Galo Abrenica vs. Manuel Gonda, et al.
inadmissible and illegal evidence which was rejected by the same court
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10100            August 15, 1916
GALO ABRENICA, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
MANUEL GONDA and MARCELO DE GARCIA, defendants-
appellees.
Marcelo Caringal for appellants.
Ramon Diokno for appellee.
ARAULLO, J.:
These proceedings were brought by the plaintiff to compel the defendant
to return to him the two parcels of land described in the complaint which
he alleges were sold by him under right of repurchase to the defendant on
February 21, 1916, for the sum of P75 and for the period of seven years.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant refused to deliver said property to
him when, upon the expiration of the period mentioned, he endeavored to
redeem the same and tendered payment to the defendant of the sum
aforesaid.
The first of the defendants, Manuel Gonda (who had already sold said
parcels to the other defendant Marcelino de Gracia, for which reason the
latter was also made a party defendant) alleged that about 19 years ago he
was the sole possessor and owner of said parcels, and in the course of the
trial endeavored to prove that they had been sold to him by the plaintiff
and his mother.
The issue presented by the pleadings, therefore, is whether said two
parcels of land were sold under right of repurchase by the plaintiff to the
defendant for the period of seven years, for the sum of P75, or whether
they were conveyed to the defendant in absolute sale by the plaintiff's
parents.
The justice of the peace of the provincial capital, who tried the case by
assignment of the judge of the Court of First Instance of the same
province, heard the evidence introduced by the parties and after making a
sufficiently clear summary of and duly considering the same, reached the
conclusion that the proofs introduced by the plaintiff were entitled to the
greater credit and, on the grounds that the plaintiff had not yet lost his
right to recover the lands from the defendant Gonda and that the sale
made by this defendant to the other defendant De Gracia, supposing it to
be genuine, could have no legal effect as Gonda was not the true owner of
the land, entered judgment in behalf of the plaintiff and against the two
defendants whereby he ordered each and both of them to return and
deliver to the plaintiff the parcels of land claimed by him, after payment to
Gonda of the sum of P75 that had been deposited with the clerk of the
court, and assessed the costs against the defendants in equal shares. The
court made no finding in regard to the damages demanded by the plaintiff
as there was no evidence to show that any had been caused. The
defendants moved for a new trial. Their motion having been overruled,
they excepted to the ruling and, by proper bill of exceptions, appealed to
the Supreme Court. In this instance the appellants allege in the first place
that the trial judge erred in holding that he had jurisdiction to try the case,
and in trying the same in spite of the fact that the Act which authorizes
justices of the peace to try by assignment cases filed with the Court of First
Instance is unconstitutional.
Before the hearing in first instance, counsel for the defendant did in fact
challenge the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace of the provincial
capital to try the case at bar, on the ground that Act No. 2041 of the
Philippine Legislature is unconstitutional. In deciding this question, said
justice of the peace held that he did have jurisdiction and immediately
proceeded to enter judgment in the manner aforestated.
This Supreme Court has held on various occasions, among them in the
decision rendered on December 24, 1914, in the case of Calampiano vs.
Tolentino (29 Phil. Rep., 116) that said Act No. 2041 is valid and does not
conflict with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; that a
justice of the peace, acting under the designation under the law just
referred to, acts not as a justice of the peace or holds a justice's court, but
acts as a judge of the zone of first instance and holds, in effect, a Court of
First Instance; and finally, that for this reason the objection that this case
falls within that of Barrameda vs. Moir, 25 Phil. Rep., 44 (which is the
one cited by the appellants in their brief to show that the error
aforementioned was incurred), is not well taken. This assignment of error
cannot, therefore, be sustained.
The second error assigned by the appellants to the judgment of the trial
court consists, as they maintain, in that the court founded its judgment on
during the course of the trial.
In effect, the plaintiff ought to have proven that on February 21, 1906, he
sold, under right of repurchase for the period of seven years, the two
parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, or, what amounts to the same
thing, that a contract of sale with right of repurchase (or one of pledge or
mortgage, as it was improperly called in the complaint and so termed by
the plaintiff) was entered into between this latter and the defendant, on
the date aforementioned, in respect to said parcels of land.
The plaintiff, testifying at the trial in regard to the existence of the
contract, stated that it was a verbal one between himself and said
defendant. Assuredly such a contract could not be proven a trial, except by
means of some written instrument in accordance with the provisions of
subsections 1 and 5, section 335, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
plaintiff, however, having been placed on the stand as a witness by his on
attorney, testified at length and answered all the questions asked him with
respect to the said contract, the details of the same, the persons who
witnessed it, the place where it was made, and various other
circumstances connected with its execution. These questions and answers
cover six pages of the record, and yet the defendants' counsel raised no
objection to the examination, aside from challenging one of the questions
as leading and another of them as irrelevant. It seems that only when the
examination was terminated did counsel for defendants move to strike out
all of the testimony given and statements made by plaintiff in regard to the
contract, on the ground that the period for the fulfillment of the contract
exceeded one year and that it could not be proven except by means of a
written instrument. The court sustained this motion, to which an
exception was entered by the plaintiff.
Defendants' counsel moved that the case be dismissed on the ground that,
as the aforementioned testimony was stricken out, there was no proof of
the contract. This motion being denied by the court, counsel excepted to
the ruling and on cross-examination put several question to the plaintiff
relative to the plaintiff's ownership in said parcels of land and the manner
in which he acquired it. Among these questions some were asked which
bore upon the answers given by the plaintiff on direct examination
regarding the existence of the contract by which, according to the plaintiff,
the defendant Gonda came to hold said parcels. These questions on cross-
examination and their respective answers are as follows:
CARINGAL: (To the plaintiff). Prior to the day on which the
defendant Manuel Gonda went to see you or to visit you in the
house of Domingo Tamayo, you had not spoken to him with
regard to the pledge of some land of yours, had you? —
A.       No, sir.
Q.       Did you then take advantage of that circumstance of his
having gone to visit you? —
A.       Yes, sir.
Q.       You knew then that he was married, did you not? —
A.       Yes, sir.
Q.       Did you not think of necessary to speak to Manuel Gonda's
wife about the mortgage? —
A.       No, sir, because I considered him as an uncle of mine.
xxx           xxx           xxx
CARINGAL: So that you knew, did you, that it was Manuel
Gonda who paid the land tax? —
A.       Yes, sir.
Q.       Who paid the land tax before the lands were pledged? —
A.       I could not declare them before they were pledged. I have
not yet paid the land tax, because I have not been able to declare
those lands.
xxx           xxx           xxx
Q.       Tell us where Manuel Gonda was living on the date when,
as you said, the pledge was made. —
A.       In the barrio of Moson.
Q.       Of Taal or Bauan? —
A.       Bauan.
Q.       What is the distance between the then domicile or
residence of Manuel Gonda and the house of Domingo Tamayo
in which you were living? —
A.       I think it is the same as between Bauan and Taal.
Q.       And notwithstanding that distance, Manuel Gonda went
purposely to take the money to you? —
A.       He took the money to the house of Domingo Tamayo.
Q.       Was there no written contract of that mortgage? —
A.       No, sir.
That is all.
Continuing to present evidence, the plaintiff put three witnesses on the
stand and they were examined.
One of them, Juan Carandang, testified in regard to the plaintiff's
ownership and possession of the lands. The court sustained a motion by
defendants' counsel to strike out one of the statements made by this
witness in which he stated that he knew by hearsay that said lands had
been "pledged" (sic).
Another of these witnesses, Domingo Tamayo, testified that he was
present at the time the plaintiff asked the defendant for the P75
mentioned in the complaint, and when the agreement was made with
regard thereto between the two men in connection with the so-called
pledge of the lands in question. He also testified that he received that sum
from the defendant, at the plaintiff's suggestion.
And, finally, the third witness, Pedro Mendoza, also the plaintiff's, testified
that he was present when the money was tendered by the defendant to the
plaintiff, and heard the latter tell the witness Domingo Tamayo to receive
it. He stated that Tamayo did in fact take the money.
In the course of the examination of these witnesses, the defendants'
counsel moved that their testimony be stricken out. The court sustained
one of these motions, while as to the rest of them be said that counsel's
motion would be taken under consideration; later, when one of these
witnesses, replying to a question by the court, stated that the contract was
not executed in writing, the court said that the motion was sustained, but,
notwithstanding this ruling, and immediately after it had been made, the
defendants' counsel put the following question to this witness on cross-
examination:
Q.       Do you remember positively that it was on a Sunday the
first time, and on a Tuesday or a Wednesday the second time,
that Manuel Gonda went to your house and delivered the
money? —
A.       Yes, sir.
The court finally granted the motion of counsel for defendants for strike
out the testimony given by this witness. Counsel for plaintiff excepted to
this ruling.
Now then, it has been repeatedly laid down as a rule of evidence that a
protest or objection against the admission of any evidence must be made
at the proper time, and that if not so made it will be understood to have
been waived. The proper time to make a protest or objection is when, from
the question addressed to the witness, or from the answer thereto, or from
the presentation of the proof, the inadmissiblity of the evidence is, or may
be, inferred.
A motion to strike out parol or documentary evidence from the record is
useless and ineffective if made without timely protest, objection, or
opposition on the part of the party against whom it was presented.
Objection to the introduction of evidence should be made before
the question is answered. When no such objection is made, a
motion to strike out the answer ordinarily comes too late. (De
Dios Chua Soco vs. Veloso, 2 Phil. Rep., 658).
In the case of Conlu vs. Araneta and Guanko (15 Phil. Rep., 387) in which
one of the points discussed was the inadmissibility of parol evidence to
prove contracts involving real property, in accordance with the provisions
of section 335 of the Code of Civil Procedure, no objection having been
made to such evidence, this court said:
A failure to except to the evidence because it does not conform
with the statute, is a waiver of the provisions of the law.
An objection to a question put to a witness must be made at the
time question is asked. (Kreigh vs. Sherman, 105 Ill., 49; 46 Am.
Dig., Century Ed., 932.)
Objections to evidence and the reason therefor must be stated in apt
time." (Kidder vs. McIlhenny, 81 N. C., 123; 46 Am. Dig., Century Ed.,
933.)
It is held in general that by failing to object to the proof of an
oral contract a party waives the benefit of the statute and cannot
afterward claim it. (20 Cyc., 320, where several decisions on the
subject are cited.)
Many rulings have been made in regard to this matter by the courts of the
United States, and among them we cite a few found in volume 46 of the
American Digest, page 933:
Where plaintiff without objection proved by parol evidence that
certain land belonged to him, defendant cannot afterwards
object that the deed should have been produced. (Clay vs. Boyer,
10 Ill. [5 Gilman], 506.)
After a question has been repeatedly asked and answered
without objection, it is too late to object to its repetition on the
ground that the answer is in itself inadmissible. (McKee vs.
Nelson, 4 Cow., 355; 15 Am. Dec., 384.)
An objection to the admission of evidence on the ground of
incompetency, taken after the testimony has been given, is too
late. (In re Morgan, 104 N. Y., 74; 9 N. E., 861.)
Plaintiff having testified to conversation between defendant's
son and himself until the direct examination extended through
about 12 folios, defendant could not sit by and then objet to the
"foregoing testimony." (Boehme vs. Michael, 5 N. Y. St. Rep.,
492.)
The first witness to testify at the trial was the plaintiff himself. From the
first question put to him, it clearly appeared, as may be seen in folios 5, 6,
and 7 of the stenographic notes, that the contract of pledge or mortgage of
the lands, as the plaintiff himself improperly calls it, or the sale of said
lands with right of repurchase, between him and the defendant Gonda,
was a verbal one and for the period of seven years, made in the course of a
conversation between the plaintiff and said defendant in the house of
Domingo Tamayo. The defendants' counsel, however, did not endeavor
immediately to obtain from the witness a statement as to whether that
contract was set forth in any instrument; he did not object to the witness'
continuing to testify in regard to the contract, nor did he in any way object
to the questions they continued to ask the witness concerning the matter,
though he did object to one question as leading and to another one as
irrelevant, thus indicating that he had no other objection to make to those
questions. Only after witness, the plaintiff, had finished answering all the
questions put to him on the subject of the contract, did counsel for the
defendants move that all of his testimony and statements be stricken out.
It is obvious that the court should not have granted that motion; but we
must also bear in mind that the court did not grant other similar and
subsequent motions made during the examination of the other witnesses;
he merely said that he would take them under advisement. The fact that
the defendants' counsel asked various cross-questions, both of the plaintiff
and of the other witness, in connection with the answers given by them in
their direct examination, with respect to particulars concerning the
contract, implies a waiver on his part to have the evidence stricken out.
It is true that, before cross-examining the plaintiff and one of the
witnesses, this same counsel requested the permission of the court, and
stipulated that his clients' rights should not be prejudiced by the answers
to those witnesses in view of the motion presented to strike out their
testimony; buy this stipulation of the defendants' counsel has no value or
importance whatever, because, if the answers of those witnesses were
stricken out, the cross-examination could have no object whatsoever, and
if the questions were put to the witnesses and answered by them, they
could only be taken into account by connecting them with the answers
given by those witnesses on direct examination.
As no timely objection or protest was made to the admission of the
testimony of the plaintiff with respect to the contract; and as the motion to
strike out said evidence came to late; and, furthermore, as the defendants
themselves, by the cross-questions put by their counsel for the witnesses
in respect to said contract, tacitly waived their right to have it stricken out,
that evidence, therefore, cannot be considered either inadmissible or
illegal, and court, far from having erred in taking it into consideration and
basing his judgment thereon, notwithstanding the fact that it was ordered
to be stricken out during the trial, merely corrected the error he
committed in ordering it to be so stricken out and complied with the rules
of procedure hereinbefore cited.
The lower court was guided by the evidence in making that finding, for it
was proved that the plaintiff sold to the defendant Gonda for the period of
seven years, with right of repurchase, the two aforementioned parcels of
land, on February 21, 1906, for the sum of P75, Philippine currency. The
testimony of the plaintiff himself and of the witnesses Juan Carandang,
Domingo Tamayo, and Pedro Mendoza, of which mentioned is made in
the judgment, proves those facts. As against this testimony, the defendants
presented that of one of themselves, Manuel Gonda, who stated that said
two parcels of land were sold to him outright by the plaintiff Galo Abrenica
and his mother, Mamerta Bonio, more than 19 years ago, for the sum of
P75; but this allegation was in no matter proven, for, having stated that an
instrument of sale was executed but that it had been lost, he furnished
absolutely no proof of the existence of the instrument, nor of any such sale
having been made between himself and the plaintiff. This defendant did,
indeed, exhibit a copy of the affidavit filed by him on May 26, 1906, in the
municipality of Taal, for the purpose of the assessment of a piece of land
which he says included the two parcels in question; but the plaintiff has
explained why the tax declaration of said parcels was not made by him,
but by the defendant Gonda. It is easily understood that the latter might
have made this declaration on May 26, 1906, that is, three months after
the land had been sold to him by the plaintiff under right of repurchase,
inasmuch as said defendant had been the owner of said parcels since the
month of February of the same year and, by reason of said sale, was to be
their owner for seven years, so long as the plaintiff did not make use of his
right to redeem them. On the other hand, the very fact that the defendant
Gonda did not declare these parcels of land before May 26, 1906, is proof
that he did not purchase them outright from the plaintiff and the latter's
mother 19 years ago.
As the plaintiff made use of his right to recover the property within the
period stipulated by the contract and which did not exceed ten years, and
as he deposited with the clerk of the court the sum of P75, the price of the
purchase, in due time, the defendant is not entitled to oppose the recovery,
and the said parcels of land must be delivered to the plaintiff, even though
they be in the possession of the other defendant, Marcelino de Garcia, to
whom they were sold by his codefendant Gonda, for the latter could not
sell them to De Gracia except under the condition that they could be
repurchased by the plaintiff within the said period of seven years. Even
still less right could the defendant De Gracia have to retain possession of
these lands, if the contract executed between the plaintiff and Manuel
Gonda had been one of mortgage (as it was styled all along by the plaintiff
and the defendants at the trial and by the lower court himself in the
judgment appealed from) for, as the defendant Gonda was not the owner
of the lands, he could not lawfully convey them to his codefendant.

