Luisa Navarro Marcos vs. The Heirs of the late Dr. Andres Navarro, Jr.,
namely: Nonita Navarro, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 198240               July 3, 2013
LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, Petitioner,  PO2 Alvarez. They also agreed with the CA that her disqualification was
vs.
THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely
NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO MALAPITAN,
SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN
NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III,
MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA
NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-
REJUSO,Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Petitioner Luisa Navarro Marcos appeals the Decision 1 dated February 28,
2011 and Resolution2 dated July 29, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 92460.
The antecedent facts follow:
Spouses Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in
1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several parcels of land
including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot) located in Cayabon,
Milagros, Masbate.3
The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos,
herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only
son Andres Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents
herein.4
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming
exclusive ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on
the Affidavit of Transfer of Real Property dated May 19, 1954 where
Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr. 5
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal
Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The
PNP handwriting expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.’s
signature on the affidavit and the submitted standard signatures of
Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. 6
Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of
donation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate, where the
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215. 7
After the pre-trial, respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a
witness. They argued that the RTC did not authorize the handwriting
examination of the affidavit. They added that presenting PO2 Alvarez as a
witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no notice
was given to them before the examination was conducted. 8 Thus, PO2
Alvarez’s report is a worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be
useless and irrelevant. 9
In its Order10 dated August 19, 2004, the RTC granted respondents’
motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that PO2
Alvarez’s supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal
knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need
for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert
witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their
motion in an Order11 dated October 11, 2005.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which
however, dismissed their petition in the assailed Decision dated February
28, 2011 on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has
mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness.
Later, the CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration in its
Resolution dated July 29, 2011. The CA refused to take judicial notice of
the decision of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215.
The CA held that a CA Justice cannot take judicial notice of decisions or
matters pending before another Division of the appellate court where he
or she is not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for
belatedly informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated.
Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that the CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed
decision in light of the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 5215. Petitioner
adds that the CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed grave abuse
of discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. 12 They stress that
PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an opinion
on whether the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or
whether it is a forgery.13
In their comment,14 respondents counter that the CA properly disqualified
mooted by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215.
We find in favor of petitioner.
The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the
issue of PO2 Alvarez’s disqualification as a witness can no longer be
justified. Hence, we reverse the CA ruling. While we agree with the CA in
considering the RTC’s Orders15 which dismissed Civil Case No. 5215, we
are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the
Decision16 of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215.
Subsequent proceedings were even held in the reinstated Civil Case No.
5215 per Orders17 issued by the RTC which were already submitted to the
CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that cannot be
ignored.
We also agree with petitioner that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of
discretion defies exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. 18 Grave
abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the
Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence. 19
In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits
System v. Republic of the Philippines, 20 we said that a witness must only
possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in
the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.-Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to
24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by
reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a
witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason
of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness
by reason of privileged communication.
In Cavili v. Judge Florendo, 21 we have held that the specific enumeration
of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability
other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be
interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. We said:
The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent.
Interest in the outcome of a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise
provided by law, and religious belief are not grounds for disqualification.
Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications.
Section 19 disqualifies those who are mentally incapacitated and children
whose tender age or immaturity renders them incapable of being
witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based
on privileged communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on
disqualification of witnesses but it states the grounds when a witness may
be impeached by the party against whom he was called.
There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default
from taking the witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does
not provide default as an exception. The specific enumeration of
disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other
than those mentioned in the Rules. It is a maxim of recognized utility and
merit in the construction of statutes that an express exception, exemption,
or saving clause excludes other exceptions. x x x As a general rule, where
there are express exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the
operation of a statute and no other exception will be implied. x x x The
Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied
therein. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.)

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and
make known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is
qualified as a witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she
possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the Rules.
Respondents’ motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the
RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The
RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility People of the Philippines vs. Daniel Hayag
and weight of her testimony.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the
Manila
opinion of an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SECOND DIVISION
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.-The opinion of a witness on a matter
requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence. G.R. No. L-38635 November 17, 1980

For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador,22 we were inclined to believe that
Tamani’s signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP
document examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery,
such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the
opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of
whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may
afford in pointing out distinguishing marks, characteristics and
discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing
which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony would be
hearsay. Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2
Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as the PNP document
examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset
that PO2 Alvarez’s testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is
offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under the circumstances,
the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and annulled the
RTC ruling.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
DANIEL HAYAG, accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:
Daniel Hayag appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Davao del Norte, Tagum Branch VIII, convicting him of rape, sentencing
him to "imprisonment for the rest of his natural life" and ordering him to
pay to Esperanza Ranga ten thousand pesos as moral damages (Criminal
Case No. 1210).
Issue is the trustworthiness of the interpreter's verbalization of deaf-
mute's sign language. — In this alleged rape of Esperanza, 32, a farm girl
and a deaf-mute, the case has been simplified by the admission of the
accused, Hayag, 50, a married man with eight children, who finished
grade six, that he had sexual intercourse with Esperanza nine times
between 1970 and December 4, 1972 in the town of Carmen, Davao del
Norte.

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on
Evidence signifies that the use of opinion of an expert witness is
permissive and not mandatory on the part of the courts. 23 Jurisprudence is
also replete with instances wherein this Court dispensed with the
testimony of expert witnesses to prove forgeries. 24 However, we have also
recognized that handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses
considering the technical nature of the procedure in examining forged
documents.25 More important, analysis of the questioned signature in the
deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.
In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness.
She has the qualifications of witness and possess none of the
disqualifications under the Rules. The Rules allow the opinion of an expert
witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the opinion of an
expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be
determined if P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the
handwriting examination she conducted.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the (1) Decision
dated February 28, 2011 and Resolution dated July 29, 2011 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 92460, and (2) Orders dated August 19,
2004 and October II, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
5215. We DENY respondents' motion to disqualify P02 Mary Grace
Alvarez as a witness.
No pronouncement as to costs.
The ultimate issue is whether Virginia Ranga 26, a public school teacher, a
college graduate and the victim's sister, correctly and credibly interpreted
and verbalized the sign language of Esperanza as meaning that Hayag
raped Esperanza on October 26, 1972 or whether credence should be given
to Hayag's story that the sexual intercourse on that occasion, as on other
occasions, was voluntary.
Attached to the complaint for rape was a certificate from the Davao
General Hospital that on December 7, 1972 Esperanza was examined and
found to be "positive for pregnancy" (Exh. C or 10). However, the record
does not show whether she gave birth. There was no medical examination
of Esperanza immediately after the rape allegedly perpetrated on October
26, 1972.
