Harold V. Tamargo vs.
Romulo Awingan, Lloyd Antiporda and Licerio affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or
Antiporda, Jr.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 177727               January 19, 2010
HAROLD V. TAMARGO, Petitioner,  center.16
vs.
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO
ANTIPORDA, JR.,Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the November 10, 2006
decision2 and May 18, 2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. SP No. 93610.
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail
Franzielle, were shot and killed at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003
along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo, Manila. The police had
no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo Geron
surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated
that a certain Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty.
Tamargo was ordered killed by respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he
(Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo. He added that he
told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect
closely resembled Columna.4
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of
Geron’s affidavit, the investigating prosecutor 5 issued a resolution dated
December 5, 2003 finding probable cause against Columna and three
John Does.6 On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations for
murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, one assigned to Branch 27 for the death of Atty. Franklin
Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death of the minor Gail
Franzielle.7 Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February
17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial. 8
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed
an affidavit wherein he admitted his participation as "look out" during the
shooting and implicated respondent Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as
the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as masterminds
respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd
Antiporda.9 The former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of
Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the killing took place, Licerio
Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty. Tamargo
was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty.
Tamargo) filed a complaint against those implicated by Columna in the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 10
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating
prosecutor11 who subjected him to clarificatory questions. 12
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that
Licerio was a candidate for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May
2004 elections and that the case was instituted by his political opponents
in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty.
Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty.
Tamargo had been defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the
killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election case against Lloyd and a
kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However, they
claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in
the elections and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan. 13
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented
Columna’s unsolicited handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to
respondent Lloyd, sent from Columna’s jail cell in Manila. In the letter,
Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and
narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial
confession. He stated that those he implicated had no participation in the
killings.14 Respondent Licerio also submitted an affidavit of Columna
dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the statements
in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columna’s letter and affidavit, the investigating
prosecutor set a clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his
contradictory affidavits and his unsolicited letter. During the hearing held
on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically admitted the authorship and
voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25, 2004
extract the affidavit from him.15
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended
the dismissal of the charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor
Ramon Garcia dated October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only
forced to withdraw all his statements against respondents during the
October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats to his life
inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the
Department of Justice (DOJ). 17 On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then
Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez, reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing
of the Informations for murder.18 He opined that the March 8, 2004
extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent
recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable
guilt of respondents.19 Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the
cases were consolidated and assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29. 20
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas’
motion for reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the
Informations.21 This time, he declared that the extrajudicial confession of
Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that, even if it was
admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. 22 As a result, on
August 22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the
Informations. On October 4, 2005, Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioner’s
MR.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to
withdraw the Informations in an order dated October 26,
2005.23Petitioner filed an MR but the judge voluntarily inhibited herself
without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch 19,
presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of
petitioner in a resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based
on Columna’s March 8, 2004 affidavit which he affirmed before the
investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to hold the accused for
trial. She denied the MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6,
2006.
Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari
and prohibition in the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The
Antipordas separately filed another certiorari case docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA
ruled that the RTC judge gravely abused her discretion because she
arbitrarily left out of her assessment and evaluation the substantial
matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in concluding
that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It also held that
Columna’s extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the
respondents because, aside from the recanted confession, there was no
other piece of evidence presented to establish the existence of the
conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after Columna was
arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was
consolidated with CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The CA denied reconsideration
in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a decision dated August 24, 2007,
the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of respondents
Antiporda.24
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
93610. Later on, he filed an amended petition impleading respondents
Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding
that Judge Daguna had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge
Daguna, there was probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of
Columna. She considered all the pieces of evidence but did not give credit
to Columna’s recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of
discretion by limiting her evaluation and assessment only to evidence that
supported probable cause while completely disregarding contradicting
evidence. They also contend that Columna’s extrajudicial confession was
inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios
acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an
Information (on the ground of lack of probable cause to hold the accused
for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ Secretary), the trial court has the
duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of the motion. 25It
may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of
the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case.26 The court must itself be convinced that there is indeed no
sufficient evidence against the accused.27
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the
following: (1) Columna’s affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he
implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his affirmation of this
affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter
dated October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution
upholding the prosecutor’s recommendation to file the murder charges. 28
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1)
Columna’s May 3, 2004 letter to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating
the torture he suffered to force him to admit his participation in the
crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit
where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement
in the murders and (3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004
clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically affirmed his May 3, 2004
letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
evidence other than the admission itself (b) the admission relates to the
common object and (c) it has been made while the declarant was engaged
in carrying out the conspiracy. 37 Otherwise, it cannot be used against the
alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be
confronted with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. 38
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted,
no other piece of evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy.
There was no other prosecution evidence, direct or circumstantial, which
the extrajudicial confession could corroborate. Therefore, the recanted
confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against respondents,
had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented
against the respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it
is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to
the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved from the pain of going
through a full blown court case.39 When, at the outset, the evidence offered
during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an
uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the
criminal complaint should not prosper so that the system would be spared
from the unnecessary expense of such useless and expensive
litigation.40 The rule is all the more significant here since respondent
Licerio Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant
to the warrant of arrest issued by Judge Daguna. 41

We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez29 that [although] there is no general
formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the
same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given
situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or
opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a finding
should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter
to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore,
should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some
credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would
be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are
created to uphold.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she
would have seen that, aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on,
there were others which cast doubt on them. We quote with approval the
reflections of the CA on this point:
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was
only to satisfy herself whether there was probable cause or sufficient
ground to hold respondents for trial as co-conspirators. Given that she had
no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against respondents, her
orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against
them were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the
petitions for certiorari of respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving

the motion to withdraw the informations effectively sidetracked the
guidelines for an independent assessment and evaluation of the merits of
the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial rights of
the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by
looking at everything made available to her at that point of the cases. No
less than that was expected and required of her as a judicial officer.
According to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-
affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the
records of the public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to
produce before the court; or any evidence already adduced before the
court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by the public
prosecutor.31

Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columna’s extrajudicial

confession in his March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence
against respondents in view of the rule on res inter alios acta.

Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios
actaprovides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. 32 Consequently, an extrajudicial
confession is binding only on the confessant, is not admissible against his
or her co-accused33 and is considered as hearsay against them. 34 The
reason for this rule is that:

on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are
binding upon himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct
and declarations. Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also
manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere
unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against
him.35

An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a

conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:

Admission by conspirator. — The act or declaration of a conspirator

relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in
evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by
evidence other than such act or declaration.