There being no proof that any damages was caused to the plaintiff by the People of the Philippines vs. Jose Perez Y Dalegdeg
defendants' refusal to return said parcels of land to him, no finding should
be made against the defendants with respect thereto. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
We therefore affirm the judgment appealed from, with the costs of this Manila
instance against the appellants. So ordered.
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 182924             December 24, 2008

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 

vs.
JOSE PEREZ @ DALEGDEG, accused-appellant.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
02235 dated 26 November 2007 which affirmed with modifications the
decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan and Puerto
Princesa City, Branch 50, in Criminal Case No. 15685, finding appellant
Jose Perez @ Dalegdeg guilty of statutory rape committed against
AAA.3The Court of Appeals reduced the death penalty imposed by the trial
court to reclusion perpetua, and, in addition to the grant of civil
indemnity and moral damages, awarded exemplary damages.

On 18 January 2000, an information was filed before the RTC of Palawan

and Puerto Princesa City charging appellant with statutory rape. The
accusatory portion thereof reads:

That on or about the 19th day of September, 1999 at around 9:00

o’clock in the evening, at Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused with lewd design and by
the use of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one,
AAA, a minor of six (6) years old, against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.4

A warrant of arrest was issued against appellant who was arrested and
detained, with no bail recommended, at the Provincial Jail of Puerto
Princesa City.5

When arraigned on 5 June 2000, appellant, with the assistance of

counsel de oficio, pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.6

During the pre-trial conference held on 6 September 2000, appellant tried

to plea bargain by manifesting that he was willing to enter a plea of guilty
to the lesser offense of Acts of Lasciviousness to which the public
prosecutor, upon conferring with the offended party, refused to consent.
At said pre-trial conference, appellant likewise admitted the following: (1)
that the victim was a six (6)-year-old minor; (2) that the victim was
from Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX; and (3) that on September 19,
1999, accused Jose Perez was in Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX.7

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: BBB, 8 the victim’s

mother; the victim AAA;9 CCC,10 the victim’s father; Dr. Jerry
Gundayao,11 Municipal Health Officer, Rural Health Clinic of XXX,
Palawan; and psychologist Shiela Chan. 12 Their collective testimonies
reveal:

On September 19, 1999, at around 8:00 p.m., CCC, together with his
children DDD, EEE and six-year-old AAA, 13 was at the house of Florencio
Bumanlag at Barangay XXX, Municipality of XXX, Palawan, watching a
movie. At said place, CCC and his two boys, DDD and EEE, were seated in
the middle row while AAA was at the front part of the movie house. When
the movie ended at around 9:00 p.m., CCC, along with DDD and EEE,
went out of the movie house. Noticing that AAA was not with them, CCC
instructed his eldest son, DDD, to go back inside and fetch her. As DDD
went back, he chanced upon AAA already going out. While DDD and AAA
were on their way out of the movie house, CCC noticed AAA crying. He
asked AAA what happened, and she told him that appellant hit her on her
right eye with a stone and punched her on the abdomen. They proceeded
home.

