TORTS & DAMAGES CASE DIGESTS

Atty. Jerick Sta. Barbara Syllabus [Aly Notes]

TISON vs. SPS. POMASIN

G.R. No. 173180; August 24, 2011

PET: ALBERT TISON and CLAUDIO L. JABON

RES: SPS. GREGORIO POMASIN and CONSORCIA PONCE-POMASIN

Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Barangay
Agos, Polangui, Albay last 12 August 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the
direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the
opposite lane going towards Naga City.

Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni’s father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passengers side. He
testified that while the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from
the opposite direction and encroaching on the jitneys lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was
dragged further causing death and injuries to its passengers. On the other hand, Jabon recounted that while he
was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of the road.
Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid
collision, Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay.

Multiple death and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. Gregorio was injured and brought to the Albay
Provincial Hospital in Legaspi City. His daughter and sister died on the spot. His other daughter Laarni, the
jitney driver, and 1 granddaughter expired at the hospital. His wife, and another granddaughter as well as several
others sustained injuries. Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured.

(Tison), the owner of the truck, extended financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 each
immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin (Cynthia), one of Gregorios daughters.
Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance. respondents filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo. They alleged that the proximate cause of the
accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for
indemnification for the heirs:

those who perished in the accident, in each P50,000.00

hospitalization, medical and burial expenses P500,000.00
continuous hospitalization and medical expenses of Spouses P350,000.00
moral damages P1,000,000.00
Exemplary damages P250,000.00
loss of income of Cynthia P30,000.00
attorney’s fees, plus P1,000.00 per court appearance P100,000.00
litigation expenses; and cost of suit P50,000.00

In their Answer, petitioners countered that it was Laarnis negligence which proximately caused the accident.
They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an amicable settlement by
executing an Affidavit of Desistance. Notwithstanding the affidavit, petitioners complained that respondents
filed the instant complaint to harass them and profit from the recklessness of Laarni. Petitioners counterclaimed
for damages.

RTC: rendered judgment in favor of petitioners dismissing the complaint for damages. The trial court
considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable than that of Gregorios,
a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the driver. The trial
court concluded that Laarni caused the collision of the jitney and the tractor-trailer. The trial court likewise
upheld the Affidavit of Desistance

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CA: disagreed with the trial court and ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. In
support of such finding, the Court of Appeals relied heavily on Gregorios testimony that Jabon was driving the
tractor-trailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney. Based on the gravity of the impact and
the damage caused to the jitney resulting in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals inferred that
Jabon must be speeding. The appellate court noted that the restriction in Jabon’s driver’s license was violated,
thus, giving rise to the presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident. MR denied.

ISSUE: The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law which lead back to the very issue litigated
by the trial court: Who is the negligent party or the party at fault?

RULING: We give weight to this findings of the trial court greater than the opposite conclusion reached by
the appellate court. The trial court expounded, thus:

In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration is their

opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the matter they
testify to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which oftentimes
happen merely momentarily or in the split of a second. In the case of a running or travelling vehicle,
especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary roads, the driver
is concentrated on his driving continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While in
the case of a mere passenger, he does not have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the
travelling vehicle, as in fact he may converse with other passengers and pay no attention to the
driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze off to sleep if he wants to,
rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the accident or collision or
immediately preceding thereto not as much as that of the driver whose attention is continuously
focused on his driving.

While it is logical that a drivers attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger, it should
also be considered that the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a general
rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a passenger,
the former is more credible.

Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and a passenger in a vehicle
was not the only basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabons alleged vantage point to clearly
observe the incident, the trial court also took into consideration Gregorios admission that prior to the accident,
the jitney was running on the curving and downward portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took
into account the other and opposite testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and when
it was about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming truck running very fast and encroaching the jitneys lane. We
perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when
it collided with the descending jitney. The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was
straightforward and consistent. The recollection of Gregorio veered from curving and downward to uphill. On
this point, Jabon and his testimony is more credible.

There was no showing that the tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-
trailer was in fact ascending. Clearly, the negligence of Gregorios daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of
the accident.

Although at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction imposed
on his driver’s license. The CA concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of
the collision. Driving without a proper license is a violation of traffic regulation. Under Article 2185 of the Civil
Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was violating any traffic
regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection
must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the
violation of the traffic regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed
thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without
legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury.

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Likewise controlling is our ruling in Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se,
arising from the mere violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for
damages. The rule on negligence per se must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences
of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a
judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability arising from the failure of the actor to
perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered inflexible so as to
deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractor-trailer driver’s restrictions on his
license to the vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land
Transportation Office merely erred in not including restriction code 8 in his license. WHEREFORE, the
petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE.

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 NORMAN GAID vs. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 171636; April 7, 2009

Norman A. Gaid was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. At around 12:00
noon on 25 October 2001, petitioner was driving his passenger jeepney along a two-lane road where the
Laguindingan National High School is located toward the direction of Moog in Misamis Oriental. His jeepney
was filled to seating capacity. At the time several students were coming out of the school premises. Meanwhile,
a fourteen year-old student, Michael Dayata (Dayata), was seen by eyewitness Artman Bongolto (Bongolto)
sitting near a store on the left side of the road. From where he was at the left side of the road, Dayata raised his
left hand to flag down petitioner’s jeepney. However, neither did petitioner nor the conductor, Dennis Mellalos
(Mellalos), saw anybody flagging down the jeepney to ride at that point.

The next thing Bongalto saw, Dayatas feet was pinned to the rear wheel of the jeepney, after which, he laid flat
on the ground behind the jeepney. Another prosecution witness, Usaffe Actub (Actub), who was also situated
on the left side of the street but directly in front of the school gate, heard a strong impact coming from the jeep
sounding as if the driver forced to accelerate in order to hurdle an obstacle. Mellalos heard a shout that a boy
was run over, prompting him to jump off the jeepney to help the victim. Petitioner stopped and saw Mellalos
carrying the body of the victim.

Mellalos loaded the victim on a motorcycle and brought him to the hospital. Dayata was first brought to the
Laguindingan Health Center, but it was closed. Mellalos then proceeded to the El Salvador Hospital. Upon
advice of its doctors, however, Dayata was brought to the Northern Mindanao Medical Center where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. Dr. Tammy Uy issued an autopsy report stating cranio-cerebral injuries as the cause
of death. She testified that the head injuries of Dayata could have been caused by having run over by the jeepney.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Laguindingan found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged. The lower court held petitioner negligent in his driving considering that the victim was
dragged to a distance of 5.70 meters from the point of impact. He was also scored for not stopping his vehicle
after noticing that the jeepneys left rear tire jolted causing the vehicle to tilt towards the right. On appeal, the
RTC affirmed in toto. The CA affirmed the trial courts judgment with modification in that it found petitioner
guilty only of simple negligence resulting in homicide. CA exonerated petitioner from the charge of reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide on the ground that he was not driving recklessly at the time of the accident.
However, the appellate court still found him to be negligent when he failed to promptly stop his vehicle to check
what caused the sudden jotting of its rear tire. MR denied.

Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that there is (sic) absolutely lack of precaution on
the part of the petitioner when he continued even after he had noticed that the left rear tire and the jeep tilted to
its right side. Petitioner stressed that he, in fact, stopped his jeep when its left rear tire bounced and upon hearing
that somebody had been ran over. Petitioner asserts that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion in
convicting him of the offense of simple negligence resulting in homicide. Assuming arguendo that he failed to
promptly stop his vehicle, petitioner maintains that no prudent man placed in the same situation could have
foreseen the vehicular accident or could have stopped his vehicle in time when its left rear tire bounced due to
the following reasons: (1) the victim was only a trespasser; (2) petitioners attention was focused on the road and
the students outside the schools gate; and (3) the jeepney was fully loaded with passengers and cargoes and it
was impossible for the petitioner to promptly stop his vehicle. OSG maintained that petitioner was negligent
when he continued to run towards the direction of Moog, Laguindingan, dragging the victim a few meters from
the point of impact, despite hearing that a child had been run over

ISSUE: WON petitioner was negligent?

RULING: Petitioner must be acquitted at least on reasonable doubt. The award of damages must also be deleted
pursuant to Article 2179 of the Civil Code which states that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the
immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

1ST STAGE: began when Dayata flagged down the jeepney while positioned on the left side of the road and
ended when he was run over by the jeepney

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2nd STAGE: covered the span between the moment immediately after the victim was run over and the point
when petitioner put the jeepney to a halt

Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material
damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to
perform such act. In the instant case, petitioner was driving slowly at the time of the accident, as testified to by
two eyewitnesses. Petitioner stated that he was driving at no more than 15 kilometers per hour. It appears from
the evidence Dayata came from the left side of the street. Petitioner, who was driving the jeepney on the right
lane, did not see the victim flag him down. He also failed to see him go near the jeepney at the left side.
Understandably, petitioner was focused on the road ahead. In Dayatas haste to board the jeep which was then
running, his feet somehow got pinned to the left rear tire, as narrated by Bongolto. Actub only saw Dayata after
he heard a strong impact coming from the jeep.

With the foregoing facts, petitioner cannot be held liable during the first stage. Specifically, he cannot be held
liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, as found by the trial court. The proximate cause of the
accident and the death of the victim was definitely his own negligence in trying to catch up with the moving
jeepney to get a ride. Petitioner had exercised extreme precaution as he drove slowly upon reaching the vicinity
of the school. He cannot be faulted for not having seen the victim who came from behind on the left side.

However, the CA found petitioner guilty of simple negligence resulting in homicide for failing to stop driving
at the time when he noticed the bouncing of his vehicle. Verily, the appellate court was referring to the second
stage of the incident. Negligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements of simple negligence: are (1) that there is lack of
precaution on the part of the offender; and (2) that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the
danger is not clearly manifest

The standard test in determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby injury or damage
results to the person or property of another is this: could a prudent man, in the position of the person to
whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the
course actually pursued? If so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take
precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. Reasonable
foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this provision, is always necessary before
negligence can be held to exist.

In this case, the courts below zeroed in on the fact that petitioner did not stop the jeepney when he felt the
bouncing of his vehicle, a circumstance which the appellate court equates with negligence. Assuming arguendo
that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient,
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred In order to
establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct
causal connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is
not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury

Clearly then, the prosecution was not able to establish that the proximate cause of the victims death was
petitioners alleged negligence, if at all, even during the second stage of the incident. Petitioner Norman A. Gaid
is ACQUITTED of the crime of Simple Negligence Resulting in Homicide as found by the Court of Appeals
and of the charge of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide

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 ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE vs, SPOUSES PEREZ & SPOUSES QUINTOS
G.R. No. 222740, September 28, 2016

PET: ST. LUKE'S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE-WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION; DR. BRIGIDO L. CARANDANG; and DR. ALEJANDRO P. ORTIGAS
RES: SPOUSES MANUEL & ESMERALDA PEREZ and SPOUSES ERIC & JURISITA QUINTOS

In February 2010, St. Luke's sent four (4) of its 4th year medical students to the clinic, namely: plaintiffs-
appellants Spouses Perez's daughter Jessa, plaintiffs-appellants Spouses Quintos' daughter Cecille, Jerillie Ann
Murillo (Murillo) and Miguel Rafael Ramos (Ramos). They were tasked to complete a four-week clerkship
rotation at the clinic and like the previous batches, they were housed in the second floor of the clinic.

According to Ramos, he and his groupmates reported for duty at the Cabiao clinic at approximately 10 o'clock
in the morning of February 8, 2010. When their shift ended at 5 o'clock that afternoon, the group went for a jog
and returned to the clinic at around 7 o'clock in the evening. They again went out at 9 o'clock in the evening to
buy beverages, cooking oil and other items needed for their breakfast the next day and went to sleep sometime
after midnight. Ramos admitted that one of the beverages they bought was an alcoholic beverage called The
Bar, which consisted of either vodka or gin. He also admitted that only he and Cecille drank the alcoholic
beverage which they mixed with the soda and that they did not consume the whole bottle.

Ramos was awakened sometime between 3 o'clock and 3:30 in the morning of February 9, 2010 when he heard
Murillo shouting from the other side of the room that there was a fire. Ramos immediately ran to the door which
led to the living room and when he opened the same, he saw thick smoke coming from the left portion of the
living room where there was a glow. The girls, who had followed him to the bathroom, stayed behind. When
Ramos' attempt to put out the fire proved to be futile, he went back to the bathroom and poured water on the
girls in an attempt to alleviate the extreme heat coming from the fire.

According to Ramos, the smoke started to seep through the bathroom door and the group had started shouting
for help. After a considerable amount of time, somebody broke the window and started to dismantle the iron
grills barring the same. By that time, Ramos had started losing consciousness due to smoke inhalation and only
remembered that he was being pulled out of the building through the window. Unfortunately, the fire resulted
in the deaths of the female medical students, including the daughters of plaintiffs-appellants due to smoke
inhalation resulting to asphyxia. As a result of the deaths, defendant-appellee St. Luke's compensated the parents
of the three deceased students in the amount of PhP300,000.00 each from insurance proceeds.

The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an investigation on the incident that the fire was purely
ACCIDENTAL IN NATURE due to UNATTENDED COOKING that occurred at the kitchen of said floor and
no evidence were gathered to show that the fire was intentionally, deliberately or maliciously set.

Respondents had their doubts. Thus plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a meeting with defendants. The officials
informed plaintiffs-appellants that the fire was caused by the gas burner left open by the victims which greatly
disturbed plaintiffs-appellants. In a subsequent meeting, they were informed that there was also evidence that
the victims were drinking alcoholic beverages on the night of the fire which plaintiffs-appellants refused to
accept. Convinced that there was a cover-up, plaintiffs-appellants continued to question individual defendants-
appellees. Exasperated, defendant-appellee Dr. Carandang allegedly asked "Ano pa bang gusto ninyo sa amin?
Nakiramay na kami."

Offended and still unconvinced, respondent Spouses Manuel and Esmeralda Perez, the parents of Jessa, and
respondent Spouses Eric and Jurisita Quintos, the parents of Cecille, sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). The NBI declared that the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic building was in
violation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9514 (R.A. No. 9514) or the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines, that the cause of the fire was due to faulty electrical wiring, and that St. Luke's negligence is
criminal in nature. All the windows at the second floor are also covered by permanent iron grills. There are no
fire exits, fire alarms, fire extinguishers, sprinklers, emergency lights. The community center is a virtual
fire/death trap. During night time, medical students were left alone inside the 2nd floor with the main gate
locked from the outside and with no apparent signs of fire alarms, fire sprinklers, fire exit plan, emergency

6 |AL Y C A B S
lights, provisions of confining the fire to its source, among others, for the occupants fire safety and protection
system.

Engr. David R. Aoanan, Chief Electrical Section of the and member of the NBI investigating team observed
that the ratio between the capacity of the circuit breaker and the electrical service wire is out of proportion and
became electrically insensitive to overload and wire short circuits; thereby negating the very purpose the circuit
breaker was designed. Moreover, the Cabiao Bureau of Fire Protection failed to perform its mandate pursuant
to RA 9514. Under the Fire Code, the Bureau of Fire Protection is required to conduct fire safety inspections as
pre-requisite to the grant of licenses and permits and that inasmuch as FO3 ESQUIVEL (Cabiao BFP head) has
bungled the investigation of the fire by removing items from the scene of the fire and his failure to explain the
disappearance of other electrical debris, the opening and enlargement of the iron grill where the sole survivor
passed, the back door broken, and the non-recording of the investigations, FO3 Esquivel's action and behaviors
are highly suspect of a massive cover up of the real cause of the fire.

NBO also concluded that the Cabiao BFP has manifested its prejudice and bias and thus, cannot be an
independent, reliable and credible investigator of this fire incident. They could not even entertain any theory,
other than the gas burner, because in doing so would place themselves in jeopardy. They even resorted to
tampering of premises by removing all electrical wire debris, thinking that in its absence, fire caused by short
circuits cannot be proven. It is highly probable that the origin of fire is electrical.

Respondents then filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners St. Luke's College of Medicine-William H.
Quasha Memorial Foundation, Dean of Medicine Brigido L. Carandang, and Associate Dean for Faculty and
Student Affairs Alejandro P. Ortigas, claiming that their negligence caused the deaths of respondents' daughters.
Respondents maintained that, as a learning institution which sends out its medical students to rural areas to
comply with its curriculum requirement, St. Luke's has the contractual duty and legal responsibility to see to it
that the premises to where it sends its students are safe and that, in the case at bar, St. Luke's refused to recognize
its obligations/liabilities

RTC: dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It held that the Cabiao Community Clinic was not a fire trap
as there were two fire exits, and that respondents failed to present any report or finding by a competent authority
that the said Clinic was not a safe and secure place for the conduct of St. Luke's clerkship program. The RTC
did not take into consideration the NBI Report as it was allegedly not presented. RTC further held that the Clinic
is owned by the Municipality of Cabiao, responsible officials should have been impleaded as indispensable
parties

CA: reversed the RTC Decision and remanded the case to the RTC for reception of evidence on the amount of
damages to be awarded. CA held that the Municipality of Cabiao was not an indispensable party as the
Complaint was one for damages based on the allegations in the enrollment contract. And that although schools
cannot be insurers of its students against all risks, in the case at bar, the safety of the victims was within the
reach of petitioners and the hazard of a fire was not unforeseeable

ISSUE: WON petitioner was negligent?

RULING: It is settled that in culpa contractual, the mere proof of the existence of the contract and the failure,
of its compliance justify, prima facie, a corresponding right of relief. In the case at bar, it was amply shown that
petitioners and the victims were bound by the enrollment contracts, and that petitioners were negligent in
complying with their obligation under the said contracts to ensure the safety and security of their students. For
this contractual breach, petitioners should be held liable.

A perusal of the Complaint readily shows that respondents base their cause of action on petitioners' breach of
the contractual obligation, as an educational institution, of ensuring that their students, in the performance of a
required school activity, would be safe and secure. The Municipality of Cabiao, not being a party to said
enrollment contract, is not an indispensable party to the case. Indeed, the present case is one between a school
and its students, with their relationship being based on the enrollment contracts.

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In the illuminating case of PSBA, et al. v. CA, et al. the Court had the opportunity to lay down the principle that
when an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the necessary tools
and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Indubitably, institutions of learning have the "built-in" obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for
learning, an atmosphere where there are no constant threats to life and limb, and one where peace and order are
maintained.
In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus premises of St. Luke's.
In the course description of the clerkship program in preventive and community medicine, it is stated that the
Cabiao Community Clinic serves as the base operation of the clerkship program. As such, petitioner had the
same obligation to their students, even though they were stationed in the Cabiao Community Clinic, and it was
incumbent upon petitioners to ensure that said Clinic was conducive for learning, that it had no constant threats
to life and limb, and that peace and order was maintained thereat.

In Mendoza, et al. v. Sps. Gomez, we defined negligence as "the failure to observe for the protection of the
interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury." In Gaid v. People, we enumerated the elements of simple negligence
as follows: (1) that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender, and (2) that the damage impending to
be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. In the case at bar, it is well to remember that
the victims were in the Cabiao Community Clinic because it was a requirement of petitioners. The students were
complying with an obligation under the enrollment contract. Petitioners failed to take the necessary precautions
to guard their students against foreseeable harm. As correctly found by the CA, petitioners were remiss in
inspecting the premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims.

The petitioners were obviously negligent in detailing their students to a virtual fire trap. As found by the NBI,
the Clinic was unsafe and was constructed in violation of numerous provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the
Philippines. It had no emergency facilities, no fire exits, and had no permits or clearances from the appropriate
government offices.

Petitioners additionally aver that the Clinic was built under the direction, supervision, management and control
of the Municipality of Cabiao, and that it ensured that there was an agreement for the Municipality of Cabiao to
provide 24 hour security to the Clinic. Petitioners, however, cannot escape liability based on these arguments.
As held in Saludaga v. FEU, et al. a learning institution should not be allowed to completely relinquish or
abdicate matters of safety and security to a third party as to do so would result to contracting away its inherent
obligation of ensuring a safe learning environment for its students.

The enrollment contract is between petitioners and the victims, and petitioners cannot abdicate' on their
contractual obligation to provide their students a safe learning environment, nor can it pass or contract away
such obligation to a third party. The Court resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM
the Court of Appeals' Decision and Resolution

NOTES:

Meeting includes – plaintiffs-appellants, requested for a meeting with defendant-appellee Dr. Alejandro
Ortigas, Associate Dean for Faculty and Student Affairs of St. Luke's. During the meeting, plaintiffs-appellants
were surprised by the presence of defendants-appellees Dr. Brigido Carandang, St. Luke's Dean of Medicine,
the Municipal Health Officer of Cabiao Dr. De Leon, as well as Municipal Fire Marshall of Cabiao Baby Boy
Esquivel, a Cabiao police officer and its barangay captain.

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 PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS vs. VIZCARA
G.R. No. 190022; February 15, 2012

PET: PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS CORPORATION; JAPHET ESTRANAS and BEN

SAGA
RES: PURIFICACION VIZCARA, MARIVIC VIZCARA, CRESENCIA A. NATIVIDAD, HECTOR
VIZCARA, JOEL VIZCARA and DOMINADOR ANTONIO

On May 14, 2004, at about three oclock in the morning, Reynaldo Vizcara (Reynaldo) was driving a passenger
jeepney headed towards Bicol to deliver onion crops, with his companions, namely, Cresencio Vizcara
(Cresencio), Crispin Natividad (Crispin), Samuel Natividad (Samuel), Dominador Antonio (Dominador) and
Joel Vizcara (Joel). While crossing the railroad track in Tiaong, Quezon, a Philippine National Railways (PNR)
train, then being operated by respondent Japhet Estranas (Estranas), suddenly turned up and rammed the
passenger jeepney. The collision resulted to the instantaneous death of Reynaldo, Cresencio, Crispin, and
Samuel. On the other hand, Dominador and Joel, sustained serious physical injuries.

At the time of the accident, there was no level crossing installed at the railroad crossing. Additionally, the Stop,
Look and Listen signage was poorly maintained. The Stop signage was already faded while the Listen signage
was partly blocked by another signboard.

On September 15, 2004, the survivors of the mishap, Joel and Dominador, together with the heirs of the deceased
victims (abovementioned respondents) filed an action for damages against PNR, Estranas and Ben Saga, the
alternate driver of the train, before the RTC of Palayan City Branch 40. In their complaint, the respondents
alleged that the proximate cause of the fatalities and serious physical injuries sustained by the victims of the
accident was the petitioners’ gross negligence in not providing adequate safety measures to prevent injury to
persons and properties. They pointed out that in the railroad track of Tiaong, Quezon where the accident
happened, there was no level crossing bar, lighting equipment or bell installed to warn motorists of the existence
of the track and of the approaching train.

Petitioners claimed that they exercised due diligence in operating the train and monitoring its roadworthiness.
They asseverate that right before the collision, Estranas was driving the train at a moderate speed. 400 meters
away from the railroad crossing, he started blowing his horn to warn motorists of the approaching train. When
the train was only 50 meters away from the intersection, respondent Estranas noticed that all vehicles on both
sides of the track were already at a full stop. Thus, he carefully proceeded at a speed of 25 kilometers per hour,
still blowing the trains horn. However, when the train was already 10 meters away from the intersection, the
passenger jeepney being driven by Reynaldo suddenly crossed the tracks.

Petitioners also maintain that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and recklessness of the
driver of the jeepney. They argue that as a professional driver, Reynaldo is presumed to be familiar with traffic
rules and regulations, including the right of way accorded to trains at railroad crossing and the precautionary
measures to observe in traversing the same. However, in utter disregard of the right of way enjoyed by PNR
trains, he failed to bring his jeepney to a full stop before crossing the railroad track and thoughtlessly followed
the ten-wheeler truck ahead of them.

RTC: ruled in favor of the respondents ordering defendants PNR, Japhet Estranas and Ben Saga to, jointly
and severally pay damages.

CA: affirmed RTC with modification with respect to the amount of damages awarded to the respondents. It
concurred with the trial court's conclusion that petitioner PNR's failure to install sufficient safety devices in
the area, such as flagbars or safety railroad bars and signage, was the proximate cause of the accident

ISSUE: WON CA erred in finding negligence on the part of petitioners?

RULING: The petitioners’ negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.

9 |AL Y C A B S
To determine the existence of negligence, the time-honored test was: Did the defendant in doing the alleged
negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect adopts the standard supposed to be
supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him.
The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and
prudence and determines liability by that.

At any rate, the records bear out that the factual circumstances of the case were meticulously scrutinized by
both the RTC and the CA before arriving at the same finding of negligence on the part of the petitioners, and
the Court found no compelling reason to disturb the same. Both courts ruled that the petitioners fell short of the
diligence expected of it, taking into consideration the nature of its business, to forestall any untoward incident.
In particular, the petitioners failed to install safety railroad bars to prevent motorists from crossing the tracks in
order to give way to an approaching train. Aside from the absence of a crossing bar, the Stop, Look and Listen
signage installed in the area was poorly maintained, hence, inadequate to alert the public of the impending
danger. A reliable signaling device in good condition, not just a dilapidated Stop, Look and Listen signage, is
needed to give notice to the public.

As to whether there was contributory negligence on the part of the respondents, the court rule in the negative.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. It is an act
or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on the part of the person injured which, concurring with the
defendants’ negligence, is the proximate cause of the injury.

Here, we cannot see how the respondents could have contributed to their injury when they were not even aware
of the forthcoming danger. It was established during the trial that the jeepney carrying the respondents was
following a ten-wheeler truck which was only about three to five meters ahead. When the truck proceeded to
traverse the railroad track,
Reynaldo, the driver of the jeepney, simply followed through. He did so under the impression that it was safe
to proceed. Thus, relying on his faculties of sight and hearing, Reynaldo had no reason to anticipate the
impending danger

As an institution established to alleviate public transportation, it is the duty of the PNR to promote the safety
and security of the general riding public and provide for their convenience, which to a considerable degree may
be accomplished by the installation of precautionary warning devices. Every railroad crossing must be installed
with barriers on each side of the track to block the full width of the road until after the train runs past the
crossing. To even draw closer attention, the railroad crossing may be equipped with a device which rings a bell
or turns on a signal light to signify the danger or risk of crossing. The responsibility of the PNR to secure public
safety does not end with the installation of safety equipment and signages but, with equal measure of
accountability, with the upkeep and repair of the same.

Finally, the CA correctly ruled that the doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable in the instant case. The
doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence brought about the occurrence of the incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the
impending harm but failed to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom. To reiterate, the
proximate cause of the collision was the petitioners’ negligence in ensuring that motorists and pedestrians alike
may safely cross the railroad track. The unsuspecting driver and passengers of the jeepney did not have any
participation in the occurrence of the unfortunate incident which befell them.

10 |AL Y C A B S
 YLARDE vs. AQUINO
G.R. No. L-33722; July 29, 1988

PET: FEDERICO YLARDE and ADELAIDA DORONIO

RES: EDGARDO AQUINO, MAURO SORIANO and COURT OF APPEALS

In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the principal of the Gabaldon Primary School, a public
educational institution located in Tayug, Pangasinan-Private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a teacher therein.
At that time, the school was fittered with several concrete blocks which were remnants of the old school shop
that was destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the huge stones were serious hazards to the schoolchildren,
another teacher by the name of Sergio Banez started burying them one by one as early as 1962. In fact, he was
able to bury ten of these blocks all by himself.

Deciding to help his colleague, Aquino gathered 18 of his male pupils, aged ten to eleven, after class dismissal
on October 7, 1963. Being their teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete block in
order to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The following day, also after classes, private respondent
Aquino called four of the original eighteen pupils to continue the digging. These four pupils — Reynaldo
Alonso, Francisco Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter and
forty centimeters deep. At this point, Aquino alone continued digging while the pupils remained inside the pit
throwing out the loose soil that was brought about by the digging.

When the depth was right enough to accommodate the concrete block, Aquino and his 4 pupils got out of the
hole. Then, said private respondent left the children to level the loose soil around the open hole while he went
to see Banez who was about thirty meters away. Aquino wanted to borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before leaving. , private respondent Aquino allegedly told the children
"not to touch the stone."

A few minutes after Aquino left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and Ylarde, playfully jumped into the
pit. Then, without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to
slide down towards the opening. Alonso and Alcantara were able to scramble out of the excavation on time but
unfortunately fo Ylarde, the concrete block caught him before he could get out, pinning him to the wall in a
standing position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained injuries. Three days later, Novelito Ylarde died.

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a suit for damages against both private respondents Aquino and
Soriano. The lower court dismissed the complaint on the following grounds: (1) that the digging done by the
pupils is in line with their course called Work Education; (2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a
very cautious person; and (3) that the demise of Ylarde was due to his own reckless imprudence. Petitioners
base their action against private respondent Aquino on Article 2176 of the Civil Code for his alleged negligence
that caused their son's death while the complaint against respondent Soriano as the head of school is founded
on Article 2180 of the same Code.

ISSUE: WON Aquino and Soriano are liable for damages?

RULING: Private respondent Aquino can be held liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-
in-charge of the children for being negligent in his supervision over them and his failure to take the necessary
precautions to prevent any injury on their persons. As regards the principal, the Court held that he cannot be
made responsible for the death of the child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic school and not a school of
arts and trades. Besides, as clearly admitted by private respondent Aquino, private respondent Soriano did not
give any instruction regarding the digging.

From a review of the record of this case, it is very clear that private respondent Aquino acted with fault and
gross negligence when he: (1) failed to avail himself of services of adult manual laborers and instead utilized
his pupils aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be a very
hazardous task; (2) required the children to remain inside the pit even after they had finished digging, knowing
that the huge block was lying nearby and could be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil who by chance
may go to the perilous area; (3) ordered them to level the soil around the excavation when it was so apparent

11 |AL Y C A B S
that the huge stone was at the brink of falling; (4) went to a place where he would not be able to check on the
children's safety; and (5) left the children close to the excavation, an obviously attractive nuisance.

The negligent act of private respondent Aquino in leaving his pupils in such a dangerous site has a direct causal
connection to the death of the child Ylarde. Left by themselves, it was but natural for the children to play around.
Tired from the strenuous digging, they just had to amuse themselves with whatever they found. Driven by their
playful and adventurous instincts and not knowing the risk they were facing three of them jumped into the hole
while the other one jumped on the stone. Since the stone was so heavy and the soil was loose from the digging,
it was also a natural consequence that the stone would fall into the hole beside it, causing injury on the
unfortunate child caught by its heavy weight.

The Court cannot agree with the finding of the lower court that the injuries which resulted in the death of the
child Ylarde were caused by his own reckless imprudence, It should be remembered that he was only ten years
old at the time of the incident, As such, he is expected to be playful and daring. His actuations were natural to
a boy his age. Going back to the facts, it was not only him but the three of them who jumped into the hole while
the remaining boy jumped on the block. From this, it is clear that he only did what any other ten-year old child
would do in the same situation.

In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent, it is evident that the lower court did not consider his age and
maturity. This should not be the case. The degree of care required to be exercised must vary with the capacity
of the person endangered to care for himself. A minor should not be held to the same degree of care as an adult,
but his conduct should be judged according to the average conduct of persons of his age and experience. The
standard of conduct to which a child must conform for his own protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity, discretion, knowledge and experience under the same or similar
circumstances. Bearing this in mind, the Court cannot charge the child Ylarde with reckless imprudence.

The court is not persuaded that the digging done by the pupils can pass as part of their Work Education. A single
glance at the picture showing the excavation and the huge concrete block 7 would reveal a dangerous site
requiring the attendance of strong, mature laborers and not ten-year old grade-four pupils. The contention that
private respondent Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of a very cautious person is certainly without cogent
basis. A reasonably prudent person would have foreseen that bringing children to an excavation site, and more
so, leaving them there all by themselves, may result in an accident. An ordinarily careful human being would
not assume that a simple warning "not to touch the stone" is sufficient to cast away all the serious danger that a
huge concrete block adjacent to an excavation would present to the children. Moreover, a teacher who stands in
loco parentis to his pupils would have made sure that the children are protected from all harm in his company.

Indemnity for the death of Child Ylarde P30,000.00

Exemplary damages 10,000.00
Moral damages 20,000.00

12 |AL Y C A B S
 JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129792; December 21, 1999

PET: JARCO MARKETING CORP., LEONARDO KONG, JOSE TIOPE and ELISA PANELO
RES: COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and CRISELDA R. AGUILAR

Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Petitioners
Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa Panelo are the stores branch manager, operations manager, and supervisor,
respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents of Zhieneth Aguilar. In the afternoon of 9 May
1983, Criselda and Zhieneth were at the 2nd floor of Syvels Department Store, Makati City. Criselda was
signing her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a sudden gust of wind and
heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She then beheld her daughter Zhieneth on the floor, her young body
pinned by the bulk of the stores gift-wrapping counter/structure Zhieneth was crying and screaming for help.
Although shocked, Criselda was quick to ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and
retrieving Zhieneth from the floor.

Zhieneth was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she was operated on. The next day Zhieneth
lost her speech and thereafter communicated with Criselda by writing on a magic slate. The injuries she
sustained took their toil on her young body. She died 14 days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the
hospital bed. She was six years old. The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained.

After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon petitioners the reimbursement of the
hospitalization, medical bills and wake and funeral expenses which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages. They sought the payment of P157,522.86
for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 for attorney’s fees and an unspecified amount for
loss of income and exemplary damages

Petitioners denied any liability for the injuries and consequent death of Zhieneth. They claimed that Criselda
was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a
store filled with glassware and appliances. Zhieneth too, was guilty of contributory negligence since she climbed
the counter, triggering its eventual collapse on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of
sturdy wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen years since its construction.
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it observed the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees. The other petitioners likewise raised due
care and diligence in the performance of their duties and countered that the complaint was malicious for which
they suffered besmirched reputation and mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of the complaint and an
award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees in their favor.

Trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim after finding that the preponderance of the evidence
favored petitioners. It ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on Zhieneth was her act of clinging
to it. It believed petitioners witnesses who testified that Zhieneth clung to the counter, after which the structure
and the girl fell with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In contrast, none of private
respondent’s witnesses testified on how the counter fell. The trial court also held that Criselda’s negligence
contributed to Zhieneth’s accident. In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the
counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a precautionary measure hence, it could not be
considered as an attractive nuisance.

The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents and reversed the appealed judgment. It
found that petitioners were negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was shaped
like an inverted “L” with a top wider than the base. It was top heavy and the weight of the upper portion was
neither evenly distributed nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective, unstable and
dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion or a push from the front could cause the counter
to fall. Two former employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of the management
the danger the counter could cause. But the latter ignored their concern.

13 |AL Y C A B S
The Court of Appeals declared that Zhieneth, who was below 7 years old at the time of the incident, was
absolutely incapable of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under 9 years could not be held
liable even for an intentional wrong, then the 6-year old Zhieneth could not be made to account for a mere
mischief or reckless act. It also absolved Criselda of any negligence, finding nothing wrong or out of the
ordinary in momentarily allowing Zhieneth to walk while she signed the document at the nearby counter.

ISSUE: WON Zhieneth and Criselda should be held liable for failing to exercise due and reasonable care while
inside the store premises?

RULING: Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive presumption that favors
children below 9 years old in that they are incapable of contributory negligence. CRISELDA too, should be
absolved from any contributory negligence.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a

reasonable man, guided by those considerations
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. It is
affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a
a fortuitous circumstance, event or happening; an
prudent and reasonable man would not do.
event happening without any human agency, or if
happening wholly or partly through human agency,
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the
an event which under the circumstances is unusual or
protection of the interest of another person, that
unexpected by the person to whom it happens
degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.

Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist with the other. Accident occurs
when the person concerned is exercising ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which
could not have been prevented by any means suggested by common prudence. The test in determining the
existence of negligence, thus: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and
caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of
negligence. We rule that the tragedy which befell Zhieneth was no accident and that Zhieneth’s death could only
be attributed to negligence.

In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is conclusively presumed to have acted without discernment,
and is, on that account, exempt from criminal liability. The same presumption and a like exemption from
criminal liability obtains in a case of a person over nine and under fifteen years of age, unless it is shown that
he has acted with discernment. Since negligence may be a felony and a quasi-delict and required discernment
as a condition of liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years of age is, by analogy, conclusively
presumed to be incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of lack of discernment or incapacity for
negligence in the case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age is a rebuttable one, under our law. The
rule, therefore, is that a child under nine years of age must be conclusively presumed incapable of
contributory negligence as a matter of law.

Even if we attribute contributory negligence to Zhieneth and assume that she climbed over the counter, no injury
should have occurred if we accept petitioners’ theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was the
truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. Criselda too, should be absolved from
any contributory negligence. Initially, Zhieneth held on to Criselda’s waist, later to the latters hand. Criselda
momentarily released the childs hand from her clutch when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise
moment, it was reasonable and usual for Criselda to let go of her child.

14 |AL Y C A B S
NOTES:

Part of res gestae – Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place or immediately
prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the
res gestae.

Attractive Nuisance – One who maintains on his premises dangerous instrumentalities or appliances of a
character likely to attract children in play, and who fails to exercise ordinary care to prevent children from
playing therewith or resorting thereto, is liable to a child of tender years who is injured thereby, even if the child
is technically a tresspasser in the premises. The principal reason for the doctrine is that the condition or appliance
in question although its danger is apparent to those of age, is so enticing or alluring to children of tender years
as to induce them to approach, get on or use it, and this attractiveness is an implied invitation to such children.

15 |AL Y C A B S
 DR. RUBI LI vs. SPOUSES REYNALDO and LINA SOLIMAN
G.R. No. 165279; June 7, 2011

On July 7, 1993, respondent’s 11-year old daughter, Angelica Soliman, underwent a biopsy of the mass located
in her lower extremity at the St. Lukes Medical Center (SLMC). Results showed that Angelica was suffering
from osteosarcoma, osteoblastic type, a high-grade (highly malignant) cancer of the bone which usually afflicts
teenage children. Following this diagnosis and as primary intervention, Angelicas right leg was amputated by
Dr. Jaime Tamayo in order to remove the tumor. As adjuvant treatment to eliminate any remaining cancer cells,
and hence minimize the chances of recurrence and prevent the disease from spreading to other parts of the
patient’s body (metastasis), chemotherapy was suggested by Dr. Tamayo. Dr. Tamayo referred Angelica to
another doctor at SLMC, herein petitioner Dr. Rubi Li, a medical oncologist.

On August 18, 1993, Angelica was admitted to SLMC. However, she died on September 1, 1993, just 11 days
after the (intravenous) administration of the first cycle of the chemotherapy regimen. Because SLMC refused
to release a death certificate without full payment of their hospital bill, respondents brought the cadaver of
Angelica to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame for post-mortem
examination. The Medico-Legal Report issued by said institution indicated the cause of death as Hypovolemic
shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation.

On the other hand, the Certificate of Death issued by SLMC stated the cause of death as follows: Immediate
cause: Osteosarcoma, Status Post AKA; Antecedent cause: Above knee amputation; Underlying cause: Status
Post Chemotherapy

On February 21, 1994, respondents filed a damage suit against petitioner, Dr. Leo Marbella, Mr. Jose Ledesma,
a certain Dr. Arriete and SLMC. Respondents charged them with negligence and disregard of Angelicas safety,
health and welfare by their careless administration of the chemotherapy drugs, their failure to observe the
essential precautions in detecting early the symptoms of fatal blood platelet decrease and stopping early on the
chemotherapy, which bleeding led to hypovolemic shock that caused Angelicas untimely demise. Further, it
was specifically averred that petitioner assured the respondents that Angelica would recover in view of 95%
chance of healing with chemotherapy and when asked regarding the side effects, petitioner mentioned only
slight vomiting, hair loss and weakness. Respondents thus claimed that they would not have given their consent
to chemotherapy had petitioner not falsely assured them of its side effects.

