8 August
2000, she was not required to file an Employees Clearance to draw her
salary, since what was required under said memorandum was a Credit
Notice from the COA. She further contends that since she was not required
to file said Employees Clearance because she had no cash advances, the
signature in her Employees Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue"
because what was required was a Credit Notice.
As to the first contention, we agree with petitioner that under the
aforesaid memorandum, what was required before she could draw her
salaries was a Credit Notice from the COA and not an Employees
Clearance. The full text of the Memorandum 47 form the Regional Governor
reads:
MEMORANDUM FROM THE REGIONAL GOVERNOR
TO: ALL CONCERNED
SUBJECT: AS STATED
DATE: AUGUST 8, 2000
1. In view of the impending expiration of the extended term of
the undersigned, it is hereby directed that all outstanding cash
advances be liquidated on or before August 31, 2000.
2. Effective September 1, 2000, the salaries and other
emoluments of all ARMM officials/employees with unliquidated
cash advance shall be withheld until they have settled their
accounts and a corresponding Credit Notice is issued to them by
the Commission on Audit.
3. Due to budgetary and financial constraints brought about by
the drastic cut of our budget, memorandum dated December 01,
1998 is hereby reiterated. Therefore all releases for financial
assistance is hereby suspended effective immediately.
4. For strict compliance.
PROF. NUR MISUARI
It is clear from said memorandum that what was required from
officers/employees who had unliquidated cash advances was the
corresponding Credit Notice issued by the COA after they had settled their
accounts. There was indeed no mention of any Employees Clearance
therein. Up to this point, we agree with petitioner. However, on her
contention that the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance was "irrelevant and a non-issue," we disagree. Whether the
signature of Laura Pangilan was imitated or not is the main issue in this
case for falsification.
From the memorandum of Gov. Misuari, the Credit Notice requirement
was effective only starting 1 September 2000 and not before. In the case at
bar, the information charges petitioner not with failure to secure a Credit
Notice, but with allegedly falsifying her Employees Clearance by imitating
the signature of Laura Y. Pangilan, Supply Officer I of the DOT-ARMM.
The Credit Notice requirement was therefore irrelevant and a non-issue as
regards the release of salaries prior to 1 September 2000.
The questions to be answered are: (1) Was the signature of Laura Pangilan
in petitioner’s Employees Clearance imitated? If yes, (2) Who imitated or
caused the imitation of said signature?
On the first query, the same was answered by Laura Pangilan. She said
that the signature in petitioner’s Employees Clearance was not hers. The
same was an imitation. When a person whose signature was affixed to a
document denies his/her signature therein, a prima facie case for
falsification is established which the defendant must overcome. 48
Petitioner argues there was no need for her to file an Employees Clearance
to draw her salary. She adds that Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive
Secretary of the ARMM, told her and her secretary, Marie Cris Batuampar,
that she did not need an Employees Clearance because she was re-
appointed.49
These arguments are untenable. There was a need for petitioner to file an
Employees Clearance not only for compliance with the Misuari
memorandum but, more importantly, because her term of office was about
to end, since her position was coterminous with the term of Gov. Misuari,
the appointing authority.50 She even admitted that before she received her
salary for August, 2000,51 an Employees Clearance was
necessary.52 Moreover, her claim that Atty. Parcasio told her and her
secretary that she did not need an Employee Clearance to get her salary
does not persuade us. In fact, we find her alleged "re-appointment," when
she was working for her Employees Clearance at around August 2000,
improbable. How could she have been re-appointed by Gov.
Alvarez,53 whom she claims re-appointed her sometime in the year 2000,
when Gov. Misuari was still the Regional Governor of the ARMM when
she had her Employees Clearance prepared sometime in August 2000?
Clearly, her statement that she did not need an Employees Clearance
because she was re-appointed does not inspire belief.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for applying the presumption that if a
person had in his position a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, he is presumed to
be the material author of the falsification. He argues that the
Sandiganbayan overlooked the fact that there was no evidence to prove
that petitioner made use of or uttered the Employees Clearance, because
there was no evidence that she submitted it -- if not, at least caused it to be
submitted to the Office of the Regional Governor. To support such claim,
she said there were no "receipt marks" in the Employees Clearance to
show that the Office of the Regional Governor received said documents.
It is to be made clear that the "use" of a falsified document is separate and
distinct from the "falsification" of a public document. The act of "using"
falsified documents is not necessarily included in the "falsification" of a
public document. Using falsified documents is punished under Article 172
of the Revised Penal Code. In the case at bar, the falsification of the
Employees Clearance was consummated the moment the signature of
Laura Pangilan was imitated. In the falsification of a public document, it is
immaterial whether or not the contents set forth therein were false. What