The prosecution labored under the handicap that it could prove the alleged
rape only through the sign language of the victim, Esperanza. The victim's
sister, Virginia, who has communicated with her since childhood by means
of sign language, was the sole available witness who could make known to
her the questions on direct and cross-examination and could articulate her
alleged answers for the record.
Because there was no means of checking the correctness and veracity of
Virginia's interpretation and because she herself believed that Esperanza
was raped by Hayag, it is not surprising that the defense counsel
vehemently objected to Virginia's role as interpreter. The defense regarded
her as biased and as lacking the cold neutrality of a third person acting as
interpreter.

SO ORDERED. As Esperanza did not study in the school for deaf-mutes and as there was
no instructor in that school available as an interpreter the trial court had
no choice but to use Virginia as the medium for communicating with
Esperanza. Was she a reliable interpreter? That is the intriguing question
in this case.

This Court in two cases convicted an accused of having raped a deaf-mute

but in those cases an instructor in the school for deaf-mutes acted as an
interpreter and the conviction was not based solely on the evidence given
by the victim. In the instant case, the judgment of conviction was based
exclusively on the story of Esperanza that she was raped, a story made
known through her sister, Virginia, who signed the complaint for rape.
In People vs. De Leon, 50 Phil. 539, the accused was charged with having
raped his fifteen-year-old step-daughter, a deaf-mute The trial was held in
the house, called "Country Home;" where the accused brought the girl. She
testified in sign language which was interpreted by a teacher in the school
for deaf-mutes. The accused was convicted on the basis of such testimony.
In People vs. Sasota, 52 Phil. 281, the accussed was also charged with
having raped a fourteen-year-old deaf-mute. She testified with the
assistance of an instructor in the school for deaf-mutes. Her testimony was
corroborated by her seven-year-old sister who was present when the
outrage was committed.
Seven days after the alleged rape, the victim, Rufina Barbuco, submitted to
a medical examination. The doctor introjudo su especulum en la parte
genital de ella y dicha Rufina sintio' dolor por la introduccion de dicho
instrumento". The accused was convicted of rape.
But in People vs. Bustos, 51 Phil. 385, a homicide case, the testimony of a
deaf-mute, an alleged eyewitness, as interpreted by a teacher from the
school for deaf-mutes, who did not teach the witness (the latter never
having studied in such school) was not given credence. (See People vs.
Nava, CA 40 O.G. 4327 and People vs. Tejano, CA-G.R. No. 21954-R, May
25, 1959, 7 Velayo's Digest 724. As to a deaf-mute convicted of robbery,
see People vs. Nazario, 97 Phil. 990.)
Rules regarding communication with a deaf-mute. — At the outset, it is
relevant to state the jurisprudential rules for verbalizing the perceptions of
a deaf-mute.
'Although in ancient times the rule was otherwise, deaf-mutes are now
generally accepted as competent witnesses. In any given case a showing
must be made that the witness has a system of communication, and if he
has and he is otherwise competent, his testimony will be received" (81 Am.
Jur. 2nd 116).
The modern rule is to the effect that deaf and dumb persons are
not incompetent as witnesses merely because they are deaf and
dumb if they are able to communicate the facts by a method
which their infirmity leaves available to them, and are of
sufficient mental capacity to observe the matters as to which
they will testify and to appreciate the obligation of an oath; but
where the person is not so educated as it is possible to make him
understand the questions which are put to him he is not
competent (97 C.J.S. 454).
The method to be employed in eliciting the testimony of a deaf-
mute should be that which is best suited to attain the desired
end, the particular method of examination resting largely in the
discretion of the trial court. Thus, a deaf and dumb witness may
be examined by means of written questions to which he gives
written answers, or he may be examined through the medium of
an interpreter who communicates with the witness by means of
signs. The qualifications of a particular person to act as an
interpreter for a deaf-mute rests largely in the discretion of the
trial court (98 C.J.S. 25).
The other statements of the procedure for taking the sign-language of a
deaf-mute are quoted below:
The modern and generally accepted rule is to the effect that deaf-
mutes are competent witnesses where they have sufficient
knowledge to understand and appreciate the sanctity of an
oath and comprehend the facts as to which they wish to speak,
and are capable of communicating their Ideas with respect
thereto (Annotation, 9 ALR 482).
If deaf-mutes have sufficient understanding to comprehend facts
about which they undertake to speak, and appreciate the
sanctity of an oath, they may give evidence by signs, or through
an interpreter or in writing, and such testimony, through an
interpreter, is not hearsay (Bugg vs. Town of Houlka, 84 So. 387,
9 ALR 480).
It has been said that a court has the inherent power to elicit
testimony from a competent deaf-mute by whatsoever means
necessary to the end to be obtained, and that the manner in
which the examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a
matter to be regulated and controlled by the trial court in its
discretion.
However, it has also been said that the best method should be
adopted. And there is authority to the effect that the method
adopted will not be reviewed by an appellate court in the absence
of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured
by reason of the particular method adopted.
In fact it has been said that, in the absence of a showing as to
what constituted the best method of taking a deaf-mute's
testimony, it will be presumed on appeal that the trial court
adopted the best method.
As is stated in the authorities approved in Bugg vs. Town of
Houlka, 84 So. 387, 9 ALR 480, the general rule is that deaf-
mutes who are competent to testify may give evidence by signs,
or through an interpreter, or in writing.
More specifically it has been held that a deaf-mute who can read
and write may testify through that medium. Thus, in Ritchey vs.
People  (1896), 23 Colo 314, 47 Pac. 272, a deaf-mute was
examined by submitting to him written questions, to which he
replied in writing, which questions and answers were then read
to the jury.
And the general rule is that the evidence of a deaf-mute who can
be communicated with by signs may be taken through an
interpreter who understands such signs and can interpret them
to the court.
And it has been held that it is permissible to take the testimony
of a deaf-mute through an interpreter by signs notwithstanding
the evidence could have been written. At least where there is no
showing that the interpretation by signs is not the better
method.
And especially where it appears that the witness is capable of
relating the facts "correctly" by signs, but, while able to read and
write, can only communicate Ideas imperfectly' by writing. And
it is not necessary that the witness be able to read and write.
However, it has been said that it would seem to be better in the
case of a deaf and dumb witness who can read and write to
conduct his examination in writing.
With respect to the conducting of the examination of a deaf-
mute itself, it has been held that the allowing of leading
questions is in the discretion of the court. This discretion was
said to arise out of the fact that 'there is always more or less
difficulty in eliciting testimony' where the witness is a deaf-mute
(Annotation, 9 ALR 482-484).