Petitioner denied having been negligent in administering the chemotherapy drugs to Angelica and asserted that
she had fully explained to respondents how the chemotherapy will affect not only the cancer cells but also the
patients normal body parts, including the lowering of white and red blood cells and platelets. She claimed that
what happened to Angelica can be attributed to malignant tumor cells possibly left behind after surgery.

Petitioner told respondents that Angelica should be given two to three weeks to recover from the operation
before starting chemotherapy. Respondents were apprehensive due to financial constraints as Reynaldo earns
only from P70,000.00 to P150,000.00 a year from his jewelry and watch repairing business.

Petitioner claimed that she explained to respondents that even when a tumor is removed, there are still small
lesions undetectable to the naked eye, and that adjuvant chemotherapy is needed to clean out the small lesions
in order to lessen the chance of the cancer to recur. She did not give the respondents any assurance that
chemotherapy will cure Angelicas cancer. During these consultations with respondents, she explained the
following side effects of chemotherapy treatment to respondents: (1) falling hair; (2) nausea and vomiting; (3)
loss of appetite; (4) low count of white blood cells, red blood cells, and platelets; (5) possible sterility due to the
effects on Angelicas ovary; (6) damage to the heart and kidneys; and (7) darkening of the skin especially when
exposed to sunlight. She actually talked with respondents four times, once at the hospital after the surgery, twice
at her clinic and the fourth time when Angelicas mother called her through long distance.

On August 18, 1993, respondents brought Angelica to SLMC for chemotherapy, bringing with them the results
of the laboratory tests requested by petitioner: Angelicas chest x-ray, ultrasound of the liver, creatinine and
complete liver function tests. Petitioner proceeded with the chemotherapy by first administering hydration fluids
to Angelica. The following day, August 19, petitioner began administering three chemotherapy drugs Cisplatin,

16 |AL Y C A B S
Doxorubicin and Cosmegen intravenously. Petitioner was supposedly assisted by her trainees Dr. Leo Marbella
and Dr. Grace Arriete. In his testimony, Dr. Marbella denied having any participation in administering the said
chemotherapy drugs.

2nd Day of Chemo: respondents noticed reddish discoloration on Angelicas face. They asked petitioner about
it, but she merely quipped, wala yan, epekto ng gamot. Petitioner recalled noticing the skin rashes on the nose
and cheek area of Angelica. At that moment, she entertained the possibility that Angelica also had systemic
lupus and consulted Dr. Victoria Abesamis on the matter

3rd Day of Chemo: Angelica had difficulty breathing and was thus provided with oxygen inhalation apparatus.
This time, the reddish discoloration on Angelica’s face had extended to her neck, but petitioner dismissed it
again as merely the effect of medicines.

4th Day of Chemo (August 22): upon seeing that their child could not anymore bear the pain, respondents
pleaded with petitioner to stop the chemotherapy. Petitioner supposedly replied: Dapat 15 Cosmegen pa iyan.
Okay, lets observe. If pwede na, bigyan uli ng chemo. At this point, respondents asked petitioners permission to
bring their child home. Later in the evening, Angelica passed black stool and reddish urine.

5th Day of Chemo (August 23): petitioner yielded to respondents request to take Angelica home. But prior to
discharging Angelica, petitioner requested for a repeat serum calcium determination and explained to
respondents that the chemotherapy will be temporarily stopped while she observes Angelicas muscle twitching
and serum calcium level. Take-home medicines were also prescribed for Angelica, with instructions to
respondents that the serum calcium test will have to be repeated after seven days.

August 24: respondents claimed that Angelica still suffered from convulsions. They also noticed that she had a
fever and had difficulty breathing. Petitioner insisted it was carpo-pedal spasm, not convulsions. She verified
that at around 4:50 that afternoon, Angelica developed difficulty in breathing and had fever.

August 26: Angelica was bleeding through the mouth. Respondents also saw blood on her anus and urine. When
Lina asked petitioner what was happening to her daughter, petitioner replied, Bagsak ang platelets ng anak mo.
Four units of platelet concentrates were then transfused to Angelica. Petitioner prescribed Solucortef.
Considering that Angelicas fever was high and her white blood cell count was low, petitioner prescribed
Leucomax. About 4-8 bags of blood, consisting of packed red blood cells, fresh whole blood, or platelet
concentrate, were transfused to Angelica.

August 27-28: Angelica continued bleeding, but petitioner claimed it was lesser in amount and in frequency.
Petitioner also denied that there were gadgets attached to Angelica at that time.

August 29: Angelica developed ulcers in her mouth, which petitioner said were blood clots that should not be
removed. Respondents claimed that Angelica passed about half a liter of blood through her anus at around seven
oclock that evening, which petitioner likewise denied.

August 30: Angelica continued bleeding. She was restless as endotracheal and nasogastric tubes were inserted
into her weakened body. Angelica was given more platelet concentrate and fresh whole blood, which petitioner
claimed improved her condition. Petitioner told Angelica not to remove the endotracheal tube because this may
induce further bleeding.

The next day, respondents claimed that Angelica became hysterical, vomited blood and her body turned black.
Part of Angelicas skin was also noted to be shredding by just rubbing cotton on it. Angelica was so restless she
removed those gadgets attached to her, saying Ayaw ko na; there were tears in her eyes and she kept turning her
head. Observing her daughter to be at the point of death, Lina asked for a doctor but the latter could not answer
her anymore. At this time, the attending physician was Dr. Marbella who was shaking his head saying that
Angelicas platelets were down and respondents should pray for their daughter.

September 1, 3am: a priest came and they prayed before Angelica expired. Petitioner finally came back and
supposedly told respondents that there was malfunction or bogged-down machine.

17 |AL Y C A B S
On September 1, exactly two weeks after being admitted at SLMC for chemotherapy, Angelica died. The cause
of death, according to petitioner, was septicemia, or overwhelming infection, which caused Angelicas other
organs to fail. Petitioner attributed this to the patients poor defense mechanism brought about by the cancer
itself.

Respondents also presented as witnesses Dr. Jesusa Nieves-Vergara, Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP-Crime
Laboratory who conducted the autopsy on Angelicas cadaver, and Dr. Melinda Vergara Balmaceda who is a
Medical Specialist employed at the DOH Operations and Management Services. Dr. Vergara opined that this
can be attributed to the chemical agents in the drugs given to the victim, which caused platelet reduction
resulting to bleeding sufficient to cause the victims death. The witness conceded that the victim will also die of
osteosarcoma even with amputation or chemotherapy, but in this case Angelicas death was not caused by
osteosarcoma. Dr. Vergara admitted that she is not a pathologist but her statements were based on the opinion
of an oncologist whom she had interviewed. This oncologist supposedly said that if the victim already had DIC
prior to the chemotherapy, the hospital staff could have detected it.

On her part, Dr. Balmaceda declared that it is the physician’s duty to inform and explain to the patient or his
relatives every known side effect of the procedure or therapeutic agents to be administered, before securing the
consent of the patient or his relatives to such procedure or therapy. Dr. Balmaceda stressed that the patient or
relatives must be informed of all known side effects based on studies and observations, even if such will
aggravate the patient’s condition.

Dr. Jaime Tamayo, the orthopaedic surgeon who operated on Angelicas lower extremity, testified for the
defendants. He explained that in case of malignant tumors, there is no guarantee that the ablation or removal of
the amputated part will completely cure the cancer. Thus, surgery is not enough. The mortality rate of
osteosarcoma at the time of modern chemotherapy and early diagnosis still remains at 80% to 90%. Usually,
deaths occur from metastasis, or spread of the cancer to other vital organs like the liver, causing systemic
complications.

Trial court dismissed the complaint ruling that petitioner was not liable for damages as she observed the best
known procedures and employed her highest skill and knowledge in the administration of chemotherapy drugs
on Angelica but despite all efforts said patient died. It cited the testimony of Dr. Tamayo who testified that he
considered petitioner one of the most proficient in the treatment of cancer and that the patient in this case was
afflicted with a very aggressive type of cancer necessitating chemotherapy as adjuvant treatment. The trial court
declared that petitioner has taken the necessary precaution against the adverse effect of chemotherapy on the
patient, adding that a wrong decision is not by itself negligence.

Respondents appealed to the CA which, while concurring with the trial courts finding that there was no
negligence committed by the petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy treatment to Angelica, found that
petitioner as her attending physician failed to fully explain to the respondents all the known side effects of
chemotherapy hence, spouses are entitled to their claim for damages.

Petitioner contends that in the absence of any clear showing or proof, she cannot be charged with negligence in
not informing the respondents all the side effects of chemotherapy or in the pre-treatment procedures done on
Angelica. As to the cause of death, petitioner insists that Angelica did not die of platelet depletion but of sepsis
which is a complication of the cancer itself.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner should be held liable for failure to fully disclosed serious side effects to the parents of
the child patient?

RULING: Petition is meritorious.

The type of lawsuit which has been called medical malpractice or, more appropriately, medical negligence, is
that type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has caused bodily harm. In order to successfully pursue such a claim, a patient must prove
that a health care provider, in most cases a physician, either failed to do something which a reasonably prudent

18 |AL Y C A B S
health care provider would have done, or that he or she did something that a reasonably prudent provider would
not have done; and that that failure or action caused injury to the patient

This Court has recognized that medical negligence cases are best proved by opinions of expert witnesses
belonging in the same general neighborhood and in the same general line of practice as defendant physician or
surgeon. In this case, both the trial and appellate courts concurred in finding that the alleged negligence of
petitioner in the administration of chemotherapy drugs to respondents child was not proven considering that
Drs. Vergara and Balmaceda, not being oncologists or cancer specialists, were not qualified to give expert
opinion as to whether petitioners lack of skill, knowledge and professional competence in failing to observe the
standard of care in her line of practice was the proximate cause of the patients death.

The doctrine of informed consent within the context of physician-patient relationships goes far back into
English common law. As early as 1767, doctors were charged with the tort of battery (i.e., an unauthorized
physical contact with a patient) if they had not gained the consent of their patients prior to performing a surgery
or procedure. From a purely ethical norm, informed consent evolved into a general principle of law that a
physician has a duty to disclose what a reasonably prudent physician in the medical community in the exercise
of reasonable care would disclose to his patient as to whatever grave risks of injury might be incurred from a
proposed course of treatment, so that a patient, exercising ordinary care for his own welfare, and faced with a
choice of undergoing the proposed treatment, or alternative treatment, or none at all, may intelligently exercise
his judgment by reasonably balancing the probable risks against the probable benefits.

It is also his duty to warn of the dangers lurking in the proposed treatment and to impart information which the
patient has every right to expect. Indeed, the patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which
traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with arm’s length transactions. The physician is
not expected to give the patient a short medical education, the disclosure rule only requires of him a reasonable
explanation, which means generally informing the patient in nontechnical terms as to what is at stake; the
therapy alternatives open to him, the goals expectably to be achieved, and the risks that may ensue from
particular treatment or no treatment.

Cobbs v. Grant further reiterated the pronouncement in Canterbury v. Spence that for liability of the physician
for failure to inform patient, there must be causal relationship between physicians failure to inform and the
injury to patient and such connection arises only if it is established that, had revelation been made, consent to
treatment would not have been given.

There are four essential elements a plaintiff must prove in a malpractice action based upon the doctrine of
informed consent: (1) the physician had a duty to disclose material risks; (2) he failed to disclose or inadequately
disclosed those risks; (3) as a direct and proximate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment she otherwise would not have consented to; and (4) plaintiff was injured by the proposed treatment.
The gravamen in an informed consent case requires the plaintiff to point to significant undisclosed information
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it.

Examining the evidence on record, we hold that there was adequate disclosure of material risks inherent in the
chemotherapy procedure performed with the consent of Angelicas parents. Respondents could not have been
unaware in the course of initial treatment and amputation of Angelicas lower extremity, that her immune system
was already weak on account of the malignant tumor in her knee. When petitioner informed the respondents
beforehand of the side effects of chemotherapy which includes lowered counts of white and red blood cells,
decrease in blood platelets, possible kidney or heart damage and skin darkening, there is reasonable expectation
on the part of the doctor that the respondents understood very well that the severity of these side effects will not
be the same for all patients undergoing the procedure.

In other words, by the nature of the disease itself, each patient’s reaction to the chemical agents even with pre-
treatment laboratory tests cannot be precisely determined by the physician. That death can possibly result from
complications of the treatment or the underlying cancer itself, immediately or sometime after the administration
of chemotherapy drugs, is a risk that cannot be ruled out, as with most other major medical procedures, but such
conclusion can be reasonably drawn from the general side effects of chemotherapy already disclosed.

19 |AL Y C A B S
On the other hand, it is difficult to give credence to respondents claim that petitioner told them of 95% chance
of recovery for their daughter, as it was unlikely for doctors like petitioner who were dealing with grave
conditions such as cancer to have falsely assured patients of chemotherapy’s success rate. Besides, informed
consent laws in other countries generally require only a reasonable explanation of potential harms, so specific
disclosures such as statistical data, may not be legally necessary

In this case, the testimony of Dr. Balmaceda who is not an oncologist but a Medical Specialist of the DOHs
Operational and Management Services charged with receiving complaints against hospitals, does not qualify as
expert testimony to establish the standard of care in obtaining consent for chemotherapy treatment. In the
absence of expert testimony in this regard, the Court feels hesitant in defining the scope of mandatory disclosure
in cases of malpractice based on lack of informed consent, much less set a standard of disclosure that, even in
foreign jurisdictions, has been noted to be an evolving one.

NOTES:

Medical Specialists’ findings –

Testifying on the findings stated in her medico-legal report, Dr. Vergara noted the following: (1) there were fluids recovered
from the abdominal cavity, which is not normal, and was due to hemorrhagic shock secondary to bleeding; (2) there was
hemorrhage at the left side of the heart; (3) bleeding at the upper portion of and areas adjacent to, the esophagus; (4) lungs
were heavy with bleeding at the back and lower portion, due to accumulation of fluids; (4) yellowish discoloration of the
liver; (5) kidneys showed appearance of facial shock on account of hemorrhages; and (6) reddishness on external surface
of the spleen. All these were the end result of hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ hemorrhages and
disseminated intravascular coagulation.

Cisplatin: It slows or stops the growth of cancer cells

Doxorubicin: is an anti-cancer chemotherapy drug. It is classified as an anthracycline antibiotic.
Cosmegen: is the trade name for Dactinomycin, an anti-cancer chemotherapy drug

Red Blood Cells

Red blood cells (also called erythrocytes) make up about 40% of the blood's volume. Red blood cells contain hemoglobin,
a protein that gives blood its red color and enables it to carry oxygen from the lungs and deliver it to all body tissues.

White Blood Cells

White blood cells (also called leukocytes) are fewer in number than red blood cells, with a ratio of about 1 white blood cell
to every 600 to 700 red blood cells. White blood cells are responsible primarily for defending the body against infection.

Platelets
Platelets (also called thrombocytes) are cell-like particles that are smaller than red or white blood cells. Platelets are fewer
in number than red blood cells, with a ratio of about 1 platelet to every 20 red blood cells. Platelets help in the clotting
process by gathering at a bleeding site and clumping together to form a plug that helps seal the blood vessel. At the same
time, they release substances that help promote further clotting.

20 |AL Y C A B S
 DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI
G.R. No. 122445; November 18, 1997

On March 22, 1991, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the Perpetual Help Clinic and
General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy operation
on March 23, 1991. Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991 as the latter
was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. According to Rowena, she noticed that the
clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the attendant for a rag to
wipe the window and the floor with. Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena tried to persuade her
mother not to proceed with the operation. The following day, before her mother was wheeled into the operating
room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The petitioner called Lydia into her
office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the petitioner told her that she must be
operated on as scheduled

During the operation, Dr. Lina Ercillo went out of the operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet
ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out
again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank
and the same was brought. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher
and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to buy additional blood for Lydia.
Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was no more type "A" blood
available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was later transfused to Lydia.

Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for breath. Apparently the
oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the accused had to go to the San
Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood
pressure dropped to 60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital
so she could be connected to a respirator and further examined. The transfer to the San Pablo City District
Hospital was without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the
intended transfer only when an ambulance arrived.

Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision. The attending
physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of the San
Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in shock and possibly dead as
her blood pressure was already 0/0.

While petitioner was closing the abdominal wall, the patient died. Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in
the morning, Lydia Umali was pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of
death and "Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.

MTCC found there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency that might
happen during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo District
Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz conducted
the operation. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to indicate that she
should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation. RTC reiterated the abovementioned
findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of "incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight
and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the subject patient before and after the operation."

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide?

RULING: The Supreme Court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient
to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.

Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his patient is
to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in good standing

21 |AL Y C A B S
under similar circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to
establish not only the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment
and care falls below such standard.

Inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are determinable only in the light of
scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually necessary to support the conclusion
as to causation.

The absence of any expert testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good
standing in the conduct of similar operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto
Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr. of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the
possible cause of death but did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that
petitioner should have exercised.

The deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating. Expert
testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are constitutive
of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when performing
the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the
instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary precaution and
employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently
established. This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the case at bench.

Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of provisions;
the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo
Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert testimony, that
petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof exists that any of
these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of reckless imprudence:
that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence.

The Court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC
which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The Court
is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the
sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the
heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case: P50,000.00 as civil liability; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages.

NOTES:

The elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the failure to
do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the reckless imprudence; and
(5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender

Medical parlance that the "abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the
moment it was open.

Hemorrhagic Compatible – It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood
and so the victim before she died there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She died most probably before
the actual complete blood loss.

Autopsy Report Cause of Death: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock as a result of blood loss.

"Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency and when
massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs. (The probability that
Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind of this Court a reasonable
doubt as to the petitioner's guilt.)

22 |AL Y C A B S
 CARLOS BORROMEO vs. FA MILY CARE HOSPITAL, INC. and RAMON S. INSO, M.D.
G.R. No. 191018; January 25, 2016

The petitioner, Carlos Borromeo, was the husband of the late Lilian V. Borromeo (Lilian). Lilian was a
patient of the respondent Family Care Hospital, Inc. (Family Care) under the care of respondent Dr. Ramon
Inso (Dr. Inso). On July 13, 1999, the petitioner brought his wife to the Family Care Hospital because she had
been complaining of acute pain at the lower stomach area and fever for two days. She was admitted at the
hospital and placed under the care of Dr. Inso. Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian might be suffering from acute
appendicitis. However, there was insufficient data to rule out other possible causes and to proceed with an
appendectomy. Thus, he ordered Lilian’s confinement for testing and evaluation.

Over the next 48 hours, Lilian underwent multiple tests such as complete blood count, urinalysis, stool exam,
pelvic ultrasound, and a pregnancy test. However, the tests were not conclusive enough to confirm that she had
appendicitis and Lilian’s condition did not improve. She suffered from spiking fever and her abdominal pain
worsened. The increasing tenderness of her stomach, which was previously confined to her lower right side,
had also extended to her lower left side. Lilian abruptly developed an acute surgical abdomen.

On July 15, 1999, Dr. Inso decided to conduct an exploratory laparotomy on Lilian because of the findings on
her abdomen and his fear that she might have a ruptured appendix. Dr. Inso obtained the patient’s consent to
the laparotomy. At around 3:45 P.M., Lilian was brought to the operating room where Dr. Inso conducted the
surgery. During the operation, Dr. Inso confirmed that Lilian was suffering from acute appendicitis. He
proceeded to remove her appendix which was already infected and congested with pus.

The operation was successful. Lilian’s appearance and vital signs improved. At around 7:30 P.M., Lilian was
brought back to her private room from the recovery room. At around 1:30 A.M. on July 16, 1999, roughly six
hours after Lilian was brought back to her room, Dr. Inso was informed that her blood pressure was low. After
assessing her condition, he ordered the infusion of more intravenous (IV) fluids which somehow raised her blood
pressure. Despite the late hour, Dr. Inso remained in the hospital to monitor Lilian’s condition. Subsequently, a
nurse informed him that Lilian was becoming restless. Dr. Inso immediately went to Lilian and saw that she
was quite pale. He immediately requested a blood transfusion.

Lilian did not respond to the blood transfusion even after receiving two 500 cc-units of blood. Various drugs
were also administered. An endotracheal tube connected to an oxygen tank was inserted into Lilian to ensure
her airway was clear and to compensate for the lack of circulating oxygen in her body from the loss of red blood
cells. Nevertheless, her condition continued to deteriorate. Dr. Inso observed that Lilian was developing
petechiae in various parts of her body. At this point, Dr. Inso suspected that Lilian had Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC). However, Dr. Inso did not have the luxury to conduct further tests because
the immediate need was to resuscitate Lilian.

Dr. Inso also informed her family that there may be a need to re-operate on her, but she would have to be put in
an ICU. Unfortunately, Family Care did not have an ICU because it was only a secondary hospital and was not
required by the DOH to have one. Dr. Inso informed the petitioner that Lilian would have to be transferred to
another hospital. Dr. Inso personally called the Perpetual Help Medical Center to arrange Lilian’s transfer, but
the latter had no available bed in its ICU. Dr. Inso then personally coordinated with the Muntinlupa Medical
Center (MMC) which had an available bed. At around 4AM, Lilian was taken to the MMC by ambulance, Dr.
Inso followed closely behind in his own vehicle. Unfortunately, at around 10AM., Lilian passed away despite
efforts to resuscitate her.

At the request of the petitioner, Lilian’s body was autopsied at the PNP Camp Crame Crime Laboratory. Dr.
Emmanuel Reyes (Dr. Reyes), the medico-legal assigned. Dr. Reyes concluded that the cause of Lilian’s death
was hemorrhage due to bleeding petechial blood vessels: internal bleeding. He further concluded that the
internal bleeding. He opined that the bleeding could have been avoided if the site was repaired with double
suturing instead of the single continuous suture repair that he found. Based on the autopsy, the petitioner filed
a complaint for damages against Family Care and against Dr. Inso for medical negligence.

23 |AL Y C A B S
Petitioner presented Dr. Reyes as his expert witness. Dr. Reyes testified as to his findings during the autopsy
and his opinion that Lilian’s death could have been avoided if Dr. Inso had repaired the site with double suture
rather than a single suture. However, Dr. Reyes admitted that he had very little experience in the field of
pathology and his only experience was an OJT at the V. Luna Hospital where he was only on observer status.
He further admitted that he had no experience in appendicitis or appendectomy and that Lilian’s case was his
first autopsy involving a death from appendectomy.

Dr. Inso and Family Care witnesses:

Dr. Celso Ramos Dr. Herminio Hernandez

(practicing pathologist with over 20 years of (general surgeon & a hospital administrator for 20
experience) year)

Dr. Ramos discredited Dr. Reyes’ theory. Dr.
Ramos submitted that the cause of Lilian’s death
was hemorrhage due to DIC, a blood disorder that
leads to the failure of the blood to coagulate. Dr.
Ramos considered the abundant petechial
hemorrhage in the myocardic sections and the
hemorrhagic right lung; the multiple bleeding points
indicate that Lilian was afflicted with DIC.
Dr. Hernandez testified that Lilian’s death could not
be attributed to the alleged wrong suturing. Dr.
Hernandez testified that Lilian had uncontrollable
bleeding in the microcirculation as a result of DIC.
Dr. Hernandez further testified that the procedure
that Dr. Inso performed was consistent with the
usual surgical
procedure and he would not have done anything
differently

The petitioner presented Dr. Rudyard Avila III (Dr. Avila) as a rebuttal witness. Dr. Avila, also a lawyer,
was presented as an expert in medical jurisprudence. Dr. Avila testified that between Dr. Reyes who autopsied
the patient and Dr. Ramos whose findings were based on medical records, greater weight should be given to Dr.
Reyes’ testimony.

The RTC relied on Dr. Avila’s opinion and gave more weight to Dr. Reyes’ findings regarding the cause of
Lilian’s death. It held that Dr. Inso was negligent in using a single suture on the repair site causing Lilian’s
death by internal hemorrhage. It applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, holding that a patient’s death does not
ordinarily occur during an appendectomy. The CA reversed the RTC’s decision and dismissed the complaint.
The CA gave greater weight to the testimonies of Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos over the findings of Dr. Reyes
because the latter was not an expert in pathology, appendectomy, nor in surgery. The CA denied the applicability
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because the element of causation between the instrumentality under the
control and management of Dr. Inso and the injury that caused Lilian’s death was absent.

ISSUE: WON Dr. Inso and Family Care were negligent in caring for Lilian before, during, and after her
appendectomy and were responsible for her death?

RULING: The testimonies of expert witnesses Dr. Hernandez and Dr. Ramos carry far greater weight than that
of Dr. Reyes. The petitioner’s failure to present expert witnesses resulted in his failure to prove the respondents’
negligence. The preponderance of evidence clearly tilts in favor of the respondents. The Court affirmed the
ruling of the CA.

A medical professional has the duty to observe the standard of care and exercise the degree of skill, knowledge,
and training ordinarily expected of other similarly trained medical professionals acting under the same
circumstances. A breach of the accepted standard of care constitutes negligence or malpractice and renders the
defendant liable for the resulting injury to his patient. The standard is based on the norm observed by other
reasonably competent members of the profession practicing the same field of medicine. Because medical
malpractice cases are often highly technical, expert testimony is usually essential to establish: (1) the standard
of care that the defendant was bound to observe under the circumstances; (2) that the defendant’s conduct fell
below the acceptable standard; and (3) that the defendant’s failure to observe the industry standard caused injury
to his patient.

24 |AL Y C A B S
The expert witness must be a similarly trained and experienced physician. Thus, a pulmonologist is not
qualified to testify as to the standard of care required of an anesthesiologist and an autopsy expert is not qualified
to testify as a specialist in infectious diseases. After having conducted over a thousand traumatic autopsies, Dr.
Reyes can be considered an expert in traumatic autopsies or autopsies involving violent deaths. However, his
expertise in traumatic autopsies does not necessarily make him an expert in clinical and pathological autopsies
or in surgery. Dr. Reyes is not an expert witness who could prove Dr. Inso’s alleged negligence. His testimony
could not have established the standard of care that Dr. Inso was expected to observe nor assessed Dr. Inso’s
failure to observe this standard. His testimony cannot be relied upon to determine if Dr. Inso committed errors
during the operation.

The testimony of Dr. Avila also has no probative value in determining whether Dr. Inso was at fault. Dr. Avila
testified in his capacity as an expert in medical jurisprudence, not as an expert in medicine, surgery, or
pathology. His testimony fails to shed any light on the actual cause of Lilian’s death.

On the other hand, the respondents presented testimonies from Dr. Inso himself and from two expert witnesses
in pathology and surgery. Dr. Hernandez affirmed that Dr. Inso did not deviate from the usual surgical
procedure. Both experts agreed that Lilian could not have died from bleeding of the appendical vessel. They
identified Lilian’s cause of death as massive blood loss resulting from DIC.

Res ipsa loquitur is not applicable when the failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to the
layman. The petitioner cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift the burden of evidence onto the
respondent. Res ipsa loquitur, literally, "the thing speaks for itself;" is a rule of evidence that presumes
negligence from the very nature of the accident itself using common human knowledge or experience. This
doctrine is used in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. The rule is not applicable in cases such
as the present one where the defendant’s alleged failure to observe due care is not immediately apparent to a
layman. These instances require expert opinion to establish the culpability of the defendant doctor. It is also not
applicable to cases where the actual cause of the injury had been identified or established

NOTES:

Exploratory laparotomy is a surgical procedure involving a large incision on the abdominal wall that would enable

Petechiae are small bruises caused by bleeding under the skin whose presence indicates a blood-coagulation problem – a
defect in the ability of blood to clot.

Disseminated Intravascular Coagulation (DIC), a blood disorder characterized by bleeding in many parts of her body
caused by the consumption or the loss of the clotting factors in the blood

Res ipsa loquitur requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
(2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with
negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution from the injured
person.The concurrence of these elements creates a presumption of negligence that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff’s
burden of proof.

Dr. Ramos graduated from the Far Eastern University, Nicanor Reyes Medical Foundation, in 1975. He took up his post-
graduate internship at the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena City, before taking the board exams. After obtaining his
professional license, he underwent residency training in pathology at the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Center from 1977 to
1980. At the time of his testimony, Dr. Ramos was an associate professor in pathology. He was the head of the Batangas
General Hospital Teaching and Training Hospital where he also headed the Pathology Department. He also headed the
Perpetual Help General Hospital Pathology department

Dr. Hernandez at that time was a General Surgeon with 27 years of experience as a General Practitioner and 20 years of
experience as a General Surgeon. He obtained his medical degree from the University of Santo Tomas before undergoing
five years of residency training as a surgeon at the Veterans Memorial Center hospital. He was certified as a surgeon in
1985. He also holds a master’s degree in Hospital Administration from the Ateneo de Manila University.

25 |AL Y C A B S
 GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM vs. PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170414; August 25, 2010

RES: PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, ELY BUNGABONG, and MICHAEL GALVEZ

Before the Court are three consolidated petitions for review of the Court of Appeals. The facts are as follows:
On 2 April 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation (PAC) arrived
at the Manila International Airport from El Nido, Palawan. In command of the aircraft was Ely B.
Bungabong. With Bungabong in the cockpit was Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot. Upon touchdown, the Twin
Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to disembark its passengers. After the last
passenger disembarked, PACs pilots started the engine of the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar
located at the other end of the airport. At around 7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted ground control to ask for clearance
to taxi to taxiway delta. Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the Air Transportation Office (ATO),
issued the clearance on condition that he be contacted again upon reaching taxiway delta intersection.

Upon reaching the intersection of taxiway delta, Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway delta, which
request was granted. Galvez requested clearance to make a right turn to fox 1 and to cross runway 13 in order
to proceed to fox 1 bravo. ATO granted the request. Upon reaching runway 13, PACs pilots did not make a full
stop at the holding point to request clearance right before crossing runway 13. Without such clearance, PACs
pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.

Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casio and Ruel Isaac, was
preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and start on runway 13.
Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty at the ATO issued the clearance. Pilots Casio and Isaac then
proceeded with the take-off procedure. Casio caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing
737 about to cross runway 13.

Galvez noticed the Boeing 737 and told Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side.
Bungabong then said, Diyos ko po and gave full power to the Twin Otter. The PAL pilots attempted to abort the
take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft. However, the Boeing 737 still collided with the Twin Otter.
Bungabong suffered sprain on his shoulder while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb. An ambulance
brought the two pilots to Makati Medical Center where they were treated for serious and slight physical injuries.

On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City a
complaint for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and ATOs traffic
control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as insurer of the Boeing
737 that figured in the collision, intervened.

RTC: the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., as ATOs traffic
control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller, respectively, at the time of the collision.
The trial court further held that the direct cause of the collision was the negligence of Casio and Isaac, as the
pilots of the Boeing 737 that collided with the Twin Otter.

CA: found that the trial court did not commit any reversible error, affirmed in toto the decision.

ISSUE: WON who among the parties is liable for negligence under the circumstances

RULING: To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, we must refer to the applicable rules
governing the specific traffic management of aircrafts at an airport. The Rules of the Air of the Air
Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered in the Philippines. The Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter in
this case were both registered in the Philippines. Both are thus subject to the Rules of the Air. In case of danger
of collision between two aircrafts, the Rules of the Air state:
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts
taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome, the following shall apply:

26 |AL Y C A B S
 a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or approximately so, each shall stop or where
practicable, alter its course to the right so as to keep well clear.
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the one which has the other on its
right shall give way

In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of the collision.
Only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of the Air provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome shall give
way to aircraft taking off or about to take off.

Therefore, PALs aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because it was on the right
side of PACs aircraft, but more significantly, because it was taking off or about to take off.

For disregarding PALs right of way, PACs pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one that is
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act,
not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.

The Court find it hard to believe that PACs pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked to the left and
to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April and the Boeing 737, only
200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights on before and during the
actual take-off roll. The only plausible explanation why PACs pilots did not see the Boeing 737 was that they
did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing the active runway.

The Rules of Air Control govern airplane traffic management and clearance at the then Manila International
Airport. It contains several provisions indicating that airplane traffic management and clearance are not the sole
responsibility of ATO and its traffic controllers, but of the pilots-in-command of aircrafts as well. Therefore,
even if ATO gave both PALs pilots and PACs pilots clearance to take off and clearance to cross runway 13,
respectively, it remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to see to it that the respective
clearances given were suitable. Since the pilots-in-command have the final authority as to the disposition of
the aircraft, they cannot, in case a collision occurs, pass the blame to ATO for issuing clearances that turn out
to be unsuitable.

The clearance to cross runway 13, premature as it was, was not an absolute license for PACs pilots to recklessly
maneuver the Twin Otter across an active runway. PACs pilots should have stopped first at the holding point to
ask for clearance to cross the active runway. On the other hand, evidence on record shows that the air traffic
controller properly issued the clearance to take off to the Boeing 737. Nothing on record indicates any
irregularity in the issuance of the clearance. In fact, the trial court, in the criminal case for reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the collision, ruled
that air traffic controller Linog, Jr. was not negligent.

Prosimate Cause. Records show that PALs pilots timely requested clearance to take off. Linog, Jr., ATO’s air
traffic controller, duly issued the clearance to take off. Under the Rules of the Air, PALs aircraft being on take-
off roll undisputedly had the right of way. The Court is convinced that the immediate and proximate case of the
collision is the gross negligence of PACs pilots. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred. In this case, the fact that PACs pilots disregarded PALs right of way and did
not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an active runway was the proximate cause of the collision.
Were it not for such gross negligence on the part of PACs pilots, the collision would not have happened.

Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PALs right to claim actual or compensatory damages in connection
with the repair of the damaged Boeing 737, is entitled to reimbursement for the amount it advanced. GSIS
claims reimbursement for the amount of US$2,775,366.84. The Court find the claim fully supported by evidence
on record and thus resolved to grant the same.

27 |AL Y C A B S
Pacific Airways Corporation, Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez are ORDERED to solidarily pay:
Philippine Airlines, Inc. actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$548,819.93; Rogelio Casio and
Ruel Isaac individually moral damages in the amount of P100,000, exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000, and attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000; and GSIS as insurer subrogee of Philippine Airlines,
actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$2,775,366.84.

NOTES:

In G.R. No. 170418, petitioners PAL, Casio, and Isaac argue that the Court of Appeals should have applied the
emergency rule instead of the last clear chance doctrine.

In G.R. No. 170414, petitioner GSIS points out that PACs pilots were the ones guilty of negligence as they
violated the Rules of the Air, which provide that right of way belongs to the aircraft on take-off roll and the
aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses that such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.

In G.R. No. 170460, petitioners ATO, Alzola, and Lim call our attention to the fact that PAC was a mere lessee,
not the owner of the Twin Otter. They argue that PAC, as mere lessee, was not the real party-in-interest in the
complaint seeking recovery for damages sustained by the Twin Otter. Petitioners maintain that ground and air
traffic clearances were the joint responsibility of ATO and the pilots-in-command.

While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, may have been
negligent in the performance of their functions, such negligence is only contributory. Their contributory
negligence arises from their granting the premature request of PACs pilots for clearance to cross runway 13
while the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13. However, as explained earlier, the granting of
their premature request for clearance did not relieve PACs pilots from complying with the Rules of the Air.

The Rules of Air Control state:

1.3 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or not, be responsible for the
operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that he may depart from these rules in
circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in the interest of safety.

1.5 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft while
he is in command.

3.1 Clearances are based solely on expediting and separating aircraft and do not constitute authority to violate
any applicable regulations for promoting safety of flight operations or for any other purpose.

xxxx

If an air traffic control clearance is not suitable to the pilot-in-command of an aircraft, he may request,
and, if practicable, obtain an amended clearance.

10.1.5 Clearances issued by controllers relate to traffic and aerodrome conditions only and do not relieve a pilot
of any responsibility whatsoever in connection with a possible violation of applicable rules and regulations.

Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the
defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Art. 2207. If the plaintiff’s property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the insurance company for the
injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to
the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the
insurance company does not fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the
deficiency from the person causing the loss or injury.

Q: What is this push and start clearance?

A: When the aircraft is already ready the passenger they have to be pushed to the starting point and start the engine.

28 |AL Y C A B S
 CRESENCIO BAO vs. BACHELOR EXPRESS, INC/CERES LINER, INC. and WENIFREDO
SALVAA
G.R. No. 191703; March 12, 2012

PET: CRESENCIO BAO AND HEIRS OF THE DECEASED AMANCIO ASUMBRADO

On November 6, 1993, respondent Wenifredo Salvaa (Salvaa) was driving the bus owned by respondent
Bachelor Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc. with plate number, LVD-273 (Bus 4042) along the national highway
at Magdum, Tagum City bound for Davao City. in the afternoon, he overtook a Lawin PUJ jeepney while
negotiating a blind curve in a descending road at Km. 60, causing him to intrude into the opposite lane and
bump the 10-wheeler Hino dump truck of petitioner Cresencio Bao (Bao) running uphill from the opposite
direction. The collision resulted in damage to both vehicles, the subsequent death of the truck driver, Amancio
Asumbrado (Asumbrado), and serious physical injuries to bus driver Salvaa.

On March 11, 1994, Bao and the heirs of Asumbrado (collectively called petitioners) filed a complaint for quasi-
delict, damages and attorney's fees against respondents, accusing Salvaa of negligently driving Bus 4042
causing it to collide with the dump truck. Respondents denied liability, claiming that prior to the collision, Bus
4042 was running out of control because of a problem in the steering wheel system which could not have been
avoided despite their maintenance efforts. Instead, they claimed that Asumbrado had the last clear chance to
avoid the collision had he not driven the dump truck at a very fast speed.

RTC: RTC found that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident was the reckless negligence of the
bus driver, Salvaa, in attempting to overtake a jeepney along a descending blind curve and completely invading
the opposite lane. The photographs taken immediately after the collision, the Traffic Accident and Investigation
Report, and the Sketch all showed the dump truck at the shoulder of its proper lane while the bus was positioned
diagonally in the same lane with its right side several feet from the center line. Having established the negligence
of its employee, the presumption of fault or negligence on the part of the employer, respondent Bachelor
Express, Inc./Ceres Liner, Inc., arose, which it failed to rebut by evidence

CA: affirmed the RTC's findings on respondents' negligence and liability for damages, but deleted the separate
awards of exemplary damages in favor of petitioners for their failure to prove that respondents acted with gross
negligence. Similarly, the appellate court deleted the awards for the value of and lost income from the dump
truck for lack of sufficient basis. The CA also deleted the award of moral damages to Bao for the damage to his
property.

ISSUE: WON respondent Salvaa was grossly negligent in continuing to drive the bus even after he had
discovered the malfunction in its steering wheel?

RULING: Records show that when bus driver Salvaa overtook the jeepney in front of him, he was rounding a
blind curve along a descending road. Considering the road condition, and that there was only one lane on each
side of the center line for the movement of traffic in opposite directions, it would have been more prudent for
him to confine his bus to its proper place. Having thus encroached on the opposite lane in the process of
overtaking the jeepney, without ascertaining that it was clear of oncoming traffic that resulted in the collision
with the approaching dump truck driven by deceased Asumbrado, Salvaa was grossly negligent in driving his
bus. He was remiss in his duty to determine that the road was clear and not to proceed if he could not do so in
safety.

In the case of Government Service Insurance System v. Pacific Airways Corporation, the Court has defined
gross negligence as one that is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a
situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. Therefore, Salvaa was grossly negligent
in driving the bus.

