Maximo Alvarez vs. Susan Ramirez. A: He is my husband, sir, Maximo Alvarez.

Republic of the Philippines

Q: If that Maximo Alvarez you were able to see, can you identify him?
SUPREME COURT
A: Yes, sir.
THIRD DIVISION
Q: If you can see him inside the Court room, can you please point him?
G.R. No. 143439 October 14, 2005
A: Witness pointing to a person and when asked to stand and asked his
MAXIMO ALVAREZ, Petitioner, 
name, he gave his name as Maximo Alvarez." 4
vs.
SUSAN RAMIREZ, Respondent.
In the course of Esperanza’s direct testimony against petitioner, the latter
showed "uncontrolled emotions," prompting the trial judge to suspend the
DECISION
proceedings.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion 5 to
disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 of the Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.
the Court of Appeals dated May 31, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 56154,
entitled "Susan Ramirez, petitioner, versus, Hon. Benjamin M. Aquino,
Respondent filed an opposition 6 to the motion. Pending resolution of the
Jr., as Judge RTC, Malabon, MM, Br. 72, and Maximo
motion, the trial court directed the prosecution to proceed with the
Alvarez, respondents."
presentation of the other witnesses.

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal

On September 2, 1999, the trial court issued the questioned Order
Case No. 19933-MN for arson3 pending before the Regional Trial Court,
disqualifying Esperanza Alvarez from further testifying and deleting her
Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein
testimony from the records.7 The prosecution filed a motion for
petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of
reconsideration but was denied in the other assailed Order dated October
respondent.
19, 1999.8

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the
witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband.
Petitioner and his counsel raised no objection.
Esperanza testified as follows:
"ATTY. ALCANTARA:
This prompted respondent Susan Ramirez, the complaining witness in
Criminal Case No. 19933-MN, to file with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari9with application for preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order.10
On May 31, 2000, the Appellate Court rendered a Decision nullifying and
setting aside the assailed Orders issued by the trial court.

We are calling Mrs. Esperanza Alvarez, the wife of the accused, Your Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Honor.
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify
COURT: against her husband in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.

Swear in the witness. Section 22, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

xxx "Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. - During their marriage,

ATTY. MESIAH: (sic)
Your Honor, we are offering the testimony of this witness for the purpose
of proving that the accused Maximo Alvarez committed all the elements of
the crime being charged particularly that accused Maximo Alvarez pour on
May 29, 1998 gasoline in the house located at Blk. 5, Lot 9, Phase 1-C,
Dagat-dagatan, Navotas, Metro Manila, the house owned by his sister-in-
law Susan Ramirez; that accused Maximo Alvarez after pouring the
gasoline on the door of the house of Susan Ramirez ignited and set it on
fire; that the accused at the time he successfully set the house on fire (sic)
of Susan Ramirez knew that it was occupied by Susan Ramirez, the
members of the family as well as Esperanza Alvarez, the estranged
wife of the accused; that as a consequence of the accused in successfully
setting the fire to the house of Susan Ramirez, the door of said house was
burned and together with several articles of the house, including shoes,
chairs and others.
COURT:
neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by one
against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter’s direct descendants or ascendants."
The reasons given for the rule are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger
of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidences of private
life, even at the risk of an occasional failure of justice, and to prevent
domestic disunion and unhappiness; and
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing
one spouse through the hostile testimony of the other. 11