Procedure followed by the lower court in qualifying Virginia Ranga as
an interpreter of her sister's sign language. — How to communicate with
the victim, Esperanza, was the problem of the municipal judge during the
preliminary examination. Esperanza knows how to sign her name and to
read and write figures. That was all.
The complaint for rape, filed in the municipal court on December 26,
1972, was signed by Esperanza. Her sister Virginia certified under oath
that she translated, interpreted and explained the contents of the
complaint "faithfully and truthfully through sign language" to Esperanza
(p. 1, Record).
At the preliminary examination, the municipal judge tested the capacity of
Virginia to communicate with Esperanza. Virginia admitted that there
were deficiencies in her mode of communication with Esperanza. Virginia
testified:
17. Q: (by municipal judge). How adequate is the
communication between Esperanza Ranga and you? —
A: Not too much but I think only a few things which
she wish to convey which I do not understand.
18. Q: Would you ten me one or two of these few things
which you don't understand? — A: Those things which
are very deep like for example those invisible words.
19. Q: What do you mean by invisible words? — A: For
example, the meaning of the word 'truth' whereby I
could not expect to her in one sign only the meaning of
the word 'truth' but I could only explain that through
other signs.
20. Q: These signs that you employ in communicating
between you and Esperanza Ranga, are these
conventional signs or the 'Deaf and Dumb signs? — A:
No, sir.
21. Q: What then are the signs? — A: Just like the
actions.
22. Q: In other words, you just contrived or
improvised the signs? — A: Yes, sir.
23. Q: For how long a time have both of you been at
this means of communications? — A: Since my birth.
 24. Q: You mean that when you were born you ready
communicate with each other? — A: Not exactly but
when I already teamed to talk and she could not
understand.
25. Q: Do you still employ the same improvised signs in
communicating with your older sister? — A: Yes, sir.
26. Q: Have you ever revised or modify these so-called
improvised signs? — A: No, sir.
27. Q: You have improvised along the way, have you? —
A: Yes, sir.
28. Q: Suppose you wanted to convey to your older
sister the meaning of: 'She better dress up because you
are going to bring her to the Court'. How would you
communicate with your sister?
A: (The witness demonstrated by raising her two hands
from the head then downward which would imply
putting on the dress; her right hand placed over the
nose which means 'good or beautiful' and touch her
older sister (Esperanza) on her shoulder and pointing
towards her and touching both of them with the same
hand gesturing towards the road and a sign indicating
a roof which implies the Municipal Hall.)
The Court is of the opinion that witness may adequately
communicate with her older sister Esperanza Ranga through
their improvised sign language. In view thereof, this Court
hereby commissions Virginia Ranga to act as an interpreter for
her sister, Esperanza Ranga, in this preliminary examination
(pp. 15-16, Record).
The municipal judge then asked Virginia to take an oath as an interpreter.
After taking the oath, the judge instructed Virginia to ask Esperanza
whether the latter understood the meaning of an oath. Esperanza replied
by signs that she would tell the truth.
According to the sign language of Esperanza, as interpreted by Virginia,
the alleged rape was committed in this manner:
While she (Esperanza) was she was pulled away from the road and then
she resisted and (was) dragged until she was kicked on her leg whereby
she stumbled down. The one (Hayag) who pulled her boxed her on her
breast and on the legs and then she lost consciousness and then when she
lost consciousness, she did not know what happened.
When she regained consciousness, she found out that she was
raped by the man who pulled her (pp. 16-17, Record).
Esperanza Identified the man who raped her as a person with a mole
between his eyes just below his forehead. She pointed to Hayag as the
rapist. Hayag and his counsel were present at the preliminary
examination.
The rape was not reported because Hayag told Esperanza that she would
be killed if she divulged the rape to anybody (p. 18, Record).
Hayag waived the second stage of the preliminary investigation. The case
was elevated to the Court of First Instance where the provincial fiscal filed
an information for rape dated February 12, 1973.
The trial court tested Virginia's capacity to communicate with Esperanza
in sign language improvised by the two sisters, a procedure opposed by
defense counsel, as may be seen from the following transcript:
Private prosecutor: ... since the complainant, your Honor, is a
deaf-mute, we wig present her sister as an interpreter, and we
will qualify the sister to act as an interpreter. ...
Defense counsel: ... we object to the competency (of Virginia) on
the ground that this witness is not an expert witness to interpret
the language of a deaf-mute. She would not be competent as to
the sign to be conveyed to her, and finally it would be prejudicial
and biased, your Honor. ...
I believe, your Honor, that this case is so serious as it involves
the liberty of the accused, and if we will be hasty in proceeding ...
even granting that the witness can be able to perceive and
communicate, there is no definite provision in the Rules of Court
that a sister could be qualified as an interpreter to a deaf-
mute. ...
Court: ... the Court win allow her (the sister) to be an interpreter
in the case as long as she can be qualified to interpret the signs of
her sister.
Defense counsel ... And granting that the sister will be allowed to
translate and interpret in behalf of the offended party,  how will
we be so sure that the sister will convey the same translation as
the offended party wanted to convey to her? ...
Private prosecutor: Good faith is presumed, your Honor please.
Bad faith is not presumed. ...
Court: Well, anyway, those are recorded already and in case of
an appeal, those can be taken up because those will appear in the
transcript of the stenographic notes, all the objections that you
have raised insofar as allowing the sister of the offended party to
interpret her sign language.
Defense counsel: ... we will submit a memorandum to that effect
that the sister is the interpreter in this case, she being not
competent and expert witness.
Court: Well, she is not presented here as an expert witness. She
is just being used now as an interpreter, and you are objecting to
that?
Defense counsel: ... We are really seriously objecting.
Court: ... the appellate court will be guided by the stenographic
transcript whether you made your observation and your
objection in time before a person is allowed to be an interpreter
in a case like this.
We cannot also ask say a teacher in (the) school for deaf-mutes
to be an interpreter here because, probably, if that deaf-mute did
not go to the school for deaf-mutes, she would not know the sign
language of the teacher.
So, probably, this is my personal observation, that they should
adapt themselves to the circumstances of the situation. Now,
since their sister is dumb and cannot hear, and because they
were living together, they have to devise a way by which they
could communicate (with) each other, and, probably, not the
same sign language in the school for deaf and dumb persons.
So, in the interest of justice, the Court will allow the sister to
interpret the testimony of the offended party. (4-11 tsn June 11,
1973).