29 |AL Y C A B S
NOTES:

RTC
1. To plaintiff Cresencio Bao -
(a) P700,000.00, as payment for
his Hino dump truck which
was rendered a total wreck;
(b) P296,601.50 per month, as
loss of earning of the Hino
dump truck, to be computed
from November 6, 1993 with
legal interest thereon until
the P700,000.00 mentioned
in the next preceding number
will be fully paid by the
defendants to plaintiff
Cresencio Bao;
(c) P100,000.00 and
P50,000.00, as moral
damages and exemplary
damages, respectively;
2. To the Heirs of the late Amancio
Asumbrado -
(a) P50,000.00, as civil
indemnity for the death of
Amancio Asumbrado;
(b) P20,268.45, as
reimbursement for the
medicines, hospitalization
and funeral expenses
incurred;
(c) P576,000.00, as loss of
earning capacity of the late
Amancio Asumbrado;
(d) P100,000.00 and
P50,000.00, as moral
damages and exemplary
damages, respectively;
CA
Deleted the separate awards of
exemplary damages in favor of
petitioners for their failure to prove
that respondents acted with gross
negligence.
Deleted the awards for the value of
and lost income from the dump
truck for lack of sufficient basis,
awarding in their stead temperate
damages in the sums of P100,000.00
and P200,000.00, respectively.
Reduced the RTC's awards of actual
damages representing the hospital
and funeral expenses from
P20,268.45 to P19,136.90; loss of
earning capacity from P576,000.00
to P415,640.16; and moral damages
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Deleted the award of litigation
expenses and reduced the award of
attorney's fees from 25% of
petitioners' claims to P50,000.00.
SC
1. Petitioner Heirs of Amancio
Asumbrado:
(a) P19,136.90 as actual
damages representing
hospital and funeral
expenses;
(b) P415,640.16 as loss of
earning capacity of the
deceased Asumbrado;
(c) P50,000.00 as death
indemnity;
(d) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and
(e) P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
2. Petitioner Cresencio Bao:
(a) P400,000.00 as temperate
damages for his damaged
dump truck;
(b) P200,000.00 as lost income
of the said truck; and
(c) P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
3. Attorney's fees of P100,000.00 to
petitioners collectively.

3. To the Plaintiffs -
(a) P25,000.00, as
reimbursement of the
expenses
(b) Attorney's fee in the sum of
equivalent to 25% of
plaintiffs' total claim against
the defendants plus
P14,500.00, as appearance
fees;
(c) Costs of suit.

Section 41(a) Republic Act No. 4136 otherwise known as the Land and Transportation and Traffic Code,
as amended provides: Section 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing.
(a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking
or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible, and
is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be
made in safety.

30 |AL Y C A B S
 SPS. CRISTINO & EDNA CARBONELL vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 178467; April 26, 2017

The petitioners initiated against the respondent Civil Case No. 65725, an action for damages, alleging that they
had experienced emotional shock, mental anguish, public ridicule, humiliation, insults and embarrassment
during their trip to Thailand because of the respondent's release to them of five US$100 bills that later on turned
out to be counterfeit.

They claimed that they had travelled to Bangkok, Thailand after withdrawing US$1,000.00 in US$100 notes
from their dollar account at the respondent's Pateros branch. They had exchanged five US$100 bills into Baht,
but only four of the US$100 bills had been accepted by the foreign exchange dealer because the fifth one was
"no good.” Subsequently, they had asked a companion to exchange the same bill at Norkthon Bank in Bangkok
but the bank teller thereat had informed them that the dollar bill was fake. The teller had then confiscated the
US$100 bill and had threatened to report them to the police if they insisted in getting the fake dollar bill back.

The petitioners claimed that later on, they had bought jewelry from a shop owner by using four of the remaining
US$100 bills as payment; that on the next day, however, they had been confronted by the shop owner at the
hotel lobby because their four US$100 bills had turned out to be counterfeit; that the shop owner had shouted
at them: "You Filipinos, you are all cheaters!" and that the incident had occurred within the hearing distance of
tel low travelers and several foreigners.

The petitioners continued that upon their return to the Philippines, they had confronted the manager of the
respondent's Pateros branch on the fake dollar bills, but the latter had insisted that the dollar bills she had
released to them were genuine inasmuch as the bills had come from the head office; that in order to put the issue
to rest, the counsel of the petitioners had submitted the subject US$100 bills to the BSP for examination; that
the BSP had certified that the four US$100 bills were near perfect genuine notes.

The petitioners then sent a written notice to the respondent, attaching the BSP certification and informing the
latter that they were giving it five days within which to comply with their demand, or face court action. In
response, the respondent's counsel wrote to the petitioners on March 1996 expressing sympathy with them on
their experience but stressing that the respondent could not absolutely guarantee the genuineness of each and
every foreign currency note that passed through its system; that it had also been a victim like them; and that it
had exercised the diligence required in dealing with foreign currency notes and in the selection and supervision
of its employees.

RTC: ruled in favor of the respondent, dismissing plaintiffs complaint for lack of merit AND awarding
Metrobank the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.

CA: affirmed the judgment of the RTC with the modification of deleting the award of attorney's fees

ISSUE: WON respondent failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in handling the affairs of its
clients?

RULING: The General Banking Act of 2000 demands of banks the highest standards of integrity and
performance. As such, the banks are under obligation to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous
care. However, the banks' compliance with this degree of diligence is to be determined in accordance with the
particular circumstances of each case.

The petitioners argue that the respondent was liable for failing to observe the diligence required from it by not
doing an act from which the material damage had resulted by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution in the
performance of its duties.Hence, the respondent was guilty of gross negligence. The petitioners' argument is
unfounded. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of one's duties; it is a negligence
characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is duty to act,
not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid
them.

31 |AL Y C A B S
In order for gross negligence to exist as to warrant holding the respondent liable therefor, the petitioners must
establish that the latter did not exert any effort at all to avoid unpleasant consequences, or that it wilfully and
intentionally disregarded the proper protocols or procedure in the handling of US dollar notes and in selecting
and supervising its employees. The CA and the RTC both found that the respondent had exercised the diligence
required by law in observing the standard operating procedure. Such factual findings by the trial court are
entitled to great weight and respect especially after being affirmed by the appellate court

Nonetheless, the petitioners contend that the respondent should be liable for moral and exemplary damages on
account of their suffering the unfortunate experience abroad brought about by their use of the take US dollar
bills withdrawn from the latter. The contention cannot be upheld.

The relationship existing between the petitioners and the respondent that resulted from a contract of loan was
that of a creditor-debtor. Even if the law imposed a high standard on the latter as a bank by virtue of the fiduciary
nature of its banking business, bad faith or gross negligence amounting to bad faith was absent. Hence, there
simply was no legal basis for holding the respondent liable for moral and exemplary damages. In breach of
contract, moral damages may be awarded only where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. That was
not true herein because the respondent was not shown to have acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

With the respondent having established that the characteristics of the subject dollar notes had made it difficult
even for the BSP itself as the country's own currency note expert to identify the counterfeiting, holding it liable
for damages in favor of the petitioners would be highly unwarranted in the absence of proof of bad faith, malice
or fraud on its part.

Under the law, moral damages for culpa contractual or breach of contract are recoverable only if the defendant
acted fraudulently or in bad faith, or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligations. The breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith,
oppressive or abusive. In order to maintain their action for damages, the petitioners must establish that their
injury resulted from a breach of duty that the respondent had owed to them, that is, there must be the concurrence
of injury caused to them as the plaintiffs and legal responsibility on the part of the respondent. In this regard,
there must first be a breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be
awarded; and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. That was not so in this case.

In every situation of damnum absque injuria, therefore, the injured person alone bears the consequences because
the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act that does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
Indeed, the lack of malice in the conduct complained of precluded the recovery of damages. Here, although the
petitioners suffered humiliation resulting from their unwitting use of the counterfeit US dollar bills, the
respondent, by virtue of its having observed the proper protocols and procedure in handling the US dollar bills
involved, did not violate any legal duty towards them. Being neither guilty of negligence nor remiss in its
exercise of the degree of diligence required by law or the nature of its obligation as a banking institution, the
latter was not liable for damages. Given the situation being one of damnum absque injuria, they could not be
compensated for the damage sustained.

NOTES:

Even without taking into consideration the news clippings to the effect that the US Secret Service and Central
Intelligence Agency had themselves been deceived by the 1990 series of the US dollar notes infamously known
as the supernotes

Injury – is the illegal invasion of a legal right, damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury;
and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These
situations are often called damnum absque injuria.

32 |AL Y C A B S
 STANDARD INSURANCE CO., INC. vs. ARNOLD CUARESMA AND JERRY B. CUARESMA
G.R. No. 200055; September 10, 2014

On March 20, 2004, two vehicles, one driven by Jefferson Cham and insured with petitioner Standard Insurance
Co., Inc., and the other owned by respondent Arnold Cuaresma and driven by respondent Jerry B. Cuaresma,
figured in an accident at North Avenue, Quezon City. After the vehicle was repaired, Cham then executed
a Release of Claim in favor of petitioner subrogating the latter to all his rights to recover on all claims, demands,
and rights of action on account of the loss, damage, or injury sustained as a consequence of the accident from
any person liable thereto. Based on said document, petitioner, in its letter, addressed to respondents, demanded
the payment of the sum spent on repairing the vehicle driven by Cham.

On August 10, 2004, an Information was filed with the MeTC of Quezon City charging Cham of the crime of
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. During the pendency thereof, on March 17, 2008,
petitioner, claiming that respondents collided with Cham's vehicle in a reckless and imprudent manner, filed a
Complaint for Sum of Money with the MeTC of Manila against respondents demanding payment of the sum of
P256,643.26 representing the cost of repairs on Cham's vehicle.

Respondents, however, were declared in default on December 12, 2008 for failure to file their responsive
pleading. As a result, petitioner was allowed to present its evidence ex parte. Finding that petitioner sufficiently
proved its claims by preponderance of evidence, the MeTC ruled in favor of petitioner. RTC, however, reversed
the ruling of the MeTC. RTC found that not only were there inconsistencies in the evidence presented by
petitioner as to its corporate identity as well as the amount of the supposed cost of indemnification, but petitioner
also failed to sufficiently prove that the proximate cause of the damage incurred by Cham's vehicle was
respondents' fault or negligence.

On appeal, the CA likewise found that the evidence proffered by petitioner is insufficient to support its averment
of negligence. Consequently, it affirmed the RTC's Decision

ISSUE: WON Petitioner's evidence, specifically the testimony of its assured, Jefferson Cham and its assistant
vice-president for claims, Cleto D. Obello, Jr., as well as the traffic accident report, are insufficient to prove its
claims by the required quantum of evidence?

RULING: To prove the allegations in its complaint, herein petitioner presented testimonies of its assured and
its Assistant Vice-President, the Traffic Accident Investigation Report, and documents evidencing the assured's
insurance policy with petitioner as well as the payment of repair expenses. As aptly ruled by the RTC and the
CA, however, the evidence presented by petitioner failed to preponderantly establish negligence on the part of
the respondents.

While petitioner may have proven the fact of its payment of the expenses for the repair of Cham's vehicle
through the testimony of its Assistant Vice-President and other supporting receipts and documents, it fell short
in proving that the damage caused on said vehicle was due to the fault of the respondents.

As correctly noted by the courts below, while the Traffic Accident Investigation Report was exhibited as
evidence, the investigating officer who prepared the same was not presented in court to testify that he had
sufficient knowledge of the facts therein stated, and that he acquired them personally or through official
information. Neither was there any explanation as to why such officer was not presented. We cannot simply
assume, in the absence of proof, that the account of the incident stated in the report was based on the personal
knowledge of the investigating officer who prepared it.

Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the
credible evidence." It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto. The reason for this is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof. Mere allegations, therefore, cannot be deemed as evidence.

33 |AL Y C A B S
Thus, while petitioner presented its assured to testify on the events that transpired during the vehicular collision,
his lone testimony, unsupported by other preponderant evidence, fails to sufficiently establish petitioner's claim
that respondents' negligence was, indeed, the proximate cause of the damage sustained by Cham's vehicle.

Hence, before the Court can sustain petitioner's argument that its right to be reimbursed for the repair is by
operation of law upon mere proof of payment of the insurance claim, a determination of the liability of
respondents vis-a-viz the assured in the vehicular collision must first be made, for petitioner cannot acquire any
claim, security or remedy its assured did not have. Considering, however, the insufficiency of preponderant
evidence attributing negligence on respondents resulting in the damage sustained by the assured's vehicle, it
will be unfair to hold respondents liable for the same, payment by petitioner of its costs, notwithstanding.

Forum Shopping. Prefatorily, the Court addressed the issue of forum shopping in saying that the essence of
forum shopping is the filing by a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum,
seeking another and possibly a favorable opinion in another suit other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari. It is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. However, as the RTC already
mentioned, there exists no forum shopping herein for the filing of the instant suit is expressly allowed to proceed
independently of the criminal action filed by respondents. Criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property based on the Revised Penal Code as opposed to civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code, although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have different
causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised Penal Code, while
the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

Therefore, petitioner, who is subrogated to the rights of Cham, the accused in the criminal case instituted by
respondents, cannot be guilty of forum shopping for its separate civil action is expressly allowed to proceed
independently of the criminal action involved herein. It must be noted, however, that notwithstanding the
allowance of the instant petition to proceed independently of the criminal action, the claims of petitioner cannot
be sustained in the absence of satisfactory evidence proving its right thereto.

NOTES:

The Traffic Accident Investigation Report cannot be given probative weight. Section 44 of Rule 130 provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records - Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty
by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

Moreover, for the Traffic Accident Investigation Report to be admissible as prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated, the following requisites must be present:

(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to do
so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which
must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
Petitioner failed to prove the third requisite cited above.
Subrogation is ultimately the substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim
or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to a debt or claim, including
its remedies or securities. A subrogee, in effect, steps into the shoes of the insured and can recover only if the
insured likewise could have recovered.

34 |AL Y C A B S
 VICENTE JOSEFA vs. MA NILA ELECTRIC COMPANY
G.R. No. 182705; July 18, 2014

At around 1 :45 p.m. on April 21, 1991, a dump truck, a jeepney and a car figured in a vehicular accident along
Ortigas Avenue, Pasig City.4 As a result of the accident, a 45-foot wooden electricity post, three 75 KVA
transformers, and other electrical line attachments were damaged.5 Upon investigation, respondent Manila
Electric Company (Meralco) discovered that it was the truck with plate number PAK-874 and registered in
Josefa’s name that hit the electricity post. Meralco demanded from Josefa reimbursement for the replacement
cost of the electricity post and its attachments, but Josefa refused to pay. Thus, Meralco sued Josefa and Pablo
Manoco, the truck driver, for damages before the RTC of Pasig City.

Meralco alleged that Manoco’s reckless driving resulted in damage to its properties. It also imputed primary
liability on Josefa for his alleged negligence in the selection and supervision of Manoco. It thus prayed for the
indemnification of the amount of ₱384,846.00 as actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees, ₱10,000.00 as
litigation expenses, and the costs of the suit. In defense, Josefa denied that Manoco was his employee when the
accident occurred. He also maintained that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection
and supervision of all his employees. As a counterclaim, he sought the payment of attorney’s fees for Meralco’s
filing of a baseless complaint.

During trial, Meralco offered the testimonies of six witnesses as well as documentary evidence to substantiate
its claim for damages against Josefa: Juan Fernandez, Meralco’s senior legal investigator, testified that he
arrived at the scene of the accident at around 2:30 p.m. on that fateful day and saw Meralco employees installing
a new electricity post. He interviewed the people in the vicinity who told him that it was the truck that rammed
the electricity post. Fernandez also talked toSPO2 Alexander Galang who informed him that the owner of the
offending vehicle was Josefa.

Elmer Albio identified himself as the driver of the jeepney that was involved in the accident. He testified that a
truck suddenly hit the rear of his jeepney while he was driving along Ortigas Avenue. He thus lost control of
the jeepney and hit a Nissan car on the other lane of the road. Thereafter, the truck hit the electricity post. SPO2
Manuel Valiente testified that he immediately went to the scene of the accident after a concerned citizen went
to the police station and informed him about the accident.17 However, he could no longer recall the truck’s
exact position with reference to the electricity post at the time of his arrival at the scene of the accident.

The RTC ordered Josefa to present his evidence-in-chief. The RTC eventually declared the case as submitted
for decision without Josefa’s evidence-in-chief due to the numerous and unreasonable delays that he incurred
in the presentation of evidence. RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC held that
Meralco failed to establish that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The RTC ruled that SPO2 Galang’s
account of the accident was merely hearsay since he did not personally witness the incident. It also did not give
probative value to the police blotter entry dated January 7, 1994 since the accident had long occurred in 1991.
The RTC likewise denied Meralco’s claim for actual damages for lack of evidentiary support.

CA reversed the RTC ruling and held that the RTC erred in disregarding the parties’ stipulation at the pre-trial
that it was the truck that hit the electricity post. The CA also found that Bautista (correct the name "Pablo
Manoco" to Pablo Manojo Bautista) was Josefa’s employee when the accident occurred since Josefa did not
specifically deny this material allegation in the amended complaint. It likewise noted that the sheriff’s return
stated that Bautista was under Josefa’s employ until 1993. The CA concluded that the fact that the truck hit the
electricity post was sufficient to hold Josefa vicariously liable regardless of whether Bautista was negligent in
driving the truck. In the same breath, the CA also stated that the employer’s presumptive liability in quasi-
delicts was anchored on injuries caused by the employee’s negligence. It further ruled that Josefa failed to rebut
the presumption that he negligently selected and supervised Bautista in employment since he did not present his
evidence-in-chief during trial.

ISSUE: WON the finding that it was the truck that hit the electricity post lacks evidentiary support?

RULING: Meralco has sufficiently established the direct causal link between the truck and the electricity post
through Elmer Abio’s testimony. Abio categorically stated during trial that he saw the truck hit the electricity

35 |AL Y C A B S
post. We find his first-hand account of the incident during the directexamination frank and straightforward.
More importantly, Josefa failed to impeach the veracity of Abio’s testimony during the cross-examination. Abio
even reiterated that it was Josefa’s truck that rammed the electricity post. The Court thus give full faith and
credence to his positive, unrebutted, and categorical declaration on the witness stand, made under solemn oath,
that it was the truck that caused damage to Meralco’s property.
Even without Abio’s testimony, it does not escape this Court’s attention that Josefa judicially admitted in his
motions and pleading that his truck hit the electricity post (no specific denial = judicial admission; general denial
= judicial admission). Judicial admissions made by the parties in the pleadings or in the course of the trial or
other proceedings in the same case are conclusive and do not require further evidence to prove them. These
admissions cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been made through palpable mistake or that
no such admission was made. A party who judicially admits a fact cannot later challenge this fact for the reason
that judicial admissions remove an admitted fact from the field of controversy

In some cases where negligence is difficult to prove, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of
negligence on the part of the defendant or some other person who is charged with negligence where the thing
or transaction speaks for itself. This doctrine postulates that, as a matter of common knowledge and experience
and in the absence of some explanation by the defendant who is charged with negligence, the very nature of
occurrences may justify an inference of negligence on the part of the person who controls the instrumentality
causing the injury.

In his pleadings, Josefa raises the possibility that the fault or negligence of the jeepney and/or the car drivers
may have been the proximate cause of the damage. As a matter of defense, Josefa should have substantiated this
theory considering that the burden of evidence has shifted against him after Meralco had established that it was
the truck that hit the electricity post. However, Josefa did not adduce any evidence in support of his defense
during trial.

Josefa cannot evade his responsibility by mere denial of his employment relations with Bautista in the absence
of proof that his truck was used without authorization or that it was stolen when the accident occurred.53 In
quasi-delict cases, the registered owner of a motor vehicle is the employer of its driver in contemplation of
law.54 The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to third persons for injuries caused while the vehicle was being driven on highways or streets.
The purpose of motor vehicle registration is precisely to identify the owner so that if any injury is caused by the
vehicle, responsibility can be imputed to the registered owner.

In order for Josefa to be relieved of his vicarious liability, he must show that he exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of Bautista. In concrete terms, Josefa should show by competent object or
documentary evidence that he examined Bautista as to the latter’s qualifications, experience and service records
prior to employment. He should likewise prove by competent objector documentary evidence that he formulated
standard operating procedures, monitored their implementation and imposed disciplinary measures for breach
of these procedures. However, Josefa failed to overcome the presumption of negligence against him since he
waived his right to present evidence during trial. We are thus left with no other conclusion other than to rule
that Josefa is primarily liable for all natural and probable consequences of Bautista’s negligence.

Despite Josefa’s vicarious liability in this case, Meralco failed to point out the specific facts that afforda basis
for its claim for actual damages. Actual damages cannot be presumed; they must be pleaded and proven in court
in order to be recoverable. One is entitled to an adequate compensation only for the pecuniary loss that he has
adequately proved based upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable by him. Nonetheless,
Meralco is entitled totemperate damages because there is no doubt that it suffered pecuniary loss as a result of
Bautista and Josefa’s negligence. Considering the attendant circumstances of this case, the Court finds the
amount of ₱200,000.00 to be a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages. Likewise, Meralco is
not entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. It is a settled rule that attorney’s fees shall not be
recovered as cost where the party’s persistence in litigation is based on his mistaken belief in the righteousness
of his cause. Finally, the Court imposes an interest rate of 6% per annum on temperate damages pursuant to the
guidelines enunciated in Eastern Shipping Lines v. CA.

36 |AL Y C A B S
 BJDC CONSTRUCTION vs. NENA E. LANUZO
G.R. No. 161151; March 24, 2014

PET: BJDC REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER/PROPRIETOR JANET S. DELA CRUZ

RES: NENA E. LANUZO, CLAUDETTE E. LANUZO, JANET E. LANUZO, JOAN BERNABE E.
LANUZO, and RYAN JOSE E. LANUZO

The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to establish the allegation
with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in nature, the proof required is preponderance
of evidence. This case involves a claim for damages arising from the death of a motorcycle rider in a nighttime
accident due to the supposed negligence of a construction company then undertaking re-blocking work on a
national highway.

On January 5, 1998, Nena E. Lanuzo (Nena) filed a complaint for damages1 against BJDC Construction
(company), a single proprietorship engaged in the construction business under its Manager/Proprietor Janet S.
de la Cruz. The company was the contractor of the re-blocking project to repair the damaged portion of one lane
of the national highway at San Agustin, Pili, Camarines Sur from September 1997to November 1997.

Nena alleged that she was the surviving spouse of the late Balbino Los Baños Lanuzo (Balbino) who figured in
the accident that transpired at the site of the re-blocking work at about 6:30 p.m. on October 30, 1997; that
Balbino's Honda motorcycle sideswiped the road barricade placed by the company in the right lane portion of
the road, causing him to lose control of his motorcycle and to crash on the newly cemented road, resulting in
his instant death; and that the company's failure to place illuminated warning signs on the site of the project,
especially during night time, was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino.

The company denied Nena's allegations of negligence, insisting that it had installed warning signs and lights
along the highway and on the barricades of the project; that at the time of the incident, the lights were working
and switched on; that its project was duly inspected by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
the Office of the Mayor of Pili, and the Pili Municipal Police Station; and that it was found to have satisfactorily
taken measures to ensure the safety of motorists. The company insisted that the death of Balbino was an accident
brought about by his own negligence, as confirmed by the police investigation report that stated, among others,
that Balbino was not wearing any helmet at that time, and the accident occurred while Balbino was overtaking
another motorcycle; and that the police report also stated that the road sign/barricade installed on the road had
a light.

RTC: the plaintiffs were unable to make out a case for damages, with a preponderance of evidence. Plaintiff
DID NOT present an eyewitness account of the death of their decedent; on the contrary, the flagman of
defendant was present when the accident occurred, which was caused by the decedent having overtaken a
motorcycle ahead of [him] and on swerving, to avoid the barricade, hit it, instead, breaking the lighted electric
bulb on top of the barricade, resulting in the fall of the decedent about 18 paces from where his motorcycle fell
on the reblocked pavement.

CA: CA promulgated its decision declaring that the issue was whether the company had installed adequate
lighting in the project so that motorists could clearly see the barricade placed on the newly cemented lane that
was then still closed to vehicular traffic, thereby reversing the judgment of the RTC. The CA ruled that the
following elements for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were present.

CA regarded as self-serving the testimony of Eduardo Zamora, an employee of the company who testified that
there was an electric bulb placed on top of the barricade on the area of the accident. It held that Zamora's
statement was negated by the statements of Ernesto Alto and Asuncion Sandia to the effect that they had passed
by the area immediately before the accident and had seen the road to be dark and lit only by a gas lamp.

CA ruled that the placing of road signs and streamers alone did not prove that the electric bulbs were in fact
switched on at the time of the accident as to sufficiently light up the newly re-blocked portion of the highway.

ISSUE: Whose negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Balbino?

37 |AL Y C A B S
RULING: Upon a review of the records, the Court affirms the findings of the RTC, and rules that the Lanuzo
heirs, the parties carrying the burden of proof, did not establish by preponderance of evidence that the negligence
on the part of the company was the proximate cause of the fatal accident of Balbino.

Negligence, the Court said in Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, is "the omission to do something which
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would
do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do, or as Judge Cooley defines it,
'(t)he failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person, that degree of care, precaution, and
vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.'" In order that a
party may be held liable for damages for any injury brought about by the negligence of another, the claimant
must prove that the negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of the injury.

Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim
or defense by the amount of evidence required by law. It is basic that whoever alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence is given on
either side. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual allegations of the complaint.

During the trial, the Lanuzo heirs attempted to prove inadequacy of illumination instead of the total omission
of illumination. However, the witnesses of the plaintiffs were not consistent on their recollections of the
significant detail of the illumination of the site. The Court observes, too, that SPO1 Corporal, a veteran police
officer detailed for more than 17 years at the Pili Police Station, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duties. The presumption, although rebuttable, stands because the Lanuzo heirs did
not adduce evidence to show any deficiency or irregularity in the performance of his official duty as the police
investigator of the accident. They also did not show that he was impelled by any ill motive or bias to testify
falsely.

The CA unreasonably branded the testimonies of Zamora and SPO1 Corporal as "self-serving." They were not.
Self-serving evidence refers to out-of-court statements that favor the declarant's interest; it is disfavored mainly
because the adverse party is given no opportunity to dispute the statement and their admission would encourage
fabrication of testimony. But court declarations are not self-serving considering that the adverse party is
accorded the opportunity to test the veracity of the declarations by cross-examination and other methods. There
is no question that Zamora and SPO1 Corporal were thoroughly cross-examined by the counsel for the Lanuzo
heirs. Their recollections remained unchallenged by superior contrary evidence from the Lanuzo heirs.

Further, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur had no application here. The Court has warned in Reyes v. Sisters of
Mercy Hospital, however, that "res ipsa loquitur is not a rigid or ordinary doctrine to be perfunctorily used but
a rule to be cautiously applied, depending upon the circumstances of each case."

Based on the evidence adduced by the Lanuzo heirs, negligence cannot be fairly ascribed to the company
considering that it has shown its installation of the necessary warning signs and lights in the project site. In that
context, the fatal accident was not caused by any instrumentality within the exclusive control of the company.
In contrast, Balbino had the exclusive control of how he operated and managed his motorcycle. The records
disclose that he himself did not take the necessary precautions. As Zamora declared, Balbino overtook another
motorcycle rider at a fast speed, and in the process could not avoid hitting a barricade at the site, causing him
to be thrown off his motorcycle onto the newly cemented road.

The RTC was correct on its conclusions and findings that the company was not negligent in ensuring safety at
the project site. All the established circumstances showed that the proximate and immediate cause of the death
of Balbino was his own negligence. Hence, the Lanuzo heirs could not recover damages.

NOTES:

According to Dr. Abilay, the cause of death of Balbino was the fatal depressed fracture at the back of his head, an injury
that Dr. Abilay opined to be attributable to his head landing on the cemented road after being thrown off his motorcycle.

38 |AL Y C A B S
 OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR. vs. GERONIMO BACOY
G.R. No. 173870; April 25, 2012

RES: BACOY, guardian and, representing the children, namely: MARY MARJORIE B. MONSALUD,
ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B.
MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD

At dawn on New Year’s Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse Leonardo
Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a Christmas party they
attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok Paglaom, they were run over by a
Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The
jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle
plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.

Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the RTC of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. Said
court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.

During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilia’s father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of the six
minor children of the Monsaluds, filed an independent civil action for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside
from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr.
(Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr.

Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victim’s deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the Monsaluds have
no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and that they were never the
employers of Allan. For his part, Oscar Jr. alleged that Allan and his friends stole his jeep while it was parked
beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject
jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without
any headlights on.

Oscar Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and Benjamin
Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident, declared before the
investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr.
even filed before the same trial court a car-napping case against Allan and his companions. Oscar Jr. clarified
that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latter’s brother, Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who
was employed as the driver. In any event, Allan’s employment as conductor was already severed before the
mishap.

Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio Junior Baobao (Cresencio).
Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot on December 31,
1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to work as such at around
December 15 or 16, 1992. Cresencio, for his part, testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.’s conductor from
December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that Rodrigo was his driver.

Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to December 14,
1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose).
Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave
and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately
before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of his house. Jose likewise attested
that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-
December of 1992.

RTC: RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their
son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the
principle of res ipsa loquitur. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep, managed
and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both

39 |AL Y C A B S
Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the
ignition key, they should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by
unauthorized persons like Allan.

CA: It ruled in the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those
of Oscar Jr.’s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by
Geronimo, Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His testimony was
also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice. As regards Cresencios testimony, the
appellate court found it puzzling why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was
the subject of an accident when it was his bread and butter. CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the
victims based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the
injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle.

ISSUE: WON Oscar Jr. should be held liable/

RULING: Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged
cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Notably, the car-napping case filed
against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this
civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required
was likewise not met to support Oscar Jr.’s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken. Assuming arguendo that
Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he
was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly
handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr.
never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan really
stole the jeep.

While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was stolen, this
circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the headlights were not on at the
time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the trial. Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and
other relevant evidence to support the defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.’s claim
that his jeep was stolen. The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.

Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, [w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is shown to be
under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the ordinary course of things, would
not happen if those who had management or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the
absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care. Res ipsa loquitur is merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere
procedural convenience. It recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,
thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. The doctrine is applicable in this case.
There now arises a presumption of negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that
he exercised due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do
so.

In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, the car of therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado
Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable
for damages for the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving
registered motor vehicles,
i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily be responsible
to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways
or streets. Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use or that the subject vehicle was stolen which are valid
defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict resulting from his
jeeps use.

40 |AL Y C A B S
 MACALINAO vs. ONG
G.R. No. 146635; December 14, 2005

PET: MARCELO MACALINAO substituted by ESPERANZA MACALINAO and ANTONIO

MACALINAO
RES: EDDIE MEDECIELO ONG and GENOVEVO SEBASTIAN

Macalinao and Ong were employed as utility man and driver, respectively, at the Genetron International
Marketing (Genetron), a single proprietorship owned and operated by Sebastian.

On 25 April 1992, Sebastian instructed Macalinao, Ong and two truck helpers to deliver a heavy piece of
machinerya reactor/motor for mixing chemicals, to Sebastians manufacturing plant in Angat, Bulacan. While in
the process of complying with the order, the vehicle driven by Ong, Genetrons Isuzu Elf truck with plate no.
PMP-106 hit and bumped the front portion of a private jeepney with plate no. DAF-922 along Caypombo, Sta.
Maria, Bulacan at around 11:20 in the morning. Both vehicles incurred severe damages while the passengers
sustained physical injuries as a consequence of the collision. Macalinao incurred the most serious injuries.

Macalinaos body was paralyzed and immobilized from the neck down as a result of the accident and per doctors
advice, his foot was amputated. He also suffered from bed sores and infection. His immedicable condition,
coupled with the doctor’s recommendation, led his family to bring him home where he died on 7 November
1992. Before he died, Macalinao was able to file an action for damages against both Ong and Sebastian before
the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 81. After his death, Macalinao was substituted by his parents in the action. A
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries had also been instituted earlier
against Ong.

RTC held that based on the evidence, Ong drove the Isuzu truck in a reckless and imprudent manner thereby
causing the same to hit the private jeepney. It observed that while respondents claimed that Ong was driving
cautiously and prudently at the time of the mishap, no evidence was presented to substantiate the claim. It
declared Ong negligent and at the same time, it held that Sebastian failed to exercise the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Ong. Consequently, the trial court pronounced the two of
them jointly liable to pay actual, moral, and exemplary damages as well as civil indemnity for Macalinao’s
death.

CA reversed the findings of the trial court. It held that the evidence presented by petitioners was woefully scant
to support a verdict of negligence against Ong. And since respondents liability hinged squarely on proof of
Ong’s negligence, neither of them could be held liable for damages to petitioners. The pictures of the collision
afford no basis for concluding that it was the fault of the defendant driver, or that he was driving recklessly. The
police report contains no findings as to the road conditions, estimates of the relative speed of the vehicles, or
their exact position at the time of the accident. And even so, entries in the police blotter should not be given
significance or probative value as they do not constitute conclusive proof of the truth thereof. Nor were
eyewitnesses presented, not even affidavits or statements to give any indication as to what actually happened.
The police investigators findings are sketchy at best, with only the phrase Isuzu lost control as his opinion, with
no explanation how he reached it.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner’s evidence conclusively establish fault or negligence on the part of Ong?

RULING: The evidence on record coupled with the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur sufficiently establishes Ongs
negligence. The photographs of the accident which the appellate court cavalierly brushed aside as insignificant
deserve substantial cogitation. In Jose v. Court of Appeals, we upheld the trial courts reliance on photographs
of the accident as opposed to a party’s obviously biased testimony.

In this case, while there is a dearth of testimonial evidence to enlighten us about what actually happened,
photographs depicting the relative positions of the vehicles immediately after the accident took place do exist.
It is well established that photographs, when duly verified and shown by extrinsic evidence to be faithful
representations of the subject as of the time in question, are, in the discretion of the trial court, admissible in
evidence as aids. According to American courts, photographs are admissible in evidence in motor vehicle

41 |AL Y C A B S
accident cases when they appear to have been accurately taken and are proved to be a faithful and clear
representation of the subject, which cannot itself be produced, and are of such nature as to throw light upon a
disputed point.

In the case at bar, the photographer testified in open court and properly identified the pictures as the ones he
took at the scene of the accident. An examination of said photographs clearly shows that the road where the
mishap occurred is marked by a line at the center separating the right from the left lane. Based on the motorists
right of way rule, the Isuzu truck which was headed towards Norzagaray, Bulacan should have been occupying
the left lane while the private jeepney which was traversing the road to the town proper of Sta. Maria, Bulacan
should have been in the right lane. Exhibits L and L-4 among the photographs, however, reveal that in the
aftermath of the collision, the Isuzu truck usurped the opposite lane to such an extent that only its right rear
wheel remained in the left lane, a few inches from the demarcation line. Moreover, the unequal size and weight
of the two vehicles would make it improbable for the relatively lighter private jeepney to have stricken the
heavier truck with such force as to push the latter to the formers side of the road.

Another piece of evidence which supports a finding of negligence against Ong is the police report of the incident
denoted as Entry No. 04-229 of the Sta. Maria Police Station. While true in most instances, it must still be
remembered that although police blotters are of little probative value, they are nevertheless admitted and
considered in the absence of competent evidence to refute the facts stated therein. Entries in police records made
by a police officer in the performance of the duty especially enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the
fact therein stated.

On the other hand, aside from a blanket allegation that the driver of the other vehicle was the one at fault,
respondents did not present any evidence to back up their charge and show that the conclusion of the police
investigator was false. Ong was driving the truck while the two other truck helpers also survived the accident.
Any or all of them could have given their testimony to shed light on what actually transpired, yet not one of
them was presented to substantiate the claim that Ong was not negligent.

While not constituting direct proof of Ongs negligence, the foregoing pieces of evidence justify the application
of res ipsa loquitur, a Latin phrase which literally means the thing or the transaction speaks for itself. Res ipsa
loquitur recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the
principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present along with proof of the
accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the doctrine, create an inference or presumption of
negligence and thereby place on the defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part.
The doctrine can be invoked only when under the circumstances, direct evidence is absent and not readily
available.

In this case, Macalinao could no longer testify as to the cause of the accident since he is dead. Petitioners, while
substituting their son as plaintiff, have no actual knowledge about the event since they were not present at the
crucial moment. This justifies the invocation of the doctrine. And the Court is convinced that the doctrine is
thus applicable in this case. No two motor vehicles traversing opposite lanes will collide as a matter of course
unless someone is negligent. Driving the Isuzu truck gave Ong exclusive management and control over it. No
contributory negligence could be attributed to Macalinao relative to the happening of the accident since he was
merely a passenger in the Isuzu truck.

There exists a fourth requisite under American jurisprudence, that is, that the defendant fails to offer any
explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care. In this case, while
respondents claimed that Ong drove cautiously and prudently during the time in question, no evidence was
proffered to substantiate the same. In fact, Ong did not bother to testify to explain his actuations and to show
that he exercised due care when the accident happened, so even this requisite is fulfilled.

All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption
or inference of Ongs negligence arises. In consonance with the effect of the doctrine, the burden of proving due
care at the time in question shifts to respondents. Unfortunately, as previously discussed, aside from blanket
allegations that Ong exercised prudence and due care while driving on the day of the accident, respondents

42 |AL Y C A B S
proffered no other proof. As a consequence, the prima facie finding of negligence against Ong, remaining
unexplained and/or uncontradicted, is deemed established.

Such liability of Ong is solidary with Sebastian pursuant to Art. 2176 in relation to Art. 2180 of the Civil Code.
Whenever an employee’s negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption
juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo)
or supervision (culpa in vigilando) of its employees.

In an attempt to exculpate himself from liability, Sebastian claimed that he exercised due care in selecting Ong
as a driver. Before he hired Ong, he allegedly required him to produce police and NBI clearances and he took
into account the recommendations of Ongs previous employer and friends. However, Sebastians statements are
not sufficient to prove that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of Ong. His
testimony is selfserving and devoid of corroboration as he did not bother to support the same with document
evidence.

On the other hand, due diligence in supervision requires the formulation of rules and regulations for the guidance
of employees and the issuance of proper instructions as well as actual implementation and monitoring of
consistent compliance with the rules. Admonitions to drive carefully without the corresponding guidelines and
monitoring of the employee do not satisfy the due diligence required by law either.

In an obvious ploy to relieve himself from liability should the appellate court’s decision be reversed, Sebastian
averred that Macalinao is not entitled to damages. He anchored his claim on the novel argument that the
provisions of Art. 2180 apply only when the injured party is a third person but it has no application to an
employee like Macalinao. Sebastian is grasping at straws. Art. 2180 makes no distinction whatsoever whether
the claimant is an employee or a third person relative to the employer. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

Ong’s gross negligence in driving the Isuzu truck precipitated the accident. This is lucidly portrayed in the
photographs on record and it justifies the award of exemplary damages in petitioners favor. However, the trial
courts award of P10,000.00 is insufficient, thus the Court deems it proper to increase the award to P25,000.00
under the circumstances.

NOTES:

Res ipsa loquitur requires: (1) that the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone
is negligent; (2) that the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of
the person charged with negligence; and (3) that the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary
action or contribution from the injured person.The concurrence of these elements creates a presumption of
negligence that, if unrebutted, overcomes the plaintiff’s burden of proof. FOURTH that the defendant fails to
offer any explanation tending to show that the injury was caused by his or her want of due care.

Macalinao was initially brought to the Sta. Maria District Hospital for first aid treatment but in view of the
severity of his condition, he was transferred to the Philippine Orthopedic Center at the instance of Sebastian.
He was again moved to the Capitol Medical Center by his parents, petitioners herein, for medical reasons and
later to the Philippine General Hospital for financial considerations.