You may proceed. But like all other general rules, the marital disqualification rule has its own
exceptions, both in civil actions between the spouses and in criminal cases
for offenses committed by one against the other. Like the rule itself, the
xxx
exceptions are backed by sound reasons which, in the excepted cases,
outweigh those in support of the general rule. For instance, where the
DIRECT EXAMINATION marital and domestic relations are so strained that there is no more
harmony to be preserved nor peace and tranquility which may be
ATTY. ALCANTARA: disturbed, the reason based upon such harmony and tranquility fails. In
such a case, identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of
xxx perjury based on that identity is non-existent. Likewise, in such a
situation, the security and confidences of private life, which the law aims
at protecting, will be nothing but ideals, which through their absence,
Q: When you were able to find the source, incidentally what was the
merely leave a void in the unhappy home. 12
source of that scent?
In Ordoño vs. Daquigan,13 this Court held:
A: When I stand by the window, sir, I saw a man pouring the gasoline in
the house of my sister (and witness pointing to the person of the accused
inside the court room). "We think that the correct rule, which may be adopted in this jurisdiction,
is that laid down in Cargil vs. State, 35 ALR 133, 220 Pac. 64, 25 Okl. 314,
wherein the court said:
Q: For the record, Mrs. Witness, can you state the name of that person, if
you know?
‘The rule that the injury must amount to a physical wrong upon the person
is too narrow; and the rule that any offense remotely or indirectly affecting
domestic harmony comes within the exception is too broad. The better
rule is that, when an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally
impairs, the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the statute
that one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal
prosecution for a crime committee (by) one against the other.’"
Obviously, the offense of arson attributed to petitioner, directly impairs
the conjugal relation between him and his wife Esperanza. His act, as
embodied in the Information for arson filed against him, eradicates all the
major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence, respect and love by
which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes.
As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals:
"The act of private respondent in setting fire to the house of his sister-in-
law Susan Ramirez, knowing fully well that his wife was there, and in fact
with the alleged intent of injuring the latter, is an act totally alien to the
harmony and confidences of marital relation which the disqualification
primarily seeks to protect. The criminal act complained of had the effect of
directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. It underscored the fact
that the marital and domestic relations between her and the accused-
husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony, peace or
tranquility to be preserved. The Supreme Court has held that in such a
case, identity is non-existent. In such a situation, the security and
confidences of private life which the law aims to protect are nothing but
ideals which through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy
home. (People v. Castañeda, 271 SCRA 504). Thus, there is no longer any
reason to apply the Marital Disqualification Rule."
It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the
commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his
wife was already strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six
months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented
reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.
At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying
the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the
innocent exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of
Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by
this Court in Francisco14), "it was the latter himself who gave rise to its
necessity."
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow
Esperanza Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal
Case No. 19933-MN. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Lilibeth Sunga-Chan, et al. vs. Lamberto T. Chua
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 143340       August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners, 
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court of the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated January 31, 2000 in
the case entitled "Lamberto T. Chua vs. Lilibeth Sunga Chan and Cecilia
Sunga" and of the Resolution dated May 23, 2000 denying the motion for
reconsideration of herein petitioners Lilibeth Sunga and Cecilia Sunga
(hereafter collectively referred to as petitioners).
The pertinent facts of this case are as follows:
On June 22, 1992, Lamberto T. Chua (hereafter respondent) filed a
complaint against Lilibeth Sunga Chan (hereafter petitioner Lilibeth) and
Cecilia Sunga (hereafter petitioner Cecilia), daughter and wife,
respectively of the deceased Jacinto L. Sunga (hereafter Jacinto), for
"Winding Up of Partnership Affairs, Accounting, Appraisal and Recovery
of Shares and Damages with Writ of Preliminary Attachment" with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte.
Respondent alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership
with Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane Liquefied Petroleum Gas
(LPG) in Manila. For business convenience, respondent and Jacinto
allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership,
SHELLITE GAS APPLIANCE CENTER (hereafter Shellite), under the
name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Respondent allegedly delivered
his initial capital contribution of P100,000.00 to Jacinto while the latter
in turn produced P100,000.00 as his counterpart contribution, with the
intention that the profits would be equally divided between them. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy
(hereafter Josephine), a sister of the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy. As
compensation, Jacinto would receive a manager's fee or remuneration of
10% of the gross profit and Josephine would receive 10% of the net profits,
in addition to her wages and other remuneration from the business.
Allegedly, from the time that Shellite opened for business on July 8, 1977,
its business operation went quite and was profitable. Respondent claimed
that he could attest to success of their business because of the volume of
orders and deliveries of filled Shellane cylinder tanks supplied by Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation. While Jacinto furnished respondent with the
merchandise inventories, balance sheets and net worth of Shellite from
1977 to 1989, respondent however suspected that the amount indicated in
these documents were understated and undervalued by Jacinto and
Josephine for their own selfish reasons and for tax avoidance.
Upon Jacinto's death in the later part of 1989, his surviving wife,
petitioner Cecilia and particularly his daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took
over the operations, control, custody, disposition and management of
Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's repeated
demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding
up and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to
comply. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly continued the operations of Shellite,
converting to her own use and advantage its properties.
On March 31, 1991, respondent claimed that after petitioner Lilibeth ran
out the alibis and reasons to evade respondent's demands, she disbursed
out of the partnership funds the amount of P200,000.00 and partially
paid the same to respondent. Petitioner Lilibeth allegedly informed
respondent that the P200,000.00 represented partial payment of the
latter's share in the partnership, with a promise that the former would
make the complete inventory and winding up of the properties of the
business establishment. Despite such commitment, petitioners allegedly
failed to comply with their duty to account, and continued to benefit from