is important is the fact that the signature of another was
counterfeited.54 It is a settled rule that in the falsification of public or
official documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain
or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that in the falsification
of a public document, the principal thing punished is the violation of the
public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed.55 Thus, the purpose for which the falsification was made and
whether the offender profited or hoped to profit from such
falsification are no longer material.
The records further show that petitioner "used" or uttered the Employees
Clearance. The fact that the same was circulated to the different division
heads for their signatures is already considered use of falsified documents
as contemplated in Article 172. The lack of the stamp mark "Received" in
the Employees Clearance does not mean that said document was not
received by the Office of the Regional Governor. We find the certification
signed by Atty. Randolph C. Parcasio, Executive Secretary of Office of the
Regional Governor - ARMM, as contained in the Employees Clearance, to
be sufficient proof that the same was submitted to the Office of the
Regional Governor. It must be stressed that the Executive Secretary is part
of the Office of the Regional Governor.
Petitioner denies having "actually" falsified her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan, claiming that she had no
knowledge about the falsification because it was her assistant secretary,
Marie Cris Batuampar, who worked for her Employees Clearance.
Petitioner’s denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly
fail. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence, which deserves no greater evidentiary
value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative
matters.56 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative and self-serving
assertion.57
In the case at bar, petitioner did not even present as her witness Marie
Cris Batuampar, the person whom she instructed to work for her
Employees Clearance. Her failure to present this person in order to shed
light on the matter was fatal to her cause. In fact, we find that the defense
never intended to present Marie Cris Batuampar as a witness. This is clear
from the pre-trial order, because the defense never listed her as a
witness.58 Her attempt to present Ms. Batuampar to help her cause after
she has been convicted is already too late in the day, and Ms. Batuampar’s
testimony, which is supposed to be given, cannot be considered newly
discovered evidence as to merit the granting of her motion for new trial
and/or reception of newly discovered evidence.
The lack of direct evidence showing that petitioner "actually" imitated the
signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees Clearance will not exonerate
her. We have ruled that it is not strange to realize that in cases of forgery,
the prosecution would not always have the means for obtaining such direct
evidence to confute acts contrived clandestinely. Courts have to rely on
circumstantial evidence consisting of pieces of facts, which if woven
together would produce a single network establishing the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt.59 We totally agree with the
Sandiganbayan, which said:
While there is no direct evidence to show that the accused herself
"actually" forged the signature of Laura Pangilan in the Employees
Clearance in question, the Court nevertheless finds the following
circumstances, obtaining in the records, to establish/indicate that she was
the one who committed the forgery or who asked somebody else to forge
or caused the forgery of the signature of Laura Pangilan in her Employees
Clearance, to wit -
1. that the accused instructed her staff Maricris Batuampar to
work for her Employees Clearance in compliance with the
Memorandum of ARMM Regional Governor Nur Misuari and
that the forged signature of Laura Pangilan was affixed on her
clearance are strong evidence that the accused herself either
falsified the said signature or caused the same to be
falsified/imitated, and that possession by Maricris of the falsified
clearance of the accused is possession by the accused herself
because the former was only acting upon the instructions and in
behalf of the latter;
2. that it was the accused who is required to accomplish and to
submit her Employees Clearance to enable her to collect her
salary for the months of August and September 2000 is
sufficient and strong motive or reason for her to commit the
falsification by imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan or
order someone else to forge it; and
3. that the accused was the only one who profited or benefited
from the falsification as she admitted that she was able to collect
her salary for the month of August 2000 after her falsified
Employees Clearance was submitted and approved by the ORG-
ARMM and therefore, she alone could have the motive for
making such falsification.
On the basis of the foregoing circumstances, no reasonable and fair-
minded man would say that the accused - a Regional Secretary of DOT-
ARMM - had no knowledge of the falsification. It is an established rule,
well-buttressed upon reason, that in the absence of a satisfactory
explanation, when a person has in his possession or control a falsified
document and who makes use of the same, the presumption or inference
is justified that such person is the forger or the one who caused the forgery
and, therefore, guilty of falsification. Thus, in People v. Sendaydiego, the
Supreme Court held that -
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and
he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby,