43 |AL Y C A B S
 VIRGINIA REAL vs. SIS ENANDO H. BELO
G.R. NO. 146224; January 26, 2007

Petitioner owned and operated the Wasabe Fastfood stall located at the Food Center of the Philippine Women's
University (PWU) along Taft Avenue, Malate, Manila. Sisenando H. Belo (respondent) owned and operated the
BS Masters fastfood stall, also located at the Food Center of PWU. Around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of
January 25, 1996, a fire broke out at petitioner's Wasabe Fastfood stall. The fire spread and gutted other fastfood
stalls in the area, including respondent's stall. An investigation on the cause of the fire by Fire Investigator SFO1
Arnel C. Pinca (Pinca) revealed that the fire broke out due to the leaking fumes coming from the Liquefied
Petroleum Gas (LPG) stove and tank installed at petitioner's stall. For the loss of his fastfood stall due to the
fire, respondent demanded compensation from petitioner.

Respondent alleged that petitioner failed to exercise due diligence in the upkeep and maintenance of her cooking
equipments, as well as the selection and supervision of her employees; that petitioner's negligence was the
proximate cause of the fire that gutted the fastfood stalls. Petitioner denied liability on the grounds that the fire
was a fortuitous event and that she exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees.

The MeTC held that the investigation conducted by the appropriate authority revealed that the fire broke out
due to the leaking fumes coming from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall; that factual
circumstances did not show any sign of interference by any force of nature to infer that the fire occurred due to
fortuitous event; and vigilance in the conduct of her business, particularly, in maintaining the safety of her
cooking equipment as well as in the selection and supervision of her employees; that even if petitioner passes
the fault to her employees, Article 2180 of the Civil Code finds application. The RTC affirmed the Decision of
the MeTC but increased the amount of temperate damages awarded to the respondent from P50,000.00 to
P80,000.00. The CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for being "procedurally flawed/deficient." The
CA held that the attached RTC Decision was not certified as a true copy by the Clerk of Court; that a certified
true copy of the MeTC Decision was not attached.

ISSUE: Whether the herein petitioner could be held liable for damages as a result of the fire?

RULING: Jurisprudence defines the elements of a "fortuitous event" as follows: (a) the cause of the unforeseen
and unexpected occurrence must be independent of human will; (b) it must be impossible to foresee the event
which constitutes the caso fortuito, or if it can be foreseen, it must be impossible to avoid; (c) the occurrence
must be such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal manner; and (d) the
obligor must be free from any participation in the aggravation of the injury resulting to the creditor.

Article 1174 of the Civil Code provides that no person shall be responsible for a fortuitous event which could
not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. In other words, there must be an entire exclusion of
human agency from the cause of injury or loss. It is established by evidence that the fire originated from leaking
fumes from the LPG stove and tank installed at petitioner's fastfood stall and her employees failed to prevent
the fire from spreading and destroying the other fastfood stalls, including respondent's fastfood stall. Such
circumstances do not support petitioner's theory of fortuitous event.

In this case, petitioner not only failed to show that she submitted proof that the LPG stove and tank in her
fastfood stall were maintained in good condition and periodically checked for defects but she also failed to
submit proof that she exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of her
employees. For failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of her cooking equipment and in the
selection and supervision of her employees, the necessary inference was that petitioner had been negligent.

As to the award of temperate damages, the increase in the amount thereof by the RTC is improper. The RTC
could no longer examine the amounts awarded by the MeTC since respondent did not appeal from the Decision
of the MeTC. It is well-settled that a party who does not appeal from the decision may not obtain any affirmative
relief from the appellate court other than what he has obtained from the lower court, if any, whose decision is
brought up on appeal. While there are exceptions to this rule, such as if they involve (1) errors affecting the
lower court's jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3) clerical errors, none
apply here.

44 |AL Y C A B S
 SOUTHEASTERN COLLEGE, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126389; July 10, 1998

RES: JUANITA DE JESUS VDA. DE DIMAANO, EMERITA DIMAANO, REMEDIOS DIMAANO,

CONSOLACION DIMAANO and MILAGROS DIMAANO

Private respondents are owners of a house at 326 College Road, Pasay City, while petitioner owns a four-storey
school building along the same College Road. On October 11, 1989, at about 6:30 in the morning, a powerful
typhoon Saling hit Metro Manila. Buffeted by very strong winds, the roof of petitioners building was partly
ripped off and blown away, landing on and destroying portions of the roofing of private respondent’s house.
After the typhoon had passed, an ocular inspection of the destroyed buildings was conducted by a team of
engineers headed by the city building official, Engr. Jesus L. Reyna.

The report shows that: one of the factors that may have led to this calamitous event is the formation of the
buildings in the area and the general direction of the wind. Situated in the peripheral lot is an almost U-shaped
formation of 4-storey building. With the strong winds having a westerly direction, the general formation of the
buildings becomes a big funnel-like structure, the one situated along College Road, receiving the heaviest
impact of the strong winds.

It then recommended that to avoid any further loss and damage to lives, limbs and property of persons living in
the vicinity, the fourth floor of subject school building be declared as a structural hazard. Private respondents
filed a complaint before RTC Pasay Branch 117, alleging that the damage to their house rendered the same
uninhabitable, forcing them to stay temporarily in others houses. And so they sought to recover from petitioner
P117,116.00, as actual damages, P1,000,000.00, as moral damages, P300,000.00, as exemplary damages and
P100,000.00, for and as attorney’s fees; plus costs

Petitioner averred that subject school building had withstood several devastating typhoons and other calamities
in the past, without its roofing or any portion thereof giving way; that it has not been remiss in its responsibility
to see to it that said school building, which houses school children, faculty members, and employees, is in tip-
top condition; and furthermore, typhoon Saling was an act of God and therefore beyond human control such
that petitioner cannot be answerable for the damages wrought thereby, absent any negligence on its part.

RTC: gave credence to the ocular inspection report to the effect that subject school building had a defective
roofing structure, found that, while typhoon Saling was accompanied by strong winds, the damage to private
respondent’s house could have been avoided if the construction was not faulty.

CA: affirmed with modification the trial courts disposition by reducing the award of moral damages from
P1,000,000.00 to P200,000.00.

ISSUE: Whether the damage on the roof of the building of private respondents resulting from the impact of the
falling portions of the school buildings roof ripped off by the strong winds of typhoon Saling, was, within legal
contemplation, due to fortuitous event?

RULING: The Supreme Court held that petitioner has not been shown negligent or at fault regarding the
construction and maintenance of its school building in question and that typhoon Saling was the proximate cause
of the damage suffered by private respondent’s house. Petitioner cannot be made to answer for a purely
fortuitous event. More so because no bad faith or willful act to cause damage was alleged and proven to warrant
moral damages.

The antecedent of fortuitous event or caso fortuito is found in the Partidas which defines it as an event which
takes place by accident and could not have been foreseen. Escriche elaborates it as an unexpected event or act
of God which could neither be foreseen nor resisted. Civilist Arturo M. Tolentino adds that fortuitous events
may be produced by two general causes: (1) by nature, such as earthquakes, storms, floods, epidemics, fires,
etc. and (2) by the act of man, such as an armed invasion, attack by bandits, governmental prohibitions, robbery,
etc.

45 |AL Y C A B S
In order that a fortuitous event may exempt a person from liability, it is necessary that he be free from any
previous negligence or misconduct by reason of which the loss may have been occasioned. An act of God cannot
be invoked for the protection of a person who has been guilty of gross negligence in not trying to forestall its
possible adverse consequences.
When a person’s negligence concurs with an act of God in producing damage or injury to another, such person
is not exempt from liability by showing that the immediate or proximate cause of the damage or injury was a
fortuitous event. After a thorough study and evaluation of the evidence on record, this Court believes otherwise,
notwithstanding the general rule that factual findings by the trial court, especially when affirmed by the appellate
court, are binding and conclusive upon this Court. After a careful scrutiny of the records and the pleadings
submitted by the parties, we find exception to this rule and hold that the lower courts misappreciated the
evidence proffered.

In order to be exempt from liability arising from any adverse consequence engendered thereby, there should
have been no human participation amounting to a negligent act. In other words, the person seeking exoneration
from liability must not be guilty of negligence. Private respondents, in establishing the culpability of petitioner,
merely relied on the aforementioned report submitted by a team which made an ocular inspection of petitioner’s
school building after the typhoon. As the term imparts, an ocular inspection is one by means of actual sight or
viewing. What is visual to the eye though, is not always reflective of the real cause behind. For instance, one
who hears a gunshot and then sees a wounded person, cannot always definitely conclude that a third person shot
the victim. It could have been self-inflicted or caused accidentally by a stray bullet.

Here, other than the said ocular inspection, no investigation was conducted to determine the real cause of the
partial unroofing of petitioners school building. Private respondents did not even show that the plans,
specifications and design of said school building were deficient and defective. On the other hand, petitioner
elicited from one of the witnesses of private respondents, city building official Jesus Reyna, that the original
plans and design of petitioner’s school building were approved prior to its construction. Engr. Reyna admitted
that it was a legal requirement before the construction of any building to obtain a permit from the city building
official.

In addition, petitioner presented its vice president for finance and administration who testified that an annual
maintenance inspection and repair of subject school building were regularly undertaken. Moreover, the city
building official, who has been in the city government service since 1974, admitted in open court that no
complaint regarding any defect on the same structure has ever been lodged before his office prior to the
institution of the case at bench.

Private respondents merely submitted an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their subject
building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were caused ONLY by petitioners alleged negligence in
the maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential
question that remains indeterminable.

46 |AL Y C A B S
 PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. vs. SPS. SARANGAYA
G.R. No. 147746; October 25, 2005

PET: PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. and BIENVENIDO S. PASCUAL

RES: SPS. GAUDENCIO SARANGAYA III and PRIMITIVA B. SARANGAYA

In 1986, respondent spouses Gaudencio Sarangaya III and Primitiva Sarangaya erected a semi-concrete, semi-
narra, one-storey commercial building fronting the provincial road of Santiago, Isabela. The building was
known as Super A Building and was subdivided into three doors, each of which was leased out. The two-storey
residence of the Sarangaya’s was behind the second and third doors of the building. On the left side of the
commercial building stood the office of the Matsushita Electric Philippine Corporation (Matsushita).

In 1988, petitioner Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. (petitioner-corporation), through its branch manager and
co-petitioner Bienvenido Pascual, entered into a contract of lease of the first door of the Super A Building,
abutting the office of Matsushita. Petitioner-corporation renovated its rented space and divided it into two.

On July 7, 1988, Pascual left for San Fernando, Pampanga but did not bring the car with him. Three days later,
he returned to Santiago and, after checking his appointments the next day, decided to warm up the car. When
he pulled up the handbrake and switched on the ignition key, the engine made an odd sound and did not start.
This revved the engine but petitioner again heard an unusual sound. He then saw a small flame coming out of
the engine. Startled, he turned it off, alighted from the vehicle and started to push it out of the garage when
suddenly, fire spewed out of its rear compartment and engulfed the whole garage. Pascual was trapped inside
and suffered burns on his face, legs and arms.

Meanwhile, respondents were busy watching television when they heard two loud explosions. The smell of
gasoline permeated the air and, in no time, fire spread inside their house, destroying all their belongings,
furniture and appliances. The city fire marshall conducted an investigation and concluded that the fire was
accidental. The report also disclosed that petitioner-corporation had no fire permit as required by law.

Respondents later on filed a civil complaint based on quasi-delict against petitioners for a sum of money and
damages, alleging that Pascual acted with gross negligence while petitioner-corporation lacked the required
diligence in the selection and supervision of Pascual as its employee. Respondents presented witnesses who
testified that a few days before the incident, Pascual was seen buying gasoline in a container from a nearby gas
station. He then placed the container in the rear compartment of the car.

Pascual insisted that the fire was purely an accident, a caso fortuito, hence, he was not liable for damages. He
also denied putting a container of gasoline in the car’s rear compartment. For its part, petitioner-corporation
refused liability for the accident on the ground that it exercised due diligence of a good father.

RTC: the court a quo ruled in favor of respondents and declared that, although the respondents failed to prove
the precise cause of the fire that engulfed the garage, Pascual was nevertheless negligent based on the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. It did not, however, categorically rule that the gasoline container allegedly placed in the
rear compartment of the car caused the fire.

CA: the appellate court again ruled in favor of respondents but modified the amount of damages awarded by
the trial court. The appellate court was in accord with the trial courts findings that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur was correctly applied in determining the liability of Pascual and that petitioner-corporation, as the
employer, was vicariously liable to respondents.

ISSUE: WON the cause of fire is caso fortuito?

RULING: The circumstances on record do not support the defense of Pascual. Clearly, there was no caso
fortuito because of his want of care and prudence in maintaining the car.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests on inference and not on presumption. The facts of the occurrence warrant
the supposition of negligence and they furnish circumstantial evidence of negligence when direct evidence is

47 |AL Y C A B S
lacking. The doctrine is based on the theory that the defendant either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and the plaintiff, having no knowledge thereof, is compelled to allege
negligence in general terms.
The doctrine provides a means by which a plaintiff can pin liability on a defendant who, if innocent, should be
able to explain the care he exercised to prevent the incident complained of.

To sustain the allegation of negligence based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the following requisites must
concur: 1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; 2) the cause of
the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and 3) the injury suffered must not have been
due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured.

Under the first requisite, the occurrence must be one that does not ordinarily occur unless there is negligence.
Ordinary refers to the usual course of events. Flames spewing out of a car engine, when it is switched on, is
obviously not a normal event. Neither does an explosion usually occur when a car engine is revved.

Here, the fact that Pascual, as the caretaker of the car, failed to submit any proof that he had it periodically
checked (as its year-model and condition required) revealed his negligence. A prudent man should have known
that a 14-year-old car, constantly used in provincial trips, was definitely prone to damage and other defects. For
failing to prove care and diligence in the maintenance of the vehicle, the necessary inference was that Pascual
had been negligent in the upkeep of the car.

Pascual attempted to exculpate himself from liability by insisting that the incident was a caso fortuito. Such
claim is unmeritorious. In fine, human agency must be entirely excluded as the proximate cause or contributory
cause of the injury or loss. Clearly, there was no caso fortuito because of his want of care and prudence in
maintaining the car.

Under the second requisite, the instrumentality or agency that triggered the occurrence must be one that falls
under the exclusive control of the person in charge thereof. In this case, the car where the fire originated was
under the control of Pascual. Being its caretaker, he alone had the responsibility to maintain it. The burden of
evidence is thus shifted to defendant to establish that he observed all that was necessary to prevent the accident
from happening. In this aspect, Pascual utterly failed.

Under the third requisite, there is nothing in the records to show that respondents contributed to the incident.
They had no access to the car and had no responsibility regarding its maintenance even if it was parked in a
building they owned.

While the petitioner-corporation does not appear to have erred in considering Pascual for his position, its lack
of supervision over him made it jointly and solidarily liable for the fire. In the supervision of employees, the
employer must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary
measures for the breach thereof. Here, petitioner-corporations evidence hardly included any rule or regulation
that Pascual should have observed in performing his functions. It also did not have any guidelines for the
maintenance and upkeep of company property like the vehicle that caught fire. Based on these circumstances,
petitioner-corporation clearly did not exert effort to be apprised of the condition of Pascuals car or its
serviceability.

48 |AL Y C A B S
 THE ILOCOS NORTE ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-53401; November 6, 1989

RES: LILIAN JUAN LUIS, JANE JUAN YABES, VIRGINIA JUAN CID, GLORIA JUAN CARAG,
and PURISIMA JUAN

In the evening of June 28 until the early morning of June 29, 1967 a strong typhoon "Gening" buffeted the
province of Ilocos Norte, bringing heavy rains and consequent flooding in its wake. Between 5:30 and 6:00
A.M. on June 29, 1967, after the typhoon had abated and when the floodwaters were beginning to recede the
deceased Isabel Lao Juan, fondly called Nana Belen, ventured out of the house of her son-in-law, Antonio
Yabes, towards the direction of the Five Sisters Emporium, of which she was the owner and proprietress, to
look after the merchandise therein that might have been damaged. The deceased was followed by Aida Bulong,
a Salesgirl at the Five Sisters Grocery, also owned by the deceased, and by Linda Alonzo Estavillo, a ticket
seller at the YJ Cinema, which was partly owned by the deceased. Aida and Linda walked side by side when
suddengly, the deceased screamed "Ay" and quickly sank into the water. The two girls attempted to help, but
feardissuaded them from doing so because on the spot where the deceased sank they saw an electric wire
dangling from a post and moving in snake-like fashion in the water.

Upon their shouts for help, Ernesto dela Cruz came out of the house of Antonio Yabes. Ernesto tried to go to
the deceased, but at four meters away from her he turned back shouting that the water was grounded. Aida and
Linda prodded Ernesto to seek help from Antonio Yabes at the YJ Cinema building which was four or five
blocks away. When Antonio Yabes was informed by Ernesto that his mother-in law had been electrocuted, he
acted immediately. With his wife Jane, together with Ernesto and one Joe Ros, Yabes passed by the City Hall
of Laoag to request the police to ask the people of defendant Ilocos Norte Electric Company or INELCO to cut
off the electric current.

In another place, at about 4:00 A.M. on that fateful date, June 29, 1967, Engineer Antonio Juan, Power Plant
Engineer of the National Power Corporation at the Laoag Diesel-Electric Plant, noticed certain fluctuations in
their electric meter which indicated such abnormalities. Between 6:00 and 6:30 A.M., he set out of the Laoag
NPC Compound on an inspection. On the way, he saw grounded and disconnected lines. Electric lines were
hanging from the posts to the ground. Since he could not see any INELCO lineman, he decided to go to the
INELCO Office. As he turned right at the intersection of Guerrero and Rizal, he saw an electric wire about 30
meters long strung across the street "and the other end was seeming to play with the current of the water.”
Finding the Office of the INELCO still closed, and seeing no lineman therein, he returned to the NPC
Compound.

Having learned of the death of Isabel Lao Juan, Engr. Juan passed by the house of the deceased at the corner of
Guerrero and M.H. del Pilar streets to which the body had been taken. Using the resuscitator, he tried to revive
the deceased. His efforts proved futile. Rigor mortis was setting in. Engr. Juan noticed a hollow wound.
Proceeding to the INELCO Office, he met two linemen on the way. He told them about the grounded lines of
the INELCO.

Dr. Jovencio Castro, Municipal Health Officer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, upon the request of the relatives of the
deceased, examined the body and found that the skin was grayish or, in medical parlance, cyanotic, which
indicated death by electrocution. On the left palm, the doctor found an "electrically charged wound.” The
certificate of death prepared by Dr. Castro stated the cause of' death as ,'circulatory shock electrocution"

In defense and exculpation, defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees. Through the
testimonies of their witnesses, defendant sought to prove that on and even before June 29, 1967 the electric
service system of the INELCO in the whole franchise area did not suffer from any defect that might constitute
a hazard to life and property. The service lines, devices and other INELCO equipment in Area No. 9 had been
newly-installed prior to the date in question. As a public service operator and in line with its business of
supplying electric current to the public, defendant had installed safety devices to prevent and avoid injuries to
persons and damage to property in case of natural calamities such as floods, typhoons, fire and others. Defendant
asserts that although a strong typhoon struck the province of Ilocos Norte on June 29, 1967, putting to streets

49 |AL Y C A B S
of Laoag City under water, only a few known places in Laoag were reported to have suffered damaged electric
lines.

A witness in the person of Dr. Antonio Briones was presented by the defense to show that the deceased could
not have died of electrocution. Witness claimed that without an autopsy on the cadaver of the victim, no doctor,
not even a medicolegal expert, can speculate as to the real cause of death.

Cyanosis could not have been found in the body of the deceased three hours after her death, because cyanosis
which means lack of oxygen circulating in the blood and rendering the color of the skin purplish, appears only
in a live person. The presence of the elongated burn in the left palm of the deceased is not sufficient to establish
her death by electrocution; since burns caused by electricity are more or less round in shape and with points of
entry and exit.

An action for damages in the aggregate amount of P250,000 was instituted by the heirs of the deceased with the
aforesaid CFI on June 24, 1968. In its Answer, petitioner advanced the theory, as a special defense, that the
deceased could have died simply either by drowning or by electrocution due to negligence attributable only to
herself and not to petitioner. In this regard, it was pointed out that the deceased, without petitioner's knowledge,
caused the installation of a burglar deterrent by connecting a wire from the main house to the iron gate and
fence of steel matting, thus, charging the latter with electric current whenever the switch is on. Petitioner then
conjectures that the switch to said burglar deterrent must have been left on, hence, causing the deceased's
electrocution when she tried to open her gate that early morning.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held liable for the deceased's death?

RULING: By a preponderance of evidence, private respondents were able to show that the deceased died of
electrocution, a conclusion which can be primarily derived from the photographed burnt wounds on the left
palm of the former. Such wounds undoubtedly point to the fact that the deceased had clutched a live wire of the
petitioner. But in order to escape liability, petitioner ventures into the theory that the deceased was electrocuted,
if such was really the case when she tried to open her steel gate, which was electrically charged by an electric
wire she herself caused to install to serve as a burglar deterrent. But this is mere speculation, not backed up with
evidence.

The CA properly applied the principle of res gestae. The statements made relative to the startling occurrence
are admitted in evidence precisely as an exception to the hearsay rule on the grounds of trustworthiness and
necessity. Therefore, the fact that the declarant, Ernesto de la Cruz, was not presented to testify does not make
the testimony of Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong hearsay since the said declaration is part of the res
gestae.

The Court subscribe to the conclusions of the respondent CA on the issue whether or not the defendant incurred
liability for the electrocution and consequent death of the late Isabel Lao Juan. The Court tip the scales in the
private respondents' favor. In times of calamities such as the one which occurred in Laoag City on the night of
June 28 until the early hours of June 29, 1967, extraordinary diligence requires a supplier of electricity to be in
constant vigil to prevent or avoid any probable incident that might imperil life or limb. The evidence does not
show that defendant did that. On the contrary, evidence discloses that there were no men (linemen or otherwise)
policing the area, nor even manning its office. Indeed, under the circumstances of the case, petitioner was
negligent in seeing to it that no harm is done to the general public"... considering that electricity is an agency,
subtle and deadly, the measure of care required of electric companies must be commensurate with or
proportionate to the danger. The duty of exercising this high degree of diligence and care extends to every place
where persons have a right to be"

When an act of God combines or concurs with the negligence of the defendant to produce an injury, the
defendant is liable if the injury would not have resulted but for his own negligent conduct or omission. Likewise,
the maxim "volenti non fit injuria" relied upon by petitioner finds no application in the case at bar. It is
imperative to note the surrounding circumstances which impelled the deceased to leave the comforts of a roof
and brave the subsiding typhoon. As testified by Linda Alonzo Estavillo and Aida Bulong, the deceased,
accompanied by the former two, were on their way to the latter's grocery store "to see to it that the goods were

50 |AL Y C A B S
not flooded." As such, shall the Court punish her for exercising her right to protect her property from the floods
by imputing upon her the unfavorable presumption that she assumed the risk of personal injury? Definitely not.
For it has been held that a person is excused from the force of the rule, that when he voluntarily assents to a
known danger he must abide by the consequences, if an emergency is found to exist or if the life or property of
another is in peril or when he seeks to rescue his endangered property.

Clearly, an emergency was at hand as the deceased's property, a source of her livelihood, was faced with an
impending loss. Furthermore, the deceased, at the time the fatal incident occurred, was at a place where she had
a right to be without regard to petitioner's consent as she was on her way to protect her merchandise. Hence,
private respondents, as heirs, may not be barred from recovering damages as a result of the death caused by
petitioner's negligence.

When a storm occurs that is liable to prostrate the wires, due care requires prompt efforts to discover and repair
broken lines. The fact is that when Engineer Antonio Juan of the National Power Corporation set out in the early
morning of June 29, 1967 on an inspection tour, he saw grounded and disconnected lines hanging from posts to
the ground but did not see any INELCO lineman either in the streets or at the INELCO office. The foregoing
shows that petitioner's duty to exercise extraordinary diligence under the circumstance was not observed,
confirming the negligence of petitioner. To aggravate matters, even before June 28 the people in Laoag were
already alerted about the impending typhoon, through radio announcements. And yet, despite these danger
signals, INELCO had to wait for Engr. Juan to request that defendant's switch be cut off but the harm was done.
Asked why the delay, Loreto Abijero answered that he "was not the machine tender of the electric plant to
switch off the current."

WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the respondent, except for the slight modification that actual damages
be increased to P48,229.45 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Notes:

Defendant presented the testimonies of its officers and employees, namely, Conrado Asis, electric engineer;
Loreto Abijero, collector-inspector; Fabico Abijero, lineman; and Julio Agcaoili, president-manager of
INELCO.

For the admission of the res gestae in evidence, the following requisites must be present:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence;
(2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
(3) that the statements made must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending
circumstances

In considering the liability of petitioner, the respondent CA awarded the following in private respondent's favor:
P30,229.45 in actual damages (i.e., P12,000 for the victim's death and P18,229.45 for funeral expenses);
P50,000 in compensatory damages, with the base of P15,000 as average annual income of the deceased; P10,000
in exemplary damages; P3,000 attorney's fees; and costs of suit. Except for the award of P12,000 as
compensation for the victim's death, theCourt affirm the respondent CA's award for damages and attorney's
fees. Pusuant to recent jurisprudence, the Court increase the said award of P12,000 to P30,000, thus, increasing
the total actual damages to P48,229.45.

51 |AL Y C A B S
ROMULO & ERLINDA ABROGAR vs. CO SMOS BOTTLING COMPANY & INTERGAMES, INC.
G.R. No. 164749; March 15, 2017

By this appeal, the parents of the late Rommel Abrogar, a marathon runner, seek the review and reversal of the
decision whereby the CA, reversed and set aside the judgment rendered in their favor by RTC Branch 83, in
Quezon City finding and declaring respondents Cosmos Bottling Company (Cosmos), a domestic soft-drinks
company whose products included Pop Cola, and Intergames, Inc. (Intergames), also a domestic corporation
organizing and supervising the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon held on June 15, 1980 in Quezon City, solidarily
liable for damages arising from the untimely death of Rommel, then a minor 18 years of age,3 after being
bumped by a recklessly driven passenger jeepney along the route of the marathon.

To promote the sales of "Pop Cola", defendant Cosmos, jointly with Intergames, organized an endurance
running contest billed as the "1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon" scheduled to be held on June 15, 1980. The
organizers plotted a 10-kilometer course starting from the premises of the Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP for
brevity), through public roads and streets, to end at the Quezon Memorial Circle. At the designated time of the
marathon, Rommel joined the other participants and ran the course plotted by the defendants. As it turned out,
the plaintiffs alleged, the defendants failed to provide adequate safety and precautionary measures and to
exercise the diligence required of them by the nature of their undertaking, in that they failed to insulate and
protect the participants of the marathon from the vehicular and other dangers along the marathon route. Rommel
was bumped by a jeepney that was then running along the route of the marathon on Don Mariano Marcos A
venue (DMMA for brevity), and in spite of medical treatment given to him at the Ospital ng Bagong Lipunan,
he died later that same day due to severe head injuries.

On October 28, 1980, the petitioners sued the respondents in the then Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon
City) to recover various damages for the untimely death of Rommel. Cosmos denied liability, insisting that it
had not been the organizer of the marathon, but only its sponsor; that its participation had been limited to
providing financial assistance to Intergames; that the financial assistance it had extended to Intergames, the sole
organizer of the marathon, had been in answer to the Government's call to the private sector to help promote
sports development and physical fitness; that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because there was
no privity of contract between the participants in the marathon and Cosmos; and that it had nothing to do with
the organization, operation and running of the event. It averred a cross-claim against Intergames, stating that
the latter had guaranteed to hold Cosmos "completely free and harmless from any claim or action for liability
for any injuries or bodily harm which may be sustained by any of the entries in the '1st Pop Cola Junior
Marathon' or for any damage to the property or properties of third parties, which may likewise arise in the course
of the race."

On its part, Intergames asserted that Rommel's death had been an accident exclusively caused by the negligence
of the jeepney driver; that it was not responsible for the accident; that as the marathon organizer, it did not
assume the responsibilities of an insurer of the safety of the participants; that it nevertheless caused the
participants to be covered with accident insurance, but the petitioners refused to accept the proceeds thereof;
that there could be no cause of action against it because the acceptance and approval of Rommel's application
to join the marathon had been conditioned on his waiver of all rights and causes of action arising from his
participation in the marathon; that it exercised due diligence in the conduct of the race that the circumstances
called for and was appropriate, it having availed of all its know-how and expertise, including the adoption and
implementation of all known and possible safety and precautionary measures in order to protect the participants
from injuries arising from vehicular and other forms of accidents.

RTC: ruled in favor of plaintiffs-spouses Romulo Abrogar and Erlinda Abrogar and against defendants. The
RTC observed that the safeguards allegedly instituted by Intergames in conducting the marathon had fallen short
of the yardstick to satisfy the requirements of due diligence as called for by and appropriate under the
circumstances; that the accident had happened because of inadequate preparation and Intergames' failure to
exercise due diligence; that the respondents could not be excused from liability by hiding behind the waiver
executed by Rommel and the permission given to him by his parents because the waiver could only be effective
for risks inherent in the marathon, such a:s stumbling, heat stroke, heart attack during the race, severe exhaustion
and similar occurrences.

52 |AL Y C A B S
CA: found that appellant Intergames was not negligent in organizing the said marathon. CA found that the
standard of conduct used by the trial court is not the ordinary conduct of a prudent man in such a given situation.
CA ruled that, according to the RTC, the only way to conduct a safe road race is to block off the traffic for the
duration of the event and direct the cars and public utilities to take alternative routes in the meantime that the
marathon event is being held.

But such standard is too high and is even inapplicable in the case at bar because, there is no alternative route
from IBP to Don Mariano Marcos to Quezon City Hall. The Civil Code provides that if the law or contract does
not state the diligence which is to be observed in the performance of an obligation that which is expected of a
good father of the family shall only be required. Accordingly, appellant Intergames is only bound to exercise
the degree of care that would be exercised by an ordinarily careful and prudent man in the same position and
circumstances and not that of the cautious man of more than average prudence. Hence, appellant Intergames is
only expected to observe ordinary diligence and not extraordinary diligence.

CA also found the doctrine of assumption of risk applicable in the case at bar. Appellant Romulo Abrogar
himself admitted that his son, Rommel Abrogar, surveyed the route of the marathon and even attended a briefing
before the race. Consequently, he was aware that the marathon would pass through a national road and that the
said road would not be blocked off from traffic. And considering that he was already eighteen years of age, had
voluntarily participated in the marathon, with his parents' consent, and was well aware of the traffic hazards
along the route, he thereby assumed all the risks of the race.

ISSUE: WON respondent Intergames failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the
conduct of the marathon?

RULING: Intergames as the organizer was guilty of negligence. The Court considered the "safeguards"
employed and adopted by Intergames not adequate to meet the requirement of due diligence. Based on the
foregoing testimony of Castro, Jr., Intergames had full awareness of the higher risks involved in staging the race
alongside running vehicles, and had the option to hold the race in a route where such risks could be minimized,
if not eliminated. But it did not heed the danger already foreseen, if not expected, and went ahead with staging
the race along the plotted route on Don Mariano Marcos Highway on the basis of its supposedly familiarity with
the route.

Another failing on the part of Intergames was the patent inadequacy of the personnel to man the route. As borne
by the records, Intergames had no personnel of its own for that purpose, and relied exclusively on the assistance
of volunteers, that is, "seven (7) traffic operatives, five (5) motorcycle policemen, fifteen (15) patrolmen
deployed along the route, fifteen (15) boy scouts, twelve (12) CATs, twenty (20) barangay tanods, three (3)
ambulances and three (3) medical teams" to ensure the safety of the young runners who would be running
alongside moving vehicular traffic, to make the event safe and well-coordinated. In this regard, it can be pointed
out that the number of deployed personnel, albeit sufficient to stage the marathon, did not per se ensure the safe
conduct of the race without proof that such deployed volunteers had been properly coordinated and instructed
on their tasks.

It was obvious that Intergames' inaction had been impelled by its belief that it did not need any action plan
because it had been dealing with people who had been manning similar races for a long period of time. The
evidence presented undoubtedly established that Intergames' notion of coordination only involved informing
the cooperating agencies of the date of the race, the starting and ending points of the route, and the places along
the route to man. Intergames did not conduct any general assembly with all of them, being content with holding
a few sporadic meetings with the leaders of the coordinating agencies. It held no briefings of any kind on the
actual duties to be performed by each group of volunteers prior to the race. It did not instruct the volunteers on
how to minimize, if not avert, the risks of danger in manning the race, despite such being precisely why their
assistance had been obtained in the first place.

Intergames had no right to assume that the volunteers had already been aware of what exactly they would be
doing during the race. It had the responsibility and duty to give to them the proper instructions despite their
experience from the past races it had organized considering that the particular race related to runners of a
different level of experience, and involved different weather and environmental conditions, and traffic

53 |AL Y C A B S
situations. It is relevant to note that the participants of the 1st Pop Cola Junior Marathon were mostly minors
aged 14 to 18 years joining a race of that kind for the first time. The combined factors of their youth, eagerness
and inexperience ought to have put a reasonably prudent organizer on higher guard as to their safety and security
needs during the race, especially considering Intergames' awareness of the risks already foreseen and of other
risks already known to it as of similar events in the past organizer.

In that respect, Intergames did not observe the degree of care necessary as the organizer, rendering it liable for
negligence. The circumstances of the persons, time and place required far more than what Intergames undertook
in staging the race. Due diligence would have made a reasonably prudent organizer of the race participated in
by young, inexperienced or beginner runners to conduct the race in a route suitably blocked off from vehicular
traffic for the safety and security not only of the participants but the motoring public as well.

Negligence of Intergames as the organizer was the proximate cause of the death of Rommel. To be
considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event closest in time to the injury;
a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the injury, if the happening of it set other
foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the damage. First of all, Intergames' negligence in not
conducting the race in a road blocked off from vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer
personnel manning the marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. Secondly, injury
to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route was an event known to and
foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if only Intergames had acted with due diligence
by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road, and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient
supervision of the race through its volunteers. And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an
intervening cause, was not efficient enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of
Intergames and the injurious consequence suffered by Rommel.

The doctrine of assumption of risk had no application to Rommel. The doctrine of assumption of risk means
that one who voluntarily exposes himself to an obvious, known and appreciated danger assumes the risk of
injury that may result therefrom. It rests on the fact that the person injured has consented to relieve the defendant
of an obligation of conduct toward him and to take his chance of injury from
a known risk, and whether the former has exercised proper caution or not is immaterial. In other words, it is
based on voluntary consent, express or implied, to accept danger of a known and appreciated risk; it may
sometimes include acceptance of risk arising from the defendant's negligence, but one does not ordinarily
assume risk of any negligence which he does not know and appreciate. The doctrine requires the concurrence
of three elements, namely: (1) the plaintiff must know that the risk is present; (2) he must further understand its
nature; and (3) his choice to incur it must be free and voluntary.

Contrary to the notion of the CA, the concurrence of the three elements was not shown to exist. Rommel could
not have assumed the risk of death when he participated in the race because death was neither a known nor
normal risk incident to running a race. Although he had surveyed the route prior to the race and should be
presumed to know that he would be running the race alongside moving vehicular traffic, such knowledge of the
general danger was not enough, for some authorities have required that the knowledge must be of the specific
risk that caused the harm to him. He could not have appreciated the risk of being fatally struck by any moving
vehicle while running the race. Instead, he had every reason to believe that the organizer had taken adequate
measures to guard all participants against any danger from the fact that he was participating in an organized
marathon. Stated differently, nobody in his right mind, including minors like him, would have joined the
marathon if he had known of or appreciated the risk of harm or even death from vehicular accident while running
in the organized running event.

Neither was the waiver by Rommel, then a minor, an effective form of express or implied consent in the context
of the doctrine of assumption of risk. There is ample authority, cited in Prosser, to the effect that a person does
not comprehend the risk involved in a known situation because of his youth, or lack of information or
experience, and thus will not be taken to consent to assume the risk.

Nonetheless, the CA did not err in absolving Cosmos from liability. Cosmos is not liable for the negligence of
Intergames as the organizer. The sponsorship of the marathon by Cosmos was limited to financing the race.
Cosmos did nothing beyond that, and did not involve itself at all in the preparations for the actual conduct of

54 |AL Y C A B S
the race. The Court upheld the finding by the CA that the role of Cosmos was to pursue its corporate commitment
to sports development of the youth as well as to serve the need for advertising its business. In the absence of
evidence showing that Cosmos had a hand in the organization of the race, and took part in the determination of
the route for the race and the adoption of the action plan.

Notes:

Assumption of Risk – the general principle underlying the defense of assumption of risk is that a plaintiff who
voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot recover
for such harm. The defense may arise where a plaintiff, by contract or otherwise, expressly agrees to accept a
risk or harm arising from the defendant's conduct, or where a plaintiff who fully understands a risk or harm
caused by the defendant's conduct, or by a condition created by the defendant, voluntarily chooses to enter or
remain, or to permit his property to enter or remain, within the area of such risk, under circumstances
manifesting his willingness to accept the risk.

Assumption of the risk in its primary sense arises by assuming through contract, which may be implied, the risk
of a known danger. Its essence is venturousness. It implies intentional exposure to a known danger; It embraces
a mental state of willingness; It pertains to the preliminary conduct of getting into a dangerous employment or
relationship, it means voluntary incurring the risk of an accident, which may or may not occur, and which the
person assuming the risk may be careful to avoid; and it defeats recovery because it is a previous abandonment
of the right to complain if an accident occurs.
The term 'risk' as used in this connection applies to known dangers, and not to things from which danger may
possibly flow. The risk referred to is the particular risk, or one of the risks, which the plaintiff accepted within
the context of the situation in which he placed himself and the question is whether the specific conduct or
condition which caused the injury was such a risk

The race organized by Intergames was a junior marathon participated in by young persons aged 14 to 18 years.
It was plotted to cover a distance of 10 kilometers, starting from the IBP Lane, then going towards the Batasang
Pambansa, and on to the circular route towards the Don Mariano Marcos Highway, and then all the way back
to the Quezon City Hall compound where the finish line had been set.

Jose R. Castro, Jr., the President of Intergames:

The preparations for the event included conducting an ocular inspection of the route of the race, sending out
letters to the various cooperating agencies, securing permits from proper authorities,46 putting up directional
signs,47 and setting up the water stations.

According to an authority on civil law (Caguioa):"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an
action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which
the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct,
successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no damage exists in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such act or condition
is the proximate cause."

The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the existence or non-existence of intervening
events, but by their character and the natural connection between the original act or omission and the injurious
consequences. When the intervening cause is set in operation by the original negligence, such negligence is still
the proximate cause. If the party guilty of the first act of negligence might have anticipated the intervening
cause, the connection is not broken.

An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one not produced by a wrongful act or omission,
but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first
wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original
wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury."

55 |AL Y C A B S
 MA. LOURDES VALENZUELA vs. CO URT OF APPEALS, RICHARD LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.
G.R. No. 115024; February 7, 1996

This is an action to recover damages based on quasi-delict, for serious physical injuries sustained in a vehicular
accident. At around 2:00 in the morning of June 24, 1990, plaintiff Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving a blue
Mitsubishi lancer with Plate No. FFU 542 from her restaurant at Marcos highway to her home at Palanza Street,
Araneta Avenue. She was travelling along Aurora Blvd. with a companion, Cecilia Ramon, heading towards
the direction of Manila. Before reaching A. Lake Street, she noticed something wrong with her tires; she stopped
at a lighted place where there were people, to verify whether she had a flat tire and to solicit help if needed.
Having been told by the people present that her rear right tire was flat and that she cannot reach her home in
that car's condition, she parked along the sidewalk, ut on her emergency lights, alighted from the car, and went
to the rear to open the trunk.

She was standing at the left side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to a man who will help her fix the
tire when she was suddenly bumped by a 1987 Mitsubishi Lancer driven by defendant Richard Li and registered
in the name of defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc. Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown against the
windshield of the car of the defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to the ground. She was pulled out
from under defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She was brought to the UERM Medical Memorial Center where she
was found to have a "traumatic amputation, leg, left up to distal thigh (above knee)". She was confined in the
hospital for twenty (20) days and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg. The expenses for the hospital
confinement (P120,000.00) and the cost of the artificial leg (P27,000.00) were paid by defendants from the car
insurance.