Upon arriving at their house at around 10:00 p.m., BBB, AAA’s mother
who was taking care of her infant child, immediately noticed AAA crying.
After learning from her husband what happened to their daughter, BBB
examined AAA’s injuries and also noticed that AAA’s private part was
bleeding. She simply cleaned up AAA and changed her clothes. Thereafter,
she asked AAA why her vagina was bleeding, AAA did not answer and
began trembling. She told her daughter to sleep and rest.
At around 3:00 a.m. of the next day, AAA woke up and told BBB that she
wanted to urinate. BBB told AAA to just continue sleeping since the
wounds in her vagina were still fresh. AAA started crying claiming that her
vagina was not wounded. After she stopped crying, AAA revealed to BBB
what really happened to her. AAA told her that appellant struck her eye
with a stone and then punched her stomach. Appellant then brought her at
the back of the house of one Oring Ragote where appellant inserted his
finger into her vagina followed by his sex organ. 14 While appellant was
inserting his organ into AAA’s vagina, she lost consciousness because of
the pain.
That same morning, after hearing what befell their daughter, BBB
accompanied AAA to the Barangay Office at XXX, XXX, Palawan and
reported the matter to the Barangay Captain. She was instructed to have
AAA medically examined. Heeding the advice, AAA, this time
accompanied by CCC, proceeded to the Health Center
in BarangayPoblacion, XXX, Palawan where he requested AAA to be
examined.15 Dr. Gundayao conducted the examination and found that AAA
had a hematoma and abrasion in the right eye, and contusion on her right
dorsal thigh and lower back; her vulva also had contusions and swelling;
the labia majora had swelling and hematoma and she had fresh hymenal
lacerations at 6:00 and 9:00 o’clock positions. 16 Based on his findings, he
concluded that AAA had indeed been sexually abused.
After the examination, AAA and CCC proceeded to the XXX Police Station
where they executed their affidavits and filed charges against appellant. 17
A year after the incident, AAA was brought to a psychologist to be
examined. Sheila Chan diagnosed AAA to be suffering from Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder. Per Psychological Report dated 3 October
2000, AAA was assessed to have "moderate difficulty in social
relationships and symptoms of trauma are expressed through nightmares,
dissociation, and conflict with parents and siblings." 18
On 28 May 2001, the prosecution formally offered 19 its documentary
evidence consisting of Exhibits A to F, with sub-markings, to which the
defense filed its comment. 20 The trial court admitted all the exhibits on 27
June 2001.
For the defense, appellant and his father, Leonardo Perez, took the stand.
Jose Perez testified that he lives in Barangay Malaud in the small island
of Buenavista, in Coron, Palawan. To go to Baragay XXX, where his
relatives lived and where he delivered fish, he sometimes rode his
brother’s pump boat. On September 19, 1999, he went to Barangay XXX
to attend the birthday celebration of his friend, but which he was not able
to. He returned to Baragay Malaud at about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon
upon the prodding of his brother who was in a hurry to set out to sea and
fish.
Appellant denied raping AAA, claiming that he was at home with his
parents when the alleged rape was committed. He disclosed that he knew
how to operate a pump boat and that he used his brother’s pump boat in
going to and from Barangays Malaud and XXX. He said he had no
knowledge of any reason or motive why AAA charged him with rape.
Leonardo Perez testified that on September 19, 1999, he, together with his
wife and son, the appellant, watched a movie at the house of Florencio
Bumanlag. He saw CCC and his children watching the film. Just before the
show started, he saw CCC and his daughter, AAA, go out of the movie
house. Later, he noticed that his son Jose Perez was carrying AAA and
handed her over to CCC. He claimed that no untoward incident happened
to AAA or to any of the people at the film showing.
In its decision dated 2 September 2005, the trial court convicted appellant
of statutory rape and imposed on him the capital punishment. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused JOSE
PEREZ ALIAS DALEGDIG is hereby sentenced to suffer the
extreme penalty of DEATH. He is also ordered to pay the victim
AAA the sum of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto which
is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape;
and P75,000.00 as moral damages, even without need of proof
since it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries.
Further, accused is ordered to pay the cost of suit. 21
The trial court was convinced that AAA was raped by appellant on that
fateful night of 19 September 1999. It accorded credence to the testimony
of the victim who, at seven years old, testified in a straightforward and
credible manner. She positively identified appellant as the one who
committed the dastardly act to her. It found that it was inconceivable for
the victim, who was six years old when the sexual assault was perpetrated,
to fabricate the charge of defloration and undergo the medical
examination of her private parts, subject herself to public trial and tarnish
her family’s honor and reputation, unless she was motivated by a potent
desire to seek justice for the wrong committed against her. The victim’s
testimony was further supported by the findings of the Dr. Jerry
Gundayao who, upon genital examination, found lacerations in her hymen
at the 6:00 o’clock and the 4:00 o’clock positions. Consistent with his
findings, Dr. Gundayao concluded that AAA had lost her virginity. In
addition, the trial court agreed with the findings of psychologist Shiela
Chan that the victim’s behavior after the incident was compatible with the
behavior of a child subjected to abuse.
The trial court brushed aside appellant’s defenses of denial and alibi. It
said that the defenses of appellant had conflicting versions. Appellant’s
claim that he was not at the crime scene at the time when the rape was
committed was contradicted by his own father, who said that he was there
and saw him handing AAA over to her father CCC. The trial court added
that since the crime scene, according to appellant, was only an hour away
by boat, and that appellant had access to a pump boat which he knew how
to operate, it was not impossible for him to be at the locus criminis during
the time in question. Inherently weak, appellant’s denial must similarly
fail in light of his identification by AAA.
The death penalty having been imposed, the trial court forwarded the
records of the case to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to
Section 10, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. However,
pursuant to Our ruling in People v. Mateo,22 the case was transferred to
the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 23
On 26 November 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s
conviction but modified the decision of the trial court by reducing the
penalty imposed from capital punishment to reclusion perpetua, and by
awarding exemplary damages. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED SEPTEMBER 2, 2005 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. The death penalty imposed is reduced to RECLUSION
PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act 9346 without eligibility for
parole under the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
2. The accused is ORDERED to pay AAA the amount of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to the civil
indemnity of P75,000.00 and moral damages of P75,000.00
already imposed.
Costs of suit to be paid by the accused. 24
On 4 January 2008, appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. 25 With the Notice
of Appeal having been timely filed, the Court of Appeals gave due course
thereto and directed the elevation of the records of the case to this Court
for automatic review.26 Thereafter, in our resolution dated 21 July 2008,
we noted the elevation of the records, accepted the appeal and notified the
parties that they may file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desired, within thirty (30) days from notice. 27 The parties opted not to file
a supplemental brief on the ground they had fully argued their positions in
their respective briefs.28
Appellant makes a lone assignment of error:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF RAPE DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
In trying to exonerate himself, appellant advances the following
arguments, to wit: (1) the truth cannot be determined from the testimony
of AAA because the same was made up and coached. The prosecutor was
practically suggesting to AAA how the latter should answer. Although
leading questions may be asked on direct examination, especially when the
witness is a child, the prosecutor should not put words in the mouth of the
witness because a young child is open to ideas which, if persistently
rammed into her mind, will appear real to her; (2) no eyewitnesses were
presented to pinpoint the appellant as the perpetrator of the crime; (3)
nobody in the movie house noticed anything untoward happen to AAA or
hear AAA cry or make any sound to show that she was being molested or
attacked; (4) the public health officer did not say that the fresh hymenal
injuries on AAA were compatible with rape; and (5) no seminal fluids were
found in AAA’s vaginal area.
To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the
courts are guided by three well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to
disprove; (2) considering that in the nature of things, only two persons are
usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the
prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to
draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. 29
After examining the testimony of the AAA, we find that it was neither A:     Yes ma’am.
made up nor coached. The questions propounded to AAA were leading. A Q:     Did you cry?
question that suggests to the witness the answer, which the examining A:     Yes ma’am.
party wants, is a leading question. As a rule, leading questions are not Q:     Did you tell to your father what happened to you?
allowed. However, the rules provide for exceptions when the witness is a A:     Yes ma’am.
child of tender years, as it is usually difficult for such child to state facts Q:     Did you tell your mother?
without prompting or suggestion. Leading questions are necessary to coax A:     Yes ma’am.
the truth out of their reluctant lips.30 COURT: (to Atty. Anda)
You asked her why she cried?
Section 10, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides: ATTY. ANDA
Yes Your Honor.
Q:     Why did you cry?
SEC. 10. Leading and misleading questions. - A question
A:     Because it was painful ma’am.33
which suggests to the witness the answer which the examining
AAA’s testimony on cross-examination clearly shows that she was not
party desires is a leading question. It is not allowed, except:
coached. After a thorough and extensive examination by counsel for the
accused, AAA never wavered in pointing to appellant as her ravisher.
xxxx
Q:     Madam witness, do you know Dalegdeg?
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and A:     Yes sir.
intelligible answers from a witness who is ignorant, Q:     Why do you know this Dalegdeg?
or a child of tender years, or is of feeble mind, or a deaf A:     Because we stayed in one place.
mute. Q:     For how long have you known this Dalegdeg, madam
witness?
In the case at bar, the trial court was thus justified in allowing leading A:     I’ve (sic) known him for a long time sir.
questions to AAA, as she was merely seven years old when and was not yet Q:     Do you know madam witness, what Dalegdeg have done to
going to school when she testified. As further explained in People v. you?
Daganio31: A:     Yes sir.
Q:     What was that?
The trend in procedural law is to give wide latitude to the courts A:     He hit me (pokpok).
in exercising control over the questioning of a child witness. The Q:     Why you was (sic) hit by Dalegdeg?
reasons are spelled out in our Rule on Examination of a Child xxxx
Witness, which took effect on December 15, 2000, namely, (1) to ATTY. ANIGAN: (to witness) When you were hit by Dalegdeg,
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) to ensure that what are you doing at that time?
questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental A:     None sir.
level of the child, (3) to protect children from harassment or Q:     Do you remember the time when you were hit by Dalegdeg?
undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time. Leading A:     Yes sir.
questions in all stages of examination of a child are allowed if the Q:     At what time?
same will further the interests of justice. A:     At night time sir.
Q:     Was the place dark or was lighted?
A:     It was dark.
We agree with the Court of Appeals when it said:
Q:     Were you able to see Dalegdeg’s face?
A:     Yes sir.
[T]he accused’s contention, that AAA was a coached witness, was Q:     Why did you know that it was Dalegdeg who hit you?
entirely baseless. A:     Yes sir, I know him.
xxxx
The leading questions made to AAA did not take the form of Q:     Why did she know Jose Perez alias Dalegdeg at that time?
coaching a child witness, because even the accused himself was A:     Because I recognized him ma’am.
unaware of any reason why AAA should accuse him of rape if it Q:     How were you able to recognized (sic) Dalegdeg?
was false. The testimony of a rape victim is credible where she A:     Because I can identify him.
has no ill motive to testify against the accused. The failure of the ATTY. ANIGAN: (to witness) In what way or manner madam
accused to offer any explanation as to why the complainant witness were you able to identify him?
implicated him in a very serious accusation indicated that no ATTY. ANDA: (to court) She already answered a while ago that
improper motive had impelled her to charge him thus. Dalegdeg stayed in their area and live there.
ATTY. ANIGAN: (to witness) My question is how was she able to
There was also no basis in his suggestion that the answers given identify him in what way?
by AAA had been merely suggested to her, or that the idea of A:     I was able to identify him because he also stayed in the
rape had been rammed into her head, or that words were simply same place where we reside.
placed in the mouth of AAA. For, how could a child so young and xxxx
so ignorant of worldly ways be expected to consistently point to Q:     Can you demonstrate to us madam witness how Dalegdeg
the accused as her defiler and to narrate the incidents of the rape sexually abused you?
in an unaffected manner unless she had really gone through the A:     I was carried by Dalegdeg in his arms.
harrowing experience. It was doubtful that she would even Q:     You were walked by Dalegdeg?
remember the supposed coaching or that she could memorize A:     Yes sir.
the coached answers considering her inability to recall even her Q:     After you suddenly walked by Dalegdeg, what did Dalegdeg
own age.32 do to you?
A:     He hit my eyes.
We quote the testimony of AAA on direct examination: Q:     Did you resist madam witness when you were struggled by
Dalegdeg?
A:     Yes sir.
ATTY. ANDA: (to witness) AAA, do you know Jose Perez alias Q:     Why did you gave (sic) your consent, when you were carried
Dalegdeg? by Dalegdeg?
A:     Yes, ma’am. A:     I was afraid to (sic) him.
Q:     Can you point him to us now? Q:     Why, are you alone outside your house at the time of the
COURT: (to Interpreter) Witness pointing to the person wearing incident?
a white T-shirt, a person pointed to stood up, gave his name as A:     Yes sir, I was alone outside the house because my
Jose Perez alias Dalegdeg., companion is watching the movie.
ATTY. ANDA: Did Jose Perez alias Dalegdeg hit your right eye Q:     Why are you outside in your house at that time?
with the piece of stone? A:     We are watching movie.
A:     Yes ma’am. Q:     You are watching movie, in the movie house?
Q:     And did he also punch your stomach? A:     Yes sir.
A:     Yes ma’am. Q:     How far this movie house from you house?
Q:     And thereafter did he insert his finger into your sex organ? A:     It’s near.
A:     Yes ma’am. Q:     Did you reach it by walking?
Q:     And that later, did he insert his sex organ into your vagina? A:     Yes sir.
A:     Yes ma’am. Q:     When you go to the movie house, madam witness, are you
Q:     And did it hurt you? alone?
A:     Yes ma’am. A:     My companion is my father.
Q:     Because of what by (sic) Jose Perez alias Dalegdeg did to Q:     So, you are watching movie together with your father?
you, what happened to you? A:     Yes sir.
A:     I was painted (sic) (Nalipong). Q:     When you got by Dalegdeg where is your father?
COURT: Quote in quote (Nalipong). A:     He was at the movie house sir.
Q:     Did you bleed after that? Q:     Why did Dalegdeg able to get you?
 A:     Because my father was not with me when Dalegdeg took
me.
Q:     You were outside the movie house?
A:     Yes sir.
Q:     How about your father he was watching the movie while
Dalegdeg get you?
A:     Yes sir.
Q:     After you were sexually abused what did you do madam
witness?
A:     I fell (sic) the pain sir.
Q:     When did your father know this incident madam witness?
A:     Yes sir.
Q:     When?
A:     My father came to know, when he went out in the movie