the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification. This
is especially true if the use or uttering of the forged documents was so
closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or possessor may
be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers. (U.S. v. Castillo, 6 Phil. 453; People v. De
Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People v. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People v. Astudillo, 60
Phil. 338; People v. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In line with the above ruling, and considering that it was the accused who
took advantage and profited in the use of the falsified Employees
Clearance in question, the presumption is inevitable that she is the
material author of the falsification. And despite full opportunity, she was
not able to rebut such presumption by failing to show that it was another
person who forged or falsified the signature of Laura Pangilan or that at
least another person and not she alone, had the reason or motive to
commit the forgery or falsification, or was or could have been benefited by
such falsification/forgery.60
The circumstances enumerated by the Sandiganbayan, as against the
denials of petitioner, convince us to apply the rule that in the absence of
satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of, and who has
used, a forged document, is the forger and, therefore, guilty of
falsification.61 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of proof is to
create the need of presenting evidence to overcome the prima facie case
created, which, if no contrary proof is offered, will thereby prevail. 62 A
prima facie case of falsification having been established, petitioner should
have presented clear and convincing evidence to overcome such burden.
This, she failed to do.
Petitioner assails the weight given by the Sandiganbayan to the
testimonies of the two Pangilans when they failed to report the alleged
falsification to the police or alert the Office of the Regional Governor of
said falsification, or tried to stop petitioner from getting her salaries.
We do not agree with the petitioner. It is a settled rule that the findings of
fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions
anchored on said findings, are accorded high respect if not conclusive
effect.63 The determination of the credibility of witnesses is the domain of
the trial court, as it is in the best position to observe the witnesses’
demeanor.64 The Sandiganbayan has given full probative value to the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. So have we. We find no reason to
depart from such a rule.
Aware that the prosecution failed to present the original from which the
photocopy of petitioner’s Employees Clearance was supposed to have been
obtained, she maintains that the Sandiganbayan should have doubted the
authenticity and probative value of the photocopy of the Employees
Clearance.
The Sandiganbayan correctly admitted in evidence the photocopy of the
Employees Clearance. We agree when it ruled:
Section 3, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that when the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself. The purpose of the rule requiring
the production by the offeror of the best evidence if the prevention of
fraud, because if a party is in possession of such evidence and withholds it
and presents inferior or secondary evidence in its place, the presumption
is that the latter evidence is withheld from the court and the adverse party
for a fraudulent or devious purpose which its production would expose
and defeat. Hence, as long as the original evidence can be had, the Court
should not receive in evidence that which is substitutionary in nature,
such as photocopies, in the absence of any clear showing that the original
has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court. Such
photocopies must be disregarded, being inadmissible evidence and barren
of probative weight.
The foregoing rule, however, admits of several exceptions. Under Section
3(b) of Rule 130, secondary evidence of a writing may be admitted "when
the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice." And to warrant the admissibility of secondary
evidence when the original of a writing is in the custody or control of the
adverse party, Section 6 of Rule 130 provides as follows:
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party’s custody or control. -
If the document is in the custody or control of the adverse party, he must
have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice and after
satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the document,
secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of loss.
Thus, the mere fact that the original is in the custody or control of the
adverse party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of
secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his
power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to
produce the document which may be in the form of a motion for the
production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the
adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in
custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such
party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to
produce it, or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.
Here, the accused admitted that her Employees Clearance was always in
the possession of her assistant secretary, [Marie Cris] Batuampar. So the
prosecution in its effort to produce the original copy of the said Employees
Clearance of the accused, thru Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano of the Office of the Prosecutor, sent on May 31, 2005 thru the