Defendant Richard Li denied that he was negligent. He was on his way home, travelling at 55 kph; considering
that it was raining, visibility was affected and the road was wet. Traffic was light. He testified that he was
driving along the inner portion of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. towards the direction of Araneta Avenue, when
he was suddenly confronted, in the vicinity of A. Lake Street, San Juan, with a car coming from the opposite
direction, travelling at 80 kph, with "full bright lights". Temporarily blinded, he instinctively swerved to the
right to avoid colliding with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's car, which he did not see because it
was midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or early warning device, and the area was poorly lighted.

The police investigator, Pfc. Felic Ramos, who prepared the vehicular accident report and the sketch of the three
cars involved in the accident, testified that the plaintiff's car was "near the sidewalk"; this witness did not
remember whether the hazard lights of plaintiff's car were on, and did not notice if there was an early warning
device; there was a street light at the corner of Aurora Blvd. and F. Roman, about 100 meters away. It was not
mostly dark, i.e. "things can be seen" A witness for the plaintiff, Rogelio Rodriguez, testified that after plaintiff
alighted from her car and opened the trunk compartment, defendant's car came approaching very fast ten meters
from the scene; the car was "zigzagging". The rear left side of plaintiff's car was bumped by the front right
portion of defendant's car; as a consequence, the plaintiff's car swerved to the right and hit the parked car on the
sidewalk. Plaintiff was thrown to the windshield of defendant's car, which was destroyed, and landed under the
car.

The lower court sustained the plaintiff's submissions and found defendant Richard Li guilty of gross negligence
and liable for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. The trial court likewise held Alexander
Commercial, Inc., Li's employer, jointly and severally liable for damages pursuant to Article 2180. Defendants
filed an Omnibus Motion for New Trial and for Reconsideration, citing testimony in Criminal Case O.C. No.
804367 (People vs. Richard Li), tending to show that the point of impact, as depicted by the pieces of
glass/debris from the parties' cars, appeared to be at the center of the right lane of Aurora Blvd. The trial court
denied the motion. Defendants forthwith filed an appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals found that there was "ample basis from the evidence of record for the trial court's finding
that the plaintiff's car was properly parked at the right, beside the sidewalk when it was bumped by defendant's
car." Dismissing the defendants' argument that the plaintiff's car was improperly parked, almost at the center of
the road; and that defendant Li's testimony that he was driving at a safe speed of 55 km./hour is self-serving In

56 |AL Y C A B S
agreeing with the trial court that the defendant Li was liable for the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the Court
of Appeals, in its decision, however, absolved the Li's employer, Alexander Commercial, Inc. from any liability
towards petitioner Lourdes Valenzuela and reduced the amount of moral damages to P500,000.00

ISSUE: WON Li is negligent in driving his company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer? WON Valenzuela was likewise
guilty of contributory negligence in parking her car alongside Aurora Boulevard, which entire area Li points
out, is a no parking zone?

RULING: Valenzuela's version of the incident was fully corroborated by an uninterested witness, Rogelio
Rodriguez, the owner-operator of an establishment located just across the scene of the accident. The Court
agreed that as between Li's "self-serving" asseverations and the observations of a witness who did not even
know the accident victim personally and who immediately gave a statement of the incident similar to his
testimony to the investigator immediately after the incident, the latter's testimony deserves greater weight.
Against the unassailable testimony of witness Rodriguez we note that Li's testimony was peppered with so many
inconsistencies leading us to conclude that his version of the accident was merely adroitly crafted to provide a
version, obviously self-serving, which would exculpate him from any and all liability in the incident.

One will have to suspend disbelief in order to give credence to Li's disingenuous and patently self-serving
asseverations. The average motorist alert to road conditions will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at work, provided such
mechanisms were not dulled by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc. Li's failure to react in a manner
which would have avoided the accident could therefore have been only due to either or both of the two factors:
1) that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as testified by Rodriguez; and 2) that he was under the influence of
alcohol.

The Court ruled that the respondent court that Valenzuela was not guilty of contributory negligence.
Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he
has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. Based
on the foregoing definition, the standard or act to which, according to petitioner Li, Valenzuela ought to have
conformed for her own protection was not to park at all at any point of Aurora Boulevard, a no parking zone.
The Court cannot agree.

Courts have traditionally been compelled to recognize that an actor who is confronted with an emergency is
not to be held up to the standard of conduct normally applied to an individual who is in no such situation. The
law takes stock of impulses of humanity when placed in threatening or dangerous situations and does not require
the same standard of thoughtful and reflective care from persons confronted by unusual and oftentimes
threatening conditions. Under the "emergency rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of Appeals, an
individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he
fails to undertake what subsequently and upon reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless the
emergency was brought by his own negligence.

While the emergency rule applies to those cases in which reflective thought, or the opportunity to adequately
weigh a threatening situation is absent, the conduct which is required of an individual in such cases is dictated
not exclusively by the suddenness of the event which absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the over-all
nature of the circumstances. A woman driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire on a rainy night will not
be faulted for stopping at a point which is both convenient for her to do so and which is not a hazard to other
motorists. She is not expected to run the entire boulevard in search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street or
alley where she would likely find no one to help her. It would be hazardous for her not to stop and assess the
emergency (simply because the entire length of Aurora Boulevard is a no-parking zone) because the hobbling
vehicle would be both a threat to her safety and to other motorists.

Valenzuela did exercise the standard reasonably dictated by the emergency and could not be considered to have
contributed to the unfortunate circumstances which eventually led to the amputation of one of her lower
extremities. The emergency which led her to park her car on a sidewalk in Aurora Boulevard was not of her
own making, and it was evident that she had taken all reasonable precautions. Obviously in the case at bench,

57 |AL Y C A B S
the only negligence ascribable was the negligence of Li on the night of the accident. In fine, Alexander
Commercial, Inc. has not demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it exercised the care and diligence of a good
father of the family in entrusting its company car to Li. No allegations were made as to whether or not the
company took the steps necessary to determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and history of Li, to whom
it gave full and unlimited use of a company car. Not having been able to overcome the burden of demonstrating
that it should be absolved of liability for entrusting its company car to Li, said company, based on the principle
of bonus pater familias, ought to be jointly and severally liable with the former for the injuries sustained by Ma.
Lourdes Valenzuela during the accident.

58 |AL Y C A B S
 RAMOS vs. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I.
G.R. No. L-22533; February 9, 1967

PET: PLACIDO C. RAMOS and AUGUSTO L. RAMOS

RES: PE PSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE P.I. and ANDRES BONIFACIO

On June 30, 1958 Placido and Augusto Ramos sued Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I. and Andres Bonifacio
in the CFI of Manila as a consequence of a collision, on May 10, 1958, involving the car of Placido Ramos and
a tractor-truck and trailer of PEPSI-COLA. Said car was at the time of the collision driven by Augusto Ramos,
son and co-plaintiff of Placido. PEPSI-COLA's tractor-truck was then driven by its driver and co-defendant
Andres Bonifacio. CFI rendered judgment finding Bonifacio negligent and declaring that PEPSI-COLA had not
sufficiently proved its having exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
PEPSI-COLA and Bonifacio, solidarily, were ordered to pay the plaintiffs. CA affirmed the trial court's
judgment insofar as it found defendant Bonifacio negligent, but modified it by absolving defendant PEPSI-
COLA from liability, finding that, contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, PEPSI-COLA sufficiently proved due
diligence in the selection of its driver Bonifacio.

The uncontradicted testimony of Juan T. Anasco, personnel manager of defendant-company, was to the effect
that defendant driver was first hired as a member of the bottle crop in the production department; that when he
was hired as a driver, 'we had size [sic] him by looking into his background, asking him to submit clearances,
previous experience, physical examination and later on, he was sent to the pool house to take the usual driver's
examination. In view hereof, CA are of the sense that defendant-company had exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the choice or selection of defendant driver'.

ISSUE: WON respondent exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees?

RULING: Appellants herein seek to assail the foregoing portion of the decision under review by taking issue
with the testimony of Anasco upon which the findings of due diligence aforestated are rested. Thus, it is now
contended that Añasco being PEPSI-COLA's employee, is a biased and interested witness; and that his
testimony is not believable. It is rather clear, therefore, that appellants would raise herein an issue of fact and
credibility, something as to which this Court has consistently respected the findings of the Court of Appeals,
with some few exceptions, which do not obtain herein. Stated differently, Añascos credibility is not for this
Court now to re-examine. And said witness having been found credible by the Court of Appeals, his testimony,
as accepted by said Court, cannot at this stage be assailed.

From all this it follows that for the purposes of this appeal, it must be taken as established that, as testified to by
Añasco, PEPSI-COLA did in fact carefully examine the driver-applicant Bonifacio as to his qualifications,
experiences and record of service, taking all steps mentioned by the Court of Appeals. Such being the case,
there can be no doubt that PEPSI-COLA exercised the required due diligence in the selection of its driver. As
ruled by this Court in Campo vs. Camarote: "In order that the defendant may be considered as having exercised
all diligence of a good father of a family, he should not be satisfied with the mere possession of a professional
driver's license; he should have carefully examined the applicant for employment as to his qualifications, his
experience and record of service."

Petitioners impute to PEPSI-COLA the violation of subpars. 1 and 4(d), par. (a), Sec. 27 of M.V.O.
Administrative Order No. 1, dated Sept. 1, 1951, in that at the time of the collision, the trailer-truck, which had
a total weight of 30,000 kgms., was (a) being driven at a speed of about 30 k.p.h. or beyond the 15 k.p.h. limit
set and (b) was not equipped with a rear-vision mirror nor provided with a helper for the driver. It is a fact that
driver Bonifacio was not accompanied by a helper on the night of the collision since he was found to be driving
alone. However, there is no finding that the tractor-truck did not have a rear-vision mirror. To be sure, the
records disclose that Pat. Rodolfo Pahate, the traffic policeman who went to the collision scene, testified that he
saw the tractor-truck there but he does not remember if it had any rear vision mirror. This cannot prove lack of
rearvision mirror.

Petitioners also charge PEPSI-COLA with having violated par. (b) of Sec. 8-A of the Rev. Motor Vehicle Law
that no motor vehicle operating as a single unit shall exceed overall width of 2.5 meters since there was an

59 |AL Y C A B S
express finding that the truck-trailer was 3 meters wide. However, Sec. 9 (d) of the same law, as amended,
providing that the chief of the Motor Vehicles Office with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications shall establish regulations and a tariff of additional fees under which special permits may be
issued in the discretion of the Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office or his deputies, for each of the following
special cases.
So, to conclude that there was a violation of law — which undisputedly constitutes negligence, at the very least
— it is not enough that the width of the tractor-truck exceed the limit in Sec. 8-A; in addition, it must also appear
that there was no special permit granted under Sec. 9. Unfortunately for petitioners, that vital factual link is
missing.

Petitioners would also haven the Court abandon the Bahia ruling. In its stead, We are urged to apply the Anglo-
American doctrine of respondent superior. A motor vehicle owner is not an absolute insurer against all damages
caused by its driver. Article 2180 of our Civil Code is very explicit that the owner's responsibility shall cease
once it proves that it has observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. The Bahia case
merely clarified what that diligence consists of, namely, diligence in the selection and supervision of the driver-
employee. Neither could the Court apply the respondent superior principle. Under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code, the basis of an employer's liability is his own negligence, not that of his employees. The former is made
responsible for failing to properly and diligently select and supervise his erring employees.

60 |AL Y C A B S
 SPS. SANTOS vs. HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO
G.R. No. 151452; July 29, 2005

PET: SPS. ANTONIO C. SANTOS and ESPERANZA C. SANTOS, NORA BARNALO, BELINDA
LUMACTAD, MARIENELA DY, NIKKA SANTOS and LEONARDO FERRER
RES: HON. NORMANDIE B. PIZARDO, as Presiding Judge, RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101,
DIONISIO M SIBAYAN, and VIRON TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, INC., represented by
VIRGILIO Q. RONDARIS

In an Information dated April 25, 1994, Dionisio M. Sibayan (Sibayan) was charged with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting to Multiple Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries in connection with a vehicle collision between
a southbound Viron Transit bus driven by Sibayan and a northbound Lite Ace Van, which claimed the lives of
the van’s driver and 3 of its passengers, including a two-month old baby, and caused physical injuries to 5 of
the vans passengers. After trial, Sibayan was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years 2 months. However, as there was a reservation to file a separate civil
action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the municipal circuit trial court in its decision
promulgated on December 17, 1998.

On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its
President/Chairman, Virgilio Q. Rondaris, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, pursuant to their
reservation to file a separate civil action. Viron Transit moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
improper service of summons, prescription and laches, and defective certification of non-forum shopping. It
also sought the dropping of Virgilio Q. Rondaris as defendant in view of the separate personality of Viron
Transit from its officers.

Petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss contending, among others, that the right to file a separate action in
this case prescribes in ten (10) years reckoned from the finality of the judgment in the criminal action. As there
was no appeal of the decision convicting Sibayan, the complaint which was filed barely two (2) years thence
was clearly filed within the prescriptive period. The trial court dismissed the complaint on the principal ground
that the cause of action had already prescribed. According to the trial court, actions based on quasi delict, as it
construed petitioner’s cause of action to be, prescribe four (4) years from the accrual of the cause of action.
Hence, notwithstanding the fact that petitioners reserved the right to file a separate civil action, the complaint
ought to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration pointing out yet again that the complaint is not based on quasi
delict but on the final judgment of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes ten (10) years from the
finality of the judgment. Trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration reiterating that petitioners
cause of action was based on quasi delict and had prescribed under Article 1146 of the Civil Code because the
complaint was filed more than four (4) years after the vehicular accident.

Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same for error in the
choice or mode of appeal. Petitioners insist that the liability sought to be enforced in the complaint arose ex
delicto and is not based on quasi delict. The trial court allegedly committed grave abuse of discretion when it
insisted that the cause of action invoked by petitioners is based on quasi delict and concluded that the action
had prescribed.

Private respondents insist that the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prescription was in order. They
point out that the averments in the complaint make out a cause of action for quasi delict under Articles 2176
and 2180 of the Civil Code. As such, the prescriptive period of four (4) years should be reckoned from the time
the accident took place. Viron Transit also alleges that its subsidiary liability cannot be enforced since Sibayan
was not ordered to pay damages in the criminal case. It is Viron Transits contention that the subsidiary liability
of the employer contemplated in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code presupposes a situation where the civil
aspect of the case was instituted in the criminal case and no reservation to file a separate civil case was made.

ISSUE: WON the action has prescribed?

61 |AL Y C A B S
RULING: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil action as a result of the
crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this reservation, the municipal circuit trial court, in its decision
convicting Sibayan, did not make any pronouncement as to the latters civil liability. Predicating their claim on
the judgment of conviction and their reservation to file a separate civil action made in the criminal case,
petitioners filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its President/Chairman.

Petitioners assert that by the institution of the complaint, they seek to recover private respondent’s civil liability
arising from crime. Unfortunately, based on its misreading of the allegations in the complaint, the trial court
dismissed the same, declaring that petitioners cause of action was based on quasi delict and should have been
brought within four (4) years from the time the cause of action accrued, i.e., from the time of the accident.

A reading of the complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent with petitioner’s claim that the
action was brought to recover civil liability arising from crime. Although there are allegations of negligence on
the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause of
action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex
quasi delicto had already prescribed.

At the time of the filing of the complaint for damages in this case, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had
already prescribed. Nonetheless, petitioners can pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by their
reservation, i.e., the surviving cause of action ex delicto. This is so because the prescription of the action ex
quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as
the latter action had been expressly reserved.

The case of Mendoza v. La Mallorca Bus Company was decided upon a similar set of facts. Therein, the driver
of La Mallorca Bus Company was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property. The
plaintiff made an express reservation for the filing of a separate civil action. The driver was convicted which
conviction was affirmed by this Court. Later, plaintiff filed a separate civil action for damages based on quasi
delict which was ordered dismissed by the trial court upon finding that the action was instituted more than six
(6) years from the date of the accident and thus, had already prescribed. Subsequently, plaintiff instituted another
action, this time based on the subsidiary liability of the bus company. The trial court dismissed the action holding
that the dismissal of the earlier civil case operated as a bar to the filing of the action to enforce the bus company’s
subsidiary liability.

The Court held that the dismissal of the action based on culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability of the employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in the discharge of the duties of the employees.
This is so because Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code operates with controlling force to obviate the
possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment
convicting the employee.

Seen in this light, the trial court should not have dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription, but
instead allowed the complaint for damages ex delicto to be prosecuted on the merits, considering petitioners
allegations in their complaint, the action was to recover civil liability arising from crime.

This does not offend the policy that the reservation or institution of a separate civil action waives the other civil
actions. The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out
of the same act or omission of the offender. However, since the stale action for damages based on quasi delict
should be considered waived, there is no more occasion for petitioners to file multiple suits against private
respondents as the only recourse available to them is to pursue damages ex delicto.

62 |AL Y C A B S
 RAMOS vs. C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184905; August 28, 2009

On or about 10:40 o’clock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah Matanda
(Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing Plate Number
XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin (Aquilino), and a Ford
Expedition, owned by Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel Ilustrisimo (Rodel), with Plate Number
LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat (Estela) sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed
to the hospital for treatment.

C.O.L. Realty averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of 5 to 10
kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of Katipunan Avenue when
Ramos Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door and fender. With the force of the
impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where it came from. Upon investigation, the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition,
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from
respondent reimbursement for the expenses incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in
the aggregate amount of P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting C.O.L. Realty to file a Complaint
for Damages based on quasi-delict before the MeTC Quezon City.

Ramos denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence of Aquilino, C.O.L. Realty’s driver,
which was the proximate cause of the accident. Ramos maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue
from Rajah Matanda Street despite the concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the
intersection. Ramos further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver, Rodel.

MeTC rendered the Decision exculpating Ramos from liability. RTC of Quezon City affirmed the MeTC’s
Decision. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied by the RTC. C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah
Matanda Street, as per Certification of the MMDA, such act is specifically prohibited (the crossing of vehicles
at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City is not allowed since
January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area)

Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street in order
to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino crossed Katipunan Avenue
through certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus violating the MMDA rule. However, the Court
of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle was moving at high speed in a busy
area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction. Hence, the appellate court rendered the decision
making respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L.
Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration
but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in making Ramos solidarily liable with Rodel to pay C.O.L. Realty
Corporation?

RULING: The petition is meritorious. There is no doubt in the appellate courts mind that Aquilinos violation
of the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate
cause of the accident. Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even conceded
that petitioner was guilty of mere contributory negligence. C.O.L. Realty admitted that there were barricades
along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to
caution drivers not to pass through the intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as C.O.L. Realty
claimed, the barriers were broken at that point creating a small gap through which any vehicle could pass. What
is clear is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it. However, it also declared
Ramos liable vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in driving the Ford Expedition at high speed
along a busy intersection.

63 |AL Y C A B S
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case. If the master is injured by the
negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the
latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third person,
assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint
is made.

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan Avenue via
Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause
of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda, the
accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was
intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural and probable result if he crossed
Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the
thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for
the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when
the plaintiff’s own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rode’ls contributory negligence, since it cannot
overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of the accident. Rodel’s
contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to recover from respondent whatever
damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have the effect of mitigating the award of damages
in his favor. In other words, an assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner;
it could not eliminate respondent’s liability for Aquilino’s negligence which is the proximate result of the
accident.

64 |AL Y C A B S
 MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO
G.R. No. L-8328; May 18, 1956

On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his stepbrother, to repair a
“media agua” said to be in a leaking condition. The “media agua” was just below the window of the third story.
Standing on said “media agua”, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3’ X 6’ galvanized iron sheet
to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron sheet came into contact
with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to as the Company) strung parallel to the
edge of the “media agua” and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing his death by electrocution.

His widow and children filed suit to recover damages from the company. After hearing, the trial court rendered
judgment in their favor. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed the judgment with slight
modification by reducing the attorney’s fees from P3,000 to P1,000 with costs. The electric company has
appealed said decision. The findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals which are conclusive are stated in
the following: ““The electric wire in question was an exposed, uninsulated primary wire stretched between poles
on the street and carrying a charge of 3,600 volts. It was installed there some two years before Peñaloza’s house
was constructed. The record shows that during the construction of said house a similar incident took place,
although fortunately with much less tragic consequences. A piece of wood which a carpenter was holding
happened to come in contact with the same wire, producing some sparks.”

At any rate, as revealed by the ocular inspectioon of the premises ordered by the trial court, the distance from
the electric wire to the edge of the ‘media agua’ on which the deceased was making repairs was only 30 inches
or 2 1/2 feet. Regulations of the City of Manila required that ‘all wires be kept three feet from the building.
Appellant points out, nevertheless, that the fact that in the case of the house involved herein such distance was
actually less than 3 feet was due to the fault of the owner of said house, because the city authorities gave him a
permit to construct a ‘media agua’ only one meter wide, but instead he built one having a width of 65 3/4 inches,
17 3/8 inches more than the width permitted by the authorities, thereby reducing the distance to the electric wire
to less than the prescribed minimum of 3 feet.

ISSUE: WON death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence?

RULING: YES. The death of Magno was primarily caused by his own negligence and in some measure by the
too close proximity of the “media agua” or rather its edge to the electric wire of the company by reason of the
violation of the original permit given by the city and the subsequent approval of said illegal construction of the
“media agua”. The Court fails to see how the Company could be held guilty of negligence or as lacking in due
diligence.

Although the city ordinance called for a distance of 3 feet of its wires from any building, there was actually a
distance of 7 feet and 2 3/4 inches of the wires from the side of the house of Peñaloza. Even considering said
regulation distance of 3 feet as referring not to the side of a building, but to any projecting part thereof, such as
a “media agua”, had the house owner followed the terms of the permit given him by the city for the construction
of his “media agua”, namely, one meter or 39 3/8 inches wide, the distance from the wires to the edge of said
“media agua” would have been 3 feet and 11 3/8 inches. In fixing said one meter width for the “media agua”
the city authorities must have wanted to preserve the distance of at least 3 feet between the wires and any portion
of a building. Unfortunately, however, the house owner disregarding the permit, exceeded the one meter fixed
by the same by 17 3/8 inches and leaving only a distance of 2 1/2 feet between the “Media agua” as illegally
constructed and the electric wires. And added to this violation of the permit by the house owner, was its approval
by the city through its agent, possibly an inspector. Surely we cannot lay these serious violations of a city
ordinance and permit at the door of the Company, guiltless of breach of any ordinance or regulation.

In the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the “media agua” was not the direct cause
of the accident. It merely contributed to it. Had said “media agua” been only one meter wide as allowed by the
permit, Magno standing on it, would instinctively have stayed closer to or hugged the side of the house in order
to keep a safe margin between the edge of the “media agua” and the yawning 2-story distance or height from
the ground, and possibly if not probably avoided the fatal contact between the lower end of the iron sheet and
the wires.

65 |AL Y C A B S
Consequently, we may not hold said company as guilty of negligence or wanting in due diligence in failing to
insulate said wires. As to their proximity to the house it is to be supposed that distance of 3 feet was considered
sufficiently safe by the technical men of the city such as its electrician or engineer. Of course, a greater distance
of say 6 feet or 12 feet would have increased the margin of safety but other factors had to be considered such as
that the wires could not be strung or the posts supporting them could not be located too far toward the middle
of the street. Thus, the real cause of the accident or death was the reckless or negligent act of Magno himself.

It is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote
cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the galvanized iron
sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting
said iron sheet, considering the latter’s length of 6 feet.

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did nothing more than
furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened
between such prior or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the
injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause.
And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.”

66 |AL Y C A B S
 LAMBERT vs. HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON
G.R. No. 160709; February 23, 2005

PET: NELEN LAMBERT, assisted by her husband, GLENROY ALOYSUIS LAMBERT

RES: HEIRS OF RAY CASTILLON, Represented by MARILOU T. CASTILLON and SERGIO
LABANG

In the evening of January 13, 1991, Ray Castillon visited the house of his brother Joel Castillon at Tambo, Iligan
City and borrowed his motorcycle. He then invited his friend, Sergio Labang, to roam around Iligan City. Ray
drove the motorcycle with Sergio as the backrider. At around past 10:00 p.m., after eating supper at Honas
Restaurant and imbibing a bottle of beer, they traversed the highway towards Tambo at a high speed. Upon
reaching Brgy. Sto. Rosario, they figured in an accident with a Tamaraw jeepney, owned by petitioner Nelen
Lambert and driven by Reynaldo Gamot, which was traveling on the same direction but made a sudden left turn.
The incident resulted in the instantaneous death of Ray and injuries to Sergio.

Factual backdrop of the case provides that when Reynaldo Gamot was approaching the side road, he slightly
veered to the right for his allowance. Ray Castillon, who was following closely behind, instinctively veered to
the left but it was also the moment when Reynaldo Gamot sharply turned to the left towards the side road. At
this juncture both were moving obliquely to the left. Thus the motorcycle sliced into the side of the jeepney
throwing the driver forward so that his forehead hit the angle bar on the left front door of the jeepney even as
the motorcycle shot forward and the jeepney veered back to the right and sped away.

The testimonies of the witnesses Frias, Opada, Labang and Sumile show that he did not stop even for a second,
or less before making the left turn. On the contrary, he slightly veered to the right immediately followed by the
abrupt and sudden turn to the left in order to enter the side road. It is apparent that Reynaldo Gamot did not keep
a lookout for vehicles or persons following him before proceeding to turn left. He failed to take into account the
possibility that others may be following him. He did not employ the necessary precaution to see to it that the
road was clear

Respondents, the heirs of Ray Castillon, thus filed an action for damages with prayer for preliminary attachment
against the petitioner Nelen Lambert. The complaint was subsequently amended to include the claim by Joel
Castillon for the damages caused to the motorcycle. On June 29, 1993, after a full-blown trial, the court a quo
rendered a decision in favor of herein private respondents but reduced petitioner’s liability by 20% in view of
the contributory negligence of Ray. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Hence the
present petition.

Petitioner insists that the negligence of Ray Castillon was the proximate cause of his unfortunate death and
therefore she is not liable for damages.

ISSUE: WON the death of Ray Castillon was due to his negligence?

RULING: Clearly, the abrupt and sudden left turn by Reynaldo, without first establishing his right of way, was
the proximate cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Ray and injured Sergio. Proximate cause is defined
as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces
the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the
negligent act of Reynaldo for, as the trial court correctly held, without that left turn executed with no precaution,
the mishap in all probability would not have happened.

Petitioner misunderstood our ruling in Raynera v. Hiceta. That case also involved a motorcycle crashing into
the left rear portion of another vehicle, and we declared therein that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of
another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. In Raynera,
the death of the victim was solely attributable to his own negligence in bumping the rear of the trailer truck
which was traveling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. Raynera, being the driver of the rear vehicle,
had full control of the situation as he was in a position to observe the vehicle in front of him. The trailer truck
therein did not make a sudden left turn as in the case at bar. Thus, the theory that drivers of vehicles who bump
the rear of another vehicle are presumed to be the cause of the accident is, as in this case, sufficiently

67 |AL Y C A B S
contradicted by evidence, which is the sudden left turn made by Reynaldo which proximately caused the
collision.

While we agree with the trial court that Ray was likewise guilty of contributory negligence as defined under
Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we find it equitable to increase the ratio of apportionment of damages on account
of the victims negligence.

The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury
should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The
defendant must thus be held liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence. The determination
of the mitigation of the defendants liability varies depending on the circumstances of each case. The Court had
sustained a mitigation of 50% in Rakes v. AG & P; 20% in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate
Court and LBC Air Cargo, Inc. v. Court of Appeals; and 40% in Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of
Appeals and Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals.

In the case at bar, it was established that Ray, at the time of the mishap: (1) was driving the motorcycle at a high
speed; (2) was tailgating the Tamaraw jeepney; (3) has imbibed one or two bottles of beer; and (4) was not
wearing a protective helmet. These circumstances, although not constituting the proximate cause of his demise
and injury to Sergio, contributed to the same result. The contribution of these circumstances are all considered
and determined in terms of percentages of the total cause. Hence, pursuant to Rakes v. AG & P, the heirs of Ray
Castillon shall recover damages only up to 50% of the award. In other words, 50% of the damage shall be borne
by the private respondents; the remaining 50% shall be paid by the petitioner.

In considering the earning capacity of the victim as an element of damages, the following factors are considered
in determining the compensable amount of lost earnings: (1) the number of years for which the victim would
otherwise have lived; and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Jurisprudence provides that
the first factor, i.e., life expectancy, is computed by applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in
the American Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. As to
the second factor, it is computed by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the
total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings.
Thus, the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3 x
(80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)]

We sustain the awards of P33,215.00 as funeral and burial expenses being supported with receipts; P50,000.00
as death indemnity; and P50,000.00 as moral damages. However, the award of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees
must be deleted for lack of basis. The indemnity for death caused by a quasi-delict used to be pegged at
P3,000.00, based on Article 2206 of the Civil Code. However, the amount has been gradually increased through
the years. At present, prevailing jurisprudence fixes the amount at P50,000.00. While it is true that there can be
no exact or uniform rule for measuring the value of human life and the measure of damages cannot be arrived
at by a precise mathematical calculation, we hold that the trial courts award of moral damages of P50,000.00
for the death of Ray Castillon is in accord with the prevailing jurisprudence.

Notes—

ART. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos,
even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:

(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid
to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless the
deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the
time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient who is not an
heir called to the decedents inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support from the
person causing the death, for a period of not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.

68 |AL Y C A B S
 PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97626. March 14, 1997

PET: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMERCE, now absorbed by PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL

INTRNT’L BANK, ROGELIO LACSON, DIGNA DE LEON, MARIA ANGELITA PASCUAL, et al.,
RES: ROMMEL'S MARKETING CORP., represented by ROMEO LIPANA, its
President & General Manager

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by the private respondent Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC
for brevity), represented by its President and General Manager Romeo Lipana, to recover from the former
Philippine Bank of Commerce (PBC for brevity), now absorbed by the Philippine Commercial International
Bank, the sum of P304,979.74 representing various deposits it had made in its current account with said bank
but which were not credited to its account, and were instead deposited to the account of one Bienvenido Cotas,
allegedly due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of the petitioner bank.

RMC maintained two (2) separate current accounts, Current Account Nos. 53-01980-3 and 53-01748-7, with
the Pasig Branch of PBC in connection with its business of selling appliances. From May 5, 1975 to July 16,
1976, petitioner Romeo Lipana claims to have entrusted RMC funds in the form of cash totalling P304,979.74
to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing said funds in the current accounts of RMC with
PBC. It turned out, however, that these deposits, on all occasions, were not credited to RMC's account but were
instead deposited to Account No. 53-01734-7 of Yabut's husband, Bienvenido Cotas who likewise maintains
an account with the same bank. During this period, petitioner bank had, however, been regularly furnishing
private respondent with monthly statements showing its current accounts balances. Unfortunately, it had never
been the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly statements of account reposing complete trust and
confidence on petitioner bank.

Irene Yabut's modus operandi is far from complicated. She would accomplish two (2) copies of the deposit slip,
an original and a duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current account
number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her husband but the name of the account
holder was left blank. PBC's teller, Azucena Mabayad, would, however, validate and stamp both the original
and the duplicate of these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information on the
duplicate slip. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut allegedly for record purposes. After validation, Yabut
would then fill up the name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account number
written thereon, which is that of her husband's, and make it appear to be RMC's account number. She made her
company believe that all the while the amounts she deposited were being credited to its account when, in truth
and in fact, they were being deposited by her and credited by the petitioner bank in the account of Cotas. This
went on in a span of more than 1 year without private respondent's knowledge.

Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the return of its money, but as its
demand went unheeded, it filed a collection suit before the RTC of Pasig. RTC ruled that petitioner bank was
negligent and ordered Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank and Azucena Mabayad to pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally. The appellate court affirmed the foregoing decision with modifications in the sense that
the awards of exemplary damages and attorney's fees specified therein are eliminated and instead, appellants
are ordered to pay plaintiff, in addition to the principal sum of P304,979.74 representing plaintiff's lost deposit
plus legal interest thereon from the filing of the complaint, P25,000.00 attorney's fees and costs in the lower
court as well as in this Court.

Petitioners submit that the proximate cause of the loss is the negligence of respondent RMC and Romeo Lipana
in entrusting cash to a dishonest employee in the person of Ms. Irene Yabut.[5] According to them, it was
impossible for the bank to know that the money deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut belong to RMC; neither was the
bank forewarned by RMC that Yabut will be depositing cash to its account. Thus, it was impossible for the bank
to know the fraudulent design of Yabut considering that her husband, Bienvenido Cotas, also maintained an
account with the bank For the bank to inquire into the ownership of the cash deposited by Ms. Irene Yabut
would be irregular.

69 |AL Y C A B S
Private respondent, on the other hand, maintains that the proximate cause of the loss was the negligent act of
the bank, thru its teller Ms. Azucena Mabayad, in validating the deposit slips, both original and duplicate,
presented by Ms. Yabut to Ms. Mabayad, notwithstanding the fact that one of the deposit slips was not
completely accomplished.

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of the loss, to the tune of P304,979.74, suffered by the private
respondent RMC -- petitioner bank's negligence or that of private respondent's?

RULING: The Court sustained the private respondent. There is no dispute as to the damage suffered by the
private respondent (plaintiff in the trial court) RMC in the amount of P304, 979.74. It is in ascribing fault or
negligence which caused the damage where the parties point to each other as the culprit. Negligence is the
omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a prudent and reasonable man would
do. Thus, it appears that the bank's teller, Ms. Azucena Mabayad, was negligent in validating, officially stamping
and signing all the deposit slips prepared and presented by Ms. Yabut, despite the glaring fact that the duplicate
copy was not completely accomplished contrary to the self-imposed procedure of the bank with respect to the
proper validation of deposit slips, original or duplicate, as testified to by Ms. Mabayad herself.

Clearly, Ms. Mabayad failed to observe this very important procedure. The odd circumstance alone that such
duplicate copy lacked one vital information -- that of the name of the account holder -- should have already put
Ms. Mabayad on guard. Rather than readily validating the incomplete duplicate copy, she should have proceeded
more cautiously by being more probing as to the true reason why the name of the account holder in the duplicate
slip was left blank while that in the original was filled up. She should not have been so naive in accepting hook,
line and sinker the too shallow excuse of Ms. Irene Yabut to the effect that since the duplicate copy was only
for her personal record, she would simply fill up the blank space later on.

Negligence here lies not only on the part of Ms. Mabayad but also on the part of the bank itself in its lackadaisical
selection and supervision of Ms. Mabayad. This was exemplified in the testimony of Mr. Romeo Bonifacio,
then Manager of the Pasig Branch of the petitioner bank and now its Vice President, to the effect that, while he
ordered the investigation of the incident, he never came to know that blank deposit slips were validated in total
disregard of the bank's validation procedures. It was this negligence of Ms. Azucena Mabayad, coupled by the
negligence of the petitioner bank in the selection and supervision of its bank teller, which was the proximate
cause of the loss sufferedby the private respondent, and not the latter's act of entrusting cash to a dishonest
employee, as insisted by the petitioners.

Proximate cause is determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense,
policy and precedent. In this case, absent the act of Ms. Mabayad in negligently validating the incomplete
duplicate copy of the deposit slip, Ms. Irene Yabut would not have the facility with which to perpetrate her
fraudulent scheme with impunity.

Furthermore, under the doctrine of "last clear chance" (also referred to, at times as "supervening negligence"
or as "discovered peril"), petitioner bank was indeed the culpable party. This doctrine, in essence, states that
where both parties are negligent, but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other,
or when it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident, the one who
had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do so is chargeable with the
consequences thereof. Stated differently, the rule would also mean that an antecedent negligence of a person
does not preclude the recovery of damages for the supervening negligence of, or bar a defense against liability
sought by another, if the latter, who had the last fair chance, could have avoided the impending harm by the
exercise of due diligence. Here, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, thus providing the latter with the opportunity to defraud the company, as advanced by the
petitioner, yet it cannot be denied that the petitioner bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert
the injury incurred by its client, simply by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

In the case of banks, however, the degree of diligence required is more than that of a good father of a family.
Considering the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their depositors, banks are duty bound to treat the
accounts of their clients with the highest degree of care. As elucidated in Simex International (Manila), Inc. v.

70 |AL Y C A B S
Court of Appeals, in every case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity,
whether such account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single
transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. The point is that as a business
affected with public interest and because of the nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the
accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.
In the case before us, it is apparent that the petitioner bank was remiss in that duty and violated that relationship.

While it is true that had private respondent checked the monthly statements of account sent by the petitioner
bank to RMC, the latter would have discovered the loss early on, such cannot be used by the petitioners to
escape liability. This omission on the part of the private respondent does not change the fact that were it not for
the wanton and reckless negligence of the petitioners' employee in validating the incomplete duplicate deposit
slips presented by Ms. Irene Yabut, the loss would not have occurred. Considering, however, that the fraud was
committed in a span of more than one (1) year covering various deposits, common human experience dictates
that the same would not have been possible without any form of collusion between Ms. Yabut and bank teller
Mabayad.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it cannot be denied that, indeed, private respondent was likewise negligent in
not checking its monthly statements of account. Had it done so, the company would have been alerted to the
series of frauds being committed against RMC by its secretary. The damage would definitely not have ballooned
to such an amount if only RMC, particularly Romeo Lipana, had exercised even a little vigilance in their
financial affairs. Article 2179 of the New Civil Code states that when negligence was only contributory, the
immediate and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

In view of this, we believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damage on a
60-40 ratio. Thus, 40% of the damage awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of
P25,000.00 attorney's fees, shall be borne by private respondent RMC; only the balance of 60% needs to be paid
by the petitioners. The award of attorney's fees shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners.

71 |AL Y C A B S
 SPS. FERNANDO AND HERMINIA VERGARA vs. ERLINDA TORRECAMPO SONKIN
G.R. No. 193659; June 15, 2015

Petitioners-spouses Fernando Vergara and Herminia Vergara (Sps. Vergara) and Spouses Ronald Mark Sonkin
and Erlinda Torrecampo Sonkin (Sps. Sonkin) are adjoining landowners in Poblacion, Norzagaray, Bulacan. In
view of the geographical configuration of the adjoining properties, the property owned by Sps. Sonkin (Sonkin
Property) is slightly lower in elevation than that owned by Sps. Vergara (Vergara Property).

When Sps. Sonkin bought the Sonkin Property sometime in 1999, they raised the height of the partition wall
and caused the construction of their house thereon. The house itself was attached to the partition wall such that
a portion thereof became part of the wall of the master's bedroom and bathroom. Sometime in 2001, Sps. Vergara
levelled the uneven portion of the Vergara Property by filling it with gravel, earth, and soil. As a result, the level
of the Vergara Property became even higher than that of the Sonkin Property by a third of a meter. Eventually,
Sps. Sonkin began to complain that water coming from the Vergara Property was leaking into their bedroom
through the partition wall, causing cracks, as well as damage, to the paint and the wooden parquet floor. Sps.
Sonkin repeatedly demanded that Sps. Vergara build a retaining wall on their property in order to contain the
landfill that they had dumped thereon, but the same went unheeded.