After Virginia had taken her oath and testified that she and Esperanza had
been communicating by means of sign language since childhood, she was
directed to ask Esperanza's name.
Virginia made a sign to Esperanza to sign her name. Esperanza wrote on a
piece of paper "Esperanza Ranga May 3, 1972 " (17-18 tsn June 11, 1973).
When the trial judge directed Virginia to ask Esperanza why she was in
court, Esperanza moved her head sidewise and placed a finger on her lips.
She was not able to answer that question in sign language because, as the
private prosecutor himself admitted, it is difficult to formulate a "why"
question in sign language (17-19, 23 tsn).
The fiscal noted that Esperanza could answer "what where and when"
questions but it would be difficult to make her understand a "why"
question because "there were certain questions that she cannot easily
understand" (26-27 tsn). The following portion of the transcript is a
sample of how Virginia communicated with Esperanza on direct
examination:
Q. Alright. Tell her (Esperanza) to demonstrate to kick
her right leg? — A. Yes,sir. (Witness-interpreter's sister
doing the same.)
Q. Tell her to repulse or fight back an opponent when
she is attacked? — A. Yes, sir. (The sister doing the
same.)
Q. Let us be specific. Does your sister know how to look
(up) a date in the calendar? — A. Yes, sir.
Q. You taught her. — A. She has an Idea.
Q. Alright. Do you have ... a calendar? — A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you tell your sister to point to figure 7? — A. Yes,
sir. (Witness-interpreter translating the same to her
sister in sign language and the sister likewise pointed
to figure 7.)
 Q Tell her to point to No. 23. — A. Yes, sir. (Witness-
interpreter translating the same to the sister and the
sister pointing also to No. 23.)
Q What about the month appearing in that calendar,
can she read? What is that month there appearing
there in that calendar for 1973, in her sign language? ...
— A. She cannot read.
Q But she can read the days or the number? — A. Yes,
sir.
Q Can she point to No. 18? (Witness-interpreter
translating the same to the sister, and the sister
pointing also to No. 18.)
Q Alright. Now, how would she communicate the
month of a year. What month is she referring when she
refers to a date, for example. How will she
communicate that with you? — A. She will use the
calendar, sir.
Q But she cannot read the month in the calendar, she
said already. Is it not? — A. She can understand, and at
least she can point.
Q Alright.Will you tell your sister to see in that
calendar the month of July? — A. We still need to write
the month, sir.
Q You give her a piece of paper and write there July.
Then let her locate it there in the calendar. — A. Yes,
sir. (Witness-interpreter doing the same and the sister
located the month of July.)
Q Now, tell her to locate the month of November. — A.
Yes, sir. (The sister locating the same )
Q Will you tell her whether she knows the days in the
week, like Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday like that? —
A. Yes, sir. I think she knows.
Q And what are the days in the week? Ask her. — A.
She does not know, sir.
Q Do you know what day is today? Ask her. — A. Yes,
sir. (Witness-interpreter translating the question to the
sister, and she pointed to June 11 in the 1973
Calendar.)
Q Now, can you point therein the calendar any day? —
A. (The sister pointed to Tuesday after the question
was properly translated to her by the witness-
interpreter.) "Court: Make it of record that she pointed
to Tuesday.
Q by Court: Do you know what day is today? (Witness
pointing to June 11 in the 1973 calendar.) — A: (by
Witness-interpreter): She does not know, your Honor.
Q by Court: Do you know what is today? — (Witness
pointing to June 11 in the 1973 calendar.)
Court: I think she can adequately communicate,
perhaps not to our satisfaction. Alright, ... (To the
Witness-Interpreter Virginia): Do you swear to
interpret faithfully and to the best of your knowledge
the questions to your sister and the answers that she
gives to the questions? — Witness-Interpreter: Yes,
your Honor.
Court: Alright. (To private prosecutor )Your first
witness
Private prosecutor: Our first witness is the complainant
herself, your Honor.
Court: Put her on the stand. (30-37 tsn.)
The oath was then administered to Esperanza. How it was administered is
not shown in the record. It should be recalled that Virginia testified that
"invisible words" like truth cannot be made known in sign language to
Esperanza.
When Esperanza was asked as to her age, she write on a piece of paper
"May 3, 1983 32" (39 tsn June 11, 1973).
Testimony of Esperanza as verbalized by her sister Virginia. —
Esperanza resided in Carmen and worked in the ricefield of her brother
Dencio She used to walk from her house to the ricefield which was quite
far. Upon being asked, Esperanza pointed to the figure "26" in the
calendar. She worked in the ricefield on October 26, 1972 up to the time in
the afternoon when the sun was in a certain position which, as calculated
by the court, meant that it was approximately three o'clock.
She was on her way home alone. She sketched the road leading to the
highway which was taken by her and the scene of the alleged rape (Exh. A
or 2). When she reached a grassy spot along the road, her left hand was
pulled by a man with a mole between his eyebrows whom Esperanza
Identified as Hayag who was in court. Hayag pulled her to the grassy bush.
(At this point, defense counsel manifested that Esperanza did not make
any sign that she was pulled to the grassy bush and that it was Virginia,
the interpreter, who supplied that allegation, 47 tsn).
Esperanza resisted but Hayag kicked her in the right leg and she stumbled.
Hayag choked her while she was prostrate on the ground. Asked if she was
boxed, Esperanza replied that Hayag boxed her on the chest while he was
standing. At this point, Esperanza went down the witness stand and
demonstrated how she resisted.
Hayag removed her short pants and kissed her and then, as stated by the
interpreter, she was raped. Asked the leading question of whether she was
unconscious when she was raped, she replied in the affirmative and added
that she regained consciousness after she was raped. Her pants were on
her side on the ground. There was blood in her private part. She pushed
aside Hayag.
Hayag stood up and told Esperanza not to tell anybody what happened or
else he would kill her. Hayag picked up her pants and threw them over her
body and left. She put on her pants and went home crying. She was still
crying when she arrived home but she did not disclose to her mother the
alleged rape because of the threat made by Hayag.
Esperanza indicated in the sketch the spot where she was raped on
October 26, 1972, Identified as Exhibit A-2 or 2-A (63 tsn).
According to Esperanza. on December 4, 1972 she encountered Hayag in
the same place but she avoided him by passing near the central school and
going to the house of her sister-in-law, as indicated in the sketch, Exhibit
A. She arrived home at eight o'clock in the evening and reported the rape
incident to her mother.