COA Telegraph Office at Quezon City two (2) telegram subpoenas
addressed to accused Normallah Pacasum, and [Marie Cris] Batuampar
ordering them to submit to the Office of the Special Prosecutor on or
before June 8, 2005, the original of the Employees’ Clearance in the name
of Normallah Alonto Lucman-Pacasum for the release of her August and
September 2000 salary as DOT Regional Secretary. Notwithstanding
receipt of the said telegram subpoena by her uncle Manso Alonto in her
residence on June 1, 200[5], the accused did not appear before or submit
to Assistant Special Prosecutor Anna Isabel G. Aurellano, the original of
the said Employees Clearance, much less offered to produce the same.
Under the circumstances, since there was proof of the existence of the
Employees Clearance as evidenced by the photocopy thereof, and despite
the reasonable notices made by the prosecution to the accused and her
assistant secretary to produce the original of said employees clearance
they ignored the notice and refused to produce the original document, the
presentation and admission of the photocopy of the original copy of the
questioned Employees Clearance as secondary evidence to prove the
contents thereof was justified.65
This Court decrees that even though the original of an alleged falsified
document is not, or may no longer be produced in court, a criminal case
for falsification may still prosper if the person wishing to establish the
contents of said document via secondary evidence or substitutionary
evidence can adequately show that the best or primary evidence - the
original of the document - is not available for any of the causes mentioned
in Section 3,66 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner claims she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan
severely restricted her time to present evidence, allowing her only two
hearing dates, thus resulting in her failure to present another important
witness in the of person of Atty. Randolph Parcasio. Petitioner was not
denied due process. She was given every opportunity to adduce her
evidence. The Sandiganbayan outlined the proceedings of the case as
follows:
After the prosecution rested its case, by agreement of the parties, the
initial hearing for the reception of defense evidence was scheduled on
September 19 and 20, 2005 both at 8:30 in the morning. However, upon
motion of the prosecution, the Court, in its Order of September 16, 2005,
cancelled the setting as the handling prosecutor, Pros. Anna Isabel G.
Aurellano, had to attend a 5-day workshop at PHINMA in Tagaytay City
on September 19-23, 2005 and scheduled anew the hearing on November
23 and 24, 2005, both at 8:30 in the morning. However, for failure of the
defense counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, to appear at the November 23,
2005 hearing despite due notice, the Court cancelled the November 23
and 24 hearings, and moved the same to March 13 and 14, 2006 both at
8:30 in the morning, and at the same time directed the said defense
counsel to show cause in writing within five (5) days from receipt of the
Order why he should not be held in contempt for his failure to appear
despite due notice. In compliance with this Order, Atty. Rico B.
Bolongaita, filed his Explanation and Withdrawal of Appearance,
respectively, which were both Noted by the Court in its Resolution of
January 19, 2006.
In view of the absence of the accused in the March 13, 2006 hearing and
her continued failure to get a substitute counsel considering that her
counsel, Atty. Rico B. Bolongaita, had already withdrawn from the case
since January 16, 2006, the Court cancelled the March 13 and 14, 2006
hearingsand moved the same to July 3 and 4, 2006 both at 8:30 in the
morning and designated Atty. Conrado Rosario of the PAO as counsel de
oficio of the accused and directed the accused upon receipt of the order to
immediately confer with said counsel for purposes of preparing for her
defense in the case.
On March 20, 2006, the Court issued the following Resolution, which
reads:
Accused Normallah L. Pacasum’s letter of February 17, 2006 (received by
mail on March 16, 2006) requesting extension of time to engage the
services of counsel is merely NOTED WITHOUT ACTION as the next
hearings are scheduled on July 3 and 4, 2006 and said accused would
have more than ample time to engage the services of counsel of her
choice. For this reason, any excuse from the accused on said settings that
she failed to engage the services of counsel or that her counsel needs
more time to prepare will be unacceptable. At all events, this Court, in its
Order of March 13, 2006, had already appointed Atty. Conrado Rosario of
the PAO as a counsel de oficio to represent the accused, with specific
orders to the latter to confer with Atty. Rosario and assist him in
preparing for her defense.
On July 3, 2006, upon the manifestation of Atty. Conrado Rosario,
counsel for the accused, that since he was appointed counsel de oficio, the
accused has not communicated with him and therefore he was not ready
to present any evidence for the accused, the Court cancelled the hearing
in order to give the defense another opportunity to present its evidence
and reset it to July 4, 2006, the following day as previously scheduled.
On July 4, 2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads -
"When this case was called for hearing, accused asked for the resetting of
the case on the ground that she just hired a new counsel who thereafter
arrived and entered his appearance as Atty. Napoleon Uy Galit with
address at Suite 202 Masonic Building, #35 Matalino St., Diliman, Quezon
City. With the appearance of her new counsel, Atty. Conrado C. Rosario is
hereby discharged as counsel de oficio of the accused.