the assets and income of Shellite to the damage and prejudice of
respondent.
On December 19, 1992, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in Manila,
not the Regional Trial Court in Zamboanga del Norte had jurisdiction over
the action. Respondent opposed the motion to dismiss.
On January 12, 1993, the trial court finding the complaint sufficient in
from and substance denied the motion to dismiss.
On January 30, 1993, petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory
Counter-claims, contending that they are not liable for partnership shares,
unreceived income/profits, interests, damages and attorney's fees, that
respondent does not have a cause of action against them, and that the trial
court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC being the
agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On August 2, 1993, petitioner filed a second Motion to Dismiss this time
on the ground that the claim for winding up of partnership affairs,
accounting and recovery of shares in partnership affairs, accounting and
recovery of shares in partnership assets/properties should be dismissed
and prosecuted against the estate of deceased Jacinto in a probate or
intestate proceeding.
On August 16, 1993, the trial denied the second motion to dismiss for lack
of merit.
On November 26, 1993, petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 32499 questioning the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On November 29, 1993, petitioners filed with the trial court a Motion to
Suspend Pre-trial Conference.
On December 13, 1993, the trial court granted the motion to suspend pre-
trial conference.
On November 15, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for lack of
merit.
On January 16, 1995, this Court denied the petition for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner, "as petitioners failed to show that a reversible
error was committed by the appellate court." 2
On February 20, 1995, entry of judgment was made by the Clerk of Court
and the case was remanded to the trial court on April 26, 1995.
On September 25, 1995, the trial court terminated the pre-trial conference
and set the hearing of the case of January 17, 1996. Respondent presented
his evidence while petitioners were considered to have waived their right
to present evidence for their failure to attend the scheduled date for
reception of evidence despite notice.
On October 7, 1997, the trial court rendered its Decision ruling for
respondent. The dispositive of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants, as follows:
(1) DIRECTING them to render an accounting in
acceptable form under accounting procedures and
standards of the properties, assets, income and profits
of the Shellite Gas Appliance Center Since the time of
death of Jacinto L. Sunga, from whom they continued
the business operations including all businesses
derived from Shellite Gas Appliance Center, submit an
inventory, and appraisal of all these properties, assets,
income, profits etc. to the Court and to plaintiff for
approval or disapproval;
(2) ORDERING them to return and restitute to the
partnership any and all properties, assets, income and
profits they misapplied and converted to their own use
and advantage the legally pertain to the plaintiff and
account for the properties mentioned in pars. A and B
on pages 4-5 of this petition as basis;
(3) DIRECTING them to restitute and pay to the
plaintiff ½ shares and interest of the plaintiff in the
partnership of the listed properties, assets and good
will (sic) in schedules A, B and C, on pages 4-5 of the
petition;
(4) ORDERING them to pay the plaintiff earned but
unreceived income and profits from the partnership
from 1988 to May 30, 1992, when the plaintiff learned
of the closure of the store the sum of P35,000.00 per
month, with legal rate of interest until fully paid;
(5) ORDERING them to wind up the affairs of the
partnership and terminate its business activities
pursuant to law, after delivering to the plaintiff all the
½ interest, shares, participation and equity in the
partnership, or the value thereof in money or money's
worth, if the properties are not physically divisible;
(6) FINDING them especially Lilibeth Sunga-Chan
guilty of breach of trust and in bad faith and hold them
liable to the plaintiff the sum of P50,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages; and,
(7) DIRECTING them to reimburse and pay the sum of
P25,000.00 as attorney's (sic) and P25,000.00 as
litigation expenses.
NO special pronouncements as to COSTS.
SO ORDERED."3
On October 28, 1997, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal with the trial
court, appealing the case to the Court of Appeals.
On January 31, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal. The
dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed. The appealed
decision is AFFIRMED in all respects."4
On May 23, 2000, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Hence, this petition wherein petitioner relies upon following grounds:
"1. The Court of Appeals erred in making a legal conclusion that
there existed a partnership between respondent Lamberto T.
Chua and the late Jacinto L. Sunga upon the latter'' invitation
and offer and that upon his death the partnership assets and
business were taken over by petitioners.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that
laches and/or prescription did not apply in the instant case.
3. The Court of Appeals erred in making the legal conclusion that
there was competent and credible evidence to warrant the
finding of a partnership, and assuming arguendo that indeed
there was a partnership, the finding of highly exaggerated
amounts or values in the partnership assets and profits." 5
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and
Jacinto from 1977 until Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written
document to show such partnership between respondent and Jacinto,
petitioners argues that these courts were proscribes from hearing the
testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to prove the alleged
partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this argument,
petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court that provides:
"SEC. 23.  Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of
adverse party.  - Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or
persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor
or administrator or other representative of a deceased person, or
against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand
against the estate of such deceased person, or against such
person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any matter of fact
occurring before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind."
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of
respondent and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to
prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented
by petitioners.
We are not persuaded.
A partnership may be constituted in any form, except where immovable
property of real rights are contributed thereto, in which case a public
instrument shall necessary.6 Hence, based on the intention of the parties,
as gathered from the facts and ascertained from their language and
conduct, a verbal contract of partnership may arise. 7 The essential profits
that must be proven to that a partnership was agreed upon are (1) mutual
contribution to a common stock, and (2) a joint interest in the
profits.8 Understandably so, in view of the absence of the written contract
of partnership between respondent and Jacinto, respondent resorted to
the introduction of documentary and testimonial evidence to prove said
partnership. The crucial issue to settle then is to whether or not the "Dead
Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render inadmissible
respondent's testimony and that of his witness, Josephine.
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the
transaction.9 But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the
introduction of testimonial evidence, it is necessary that:
 "1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons the partnership continues and its legal personality is retained until the
in whose behalf a case in prosecuted. complete winding up of its business, culminating in its termination. 24