Hayag's story. — To support his defense that his sexual intercourse with
Esperanza was voluntarily consummated and was not accomplished
through force or against her will, he testified that he and Esperanza, whom
he had known for more than fifteen years, loved each other. They were
neighbors in the town of Carmen. Hayag's daughter Ester is married to
Antonio, a brother of Esperanza.
Their liaison allegedly started one morning in December, 1970 when
Esperanza appeared at the foot of the stairs of his house and made a sign
that she wanted to drink water. Hayag signalled her to go upstairs. He was
absent from work on that day.
He went to the kitchen where Esperanza followed him. After she had
drunk water, she made a sign by pointing to herself and to Hayag and
placing her two fingers side by side or juxtaposing them. Hayag said that
by means of that sign Esperanza wanted to convey that she and Hayag
were sweethearts. Hayag nodded to show his assent to Esperanza's offer of
love.
Hayag said that thereafter Esperanza embraced him and they kissed each
other. After the embrace, Esperanza disengaged herself and formed a
circle with her left thumb and index finger and inserted into the circle the
fingers of her right hand, repeatedly making a push-and-pull movement.
That signal meant that she wanted sexual intercourse. In answer to that
signal, Hayag nodded.
Esperanza took off her panties and because the kitchen floor 'was dirty
Hayag indicated to her that they would have sexual congress on the table
which was clean. 'They performed the sexual intercourse on the table and
reached the climax in about five minutes.
After they went down from the table, they embraced and kissed and
Esperanza allegedly made a sign that they should repeat the sexual act. At
that juncture, Florita Hayag's daughter, barged in and saw them. They
separated.
Four days later, Esperanza met Hayag at about six-thirty in the morning at
the crossing or intersection of the highway going to Tagum and the road
going to Tibal-og in the vicinity of the bridge and the chapel. There was a
grassy spot in that place (Exh. 9 and A). There, they had sexual intercourse
for about five minutes.
In the meantime, Florita reported to her mother, Adoracion, that she had
seen Hayag and Esperanza in a compromising situation. Hayag and his
wife quarrelled. Mrs. Hayag and her three daughters left the conjugal
abode and took refuge in her mother's house in Maco. Hayag was able to
persuade his wife to return to their house after he had promised not to
have anything more to do with Esperanza.
For more than a year, Hayag lived up to his promise. Then, in the morning
of May 12, 1972, Hayag met Esperanza on the highway while he was
waiting for transportation to take him to his work as a
foreman (capataz) of the Bureau of Public Highways in Mawab
Nabunturan.
On that occasion, Esperanza allegedly made a sign to him that they should
have sexual intercourse, pointing to him the grassy spot where they had
done it before. Hayag made a counter-sign to convey to Esperanza the
message that they should have sexual intercourse after he had cleared a
spot amidst the dense talahib grass.
It took Hayag three days to prepare the place of assignation (See
photographs, Exh. 5 to 8). On May 15, 1973 he and Esperanza allegedly
had sexual intercourse in the spot which he had cleared. Thereafter, they
had six other acts of sexual intercourse in that place. A white plastic
raincoat allegedly belonging to Esperanza was used to cover the ground
(Exh. 4).
Hayag specified that he had carnal intercourse with Esperanza on
September 2 and 23, October 20 and 26, November 4 and December 4,
1972. Esperanza allegedly advised Hayag to remember the dates because
she might become pregnant. The last three acts of sexual intercourse took
place in the afternoon after Hayag had come from work and while
Esperanza was on her way home from the farm (13-14 tsn October 26,
1972).
After each sexual intercourse, Esperanza would take Hayag's ball pen and
write the date on the palm of his hand. Hayag himself did not make any
record of the dates of the sexual intercourse. He committed them to
memory
In the afternoon of December 4, 1972, after Hayag and Esperanza had
sexual intercourse in their usual trysting place (Exh. 5 to 8), they were
seen in that vicinity by Jose Santillan, a close friend of Hayag, and by
Esteban Ranga, the uncle of Esperanza, who appeared to be angry and
who held her and brought her home.
Two days later, or on December 6, Hayag was arrested by Patrolmen
Rolando Yambao and Samuel Casuga because Esperanza's mother and
uncle had charged him with rape.
Hayag's daughter Florita and his wife Adoracion corroborated his
testimony as to the quarrel between him and his wife when she learned
that he had an affair with Esperanza.
Florita testified that Esperanza cried when she learned that Hayag was in
prison and in sign language she allegedly made it known that she had
voluntary sexual intercourse with Hayag and that, to prove that she loved
Hayag, she (Esperanza) gave to Florita the plastic raincoat already
mentioned (Exh. 4).
Jose Santillan, a farmer, a friend of Hayag and a neighbor of the Ranga
family, testified that as a Peeping Tom or voyeur, he witnessed the sexual
intercourse between Hayag and Esperanza in the afternoon of December
4, 1972 in the grassy spot mentioned by Hayag in his testimony.
The trial court reacted in disbelief of Hayag's story. It branded Hayag's
version as unusual and bizarre. It concluded that Hayag took advantage of
the physical defect of Esperanza and that he was under the illusion that
because she is a deaf-mute she would not be able to communicate the
outrage perpetrated against her.
Ruling. — Hayag's counsel de oficio contends in this appeal that the trial
court erred in basing the judgment of conviction on the testimony of
Esperanza in sign language as verbalized by her sister, an alleged biased
interpreter.
We have conscientiously examined the record. Our conclusion is that the
prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The culpability of Hayag cannot be made to rest on the
uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister and
mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free from
suspicion. It is not impeccable and does not ring true throughout (People
vs. Ariarte 60, Phil. 326).
Lack of tenacious resistance on the part of Esperanza Ranga, her delay in
reporting the alleged rape to her mother and the absence of an immediate
medical examination of her private organ are circumstances creating
reasonable doubt as to the commission of the rape.
From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her sister, it is at once evident
that Esperanza did not offer much resistance to the alleged sexual assault
made by Hayag. She did not suffer any physical injuries. Her dress was not
torn. She did not attempt to free herself from the clutches of Hayag.
This is not a case of a teenage girl being raped by a strong and robust
adult. This is a case of a thirty-two-year-old farm girl who was allegedly
forced to have carnal intercourse by a fifty-year-old man. Her story does
not contain details as to how she repelled Hayag's attempts to ravish her.
And that story was not recounted by her directly in her own words but was
made known by means of sign language which was interpreted by her
sister. The trustworthiness of that interpretation is doubtful.
The defense objected to such interpretation. The probability of error or
fabrication in such a case is very manifest. As observed by Justice Villa-
Real, that is a dangerous procedure for ascertaining the truth especially in
a case where the liberty of an accused is at stake (People vs. Bustos, 51
Phil. 385, 390). The court and the accused have no means of checking the
accuracy of the verbalization made by the interpreter who is herself
interested in sending the accused to prison.