This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating
to the conspiracy and during its existence may be given in evidence against
co-conspirators provided that the conspiracy is shown by independent
evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. 36 Thus, in order that the
admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her co-
conspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by

People of the Philippines vs. Ramil Rarugal Alias "Amay Bisaya"
G.R. No. 188603
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "AMAY BISAYA," Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is the appeal of the June 30, 2008 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413, which affirmed with
modification the May 29, 2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 86, Quezon City in Crim. Case No. -Q-99-82409, entitled
People of the Philippines v. Ramil Rarugal that found appellant Ramil
Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
of murder.
On December 8, 1998, the following information for the crime of murder
was filed against appellant:
That on or about the 19th day of October, 1998, in Quezon City,
Philippine, the above-named appellant, with intent to kill, qualified by
evident premeditation and treachery, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon the person of one Arnel M. Florendo, by then and there stabbing him
with a bladed weapon, hitting him on the different parts of his body,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said Arnel M. Florendo.
Appellant was only arrested sometime in August 2001. During his
arraignment on August 27, 2001, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial on the
merits ensued.
Based on the testimonies of witnesses presented by the prosecution, the
RTC found that on the night of October 19, 1998 at around 9:45 p.m.,
while victim Arnel Florendo (Florendo) was cycling along Sampaguita
Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City, appellant, with the use
of a long double-bladed weapon, stabbed Florendo; thus, forcibly
depriving him of his bicycle. Immediately thereafter, appellant hurriedly
fled the scene. This incident was witnessed by Roberto Sit-Jar, who
positively identified appellant in court.
Florendo arrived home bleeding. He was quickly attended to by his
siblings, including his brother Renato. When Renato recounted the events
of that night to the court, he testified that Florendo told him and his other
relatives that it was appellant who had stabbed him. They then took
Florendo to Tordesillas Hospital but had to transfer him to Quezon City
General Hospital, due to the unavailability of blood. It was there that
Florendo died on October 26, 1998 with the family spending about
P2,896.00 for his hospitalization and P25,000.00 for his funeral.
Autopsy Report signed by Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Dominic L. Aguda,
showed the following Postmortem Findings:
Cyanosis, lips and fingernailbeds
Brain- pale
Heart-chambers, contain small amount of dark clotted blood
STAB WOUND-sutured, healing, 3.0 cms, located on left chest, 15.0 cms.
from the anterior median line directed backwards and medially involving
the skin and underlying tissues passing between the 6th and 7th left ribs,
entering the thoracic cavity and severed the lower lobe of the left lung with
a depth of 7-8 cms.
THORACOSTOMY INCISIONS-sutured, 3.5 cms., located on the left
chest, 19.0 cms. from the anterior median line; sutured, 3.2 cms. located
on the right chest 20 cms. from the anterior median line
Hemothorax- left, 500 cc
Visceral organs- pale
Stomach- empty
CAUSE OF DEATH: STAB WOUND, LEFT CHEST
In his defense, appellant denied that he stabbed Florendo since he was at
that time working as a farm administrator for the town mayor in
Pangasinan. He said he was living with his cousin in Urbiztondo,
Pangasinan on October 19, 1998, where he had been staying since 1997.
He stated that during the period 1997 to 1998, he did not visit Manila at
any point. On cross-examination, appellant stated that he was arrested in
front of his house in Novaliches, Quezon City.
On May 29, 2006, the RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. It stated:
After evaluation, the Court finds that the guilt of the appellant was proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant
as the assailant of Florendo. In view of the positive identification made by
Sit-Jar, the denial and alibi made by [appellant] has no leg to stand on.
Under prevailing jurisprudence alibis and denials are worthless in light of
positive identification by witnesses who have no motive to falsely testify.
Moreover, Florendo did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. Florendo, apparently conscious that he could die of his wound,
identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the rules,
statements made by a person under the consciousness of an impending
death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his death. The
positive identification made by the victim before he died, under the
consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating the
liability of herein appellant.
xxxx
As shown by the evidence, the killing of Arnel Florendo was sudden
indicating treachery and the appellant being then armed with a knife, the
killing was done with abuse of superior strength. These circumstances
qualify the crime to murder, all of the elements of the offense being
present.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered finding
the appellant Ramil Rarugal alias "Amay Bisaya" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the amount of P28,124.00 for actual damages, P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity and P50,000.00 as and for moral damages.
 (Citations omitted.)
Appellant filed his notice of appeal on July 21, 2006. He questioned the
RTC’s finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the commission of the
crime and its appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. He
argued that witness Sit-Jar lacked credibility for giving inconsistent
testimony. Moreover, he averred that there was no basis for the finding
that treachery qualified the crime to murder since its elements were not
established.
On June 30, 2008, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the
May 29, 2006 decision of the RTC. It stated that witness Sit-Jar’s positive
identification of appellant as the one who stabbed Florendo takes
precedence over appellant’s defense of denial and alibi. Moreover,
appellant failed to adduce evidence to show that Sit-Jar had any improper
motive to falsely testify against him. The Court of Appeals thus disposed of
the appeal in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the appellant RAMIL
RARUGAL is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P27,896.00 as actual damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. The said Decision in all other respect STANDS.
Hence, this appeal.15 Petitioner’s confinement was confirmed by the
Bureau of Corrections on September 30, 2009.
Both the appellee and the appellant waived the filing of supplemental
briefs and adopted the briefs they filed before the Court of Appeals.
We affirm the June 30, 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals, with
modification respecting the award of damages.
This Court has consistently stated that the trial court is in a better position
to adjudge the credibility of witnesses, especially if its decision is affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. We have been reminded in People v. Clores that:
When it comes to the matter of credibility of a witness, settled are the
guiding rules some of which are that (1) the appellate court will not disturb
the factual findings of the lower court, unless there is a showing that it had
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some fact or circumstance of
weight and substance that would have affected the result of the case x x x;
(2) the findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of a witness is
entitled to great respect since it had the opportunity to examine his
demeanor as he testified on the witness stand, and, therefore, can discern