house already.
Q:     Are you sure madam witness that it is Jose Perez alias
Dalegdeg who sexually abused you?
A:     Yes sir.34
Both lower courts gave full faith and credence to the testimony of AAA.
They found the same sufficient to convict appellant of the crime charged.
There being overwhelming evidence showing that on 19 September 1999
appellant had carnal knowledge of private complainant by means of force
and intimidation, we find no compelling reason to deviate from the
findings of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. When it
comes to credibility, the trial court’s assessment deserves great weight,
and is even conclusive and binding, if not tainted with arbitrariness or
oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason
is obvious. Having the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’
deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better position
than the appellate court to evaluate testimonial evidence properly. 35 In the
case at bar, even though the testimony of AAA was not flawless in all the
particulars, it bore the earmarks of truth.
This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who
are young and immature deserve full credence, considering that no young
woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subject to a public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire
to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. 36 Youth and
immaturity are generally badges of truth. 37 It is highly improbable that a
girl of tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is not
true.38
In this case, considering that the victim was of tender age, who has
undergone a traumatic experience and exposed herself to the rigors of
public trial, we find it very unlikely that she would impute so grave a crime
to appellant.
Appellant contends that AAA’s testimony is not sufficient to convict him
because the prosecution did not present eyewitnesses to pinpoint him as
the culprit, and nobody in the movie house noticed anything untoward
happen to AAA or hear AAA cry or make any sound to show that she was
being molested or attacked.
We find such argument untenable. Settled of course is the rule that in the
determination of the value and credibility of evidence, witnesses are to be
weighed, not numbered. Accordingly, the testimony of a single witness
may be sufficient to produce a conviction, if the same appears to be
trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would be
sufficient to convict the accused. 39 It is of judicial notice that the crime of
rape is usually committed in a private place where only the aggressor and
the rape victim are present. 40 The testimony of the hapless victim alone is
sufficient to convict her offender. No law or rule requires the
corroboration of the testimony of a single witness in a rape case. 41
In the case at bar, AAA positively identified appellant as the person who
sexually assaulted her. As explained above, we find AAA to be a credible
witness. As such, her sole testimony is sufficient to convict. Moreover, no
other person in the movie house witnessed the dastardly act, because the
same was committed not in the said place but in another place beyond the
prying eyes of would-be witnesses. As testified to by BBB, her daughter,
AAA told her that she was brought by appellant to the rear of the house of
one Oring Ragote where she was violated.
Appellant’s argument -- that there could not have been any rape because
the public health officer who examined AAA did not say that the hymenal
injuries on AAA were compatible with rape, and that there was no seminal
fluid found in AAA’s vaginal area -- does not persuade.
The injuries sustained by AAA are indicated in the document issued by Dr.
Jerry R. Gundayao entitled Living Case No. 92099-01.
General and Physical Findings:
xxxx
Contusion hematoma (R) lower eye with linear
abrasion, (R) nasal
Bridge.
Contussion (sic) right (R) lower back
Contussion (sic) right (R) dorsal thigh
xxxx
Genital Examination:
Vulva with contusion noted
Absence of pubic hair, contusion Labia Majora with
hematoma
U-shaped posterior fourchette
Hymenal laceration, deep, fresh, at 6:00 o’clock
position and shallow, fresh hymenal laceration at 4:00
o’clock position corresponding to the face of a watch,
vaginal canal admits
Remarks:
1) With evident sign of extragenital physical injuries
noted on the body of the subject at the time of
examination.
2) Fresh deep and shallow hymenal laceration present
Conclusion: Subject is of non-virgin state 42
Explaining his findings and conclusion on the medical examination he
conducted on AAA, Dr. Gundayao testified as follows:
COURT: Aside from your external findings did you make any
internal findings?
A:     Well in addition to that external findings Your Honor, there
is also a contusion at the right lower back, here, if you don’t
mind Your Honor I’ll show it.
COURT: Witness stood up pointing to the portion of his body
referring to the middle spinal co[l]umn.
A:     I ask the victim, what happened to that: Basta mayroong
sumuntok daw sa kanya rito, because during the time I saw that
patient talagang swelling dahil sa kanyang edad, naisip ko baka
bumagsak siya pero nakapagtataka bakit swelling and then on
my genital examination although the child has absence of pubic
hair, the vulva has contusion meaning namamaga ang vulva
there is swelling. Ang vulva po ay nakikita natin na may pubic
hair although there is no pubic hair in the little girl, doon po
dapat ang vulva in other words sa singit, nagtataka kami bakit
namamaga.
Q:     Now, besides the vulva any other finding as a result of your
genital examination?
A:     Yes ma’am, there is also on the labia majora and labia
majora Your Honor, yong tinatawag natin sa layman yong
kuntil makapal, yong babae kasi may dalawang kuntil, yong
inner part yong labia minora yong outer part yong minora
napansin po namin na ang labia majora niya
ay namamaga and at the same time may hematoma. Then going
on the deeper part of findings on the hymenal part there is six
6:00 o’clock fresh deep laceration and at the same time there is
fresh laceration at four 4 o’clock and the hymenal shape is
normally V shape meaning yong hymen niya ay  hindi pa
nagagalawand then because of this laceration that happened to
the fourchette it become U shape, because there is hymenal torn
resulting to abnormality of the fourchette, which is normally V
shape in virgin. However, due to the hymenal torn, there is a
finding of U shape which is abnormal in nature.
COURT: Concluding that the child has been subjected to sexual
abuse?
A:     Yes Your Honor.
Q:     Now, what does this finding indicated as sexual abuse
doctor?
A:     Well the state of virginity has been damaged.
Q:     When you conducted the corresponding examination what
did you ask to the child or to her father?
A     Even the child could answer during that time, well I asked to
that child. May gumalaw ba sa iyo, o may pumatong ba sa iyo,
she answered yes mayroon po.
xxxx
Q:     You also mentioned a while ago that the abnormalities that
you observed as a result of the genital examination, can you say
what are those abnormalities?
A:     The vulva is with contusion as I said before, the vulva is
found on the portion where there is pubic hair, sa singit po,
although the child has no pubic hair, there is a contusion on the
labia majora with hematoma and the positive fourchette is U
shape as I said before normally it is V-shape.
Q:     Yes, and the other one is her (sic) the vaginal canal admits,
will normally (sic) to that child?
COURT: Admits what?
A:     Admits one finger.
Q:     What should be the normal condition?
A:     It should be closed.
COURT: And what could have possibly caused that
abnormalities as you have observed in your findings?
A:     Your Honor there might be a penetration.
COURT: Penetration by a hard object, like what, like penis?
A:     Probably Your Honor.
COURT: Finger?
A:     Probably Your Honor.
xxxx
 COURT: On the questioning of the court, there has been an
answer a matter of fact what could possibly caused such
abnormality have what object could be finger or penis have
caused such abnormality and he said it is could it possible. That
is the answer of this witness.
Q:     Based on your experience doctor was that possibly made?
A:     Will most cases like I said before I handled a year ago two
cases there is penetration by things those two cases because they
came to me …
Q:     Penetration of what?
A:     By penis.
Q:     And you have been so sure with the same findings like this
case for abnormalities?
A In all of those abnormal findings I believe that penetration has
been made.
xxxx
Q:     Mr. Witness you said that there is an abnormality in the
fourchette or V shape, and you said also that abnormality was
caused by insertion of hard thing, is that correct?
A:     Yes sir.
Q:     There are many circumstances that might cause the said
abnormality?
A:     Other circumstances that there is…
Q:     Yes like what?
A     Well I had also one case when the child was found riding on
a bicycle then she accidentally fell out from the bicycle and then
she was possibly hit by the bicycle.
COURT: She fell from the bicycle?
A:     No, saddle that’s possible, however the laceration is very
different.43
From the foregoing testimony, Dr. Gundayao was certain that AAA was
subjected to sexual abuse. The hymenal laceration inflicted on AAA was
caused by the penetration of a penis or even by a finger which is consistent
with AAA’s declaration that appellant first inserted his finger into her
vagina followed by his penis. Moreover, the abnormalities in AAA’s genital
area was not caused by any accident (i.e., falling from a bicycle) or by
other factors, but by full penile penetration.
The Court of Appeals found:
The violent physical and sexual assault were too much for AAA’s
young and fragile body that she fainted from the excruciating
pain when the accused forced his penis into her vagina. As a
result, she profusely bled, and in fact, her bleeding continued
until the next day when she was examined by the doctor. The
penile penetration had lacerated her posterior fourchette, giving
it a "U" shape (instead of the "V" shape in the case of a virgin).
Such bloody and deep extent of her vaginal injuries could only
mean that the penis of the accused went beyond merely touching
the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum and
effected a full penetration. x x x.44
As to the absence of semen in AAA’s vaginal area, such would not preclude
the fact that rape has been committed on AAA. The absence of
spermatozoa is not a negation of rape. The presence or absence of
spermatozoa is immaterial since it is penetration, not ejaculation, which
constitutes the crime of rape. Besides, the absence of spermatozoa in the
vagina could be due to a number of factors, such as the vertical drainage of
the semen from the vagina, the acidity of the vagina, or the washing of the
vagina immediately after sexual intercourse. 45 The absence of sperm
samples in the vagina of the victim does not negate rape, because the
absence of spermatozoa is not an element thereof. 46 It is a settled rule that
for rape to be consummated, the hymen of the private complainant need
not be penetrated or ruptured. It is enough that the penis reaches
the pudendum, or at the very least, the labia. The briefest of contacts
under circumstances of force, intimidation or unconsciousness, even
without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be rape in our
jurisprudence. The mere introduction of the penis into the aperture of the
female organ, thereby touching the labia of the pudemdum, already
consummates the crime of rape.47
In this case, the absence of sperm can be explained by the fact that AAA’s
mother and the midwife who assisted Dr. Gundayao in his examination of
AAA, cleaned AAA’s private part. 48 The absence of spermatozoa in the
victim's vagina is, therefore, not fatal to AAA’s cause. Her credible
testimony alone suffices to establish appellant's guilt. The medical report
of Dr. Gundayao further corroborated her claim that she was raped. The
findings of multiple and deep lacerations and other injuries in AAA's
vagina indicated that AAA was no longer a virgin. Hymenal lacerations,
whether healed or fresh, are the best evidence of forcible defloration. 49And
when the consistent and forthright testimony of a rape victim is consistent
with medical findings, there is sufficient basis to warrant a conclusion that
the essential requisites of carnal knowledge have been established. 50
Against a deluge of damning evidence from the prosecution, appellant
merely raises the defenses of denial and alibi. He denies raping AAA
claiming that at that time of the incident, he was with his parents in their
house which was an hour away by boat from the scene of the crime.
His denial, unsubstantiated and uncorroborated, must certainly fail. Mere
denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, has no weight
in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the positive
testimony of a rape victim.51 Denial is intrinsically weak, being a negative
and self-serving assertion. 52
Moreover, appellant’s statement that he did not know of any reason why
AAA charged him with rape 53 further bolstered the credibility of AAA.
When there is no evidence to show any improper motive on the part of the
rape victim to testify falsely against the accused or to falsely implicate him
in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is that the testimony
is worthy of full faith and credence.54
Petitioner likewise interposes the defense of alibi. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses,
for it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove, and for which reason it is
generally rejected.55 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative
that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was not at the locus delicti
at the time the offense was committed; and (2) it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene at the time of its
commission.56Petitioner failed to do so.
In the case at bar, petitioner avers that he was in his house
at BarangayMalaud in the small island of Buenavista in Coron, Palawan
when AAA was sexually assaulted. He said that it takes an hour by pump
boat to travel from his residence to Barangay XXX where the crime was
committed. Thus, it was not possible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime when it was committed. On top of this, his own father
contradicted his statement that he was not in Barangay XXX when the
crime was committed. Appellant’s father categorically said appellant was
with them (father and mother) in the movie house when AAA was raped.
In fact, his father saw him carrying AAA inside the movie house and then
handing her over to her father.
The felony was committed on 19 September 1999. The provisions of
Republic Act No. 8353, 57 which was the law in effect on the day when the
rape was committed, shall apply.
The gravamen of the offense of rape is sexual congress with a woman by
force and without consent. If the woman is under 12 years of age, proof of
force is not an element of statutory rape, but the absence of a free consent
is presumed. Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual intercourse is
proven. But if the woman is 12 years of age or over at the time she was
violated, sexual intercourse must be proven; and also the fact that it was
done through force, violence, intimidation or threat. 58
As provided for in the Revised Penal Code, 59 sexual intercourse with a girl
below 12 years old is statutory rape. The two elements of statutory rape
are: (1) that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that
the woman was below 12 years of age. Sexual congress with a girl under 12
years old is always rape.60
In the present case, appellant was charged with statutory rape. The first
element was proved by the testimony of the victim herself, while the
second element was established by appellant’s admission and the
presentation of AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born
on 22 March 1993. When the crime was committed on 19 September 1999,
AAA was only six years old.
For one to be convicted of qualified rape, at least one of the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B 61must
be alleged in the information and duly proved during the trial. In the
instant case, since the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of the victim’s
minority (below seven years of age) had been properly alleged in the
information and proved during trial, the trial court’s imposition of the
penalty of death on appellant was justified.
With the effectivity,62 however, of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death has been prohibited. Pursuant
to Section 2 thereof, the penalty to be meted out to appellant shall
be reclusion perpetua. Said section reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be
imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does
not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised
Penal Code.
Thus, the Court of Appeals properly reduced the penalty imposed on
appellant from death penalty to reclusion perpetua.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the penalty imposed on appellant, he is
not eligible for parole following Section 3 of said law, which provides:
 SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished
with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced
to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible
for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