2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound
mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against
the estate of such deceased person or against person of unsound
mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred
before the death of such deceased person or before such person
became of unsound mind."10
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this
case.
First, petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim 11 against respondents in
their answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their
counterclaim, petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from
the ambit of the "Dead Man's Statute". 12 Well entrenched is the rule that
when it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estates
that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein respondent, may testify
to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat the
counterclaim.13 Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is
not disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the
death of the deceased, said action not having been brought against but by
the estate or representatives of the deceased. 14
In a desperate bid to cast doubt on the validity of the oral partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners maintain that said
partnership that had initial capital of P200,000.00 should have been
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) since
registration is mandated by the Civil Code, True, Article 1772 of the Civil
Code requires that partnerships with a capital of P3,000.00 or more must
register with the SEC, however, this registration requirement is not
mandatory. Article 1768 of the Civil Code25 explicitly provides that the
partnership retains its juridical personality even if it fails to register. The
failure to register the contract of partnership does not invalidate the same
as among the partners, so long as the contract has the essential requisites,
because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties,
and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents
of their contract.26 In the case at bar, non-compliance with this directory
provision of the law will not invalidate the partnership considering that
the totality of the evidence proves that respondent and Jacinto indeed
forged the partnership in question.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the
appealed decision is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's