"As prayed for by the accused, she is given the last chance to present her
evidence on October 9 and 10, 2006, both at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
For repeated failure of the accused to acknowledge receipt of the notices of
the Court, her waiver of appearance is hereby cancelled and she is ordered
to personally appear in the scheduled hearings of this case.
SO ORDERED.
On October 6, 2006, the accused thru counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman,
filed an Entry of Appearance, Motion For Postponement of October 9
and 10 Hearings stating therein that since his service as new counsel was
just engaged by the accused, and that the accused herself cannot also
attend the said hearing because she is undergoing fasting until October 24,
2006 in observance of Ramadan, he asked to postpone the settings on
October 9 and 10, 2006. At the hearing on October 9, 2006, the Court
issued the following, which reads -
"Acting on the Entry of Appearance, Motion for Postponement of October
9 and 10, 2006 Hearing filed by accused Normallah L. Pacasum, thru
counsel, Atty. Bantreas Lucman, finding the same to be without merit,
as this case has been set for hearing several times and the accused has
been given the last chance to present evidence, the Court hereby denies
the motion for postponement.
"In this regard, in view of the absence of accused Normallah L. Pacasum
in today’s hearing despite the Order of the Court dated July 4, 2006,
canceling her waiver of appearance, and ordering her to personally
appear before this Court, as prayed for by the prosecution, let a Bench
Warrant of Arrest be issued against the said accused. The cash bond
posted for her provisional liberty is ordered confiscated in favor of the
government. The accused is given thirty (30) days from notice to explain
in writing why final judgment shall not be rendered against the said bond.
With the Manifestation of Atty. Bantreas Lucman that the defense is not
ready to present its evidence today and tomorrow, the last chance for it
to present its evidence, the Court is constraint to consider the accused’s
right to present evidence as waived.
The parties are hereby given thirty (30) days to submit their respective
memoranda. Thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision.
SO ORDERED.
Subsequently, the accused thru counsel, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Order dated October 25, 2006, and Motion
to Set Hearing For Motion for Reconsideration and to Lift Warrant of
Arrest dated October 31, 2006.
At the hearing of accused’s motion for reconsideration on November 3,
2006, the Court issued the following Order, which reads -
"When the ‘Motion To Set Hearing for Motion for Reconsideration and to
Lift Warrant of Arrest’ was called for hearing this morning, only Attorneys
Bantuas M. Lucman and Jose Ventura Aspiras appeared. Accused
Normallah L. Pacasum was absent.
In view of the absence of the accused, the Court is not inclined to give
favorable action to the Motion for Reconsideration. It must be stressed
that the primordial reason for the issuance of the order sought to be
reconsidered in the presence of the accused in the previous hearing in
violation of the Court’s Order for her to personally appear in the hearings
of this case and for her indifference to the directives of the Court. With the
absence anew of the accused, the Court has no alternative but to deny the
Motion.
Moreover, the Court notes the allegation in the Motion that the counsel
sought the assurance of the accused (and she promised) to appear before
this Court if the motion will be granted, as if the Court owes the accused
the favor to appear before it. The accused is reminded/advised that the
issuance of the warrant of arrest, she has to voluntarily surrender and
appear before the Court or be arrested and brought to the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is denied.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance Consideration of
Prosecution’s Memorandum (And for a Second Look on the Matter of
Accused’s Right to Present Defense Evidence) of the accused dated
November 21, 2006, and the prosecution’s Opposition thereto, the Court
issued the following Order, which reads -
"This refers to the Accused "Omnibus Motion to Hold in Abeyance
Consideration of Prosecution’s November 7, 2006 Memorandum (And For
a Second Look on the Matter of Accused’s Right to Present Defense
Evidence)" dated November 21, 2006 and the plaintiff’s Opposition
thereto dated November 28, 2006.
"Inasmuch as the accused has already appeared before the Court and
posted an additional bond of P10,000.00 despite the aforesaid opposition
of the prosecution, in the interest of justice, the Court is inclined to
reconsider and give favorable action to the motion and grant the accused
another and last opportunity to present here evidence.
"WHEREFORE, the motion is granted and this case is set for hearing for
the accused’s last chance to present and/or complete the presentation of
her evidence on February 5 and 6, 2007 both at 8:30 in the morning in
the Sandiganbayan Centennial Building in Quezon City.
SO ORDERED.
Thus, despite the initial indifference of the accused to present her defense,
the Court gave her ample opportunity to present her evidence. 67
The Sandiganbayan properly dealt with the situation. In fact, we find that
the trial court was lenient with the petitioner. The failure of the defense to
present Atty. Parcasio was its own doing. The defense failed to prepare its
witnesses for the case. As proof of this, we quote a portion of the hearing
when petitioner was testifying:
ATTY. ASPIRAS
Q Would you know where (sic) the whereabouts of this Sec. Parcasio
would be (sic) at this time?