Consequently, Sps. Sonkin filed the instant complaint for damages and injunction with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and issuance of a temporary restraining order against Sps. Vergara, as well as Sps. Rowena
Santiago and Harold Santiago, Dolores Vergara-Orbistondo, and Rosario Vergara-Payumo, the other possessors
of the Vergara Property. In defense, Sps. Vergara claimed that Sps. Sonkin's act of raising the partition wall
made the same susceptible to breakage, which therefore cannot be attributed to them (Sps. Vergara). They
likewise claimed that when they levelled their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, they left a distance
of 1 meter from the partition wall such that the edge of the landfill did not breach it, asserting further that there
was no valid and legal reason why they should be enjoined from exercising their proprietary rights

During the trial, Sps. Sonkin presented the testimony of Engineer Ma. Victoria Mendoza, considered an expert
witness, who categorically declared that in view of the sloping terrain and the Sonkin Property being lower in
elevation than that of the Vergara Property, the Sps. Vergara were then duty bound to provide a retaining wall
because they were the ones who caused the landfill, citing Section 1202 of Presidential Decree No.
1096, otherwise known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines" (National Building Code). She
explained that it was Sps. Vergara's duty to provide safety requirements for the landfill they made on their
property to prevent any danger to life or property. Moreover, Sps. Vergara failed to provide a sewerage line to
divert the flow of the water into the adjoining property, in violation of Section 901 of the National Building
Code.

RTC found Sps. Vergara civilly liable to Sps. Sonkin for damages and directed them: (a) to scrape the earth
and other filling materials dumped in the adjacent perimeter wall of the Sonkin Property and erect a retaining
wall in accordance with the standards of the National Building Code; (b) to install and provide an adequate
drainage system in accordance with the same Code; and (c) to jointly and severally pay Sps. Sonkin damages,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit. The RTC found that the earth dumped on the Vergara Property pushed back
the perimeter wall, causing cracks on Sps. Sonkin's bedroom wall and water to seep through the floor of the
house. Moreover, the water seepage could only have come from the Vergara Property which was higher in
elevation, as Sps. Vergara have failed to provide any drainage to divert the flow of water. Aggrieved, Sps.
Vergara appealed, the CA reversed and set aside the assailed RTC Decision and entered a new one: (a) ordering
the Sps. Vergara to install and provide an adequate drainage system on their property to prevent the flow of
water into the Sonkin Property, and to pay Sps. Sonkin the amounts of P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P100,000.00 as attorney's fees; (b) setting aside the directive to Sps. Vergara to remove the landfill and build a
retaining wall on their property; (c) deleting the award of actual damages, as well as exemplary damages; and
(d) dismissing the separate appeal of the Sps. Sonkin for lack of merit.

While the CA concurred with the finding of the RTC that the cause of the water seepage into the Sonkin Property
was the act of Sps. Vergara in elevating their own property by filling it with gravel and soil, it ascribed error
upon the RTC in not fmding that Sps. Sonkin were likewise guilty of contributory negligence in building their
house directly abutting the perimeter wall. The CA explained that despite the fact that under Article 637 of the

72 |AL Y C A B S
Civil Code, the Sonkin Property is legally obliged to receive any water from higher estates such as the Vergara
Property, it being the lower estate, the Sps. Sonkin still built their house with parts thereof directly abutting the
perimeter wall and, in the process, violated the two (2)-meter setback rule under Section 708 of the National
Building Code.Thus, the CA deduced that had Sps. Sonkin followed such rule, then their house would not have
sustained any damage from water coming from the Vergara property. Finally, the CA found the order directing
Sps. Vergara to remove the landfill on their property to be unreasonable and an interference on their proprietary
rights.

Sps. Vergara sought reconsideration essentially arguing that Sps. Sonkin: (a) are not entitled to damages; and
(b) should be ordered to demolish the parts of their house directly abutting the perimeter wall in compliance
with Section 708 (a) of the National Building Code.

ISSUE: WON Sps. Sonkin should have made the necessary adjustments to their property? WON they
are guilty of contributory negligence?

RULING: Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to
the harm he has suffered, which falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own
protection. In the case at bar, it is undisputed that the Sonkin property is lower in elevation than the Vergara
property, and thus, it is legally obliged to receive the waters that flow from the latter, pursuant to Article 637 of
the Civil Code. This provision refers to the legal easement pertaining to the natural drainage of lands, which
obliges lower estates to receive from the higher estates water which naturally and without the intervention of
man descends from the latter, i.e., not those collected artificially in reservoirs, etc., and the stones and earth
carried by the waters:

Art. 637. Lower estates are obliged to receive the waters which naturally and without
the intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stones or earth
which they carry with them.

The owner of the lower estate cannot construct works which will impede this easement;
neither can the owner of the higher estate make works which will increase the burden.

In this light, Sps. Sonkin should have been aware of such circumstance and, accordingly, made the necessary
adjustments to their property so as to minimize the burden created by such legal easement. Instead of doing so,
they disregarded the easement and constructed their house directly against the perimeter wall which adjoins the
Vergara property, thereby violating the National Building Code in the process, specifically Section 708 (a)
thereof which reads:

Section 708. Minimum Requirements for Group A Dwellings.

(a) Dwelling Location and Lot Occupancy.
The dwelling shall occupy not more than ninety percent of a corner lot and eighty
percent of an inside lot, and subject to the provisions on Easement on Light and
View of the Civil Code of the Philippines, shall be at least 2 meters from the
property line.

Hence, the CA correctly held that while the proximate cause of the damage sustained by the house of Sps.
Sonkin was the act of Sps. Vergara in dumping gravel and soil onto their property, thus, pushing the perimeter
wall back and causing cracks thereon, as well as water seepage, the former is nevertheless guilty of contributory
negligence for not only failing to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National Building Code, but
also for disregarding the legal easement constituted over their property. As such, Sps. Sonkin must necessarily
and equally bear their own loss.

In view of Sps. Sonkin's contributory negligence, the Court deems it appropriate to delete the award of moral
damages in their favor. While moral damages may be awarded whenever the defendant's wrongful act or
omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiffs physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury in the cases

73 |AL Y C A B S
specified or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, they are only given to ease the
defendant's grief and suffering and should, therefore, reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the
gravity of the wrong done.

Finally, in view of Sps. Sonkin's undisputed failure to observe the two (2)-meter setback rule under the National
Building Code, and in light of the order of the courts a quo directing Sps. Vergara to provide an adequate
drainage system within their property, the Court likewise deems it proper, equitable, and necessary to order
Erlinda, who is solely impleaded as respondent before the Court, to comply with the aforesaid rule by the
removal of the portion of her house directly abutting the partition wall. The underlying precept on contributory
negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for his own injury should not be entitled to recover
damages in full but must bear the consequences of his own negligence. The defendant must therefore be held
liable only for the damages actually caused by his negligence.

74 |AL Y C A B S
 CAGAYAN II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. vs. ALLAN RAPANAN and MARY GINE
TANGONAN
G.R. No. 199886; December 3, 2014

On October 31, 1998, around 9:00 p.m., a motorcycle with three passengers figured in a mishap along the
National Highway of Maddalero, Buguey, Cagayan. It was driven by its owner Camilo Tangonan who died
from the accident, while his companions respondent Rapanan and one Erwin Coloma suffered injuries.
Rapanan and Camilo’s common law wife, respondent Mary Gine Tangonan, filed before the RTC of Aparri,
Cagayan a complaint for damages against petitioner. They alleged that while the victims were traversing the
national highway, they were struck and electrocuted by a live tension wire from one of the electric posts owned
by petitioner. They contended that the mishap was due to petitioner’s negligence when it failed to fix and change
said live tension wire despite being immediately informed by residents in the area that it might pose an
immediate danger to persons, animals and vehicles passing along the national highway.

Petitioner alleged that the typhoons that struck its areas of responsibility caused some of its electric poles to fall
and high tension wires to snap or cut-off which caused brownouts in said areas. It claimed that they cannot be
faulted for negligence if there were electric wires dangling along the national road since they were caused by
typhoons which are fortuitous events. It also alleged that it was able to clear the said areas of fallen electric
poles and dangling or hanging high tension wires immediately after the typhoons, to secure the safety of persons
and vehicles traveling in said areas. It likewise contended that the proximate cause of the mishap was the
victims’ negligence and imprudence in operating and driving the motorcycle they were riding on.

During the trial, respondents testified and also presented Dr. Triffany C. Hasim as witness. Mary Gine testified4
that she is not married to Camilo but they are living together and that they have one child. She also testified that
she spent ₱20,776 for the funeral expenses of Camilo. She herself prepared an itemized list and computation of
said expenses. She also claimed that Camilo worked as a jeepney driver earning ₱150 per day and that as a
result of Camilo’s death, she suffered sleepless nights and lost weight.

Dr. Triffany C. Hasim, the physician who attended to the victims when they were rushed to the Alfonso Ponce
Enrile Memorial District Hospital, also testified6 for the respondents. According to Dr. Hasim, the abrasions of
Rapanan were caused by pressure when the body was hit by a hard object or by friction but she is uncertain as
towhether a live electric wire could have caused them. She further said that she did not find any electrical burns
on Rapanan. As with Camilo, she found abrasions and hematoma on his body and that the cause of death was
due to "cardio respiratory arrest secondary to strangulation." She also opined that the strangulation could have
been caused by an electric wire entangled around Camilo’s neck.

Petitioner, for its part, presented four witnesses among whom were SPO2 Pedro Tactac, Tranquilino Rasos and
Rodolfo Adviento. SPO2 Tactac, who investigated the incident, testified7 that there was a skid mark on the
cemented portion of the road caused by the motorycle’s foot rest which was about 30 meters long. According
to him, it appears that the motorcycle was overspeeding because of said skid mark. Rasos and Adviento,
employees of petitioner, both testified8 that as a result of the onslaught of typhoons Iliang and Loleng in Buguey
and Sta. Ana, Cagayan, the power lines were cut off because the electric wires snapped and the electric poles
were destroyed. After the said typhoons, petitioner’s employees inspected the affected areas. The dangling wires
were then removed from the electric poles and were placed at the foot of the poles which were located four to
five meters from the road.

RTC: rendered a decision9 in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for damages of respondents. It
held that the proximate cause of the incident is the negligence and imprudence of Camilo in driving the
motorcycle. It further held that respondent Mary Gine has no legal personality to institute the action since such
right is only given to the legal heir of the deceased. Mary Gine is not a legal heir of Camilo since she is only his
common law wife.

CA: reversed the RTC and held petitioner liable for quasi-delict. CA found that despite the different versions
of how the incident occurred, one fact was consistent – the protruding or dangling CAGELCO wire to which
the victims were strangled or trapped. It likewise ruled that the police blotter and medical certificates together
with the testimony of one of the passengers of the motorcycle, respondent Rapanan, was able to establish the

75 |AL Y C A B S
truth of the allegations of respondents – all of which were not controverted by petitioner. The appellate court
held that clearly, the cause of the mishap which claimed the life of Camilo and injured Rapanan was the dangling
wire which struck them. The appellate court nevertheless ruled that the victims were partly responsible for the
injuries they sustained. At the time of the mishap, they were over-speeding and were not wearing protective
helmets. Moreover, the single motorcycle being driven carried three persons. While said circumstances were
not the proximate cause of Camilo’s death and Rapanan’s injuries, they contributed to the occurrence of the
unfortunate event.
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s negligence in maintenance of its facilities the proximate cause of the death of
Camilo and the injuries of Rapanan?

RULING: The petition is meritorious. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the
interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand,
whereby such other person suffers injury. The elements necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are: (1)
damages to the plaintiff; (2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose acts
the defendant must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
the damages.

The presence of the first element is undisputed because the unfortunate incident brought about the death of
Camilo and physical injuries to Rapanan. This Court, however, finds that the second and third elements are
lacking thus precluding the award of damages in favor of respondents. Adviento, petitioner’s employee testified
that their electric poles along the highways, including the one where the mishap took place, were erected about
four to five meters from the shoulder of the road. Another employee of petitioner, Rasos, testified that after the
typhoons hit Cagayan, he together with his co-employees, after checking the damage to the electric lines, rolled
the fallen electric wires and placed them at the foot of the electric poles so as to prevent mishaps to pedestrians
and vehicles passing by. Their testimonies were corroborated by whatwas recorded in the Police Blotter of the
Buguey Police Station, Buguey, Cagayan after SPO2 Tactac investigated on the incident.

Thus, there is no negligence on the part of petitioner that was allegedly the proximate cause of Camilo’s death
and Rapanan’s injuries.1a\^/phi1 From the testimonies of petitioner’s employees and the excerpt from the police
blotter, the Court can reasonably conclude that, at the time of that fatal mishap, said wires were quietly sitting
on the shoulder of the road, far enough from the concrete portion so as not to pose any threat to passing motor
vehicles and even pedestrians. Hence, if the victims of the mishap were strangled by said wires, it can only
mean that either the motorcycle careened towards the shoulder or even more likely, since the police found the
motorcycle not on the shoulder but still on the road, that the three passengers were thrown off from the
motorcycle to the shoulder of the road and caught up with the wires.

Accordingly, this shows that the motorcycle was probably running too fast that it lost control and started tilting
and sliding eventually which made its foot rest cause the skid mark on the road. Therefore, the mishap already
occurred even while they were on the road and away from petitioner's electric wires and was not caused by the
latter as alleged by respondents. It just so happened that after the motorcycle tilted and slid, the passengers were
thrown off to the shoulder where the electric wires were.

The Court hence agrees with the trial court that the proximate cause of the mishap was the negligence of Camilo.
Had Camilo driven the motorcycle at an average speed, the three passengers would not have been thrown off
from the vehicle towards the shoulder and eventually strangulated by the electric wires sitting thereon.
Moreover, it was also negligent of Camilo to have allowed two persons to ride with him and for Rapanan to ride
with them when the maximum number of passengers of a motorcycle is two including the driver. This most
likely even aggravated the situation because the motorcycle was overloaded which made it harder to drive and
control. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages.

Moreover, it should be noted that it was Mary Gine, the common law wife of Camilo, who is the complainant
in the case. As a mere common law wife of Camilo, she is not considered a legal heir of the latter, and hence,
has no legal personality to institute the action for damages due to Camilo’s death.

76 |AL Y C A B S
 PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-65295; March 10, 1987

PET: PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION, INC. and ARMANDO U. CARBONEL

RES: INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LEONARDO DIONISIO

November 15, 1975 at about 1:30 a.m., private respondent Leonardo Dionisio was on his way home from a
cocktails-and-dinner meeting with his boss, the general manager of a marketing corporation. During the
cocktails phase of the evening, Dionisio had taken "a shot or two" of liquor. Dionisio was driving his
Volkswagen car and had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets at Bangkal,
Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in
his allegation) suddenly failed. He switched his headlights on "bright" and thereupon he saw a Ford dump truck
looming some 2-1/2 meters away from his car. The dump truck, owned by and registered in the name of
petitioner Phoenix Construction Inc., was parked on the right hand side of General Lacuna Street facing the
oncoming traffic.

The dump truck was parked askew (not parallel to the street curb) in such a manner as to stick out onto the
street, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor any so-called "early warning"
reflector devices set anywhere near the dump truck, front or rear. The dump truck had earlier that evening been
driven home by petitioner Armando U. Carbonel, its regular driver, with the permission of his employer
Phoenix, in view of work scheduled to be carried out early the following morning, Dionisio claimed that he
tried to avoid a collision by swerving his car to the left but it was too late and his car smashed into the dump
truck. As a result of the collision, Dionisio suffered some physical injuries including some permanent facial
scars, a "nervous breakdown" and loss of two gold bridge dentures.

Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga basically claiming that
the legal and proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had parked the dump
truck entrusted to him by his employer Phoenix. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the
proximate cause of Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while
under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew pass. Phoenix also sought to
establish that it had exercised due rare in the selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and Carbonel and ordered the latter
to pay plaintiff jointly and severally the costs of hospital bills and the replacement of the lost dentures of
plaintiff, loss of expected income for plaintiff brought about the accident, moral damages, attorney's fees and
cost of suit. Phoenix and Carbonel appealed to the IAC but the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court but
modified/reduced the award of damages. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Dionisio’s negligence in driving fast or speeding is the proximate cause of his injuries?

RULING: whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night—both the trial court and the appellate court
were completely silent. The defendants in the trial court introduced the testimony of Patrolman Cuyno who was
at the scene of the accident almost immediately after it occurred, the police station where he was based being
barely 200 meters away. Patrolman Cuyno testified that people who had gathered at the scene of the accident
told him that Dionisio's car was "moving fast" and did not have its headlights on. Dionisio, on the other hand,
claimed that he was travelling at a moderate speed at 30 kilometers per hour. However, the Court ruled that an
automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing into a stationary object in the dead of night is a
sufficiently startling event as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers who
happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno was therefore admissible as part of the
res gestae and should have been considered by the trial court.

The Court likewise do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so heavily under the
influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. There
simply is not enough evidence to show how much liquor he had in fact taken and the effects of that upon his
physical faculties or upon his judgment or mental alertness. The Court is also aware that "one shot or two" of
hard liquor may affect different people differently. The conclusion from the factual circumstances outlined

77 |AL Y C A B S
above is that private respondent Dionisio was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that
night and driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his headlights at or near the
intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked
askew and sticking out onto the road lane.

Nonetheless, the Court agreed with the Court of First Instance and the Intermediate Appellate Court that the
legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful — or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of petitioner Carbonel. That there was a
reasonable relationship between petitioner Carbonel's negligence on the one hand and the accident and
respondent's injuries on the other hand, is quite clear. Put in a slightly different manner, the collision of
Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive and static condition" and
that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient intervening cause and that consequently
Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier
negligence of Carbonel. We note that the petitioners' arguments are drawn from a reading of some of the older
cases in various jurisdictions in the United States but we are unable to persuade ourselves that these arguments
have any validity for our jurisdiction. We note, firstly, that even in the United States, the distinctions between
"cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely
discredited."

Cause and condition. Many courts have sought to distinguish between the active "cause" of the
harm and the existing "conditions" upon which that cause operated. If the defendant has created
only a passive static condition which made the damage possible, the defendant is said not to be
liable. But so far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents
which have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to distinguish
between active forces and passive situations, particularly since, as is invariably the case, the
latter are the result of other active forces which have gone before. The defendant who spills
gasoline about the premises creates a "condition," but the act may be culpable because of the
danger of fire. When a spark ignites the gasoline, the condition has done quite as much to bring
about the fire as the spark; and since that is the very risk which the defendant has created, the
defendant will not escape responsibility. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which
the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability; one who digs a trench in the
highway may still be liable to another who fans into it a month afterward. "Cause" and
"condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of case where
the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety,
and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction between "cause"
and "condition" which is important but the nature of the risk and the character of the
intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a "passive and static condition" was
rather an indispensable and efficient cause. The collision between the dump truck and the private respondent's
car would in a probability not have occurred had the dump truck not been parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for
anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so created this risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In our view, Dionisio's negligence was not an efficient intervening or independent cause. Dionisio's
negligence was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of causation in
fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

Foreseeable Intervening Causes. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human
experience is reasonably to be anticipated or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate
under the particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligence among other reasons,
because of failure to guard against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason.

78 |AL Y C A B S
We hold that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and
proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently respondent
Dionisio may recover damages though such damages are subject to mitigation by the courts. Petitioners also ask
us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance" doctrine because private respondent Dionisio had the
"last clear chance" of avoiding the accident and hence he must bear his own injuries alone. Is there perhaps a
general concept of "last clear chance" that may be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a
general rule in negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction like ours? We do not believe so. The petitioners urge
that the truck driver (and therefore his employer) should be absolved from responsibility for his own prior
negligence because the unfortunate plaintiff failed to act with that increased diligence which had become
necessary to avoid the peril precisely created by the truck driver's own wrongful act or omission. To accept this
proposition is to come too close to wiping out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the
foreseeable consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Our law on quasi-delicts seeks to reduce the
risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among the members of society. To accept the
petitioners' pro-position must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

79 |AL Y C A B S
 MARIANO C. MENDOZA and ELVIRA LIM vs. SPOUSES LEONORA and GABRIEL GOMEZ
G.R. No. 160110; June 18, 2014

On 7 March 1997, an Isuzu Elf truck with plate number UAW 582, owned by respondent Leonora J. Gomez
and driven by Antenojenes Perez, was hit by a Mayamy Transportation bus with temporary plate number 1376-
1280, registered under the name of petitioner Elvira Lim and driven by petitioner Mariano C. Mendoza.
Owing to the incident, an Information for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple
physical injuries was filed against Mendoza. Mendoza, however, eluded arrest, thus, respondents filed a separate
complaint for damages against Mendoza and Lim, seeking actual damages, compensation for lost income, moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit.

According to PO1 Melchor F. Rosales (PO1 Rosales), investigating officer of the case, at around 5:30 a.m., the
Isuzu truck, coming from Katipunan Road and heading towards E. Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, was travelling along
the downward portion of Boni Serrano Avenue when, upon reaching the corner of Riviera Street, fronting St.
Ignatius Village, its left front portion was hit by the Mayamy bus. According to PO1 Rosales, the Mayamy bus,
while traversing the opposite lane, intruded on the lane occupied by the Isuzu truck. PO1 Rosales also reported
that Mendoza tried to escape by speeding away, but he was apprehended in Katipunan Road corner C. P. Garcia
Avenue by one Traffic Enforcer Galante and a security guard of St. Ignatius Village.

For their part, petitioners capitalized on the issue of ownership of the bus in question. Respondents argued that
although the registered owner was Lim, the actual owner of the bus was SPO1 Cirilo Enriquez (Enriquez), who
had the bus attached with Mayamy Transportation Company (Mayamy Transport) under the so-called "kabit
system."
Respondents then impleaded both Lim and Enriquez.

RTC found Mendoza liable for direct personal negligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and it also
found Lim vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the same Code. As regards Lim, the RTC relied on the
Certificate of Registration issued by the LTO in concluding that she is the registered owner of the bus in
question. Although actually owned by Enriquez, following the established principle in transportation law, Lim,
as the registered owner, is the one who can be held liable. Petitioners appealed to the CA. After evaluating the
damages awarded by the RTC, such were affirmed by the CA with the exception of the award of unrealized
income which the CA ordered deleted. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON Lim should be liable?

RULING: As found by the RTC, and affirmed by the CA, Mendoza was negligent in driving the subject
Mayamy bus, as demonstrated by the fact that, at the time of the collision, the bus intruded on the lane intended
for the Isuzu truck. Having encroached on the opposite lane, Mendoza was clearly in violation of traffic laws.
Article2185 of the Civil Code provides that unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person
driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
In the case at bar, Mendoza’s violation of traffic laws was the proximate cause of the harm.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. And more
comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

The mishap occurred when the Mayamy bus, travelling at a fast speed as shown by the impact of the collision,
and going in the opposite direction as that of the Isuzu truck, encroached on the lane rightfully occupied by said
Isuzu truck, and caused the latter to spin, injuring the passengers therein and and considerably damaging the
Isuzu truck.

80 |AL Y C A B S
His negligence having caused the damage, Mendoza is certainly liable to repair said damage. Additionally,
Mendoza’s employer may also be held liable under the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed negligence.
Under such doctrine, a person who has not committed the act or omission which caused damage or injury to
another may nevertheless be held civilly liable to the latter either directly or subsidiarily under certain
circumstances. In the case at bar, who is deemed as Mendoza’s employer? Is it Enriquez, the actual owner of
the bus or Lim, the registered owner of the bus?

In Filcar Transport Services v. Espinas, we held that the registered owner is deemed the employer of the
negligent driver, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180, of the Civil Code.
Citing Equitable Leasing Corporation v. Suyom, the Court ruled that in so far as third persons are concerned,
the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is
considered merely as an agent of such owner. Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship
between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who
the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the
vehicle in the streets and highways.

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any
damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a
definite individual, the registered owner. One of the principal purposes of motor vehicles legislation is
identification of the vehicle and of the operator, in case of accident; and another is that the knowledge that
means of detection are always available may act as a deterrent from lax observance of the law and of the rules
of conservative and safe operation.

Generally, when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee (culpa in eligiendo) or in the supervision over him after the selection (culpa vigilando), or
both. The presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure; consequently, it may be rebutted. However,
with the enactment of the motor vehicle registration law, the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code–that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage–are no longer available to the registered owner of the motor vehicle,
because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180.

As such, there can be no other conclusion but to hold Lim vicariously liable with Mendoza. This does not mean,
however, that Lim is left without any recourse against Enriquez and Mendoza. Under the civil law principle of
unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer
of the driver; and under Article 2181 of the Civil Code, whoever pays for the damage caused by his dependents
or employees may recover from the latter what he has paid or delivered in satisfaction of the claim.

Notes on Damages—

Actual Damages. Article 2202 of the Civil Code provides that in crimes and quasi delicts, the defendant shall be liable for
all damages which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that
such damages have been foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Article 2199 of the same Code,
however, sets the limitation that, except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation
only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. As such, to warrant an award of actual or compensatory
damages, the claimant must prove that the damage sustained is the natural and probable consequences of the negligent act
and, moreover, the claimant must adequately prove the amount of such damage. Although respondents alleged in their
complaint that the damage to their Isuzu truck caused them the loss of a daily income of ₱1,000.00, such claim was not
duly substantiated by any evidence on record, and thus cannot be awarded in their favor.

Moral Damages. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that
will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. In prayers for
moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. In fine, an award of moral damages calls for
the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering sustained by the
claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established; 3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is
the proximate cause of the damages sustained by the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the
instances expressed or envisioned by Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A review of the complaint and the

81 |AL Y C A B S
transcript of stenographic notes yields the pronouncement that respondents neither alleged nor offered any evidence of
besmirched reputation or physical, mental or psychological suffering incurred by them.

Contra bonus mores. Neither can respondents rely on Article 21 of the Civil Code as the RTC erroneously did. Article 21
deals with acts contra bonus mores, and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; (3) and it is done with intent to injure.43 In the present
case, it can hardly be said that Mendoza’s negligent driving and violation of traffic laws are legal acts. Moreover, it was
not proven that Mendoza intended to injure Perez, et al. Thus, Article 21 finds no application to the case at bar.

Exemplary damages. They may be imposed by way of example or correction only in addition, among others, to
compensatory damages, and cannot be recovered as a matter of right. In motor vehicle accident cases, exemplary damages
may be awarded where the defendant’s misconduct is so flagrant as to transcend simple negligence and be tantamount to
positive or affirmative misconduct rather than passive or negative misconduct. Exemplary damages are in order, given the
fact that Mendoza was grossly negligent in driving the Mayamy bus.

82 |AL Y C A B S
 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY vs. CARPITANOS
G.R. No. 143363; February 6, 2002

RES: WILLIAM CARPITANOS and LUCIA S. CARPITANOS, GUADA DANIEL, JAMES DANIEL
II, JAMES DANIEL, SR., and VIVENCIO VILLANUEVA

Claiming damages for the death of their only son, Sherwin Carpitanos, spouses William Carpitanos and Lucia
Carpitanos filed on June 9, 1995 a case against James Daniel II and his parents, James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel, the vehicle owner, Vivencio Villanueva and St. Mary’s Academy before the RTC of Dipolog City.

From the records it appears that from 13 to 20 February 1995, defendant-appellant St. Mary’s Academy of
Dipolog City conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign
was the visitation of schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s
Academy, Sherwin Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, on the fateful day, Sherwin,
along with other high school students were riding in a Mitsubishi jeep owned by defendant Vivencio Villanueva
on their way to Larayan Elementary School, Larayan, Dapitan City. The jeep was driven by James Daniel II
then 15 years old and a student of the same school. Allegedly, the latter drove the jeep in a reckless manner and
as a result the jeep turned turtle. Sherwin Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he sustained from the
accident.

RTC of Dipolog City rendered its decision ordering St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City to pay plaintiffs
William Carpitanos and Luisa Carpitanos. Their liability being only subsidiary, defendants James Daniel, Sr.
and Guada Daniel are hereby ordered to pay plaintiffs damages in the event of insolvency of principal obligor
St. Mary’s Academy of Dipolog City. Defendant James Daniel II, being a minor at the time of the commission
of the tort and who was under special parental authority of defendant St. Mary’s Academy, is ABSOLVED
from paying the above-stated damages, same being adjudged against defendants St. Mary’s Academy, and
subsidiarily, against his parents. CA promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages but otherwise
affirming the decision a quo, in toto.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding the petitioner liable for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos?

RULING: The Supreme Court reverses the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals held
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy liable for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos under Articles 218 and 219 of the
Family Code, pointing out that petitioner was negligent in allowing a minor to drive and in not having a teacher
accompany the minor students in the jeep.

Under Article 218 of the Family Code, the following shall have special parental authority over a minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody: (1) the school, its administrators and teachers; or (2) the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care. This special parental authority and responsibility applies
to all authorized activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. Thus, such
authority and responsibility applies to field trips, excursions and other affairs of the pupils and students outside
the school premises whenever authorized by the school or its teachers. Under Article 219 of the Family Code,
if the person under custody is a minor, those exercising special parental authority are principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor while under their supervision,
instruction, or custody.

However, for petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission considered as negligent was
the proximate cause of the injury caused because the negligence must have a causal connection to the accident.
In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the injury for which recovery
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient causes. In other words,
the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury

In this case, the respondents failed to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the
death of the victim. Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted that the immediate cause of the
accident was not the negligence of petitioner or the reckless driving of James Daniel II, but the detachment of

83 |AL Y C A B S
the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James Daniel
II but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio Villanueva. Respondents, including the spouses Carpitanos,
parents of the deceased Sherwin Carpitanos, did not dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator
who stated that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to
turn turtle.

Significantly, respondents did not present any evidence to show that the proximate cause of the accident was
the negligence of the school authorities, or the reckless driving of James Daniel II. Hence, the respondent’s
reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding
Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor was unfounded. Further, there was no evidence that petitioner school allowed the minor James Daniel II
to drive the jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was Ched Villanueva, grandson of respondent Vivencio
Villanueva, who had possession and control of the jeep. He was driving the vehicle and he allowed James Daniel
II, a minor, to drive the jeep at the time of the accident.

Hence, liability for the accident, whether caused by the negligence of the minor driver or mechanical detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, must be pinned on the minor’s parents primarily. The negligence of
petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the minor’s parents or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep. Considering that the negligence of the minor driver or the detachment of the steering wheel guide of
the jeep owned by respondent Villanueva was an event over which petitioner St. Mary’s Academy had no
control, and which was the proximate cause of the accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the death
resulting from such accident.

Incidentally, there was no question that the registered owner of the vehicle was respondent Villanueva. He never
denied and in fact admitted this fact. We have held that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for
public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter
while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or streets. Hence, with the overwhelming evidence
presented by petitioner and the respondent Daniel spouses that the accident occurred because of the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep, it is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.

Notes—

Article 218. The School, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall
have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.

Article 219. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the
persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of
those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required
under the particular circumstances.

84 |AL Y C A B S
 SABIDO vs. CUSTODIO
G.R. No. L-21512; August 31, 1966

PET: PROSPERO SABIDO and ASER LAGUNDA

RES: CARLOS CUSTODIO, BELEN MAKABUHAY CUSTODIO and THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS

In Barrio Halang, Municipality of Lumban, Province of Laguna, two trucks, one driven by Nicasio Mudales
and belonging to Laguna-Tayabas Bus Company, and the other driven by Aser Lagunda and owned by
Prospero Sabido, going in opposite directions met each other in a road curve. Agripino Custodia a passenger
of LTB bus, who was hanging on the left side as truck was full of passengers was sideswiped by the track driven
by Aser Lagunda. As a result, Agripino Custodio was injured and died.

To avoid any liability, Aser Lagunda and Prospero Sabido throw all the blame on Nicasio Mudales. From the
testimony, however, of Belen Makabuhay, Agripino Custodio's widow, we can deduce that Aser Lagunda was
equally negligent as Nicasio Mudales. Belen testified that the 6 x 6 truck was running fast when it met the LTB
Bus. And Aser Lagunda had time and opportunity to avoid the mishap if he had been sufficiently careful and
cautious because the two trucks never collided with each other. By simply swerving to the right side of the road,
the 6 x 6 truck could have avoided hitting Agripino Custodio.

Based upon these facts, the CFI of Laguna and the Court of Appeals concluded that the Laguna-Tayabas Bus
Co. (hereinafter referred to as the carrier) and its driver Nicasio Mudales (none of whom has appealed), had
violated the contract of carriage with Agripino Custodio, whereas petitioners Sabido and Lagunda were guilty
of a quasi-delict, by reason of which all of them were held solidarity liable in the manner above indicated.

Petitioners now maintain: (1) that the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the negligence of the
carrier and its driver; (2) that petitioners were not guilty of negligence in connection with the matter under
consideration; (3) that petitioners cannot be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver; and (4) that the
complaint against petitioners herein should be dismissed.

ISSUE: WON the death of Agripino Custodio was due exclusively to the negligence of the LTB Co. and
its driver, Mudales?

RULING: With respect to the first two (2) points, which are interrelated, it is urged that the carrier and its driver
were clearly guilty of negligence for having allowed Agripino Custodio to ride on the running board of the bus,
in violation of Section 42 of Act No. 3992, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of Agripino's death.
It should be noted, however, that the lower court had, likewise, found the petitioners guilty of contributory
negligence, which was as much a proximate cause of the accident as the carrier's negligence, for petitioners'
truck was running at a considerable speed, despite the fact that it was negotiating a sharp curve, and, instead of
being close to its right side of the road, said truck was driven on its middle portion and so near the passenger
bus coming from the opposite direction as to sideswipe a passenger riding on its running board.

Although the negligence of the carrier and its driver is independent, in its execution, of the negligence of the
truck driver and its owner, both acts of negligence are the proximate cause of the death of Agripino Custodio.
In fact, the negligence of the first two (2) would not have produced this result without the negligence of
petitioners' herein. What is more, petitioners' negligence was the last, in point of time, for Custodio was on the
running board of the carrier's bus sometime before petitioners' truck came from the opposite direction, so that,
in this sense, petitioners' truck had the last clear chance.

Petitioners contend that they should not be held solidarily liable with the carrier and its driver, because the
latter's liability arises from a breach of contract, whereas that of the former springs from a quasi delict. The rule
is, however, that: according to the great weight of authority, where the concurrent or successive negligent acts
or omission of two or more persons, although acting independently of each other, are, in combination, the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, and it is impossible to determine in what proportion
each contributed to the injury, either is responsible for the whole injury, even though his act alone might not
have caused the entire injury, or the same damage might have resulted from the acts of the other tort-feasor.

85 |AL Y C A B S
 MERCEDES M. TEAGUE vs. ELENA FERNANDEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-29745; June 4, 1973

The Realistic Institute, admittedly owned and operated by defendant-appellee Mercedes M. Teague was a
vocational school for hair and beauty culture situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building, a two-storey,
semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila. The said
second floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although it had only one
stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each of which was provided with two fire-escape
ladders, and the presence of each of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.

At about 4 o'clock in the afternoon of October 24, 1955, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials located
about ten meters away from the institute. Soler Street lay between that store and the institute. Upon seeing the
fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted 'Fire! Fire!' and thereafter, a panic ensued. Four
instructresses and six assistant instructress of the Institute were present and they, together with the registrar,
tried to calm down the students, who numbered about 180 at the time, telling them not to be afraid because the
Gil-Armi Building would not get burned as it is made of concrete, and that the fire was anyway, across the
street. They told the students not to rush out but just to go down the stairway two by two, or to use the fire-
escapes.

Mrs. Justitia Prieto, one of the instructresses, took to the microphone so as to convey to the students the above
admonitions more effectively, and she even slapped three students in order to quiet them down. Miss Frino
Meliton, the registrar, whose desk was near the stairway, stood up and tried with outstretched arms to stop the
students from rushing and pushing their way to the stairs. The panic, however, could not be subdued and the
students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way
through the stairs, thereby causing stampede therein. Indeed, no part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But,
after the panic was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-appellants, were found
dead and several others injured on account of the stampede.

The injuries sustained by Lourdes Fernandez consisted of lacerations in both eyes and on the upper lip, contused
abrasions in different parts of the body, internal hemorrhage and fractures in the second and third right ribs. The
cause of death, according to the autopsy report, was "Shock due to traumatic fractures of the ribs with
perinephric hematoma and lacerations of the conjunctiva of both eyes." The deceased's five brothers and sisters
filed an action for damages against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. The Court
of First Instance of Manila found for the defendant and dismissed the case. The plaintiffs thereupon appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which by a divided vote of 3 to 2 (a special division of five members having been
constituted) rendered a judgment of reversal and sentenced the defendant to pay damages to the plaintiffs in the
sum of P11,000.00, plus interest at the legal rate from the date the complaint was filed.

The decision of the appellate court declared that the defendant, hereinafter to be referred to as the petitioner,
was negligent and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding
of negligence is based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised Ordinances of the
City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building
where the petitioner's vocational school was housed. The alleged violation of the ordinance above-quoted
consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide,
instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second
stairway under construction.

In ruling that such non-compliance with the City Ordinances was an act of negligence and that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez, reliance is based on a number of authorities in the
American jurisdiction, thus: the mere fact of violation of a statute is not sufficient basis for an inference that
such violation was the proximate cause of the injury complained. However, if the very injury has happened
which was intended to be prevented by the statute, it has been held that violation of the statute will be deemed
to be proximate cause of the injury. The generally accepted view is that violation of a statutory duty constitutes
negligence, negligence as a matter or law, or, according to the decisions on the question, negligence per se for
the reason that nonobservance of what the legislature has prescribed as a suitable precaution is failure to
observe that care which an ordinarily prudent man would observe. Violation of an ordinance intended to

86 |AL Y C A B S
promote safety is negligence. If by creating the hazard which the ordinance was intended to avoid it brings
about the harm which the ordinance was intended to prevent, it is a legal cause of the harm.

ISSUE: WON the failure to comply with the requirement of the ordinance was the proximate cause of
the death of Lourdes Fernandez?
RULING: The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by
settling other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close
causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately affecting the injury
as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to
expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

Having in view the decision just quoted, the petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of
Lourdes Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) shouts of "Fire!,
Fire!"; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and death. As thus projected the violation of the
ordinance, it is argued, was only a remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there
intervened a number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of. A statement of the
doctrine relied upon is found in Manila Electric Co. vs. Remoquillo:

A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury was
made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the injury a
distinct, successive unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though such injury
would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the
condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate
cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

According to the petitioner "the events of fire, panic and stampede were independent causes with no causal
connection at all with the violation of the ordinance." The weakness in the argument springs from a faulty
juxtaposition of the events which formed a chain and resulted in the injury. It is true that the petitioner's
noncompliance with the ordinance in question was ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the
sense that it was coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing one, since
the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific situation which would pose a danger to the
occupants of the building.

It is true that in this particular case there would have been no overcrowding in the single stairway if there had
not been a fire in the neighborhood which caused the students to panic and rush headlong for the stairs in order
to go down. But it was precisely such contingencies or event that the authors of the ordinance had in mind, for
under normal conditions one stairway would be adequate for the occupants of the building. Thus, as stated in
American Jurisprudence:

The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered remote as
the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the occurrence of the accident,
in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing which the statute or ordinance was
intended to prevent." To consider the violation of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the
injury does not portray the situation in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say
that the overcrowding at the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what
the ordinance intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only
one. Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of proximate
cause applies to such violation.

Therefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed.

87 |AL Y C A B S
 FILOMENO URBANO vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 72964; January 7, 1988

At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano went to his ricefield at
Barangay Anonang, San Fabian, Pangasinan located at about 100 meters from the tobacco seedbed of Marcelo
Javier. He found the place where he stored his palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation canal nearby
which had overflowed. Urbano went to the elevated portion of the canal to see what happened and there he saw
Marcelo Javier and Emilio Erfe cutting grass. He asked them who was responsible for the opening of the
irrigation canal and Javier admitted that he was the one. Urbano then got angry and demanded that Javier pay
for his soaked palay. A quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo (about 2 feet long, including
the handle, by 2 inches wide) and hacked Javier hitting him on the right palm of his hand, which was used in
parrying the bolo hack. Javier who was then unarmed ran away from Urbano but was overtaken by Urbano who
hacked him again hitting Javier on the left leg with the back portion of said bolo, causing a swelling on said leg.
When Urbano tried to hack and inflict further injury, his daughter embraced and prevented him from hacking
Javier.