Statute" for the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party
to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show
that respondent offered the testimony of Josephine to establish the
existence of the partnership between respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners'
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of respondent does not make her
an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party means "assignor of a
cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned
before any cause of action has arisen." 15 Plainly then, Josephine is merely a
witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

We are not convinced by petitioners' allegation that Josephine's testimony

lacks probative value because she was allegedly coerced coerced by
respondent, her brother-in-law, to testify in his favor, Josephine merely
declared in court that she was requested by respondent to testify and that
if she were not requested to do so she would not have testified. We fail to
see how we can conclude from this candid admission that Josephine's
testimony is involuntary when she did not in any way categorically say that
she was forced to be a witness of respondent.

Also, the fact that Josephine is the sister of the wife of respondent does not
diminish the value of her testimony since relationship per se, without
more, does not affect the credibility of witnesses. 16

Petitioners' reliance alone on the "Dead Man's Statute" to defeat

respondent's claim cannot prevail over the factual findings of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals that a partnership was established between
respondent and Jacinto. Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but
the documentary evidence as well, the trial court and the Court of Appeals
considered the evidence for respondent as sufficient to prove the
formation of partnership, albeit an informal one.

Notably, petitioners did not present any evidence in their favor during
trial. By the weight of judicial precedents, a factual matter like the finding
of the existence of a partnership between respondent and Jacinto cannot
be inquired into by this Court on review. 17 This Court can no longer be
tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess
and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court and the appellate court were
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one
party or the other.18 It must be also pointed out that petitioners failed to
attend the presentation of evidence of respondent. Petitioners cannot now
turn to this Court to question the admissibility and authenticity of the
documentary evidence of respondent when petitioners failed to object to
the admissibility of the evidence at the time that such evidence was
offered.19

With regard to petitioners' insistence that laches and/or prescription

should have extinguished respondent's claim, we agree with the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the action for accounting filed by
respondents three (3) years after Jacinto's death was well within the
prescribed period. The Civil Code provides that an action to enforce an
oral contract prescribes in six (6) years 20 while the right to demand an
accounting for a partner's interest as against the person continuing the
business accrues at the date of dissolution, in the absence of any contrary
agreement.21 Considering that the death of a partner results in the
dissolution of the partnership 22, in this case, it was Jacinto's death that
respondent as the surviving partner had the right to an account of his
interest as against petitioners. It bears stressing that while Jacinto's death
dissolved the partnership, the dissolution did not immediately terminate
the partnership. The Civil Code23 expressly provides that upon dissolution,