A He lives in Davao but after what happened to Gov. Misuari, we have not
got together with the other members of the cabinet of Gov. Misuari, but he
lives in Davao, sir.

Q Would it be possible, Madame Witness, to request or ask him to testify

in this case?

A After this hearing, I will look for Sec. Parcasio just to clear my name, sir.

CHAIRMAN

Not after this hearing, you should have already done that. Because we
already gave you enough opportunity to present your side, right? You
should not be telling the Court that only after this hearing, you will start
looking (for) people who will, definitely, clear your name. You should be
doing that months ago, correct?

WITNESS

Yes, your Honors.68

Petitioner was charged with falsifying her Employees Clearance under

Article 171, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. For one to be convicted
of falsification under said paragraph, the followings elements must
concur: (1) that the offender is a public officer, an employee, or a notary
public; (2) that he takes advantage of his official position; and (3) that he
falsifies a document by counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting,
signature or rubric.
All the foregoing elements have been sufficiently established. There is no
dispute that petitioner was a public officer, being then the Regional
Secretary of the Department of Tourism of the ARMM, when she caused
the preparation of her Employees Clearance (a public document) for the
release of her salary for the months of August and September 2000. Such
being a requirement, and she being a public officer, she was duty-bound to
prepare, accomplish and submit said document. Were it not for her
position and employment in the ARMM, she could not have accomplished
said Employees Clearance. In a falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (1) he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document; or (2) he had official custody of the
document which he falsified.69 It being her duty to prepare and submit
said document, she clearly took advantage of her position when she
falsified or caused the falsification of her Employees Clearance by
imitating the signature of Laura Pangilan.
Going now to the penalties imposed on petitioner, we find the same
proper. The penalty for falsification under Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code is prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. There being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the
felony, the imposable penalty is prision mayor in its medium period, or
within the range of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty to be
imposed shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor, while
the minimum shall be taken from within the range of the penalty next
lower in degree, which is prision correccional or from six (6) months and
one (1) day to six (6) years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Crim. Case No. 27483 dated 7 August 2007 and its resolution dated 22
October 2007 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MCMP Construction Corp., v. Monark Equipment Corp.
G.R. No. 201001
MCMP CONSTRUCTION CORP., Petitioner,
- versus -
MONARK EQUIPMENT CORP., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, J.:
For consideration of the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari dated
April 20, 20li filed by MCMP Construction Corp. under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. The petition seeks the reversal of the Decision dated
October 14, 2011 and Resolution dated March 9, 2012  issued by the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 91860 entitled Monark Equipment
Corporation v. MCMP Construction Corporation. The CA Decision
affirmed the Decision dated November 20, 2007 and Order dated April
28, 2008 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 in Quezon City
(RTC) in Civil Case No. Q-02-4 7092 entitled Monark Equipment
Corporation v. MCMP Construction Corporation.
The facts of the case are as follows:
MCMP Construction Corporation (MCMP) leased heavy equipment from
Monark Equipment Corporation (Monark) for various periods in 2000,
the lease covered by a Rental Equipment Contract (Contract). Thus,
Monark delivered five (5) pieces of heavy equipment to the project site of
MCMP in Tanay, Rizal and Llavac, Quezon, the delivery evidenced by
invoices as well as Documents Acknowledgment Receipt Nos. 04667 and
5706, received and signed by representatives of MCMP, namely, Jorge
Samonte on December 5, 2000 and Rose Takahashi on January 29, 2001,
respectively. Notably, the invoices state:
"Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice.
Customer agrees to pay interest at 24% p.a. on all amounts. In addition,
customer agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and
2% per month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue.
Customer agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of any amount due as
attorney’s fees in case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction of
the courts of Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any
legal action arising from, this transactions."

Despite the lapse of the thirty (30)-day period indicated in the invoices,
MCMP failed to pay the rental fees. Upon demands made upon MCMP to
pay the amount due, partial payments were made in the amount of
Ph₱100,000.00 on April 15, 2001 and Ph₱100,000.00 on August 15, 2001.
Further demands went unheeded. As of April 30, 2002, MCMP owed
Monark the amount of Ph₱1,282,481.83, broken down as follows:

Principal Accumulated PhP 765,380.33

Interest (2%) 253,226.17

2% Monthly Penalty Charge 253,226.17


Collection Fee (1%) 10,649.16
===============  2) the alleged loss was not even reported to management or the police;
Ph P 1,282,481.83
 <
Thus, on June 18, 2002, Monark filed a suit for a Sum of Money with the
RTC docketed as Civil Case No. Q-02-47092.
 In its Answer filed on July 5, 2002, MCMP alleged in defense thatthe
complaint was premature as Monark has refused to give a detailed
breakdown of its claims. MCMP further averred that it had an agreement
with Monark that it would not be charged for the whole time that the
leased equipment was in its possession but rather only for the actual time
that the equipment was used although still on the project site. MCMP,
however, admitted that this agreement was not contained in the Contract.
During trial, Monark presented asone of its witnesses, Reynaldo Peregrino
(Peregrino), its Senior Account Manager. Peregrino testified that there
were two (2) original copies ofthe Contract, one retained by Monark, while
the other was given to MCMP. He further testified that Monark’s copy had
been lost and that diligent efforts to recover the copy proved futile.
Instead, Peregrino presented a photocopy of the Contract which he
personally had on file. MCMP objected to the presentation of secondary
evidence to prove the contents of the Contract arguing that there were no
diligent efforts to search for the original copy. Notably, MCMP did not
present its copy of the Contract notwithstanding the directive of the trial
court to produce the same.
On November 20, 2007, the RTC issued its Decision finding for Monark as
plaintiff, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the
defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 1,282,481.83 as balance for the rental fees of the subject heavy
equipments (sic) as of April 30, 2002, inclusive of the interests thereof;
2. Twenty-Five percent (25%) of the total amount to be recovered as
payment for the attorney’s fees; and,
3. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
From this Decision of the RTC, MCMP filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated January 31, 2008 while Monark interposed a Motion for
Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration. On April 28, 2008, the RTC
issued an Order, disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reversible
error in the assailed decision henceforth, the Motion for Reconsideration
of defendant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. On the other hand, the
plaintiff’s Motion for Clarification and/or Partial Reconsideration is
hereby GRANTED for being meritorious. Therefore, in the dispositive
portion of the assailed decision dated 20 November 2007, the following
should be included:
‘The payment of interests, charges and fees due after April 30, 2002 and
up to the time when all the obligations of the defendant to the plaintiff
shall have been fully paid, computed in accordance with the stipulations
entered into between the parties under Exhibits "A" to "G", and uniformly
stated in the following wise:
Credit sales are payable within 30 days from the date of invoice. Customer
agreesto pay interest at 24% p.a. on all amounts. In addition, customer
agrees to pay a collection fee of 1% compounded monthly and 2% per
month penalty charge for late payment on amounts overdue. Customer
agrees to pay a sum equal to 25% of any amount due as attorney’s fees in
case of suit, and expressly submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of
Quezon City, Makati, Pasig or Manila, Metro Manila, for any legal action
arising from, this transactions.’
SO ORDERED."
Unsatisfied, MCMP appealed the RTC’s Decision and Order to the Court of
Appeals (CA). Eventually, the appellate court, by a Decision dated October
14, 2011, affirmed in totothe Decision and Order of the RTC. MCMP’s
motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision was denied by the CA in its
Resolution dated March 9, 2012.
Hence, the instant petition.
MCMP challenges the ruling of the CA arguing that the appellate court
should have disallowed the presentation of secondary evidence to prove
the existence of the Contract, following the Best Evidence Rule. MCMP
specifically argues that based on the testimony of Peregrino, Monark did
not diligently search for the original copy of the Contract as evidenced by
the fact that: 1) the actual custodian of the document was not presented;
and 3) Monark only searched for the original copy of the document for the
purposes of the instant case.
Petitioner’s contention is erroneous.
The Best Evidence Rule, a basic postulate requiring the production of the
original document whenever its contents are the subject of inquiry, is
contained in Section 3 of Rule 130 ofthe Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following
cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in
court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it
after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact
sought to be established from them is only the general result of the whole;
and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or
is recorded in a public office. (Emphasis supplied)"
Relative thereto, Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 130 provide the relevant rules on
the presentation of secondary evidence to prove the contents of a lost
document:
"Section 5. When original document is unavailable. — When the original
document has been lost ordestroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Section 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. — If the document is inthe custody or under the control of adverse
party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such notice
and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss."
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lagman, the Court set down
the requirements before a party may present secondary evidence to prove
the contents of the original document whenever the original copy has been
lost:
Before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the
contents of the original, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the
existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of
the original or the reason for its non-production in court; and (3) on the
part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of
the original can be attributed. The correct order of proof is as follows:
existence, execution, loss, and contents.
In the instant case, the CA correctlyruled that the above requisites are
present. Both the CA and the RTC gave credence to the testimony of
Peregrino that the original Contract in the possession of Monark has been
lost and that diligent efforts were exerted to find the same but to no avail.
Such testimony has remained uncontroverted. As has been repeatedly held
by this Court, "findings offacts and assessment ofcredibility of witnesses
are matters best left to the trial court."
Hence, the Court will respect the evaluation of the trial court on the
credibility of Peregrino.
MCMP, to note, contends that the Contract presented by Monark is not
the contract that they entered into. Yet, it has failed to present a copy of