if such witness is telling the truth or not; and (3) a witness who testifies in
a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner and
remains consistent on cross-examination is a credible witness. (Citations
omitted.)
The rationale for these guidelines is that the trial courts are in a better
position to decide the question of credibility, having heard the witnesses
themselves and having observed firsthand their deportment and manner
of testifying under grueling examination.
We see no need to depart from the aforestated rules. After a careful review
of the records, we find that appellant failed to negate the findings of the
trial court with concrete evidence that the latter had overlooked,
misconstrued, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case. We agree with
the Court of Appeals that the prosecution witness recounted the details of
that fateful night in a "clear, straightforward and convincing manner,
devoid of any signs of falsehood or fabrication."
First, prosecution witness Sit-Jar positively identified appellant as the
victim’s assailant in contrast to the appellant’s defense of denial and alibi.
We have stated in Malana v. People that:
It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive
on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if
not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified appellants as two of the perpetrators of the crime. It is
incumbent upon appellants to prove that they were at another place when
the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for them
to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. x x x.
(Citations omitted.)
The records are devoid of any indication that it was physically impossible
for appellant to have been in the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed. Appellant’s bare alibi that he was working as a farm
administrator in Urbiztondo, Pangasinan and was allegedly staying there
at the time of the commission of the crime does not suffice to prove the
alleged physical impossibility that he committed the crime charged,
moreso in the face of positive identification by the witness, who was not
motivated by any improper motive to falsely testify against him.
Second, the victim was still alive after the stabbing incident. He had time
to reach his house and confide in his brother, witness Renato, that it was
appellant who had stabbed him.
Rule 130, Section 37 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 37. Dying declaration. — The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death.
The Court has stated in People v. Maglian:
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as
evidence if the following circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the
cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death; (b) it is
made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a
consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been
competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration
is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s
death." x x x. (Citation omitted.)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statement of Florendo made
to his brother Renato has complied with the requisites of a dying
declaration. It is important to note that Florendo, after being stabbed by
appellant twice on the chest, went home and under labored breathing, told
Renato that it was appellant who had stabbed him. Clearly, the statement
made was an expression of the cause and the surrounding circumstances
of his death, and under the consciousness of impending death. There
being nothing in the records to show that Florendo was incompetent, he
would have been competent to testify had he survived. It is enough to state
that the deceased was at the time competent as a witness. Lastly, the dying
declaration is offered in an inquiry the subject of which involves his death.
We reproduce the statement of the RTC:
Moreover, the victim did not immediately die after he was stabbed by the
appellant. The victim, apparently conscious that he could die of his
wound, identified his assailant as the appellant Ramil Rarugal. Under the
rules, statement made by a person under the consciousness of an
impending death is admissible as evidence of the circumstances of his
death. The positive identification made by the victim before he died, under
the consciousness of an impending death is a strong evidence indicating
the liability of herein appellant.
It is of no moment that the victim died seven days from the stabbing
incident and after receiving adequate care and treatment, because the
apparent proximate cause of his death, the punctures in his lungs, was a
consequence of appellant’s stabbing him in the chest.
Anent the finding of treachery by the RTC, we agree that appellant’s act of
suddenly stabbing Florendo while he was innocently cycling along
Sampaguita Street, Barangay Capari, Novaliches, Quezon City constituted
the qualifying circumstance of treachery. As we previously ruled, treachery
is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly
and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. Here, appellant
surprised Florendo when he suddenly and swiftly attacked and stabbed
him in the chest. The swift turn of events left Florendo defenseless to
protect himself, allowing appellant to commit the crime without risk to his
own person. Thus, we sustain the findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the
commission of the crime.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime
of murder. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the
RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code.
However, to conform to existing jurisprudence, the Court must modify the
amount of indemnity for death and exemplary damages awarded by the
courts a quo.
Anent the award of damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the
following may be recovered: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4)
exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6)
interest, in proper cases.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the heirs of the victim were able
to prove before the trial court actual damages in the amount of
P27,896.00 based on the receipts they submitted. Moreover, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that the award of exemplary damages is proper in
this case. We have stated that:
Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award
of damages, however, is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the
offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for an
award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when
the aggravating circumstance is ordinary but to be withheld when it is
qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the
criminal, rather than to the civil, liability of the offender. In fine, relative
to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether
ordinary or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of
exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning of Article 2230 of the
Civil Code. (Emphasis omitted.)
We, however, increase the award of exemplary damages to
P30,000.00 and the award for mandatory civil indemnity to
P75,000.00 to conform to recent jurisprudence.
We sustain the RTC’s award for moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 even in the absence of proof of mental and emotional
suffering of the victim’s heirs. As borne out by human nature and
experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim’s family.
In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all
the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The June 30, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02413 is AFFIRMED. Appellant
RAMIL RARUGAL alias "Amay Bisaya" is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of MURDER, and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. Appellant is further ordered to pay the heirs of Arnel
M. Florendo the amounts of P27,896.00 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages. All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest
at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision
until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