As to the award of damages, the trial court awarded P75,000.00 as civil

indemnity and P75,000.00 as moral damages. In addition thereto, the
Court of Appeals awarded exemplary damages in the amount
of P50,000.00. The amount awarded is proper, since P75,000.00 is the
amount awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances which warrant
the imposition of the death penalty. 63 With respect to the award of moral
damages, the P75,000.00 is to be granted without need of pleading or
proof of basis thereof. 64 Due to the presence of the aggravating/qualifying
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation
circumstance of minority (below seven years of age), the award of
exemplary damages by the Court of Appeals is in order, but the same Republic of the Philippines
should be reduced to P25,000.00.65 SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 26 November 2007 finding appellant guilty beyond SECOND DIVISION
reasonable doubt of statutory rape is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the award of exemplary damages is reduced
G.R. No. 138084            April 10, 2002
to P25,000.00.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner, 

SO ORDERED.
vs.
PHILIPPINE NAILS AND WIRES CORPORATION, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision dated September
30, 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45547, affirming the
decision dated December 10, 1993, of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Metro Manila, Branch 163, and the resolution dated March 25, 1999, of
the Court of Appeals denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 1

Respondent Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation insured against all

risks its shipment of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300 with petitioner Malayan Insurance Company Inc. The
shipment delivered was short by 377.168 metric tons. For this shortage,
respondent claimed insurance for P2,698,637.04, representing the value
of undelivered steel billets, plus customs duties, taxes and other charges
paid by respondent. Petitioner refused to pay.

On July 28, 1993, respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for sum
of money with the RTC of Pasig representing said lost and/or undelivered
cargo. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it
failed to state a cause of action, and that it was filed in the wrong venue.
The motion was denied. It thus filed a petition for prohibition with the
Court of Appeals. This was also denied. Upon motion for reconsideration,
the petition was reinstated. However, it was eventually dismissed by the
Court of Appeals, and its dismissal became final and executory.

On September 8, 1993, respondent filed a motion to admit an amended

complaint which the trial court granted. It sent petitioner summons and a
copy of the complaint on October 13, 1993 and also gave petitioner until
October 31, 1993 to file its answer.

On November 4, 1993, respondent moved to declare petitioner in default.

The trial court granted and allowed the presentation of evidence ex
partebefore the branch clerk of court. Respondent presented its lone
witness, Jeanne King.

On November 11, 1993, petitioner filed its answer with compulsory

counterclaim. Upon motion by the respondent, the trial court expunged
from the records the answer for late filing.

On December 10, 1993, the trial court rendered a judgment by default

which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, Judgment is hereby

rendered in favor of plaintiff and against defendant, ordering the
latter to pay the following:

1. P2,532,926.53 representing the insured value of the lost

and/or not delivered 377.168 metric tons of steel billets plus
legal rate of interest from date of filing of this complaint until
fully paid;

2. Fifteen (15) percent of the amount awarded to plaintiff as

attorney's fees; and

3. Cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.2
Respondent moved to execute judgment pending appeal. The trial court received steel billets, she based the summary only on the receipts prepared
granted the motion. Meanwhile, petitioner filed its notice of appeal which by other persons. Her testimony on steel billets received was hearsay. It
was given due course. has no probative value even if not objected to at the trial. 6

Pursuant to the grant of the motion for execution, the trial court issued the
corresponding writ. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for
a temporary restraining order to enjoin the implementation of the writ.
The Court of Appeals granted the prayer for the temporary restraining
order. The writ of execution was likewise stayed by the trial court which
favorably considered petitioner's urgent motion to stay execution pending
appeal and to approve the supersedeas bond.
Pursuant to the notice of appeal, the entire records of the case were
elevated to the Court of Appeals, where petitioner argued that the trial
court erred in rendering judgment by default notwithstanding that issues
were joined by petitioner's filing of an answer; in awarding damages to
respondent based on unauthenticated documentary evidence and hearsay;
and in admitting documentary evidence which is irregular in nature and
not in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court and disposed the case
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible
error committed by the lower court, the judgment appealed from
is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.3
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
nor err when it expunged the answer from the records because petitioner
answered way beyond the prescribed period. It further held that
respondent's witness, Jeanne King, was a competent witness because she
personally prepared the documentary evidence and had personal
knowledge of the allegations in the complaint. In addition, the appellate
court said that conclusions and findings of fact of the trial courts were
entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for
strong and cogent reasons, which were not present in this case. Lastly, the
absence of a written report by the branch clerk of court on the ex parte
proceedings did not necessarily deny petitioner due process. Nothing in
the Rules of Court stated that the absence of the commissioner's written
report nullified a judgment by default. The appellate court observed that if
there was a defect, such was only procedural that can be waived. Besides,
petitioner was declared in default because of its own failure to answer
within the prescribed period. It cannot claim denial of due process
because it was given the opportunity to be heard.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this petition
alleging that the Court of Appeals erred and acted contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence in:
On the second issue, petitioner avers that King failed to properly
authenticate respondent's documentary evidence. Under Section 20, Rule
132, Rules of Court,7 before a private document is admitted in evidence, it
must be authenticated either by the person who executed it, the person
before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was
present and saw it executed, or who after its execution, saw it and
recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the
instruments had previously confessed execution thereof. In this case,
respondent admits that King was none of the aforementioned persons. She
merely made the summary of the weight of steel billets based on the
unauthenticated bill of lading and the SGS report. Thus, the summary of
steel billets actually received had no proven real basis, and King's
testimony on this point could not be taken at face value.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in giving imprimatur
to the trial court's ruling with regard to the admission of documentary
evidence submitted by respondent. On this score, we find petitioner's
contention meritorious. Under the rules on evidence, documents are
either public or private. Private documents are those that do not fall under
any of the enumerations in Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court.8 Section 209 of the same law, in turn, provides that before any
private document is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document
executed or written, or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker. Here, respondent's documentary exhibits are
private documents. They are not among those enumerated in Section 19,
thus, their due execution and authenticity need to be proved before they
can be admitted in evidence. With the exception concerning the summary
of the weight of the steel billets imported, respondent presented no
supporting evidence concerning their authenticity. 10 Consequently, they
cannot be utilized to prove less of the insured cargo and/or the short
delivery of the imported steel billets. In sum, we find no sufficient
competent evidence to prove petitioner's liability.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated September 30, 1998 and its resolution on March 25, 1999 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 45547 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof,
Civil Case No. 63445 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.

I. …GIVING PROBATIVE VALUE TO THE PURELY HEARSAY

TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT'S SOLE WITNESS.

II. …AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT

WHICH WAS BASED ON DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
ADMITTED WITHOUT BEING PROPERLY
AUTHENTICATED.4

For resolution now are the following issues: Was Jeanne King's testimony
hearsay, thus without any probative value? Should respondent
authenticate the documentary evidence it submitted at the trial?

On the first issue, petitioner Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., contends that
Jeanne King's testimony was hearsay because she had no personal
knowledge of the execution of the documents supporting respondent's
cause of action, such as the sales contract, invoice, packing list, bill of
lading, SGS Report, and the Marine Cargo Policy. Petitioner avers that
even though King was personally assigned to handle and monitor the
importation of Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation, herein
respondent, this cannot be equated with personal knowledge of the facts
which gave rise to respondent's cause of action. Further, petitioner asserts,
even though she personally prepared the summary of weight of steel billets
received by respondent, she did not have personal knowledge of the
weight of steel billets actually shipped and delivered.

At the outset, we must stress that respondent's cause of action is founded

on breach of insurance contract covering cargo consisting of imported
steel billets. To hold petitioner liable, respondent has to prove, first, its
importation of 10,053.400 metric tons of steel billets valued at
P67,156,300.00, and second, the actual steel billets delivered to and
received by the importer, namely the respondent. Witness Jeanne King,
who was assigned to handle respondent's importations, including their
insurance coverage, has personal knowledge of the volume of steel billets
being imported, and therefore competent to testify thereon. Her testimony
is not hearsay, as this doctrine is defined in Section 36, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.5

However, she is not qualified to testify on the shortage in the delivery of

the imported steel billets. She did not have personal knowledge of the
actual steel billets received. Even though she prepared the summary of the
 The petitioner in its reply to the TUCP's comment alleged that it was
affiliated with the TUCP only in 1978 or long after the certification case
was appealed to the Director of Labor Relations.

The petitioner further manifested that other certification cases referred in

1976 to the TUCP have not been acted upon by it up to this time and that
the delay is a denial of labor justice.

The issue is whether it was legal and proper for the Director of Labor
Relations to refer to the TUCP the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions
in a certification election case.

We hold that the referral of the appeal to the TUCP is glaringly illegal and
void. The Labor Code never intended that the Director of Labor Relations
should abdicate delegate and relinquish his arbitrational prerogatives in
favor of a private person or entity or to a federation of trade unions. Such a
surrender of official functions is an anomalous, deplorable and censurable
renunciation of the Director's adjudicatory jurisdiction in representation
cases.

Ilaw At Buklod Ng Manggagawa vs. Director of Labor Relations, et al.