It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without the help of
confederates or without terrifying her with a deadly weapon. If she makes
a vigorous resistance, the likelihood is that the lascivious desire of her
assailant would be foiled.
The resistance would, as in this case, be more effective in an open field
where there are more chances of eluding the assailant or frustrating his
advances. The rape committed by a man without the assistance of other
persons is possible but is a rare case.  (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal,
1975 Ed., 588; People vs. Barbo, L-30988, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 459,
467.)
Then, there is the fact that although the alleged rape took place on October
26, 1972, it was only forty days later, or on December 4, that Esperanza
confided to her mother (by means of signs, of course) that she was
supposedly raped. Her story was not corroborated.
The uncorroborated testimony of the offended woman may be sufficient
under certain circumstances to warrant a conviction for rape. Yet, "from
the very nature of the charge and the ease with which it may be made and
the difficulty which surrounds the accused in disproving it where the point
at issue is as to whether the cohabitation was had with or without the use
of force or threats, it is imperative that such testimony should be
scrutinized with the greatest caution." (Carson, J., in U.S. vs. Flores, 26
Phil. 262, 268.)
In all such cases the conduct of the woman immediately
following the alleged assault is of the utmost importance as
tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge. Indeed it
may well be doubted whether a conviction of the offense of rape
should ever be sustained upon the uncorroborated testimony of
the woman unless the court is satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that her conduct at the time when the alleged rape was
committed and immediately thereafter was such as might be
reasonably expected from her under all the circumstances of the
case. (U.S. vs. Flores, pp. 268-269.)
Moreover, the case for the prosecution was irreparably impaired by the
inconsistencies committed by the complainant's mother, Mrs. Ranga. She
first swore that according to her interpretation of Esperanza's sign
language five rapes were admitted on different dates.
Then, she rectified her first affidavit and swore in a second affidavit and
during the preliminary examination that only one rape was committed.
(Exh. 1 and 3.)
On the witness stand, she declared that the rape was committed
on December 4, 1972 but on cross-examination she declared that her
daughter was abused on October 26, 1972. Contrary to the prosecution's
theory, Mrs. Ranga testified that Hayag did not do anything to Esperanza
on December 4, 1972 (56 and 65 tsn August 6, 1972).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment of conviction is reversed and set
aside. On the ground of reasonable doubt or the insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence, defendant Daniel Hayag is acquitted of the charge
of rape. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs. Edwin Aleman y Longhas
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 181539               July 24, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  the place where he followed them (Exh. "M"). After burying the knife in
vs.
EDWIN ALEMAN y LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision 1 dated
September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
02100 affirming the Decision2 dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-
118348 which found him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information:
That on or about the 10th day of February 2003, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another
person whose true name, identity and other personal circumstances have
not as yet been ascertained and mutually helping each other, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one RAMON JAIME
BIROSEL y VILLA in the following manner, to wit: on the date and place
aforementioned while said victim was inside his car having a conversation
over his cellphone, the said accused suddenly appeared and with intent to
gain and by means of violence approached the said vehicle and ordered
said victim to open it and once opened thereafter stabbed the said victim
with a bladed weapon hitting him on the thorax thereby inflicting upon
him serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, and thereupon took, stole and carried away
the following, to wit:
a) Two (2) NOKIA cellular phones
b) One (1) brown leather wallet
c) Undetermined amount of cash money
d) One (1) necklace
e) One (1) men’s ring all with undetermined value, belonging to
said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of said RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y
VILLA.3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned. 4After
pre-trial was conducted, trial ensued.
The prosecution established that, as shown in the medico-legal report
prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Elizardo Daileg of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who autopsied the
victim’s cadaver, the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds in the thorax." In particular, three penetrating stab
wounds were inflicted on the upper left portion of the victim’s chest,
"piercing the upper lobe of the left lung and perforating the heart." He also
suffered stab wounds in the right eye, stomach and left forearm and
incised wounds in the left upper eyelid and left palm. 5
The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker at
the time of his death. He was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena
Birosel, with whom he had no child. Filomena spent a total of P477,054.30
in funeral expenses in connection with the burial of her deceased husband.
Filomena stated that the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45 cellular phones
taken away from Ramon were valued at P3,500.00 each, while the
necklace snatched from him was worth P20,000.00.6
The prosecution’s case against accused-appellant hinges on the following
eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar:
On February 10, 2003, at about 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Mark went out
of his house to play ball in the basketball court. He walked to the
basketball court, played there, and at about 9:00 o’clock, he stopped
playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the
basketball court where there were five cars parked. While urinating, he
saw a fat man walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his
cellular phone. He then noticed two men following the fat man, who
entered a parked car. The two male persons who were then following the
fat man then separated: one went to the left side of the fat man’s car and
stood by the door at the driver’s side of the vehicle. While the other
positioned himself by the door at the opposite side of the car. Mark made a
diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on both sides, (Exhibit "L")
depicting the car and the positions of the two men. The man who stood by
the door at the driver’s side had a knife while his companion was armed
with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife in his hand stabbing
the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his body, while the man with
the gun fired once. After taking the fat man’s personal belongings,
including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men left. He
followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw them
buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a drawing representing
the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a place which he
described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his
face. He recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car
and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin
Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided not to follow them and
went home instead. It was about 11:00 o’clock in the evening when he
arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 o’clock the following morning, he
returned to the scene of the incident. There were many people gathered in
the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested her to
call the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby
girl. They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there. He
recognized and identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture
(Exhibit "N") shown to him.
On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death threat.
In the year 2003, his grandfather died in Nueva Ecija and he attended the
wake. He stayed there until his father, grandmother and another person,
whom he does not know but of the same age as that of his father, fetched
him on September 12, 2003. He was taken to Antipolo where he stayed at
the house of the relatives of the victim until December 10, 2003, the day
he initially testified in court. There was no sign language interpreter in the
said house. The relatives of the victim gave him some money which he
used to buy for two shirts, two pants and a pair of shoes.
Before going to the basketball court which is a little farther from their
house at 7:00 o’clock in the evening, he already ate his evening meal at
6:00 o’clock. There were six of them, boys and girls playing basketball.
The basketball court was a full court but they were not playing a real game,
just running and shooting. At about 8:00 o’clock, they stopped playing,
they sat down and had soft drinks. After finishing his soft drink, he
urinated in the shrubbery near the five parked cars.