People of the Philippines vs. Anecito Estibal y Calungsag
G.R. No. 208749
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus -
ANECITO ESTIBAL y CALUNGSAG, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For automatic review is the Decision dated March 25, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 05374, which upheld the
Decision dated November 24, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig City (stationed in Taguig City), Branch 69, in Criminal Case No.
139521, convicting Anecito Estibal y Calungsag (accused-appellant) of the
crime of Rape under Article 266-A(2), in relation to Article 266-B(5)(1) of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 and
in further relation to Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369.
The falloof the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Anecito Estibal y Calungsag guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Rape, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua without eligibility for parole in lieu of the death
penalty; and to pay AAA the amount of PhP 75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
PhP 75,000.00 as moral damages, and PhP 25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
SO ORDERED. (Citation omitted)
Antecedent Facts
The accusatory portion of the Information for rape against the accused-
appellant filed on February 6, 2009 reads:
That on or about the 5th day of February, 2009 in the City of Taguig,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, while taking advantage of his moral authority and
ascendancy and with his intention to gratify his sexual desire upon his
daughter [AAA], by means of force, violence and intimidation did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having sexual
intercourse with the latter against her will and consent, the said crime
having been attended by the qualifying circumstances of relationship and
minority, as the said accused being the natural father of the victim, a
thirteen (13)[-]year[-]old, a minor at the time of the commission of the
crime, which is aggravated by the circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and dwelling, all to the damage and prejudice of the said victim
[AAA].
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The accused-appellant, 43 years old, pleaded not guilty upon arraignment
on March 9, 2009. But during the pre-trial, BBB, wife of the accused-
appellant and mother of AAA, the minor victim, disclaimed any further
interest to pursue the case. Her reasons were that she pitied the accused-
appellant and, according to her, AAA had already forgiven her father. But
having entered the accused-appellant’s plea, the trial court refused to
entertain their desistance.
At the trial, four witnesses came forward to testify for the prosecution. The
testimony of the first witness, Dr. Jesille Baluyot (Dr. Baluyot) who
conducted the medicolegal examination on AAA, was stipulated by the
prosecution and the defense, as follows:
1. That she is a Police Chief Inspector of the PNP particularly assigned at
the PNP Crime Laboratory as Medico Legal Examiner;
2. That she was the one who conducted the medico-legal examination on
the minor victim on February 5, 2009;
3. That she reduced her examination into writing and issued the Initial
Medico Legal Report Case No. R09-288 which Anogenital findings are
diagnostic of previous blunt force or penetrating trauma (to the hymen);
4. And that she also issued other documents in relation to the
examination.
The parties also agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Michael Estudillo
(Estudillo) and Ronillo Perlas (Perlas), members of the Barangay Security
Force (BSF) who arrested the accused-appellant as he was coming home
from work at 6:00 p.m. on February 5, 2009, to wit:
1. That BSF Michael Estudillo and BSF Ronilo Perlas are members of the
Barangay Security Force x x x;
2. That in the evening of February5, 2009 while they were on duty at x x x,
the minor victim and her mother appeared at their office and reported that
the victim was molested or sexually abused by the accused; and that based
on this report, they proceeded to the house of the perpetrator;
3. That while on their way, they met the accused and informed him about
the complaint of the minor victim and eventually arrested him without the
corresponding warrant of arrest and brought to their office;
4. That based on the incident, they referred the case to the Taguig City
Police Station for proper disposition; and
5. That they have no personal knowledge as to the incident.
Concerning AAA and BBB, several subpoenas were sent to their address
for the taking of their testimonies, but they never appeared. On April 13,
2010, it was reported to the court that they had moved out of their house,
and subsequent subpoenas were returned unserved.
The prosecution’s last witness, Police Officer 3 Fretzie S. Cobardo (PO3
Cobardo), was the officer assigned at the Philippine National Police (PNP)
Women and Children Protection Center of Taguig City. It was she who
investigated the above incident and took down the sworn statement of
AAA late in the evening of February 5, 2009. Her testimony was also
stipulated, as follows:
1. that she is a member of the PNP assigned at the Women and Children
Protection Desk, Taguig City Police Station;
2. that she was the investigating officer at the time the accused was
brought to the police station;
3. that she personally encountered the private offended party and the
accused;
4. that she brought the private offended party to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for Genito Physical Examination;
5. that she was present at the time the private offended party executed an
affidavit complaint;
6. that she was the one who brought the private offended party and the
accused for inquest proceedings;
7. that she has no personal knowledge as to the incident which gave rise to
this case;
8. that Exhibit "A" was the same document executed by the mother of the
victim as well as the victim herself before her;
9. that Exhibit "G" was the same Medico Legal Report that was
transmitted to her by the PNP Crime Laboratory;
10. that she was the one who received the Initial Medico-Legal Report.
On clarificatory questioning by the court, PO3 Cobardo narrated how she
was trained to prepare for her assignment as desk officer at the PNP
Women and Children Protection Center; that during her investigation of
AAA and BBB, they were both crying; that without being asked leading
questions and without being coached by her mother, AAA, 13 years old
and a first-year high school student, revealed in detail how the accused-
appellant abused her for several years and how he raped her that morning
of February 5, 2009; that AAA told that the first time she was raped by her
father was when she was in Grade III, but this was the first time she was
telling anyone about the rapes; that BBB told PO3 Cobardo that she could
not imagine how her husband could commit such an outrage against their
own daughter; that from her own observations of AAA’s demeanor, PO3
Cobardo was convinced that she was telling the truth.
The accused-appellant’s defense consisted mainly of denial. From his
testimony, the court learned that the accused-appellant, his wife BBB and
their two children, AAA and CCC, livedin a one-room house in Taguig City;
that he and his wife were employed as security guards in Taguig City; that
on February 4, 2009, his wife was on night duty and came home the next
morning; that on the night of the alleged rape, he and his two children
retired for the night at around midnight, and thus, he could not have
sexually abused his daughter AAA between 1:00 a.m. and 2:00 a.m. on
February 5, 2009; that he and his wife used to fight about her brothers
Romulo and Rey Santos, whom he now suspected of influencing AAA to
file the complaint for rape against him, although he treated themas his
own brothers; that he was arrested by the Barangay Tanodat 6:00 p.m. on
February 5, 2009 as he was coming from work.
Relying on PO3 Cobardo’s testimony of what AAA narrated to her, the
RTC considered the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA as
confirmed by PO3 Cobardoas part of the res gestae, and convicted the
accused-appellant. The court said:
Thus, the court considers the spontaneity of the declarations made by AAA
as confirmed by PO3 Cobardo. Moreover, there is nothing on record that
would compel the court to believe that said prosecution witness has
improper motive to falsely testify against the accused-appellant.
Accordingly, it shall uphold the presumption of regularity in the
performance of her duties. Further, the testimony of PO3 Cobardo was
corroborated by the findings of Dr. Jesille Baluyot of a shallow healed
lacerations at 4 and 8 o’clock and deep healed laceration at5 o’clock
positions in the hymen of AAA which Anogenital findings are diagnostic of
previous blunt force or penetrating trauma. (Citations omitted)
Below is the pertinent portion ofPO3 Cobardo’s testimony cited by the
RTC:
COURT -Some questions from the Court.
Q PO3 Cobardo[,] you were the one who investigated the minor victim in
this case?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q Could you tell the Court what is the appearance of the victim at the time
of the investigation?
A At that time Your Honor the victim was together with her mother, they
were crying.
Q Both were crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q When you conducted the investigation[,] the mother was present?
A Yes[,] Your Honor, the mother was present.
Q You were aware of course when you inquired the age of the minor?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q When she narrated the incident[,] was she coached by the mother?
A No[,] Your Honor, the victim was not coached by the mother. It was the
victim who stated all the incident.
Q Did you make, did you use leading questions in conducting,
propounding the questions?
A No[,] Your Honor.
Q How did you ask the victim? Was it in a question and answer where first
you will ask the victim to narrate the incident?
A Yes[,] Your Honor. First I asked the victim to narrate the incident.
Q And then you propounded question in the question and answer form?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q After obtaining all the facts relative to the incident?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q And you found out that, was that the first time that the incident
happened or several times already?
A During that interview[,] Your Honor[,] I found out that the victim was
sexually abused by her father several times when she was in Grade III.
Q You mentioned that the victim and her mother during your
investigation were both crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor[.]
Q Did you inquire why?
A The mother told me that she could not imagine that her husband
molested their daughter.
Q How about the daughter? Did you inquire? Did you allow her some time
to rest?
A She was crying[,] Your Honor[,] since it was her first time to reveal the
incident.
Q So you asked her why she was crying?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q Because, I notice, actually I noticed in the preliminary question you
stated "hindi ako magagalit, kahit ano ang sasabihin mo sa akin,
naiintindihan mo ba lahat ng sinabi ko". It may be a preliminary question
because you have attended seminars on this. Is that right?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
COURT -
So judging from the preliminary question[,] I know that you had
undergone seminars on how to conduct questions on child abuse cases.
WITNESS
Yes[,] Your Honor.
COURT -
Q Are you convinced that the victim is telling the truth?
A Yes[,] Your Honor, I am convinced.
Q Why are you convinced? Convinced based on your questions that you
propounded, why are you convinced?