Article 226 of the Labor Code provides in peremptory terms that the
Republic of the Philippines Bureau of Labor Relations and the labor relations divisions in the regional
SUPREME COURT offices of the Ministry of Labor "shall have original and exclusive
Manila authority to act, at their own initiative or upon request of either or both
parties, on all inter-union and intra-union conflicts, and all disputes,
grievances or problems arising from or affecting labor-management
SECOND DIVISION
relations in all workplaces whether agricultural or non-agricultural, except
those arising from the implementation or interpretation of collective
G.R. No. L-48931 July 16, 1979 bargaining agreements which shall be the subject of grievance procedure
and/or voluntary arbitration."
ILAW AT BUKLOD NG MANGGAGAWA (IBM), petitioner, 
vs. Article 259 of the Labor Code provides that "all certification cases shall be
DIRECTOR OF LABOR RELATIONS, TRADE UNION decided within twenty (20) working days." Article 260 of the same Code
CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES, GENERAL MILLING provides that the Bureau of Labor Relations should decide appeals in
CORPORATION, and ASSOCIATED LABOR representation cases, within fifteen (15) working days", or twenty working
UNIONS, respondents. days, according to section 10, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Labor Code. Section 10 further provides that "the
Feliciano C. Tumale & Leonardo C. Rodriguez for petitioner. decision of the Bureau in all cases shall be final and unappealable."

Office of the Solicitor General for the Public respondents. Those provisions are mandatory and should be strictly adhered to. They
are part and parcel of the adequate administrative machinery established
AQUINO, J.: by the Labor Code for the expeditious settlement of labor disputes. The
Director's act of referring the appeal of the Associated Labor Unions to the
TUCP is not only contrary to law but is a patent nullification of the policy
This is a certification election case. On June 24, 1976, or within sixty days
of the Labor Code to avoid delay in the adjudication of labor controversies.
prior to the expiration on August 19, 1976 of the unregistered collective
bargaining agreement between the Associated Labor Unions and the
General Milling Corporation, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa, a duly There is another aspect of this case which should be underscored. And that
registered labor union, filed with Regional Office No. 7 at Cebu City of the is that the Labor Code never intended that the original record of a labor
Ministry of Labor a petition for certification election. case, an official public record, should be removed from the legitimate
custodian thereof and entrusted to a private person or entity. It should be
obvious that the delivery of an official public record to a private person is
The med-arbiter in his order of October 12, 1976 granted the petition. He
fraught with mischievous consequences. (See sec. 27, Rule 132, Rules of
ordered the holding of a certification election within twenty days from
Court on irremovability of public record.)
notice among the rank-and-file employees of the company at Lapu-Lapu
City. The Associated Labor Unions appealed from that order to the
Director of Labor Relations. Respondent Director of Labor Relations in imprudently and illegally
delivering to the TUCP the record of the certification election case (instead
of a transcript thereof) placed himself in the pitiable, lamentable and
Instead of deciding the appeal promptly, the Director turned over the
ridiculous situation of having to beg the TUCP for the return of the record
record of the case to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines TUCP a
and then to ask for a court order to compel its return since the TUCP has
federation of labor unions, allegedly by virtue of an arrangement between
cavalierly not heeded its request.
the Ministry of Labor and the said federation that cases involving its
member-unions must first be referred to it for possible settlement in
accordance with its Code of Ethics. The petitioner and the Director could have reconstituted the record and
the Director could have decided the appeal on the basis of the
reconstituted record instead of awaiting the pleasure of the TUCP's
The TUCP has not decided the controversy. On September 14, 1978, or
officers for the return of the original record.
more than twenty months after the federation received the record of the
case, the Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa filed in this Court the instant
petition for mandamus to compel the Director of Labor Relations to decide WHEREFORE, the president, secretary, or any responsible officer of the
the case, or, in the alternative, to require the TUCP to return to the Trade Union Congress of the Philippines, Marvex Bldg., South Harbor,
Director the record of the case. Port Area, Manila, is ordered to return to the Director of Labor Relations
within forty-eight hours from notice the original record of BLR Case No.
A-536-76 (LRD Case No. CE-0018).
The petitioner accused the TUCP of sitting indefinitely on the appeal
because its president and the president of appellant Associated Labor
Unions are the same person. The TUCP admits that its president is also The Director is directed to decide the appeal within ten days from the
the president of the Associated Labor Unions but it clarifies that its receipt of the record. Costs against respondent TUCP
executive board, not its president, will decide the controversy.
SO ORDERED.
The Director of Labor Relations manifested in his comment that he is
willing to decide the appeal. He prays that the TUCP be ordered to return
to him immediately the record of the case.

Respondent employer, the General Milling Corporation, revealed in its

comment that it has a registered collective bargaining agreement with the
Associated Labor Unions which will expire on August 19, 1979.
Presumably, that agreement was a renewal of the unregistered collective
bargaining agreement which expired on August 19, 1976. It was the
impending expiration of that agreement which provoked the Ilaw at
Buklod ng Manggagawa to file its petition for certification election in June,
1976.

Philip S. Yu vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154115 November 29, 2005
PHILIP S. YU, Petitioner,  Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals passed upon errors of
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, and VIVECA LIM
YU,Respondents.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
This treats of the petition for review on certiorari of the Court of Appeals’
Decision and Resolution in CA G.R. SP No. 66252 dated 30 April
20021 and 27 June 2002, 2 respectively, which set aside the Order of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City 3 dated 10 May 2001, declaring an
application for insurance and an insurance policy as inadmissible
evidence.
The facts of the case are undisputed.
On 15 March 1994, Viveca Lim Yu (private respondent) brought against
her husband, Philip Sy Yu (petitioner), an action for legal separation and
dissolution of conjugal partnership on the grounds of marital infidelity
and physical abuse. The case was filed before the RTC of Pasig and raffled
to Branch 158, presided by Judge Jose R. Hernandez.
During trial, private respondent moved for the issuance of a subpoena
duces tecum and ad testificandum4 to certain officers of Insular Life
Assurance Co. Ltd. to compel production of the insurance policy and
application of a person suspected to be petitioner’s illegitimate child. 5The
trial court denied the motion. 6 It ruled that the insurance contract is
inadmissible evidence in view of Circular Letter No. 11-2000, issued by the
Insurance Commission which presumably prevents insurance
companies/agents from divulging confidential and privileged information
pertaining to insurance policies.7 It added that the production of the
application and insurance contract would violate Article 280 8 of the Civil
Code and Section 5 of the Civil Registry Law, 9both of which prohibit the
unauthorized identification of the parents of an illegitimate child. 10 Private
respondent sought reconsideration of the Order, but the motion was
denied by the trial court.11
Aggrieved, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals, imputing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of Judge Hernandez in issuing the 10
May 2001 Order.12 The Court of Appeals summarized the issues as follows:
(i) whether or not an insurance policy and its corresponding application
form can be admitted as evidence to prove a party’s extra-marital affairs in
an action for legal separation; and (ii) whether or not a trial court has the
discretion to deny a party’s motion to attach excluded evidence to the
record under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. 13
According to the Court of Appeals, private respondent was merely seeking
the production of the insurance application and contract, and was not yet
offering the same as part of her evidence. Thus, it declared that
petitioner’s objection to the admission of the documents was premature,
and the trial court’s pronouncement that the documents are inadmissible,
precipitate.14 The contents of the insurance application and insurance
documents cannot be considered as privileged information, the Court of
Appeals added, in view of the opinion of the Insurance Commissioner
dated 4 April 2001 to the effect that Circular Letter No.11-2000 "was never
intended to be a legal impediment in complying with lawful
orders".15 Lastly, the Court of Appeals ruled that a trial court does not have
the discretion to deny a party’s privilege to tender excluded evidence, as
this privilege allows said party to raise on appeal the exclusion of such
evidence.16 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but to no avail.
In the present petition, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals
blundered in delving into errors of judgment supposedly committed by the
trial court as if the petition filed therein was an ordinary appeal and not a
special civil action. Further, he claims that the Court of Appeals failed to
show any specific instance of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court in issuing the assailed Order. Additionally, he posits that
private respondent had already mooted her petition before the Court of
Appeals when she filed her formal offer of rebuttal exhibits, with tender of
excluded evidence before the trial court. 17
For her part, private respondent maintains that the details surrounding
the insurance policy are crucial to the issue of petitioner’s infidelity and
his financial capacity to provide support to her and their children. Further,
she argues that she had no choice but to make a tender of excluded
evidence considering that she was left to speculate on what the insurance
application and policy ruled out by the trial court would contain. 18
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to correct
errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction committed by a lower court. 19 Where a respondent
does not have the legal power to determine the case and yet he does so, he
acts without jurisdiction; where, "being clothed with power to determine
the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, he is performing a
function in excess of jurisdiction." 20
judgment, not errors of jurisdiction, since it delved into the propriety of
the denial of the subpoena duces tecum and subpoena ad
testificandum. The argument must fail.
While trial courts have the discretion to admit or exclude evidence, such
power is exercised only when the evidence has been formally offered. 21For
a long time, the Court has recognized that during the early stages of the
development of proof, it is impossible for a trial court judge to know with
certainty whether evidence is relevant or not, and thus the practice of
excluding evidence on doubtful objections to its materiality should be
avoided.22 As well elucidated in the case of Prats & Co. v. Phoenix
Insurance Co.:23
Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat of the battle over which
he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into error in judging
of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in fact
shown. When such a mistake is made and the proof is erroneously ruled
out, the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and
possibly unable to correct the effects of the error without returning the
case for a new trial, — a step which this court is always very loath to take.
On the other hand, the admission of proof in a court of first instance, even
if the question as to its form, materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can
never result in much harm to either litigant, because the trial judge is
supposed to know the law; and it is its duty, upon final consideration of
the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from the irrelevant and
immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is prosecuted to the
Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material before it
necessary to make a correct judgment.
In the instant case, the insurance application and the insurance policy
were yet to be presented in court, much less formally offered before it. In
fact, private respondent was merely asking for the issuance of subpoena
duces tecum and subpoena ad testificandum when the trial court issued
the assailed Order. Even assuming that the documents would eventually
be declared inadmissible, the trial court was not then in a position to make
a declaration to that effect at that point. Thus, it barred the production of
the subject documents prior to the assessment of its probable worth. As
observed by petitioners, the assailed Order was not a mere ruling on the
admissibility of evidence; it was, more importantly, a ruling affecting the
proper conduct of trial. 24
Excess of jurisdiction refers to any act which although falling within the
general powers of the judge is not authorized and is consequently void
with respect to the particular case because the conditions under which he
was only authorized to exercise his general power in that case did not exist
and therefore, the judicial power was not legally exercised. 25 Thus, in
declaring that the documents are irrelevant and inadmissible even before
they were formally offered, much less presented before it, the trial court
acted in excess of its discretion.
Anent the issue of whether the information contained in the documents is
privileged in nature, the same was clarified and settled by the Insurance
Commissioner’s opinion that the circular on which the trial court based its
ruling was not designed to obstruct lawful court orders. 26Hence, there is
no more impediment to presenting the insurance application and policy.
Petitioner additionally claims that by virtue of private respondent’s tender
of excluded evidence, she has rendered moot her petition before the Court
of Appeals since the move evinced that she had another speedy and
adequate remedy under the law. The Court holds otherwise.
Section 40, Rule 132 provides:

Sec.40. Tender of excluded evidence.—If documents or things offered in

evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the
offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.