Immediately thereafter, Antonio Erfe, Emilio Erfe, and Felipe Erfe brought Javier to his house about 50 meters
away from where the incident happened. The group went to Dr. Guillermo Padilla, rural health physician of San
Fabian, who did not attend to Javier but instead suggested that they go to Dr. Mario Meneses because Padilla
had no available medicine. After Javier was treated by Dr. Meneses, he and his companions returned to Dr.
Guillermo Padilla who conducted a medico-legal examination. Upon the intercession of Councilman Solis,
Urbano and Javier agreed to settle their differences. Urbano promised to pay P700.00 for the medical expenses
of Javier. Urbano advanced P400.00 to Javier at the police station. On November 3, 1980, the additional P300.00
was given to Javier at Urbano's house in the presence of barangay captain Soliven.

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 14, 1980, Javier was rushed to the Nazareth General Hospital in a very serious
condition. When admitted to the hospital, Javier had lockjaw and was having convulsions. Dr. Edmundo
Exconde who personally attended to Javier found that the latter's serious condition was caused by tetanus toxin.
He noticed the presence of a healing wound in Javier's palm which could have been infected by tetanus. On
November 15, 1980 at exactly 4:18 p.m., Javier died in the hospital.

In an information dated April 10, 1981, Filomeno Urbano was charged with the crime of homicide before the
then Circuit Criminal Court of Dagupan City, Third Judicial District. Upon arraignment, Urbano pleaded "not
guilty." After trial, the trial court found Urbano guilty as charged. He was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate
prison term of from 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, together with the accessories of the law, to indemnify the heirs of the victim, Marcelo
Javier, in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
He was ordered confined at the New Bilibid Prison, in Muntinlupa, Rizal upon finality of the decision, in view
of the nature of his penalty. The then Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the conviction of Urbano on appeal
but raised the award of indemnity to the heirs of the deceased to P30,000.00 with costs against the appellant.
The appellant filed a motion for reconsideration and/or new trial. The motion was denied. Hence, this petition.

The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to his own
negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected with tetanus
when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare hands exposing the
wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

ISSUE: WON Javier's death was the natural and logical consequence of Urbano's unlawful act? WON
there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death which would
exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death?

RULING: First, we look into the nature of tetanus— the incubation period of tetanus (the time between injury
and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms) ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80% of patients
become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease, and when symptoms
occur within 2 or 3 days of injury the mortality rate approaches 100%. Non-specific premonitory symptoms

88 |AL Y C A B S
such as restlessness, irritability, and headache are encountered occasionally, but the commonest presenting
complaints are pain and stiffness in the jaw, abdomen, or back and difficulty swallowing. Mild tetanus is
characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. The criteria
for severe tetanus include a short incubation time, and an onset time of 72hrs. or less, severe trismus, dysphagia
and rigidity and frequent prolonged, generalized convulsive spasms.
In the case at bar, Javier suffered a 2-inch incised wound on his right palm when he parried the bolo which
Urbano used in hacking him. This incident took place on October 23, 1980. After 22 days, or on November
14, 1980, he suffered the symptoms of tetanus, like lockjaw and muscle spasms. The following day, November
15, 1980, he died. If, therefore, the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus
germs at the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a mild cause of
tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd day after the hacking incident or more than 14
days after the infliction of the wound. Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier,
however, died on the second day from the onset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time Javier's
wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him was not yet present.
Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the
circumstance surrounding Javier's death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not
20 to 22 days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds
inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the
accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical
findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient
intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent infection,
for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been the proximate cause of Javier's death with
which the petitioner had nothing to do. At the very least, the records show he is guilty of inflicting slight physical
injuries. However, the petitioner's criminal liability in this respect was wiped out by the victim's own act. After
the hacking incident, Urbano and Javier used the facilities of barangay mediators to effect a compromise
agreement where Javier forgave Urbano while Urbano defrayed the medical expenses of Javier. This settlement
of minor offenses is allowed under the express provisions of Presidential Decree G.R. No. 1508, Section 2(3).

It does not necessarily follow that the petitioner is also free of civil liability. The well-settled doctrine is that a
person, while not criminally liable, may still be civilly liable. The respondent court increased the P12,000.00
indemnification imposed by the trial court to P30,000.00. However, since the indemnification was based solely
on the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the homicide case, the civil liability of the petitioner was not
thoroughly examined. This aspect of the case calls for fuller development if the heirs of the victim are so minded.

Notes—
The case involves the application of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "Criminal liability shall be
incurred: (1) By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; (2) By any person performing an act which would be an offense against person or property were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or an account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means” Pursuant
to this provision "an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him in violation of law and for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom."

Criminal liability and civil responsibility. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from a crime; but the
public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be extinguished."

As more muscles are involved, rigidity becomes generalized, and sustained contractions called risus sardonicus.

Spasms are caused by sudden intensification of afferent stimuli arising in the periphery, which increases rigidity and causes
simultaneous and excessive contraction of muscles and their antagonists. Spasms may be both painful and dangerous.

Trismus is also called lockjaw

89 |AL Y C A B S
 ROGELIO ENGADA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 140698; June 20, 2003

On November 29, 1989, at about 1:30 in the afternoon, Edwin Iran was driving a blue Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
with Plate No. FBF-601 owned by Joelito and Sheila Seyan, bound for Iloilo City. On board was Sheila Seyan,
the registered owner of the Tamaraw. While traversing the road along Barangay Acquit, Barotac Nuevo, the
Tamaraw passengers allegedly saw from the opposite direction a speeding Isuzu pick-up, with Plate No. SAR-
117 owned by the Land Bank of the Philippines driven by petitioner Rogelio Engada. The pick-up had just
negotiated a hilly gradient on the highway. When it was just a few meters away from the Tamaraw, the Isuzu
pick-ups right signal light flashed, at the same time, it swerved to its left, encroaching upon the lane of the
Tamaraw and headed towards a head-on collision course with it. Seyan shouted at Iran to avoid the pick-up.
Iran swerved to his left but the pick-up also swerved to its right. Thus, the pick-up collided with the Tamaraw,
hitting the latter at its right front passenger side. The impact caused the head and chassis of the Tamaraw to
separate from its body. Seyan was thrown out of the Tamaraw and landed on a ricefield. The pick-up stopped
diagonally astride the center of the road.

Seyan and Iran were brought to Barotac Nuevo Medicare Hospital. Seyan was profusely bleeding from her nose
and was in a state of shock with her eyes closed. In the afternoon of the same day, November 29, 1989, she was
transferred to St. Pauls Hospital in Iloilo City where she was confined. Her medical certificate revealed that she
suffered a fracture on the right femur, lacerated wound on the right foot, multiple contusions, abrasions, blunt
abdominal injury, and lacerations of the upper-lower pole of the right kidney. She was discharged from the
hospital only on January 15, 1990. Seyan incurred P130,000 in medical expenses. The Toyota Tamaraw jeepney
ended up in the junk heap. Its total loss was computed at P80,000.

A criminal complaint for damage to property through reckless imprudence with serious physical injuries was
filed with the MTC of Barotac Nuevo against petitioner Rogelio Engada and Edwin Iran. Probable cause was
found against petitioner, while the complaint against Iran was dismissed. Consequently, an Information was
filed against petitioner charging him with serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless
imprudence.

RTC rendered decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Imprudence resulting in
physical injuries and damage to property and sentences the accused Rogelio Engada to suffer imprisonment of
1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor. Petitioner appealed to the CA. the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed
with modification the trial court’s decision sentencing accused to suffer imprisonment of 4 months of arresto
mayor.

Petitioner contends that the CA failed to consider that he already relayed his intention to go back to his lane by
flashing the pick-ups right signal light. He submits that at that moment Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, had no
more reason to swerve to his left. Had Iran not swerved to the left, according to petitioner, the collision would
have been avoided. It was Iran who was clearly negligent, says petitioner. Citing our ruling in McKee v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, petitioner avers that although his act of occupying the Tamaraw’s lane was the
initial act in the chain of events, Iran’s swerving to the left after petitioner flashed his right turn signal,
constituted a sufficient intervening event, which proximately caused the eventual injuries and damages to
private complainant.

The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the state, counters that the Court of Appeals did not err in
convicting the accused, now petitioner herein. Petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident,
according to the OSG, for the following reasons: First, petitioner for no justifiable reason occupied the opposite
lane. Second, while on the wrong lane, petitioner was driving the Isuzu pick-up fast, and he returned to his own
lane only at the last minute. This left Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, with no opportunity to reflect on the safest
way to avoid the accident. Irans swerving to the left was his reaction to petitioner’s wrongful act, which
appropriately calls for the application of the emergency rule. The rationale of this rule is that a person who is
confronted with a sudden emergency might have no time for thought, and he must make a prompt decision
based largely upon impulse or instinct. Thus, he cannot be held to the same standard of conduct as one who had
an opportunity to reflect, even though it later appears that he made the wrong decision.

90 |AL Y C A B S
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals err in finding that the action of petitioner, Rogelio Engada, was the
proximate cause of the collision?

RULING: Petitioners attempt to pin the blame on Edwin Iran, the driver of the Tamaraw, for the vehicular
collision is unfounded. Iran swerved to the left only to avoid petitioner’s pick-up, which was already on a head
to head position going against Irans Tamaraw jeepney immediately before the vehicles collided. This fact has
been established by the evidence on record. No convincing proof was adduced by petitioner that the driver of
the Tamaraw, Iran, could have avoided a head-on collision.

Petitioner admitted his Isuzu pick-up intruded into the lane of the Tamaraw jeepney. Prosecution witness Nelson
Alobin, one of those who went to the scene of the incident immediately, testified that when he arrived at the
place where the collision took place, he saw the pick-up positioned diagonally at the center of the road. Its head
was towards the direction of Barotac Nuevo and the rear tires were just a few inches beyond the center of the
lane.Moving backwards facing Barotac Nuevo, at two arm’s length away from the pick-up, Alobin also saw a
tire mark, 12 inches long and located at the left side of the center line going to the right side. The above
circumstance corroborates the testimony of both Seyan and Iran that, immediately before the collision, the pick-
up was not on its proper lane but on the other lane directly on collision course with the Tamaraw jeepney. The
tire mark reveals the short distance between the two vehicles when the Isuzu pick-up attempted to return to its
proper lane.

It is a settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do so in
safety. This rule is consistent with Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. Iran could not be faulted when in his attempt to avoid the pick-up, he
swerved to his left. Petitioner’s acts had put Iran in an emergency situation which forced him to act quickly.

Petitioner tries to extricate himself from liability by invoking the doctrine of last clear chance. He avers that
between him and Iran, the latter had the last clear chance to avoid the collision, hence Iran must be held liable.
The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding
an accident, notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for the
consequences of the accident. But as already stated on this point, no convincing evidence was adduced by
petitioner to support his invocation of the abovecited doctrine. Instead, what has been shown is the presence of
an emergency and the proper application of the emergency rule. Petitioner’s act of swerving to the Tamaraws
lane at a distance of 30 meters from it and driving the Isuzu pick-up at a fast speed as it approached the Tamaraw,
denied Iran time and opportunity to ponder the situation at all. There was no clear chance to speak of.

Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in holding petitioner responsible for the vehicular collision and
the resulting damages, including the injuries suffered by Mrs. Sheila Seyan and the total loss of the Tamaraw
jeepney. It also did not err in imposing on petitioner the sentence of 4 months of arresto mayor

Notes—

Section 41, paragraph (a) of R.A. 4136 as amended, otherwise known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:
Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive to the left
side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance
ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be made in safety.

91 |AL Y C A B S
 CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 138569; September 11, 2003

RES: COURT OF APPEALS and L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs

Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws. Private respondent
L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting.
Sometime in March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank. L.C. Diaz through its cashier,
Mercedes Macaraya , filled up a savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.
Macaraya instructed the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with
Solidbank. Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.

Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the passbook. The teller
acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Teller
No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD
OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied
Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to
Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the passbook. Calapre went
back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya.

Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check of P200,000. Macaraya, together
with Calapre, went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the deposit slip and check. When Macaraya asked
for the passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to
whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller No. 6
answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook.

Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 for the deposit of a check for P90,000
drawn on Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a check that it had long
closed. PBC subsequently dishonored the check because of insufficient funds and because the signature in the
check differed from PBCs specimen signature. Failing to get back the passbook, Macaraya went back to her
office and reported the matter to the Personnel Manager of L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel Alvarez. The following day,
L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz (Diaz), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction
using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account. On the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of
the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14 August 1991, of P300,000 from its savings account. The
withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz
and Rustico L. Murillo. The signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo
received the P300,000.

L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano Ilagan and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification
of Commercial Document. The RTC of Manila dismissed the criminal case. L.C. Diaz through its counsel
demanded from Solidbank the return of its money. Solidbank refused. L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint for Recovery
of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the RTC of Manila, Branch 8. After trial, the trial court rendered on
28 December 1994 a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. In absolving Solidbank, the
trial court applied the rules on savings account written on the passbook. The rules state that possession of this
book shall raise the presumption of ownership and any payment or payments made by the bank upon the
production of the said book and entry therein of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the
depositor personally. At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in possession of the
passbook, he also presented a withdrawal slip with the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz.
The trial court pointed out that the burden of proof now shifted to L.C. Diaz to prove that the signatures on the
withdrawal slip were forged but L.C. Diaz did not offer this evidence. Solidbank did not have any participation
in the custody and care of the passbook. The trial court believed that Solidbanks act of allowing the withdrawal
of P300,000 was not the direct and proximate ause of the loss.

L.C. Diaz then appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 1998, the Court of Appeals issued its Decision
reversing the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbanks negligence was the
proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. The

92 |AL Y C A B S
appellate court reached this conclusion after applying the provision of the Civil Code on quasi-delict. The Court
of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank who received the withdrawal slip for P300,000 allowed the
withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also
negligent in entrusting its deposits to its messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller,
Solidbank could not escape liability because of the doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have averted
the injury suffered by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. The appellate court ruled
that the degree of diligence required from Solidbank is more than that of a good father of a family. The business
and functions of banks are affected with public interest. Banks are obligated to treat the accounts of their
depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship with their
clients.

ISSUE: WON the CA Erred in applying the doctrine of last clear chance and in holding that petitioner
banks teller had the last opportunity to withhold the withdrawal?

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious. We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to
negligence, or culpa contractual. The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions
of the Civil Code on simple loan. Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that savings deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple loan. There is a
debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the debtor and the depositor is the
creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to pay the depositor on demand. The savings
deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is the contract that determines the rights and obligations
of the parties.

The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of RA 8791 (The
General Banking Law of 2000) which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State recognizes the
fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance. This fiduciary relationship
means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity and performance is deemed written into
every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor. The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to
assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father of a family.

However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract between the bank
and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement. The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a
simple loan into a trust agreement because banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money
for themselves. The law allows banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the
highest possible interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to the bank and
not to the depositors who are not cestui que trust of banks.

Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to Allied Bank for
another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of Solidbank for the processing of the
deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. Solidbanks rules on savings account require that the deposit book should
be carefully guarded by the depositor and kept under lock and key, if possible. When the passbook is in the
possession of Solidbanks tellers during withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of
diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same.

In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the defendant
was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault or negligent. In contrast,
in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant was negligent. In the present case,
L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was
negligent in not returning the passbook to Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no
negligence on its part or its employees.

Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6, the teller with
whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to him. The record does not

93 |AL Y C A B S
indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved the passbook. Solidbank is bound by
the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat superior or command responsibility. The
defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not a complete
defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa aquiliana.

L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was inpossession of
the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the transaction, Solidbank had the
contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz.
Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it gave the passbook to another person. Solidbanks
failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of the P300,000 by the impostor who
took possession of the passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000
would not have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks
negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence caused
the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to do so, is chargeable with the
loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering
damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence.

We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for breach of contract
due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This is a case of culpa
contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss,
would exonerate the defendant from liability. Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff
merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his
breach of contract.

Notes—

CESTUI QUE TRUST. He who has a right to a beneficial interest in and out of an estate the legal title which is vested in
another. The person who possesses the equitable right to the property and receives the rent, issues, and profits thereof, the
legal estate of which is vested in a trustee. A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not a trust in the technical
sense for in a typical trust, confidence is reposed in one person who is named a trustee for the benefit of another who is
called cestui que trust, respecting the property which is held by the trustee for the benefit of cestui que trust.

94 |AL Y C A B S
 LOADMASTERS CUSTOMS SERVICES, INC. vs. GLODEL BROKERAGE CORPORATION
and R&B INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 179446; January 10, 2011

On August 28, 2001, R&B Insurance issued Marine Policy No. MN-00105/2001 in favor of Columbia to insure
the shipment of 132 bundles of electric copper cathodes against All Risks. On August 28, 2001, the cargoes
were shipped on board the vessel Richard Rey from Isabela, Leyte, to Pier 10, North Harbor, Manila. They
arrived on the same date. Columbia engaged the services of Glodel for the release and withdrawal of the cargoes
from the pier and the subsequent delivery to its warehouses/plants. Glodel, in turn, engaged the services of
Loadmasters for the use of its delivery trucks to transport the cargoes to Columbias warehouses/plants in
Bulacan and Valenzuela City.

The goods were loaded on board twelve (12) trucks owned by Loadmasters, driven by its employed drivers and
accompanied by its employed truck helpers. Six (6) truckloads of copper cathodes were to be delivered to
Balagtas, Bulacan, while the other six (6) truckloads were destined for Lawang Bato, Valenzuela City. The
cargoes in six truckloads for Lawang Bato were duly delivered in Columbias warehouses there. Of the six (6)
trucks en route to Balagtas, Bulacan, however, only five (5) reached the destination. One (1) truck, loaded with
11 bundles or 232 pieces of copper cathodes, failed to deliver its cargo. Later on, the said truck, an Isuzu with
Plate No. NSD-117, was recovered but without the copper cathodes. Because of this incident, Columbia filed
with R&B Insurance a claim for insurance indemnity in the amount. After the requisite investigation and
adjustment, R&B Insurance paid Columbia the amount of P1,896,789.62 as insurance indemnity.

R&B Insurance, thereafter, filed a complaint for damages against both Loadmasters and Glodel before the RTC
Manila Branch 14. It sought reimbursement of the amount it had paid to Columbia for the loss of the subject
cargo. It claimed that it had been subrogated to the right of the consignee to recover from the party/parties who
may be held legally liable for the loss. RTC rendered a decision holding Glodel liable for damages for the loss
of the subject cargo and dismissing Loadmasters counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees against R&B
Insurance. Both R&B Insurance and Glodel appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed
decision ruling that Loadmasters is likewise held liable to Glodel. Considering that Loadmasters is an agent of
appellant Glodel, whatever liability the latter owes to appellant R&B Insurance Corporation as insurance
indemnity must likewise be the amount it shall be paid by appellee Loadmasters. Hence, Loadmasters filed the
present petition for review on certiorari.

To totally exculpate itself from responsibility for the lost goods, Loadmasters argues that it cannot be considered
an agent of Glodel because it never represented the latter in its dealings with the consignee. Glodel counters that
Loadmasters is liable to it under its cross-claim because the latter was grossly negligent in the transportation of
the subject cargo. Glodel also argues that its relationship with Loadmasters is that of Charter wherein the
transporter (Loadmasters) is only hired for the specific job of delivering the merchandise. Thus, the diligence
required in this case is merely ordinary diligence or that of a good father of the family, not the extraordinary
diligence required of common carriers.

ISSUE: Who, between Glodel and Loadmasters, is liable to pay R&B Insurance for the amount of the
indemnity it paid Columbia?

RULING: Under Article 1732 of the Civil Code, common carriers are persons, corporations, firms, or
associations engaged in the business of carrying or transporting passenger or goods, or both by land, water or
air for compensation, offering their services to the public. Based on the aforecited definition, Loadmasters is a
common carrier because it is engaged in the business of transporting goods by land, through its trucking service.
It is a common carrier as distinguished from a private carrier wherein the carriage is generally undertaken by
special agreement and it does not hold itself out to carry goods for the general public. The distinction is
significant in the sense that the rights and obligations of the parties to a contract of private carriage are governed
principally by their stipulations, not by the law on common carriers.

In the present case, there is no indication that the undertaking in the contract between Loadmasters and Glodel
was private in character. There is no showing that Loadmasters solely and exclusively rendered services to
Glodel. In fact, Loadmasters admitted that it is a common carrier. In the same vein, Glodel is also considered a

95 |AL Y C A B S
common carrier within the context of Article 1732. In its Memorandum, it states that it is a corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines and is engaged in the business of
customs brokering to which a customs broker is also regarded as a common carrier, the transportation of goods
being an integral part of its business.

Loadmasters and Glodel, being both common carriers, are mandated from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, to observe the extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods transported by
them according to all the circumstances of such case, as required by Article 1733 of the Civil Code. When the
Court speaks of extraordinary diligence, it is that extreme measure of care and caution which persons of unusual
prudence and circumspection observe for securing and preserving their own property or rights. This exacting
standard imposed on common carriers in a contract of carriage of goods is intended to tilt the scales in favor of
the shipper who is at the mercy of the common carrier once the goods have been lodged for shipment. Thus, in
case of loss of the goods, the common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently but
may be rebutted by proof that the common carrier has observed extraordinary diligence over the goods.

Premises considered, the Court is of the view that both Loadmasters and Glodel are jointly and severally
liable to R & B Insurance for the loss of the subject cargo. Under Article 2194 of the New Civil Code, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary. Loadmasters claim that it was
never privy to the contract entered into by Glodel with the consignee Columbia or R&B Insurance as subrogee,
is not a valid defense. It may not have a direct contractual relation with Columbia, but it is liable for tort under
the provisions of Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. Pertinent is the ruling hat a tort may arise
despite the absence of a contractual relationship where tort is that which breaches the contract.

In connection therewith, it is not disputed that the subject cargo was lost while in the custody of Loadmasters
whose employees (truck driver and helper) were instrumental in the hijacking or robbery of the shipment. As
employer, Loadmasters should be made answerable for the damages caused by its employees who acted within
the scope of their assigned task of delivering the goods safely to the warehouse. Whenever an employee’s
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection (culpa in eligiendo) or supervision
(culpa in vigilando) of its employees.

Glodel is also liable because of its failure to exercise extraordinary diligence. It failed to ensure that Loadmasters
would fully comply with the undertaking to safely transport the subject cargo to the designated destination. It
should have been more prudent in entrusting the goods to Loadmasters by taking precautionary measures, such
as providing escorts to accompany the trucks in delivering the cargoes. Glodel should, therefore, be held liable
with Loadmasters. Its defense of force majeure is unavailing.

What then is the extent of the respective liabilities of Loadmasters and Glodel? Each wrongdoer is liable for the
total damage suffered by R&B Insurance. Where there are several causes for the resulting damages, a party is
not relieved from liability, even partially. It is sufficient that the negligence of a party is an efficient cause
without which the damage would not have resulted. It is no defense to one of the concurrent tortfeasors that the
damage would not have resulted from his negligence alone, without the negligence or wrongful acts of the other
concurrent tortfeasor.

Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the
injury would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be
had against any or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear
that one of them was more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not the same. No
actor's negligence ceases to be a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other
actors. Each wrongdoer is responsible for the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of
the injury. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although
acting independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it
is impossible to determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible
for the whole injury.

96 |AL Y C A B S
Undoubtedly, Glodel has a definite cause of action against Loadmasters for breach of contract of service as the
latter is primarily liable for the loss of the subject cargo. In this case, however, it cannot succeed in seeking
judicial sanction against Loadmasters because the records disclose that it did not properly interpose a cross-
claim against the latter. Cross-claim cannot be set up for the first time on appeal. For the consequence, Glodel
has no one to blame but itself. The Court cannot come to its aid on equitable grounds.

Notes—
By the contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf
of another, with the consent or authority of the latter. The elements of a contract of agency are: (1) consent, express or
implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third
person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority. No
principal-agent relationship between Glodel and Loadmasters

97 |AL Y C A B S
 AGAPITO FUELLAS vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-14409; October 31, 1961

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both 13 years old, on
September 16, 1954. They were classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan City. In the afternoon of
September 16, 1954, while Pepito was studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto
Cabanok and surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return the pencil,
it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held the neck of Pepito and pushed him
to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with
Pepito following. When Pepito had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry
mood.

Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico. Instead of accepting
the proffer to shake hands, Rico held Pepito by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of balance and
pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm under his body, whereupon, Rico rode
on his left side. While Rico was in such position, Pepito suddenly cried out "My arm is broken." Rico then got
up and went away. Pepito was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao
General Hospital for treatment. An X-Ray taken showed that there was a complete fracture of the radius and
ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster casting. On November 20, 1954, more than a month after
Pepito's release from the hospital, the plaster cast was removed. And up to the last day of hearing of the case,
the right forearm of Pepito was seen to be shorter than the left forearm, still in bandage and could not be fully
used.

It is contended that in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was ordered to pay damages
for the deliberate injury caused by his son; that the said court held the petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art.
2180 of the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the same Code; that according to the last article, the act
of the minor must be one wherein "fault or negligence" is present; and that there being no fault or negligence
on the part of petitioner-appellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the above mentioned articles are not
applicable, for the existence of deliberate intent in the commission of an act negatives the presence of fault or
negligence in its commission. Appellant, therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred in holding him liable
for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his minor son.

ISSUE: WON the parents are liable for the act of their minor son?

RULING: In the case of Araneta vs. Arreglado, Benjamin Araneta was talking with other students of the Ateneo
de Manila, seated atop a low ruined wall. Dario Arreglado, a former student of the Ateneo, chanced to pass by.
The boys twitted him on his leaving the Ateneo and enrolling in the De la Salle College. Arreglado, resenting
the banter, pulled a Japanese luger pistol (licensed in the name of his father Juan Arreglado), fired the same at
Araneta, hitting him in the lower jaw. Dario was indicted for frustrated homicide and pleaded guilty. But in
view of his youth, he being only 14 years of age, the Court suspended the proceedings (Art. 80 of the Revised
Penal Code). Thereafter, action was instituted by Araneta and his father against Juan Arreglado, his wife and
their son Dario to recover material, moral and exemplary damages. The Court of First Instance sentenced the
Arreglados to pay damages. This decision was predicated upon the fact that Arreglado's father had acted
negligently in allowing his son to have access to the pistol used to injure Benjamin. And this was the logical
consequence of the case, considering the fact that the civil law liability under Article 2180 is not respondeat
superior but the relationship of pater familias which bases the liability of the father ultimately on his own
negligence and not on that of his minor son, and that if an injury is caused by the fault or negligence of his
minor son, the law presumes that there was negligence on the part of his father

In an earlier case (Exconde vs. Capuno, 1957), holding the defendants jointly and severally liable with his minor
son Dante for damages, arising from the criminal act committed by the latter, this tribunal reasoned that the civil
liability which the law imposes upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any
damages that may be caused by the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which imposes upon the parents the "duty of
supporting them, keeping them in their company, educating them in proportion to their means", while on the
other hand, gives them the "right to correct and punish them in moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135, Spanish Civil

98 |AL Y C A B S
Code). The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that they exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage

Since children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes upon the parents
and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of their children and wards in order that
damages to third persons due to the ignorance, lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may
be avoided. If the parents and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of
their abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused"

It is further argued that the only way by which a father can be made responsible for the criminal act of his son
committed with deliberate intent and with discernment, is an action based on the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code on subsidiary liability of the parents; that the minor Fuellas having been convicted of serious physical
injuries at the age of 13, the provisions of par. 3 of Art. 12, Revised Penal Code, could have been applied, but
having acted with discernment, Art. 101 of the same Code cannot include him. And as par. 2, of Art. 101, states
that "the exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Article 12 and in
subdivision 4 of Art. 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
subject to the following rules: First, in cases of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of Article 12, the civil liability for acts
committed by an imbecile or insane person and by a person under nine years of age or by one over nine but
under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment, shall devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part," the
appellant concluded that this provision covers only a situation where a minor under 15 but over 9 years old
commits a criminal act "without discernment."

In the recent case of Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose Balce, the Court held that It is true that under Art. 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, a father is made civilly liable for the acts committed by his son only if the latter is an
imbecile, an insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9 but under 15 years of age, who acts without discernment,
unless it appears that there is no fault or negligence on his part. This is because a son who commits the act under
any of those conditions is by law exempt from criminal liability (Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3, Revised
Penal Code). The idea is not to leave the act entirely unpunished but to attach certain civil liability to the person
who has the delinquent minor under his legal authority or control. But a minor over 15 who acts with
discernment is not exempt from criminal liability, for which reason the Code is silent as to the subsidiary
liability of his parents should he stand convicted. In that case, resort should be had to the general law which is
our Civil Code.

The particular law that governs this case is Article 2180, the pertinent portion of which provides: "The father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company." To hold that this provision does not apply to the instant case because it only covers
obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which arise from criminal offenses, would result
in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes the father or mother may stand
subsidiarily liable for the damage caused by his or her son, no liability would attach if the damage is caused
with criminal intent. Verily, the void apparently exists in the Revised Penal Code is subserved by this particular
provision of our Civil Code, as may be gleaned from some recent decisions of this Court which cover equal or
identical cases.

Notes—
Discernment: means the capacity of the child at the time of the commission of the crime to understand the
difference between right and wrong and the consequences of the wrongful act

99 |AL Y C A B S
 RODRIGUEZ-LUNA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. L-62988; February 28, 1985

PET: FELINA RODRIGUEZ-LUNA, JOSE R. LUNA and ROBERTO R. LUNA, JR.

RES: JOSE E. DELA ROSA and LUIS DELA ROSA

The petitioners are the heirs of Roberto R. Luna who was killed in a vehicular collision. The collision took place
on January 18, 1970, at the go-kart practice area in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. Those involved were
the go-kart driven by the deceased, a business executive, and a Toyota car driven by Luis dela Rosa, a minor of
13 years who had no driver's license. In a suit for damages brought by the heirs of Roberto R. Luna against Luis
dela Rosa and his father Jose dela Rosa, the CFI of Manila rendered judgment holding defendants Luis dela
Rosa and Jose dela Rosa to pay, jointly and severally, to the plaintiffs the sum of P1,650,000.00 as unearned
net earnings of Roberto Luna, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages, and P50,000.00 for the loss of his
companionship, with legal interest from the date of this decision; plus attorney's fees in the sum of P50,000.00,
and the costs of suit. The defendants appealed to the defunct Court of Appeals which in a decision affirmed in
toto that of the trial court. Both parties filed separate petitions for review of the appellate court's decision. It
thus appears that the questions in esse are with respect to the award for unearned net earnings — should the
award be P450,000.00 only or should it be P1,650,000.00 as originally adjudged; and whether the award for
attorney's fees shall also be with interest at the legal rate.

The private respondents failed to pay the amounts and when required to explain they said that they had no cash
money. Accordingly, this Court directed the trial court to issue a writ of execution but the attempt of the special
sheriff to enter the private respondent's premises so that he could make an inventory of personal properties was
thwarted by guards and this Court had to direct the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary to assist in enforcing
the writ of execution. The execution yielded only a nominal amount. In the meantime, Luis dela Rosa is now of
age, married with two children, and living in Madrid, Spain with an uncle but only casually employed. It is said:
"His compensation is hardly enough to support his family. He has no assets of his own as yet."

The private respondents invoke Elcano vs. Hill, where it was held that Article 2180 of the Civil Code applied
to Atty. Marvin Hill notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald Hill, his son but since Reginald
had attained age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill had become merely subsidiary to that of his
son. It is now said that Luis dela Rosa, is now married and of legal age and that as a matter of equity the liability
of his father should be subsidiary only.

ISSUE: WON Luis dela Rosa’s parents should be held liable notwithstanding his emancipation?

RULING: We are unwilling to apply equity instead of strict law in this case because to do so will not serve the
ends of justice. Luis dela Rosa is abroad and beyond the reach of Philippine courts. Moreover, he does not have
any property either in the Philippines or elsewhere. In fact his earnings are insufficient to support his family.

On the amount of the award. The award of P1,650,000.00 was based on two factors, namely: (a) that the
deceased Roberto R. Luna could have lived for 30 more years; and (b) that his annual net income was
P55,000.00, computed at P75,000.00 annual gross income less P20,000.00 annual personal expenses. According
to the American Experience Table of Mortality, at age 33 the life expectancy of Roberto Luna was 33.4 years
Dr. Vicente Campa, medical director of San Miguel Corporation, testified that he was the regular physician of
Roberto Luna since his marriage to Felina Rodriguez in 1957. He said that except for a slight anemia which he
had ten years earlier, Roberto Luna was of good health.

We have not been persuaded to disturb the conclusion that the deceased had a life expectancy of thirty years.
At the time of Luna's death, he was only thirty-three years old and in the best of health. With his almost perfect
physical condition and his sound mind, the expectation that he could have lived for another thirty years is
reasonable, considering that with his educational attainment, his social and financial standing, he had the means
of staying fit and preserving his health and well-being. That he could have lived at least until the age of sixty-
three years. That Luna was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct statement but then gokart racing cannot be
categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only slightly larger
than foot-pedalled four wheeled conveyances.

100 |AL YC A B S
CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI vs. IAC, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG
G.R. No. 70890; September 18, 1992

Respondent spouses are the legitimate parents of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the deplorable incident
which took place and from which she died on January 14, 1979, was an 18-year old first year commerce student
of the University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a minor
between 18 and 19 years of age living with his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the same event on the
same date.

For more than two (2) years before their deaths, Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until
December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up her relationship with Wendell after she supposedly found him to be
sadistic and irresponsible. During the first and second weeks of January, 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie
Ann with demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her refusal, prompting the former to resort to
threats against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou Alfonso, at
the corner of Maria Cristina and Juana Osmeña Streets, Cebu City, from January 7 to 13, 1978. On January 14,
1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same firearm, a Smith
and Wesson revolver licensed in the name of petitioner Cresencio Libi, which was recovered from the scene of
the crime inside the residence of private respondents at the corner of General Maxilom and D. Jakosalem streets
of the same city.

Due to the absence of an eyewitness account of the circumstances surrounding the death of both minors, their
parents, who are the contending parties herein, posited their respective theories drawn from their interpretation
of circumstantial evidence, available reports, documents and evidence of physical facts. Private respondents,
bereaved over the death of their daughter, submitted that Wendell caused her death by shooting her with the
aforesaid firearm and, thereafter, turning the gun on himself to commit suicide. On the other hand, Petitioners,
puzzled and likewise distressed over the death of their son, rejected the imputation and contended that an
unknown third party, whom
Wendell may have displeased or antagonized by reason of his work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused Wendell’s death and then shot Julie Ann to eliminate any
witness and thereby avoid identification.

As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann filed a case in the then CFI of Cebu against the parents of
Wendell to recover damages arising from the latter’s vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
After trial, the court below rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint for insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendants’ counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of sufficient merit. On appeal to respondent court, said
judgment of the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffs-appellants was set aside and another
judgment was rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners in the present appeal by certiorari, now
submit this petition.

ISSUE: WON Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make
petitioners liable for vicarious liability?

RULING: In the proceedings before the trial court, Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, Police Medico-Legal Officer of Cebu,
submitted his findings and opinions on some postulates for determining whether or not the gunshot wound was
inflicted on Wendell Libi by his own suicidal act. However, undue emphasis was placed by the lower court on
the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It should be
emphasized, however, that this is not the only circumstance to be taken into account in the determination of
whether it was suicide or not. It is true that said witness declared that he found no evidence of contact or close-
contact of an explosive discharge in the entrance wound. However, as pointed out by private respondents, the
body of deceased Wendell Libi must have been washed at the funeral parlor, considering the hasty interment
thereof a little after 8 hours from the occurrence wherein he died. It will also be noted that Dr. Cerna was
negligent in not conducting a paraffin test on Wendell Libi, hence possible evidence of gunpowder residue on
Wendell’s hands was forever lost when Wendell was hastily buried.

As shown by the evidence, there were only two used bullets found at the scene of the crime, each of which were
the bullets that hit Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi, respectively. Also, the sketch prepared by the Medico-

101 |AL YC A B S
Legal Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, shows that there is only one gunshot wound of entrance
located at the right temple of Wendell Libi.

Private respondents assail the fact that the trial court gave credence to the testimonies of defendants’ witnesses
Lydia Ang and James Enrique Tan, being a residents of an apartment across/adjacent the street from the
Gotiongs, who declared having seen a "shadow" of a person at the gate of the Gotiong house after hearing shots
therefrom. Analyzing the foregoing testimonies, we agree with respondent court that the same do not inspire
credence as to the reliability and accuracy of the witnesses’ observations, since the visual perceptions of both
were obstructed by high walls in their respective houses in relation to the house of herein private respondents.

We have perforce to reject petitioners’ effete and unsubstantiated pretension that it was another man who shot
Wendell and Julie Ann. It is significant that the Libi family did not even point to or present any suspect in the
crime nor did they file any case against any alleged "John Doe." Nor can we sustain the trial court’s dubious
theory that Wendell Libi did not die by his own hand because of the overwhelming evidence — testimonial,
documentary and pictorial — the confluence of which point to Wendell as the assailant of Julie Ann, his motive
being revenge for her rejection of his persistent pleas for a reconciliation.

Petitioners’ defense that they had exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should
not be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son, is not borne out by the evidence on record
either. Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun
which he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a key to
the safety deposit box and Amelita’s key is always in her bag, all of which facts were known to Wendell. They
have never seen their son Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted, however, that on that fateful night the
gun was no longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly, cannot but entertain serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun
away. Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys to the safety deposit box was
negligently left lying around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where the other key was.

The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and child relationship consists, to a large
extent, of the instruction and supervision of the child. Petitioners were gravely remiss in their duties as parents
in not diligently supervising the activities of their son, despite his minority and immaturity, so much so that it
was only at the time of Wendell’s death that they allegedly discovered that he was a CANU agent and that
Cresencio’s gun was missing from the safety deposit box. Both parents were sadly wanting in their duty and
responsibility in monitoring and knowing the activities of their children who, for all they know, may be engaged
in dangerous work such as being drug informers.

It is still the duty of parents to know the activity of their children who may be engaged in this dangerous activity
involving the menace of drugs. Had the defendants-appellees been diligent in supervising the activities of their
son, Wendell, and in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have prevented Wendell from killing Julie
Ann Gotiong. Therefore, appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. In imposing sanctions for
the so-called vicarious liability of petitioners, respondent court cites Fuellas v. Cadano, which supposedly holds
that the subsidiary liability of parents for damages caused by their minor children imposed by Article 2180 of
the New Civil Code covers obligations arising from both quasi-delicts and criminal offenses. The subsidiary
liability of parent’s arising from the criminal acts of their minor children who acted with discernment is
determined under the provisions of Article 2180 N.C.C. and under Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code,
because to hold that the former only covers obligations which arise from quasi-delicts and not obligations which
arise from criminal offenses, would result in the absurdity that while for an act where mere negligence intervenes
the father or mother may stand subsidiarily liable for the damages caused by his or her son, no liability would
attach if the damage is caused with criminal intent.

Now, we do not have any objection to the doctrinal rule holding, the parents liable, but the categorization of
their liability as being subsidiary, and not primary, in nature requires a hard second look considering previous
decisions of this court on the matter which warrant comparative analyses. Our concern stems from our readings
that if the liability of the parents for crimes or quasi-delicts of their minor children is subsidiary, then the parents
can neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on the defense that they acted with the diligence of a good

102 |AL YC A B S
father of a family to prevent damages. On the other hand, if such liability imputed to the parents is considered
direct and primary, that diligence would constitute a valid and substantial defense.