A Because for a father and daughter relationship it’s not good, it’s not easy
to accused [sic] your father of sexual abuse.
Q So judging from the appearance of the minor she would be able to tell
the Court that she is telling the truth?
A Yes[,] Your Honor.
Q How many seminars have you attended relative to on how to conduct
examination on child abuse?
A Many times already[,] Your Honor.
xxxx
Significantly, it appears from the sworn statement, executed by AAA
before PO3 Cobardo, that she first revealed her ordeal to her cousin DDD
that same afternoon of February 5, 2009. With DDD’s help, BBB
confronted her daughter AAA, who told her that the accused-appellant did
not only rape her that morning, but had sexually abused her several times
since she was in Grade III.
Appeal to the CA
On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that due to the
absence of AAA’s testimony, the prosecution failed to establish the
circumstances proving beyond reasonable doubt that he raped his
daughter; that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses PO3 Cobardo,
BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas, not being themselves victims or witnesses
to the "startling occurrence" of rape, cannot create the hearsay exception
of res gestae [literally, "things done"]; and, that the medical findings of Dr.
Baluyot do not prove that he had carnal knowledge of AAA but only that
she had had sexual relations.
In its appellee’s brief, the Office of Solicitor General (OSG) asserted that
although AAA did not personally testify, and none of the prosecution
witnesses had any direct knowledge of the sexual molestation of AAA by
the accused-appellant, his guilt was fully established by circumstantial
evidence. In particular, the OSG argued that the testimony of PO3
Cobardo concerning what AAA narrated to her during her investigation
was part of the res gestae pursuant to Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. The
OSG reasoned that AAA had just undergone a startling occurrence at the
time she told PO3 Cobardo that she had been raped by her father that
morning, a statement which PO3 Cobardo found spontaneous and
credible; that the gap between the sexual assault and the time when AAA
made her narration to PO3 Cobardo was too short to permit fabrication by
AAA of such a serious accusation against her own father; and, that AAA
made the charge in the presence of her mother could only have lent
credence to her claim. Moreover, the claim of rape by AAA is corroborated
by Dr. Baluyot’s finding that she has genital lacerations, in contrast to the
accused-appellant’s only defense of a general and uncorroborated denial.
The appellate court agreed with the RTC and the OSG that the testimonies
of the three prosecution witnesses, PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF
Perlas, form part of the res gestae, although none of them was a
participant, victim or spectator to the crime. According to the CA, "they
heard what [AAA] said when she reported the sexual abuse committed
against her by accused-appellant Estibal." To further quote the CA:
Thus, in this case, even if prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas
and PO3 Cobardo were not present during the startling occurrence
experienced by AAA, they heard what she said when she reported the
sexual abuse committed against her by accused-appellant Estibal. There is
no merit to the argument of accused-appellant Estibal that, since
prosecution witnesses BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and PO3 Cobardo were
"neither participants or victims or spectators to the crime of rape being
charged against the accused-appellant" their testimonies could not be
considered as part of the res gestae.
The testimonies of said prosecution witnesses comply with the above-
mentioned requisites, viz., there is no question that the sexual abuse
committed by accused-appellant Estibal against her daughter AAA was a
startling occurrence and a traumatic experience, at that; she had no
opportunity to contrive or devise falsehood when she reported the crime to
BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas and narrated the incident to PO3 Cobardo
hours after the incident; and, the statements she made was relative to her
sexual abuse by accused-appellant Estibal and its attending
circumstances.
There might be an intervening period between the time the crime of rape
was committed and the first time it was reported by AAA to the
prosecution witnesses. However, said intervening period of less than
twenty-four (24) hours is so short a time for AAA to fully recover
physically and emotionally from such a traumatic and harrowing
experience, considering her tender age of only thirteen (13) years and the
fact that her abuser is her own biological father.
Res gestae refers to statements made by the participants or the victims of,
or the spectators to, a crime immediately before, during, or after its
commission. These statements are a spontaneous reaction or utterance
inspired by the excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity for
the declarant to fabricate a false statement. An important consideration is
whether there intervened, between the occurrence and the statement, any
circumstance calculated to divert the mind and thus restore the mental
balance of the declarant; and afford an opportunity for deliberation.
Indeed, the statements made by AAA before BSF Estudillo, BSF Perlas and
PO3 Cobardo were spontaneous and her utterances were inspired by the
excitement of the occasion, without any opportunity to fabricate a false
statement.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered, including,
but not always confined to: (1) the time that has lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2)
the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant
when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening
events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5)
the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. The Supreme
Court, in People v. Manhuyod, has explained the import of the first four
factors; thus: "x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that
should separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of
the declaration. What is important is that the declarations were
voluntarily and spontaneously made ‘so nearly contemporaneous as to be
in the presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and
were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of
design or deliberation.’
"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that ‘a statement made, or an
act done, at a place some distance from the place where the principal
transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would
render it admissible.’
"Anent the third factor, ‘[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed
spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions of the
declarant was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence
on his mind still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury,
was suffering severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a
lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant,
his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a
statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a
different statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.’
"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there
intervened between the event or transaction and the making of the
statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind
of the declarant which would thus restore his mental balance and afford
opportunity for deliberation." (Citations omitted)
Automatic review by the Supreme Court
Without the res gestae exception, the evidence of the prosecution would
consist mainly of hearsay statements by PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and
BSF Perlas all reiterating what AAA allegedly told them. The same
question, whether res gestae as an exception to the hearsay rule must be
appreciated from the factual circumstances of the case, is now before this
Court in this automatic review.
To pardon her father, AAA chose to ignore the trial court’s subpoenas to
testify in her rape complaint, thus leaving missing a vital component in the
prosecution’s case, her eyewitness account. But in itself, her pardon would
not have worked the dismissal of the rape case since it was given after the
complaint was filed in court.
AAA never appeared at the trial proper despite several subpoenas for her
to testify, and subsequent subpoenas could not be served after her family
moved to a new but unknown address on April 13, 2010. Recall that at the
pre-trial, BBB told the court that she was no longer interested in pursuing
the case against the accused-appellant since her daughter had already
pardoned him. It has, however, been held that even if it is construed as a
pardon, AAA’s desistance is not by itself a ground to dismiss the complaint
for rape against the accused-appellant once the complaint has been
instituted in court.
In People v. Bonaagua, the accused tried to invoke the affidavit of
desistance executed by the minor victim’s mother stating that they would
no longer pursue the rape cases against him. But the high court pointed
out that since R.A. No. 8353, or the Anti-Rape Law, took effect in 1997,
rape is no longer considered a crime against chastity. Having been
reclassified as a crime against persons, it is no longer considered a private
crime, or one which cannot be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the aggrieved party. Thus, pardon by the offended party of the offender
will not extinguish his criminal liability.
"As a rule, a recantation or an affidavit of desistance is viewed with
suspicion and reservation. Jurisprudence has invariably regarded such
affidavit as exceedingly unreliable, because it can easily be secured from a
poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration. Moreover, there is always the probability that it would later
on be repudiated, and criminal prosecution would thus be interminable."
The gravity of the crime of rape and its imposable penalty, vis-á-vis the
ease with which a charge of rape can be made, compels the Supreme Court
to conduct a thorough review of rape every conviction.
A charge of rape by its very nature often must be resolved by giving
primordial consideration to the credibility of the victim’s testimony.
Because conviction may rest solely thereon, the victim’s testimony must be
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things, it must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and
unavoidably, the victim’s credibility must be put on trial as well.
But if for some reason the complainant fails or refuses to testify, as in this
case, then the court must consider the adequacy of the circumstantial
evidence established by the prosecution. In People v. Canlas, the Court
said:
Where the court relies solely on circumstantial evidence, the combined
effect of the pieces of circumstantial evidence must inexorably lead to the
conclusion that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction
must rest on nothing less than moral certainty, whether it proceeds from
direct or circumstantial evidence.
xxxx
x x x Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series
of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. It is
founded on experience, observed facts and coincidences establishing a
connection between the known and proven facts and the facts sought to be
proved. Conviction may be warranted on the basis of circumstantial
evidence provided that: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the
facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. With respect to the third requisite, it is essential
that the circumstantial evidence presented must constitute an unbroken