It is thus apparent that before tender of excluded evidence is made, the

evidence must have been formally offered before the court. And before
formal offer of evidence is made, the evidence must have been identified
and presented before the court. While private respondent made a " Tender
of Excluded Evidence," such is not the tender contemplated by the above-
quoted rule, for obviously, the insurance policy and application were not
formally offered much less presented before the trial court. At most, said
"Tender of Excluded Evidence" was a

manifestation of an undisputed fact that the subject documents were

declared inadmissible by the trial court even before these were presented
during trial. It was not the kind of plain, speedy and adequate remedy
which private respondent could have resorted to instead of the petition for Enrique T. Garcia vs. Renato C. Corona, et al.
certiorari she filed before the Court of Appeals. It did not in any way
Republic of the Philippines
render the said petition moot.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.
The Decisiondated 30 April 2002 and Resolution dated 27 June 2002 are
EN BANC
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

G.R. No. 132451 December 17, 1999

SO ORDERED.

CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, petitioner, 

vs.
HON. RENATO C. CORONA, in his capacity as the Executive
Secretary, HON. FRANCISCO VIRAY, in his capacity as the
Secretary of Energy, CALTEX PHILIPPINES INC., PILIPINAS
SHELL PETROLEUM CORP. and PETRON CORP., respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On November 5, 1997, this Court in Tatad v. Secretary of the Department

of Energy and Lagman, et al., v. Hon. Ruben Torres, et al., 1declared
Republic Act No. 8180, entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes", unconstitutional, and its implementing
Executive Order No. 392 void.

R.A. 8180 was struck down as invalid because three key provisions
intended to promote free competition were shown to achieve the opposite
result. More specifically, this Court ruled that its provisions on tariff
differential, stocking of inventories, and predatory pricing inhibit fair
competition, encourage monopolistic power, and interfere with the free
interaction of the market forces.

While R.A. 8180 contained a separability clause, it was declared

unconstitutional in its entirety since the three (3) offending provisions so
permeated the law that they were so intimately the esse of the law. Thus,
the whole statute had to be invalidated.

As a result of the Tatad decision, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8479,
a new deregulation law without the offending provisions of the earlier law.
Petitioner Enrique T. Garcia, a member of Congress, has now brought this
petition seeking to declare Section 19 thereof, which sets the time of full
deregulation, unconstitutional. After failing in his attempts to have
Congress incorporate in the law the economic theory he espouses,
petitioner now asks us, in the name of upholding the Constitution, to undo
a violation which he claims Congress has committed.

The assailed Section 19 of R.A. 8479 states in full:

Sec. 19. Start of Full Deregulation. — Full deregulation of the

Industry shall start five (5) months following the effectivity of
this Act: Provided, however, That when the public interest so
requires, the President may accelerate the start of full
deregulation upon the recommendation of the DOE and the
Department of Finance (DOF) when the prices of crude oil and
petroleum products in the world market are declining and the
value of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable, taking into
account relevant trends and prospects; Provided,  further, That
the foregoing provision notwithstanding, the five (5)-month
Transition Phase shall continue to apply to LPG, regular gasoline
and kerosene as socially-sensitive petroleum products and said
petroleum products shall be covered by the automatic pricing
mechanism during the said period.

Upon the implementation of full deregulation as provided

herein, the Transition Phase is deemed terminated and the
following laws are repealed:

a) Republic Act No. 6173, as amended;