He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know
what building in Sikatuna Bliss was fronting the five cars that were parked
near the basketball court. It was the first time that he saw the fat man and
the two male persons who wore black bonnets which covered their whole
face. The fat man was already inside his car when he was repeatedly
stabbed. The fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with the
knife knocked twice on the window of the car. The window of the car was
half-opened when the fat man was immediately stabbed. The man with a
gun was on the other side of the car when he fired his gun once. He did not
notice any argument between the fat man and his attacker. He kept a
distance of about eight to ten meters between him and the two men as he
followed them. There were no persons around when the two men attacked
the fat man. After witnessing the stabbing, his initial reaction was to
follow the culprits. He did not call his playmates because they were still
playing. In fleeing, the two male persons did not run. They just walked
fast. He had been [on] their trail for about nine minutes before they
removed their bonnets. He followed them for about thirty minutes.
When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the
knife was buried under the ground. It was 9:56 o’clock when the men took
off their bonnets. The man with the knife removed the bloodstained white
t-shirt that he was wearing and, along with his bonnet, threw it away in a
place he described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00 o’clock, the
two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with the gun who
drove the motorcycle. He took the same route when he walked back home.
It was about 10:00 o’clock when he passed by the car of the fat man again.
There were no persons when he went back to the basketball court. Thus,
he just went home to sleep and the following morning, he gave his
statement to the police.
On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit
"O") showing the basketball court (Exhibit "O-1"), the five parked cars
near the place where he urinated (Exhibit "O-2"), the exact spot where he
urinated (Exhibit "O-3") and the car of the fat man (Exhibit "O-4"). When
asked how he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that
"there was light in the area which he described as near the flowing water
where the accused removed his bonnet." He stated that the light near the
flowing water came from a light bulb and the distance from the witness
stand up to second door outside the courtroom represents how far he was
from the man with the knife when the latter took off his bonnet. 7
Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was
assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language
interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who
has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990.
Catinguil had also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal
University with a degree in teaching special education children. 8
Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay
Botocan, Project 2, Quezon City when he testified. He interposed denial
and alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident
happened on February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a
15-minute walk from his residence. A road separates the billiards hall from
Sikatuna Bliss.9
On that particular night, accused-appellant went to the billiards hall at
around 7:00 in the evening and played billiards against a certain Ruben.
They played until around 10:00 in the evening. Just as they were finished
playing, accused-appellant’s sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived to fetch him for
dinner. He went home with her. The following morning, after having
breakfast, he watched a basketball game and talked to his friends. At
around noon, while on his way back to his house, a neighbor, Vangie
Barsaga, called him and informed him that police officers came to his
house looking for him. At around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day, he
went to the nearest police station, Camp Karingal, where he presented
himself to Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1, at that time Police Officer 3,
Leonardo Pasco of that station’s District Police Intelligence Unit. He asked
SPO1 Pasco if they were looking for a certain Edwin Aleman and, upon
receiving a positive answer, he introduced himself. He was informed that
he was a suspect in a killing incident. He was told to stay put while they
were waiting for the alleged eyewitness to arrive. On February 13, 2003, he
was twice made to join a police line-up together with five others. In both
instances, they were ordered to turn around several times and they
complied. Thereafter, he was given a spot report: re: Voluntary Surrender
of Alleged Suspect in a Robbery w/ Homicide Case by a police officer and
was informed that he would be turned over to the custody of the Criminal
Investigation Division of Camp Karingal.10
Accused-appellant’s testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February
10, 2003 playing against Ruben until around 10:00 in the evening was
corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of Ruben, who saw
accused-appellant and Ruben playing when she went to the billiards hall
twice that night to fetch Ruben. 11 Hilda, accused-appellant’s sister, also
corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony that she fetched him from the
billiards hall at around 10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003. She
further stated that, upon getting home, she and accused-appellant ate
dinner together and, thereafter, watched some television shows until
accused-appellant went to sleep some 30 minutes later. 12
Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark,
failed to identify him during the police line-up. Defense witness SPO1
Leonardo Pasco stated that he was the one who prepared the spot report
although it was his superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark
failed to identify accused-appellant during the police line-up. Another
defense witness, barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he
was with Mark on February 13, 2003 when Mark was asked to identify the
robber-killer of the victim from a line-up. According to Barrientos, a police
officer made a gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of his
hand and, after viewing the persons in the line-up, Mark shook his head.
The line-up was presented to Mark twice and he shook his head in both
instances.13
After studying the parties’ respective evidence, the trial court rejected the
defenses of accused-appellant for their inherent weakness and
implausibility. On the other hand, it viewed the prosecution’s evidence
favorably, particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his positive
identification of accused-appellant as the one who stabbed the victim. In
particular, the trial court found Mark’s testimony simple and credible. He
had no ill motive that would make him testify falsely against accused-
appellant. While there were minor inconsistencies in his testimony, the
discrepancies were inconsequential and did not affect the truthfulness of
Mark’s narration. Thus, in its Decision dated November 16, 2005, the trial
court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edwin Aleman guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, described and
penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act 7659, in relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the
court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of Ramon Jaime Birosel as follows:
1. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity for the death of the victim;
2. The amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
moral damages; and
3. The amount of FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN
THOUSAND FIFTY-FOUR PESOS AND THIRTY CENTAVOS
(P477,054.30) as actual damages.
He is also ordered to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00) representing
the value of the Nokia 3315 cellular phone, the amount of THREE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,500.00) representing the value
of the S-45 Siemens cellular phone, and the amount of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) representing the value of the necklace,
which were all taken from the victim.