chain which leads one to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of others, as the guilty person. (Citations
omitted)
The Court is called upon to review the verdict of conviction below, keeping
in mind the following principles as guidance: (1) an accusation for rape
can be made with facility, while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is
even more difficult for the accused, albeit innocent, to disprove; (2)
considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme care; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution
must succeed or fail on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to derive
strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In essence, the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule provides that the
declarations must have been "voluntarily and spontaneously made so
nearly contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which
they illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation."
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "a witness can
testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise
provided in these rules." Res gestae, one of eleven (11) exceptions to the
hearsay rule, is found in Section 42 of Rule 130, thus:
Sec. 42. Part of res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling
occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with
respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of
the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying an equivocal act
material to the issue, and giving it a legal significance may be received as
part of the res gestae.
In People v. Ner, this Court elaborated on Section 36 of Rule 130 as
follows:
[T]hat declarations which are the natural emanations or outgrowths of the
act or occurrence in litigation, although not precisely concurrent in point
of time, if they were yet voluntarily and spontaneously made so nearly
contemporaneous as to be in the presence of the transaction which they
illustrate and explain, and were made under such circumstances as
necessarily to exclude the idea of design or deliberation, must, upon the
clearest principles of justice, be admissible as part of the act or transaction
itself. (Italics in the original)
The Court enumerated three essential requisites for the admissibility of a
given statement as part of res gestae, to wit:
All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of res
gestae, is that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed
by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and
make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an
account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from
referring to the event in question or its immediate attending
circum[s]tances. (Citations omitted)
There are then three essential requisites to admit evidence as part of the
res gestae, namely: (1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling
occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must
concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending
circumstances.
In People v. Dianos, the Court acknowledged that there are no hard and
fast rules in determining the spontaneity of a declaration, but at least five
factors have been considered:
By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the
participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before, during
or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances
are such that the statements constitute nothing but spontaneous reaction
or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no
opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay
rule of inadmissibility. x x x.
There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be
determined although a number of factors have been considered, including,
but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the
occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statement, (2)
the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant
when the utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening
events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5)
the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself. x x x. (Citations
omitted and italics in the original)
In People v. Jorolan, the Court emphasized that there must be no
intervening circumstances between the res gestae occurrence and the time
the statement was made as could have afforded the declarant an
opportunity for deliberation or reflection; in other words, the statement
was unreflected and instinctive:
An important consideration is whether there intervened between the
occurrence and the statement any circumstance calculated to divert the
mind of the declarant, and thus restore his mental balance and afford
opportunity for deliberation. His statement then cannot be regarded as
unreflected and instinctive, and is not admissible as part of the res gestae.
An example is where he had been talking about matters other than the
occurrence in question or directed his attention to other matters.(Citation
omitted and emphasis ours)
In People v. Salafranca, the Court cited two tests in applying the res gestae
rule: a) the act, declaration or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself; and b) the said evidence clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
The term res gestae has been defined as "those circumstances which are
the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act." In a general way, res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the
main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact asto exclude the idea of deliberation
and fabrication. The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
the crime when the circumstances are such that the statements were made
as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the
occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and
to fabricate a false statement. The test of admissibility of evidence as a
part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal
fact or event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the
transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negatives any premeditation
or purpose to manufacture testimony. (Citations omitted, emphasis ours
and italics in the original)
By way of illustration, in People v. Villarama, the 4-year-old rape victim
did not testify, but the accused, an uncle of the victim, was convicted on
the basis of what the child told her mother. The Court said:
The critical factor is the ability or chance to invent a story of rape. At her
age, the victim could not have had the sophistication, let alone the malice,
to tell her mother that her uncle made her lie down, took off her panties
and inserted his penis inside her vagina.
The shock of an unwelcome genital penetration on a woman is
unimaginable, more so to a four-year-old child. Such a brutal experience
constituted unspeakable trauma. The fact that Elizabeth was still crying
when her parents arrived reinforces the conclusion that she was still in a
traumatic state when she made the statements pointing to appellant.
xxxx
x x x [I]n Contreras, the victim’s statement that she had been sexually
molested by the accused was not received under the res gestae exception
to the hearsay rule, because her statement did not refer to the incident
witnessed by Nelene but to a general pattern of molestation of her and her
companions by the accused. In contrast, Elizabeth’s declaration to her
mother regarding the then just concluded assault were so full of details
specific to the incident that there could be no doubt she was referring to
the same incident witnessed by Ricardo Tumulak.
In People v. Velasquez, the 2-year-old rape victim told her mother the
following: a) "Si Tatang kakayan na ku pu." ("Tatang has been doing
something to me."); and b) "I-tatang kasi, kinayi ne pu ing pekpek ku kaya
masakit ya." ("Because Tatang has been doing something to my private
part, that is why it hurts.") The girl then showed her mother her private
part, which was swollen and oozing with pus, and then she gestured by
slightly opening or raising her right foot, and using her right finger, to
show what the accused had done to it.
 The Court ruled:
We hold, therefore, that Aira’s statements and acts constitute res gestae,
as it was made immediately subsequent to a startling occurrence, uttered
shortly thereafter by her with spontaneity, without prior opportunity to
contrive the same. Regail’s account of Aira’s words and, more importantly,
Aira’s gestures, constitutes independently relevant statements distinct
from hearsay and admissible not as to the veracity thereof but to the fact
that they had been thus uttered.
Under the doctrine of independently relevant statements, regardless of
their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is
relevant. The hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are
admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a
fact. (Citation omitted)
In People v. Lupac, the Court accepted as part of res gestae the 10-year-old
victim’s denunciation ofher uncle to a neighbor whom she met soon after
she managed to get away from her uncle after the rape, uttering the words
"hindot" and "inano ako ni Kuya Ega."
In People v. Moreno, shortly after the three accused left the house where
the complaining victims worked as maids, the maids told their employers,
who had just arrived, that they had been raped. The employers testified in
court on these statements. The Court held that the maids’ statements were
part of res gestae since they were spontaneously made as soon as the
victims had opportunity to make them without threat to their lives. The
Court said:
This exception is based on the belief that such statements are trustworthy
because made instinctively, "while the declarant’s mental powers for
deliberation are controlled and stilled by the shocking influence of a
startling occurrence, so that all his utterances at the time are the reflex
products of immediate sensual impressions, unaided by retrospective
mental action." Said natural and spontaneous utterances are perceived to
be more convincing than the testimony of the same person on the witness
stand. (Citations omitted)
But in People v. Contreras, the accused was acquitted in one of several
statutory rape charges because, among other things, the prosecution failed
to present the victim, a 6-year-old girl, and the court found that her
alleged res gestae statement referred not to the incident or circumstance
testified to by the witness but rather to a general pattern of molestation
which she and her companions had endured for some time already.
AAA’s statements to the barangay tanod and the police do not qualify as
part of res gestae in view of the missing element of spontaneity and the
lapse of an appreciable time between the rape and the declarations which
afforded her sufficient opportunity for reflection.
In People v. Manhuyod, Jr., the Court stressed that in appreciating res
gestae the element of spontaneity is critical. Although it was acknowledged
that there is no hard and fast rule to establish it, the Court cited a number
of factors to consider, already mentioned in Dianos. The review of the facts
below constrains this Court to take a view opposite that of the RTC and the
CA.
It is of particular significance to note that in her sworn statement to the
police, AAA admitted that she first revealed her ordeal of sexual abuse to
her cousin DDD in the afternoon of February 5, 2009, although her
mother BBB had returned from her overnight guard duty that morning.
Shocked by what AAA told him, DDD relayed to BBB "na may problema [si
AAA]." BBB thus confronted her, and AAA in her own words narrated that,
"kaya kinausap na po ako ni Mama kung ano ang problema ko kaya sinabi
ko na po ang ginawa sa akin ni Papa ko po kaya nalaman na lahat ni Mama