 b) Section 5 of Executive Order No. 172, as amended;
c) Letter of Instruction No. 1431, dated October 15, 1984;
d) Letter of Instruction No. 1441, dated November 20, 1984, as
amended;
e) Letter of Instruction No. 1460, dated May 9, 1985;
f) Presidential Decree No. 1889; and
g) Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order
No. 137:
Provided, however, That in case full deregulation is started by
the President in the exercise of the authority provided in this
Section, the foregoing laws shall continue to be in force and
effect with respect to LPG, regular gasoline and kerosene for the
rest of the five (5)-month period.
Petitioner contends that Section 19 of R.A. 8479, which prescribes the
period for the removal of price control on gasoline and other finished
products and for the full deregulation of the local downstream oil industry,
is patently contrary to public interest and therefore unconstitutional
because within the short span of five months, the market is still dominated
and controlled by an oligopoly of the three (3) private respondents,
namely, Shell, Caltex and Petron.
The objective of the petition is deceptively simple. It states that if the
constitutional mandate against monopolies and combinations in restraint
of trade 2 is to be obeyed, there should be indefinite and open-ended price
controls on gasoline and other oil products for as long as necessary. This
will allegedly prevent the "Big 3" — Shell, Caltex and Petron — from price-
fixing and overpricing. Petitioner calls the indefinite retention of price
controls as "partial deregulation".
The grounds relied upon in the petition are:
A.
Sec. 19 OF R.A. NO. 8479 WHICH PROVIDES FOR FULL
DEREGULATION FIVE (5) MONTHS OR EARLIER
FOLLOWING THE EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW, IS
GLARINGLY PRO-OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND
ANTI-PEOPLE, AND IS THEREFORE PATENTLY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING IN GROSS AND CYNICAL
CONTRAVENTION OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY AND
COMMAND EMBODIED IN ARTCLE XII, SECTION 19 OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTION AGAINST MONOPOLIES AND
COMBINATIONS IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE.
B.
SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479 IS GLARINGLY PRO-
OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE, FOR
THE FURTHER REASON THAT IT PALPABLY AND
CYNICALLY VIOLATES THE VERY OBJECTIVE AND
PURPOSE OF R.A. NO. 8479, WHICH IS TO ENSURE A TRULY
COMPETITIVE MARKET UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR
PRICES.
C.
SAID SECTION 19 OF R.A. No. 8479, BEING GLARINGLY PRO-
OLIGOPOLY, ANTI-COMPETITION AND ANTI-PEOPLE,
BEING PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND BEING
PALPABLY VIOLATIVE OF THE LAW'S POLICY AND
PURPOSE OF ENSURING A TRULY COMPETITIVE MARKET
UNDER A REGIME OF FAIR PRICES, IS A VERY GRAVE AND
GRIEVOUS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT.
D.
PREMATURE FULL DEREGULATION UNDER SECTION 19 OF
R.A. NO. 8479 MAY AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE
DECLARED NULL AND VOID EVEN AS THE REST OF ITS
PROVISIONS REMAIN IN FORCE, SUCH AS THE
TRANSITION PHASE OR PARTIAL DEREGULATION WITH
PRICE CONTROLS THAT ENSURES THE PROTECTION OF
THE PUBLIC INTEREST BY PREVENTING THE BIG 3
OLIGOPOLY'S PRICE-FIXING AND OVERPRICING. 3
The issues involved in the deregulation of the downstream oil industry are
of paramount significance. The ramifications, international and local in
scope, are complex. The impact on the nation's economy is pervasive and
far-reaching. The amounts involved in the oil business are immense.
Fluctuations in the supply and price of oil products have a dramatic effect
on economic development and public welfare. As pointed out in the Tatad
decision, few cases carry a surpassing importance on the daily life of every
Filipino. The issues affect everybody from the poorest wage-earners and
their families to the richest entrepreneurs, from industrial giants to
humble consumers.
Our decision in this case is complicated by the unstable oil prices in the
world market. Even as this case is pending, the price of OPEC oil is
escalating to record levels. We have to emphasize that our decision has
nothing to do with worldwide fluctuations in oil prices and the counter-
measures of Government each time a new development takes place.
The most important part of deregulation is freedom from price control.
Indeed, the free play of market forces through deregulation and when to
implement it represent one option to solve the problems of the oil-
consuming public. There are other considerations which may be taken into
account such as the reduction of taxes on oil products, the reinstitution of
an Oil Price Stabilization Fund, the choice between government subsidies
taken from the regular taxpaying public on one hand and the increased
costs being shouldered only by users of oil products on the other, and most
important, the immediate repeal of the oil deregulation law as wrong
policy. Petitioner wants the setting of prices to be done by Government
instead of being determined by free market forces. His preference is
continued price control with no fixed end in sight. A simple glance at the
factors surrounding the present problems besetting the oil industry shows
that they are economic in nature.
R.A. 8479, the present deregulation law, was enacted to implement Article
XII, Section 19 of the Constitution which provides:
The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public
interest so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or
unfair competition shall be allowed.
This is so because the Government believes that deregulation will
eventually prevent monopoly. The simplest form of monopoly exists when
there is only one seller or producer of a product or service for which there
are no substitutes. In its more complex form, monopoly is defined as the
joint acquisition or maintenance by members of a conspiracy, formed for
that purpose, of the power to control and dominate trade and commerce in
a commodity to such an extent that they are able, as a group, to exclude
actual or potential competitors from the field, accompanied with the
intention and purpose to exercise such power. 4
Where two or three or a few companies act in concert to control market
prices and resultant profits, the monopoly is called an oligopoly or cartel.
It is a combination in restraint of trade.
The perennial shortage of oil supply in the Philippines is exacerbated by
the further fact that the importation, refining, and marketing of this
precious commodity are in the hands of a cartel, local but made up of
foreign-owned corporations. Before the start of deregulation, the three
private respondents controlled the entire oil industry in the Philippines.
It bears reiterating at the outset that the deregulation of the oil industry is
a policy determination of the highest order. It is unquestionably a priority
program of Government. The Department of Energy Act of 1992  5expressly
mandates that the development and updating of the existing Philippine
energy program "shall include a policy direction towards deregulation of
the power and energy industry."
Be that as it may, we are not concerned with whether or not there should
be deregulation. This is outside our jurisdiction. The judgment on the
issue is a settled matter and only Congress can reverse it. Rather, the
question that we should address here is — are the method and the manner
chosen by Government to accomplish its cherished goal offensive to the
Constitution? Is indefinite price control in the manner proposed by
petitioner the only feasible and legal way to achieve it?
Petitioner has taken upon himself a most challenging task.
Unquestionably, the direction towards which the nation's efforts at
economic and social upliftment should be addressed is a function of
Congress and the President. In the exercise of this function, Congress and
the President have obviously determined that speedy deregulation is the
answer to the acknowledged dominion by oligopolistic forces of the oil
industry. Thus, immediately after R.A. 8180 was declared unconstitutional
in the Tatad case, Congress took resolute steps to fashion new legislation
towards the objective of the earlier law. Invoking the Constitution,
petitioner now wants to slow down the process.
While the Court respects the firm resolve displayed by Congress and the
President, all departments of Government are equally bound by the
sovereign will expressed in the commands of the Constitution. There is a
need for utmost care if this Court is to faithfully discharge its duties as
arbitral guardian of the Constitution. We cannot encroach on the policy
functions of the two other great departments of Government. But neither
can we ignore any overstepping of constitutional limitations. Locating the
correct balance between legality and policy, constitutional boundaries and
freedom of action, and validity and expedition is this Court's dilemma as it
resolves the legitimacy of a Government program aimed at giving every
Filipino a more secure, fulfilling and abundant life.
Our ruling in Tatad is categorical that the Constitution's Article XII,
Section 19, is anti-trust in history and spirit. It espouses competition. We
have stated that only competition which is fair can release the creative
forces of the market. We ruled that the principle which underlies the
constitutional provision is competition. Thus:
Sec. 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and
in spirit. It espouses competition. The desirability of competition
is the reason for the prohibition against restraint of trade, the
reason for the interdiction of unfair competition, and the reason
for regulation of unmitigated monopolies. Competition is thus
the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our
Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We
subscribe to the observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective
of anti-trust law is "to assure a competitive economy, based upon
the belief that through competition producers will strive to
satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of
the fewest resources. Competition among producers allows
consumers to bid for goods and services, and thus matches their
desires with society's opportunity costs." He adds with
appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the operation of
the "market" system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be
produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production
process, and to whom the various products will be distributed.
The market system relies on the consumer to decide what and
how much shall be produced, and on competition, among
producers to determine who will manufacture it."  6
In his recital of the antecedent circumstances, petitioner repeats in
abbreviated form the factual findings and conclusions which led the Court
to declare R.A. 8180 unconstitutional. The foreign oligopoly or cartel
formed by respondents Shell, Caltex and Petron, their indulging in price-
fixing and overpricing, their blockade tactics which effectively obstructed
the entry of genuine competitors, the dangers posed by the oil cartel to
national security and economic development, and other prevailing
sentiments are stated as axiomatic truths. They are repeated in capsulized
context as the current background facts of the present petition.
The empirical existence of this deplorable situation was precisely the
reason why Congress enacted the oil deregulation law. The evils arising
from conspiratorial acts of monopoly are recognized as clear and present.
But the enumeration of the evils by our Tatad decision was not for the
purpose of justifying continued government control, especially price
control. The objective was, rather, the opposite. The evils were emphasized
to show the need for free competition in a deregulated industry. And to be
sure, the measures to address these evils are for Congress to determine,
but they have to meet the test of constitutional validity.
The Court respects the legislative finding that deregulation is the policy
answer to the problems. It bears stressing that R.A. 8180 was declared
invalid not because deregulation is unconstitutional. The law was struck
down because, as crafted, three key provisions plainly encouraged the
continued existence if not the proliferation of the constitutionally
proscribed evils of monopoly and restraint of trade.
In sharp contrast, the present petition lacks a factual foundation
specifically highlighting the need to declare the challenged provision
unconstitutional. There is a dearth of relevant, reliable, and substantial
evidence to support petitioner's theory that price control must continue
even as Government is trying its best to get out of regulating the oil
industry. The facts of the petition are, in the main, a general dissertation
on the evils of monopoly.
Petitioner overlooks the fact that Congress enacted the deregulation law
exactly because of the monopoly evils he mentions in his petition.
Congress instituted the lifting of price controls in the belief that free and
fair competition was the best remedy against monopoly power. In other
words, petitioner's facts are also the reasons why Congress lifted price
controls and why the President accelerated the process. The facts adduced
in favor of continued and indefinite price control are the same facts which
supported what Congress believes is an exercise of wisdom and discretion
when it chose the path of speedy deregulation and rejected Congressman
Garcia's economic theory.
The petition states that it is using the very thoughts and words of the
Court in its Tatad decision. Those thoughts and words, however, were
directed against the tariff differential, the inventory requirement, and
predatory pricing, not against deregulation as a policy and not against the
lifting of price controls.
A dramatic, at times expansive and grandiloquent, reiteration of the same
background circumstances narrated in Tatad does not squarely sustain
petitioner's novel thesis that there can be deregulation without lifting price
controls.
Petitioner may call the industry subject to price controls as deregulated. In
enacting the challenged provision, Congress, on the other hand, has
declared that any industry whose prices and profits are fixed by
government authority remains a highly regulated one.
Petitioner, therefore, engages in a legal paradox. He fails to show how
there can be deregulation while retaining government price control.
Deregulation means the lifting of control, governance and direction
through rule or regulation. It means that the regulated industry is freed
from the controls, guidance, and restrictions to which it used to be
subjected. The use of the word "partial" to qualify deregulation is sugar-
coating. Petitioner is really against deregulation at this time.
Petitioner states that price control is good. He claims that it was the
regulation of the importation of finished oil products which led to the exit
of competitors and the consolidation and dominion of the market by an
oligopoly, not price control. Congress and the President think otherwise.
The argument that price control is not the villain in the intrusion and
growth of monopoly appears to be pure theory not validated by
experience. There can be no denying the fact that the evils mentioned in
the petition arose while there was price control. The dominance of the so-
called "Big 3" became entrenched during the regime of price control. More
importantly, the ascertainment of the cause and the method of
dismantling the oligopoly thus created are a matter of legislative and
executive choice. The judicial process is equipped to handle legality but
not wisdom of choice and the efficacy of solutions.
Petitioner engages in another contradiction when he puts forward what he
calls a self-evident truth. He states that a truly competitive market and fair
prices cannot be legislated into existence. However, the truly competitive
market is not being created or fashioned by the challenged legislation. The
market is simply freed from legislative controls and allowed to grow and
develop free from government interference. R.A. 8479 actually allows the
free play of supply and demand to dictate prices. Petitioner wants a
government official or board to continue performing this task. Indefinite
and open-ended price control as advocated by petitioner would be to
continue a regime of legislated regulation where free competition cannot
possibly flourish. Control is the antithesis of competition. To grant the
petition would mean that the Government is not keen on allowing a free
market to develop. Petitioner's "self-evident truth" thus supports the
validity of the provision of law he opposes.
New players in the oil industry intervened in this case. According to them,
it is the free market policy and atmosphere of deregulation which attracted
and brought the new participants, themselves included, into the market.
The intervenors express their fear that this Court would overrule
legislative policy and replace it with petitioner's own legislative program.
The factual allegations of the intervenors have not been refuted and we see
no reason to doubt them. Their argument that the co-existence of many
viable rivals create free market conditions induces competition in product
quality and performance and makes available to consumers an expanded
range of choices cannot be seriously disputed.
On the other hand, the pleadings of public and private respondents both
put forth the argument that the challenged provision is a policy decision of
Congress and that the wisdom of the provision is outside the authority of
this Court to consider. We agree. As we have ruled in Morfe v. Mutuc 7:
(I)t is well to remember that this Court, in the language of
Justice Laurel, "does not pass upon question or wisdom, justice
or expediency of legislation." As expressed by Justice Tuason: "It
is not the province of the courts to supervise legislation and keep
it within the bounds of propriety and common sense. That is
primarily and exclusively a legislative concern." There can be no
possible objection then to the observation of Justice
Montemayor: "As long as laws do not violate any Constitutional
provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless
of whether or not they are wise or salutary." For they, according
to Justice Labrador, "are not supposed to override legitimate
policy and . . . never inquire into the wisdom of the law."
It is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief Justice Concepcion
in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional
power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may
be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to
be: The principle of separation of powers has in the main wisely
allocated the respective authority of each department and
confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be
intrusion not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left
to the discretion of a coordinate branch, the judiciary would
substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law, as
there ought to be, the last offender should be the courts of
justice, to which rightly litigants submit their controversy
precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of legal norms
and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged
provision likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if
valid and cogent, on its wisdom cannot be sustained.
In this petition, Congressman Garcia seeks to revive the long settled issue against unreasonable price increases is not the nullification of Section 19
of the timeliness of full deregulation, which issue he had earlier submitted of R.A. 8479 but the setting into motion of its various other provisions.
to this Court by way of a Partial Motion for Reconsideration in
the Tatad case. In our Resolution dated December 3, 1997, which has long For this Court to declare unconstitutional the key provision around which
become final and executory, we stated: the law's anti-trust measures are clustered would mean a constitutionally
interdicted distrust of the wisdom of Congress and of the determined
We shall first resolve petitioner Garcia's linchpin contention that exercise of executive power.
the full deregulation decreed by R.A. No. 8180 to start at the end
of March 1997 is unconstitutional. For prescinding from this Having decided that deregulation is the policy to follow, Congress and the
premise, petitioner suggests that "we simply go back to the President have the duty to set up the proper and effective machinery to
transition period, price control will be revived through the ensure that it works. This is something which cannot be adjudicated into
automatic pricing mechanism based on Singapore Posted Prices. existence. This Court is only an umpire of last resort whenever the
The Energy Regulatory Board . . . would play a limited and Constitution or a law appears to have been violated. There is no showing
ministerial role of computing the monthly price ceiling of each of a constitutional violation in this case.
and every petroleum fuel product, using the automatic pricing
formula. While the OPSF would return, this coverage would be
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
limited to monthly price increases in excess of P0.50 per liter.
SO ORDERED.
We are not impressed by petitioner Garcia's submission.
Petitioner has no basis in condemning as unconstitutional per
se the date fixed by Congress for the beginning of the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. Our Decision
merely faulted the Executive for factoring the depletion of OPSF
in advancing the date of full deregulation to February 1997.
Nonetheless, the error of the Executive is now a non-issue for the
full deregulation set by Congress itself at the end of March 1997
has already come to pass. March 1997 is not an arbitrary date. By
that date, the transition period has ended and it was expected
that the people would have adjusted to the role of market forces
in shaping the prices of petroleum and its products. The choice
of March 1997 as the date of full deregulation is a judgment of
Congress and its judgment call cannot be impugned by this
Court. 8

Reduced to its basic arguments, it can be seen that the challenge in this
petition is not against the legality of deregulation. Petitioner does not
expressly challenge deregulation. The issue, quite simply, is the timeliness
or the wisdom of the date when full deregulation should be effective.

In this regard, what constitutes reasonable time is not for judicial

determination. Reasonable time involves the appraisal of a great variety of
relevant conditions, political, social and economic. They are not within the
appropriate range of evidence in a court of justice. It would be an
extravagant extension of judicial authority to assert judicial notice as the
basis for the determination. 9

We repeat that what petitioner decries as unsuccessful is not a final result.

It is only a beginning. The Court is not inclined to stifle deregulation as
enacted by Congress from its very start. We leave alone the program of
deregulation at this stage. Reasonable time will prove the wisdom or folly
of the deregulation program for which Congress and not the Court is
accountable.

Petitioner argues further that the public interest requires price controls
while the oligopoly exists, for that is the only way the public can be
protected from monopoly or oligopoly pricing. But is indefinite price
control the only feasible and legal way to enforce the constitutional
mandate against oligopolies?

Art. 186 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, punishes as a felony the
creation of monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade. The
Solicitor General, on the other hand, cites provisions of R.A. 8479
intended to prevent competition from being corrupted or manipulated.
Section 11, entitled "Anti-Trust Safeguards", defines and prohibits
cartelization and predatory pricing. It penalizes the persons and officers
involved with imprisonment of three (3) to seven (7) years and fines
ranging from One million to Two million pesos. For this purpose, a Joint
Task Force from the Department of Energy and Department of Justice is
created under Section 14 to investigate and order the prosecution of
violations.

Sec. 8 and 9 of the Act, meanwhile, direct the Departments of Foreign

Affairs, Trade and Industry, and Energy to undertake strategies, incentives
and benefits, including international information campaigns, tax holidays
and various other agreements and utilizations, to invite and encourage the
entry of new participants. Section 6 provides for uniform tariffs at three
percent (3%).

Sec. 13 of the Act provides for "Remedies", under which the filing of
actions by government prosecutors and the investigation of private
complaints by the Task Force is provided. Sections 14 and 15 provide how
the Department of Energy shall monitor and prevent the occurrence of
collusive pricing in the industry.

It can be seen, therefore, that instead of the price controls advocated by

the petitioner, Congress has enacted anti-trust measures which it believes
will promote free and fair competition. Upon the other hand, the
disciplined, determined, consistent and faithful execution of the law is the
function of the President. As stated by public respondents, the remedy