With costs against the accused.14
Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He anchored
his appeal on the claim that the trial court erred in convicting him for
robbery with homicide. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at
discrediting the eyewitness, Mark.15
First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a
witness. Accused-appellant argued that, being a deaf-mute who cannot
make known his perception to others as he has no formal education on
sign language, Mark is unqualified to be a witness. In fact, he was unable
to give a responsive answer to some questions propounded to him through
the interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to play
in a basketball far from his house than in a nearer one. 16
Second, accused-appellant asserted that Mark’s testimony was not
corroborated by his alleged playmates or by the "chubby girl" he
mentioned in his testimony. Such lack of corroboration weakened Mark’s
testimony.17
Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money,
new clothes and shoes from the private complainant before he took the
witness stand. This made his testimony highly suspicious. 18
Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Mark’s failure to identify him as the
perpetrator of the crime in the two instances that he was presented to
Mark in a line-up. This made Mark’s alleged positive identification of
accused-appellant doubtful. 19
In its Decision dated September 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals held that
the contentions of accused-appellant lacked merit. 20
The Court of Appeals declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify
has long been recognized. The witness may communicate his perceptions
to the court through an interpreter. In this case, Mark’s testimony was
facilitated by Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter who has been
teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. With the help of
Catinguil, the trial court determined that Mark is not mentally deficient
and that he was able to tell time, space and distance. He was able to draw
and make sketches in open court to show the relative position of things
and persons as he perceived like a normal person. By using signs and
signals, he was able to recount clearly what he witnessed in the evening of
February 10, 2003. According to the appellate court, the above established
Mark’s competence as a witness.21
The Court of Appeals also found that Mark’s testimony was corroborated
by the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim’s
corpse that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds in the thorax. This physical evidence is an eloquent
manifestation of truth and its evidentiary weight is far more than that of
corroborative testimonies.22
The Court of Appeals rejected as groundless accused-appellant’s
imputation to Mark of improper motive or bias. It also pointed out the
irrelevance of non-identification of an accused in a police line-up. What is
important is the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of
the crime by the witness in open court.23
Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution
was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery
with homicide. It upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for the said
felony. The decretal portion of the Decision dated September 28, 2007
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated November 16,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court [(RTC)], National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 is
AFFIRMED.24
Accused-appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the very same
grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals.
This Court is not persuaded.
Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant
stabbed the victim several times, causing the latter’s death, for the purpose
of depriving the victim of his personal properties, which personalties
accused-appellant took away with him before leaving the scene of the
crime. The killing of the victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore
constitutes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. This
finding of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court is conclusive to
this Court. Also, a review of the records show that both the trial and the
appellate courts did not miss, misapply or misinterpret any relevant fact
that would warrant an alteration of their identical conclusions as to the
criminal responsibility of accused-appellant. 25
The Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the concerns of accused-
appellant. Accused-appellant has presented no compelling reason that
would justify the reversal of his conviction.
The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to
be a witness. The rule is that "all persons who can perceive, and
perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses."26 A deaf-mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her
other senses, such as his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow
him/her to make observations about his/her environment and
experiences. The inability to hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute
from communicating orally with others but he/she may still communicate
with others in writing or through signs and symbols and, as in this case,
sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is competent to be a witness so long as he/she
has the faculty to make observations and he/she can make those
observations known to others. As this Court held in People v. Tuangco 27:
A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may
be witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend
facts they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas
through a qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs.
Sasota, the accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-
mute. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
When a deaf-mute testifies in court, "the manner in which the
examination of a deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be
regulated and controlled by the trial court in its discretion, and the
method adopted will not be reviewed by the appellate court in the absence
of a showing that the complaining party was in some way injured by
reason of the particular method adopted." 28
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark
understood and appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he
comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason in
ruling otherwise.
Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign
language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the
Deaf who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since
1990 and possessed special education and training for interpreting sign
language. The trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to
act as interpreter for Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.
Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that
fateful February 10, 2003 - the situation of the victim who had just
boarded his car; the respective positions of accused-appellant and his still
unidentified cohort vis-à-vis the victim; accused-appellant’s knock on the
window of the victim’s car and the sudden series of stabs accused-
appellant inflicted upon the victim; the taking of the victim’s various
personal properties; accused-appellant’s walk away from the crime scene;
and, the revelation of accused-appellant’s identity when he finally
removed the bonnet that covered his face, unaware that someone was
secretly and silently watching. In this connection, the Court of Appeals
correctly observed that "despite intense and grueling cross-examinations,
the eyewitness responded with consistency upon material details that
could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the shocking events which
unfolded before his eyes." 29 The imperfections or inconsistencies cited by
accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is some difficulty in
eliciting testimony where the witness is a deaf-mute. 30 Besides they
concerned material details which are neither material nor relevant to the
case. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the credibility of
Mark’s testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the same. What is
material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and personally
saw what accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful night when the
incident happened. The trial court’s assessment of the credibility of Mark,
which was affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the highest respect of
this Court.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Mark’s testimony
was corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied
the victim’s corpse that the cause of death was "hemorrhagic shock
secondary to multiple stab wounds in the thorax." 31 The multiple mortal
wounds inflicted on the victim constitute physical evidence which further
establish the truth of Mark’s testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs
any corroborative testimony which accused-appellant requires of the
prosecution. Moreover, the settled rule is that the positive and credible
testimony of a single witness is sufficient to secure the conviction of an
accused.32
The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would
impel Mark to testify falsely against accused-appellant. As the
determination of bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this
Court respects the unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts
on the matter.
Accused-appellant’s attempt to render doubtful Mark’s identification of
him fails. Indeed, the law requires not simply an eyewitness account of the
act of committing the crime but the positive identification of the accused
as the perpetrator of the crime.33 Here, Mark has positively pointed to
accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that Mark’s failure to identify accused-appellant in a police
line-up on February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating
that a police line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is
that the positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the
crime be made by the witness in open court. 34 Nevertheless, the records
show that Mark identified accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the
victim in a police line-up on February 18, 2003 35 and, more importantly, in
open court in the course of Mark’s testimony.
In sum, the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-
appellant for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Accused-appellant’s crime is punishable under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, by reclusion
perpetua to death. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that when
the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the
crime is not attended by any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty
shall be imposed.36 Considering that no modifying circumstance attended
the commission of the crime, the penalty imposed by the trial and the
appellate courts, reclusion perpetua, is proper.
The civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the
current amount of civil indemnity awarded in cases of murder. 37 Robbery
with homicide belongs to that class of felony denominated as "Robbery
with violence against or intimidation of persons" 38 under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code and the killing or death of a person is committed "by
reason or on occasion of the robbery." The increase in the amount of civil
indemnity is called for as the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, like murder, involves a greater degree of criminal propensity
than homicide alone where the civil indemnity awarded is P50,000.00.
The P50,000.00 imposed as moral damages is proper and conforms to
recent jurisprudence.39
The reimbursement of actual damages in the total amount of P477,054.30
for various funeral-related expenses is proper as it is fully supported by
evidence on record. The same holds true for the payment of the value of
the items taken from the victim, namely, two cellphones at P3,500.00
each and the necklace at P20,000.00.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages (namely, the civil indemnity, moral
damages and actual damages) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum
from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid. 40
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision dated
November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76
in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found accused-appellant Edwin
Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as
legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the civil
indemnity, moral damages and actual damages awarded to the heirs of the
victim, which shall commence from the date of finality of this decision
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.