Josielen Lara Chan vs. Johnny T. Chan
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 179786               July 24, 2013
JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner,  information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which
vs.
JOHNNY T. CHAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the propriety of issuing a subpoena duces tecum for the
production and submission in court of the respondent husband's hospital
record in a case for declaration of nullity of marriage where one of the
issues is his mental fitness as a husband.
The Facts and the Case
On February 6, 2006 petitioner Josielene Lara Chan (Josielene) filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 144 a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent
Johnny Chan (Johnny), the dissolution of their conjugal partnership of
gains, and the award of custody of their children to her. Josielene claimed
that Johnny failed to care for and support his family and that a
psychiatrist diagnosed him as mentally deficient due to incessant drinking
and excessive use of prohibited drugs. Indeed, she had convinced him to
undergo hospital confinement for detoxification and rehabilitation.
Johnny resisted the action, claiming that it was Josielene who failed in her
wifely duties. To save their marriage, he agreed to marriage counseling but
when he and Josielene got to the hospital, two men forcibly held him by
both arms while another gave him an injection. The marriage relations got
worse when the police temporarily detained Josielene for an unrelated
crime and released her only after the case against her ended. By then, their
marriage relationship could no longer be repaired.
During the pre-trial conference, Josielene pre-marked the Philhealth
Claim Form1 that Johnny attached to his answer as proof that he was
forcibly confined at the rehabilitation unit of a hospital. The form carried a
physician’s handwritten note that Johnny suffered from
"methamphetamine and alcohol abuse." Following up on this point, on
August 22, 2006 Josielene filed with the RTC a request for the issuance of
a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Medical City, covering Johnny’s
medical records when he was there confined. The request was
accompanied by a motion to "be allowed to submit in evidence" the
records sought by subpoena duces tecum.2
Johnny opposed the motion, arguing that the medical records were
covered by physician-patient privilege. On September 13, 2006 the RTC
sustained the opposition and denied Josielene’s motion. It also denied her
motion for reconsideration, prompting her to file a special civil action of
certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 97913, imputing
grave abuse of discretion to the RTC.
On September 17, 2007 the CA 3 denied Josielene’s petition. It ruled that, if
courts were to allow the production of medical records, then patients
would be left with no assurance that whatever relevant disclosures they
may have made to their physicians would be kept confidential. The
prohibition covers not only testimonies, but also affidavits, certificates,
and pertinent hospital records. The CA added that, although Johnny can
waive the privilege, he did not do so in this case. He attached the
Philhealth form to his answer for the limited purpose of showing his
alleged forcible confinement.
Question Presented
The central question presented in this case is:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnny’s hospital
records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of
the physician-patient communication.
The Ruling of the Court
Josielene requested the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering the
hospital records of Johnny’s confinement, which records she wanted to
present in court as evidence in support of her action to have their marriage
declared a nullity. Respondent Johnny resisted her request for subpoena,
however, invoking the privileged character of those records. He cites
Section 24(c), Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence which reads:
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication.— The
following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the
following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot
in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as to any
advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may have
acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means
that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a
patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patient’s consent as
to any facts which would blacken the latter’s reputation. This rule is
intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to
him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling
the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the
future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him
and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own
health at great risk.4
1. The case presents a procedural issue, given that the time to object to the
admission of evidence, such as the hospital records, would be at the time
they are offered. The offer could be made part of the physician’s testimony
or as independent evidence that he had made entries in those records that
concern the patient’s health problems.
Section 36, Rule 132, states that objections to evidence must be made after
the offer of such evidence for admission in court. Thus:
SEC. 36. Objection.— Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral examination
of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become
reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3) days
after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.
Since the offer of evidence is made at the trial, Josielene’s request for
subpoena duces tecum is premature. She will have to wait for trial to begin
before making a request for the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum
covering Johnny’s hospital records. It is when those records are produced
for examination at the trial, that Johnny may opt to object, not just to their
admission in evidence, but more so to their disclosure. Section 24(c), Rule
130 of the Rules of Evidence quoted above is about non-disclosure of
privileged matters.
2. It is of course possible to treat Josielene’s motion for the issuance of a
subpoena duces tecum covering the hospital records as a motion for
production of documents, a discovery procedure available to a litigant
prior to trial. Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 1. Motion for production or inspection; order.— Upon motion of any
party showing good cause therefor, the court in which an action is pending
may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence
material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon
designated land or other property in his possession or control for the
purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or photographing the
property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order
shall specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and
taking copies and photographs, and may prescribe such terms and
conditions as are just. (Emphasis supplied)
But the above right to compel the production of documents has a
limitation: the documents to be disclosed are "not privileged."
Josielene of course claims that the hospital records subject of this case are
not privileged since it is the "testimonial" evidence of the physician that
may be regarded as privileged. Section 24(c) of Rule 130 states that the
physician "cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be
examined" regarding their professional conversation. The privilege, says
Josielene, does not cover the hospital records, but only the examination of
the physician at the trial.

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the

hospital records—the results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patient’s illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
—would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible without the

patient’s consent. Physician memorializes all these information in the

patient’s records. Disclosing them would be the equivalent of compelling
the physician to testify on privileged matters he gained while dealing with
the patient, without the latter’s prior consent.

3. Josielene argues that since Johnny admitted in his answer to the

petition before the RTC that he had been confined in a hospital against his
will and in fact attached to his answer a Philhealth claim form covering
that confinement, he should be deemed to have waived the privileged
character of its records. Josielene invokes Section 17, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Evidence that provides:

SEC. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence, the
remainder admissible.— When part of an act, declaration, conversation,
writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the whole of the same
subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a detached act,
declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in evidence, any other
act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to its
understanding may also be given in evidence.

But, trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said
that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence,
the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting
an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet
bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any
request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.

For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying
Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnny’s hospital
records.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the

Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 97913 dated September 17,
2007.

SO ORDERED.