ang panggagahasa sa akin ni Papa."
After an anguished silence of five years, finally AAA found the courage to
reveal to her mother her heart-rending saga of sexual abuse by her own
father. Emboldened by her cousin DDD’s moral support, AAA told her
mother that she had been hiding her dark secret since Grade III. But as
soon as BBB learned, events quickly took their logical course. With BBB
now leading the way, BBB and AAA sought the help of the barangay tanod
that same day between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m. to have the accused-
appellant arrested. At around 6:00 p.m., they were able to arrest him as he
was coming home. Later that night, AAA accompanied by BBB gave her
statement to PO3 Cobardo of the PNP women’s desk.
AAA’s revelation to DDD and BBB set off an inexorable chain of events
that led to the arrest of the accused-appellant. There is no doubt, however,
that there was nothing spontaneous, unreflected or instinctive about the
declarations which AAA made to the barangay tanod and later that night
to the police. Her statements were in fact a re-telling of what she had
already confessed to her mother earlier that afternoon; this time however,
her story to the tanods and the police was in clear, conscious pursuit of a
newly formed resolve, exhorted by her mother, to see her father finally
exposed and put behind bars. AAA made her declarations to the
authorities precisely because she was seeking their help to punish the
accused-appellant. There was then nothing spontaneous about her so-
called res gestae narrations, even as it is remarkable to note that while
AAA was giving her said statements to the police, her father was already
being held in detention, and the investigation was conducted exactly to
determine if there was a basis to hold him for trial for rape.
Res gestae speaks of a quick continuum of related happenings, starting
with the occurrence of a startling event which triggered it and including
any spontaneous declaration made by a witness, participant or spectator
relative to the said occurrence. The cases this Court has cited invariably
reiterate that the statement must be an unreflected reaction of the
declarant, undesigned and free of deliberation. In other words, the
declarant is spontaneously moved merely to express his instinctive
reaction concerning the startling occurrence, and not to pursue a purpose
or design already formed in his mind. In People v. Sanchez,  the Court be
labored to explain that startling events "speak for themselves, giving out
their fullest meaning through the unprompted language of the
participants:"
Res gestae means the "things done." It "refers to those exclamations and
statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a
crime immediately before, during, or immediately after the commission of
the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements were
made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of
the occasion and there was no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate
and to fabricate a false statement." A spontaneous exclamation is defined
as "a statement or exclamation made immediately after some exciting
occasion by a participant or spectator and asserting the circumstances of
that occasion as it is observed by him. The admissibility of such
exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external
circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement
may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and
removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and
perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is
made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses,
rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief period when
consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to bear,’
the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as
to the facts just observed by him." In a manner of speaking, the
spontaneity of the declaration is such that the declaration itself may be
regarded as the event speaking through the declarant rather than the
declarant speaking for himself. Or, stated differently, "x x x the events
speak for themselves, giving out their fullest meaning through the
unprompted language of the participants. The spontaneous character of
the language is assumed to preclude the probability of its premeditation or
fabrication. Its utterance on the spur of the moment is regarded, with a
good deal of reason, as a guarantee of its truth. (Citations omitted)
The RTC and the CA held that the inculpatory statements of AAA to the
barangay tanod and the police are part of the res gestae occurrence of the
rape. This is error. It is obvious that AAA had by then undergone a serious
deliberation, prodded by her mother, whose own outrage as the betrayed
wife and grieving mother so emboldened AAA that she finally resolved to
emerge from her fear of her father. Here then lies the crux of the matter:
AAA had clearly ceased to act unthinkingly under the immediate influence
of her shocking rape by her father, and was now led by another powerful
compulsion, a new-found resolve to punish her father.
Hearsay evidence is accorded no probative value for the reason that the
original declarant was not placed under oath or affirmation, nor subjected
to cross-examination by the defense, except in a few instances as where
the statement is considered part of the res gestae.
This Court has a situation where the incriminatory statements allegedly
made by AAA were conveyed to the trial court not by AAA herself but by
PO3 Cobardo, BSF Estudillo and BSF Perlas. In particular, PO3 Cobardo
made a summation of what she claims was AAA’s narration of her ordeal,
along with her own observations of her demeanor during the investigation.
But unless the prosecution succeeded in invoking res gestae, their
testimonies must be dismissed as hearsay, since AAA’s statements were
not subjected to cross-examination consistent with the constitutional right
of the accused-appellant to confront the evidence against him.
Hearsay testimony is devoid of probative value, and unless it is part of res
gestae, the appealed decision runs contrary to the well-settled rule against
admitting hearsay evidence, aptly described as "evidence not of what the
witness knows himself but of what he has heard from others." The hearsay
rule puts in issue the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence,
since the statement testified to was not given under oath or solemn
affirmation, and more compellingly, the declarant was not subjected to
cross examination by the opposing party to test his perception, memory,
veracity and articulateness, on whose reliability the entire worth of the
out-of-court statement depends. It is an immemorial rule that a witness
can testify only as to his own personal perception or knowledge of the
actual facts or events. His testimony cannot be proof as to the truth of
what he learned or heard from others. But equally important, Section
14(2) of the Bill of Rights guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to
face x x x." By allowing the accused to test the perception, memory, and
veracity of the witness, the trial court is able to weigh the trustworthiness
and reliability of his testimony. There is no gainsaying that the right to
confront a witness applies with particular urgency in criminal
proceedings, for at stake is a man’s personal liberty, universally cherished
among all human rights.
In Patula v. People, the Court rendered a helpful disquisition on hearsay
evidence, why it must be rejected and treated as inadmissible, and how it
can be avoided:
To elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to
Section 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can
testify only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that
is, which are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise
provided in the Rules of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness isa
substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial evidence that
establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose
because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her
as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of
the extra judicial source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard
another person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the
witness derived the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and
under oath to be examined and cross-examined. The weight of such
testimony then depends not upon the veracity of the witness but upon the
veracity of the other person giving the information to the witness without
oath. The information cannot be tested because the declarant is not
standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore, be cross-examined.
It is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to
enter into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties,
to reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that
she was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent
author. Thus, the rule against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the
ground that there was no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The
testimony may have been given under oath and before a court of justice,
but if it is offered against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-
examine the witness, it is hearsay just the same.
Moreover, the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is
offered as evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the
assertor becomes the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can
be received as evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to
the test of cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is
offered, not as an assertion to prove the matter asserted but without
reference to the truth of the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not
apply. For example, in a slander case, if a prosecution witness testifies that
he heard the accused say that the complainant was a thief, this testimony
is admissible not to prove that the complainant was really a thief, but
merely to show that the accused uttered those words. This kind of
utterance is hearsay in character but is not legal hearsay. The distinction
is, therefore, between (a)the fact that the statement was made, to which
the hearsay rule does not apply, and (b)the truth of the facts asserted in
the statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only
rule that explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from
consideration. Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the
opposing party to cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a
direct knowledge of the transaction or occurrence. If hearsay is allowed,
the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not in court. It is
then to be stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s
witness, being the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies, is essential to the administration of justice.
To address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safeguarding a party’s right to
cross-examine her adversary’s witness, the Rules of Court offers two
solutions. The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial
trial or hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation.
Section 1, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution, viz.:
"Section 1. Examination to be done in open court.- The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or
the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally."
The second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the cross- SO ORDERED.
examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
ensures this solution thusly:

"Section 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent.—Upon the

termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined
by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or
connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the
reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."

Although the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional

precept relevant to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the
1987 Constitution, which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall x x x enjoy the right x x x to meet the witnesses face to
face x x x," the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party
equally applies to non-criminal proceedings.

We thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon
serious concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay
evidence due to its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and
due to its not being subjected to cross-examination by the opposing
counsel to test the perception, memory, veracity and articulateness of the
out-of-court declarant or actor upon whose reliability the worth of the out
of-court statement depends. (Citations omitted, emphasis ours and italics
in the original)
When inculpatory facts are susceptible of two or more interpretations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does
not fulfill or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction.
It is well-settled, to the point of being elementary, that when inculpatory
facts are susceptible to two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused, the evidence does not fulfill
or hurdle the test of moral certainty required for conviction. A forced
application of the res gestae exception below results if the Court says that
AAA’s incriminatory statements were spontaneous and thus part of a
startling occurrence. It produces an outright denial of the right of the
accused-appellant to be presumed innocent unless proven guilty, not to
mention that he was also denied his right to confront the complainant. As
the Court held in People v. Ganguso:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of
Rights guarantees. Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt, he
must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the
due process clause of the Constitution which protects the accused from
conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact
necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. The burden of
proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the
accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be
entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of
course, mean such degree of proof as excluding the possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that
degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The
conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged. (Citations omitted)
This Court’s views are not a condonation of the bestiality of the accused-
appellant but only indicate that there is reasonable doubt as to his guilt
entitling him to acquittal. As the Court stated in People v. Ladrillo:
Rape is a very emotional word, and the natural human reactions to it are
categorical: sympathy for the victim and admiration for her in publicly
seeking retribution for her outrageous misfortune, and condemnation of
the rapist. However, being interpreters of the law and dispensers of
justice, judges must look at a rape charge without those proclivities and
deal with it with extreme caution and circumspection. Judges must free
themselves of the natural tendency to be overprotective of every woman
decrying her having been sexually abused and demanding punishment for
the abuser. While they ought to be cognizant of the anguish and
humiliation the rape victim goes through as she demands justice, judges
should equally bear in mind that their responsibility is to render justice
based on the law. (Citation omitted)
It needs no elaboration that in criminal litigation, the evidence of the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength
from the weakness of the defense. "[T]he burden of proof rests on the
[S]tate. The accused, if he so chooses, need not present evidence. He
merely has to raise a reasonable doubt and whittle away from the case of
the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence demands no
less," even as it also demands no less than a moral certainty of his guilt.
Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz, et al., etc., vs. Ronald Paul S. Gracia, etc.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 177728               July 31, 2009
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor CHRISTIAN DELA
CRUZ "AQUINO," represented by JENIE SAN JUAN DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity as City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie San Juan
Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas
Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of Dominique’s parents
Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. 1 After almost two months, or on
November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with Dominique’s
parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child Christian Dela
Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo City.
Jenie applied for registration of the child’s birth, using Dominique’s
surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City,
in support of which she submitted the child’s Certificate of Live
Birth,2Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father 3 (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by
Dominique’s father Domingo Butch Aquino.4 Both affidavits attested, inter
alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been
questioned. Jenie attached to the AUSF a document entitled
"AUTOBIOGRAPHY" which Dominique, during his lifetime, wrote in his
own handwriting, the pertinent portions of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
I’M CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF
AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING OCTOBER 31, 2005. 5 I RESIDE AT
PULANG-LUPA STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM
THE YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER NAMED
JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY FATHER’S NAME IS
DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY MOTHER’S NAME IS RAQUEL
STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x x.
xxxx

WHEREFORE, accused-appellant Anecito Estibal y Calungsag is hereby
ACQUITTED. His immediate RELEASE from detention is hereby
ORDERED, unless he is being held for another lawful cause. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation, who is then directed to
report to this Court the action he has taken within five (5) days from
receipt hereof.
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE DELA CRUZ. WE MET
EACH OTHER IN OUR HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE
BECAME GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. ANDAS OF NOW SHE
IS PREGNANT AND FOR THATWE LIVE TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE
NOW. THAT’S ALL.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005, 7 the City Civil Registrar of Antipolo
City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenie’s application for
registration of the child’s name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 (Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9255  ["An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their Father, Amending for
the Purpose, Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as
the ‘Family Code of the Philippines’"]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of
Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the
registration is supported by the following documents:
a. AUSF8
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years old and over at the time of the
filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following documents showing clearly the
paternity between the father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his father because he
was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his
birth and has no more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the child
(either through the back of Municipal Form No. 102 - Affidavit of
Acknowledgment/Admission of Paternity - or the Authority to Use the
Surname of the Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint 9 for injunction/registration
of name against respondent before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-539, which was raffled to Branch 73
thereof. The complaint alleged that, inter alia, the denial of registration of
the child’s name is a violation of his right to use the surname of his
deceased father under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9255,10 which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under
the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the
surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register,
or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to
institute an action before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during
his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique
constitutes an admission of paternity in a "private handwritten
instrument" within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of
law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite service of
summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on the
circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and
affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had
acknowledged his yet unborn child. 11 She offered Dominique’s handwritten
Autobiography (Exhibit "A") as her documentary evidence-in-
chief.12 Dominique’s lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also testified,
corroborating Jenie’s declarations.13
By Decision14 of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the complaint
"for lack of cause of action" as the Autobiography was unsigned, citing
paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms) of Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules and Regulations
Governing the Implementation of R.A. 9255) which defines
"private handwritten document" through which a father may acknowledge
an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument - an instrument executed in the
handwriting of the father and duly signed by him where he expressly
recognizes paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT
OF THE DECEASED FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN
BE CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY  IN A "PRIVATE
HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT" WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION OF
ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255,
WHICH ENTITLES THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHER’S
SURNAME.15(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does
not expressly require that the private handwritten instrument containing
the putative father’s admission of paternity must be signed by him. They
add that the deceased’s handwritten Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, is sufficient, for the requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2
of the Administrative Order that the admission/recognition must be "duly
signed" by the father is void as it "unduly expanded" the earlier-quoted
provision of Article 176 of the Family Code. 16
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not finding that
Dominique’s handwritten Autobiography contains a "clear and
unmistakable" recognition of the child’s paternity. 17
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that
respondent’s position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in consonance with
the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the petition. It further submits
that Dominique’s Autobiography "merely acknowledged Jenie’s pregnancy
but not [his] paternity of the child she was carrying in her womb." 18
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255, permits an
illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the latter had
expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through the record of birth
appearing in the civil register, or through an admission made in a public
or private handwritten instrument. The recognition made in any of these
documents is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child’s paternity; hence, no separate action for judicial approval is
necessary.19
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed, explicitly
state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging the child’s
paternity must be signed by the putative father. This provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related provisions of the Family
Code which require that recognition by the father must bear his signature,
thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a written
instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied in Article
176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1, Series of
2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not "unduly expand" the
import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that
Dominique’s Autobiography, though unsigned by him, substantially
satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the child’s birth. Second,
the relevant matters in the Autobiography, unquestionably handwritten by
Dominique, correspond to the facts culled from the testimonial evidence
Jenie proffered.20 Third, Jenie’s testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit
of Acknowledgment of Dominique’s father Domingo Aquino and
testimony of his brother Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights
could be affected by the registration of the questioned recognition of the
child. These circumstances indicating Dominique’s paternity of the child
give life to his statements in his Autobiography that "JENIE DELA CRUZ"
is "MY WIFE" as "WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER" and "NOW
SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER."
In Herrera v. Alba,21 the Court summarized the laws, rules, and
jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in
the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant
sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a
person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another
person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the
two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The
word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage,
death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the
names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to adopt
the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of
the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten instrument wherein
an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed
by the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim
of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten
by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount
consideration" in resolving questions affecting him. 22 Article 3(1) of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which the
Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.23 (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus "(t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially of
illegitimate children x x x."24 Too, "(t)he State as parens patriae
affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development."25
In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of
dishonor. It is to petitioner minor child’s best interests to allow him to
bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in his birth
certificate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the surname of the late
Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner
minor Christian dela Cruz in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the
same in the Register of Births.
SO ORDERED.

SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. — The

reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and the like, may be
received as evidence of pedigree.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable
as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner often
cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of the New Civil Code,
voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. To
be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father . A
notarial agreement to support a child whose filiation is admitted by the
putative father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother
vowing to be a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father
cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live
birth, proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing. Standing alone,
neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to
establish filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted statements in
Dominique’s Autobiography have been made and written by him. Taken
together with the other relevant facts extant herein - that Dominique,
during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as common-law spouses
for several months in 2005 at his parents’ house in Pulang-lupa,
Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when Dominique died on
September 4, 2005; and about two months after his death, Jenie gave
birth to the child - they sufficiently establish that the child of Jenie is
Dominique’s.