the Contract even despite the request ofthe trial court for it to produce its
copy of the Contract. Normal business practice dictates that MCMP should
have asked for and retained a copy of their agreement. Thus, MCMP’s
failure to present the same and even explain its failure, not only justifies
the presentation by Monark of secondary evidence in accordance with
Section 6 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, butit also gives rise to the
disputable presumption adverse to MCMP under Section 3 (e) of Rule 131
of the Rules of Court that "evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse
if produced."
Next, MCMP claims that the piecesof equipment were not actually
delivered to it by Monark. It bears pointing out, however, that the
witnesses of MCMP itself, Jorge Samonte, a Budget Supervisor of MCMP,
and Engr. Horacio A. Martinez, Sr., General Manager of MCMP, both
acknowledged the delivery of the equipment to the project sites.
Clearly, the contention of MCMP is false.
Evidently, the instant petition must be dismissed.
Nevertheless, the Court takes notice that the trial court imposed upon
MCMP a 24% per annum interest on the rental fees as well as a collection
fee of 1% per month compounded monthly and a 2% per month penalty
charge. In all then, the effective interest rate foisted upon MCMP is 60%
per annum. On top of this, MCMP was assessedfor attorney’s fees at the
rate of 25% of the total amount due. These are exorbitant and
unconscionable rates and, following jurisprudence, must be equitably
reduced.
In Macalinao v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, the Court reduced the
interest imposed by the bank of 36% for being excessive and
unconscionable:
"x x x Nevertheless, it should be noted that this is not the first time that
this Court has considered the interest rate of 36% per annum as excessive
and unconscionable. We held in Chua vs. Timan:
The stipulated interest rates of 7% and 5% per month imposed on
respondents’ loans mustbe equitably reduced to 1% per month or 12% per
annum. We need not unsettle the principle we had affirmed in a plethora
of cases that stipulated interest rates of 3% per month and higher are
excessive, iniquitous, unconscionable and exorbitant. Such stipulations
are void for being contrary to morals, if not against the law. While C.B.
Circular No. 905-82, which took effect on January 1, 1983, effectively
removed the ceiling on interest rates for both secured and unsecured
loans, regardless of maturity, nothing in the said circular could possibly be
read as granting carte blanche authority to lenders to raise interest rates to
levels which would either enslave their borrowers or lead to a
hemorrhaging of their assets. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there was no
express contract thereon. Hence, courts may reduce the interest rate as
reason and equity demand.
The same is true with respect tothe penalty charge. Notably, under the
Terms and Conditions Governing the Issuance and Use of the BPI Credit
Card, it was also stated therein that respondent BPI shall impose an
additional penalty charge of 3% per month. Pertinently, Article 1229 of the
Civil Code states:
Lastly, respondent promised to pay 25% of his outstanding obligations as
attorney’s fees in case of non-payment thereof. Attorney’s fees here are in
the nature of liquidated damages. As long as said stipulation does not
contravene law, morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon
respondent. Nonetheless, courts are empowered to reduce such rate if the
same is iniquitous or unconscionable pursuant to the above-quoted
provision. This sentiment is echoed inArticle 2227 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 2227. Liquidated damages, whether intended as an indemnity or a
penalty, shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Hence, we reduce the stipulated attorney's fees from 25% to 10%."
Following the above principles previously laid down by the Court, the
interest and penalty charges imposed upon MCMP must also be
considered as iniquitous, unconscionable and, therefore, void. As such, the
rates may validly be reduced. Thus, the interest rate of 24% per annum is
hereby reduced to 12% per annum. Moreover, the interest shall start to
accrue thirty (30) days after receipt of the second set of invoices on
January 21, 2001, or March 1, 2001 in accordance with the provisions in
the invoices themselves.
Additionally, the penalty and collection charge of 3% per month, or 36%
per annum, is also reduced to 6% per annum. And the amount of
attorney's fees is reduced from 25% of the total amount due to 5%.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit with the MODIFICATION that the dispositive
portion of the RTC's Decision dated November 20, 2007, as amended in
an Order dated April 28, 2008, should read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and legal premises,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and ordering the
defendant to pay the former:
1. PhP 765,380.33 representing the unpaid rental fees;
2. Interest of 12% per annum on the unpaid rental fees to be computed
from March 1, 2001 until payment;
3. Penalty and collection charge of 6% per annum on the unpaid rental
fees to be computed from March 1, 2001;
4. Attorney's Fees of five percent (5%) of the total amount to be recovered;
and,
5. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even
if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the
courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable. In exercising this power to
determine what is iniquitous and unconscionable, courts must consider
the circumstances of each case since what may be iniquitous and
unconscionable in one may be totally just and equitable in another."

In the more recent case of Pentacapital Investment Corporation v.

Mahinay, the Court reduced the interest and penalties imposed in a
contract as follows:

"Aside from the payment of the principal obligation of ₱1,936,800.00, the

parties agreed that respondent pay interest at the rate of 25% from
February 17, 1997 until fully paid. Such rate, however, is excessive and
thus, void. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void, it is as if there
was no express contract thereon. To be sure, courts may reduce the
interest rate as reason and equity demand. In this case, 12% interest is
reasonable.

The promissory notes likewise required the payment of a penalty charge of

3% per month or 36% per annum. We find such rates unconscionable.
This Court has recognized a penalty clause as an accessory obligation
which the parties attach to a principal obligation for the purpose of
ensuring the performance thereof by imposing on the debtor a special
prestation (generallyconsisting of the payment of a sum of money) in case
the obligation is not fulfilled or is irregularly or inadequately fulfilled.
However, a penalty charge of 3% per month is unconscionable; hence, we
reduce it to1% per month or 12% per annum, pursuant to Article 1229 of
the Civil Code which states:

Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by the debtor. Even
if there has been no performance, the penalty may also be reduced by the
courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.