We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, is primary and not subsidiary. In fact, if we apply Article 2194 of said code
which provides for solidary liability of joint tortfeasors, the persons responsible for the act or omission, in this
case the minor and the father and, in case of his death of incapacity, the mother, are solidarily liable.
Accordingly, such parental liability is primary and not subsidiary, hence the last paragraph of Article 2180
provides that" (t)he responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages."

We are also persuaded that the liability of the parents for felonies committed by their minor children is likewise
primary, not subsidiary. Accordingly, just like the rule in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, under the foregoing
provision the civil liability of the parents for crimes committed by their minor children is likewise direct and
primary, and also subject to the defense of lack of fault or negligence on their part, that is, the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family. That in both quasi-delicts and crimes the parents primarily respond for
such damages is buttressed by the corresponding provisions in both codes that the minor transgressor shall be
answerable or shall respond with his own property only in the absence or in case of insolvency of the former.
Thus, for civil liability ex quasi delicto of minors, Article 2182 of the Civil Code states that "if the minor causing
damage has no parents or guardian, the minor . . . shall be answerable with his own property in an action
against him where a guardian ad litem shall be appointed." For civil liability ex delicto of minors, an equivalent
provision is found in the third paragraph of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code "should there be no person
having such . . . minor under his authority, legal guardianship or control, or if such person be insolvent, said .
. . minor shall respond with (his) own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance with
civil law."

Under the foregoing considerations, therefore, we hereby rule that the parents are and should be held
primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor children
under their legal authority or control, or who live in their company, unless it is proven that the former acted
with the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent such damages. That primary liability is premised on
the provisions of Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code with respect to damages ex delicto caused by their
children 9 years of age or under, or over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted without discernment; and, with
regard to their children over 9 but under 15 years of age who acted with discernment, or 15 years or over but
under 21 years of age, such primary liability shall be imposed pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Under said Article 2180, the enforcement of such liability shall be effected against the father and, in case of his
death or incapacity, the mother. This was amplified by the Child and Youth Welfare Code which provides that
the same shall devolve upon the father and, in case of his death or incapacity, upon the mother or, in case of her
death or incapacity, upon the guardian, but the liability may also be voluntarily assumed by a relative or family
friend of the youthful offender. However, under the Family Code, this civil liability is now, without such
alternative qualification, the responsibility of the parents and those who exercise parental authority over the
minor offender. In the case at bar, whether the death of the hapless Julie Ann Gotiong was caused by a felony
or a quasi-delict committed by Wendell Libi, respondent court did not err in holding petitioners liable for
damages arising therefrom.

103 |AL YC A B S
 MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA vs. ALFONSO MONFORT
G.R. No. L-24101; September 30, 1970

PET: MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES P. CUADRA, ET AL.

Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary
School in Bacolod City. On July 9, 1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to
weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa Monfort found a plastic headband, an
ornamental object commonly worn by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found an
earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her. At that precise moment the latter
turned around to face her friend, and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the injured
part and treated it with some powder.

The next day, July 10, the eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her parents,
who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and
again on August 4, 1962, and stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the parents
spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however, Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the
sight of her right eye.

In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort,
Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00 as
moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the suit.

ISSUE: WON parents are liable for an act of his minor child which causes damage to another?

RULING: The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or negligence accompanying
the act or the omission, there being no willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission
is that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then becomes himself liable under Article 2180,
in the different cases enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the circumstances above
quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary, liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which
is presumed from that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is merely prima facie
and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph
of Article 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."

But what is the exact degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in connection with a
particular act or omission of a minor child, especially when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate
company? Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and when the law simply
refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the
attendant circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the exercise of such diligence
the damage could have been prevented.

In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the defendant could have prevented the
damage by the observance of due care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental authority
in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On the contrary, his child was at school, where it
was his duty to send her and where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and supervision
of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual
among children at play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason to anticipate much
less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character
which would reflect unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for the tragedy that befell her. But if the
defendant is at all obligated to compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable in
court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.

104 |AL YC A B S
 ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE vs. MIRANDA
G.R. No. 182353; June 29, 2010

PET: ST. JOSEPHS COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, and ROSALINDA TABUGO
RES: JAYSON MIRANDA, represented by his father, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges (SJCs) premises, the class to
which respondent Jayson Val Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur
powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of petitioner Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and
employee of SJC. The adviser of Jayson’s class Estefania Abdan.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately secured it from any untoward
incident or occurrence. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class
groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube
was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance,
the compound in the test tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts
of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were chemically burned, particularly
his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to spend for his medication. Upon filing of this case
in the lower court, Jayson’s wound had not completely healed and still had to undergo another surgery.

Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson’s mother, who was working abroad,
had to rush back home for which she spent P36,070.00 for her fares and had to forego her salary from November
23, 1994 to December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00. Then, too, Jayson and his parents suffered
sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings as a result of his injury due to [petitioners] fault and
failure to exercise the degree of care and diligence incumbent upon each one of them. Thus, they should be held
liable for moral damages. Also, Jayson sent a demand letter to [petitioners] for the payment of his medical
expenses as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed. Hence, [Jayson] was
constrained to file the complaint for damages.

On the other hand, petitioners SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Tabugo alleged that Jayson was a grade
six pupil of SJC in the school year 1994-1995. Before the science experiment was conducted, Jayson and his
classmates were given strict instructions to follow the written procedure for the experiment and not to look into
the test tube until the heated compound had cooled off. Jayson, however, a person of sufficient age and discretion
and completely capable of understanding the English language and the instructions of his teacher, without
waiting for the heated compound to cool off, as required in the written procedure for the experiment and as
repeatedly explained by the teacher, violated such instructions and took a magnifying glass and looked at the
compound, which at that moment spurted out of the test tube, a small particle hitting one of Jayson’s eyes.

Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter transferred to St. Lukes Medical
Center for treatment. At the hospital, when Tabago visited Jayson, the latter cried and apologized to his teacher
for violating her instructions not to look into the test tube until the compound had cooled off.

The parents of Jayson, through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of Jayson that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the
science experiment. In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini
Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school cannot accede to the demand because the accident occurred by reason
of Jayson’s failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his teachers repeated warnings
and instruction. Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo, Jayson’s father, on Jayson’s behalf, sued
petitioners for damages.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of Jayson and against petitioners. This Court orders and holds the petitioners
jointly and solidarily liable to pay Jayson. Aggrieved, petitioners appealed to the CA. However, as previously
adverted to, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of the RTC.

ISSUE: WON Jayson’s contributory negligence of peeking into the test tube was in fact the proximate
cause of his injury for which the petitioners should not be held liable?

105 |AL YC A B S
RULING: We find no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were
negligent since they all failed to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent
or avoid injuries to the students. Petitioners invoke our ruling in St. Mary’s Academy v. Carpitanos which
absolved St. Mary’s Academy from liability for the untimely death of its student during a school sanctioned
activity, declaring that the negligence of petitioner St. Mary’s Academy was only a remote cause of the accident.
We are not convinced.

Both courts correctly concluded that the immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent of any intervening cause.
Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of care, caution and foresight.
The individual petitioners are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over their students as well as the
supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Based on the facts presented before this Court, these petitioners
were remiss in their responsibilities and lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them. Petitioner subject
teacher Rosalinda Tabugo was inside the classroom when the class undertook the science experiment although
Jayson insisted that said petitioner left the classroom. No evidence, however, was presented to establish that
petitioner Tabugo was inside the classroom for the whole duration of the experiment. It was unnatural in the
ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought to the school clinic for immediate treatment not by petitioner
subject teacher Rosalinda Tabugo but by somebody else.

Estefania Abdan is equally at fault as the subject adviser or teacher in charge because she exercised control and
supervision over petitioner Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to insure that nothing
would go wrong and that the science experiment would be conducted safely and without any harm or injury to
the students. Petitioner Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility
because the other individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision. The negligent acts of the
other individual petitioners were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

The defense of due diligence of a good father of a family raised by petitioner St. Joseph College will not
exculpate it from liability because it has been shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision
of its teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the maintenance of what should
have been a safe and secured environment for conducting dangerous experiments. Petitioner school is still liable
for the wrongful acts of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to students.

Nonetheless, petitioners make much of the fact that Tabugo specifically instructed her students, including
Jayson, at the start of the experiment, not to look into the heated test tube before the compound had cooled off.
Petitioners would allocate all liability and place all blame for the accident on a 12-year-old student, herein
respondent Jayson. We disagree. As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the
science experiment. Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows
special parental authority on the following persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution
engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and responsibility over the minor
child while under their supervision, instruction or custody. Authority and responsibility
shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution

As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, he is partly responsible for his own injury, hence, he should
not be entitled to recover damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his own negligence.
Petitioners, therefore, should be held liable only for the damages actually caused by their negligence.

106 |AL YC A B S
 AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-47745; April 15, 1988

PET: JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA
PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A.
AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and
MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA

RES: COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P.

DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and
natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his
guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO

Alfredo Amadora was looking forward to the commencement exercises where he would ascend the stage and
in the presence of his relatives and friends receive his high school diploma. These ceremonies were scheduled
on April 16, 1972. As it turned out, though, fate would intervene and deny him that awaited experience. On
April 13, 1972, while they were in the auditorium of their school, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, a
classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that mortally hit Alfredo, ending all his expectations and his life as well.
The victim was only seventeen years old.

Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the herein petitioners, as the victim's
parents, filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San Jose-
Recoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon
and two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cebu held the remaining defendants liable to the plaintiffs in the sum
of P294,984.00, representing death compensation, loss of earning capacity, costs of litigation, funeral expenses,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

On appeal to the respondent court, however, the decision was reversed and all the defendants were completely
absolved. In its decision, which is now the subject of this petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, the respondent court found that Article 2180 was not applicable as the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos
was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of learning. It also held that the students were not
in the custody of the school at the time of the incident as the semester had already ended, that there was no clear
identification of the fatal gun and that in any event the defendant, had exercised the necessary diligence in
preventing the injury.

It is not denied by the respondents that on April 7, 1972, Sergio Damaso, Jr., the dean of boys, confiscated from
Jose Gumban an unlicensed pistol but later returned it to him without making a report to the principal or taking
any further action .6 As Gumban was one of the companions of Daffon when the latter fired the gun that killed
Alfredo, the petitioners contend that this was the same pistol that had been confiscated from Gumban and that
their son would not have been killed if it had not been returned by Damaso. The respondents say, however, that
there is no proof that the gun was the same firearm that killed Alfredo.

ISSUE: WON the petitioners are liable for the death of its student? The parties herein have also directly
raised the question of whether or not Article 2180 covers even establishments which are technically not
schools of arts and trades, and, if so, when the offending student is supposed to be "in its custody."

RULING (lengthy discussion): The Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question should
apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical or
vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of
arts and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule.
In other words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is
technical in nature, in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of
reddendo singula singulis "teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of
establishments of arts and trades" to the word "apprentices."

107 |AL YC A B S
The Court thus conforms to the dissenting opinion expressed by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Exconde where he said
in part:

I can see no sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the Old Civil Code to teachers of arts
and trades and not to academic ones. What substantial difference is there between them
insofar as concerns the proper supervision and vice over their pupils? It cannot be seriously
contended that an academic teacher is exempt from the duty of watching that his pupils do
not commit a tort to the detriment of third persons, so long as they are in a position to
exercise authority and Supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the phrase "teachers
or heads of establishments of arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil Code, the
words "arts and trades" does not qualify "teachers" but only "heads of establishments." The
phrase is only an updated version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y artesanos" used in
the Italian and French Civil Codes.

There is really no substantial distinction between the academic and the non-academic schools insofar as torts
committed by their students are concerned. The same vigilance is expected from the teacher over the students
under his control and supervision, whatever the nature of the school where he is teaching. The Court cannot see
why different degrees of vigilance should be exercised by the school authorities on the basis only of the nature
of their respective schools. There does not seem to be any plausible reason for relaxing that vigilance simply
because the school is academic in nature and for increasing such vigilance where the school is non-academic.
Notably, the injury subject of liability is caused by the student and not by the school itself nor is it a result of
the operations of the school or its equipment. The injury contemplated may be caused by any student regardless
of the school where he is registered. The teacher certainly should not be able to excuse himself by simply
showing that he is teaching in an academic school where, on the other hand, the head would be held liable if the
school were non-academic.

These questions, though, may be asked: If the teacher of the academic school is to be held answerable for the
torts committed by his students, why is it the head of the school only who is held liable where the injury is
caused in a school of arts and trades? And in the case of the academic or non- technical school, why not apply
the rule also to the head thereof instead of imposing the liability only on the teacher?

The reason for the disparity can be traced to the fact that historically the head of the school of arts and trades
exercised a closer tutelage over his pupils than the head of the academic school. The old schools of arts and
trades were engaged in the training of artisans apprenticed to their master who personally and directly instructed
them on the technique and secrets of their craft. The head of the school of arts and trades was such a master and
so was personally involved in the task of teaching his students, who usually even boarded with him and so came
under his constant control, supervision and influence. By contrast, the head of the academic school was not as
involved with his students and exercised only administrative duties over the teachers who were the persons
directly dealing with the students. The head of the academic school had then (as now) only a vicarious
relationship with the students. Consequently, while he could not be directly faulted for the acts of the students,
the head of the school of arts and trades, because of his closer ties with them, could be so blamed.

It is conceded that the distinction no longer obtains at present in view of the expansion of the schools of arts
and trades, the consequent increase in their enrollment, and the corresponding diminution of the direct and
personal contract of their heads with the students. Article 2180, however, remains unchanged. In its present
state, the provision must be interpreted by the Court according to its clear and original mandate until the
legislature, taking into account the charges in the situation subject to be regulated, sees fit to enact the necessary
amendment.

It is clear that while the custody requirement does not mean that the student must be boarding with the
school authorities, it does signify that the student should be within the control and under the influence of the
school authorities at the time of the occurrence of the injury. This does not necessarily mean that such, custody
be co-terminus with the semester, beginning with the start of classes and ending upon the close thereof, and
excluding the time before or after such period, such as the period of registration, and in the case of graduating
students, the period before the commencement exercises. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody

108 |AL YC A B S
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. As long as it can be shown that the student is in
the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student
privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues.

During all these occasions, it is obviously the teacher-in-charge who must answer for his students' torts, in
practically the same way that the parents are responsible for the child when he is in their custody. The teacher-
in-charge is the one designated by the dean, principal, or other administrative superior to exercise supervision
over the pupils in the specific classes or sections to which they are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time
of the injury, the teacher be physically present and in a position to prevent it. Custody does not connote
immediate and actual physical control but refers more to the influence exerted on the child and the discipline
instilled in him as a result of such influence.

In any event, it should be noted that the liability imposed by this article is supposed to fall directly on the
teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades and not on the school itself. If at all, the school, whatever
its nature, maybe held to answer for the acts of its teachers or even of the head thereof under the general principle
of respondeat superior, but then it may exculpate itself from liability by proof that it had exercised the diligence
of a bonus paterfamilias. Such defense is, of course, also available to the teacher or the head of the school of
arts and trades directly held to answer for the tort committed by the student. As long as the defendant can show
that he had taken the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, he can exonerate himself from
the liability imposed by Article 2180.

In this connection, it should be observed that the teacher will be held liable not only when he is acting in loco
parentis for the law does not require that the offending student be of minority age. Thus, liability attached to
the teacher and the head of the technical school although the wrongdoer was already of age. In this sense, Article
2180 treats the parent more favorably than the teacher.

At the time Alfredo Amadora was fatally shot, he was still in the custody of the authorities of Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos notwithstanding that the fourth year classes had formally ended. It was immaterial if he was in
the school auditorium to finish his physics experiment or merely to submit his physics report for what is
important is that he was there for a legitimate purpose. As previously observed, even the mere savoring of the
company of his friends in the premises of the school is a legitimate purpose that would have also brought him
in the custody of the school authorities. The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be
held liable because none of them was the teacher-in-charge as previously defined. The mere fact that Alfredo
Amadora had gone to school that day in connection with his physics report did not necessarily make the physics
teacher, respondent Celestino Dicon, the teacher-in-charge of Alfredo's killer.

At any rate, assuming that he was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing that Dicon was negligent in
enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he had waived observance of the rules and regulations of the school or
condoned their non-observance. His absence when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him
because he was not supposed or required to report to school on that day.

In the absence of a teacher-in-charge, it is probably the dean of boys who should be held liable especially in
view of the unrefuted evidence that he had earlier confiscated an unlicensed gun from one of the students and
returned the same later to him without taking disciplinary action or reporting the matter to higher authorities.
While this was clearly negligence on his part, for which he deserves sanctions from the school, it does not
necessarily link him to the shooting of Amador as it has not been shown that he confiscated and returned pistol
was the gun that killed the petitioners' son.

Finally, as previously observed, the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos cannot be held directly liable under the
article because only the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is made responsible for the damage
caused by the student or apprentice. Neither can it be held to answer for the tort committed by any of the other
private respondents for none of them has been found to have been charged with the custody of the offending
student or has been remiss in the discharge of his duties in connection with such custody.

109 |AL YC A B S
In sum, the Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein
announced that none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora
that resulted in the latter's death at the auditorium of the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos on April 13, 1972.
While we deeply sympathize with the petitioners over the loss of their son under the tragic circumstances here
related, we nevertheless are unable to extend them the material relief they seek, as a balm to their grief, under
the law they have invoked.

Notes—

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring and dissenting: I concur, except with respect to the restricted meaning given the
term "teacher" in Article 2180 of the Civil Code as "teacher-in-charge." This would limit liability to occasions where there
are classes under the immediate charge of a teacher, which does not seem to be the intendment of the law. As I understand
it, the philosophy of the law is that whoever stands in loco parentis will have the same duties and obligations as parents
whenever in such a standing.

Those persons are mandatorily held liable for the tortious acts of pupils and students so long as the latter remain in their
custody, meaning their protective and supervisory custody. And while a school is, admittedly, not directly liable since
Article 2180 speaks only of teachers and schools heads, yet, by virtue of the same provision, the school, as their employer,
may be held liable for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents.
Again, the school may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family.

110 |AL YC A B S
 SPOUSES MOISES and BRIGIDA PALISOC vs. ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-29025; October 4, 1971

RES: ANTONIO C. BRILLANTES and TEODOSIO V. VALENTON, owner and President, respectively,
of a school of arts and trades, known under the name and style of "Manila Technical Institute" (M.I.T.),
VIRGILIO L. DAFFON and SANTIAGO M. QUIBULUE

Plaintiffs-appellants as parents of their sixteen-year old son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in automotive
mechanics at the Manila Technical Institute, Quezon Boulevard, Manila, had filed on May 19, 1966, the action
below for damages arising from the death on March 10, 1966 of their son at the hands of a fellow student,
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at the laboratory room of the said Institute.

The deceased Dominador Palisoc and the defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates, and on the afternoon
of March 10, 1966, between two and three o'clock, they, together with another classmate Desiderio Cruz were
in the laboratory room located on the ground floor. At that time the classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on at them. Daffon
made a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of this remark Palisoc slapped
slightly Daffon on the face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was
followed by other fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which caused him to fall
face downward. Palisoc became pale and fainted. First aid was administered to him but he was not revived, so
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never regained consciousness and died.

The defendant Antonio C. Brillantes, at the time when the incident which gave rise to his action occurred was
a member of the Board of Directors of the institute; the defendant Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof; the
defendant Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to which the deceased belonged; and the defendant
Virgilio L. Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased. At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute was a
single proprietorship, but lately on August 2, 1962, it was duly incorporated.

The trial court expressly gave credence to this version of the incident, as testified to by the lone eyewitness,
Desiderio Cruz, a classmate of the protagonists, as that of a disinterested witness who "has no motive or reason
to testify one way or another in favor of any party" and rejected the self-exculpatory version of defendant Daffon
denying that he had inflicted any fist blows on the deceased.

With the postmortem findings of Dr. Angelo Singian of the Manila Police Department who performed the
autopsy, it was revealed that the cause of death is shock due to traumatic fracture of the ribs with intra-gastric
hemorrhage and slight subarachnoid hemorrhage on the brain," and his testimony that these internal injuries of
the deceased were caused "probably by strong fist blows," the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for the
quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. It held that the act, therefore, of the accused Daffon in giving
the deceased strong fist blows in the stomach which ruptured his internal organs and caused his death falls
within the purview of this article of the Code. The trial court, however, absolved from liability the three other
defendants-officials of the Manila Technical Institute. In the opinion of the Court, article 2180 of the Code is
not applicable to the case at bar, since this contemplates the situation where the control or influence of the
teachers and heads of school establishments over the conduct and actions by the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. The clause "so long as they remain in their custody" contained in Article 2180 of the new civil code
contemplated a situation where the pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that the control or influence on
the pupil supersedes those of the parents. There is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded with
his teacher or the other defendant officials of the school. These defendants cannot therefore be made responsible
for the tort of the defendant Daffon. Hence, this petition. The parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon,
are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at the time of the tragic incident. There is no question, either,
that the school involved is a non-academic school, being admittedly a technical vocational and industrial school.
.

ISSUE: WON the teachers or the officials of the school should be liable?

111 |AL YC A B S
RULING: The Court holds that under the cited codal article, defendants head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute are liable jointly and severally for damages to plaintiffs-appellants for the death of the latter's
minor son at the hands of defendant Daffon at the school's laboratory room. No liability attaches to defendant
Brillantes as a mere member of the school's board of directors. The school itself cannot be held similarly liable,
since it has not been properly impleaded as party defendant. The rationale of such liability of school heads and
teachers for the tortious acts of their pupils and students, so long as they remain in their custody, is that they
stand, to a certain extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the child." This is expressly provided for in Articles 349, 350 and
352 of the Civil Code.

In the law of torts, the governing principle is that the protective custody of the school heads and teachers is
mandatorily substituted for that of the parents, and hence, it becomes their obligation as well as that of the
school itself to provide proper supervision of the students' activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time, as well as to take the necessary precautions to protect the
students in their custody from dangers and hazards that would reasonably be anticipated, including injuries that
some student themselves may inflict willfully or through negligence on their fellow students.

As tersely summarized by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes in his dissenting opinion in Exconde Case, "the basis of the
presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 [now 2180] is some culpa in vigilando that the parents, teachers, etc.
are supposed to have incurred in the exercise of their authority" and "where the parent places the child under
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter, and not the parent, should be the one answerable for the torts
committed while under his custody, for the very reason that the parent is not supposed to interfere with the
discipline of the school nor with the authority and supervision of the teacher while the child is under instruction."
The school itself, likewise, has to respond for the fault or negligence of its school head and teachers under the
same cited article.

The lower court therefore erred in law in absolving defendants-school officials on the ground that they could be
held liable under Article 2180, Civil Code, only if the student who inflicted the fatal fistblows on his classmate
and victim "lived and boarded with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school." As stated above,
the phrase used in the cited article — "so long as (the students) remain in their custody" means the protective
and supervisory custody that the school and its heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as
long as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time. There is nothing in the law that requires that
for such liability to attach the pupil or student who commits the tortious act must live and board in the school,
as erroneously held by the lower court, and the dicta in Mercado (as well as in Exconde) on which it relied,
must now be deemed to have been set aside by the present decision.

Defendants Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must therefore be held
jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of their co-defendant Daffon in the latter's having caused the
death of his classmate, the deceased Dominador Palisoc. The unfortunate death resulting from the fight between
the protagonists-students could have been avoided, had said defendants but complied with their duty of
providing adequate supervision over the activities of the students in the school premises to protect their students
from harm, whether at the hands of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless
they relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180, Civil Code, by
"(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage." In the light of
the factual findings of the lower court's decision, said defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability.
.

Notes—
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring: I concur with the opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee but would like to clarify that the
argument of the dissenting opinion of the effect that the responsibility of teachers and school officers under Articles 2180
should be limited to pupils who are minors (below the age of majority) is not in accord with the plain text of the law.
Examination of the article shows that where the responsibility prescribed therein is limited to illegal acts during minority,
the article expressly so provides, as in the case of the parents and of the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the law had
intended to similarly restrict the civil responsibility of the other categories of persons enumerated in the article, it would
have expressly so stated. The fact that it has not done so indicates an intent that the liability be not restricted to the case of
persons under age. Further, it is not without significance that the teachers and heads of scholarly establishments are not

112 |AL YC A B S
grouped with parents and guardians but ranged with owners and managers of enterprises, employers and the state, as to
whom no reason is discernible to imply that they should answer only for minors. I submit, finally, that while in the case of
parents and guardians, their authority and supervision over the children and wards end by law upon the latter reaching
majority age, the authority and custodial supervision over pupils exist regardless of the age of the latter. A student over
twenty-one, by enrolling and attending a school, places himself under the custodial supervision and disciplinary authority
of the school authorities, which is the basis of the latter's correlative responsibility for his torts, committed while under
such authority.

MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting: I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid down by this Court in Mercado Case,
where the clause "so long as they remain in their custody" was construed as referring to a "situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the latter's control, direction and influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents." Here, the parents of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not involved, since Daffon was already of age at
the time of the tragic incident then it stands to reason that just as parents are not responsible for damages caused by their
children who are no longer minors, so should teachers and school heads be exempt from liability

113 |AL YC A B S
 REYNALDO PASCO vs. CFI OF BULACAN, BRANCH 5, STA. MARIA and ARANETA
UNIVERSITY
G.R. No. L-54357; April 25, 1988

The sole question of law raised by petitioner in this case is whether the provision of the penultimate paragraph
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which states: “Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody” is equally applicable to academic institutions.

On August 24, 1979 at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner, together with two companions, while
walking inside the campus of the private respondent Araneta University, after attending classes in said
university, was accosted and mauled by a group of Muslim students led by Abdul Karim Madidis alias "Teng."
Said Muslim group were also students of the Araneta University. Petitioner was subsequently stabbed by Abdul
and as a consequence he was hospitalized at the Manila Central University (MCU) Hospital where he underwent
surgery to save his life.

On October 5, 1979, petitioner, assisted by his father Pedro Pasco, filed a complaint for damages against Abdul
Karim Madidis and herein private respondent Gregorio Araneta. Said school was impleaded as a party defendant
based on the aforementioned provision of the Civil Code. Respondent school filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging
that the penultimate paragraph of Article 2180 of the New Civil Code under which it was sued applies only to
vocational schools and not to academic institutions.

On May 12, 1980, respondent court issued an Order granting said Motion to Dismiss. Petitioner moved to
reconsider the Order of Dismissal but the motion was likewise denied on the ground that there is no sufficient
justification to disturb its ruling. Hence, this instant Petition for certiorari under Republic Act No. 5440, praying
that judgment be rendered setting aside the questioned order of May 12, 1980 dismissing the complaint as
against respondent school and the order of July 17, 1980 denying the reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal, with costs against respondent school.

ISSUE: WON the school should be liable?

RULING: Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. We find no necessity of discussing the applicability of the
Article to educational institutions (which are not schools of arts and trades) for the issue in this petition is
actually whether or not, under the article, the school or the university itself (as distinguished from the teachers
or heads) is liable. We find the answer in the negative, for surely the provision concerned speaks only of
"teachers or heads."

Notes—

SARMIENTO, J., dissenting: I dissent. Paragraph 5 of Art. 2180 may be construed as the basis for the liability of the
school as the employer for the failure of its teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute
parents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting: I join Justice Sarmiento in his dissent. As stated by him, my view is that while
the educational institution is not directly liable, yet the school, as the employer, may be held liable for the failure of its
teachers or school heads to perform their mandatory legal duties as substitute parents (Article 2180, Civil Code). The
school, however, may exculpate itself from liability by proving that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the
family.

114 |AL YC A B S
 SALVOSA vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 70458; October 5, 1988

PET: BENJAMIN SALVOSA and BAGUIO COLLEGES FOUNDATION

RES: EDUARDO B. CASTRO, DIOMEDES B. CASTRO, VIRGINIA B. CASTRO and RODOLFO B.
CASTRO

Baguio Colleges Foundation (BCF, hereafter) is an academic institution. It has also advertised itself as an
institution of arts and trade. Its brochure shows that BCF has a full-fledged technical-vocational department
offer Communication, Broadcast and Teletype Technician as well as Electronics and Automotive Mechanics
courses. Within the premises of the BCF is an ROTC Unit, the BCF Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC)
Unit, which is under the fifth control of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. By way of accommodation to the
AFP and pursuant to DO No. 14-S.1975 of the Department of Education and Culture, is provided by the BCF
an office and an armory located in the basement

The BCF ROTC Unit had Jimmy B. Abon as its duly appointed armorer. As armorer of the ROTC Unit, Jimmy
B. Abon received his appointment from the AFP. Not being an employee of the BCF, he also received his salary
from the AFP, as well as orders from Captain Roberto C. Ungos, the Commandant of the Baguio Colleges
Foundation ROTC Unit. Jimmy B. Abon was also a commerce student of the BCF. On 3 March 1977, at around
8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF, Jimmy B. Abon shot Napoleon Castro a student of the University of
Baguio with an unlicensed firearm which the former took from the armory of the ROTC. As a result, Napoleon
Castro died and Jimmy B. Abon was prosecuted for, and convicted of the crime of Homicide by Military
Commission No. 30, AFP. Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy
B. Abon, Roberto C. Ungos, Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of the Board of BCF), the Baguio
Colleges Foundation Inc. as well as other officials of the school therein.

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a decision sentencing defendants jointly and severally, to pay private
respondents, as heirs of Napoleon Castro. On appeal by petitioners, the respondent Court affirmed with
modification the decision of the Trial Court. The modification consisted in reducing the award for loss of earning
capacity of the deceased from P316,000.00 to P30,000.00 by way of temperate damages, and increasing the
indemnity for the death of Napoleon Castro from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article
2180 of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon?

RULING: We hold that Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to have been "at attendance in the school," or in
the custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro. Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code be held solidarity liable with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from his acts.

Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades are liable for "damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so long as the student remains in the custody of a teacher, the
latter "stands, to a certain extent, in loco parentis as to the student and is called upon to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of the student." The protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils as they are at attendance in the school, including recess time,
remains.

In the case at bar, in holding that Jimmy B. Abon was in in the protective and supervisory custody of the Baguio
Colleges Foundation when he shot Napoleon Castro. In line with the case of Palisoc, a student not "at attendance
in the school" cannot be in "recess" thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced in the phrase "at attendance
in the school," contemplates a situation of temporary adjournment of school activities where the student still
remains within call of his mentor and is not permitted to leave the school premises, or the area within which the
school activity is conducted. It does not include dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being enrolled or being in
the premises of a school without more does not constitute "attending school" or being in the “protective and
supervisory custody” of the school, as contemplated in the law.

115 |AL YC A B S
The record shows that before the shooting incident, Roberto B. Ungos ROTC Unit Commandant, AFP, had
instructed Jimmy B. Abon "not to leave the office and to keep the armory well-guarded." Apart from negating
a finding that Jimmy B. Abon was under the custody of the school when he committed the act for which the
petitioners are sought to be held liable, this circumstance shows that Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working
in the armory with definite instructions from his superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Napoleon
Castro. Considering that Jimmy B. Abon was not in the custody of BCF when he shot Napoleon Castro, the
Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon issue of whether BCF is an academic or vocational institution.

116 |AL YC A B S
 SOLIMAN vs. TUAZON
G.R. No. 66207; May 18, 1992

PET: MAXIMINO SOLIMAN, JR. represented by his judicial guardian VIRGINIA C. SOLIMAN
RES: HON. JUDGE RAMON TUAZON, Presiding Judge of Branch 61, RTC of Region III, Angeles City,
and the REPUBLIC CENTRAL COLLEGES, represented by its President

On 22 March 1983, petitioner Soliman, Jr. filed a civil complaint for damages against private respondent
Republic Central Colleges ("Colleges"), the R.L. Security Agency Inc. and one Jimmy B. Solomon, a security
guard, as defendants.

On 13 August 1982, in the morning thereof, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the
defendant, Republic Central Colleges, as he was and is still a regular enrolled student of said school taking his
morning classes, the defendant, JIMMY B. SOLOMON, who was on said date and hour in the premises of said
school performing his duties and obligations as a duly appointed security guard under the employment,
supervision and control of his employer-defendant R.L. Security Agency, Inc., headed by Benjamin Serrano,
without any provocation, in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill,
attack, assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver. The plaintiff was
treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and, as per doctor's opinion, the plaintiff may
not be able to attend to his regular classes and will be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a
duration of from three to four months before his wounds would be completely healed.

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint stated no cause of action
against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner
student for the reason that private respondent school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy
Solomon, and hence was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further
argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the Civil Code did not apply, since said paragraph holds teachers
and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice of the school.
Respondent Judge granted private respondent school's motion to dismiss, holding that security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not an employee of the school which accordingly could not be held liable for his acts or omissions.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge committed a grave
abuse of discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349,
350 and 352, of the Civil Code and granted the school's motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: WON Article 2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352, of the Civil Code apply to Jimmy
Solomon? WON private respondents should be held liable?

RULING: Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by one against
another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission, but also for acts or omissions of a
person for whom one is by law responsible. The first paragraph of the article offers no basis for holding the
Colleges liable for the alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner
Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. The employer of Jimmy
Solomon was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the school was the client or customer of the R.L. Security
Agency Inc.

It is settled that where the security agency, as here, recruits, hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or harmful acts
committed by the security guards attaches to the employer agency, and not to the clients or customers of such
agency. As a general rule, a client or customer of a security agency has no hand in selecting who among the
pool of security guards or watchmen employed by the agency shall be assigned to it; the duty to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of the guards cannot, in the ordinary course of events, be
demanded from the client whose premises or property are protected by the security guards. The fact that a client
company may give instructions or directions to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the

117 |AL YC A B S
client responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable for their wrongful acts or
omissions. Those instructions or directions are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the security agency. There being no employer-employee relationship
between the Colleges and Jimmy Solomon, petitioner student cannot impose vicarious liability upon the
Colleges for the acts of security guard Solomon.

Since there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the Colleges, he
being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc., the Article 2180 of the Civil Code is similarly not
available for imposing liability upon the Republic Central Colleges for the acts or omissions of Jimmy Solomon.
In Palisoc v. Brillantes, 4 invoked by petitioner, the Court held the owner and president of a school of arts and
trades known as the "Manila Technical Institute," Quezon Blvd., Manila, responsible in damages for the death
of Dominador Palisoc, a student of Institute, which resulted from fist blows delivered by Virgilio L. Daffon,
another student of the Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v. Brillantes brought it expressly within
the 7th paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but those facts are entirely different from the facts existing in
the instant case.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage inflicted upon a third person
by the child or person subject to such substitute parental authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy
Solomon who committed allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental authority over Solomon.

Clearly, within the confines of its limited logic, i.e., treating the petitioner's claim as one based wholly and
exclusively on Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the order of the respondent trial judge was correct. Does it follow,
however, that respondent Colleges could not be held liable upon any other basis in law, for or in respect of the
injury sustained by petitioner, so as to entitle respondent school to dismissal of petitioner's complaint in respect
of itself?

In Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that Article 2180
of the Civil Code was not applicable where a student had been injured by one who was an outsider or by one
over whom the school did not exercise any custody or control or supervision. At the same time, however, the
Court stressed that an implied contract may be held to be established between a school which accepts students
for enrollment, on the one hand, and the students who are enrolled, on the other hand, which contract results in
obligations for both parties. When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established
a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which parties are bound to comply with. For its part,
the school undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with
the necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student
covenants to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by respondent Colleges, upon the
assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based, and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same
time constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. In line, therefore, with the most recent
jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside
technical considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error correctible by this
Court in the instant case. Respondent trial judge should not have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should
have, in the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu
or ex lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

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 PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC vs. PH IL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC.
G.R. No. L-25142; March 25, 1975

PET: PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and FELIX PANGALANGAN

RES: PH IL-AMERICAN FORWARDERS, INC., ARCHIMEDES J. BALINGIT and FERNANDO
PINEDA

In the complaint for damages filed by the bus company and Pangalangan against Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc., Balingit and Pineda, it was alleged that on November 24, 1962, Pineda drove recklessly a freight truck,
owned by Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., along the national highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the bus driven by Pangalangan, which was owned by Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. As a result of
the bumping, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus was damaged and could not be used for seventy-nine
days, thus depriving the company of earnings amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-
American Forwarders, Inc.

Among the defenses interposed by the defendants in their answer was that Balingit was not Pineda's employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that the bus company and the bus
driver had no cause of action against him. As already stated, the lower court dismissed the action as to Balingit.
The bus company and its driver appealed.

ISSUE: WON the terms "employers" and "owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise"
(dueños o directores de un establicimiento o empresa) used in article 2180 of the Civil Code embrace the
manager of a corporation owning a truck?

RULING: The court is of the opinion that those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be
gathered from the context of article 2180 that the term "manager" ("director" in the Spanish version) is used in
the sense of "employer". Hence, under the allegations of the complaint, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability
can be fastened on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the vehicular
accident.

The bus company and its driver, in their appellants' brief, injected a new factual issue which was not alleged in
their complaint. They argue that Phil- American Forwarders, Inc. is merely a business conduit of Balingit
because out of its capital stock with a par value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had subscribed P40,000 and
they paid P10,000 on their subscription, while the other incorporators, namely, Rodolfo Limjuco, Ponciano
Caparas and Rafael Suntay paid P250.25 and P25, respectively.

That argument implies that the veil of corporate fiction should be pierced and that Phil-American Forwarders,
Inc. and Balingit and his wife should be treated as one and the same civil personality. We cannot countenance
that argument in this appeal. It was not raised in the lower court. The case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was assumed that Phil-American Forwarders, Inc. has a personality
separate and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses. When a party deliberately adopts a certain theory and
the case is decided upon that theory in the court below, he will not be permitted to change his theory on appeal
because, to permit him to do so, could be unfair to the adverse party.

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LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN vs. MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of
the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
G.R. No. 145804; February 6, 2003

On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered
the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing
on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No
evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first
blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated
by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed
instantaneously.

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her children,
filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit
Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a
counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied
liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence,
filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task.

On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs. Prudent
appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its now assailed decision
exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and
Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then
as yet boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place
where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor. In
exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the
death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been hit by the train owned
and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.

Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the trial court
by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of negligence on the part of
a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or prevented.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage was deemed
created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling
Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly
held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed
upon a common carrier.

ISSUE: WON CA gravely erred in finding that petitioners are liable for the death of Nicanor Navidad,
Jr.

RULING: Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the safety of
passengers. The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety to its
passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its
premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage.

The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or willful acts of its employees or b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other passengers
or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due diligence could have

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prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been
at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the
injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure. In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier
on how the accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an exception from the general rule that negligence must be
proved.

The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises
from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common
carrier.

Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the provisions of
Article 2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180, of the Civil Code. The premise, however,
for the employer’s liability is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary
and can only be negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual
matter that has not been shown.

Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the common carrier, on the one
hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual
obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability
for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract.

Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad, this Court
is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of
Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven. There
being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act or omission,
he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is
not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own
fault or negligence.

The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or
recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.

Notes—

Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.

Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.

Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful acts
of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of
the orders of the common carriers.

This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employees.

Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of
a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission.

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 SPS. BUENAVENTURA and ROSARIO JAYME vs. RODRIGO APOSTOL, et al.
G.R. No. 163609; November 27, 2008

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven
by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The pick-up truck was registered under the
name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up
truck from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight. The
pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the National Highway in
Poblacion, Polomolok, South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50) meters away
from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a very high speed at the time of the
accident.

Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and diffused cerebral contusion. He was initially
treated at the Howard Hubbard Memorial Hospital. Due to the seriousness of his injuries, he was airlifted to the
Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for more intensive treatment. Despite medical attention, Marvin
expired six (6) days after the accident.

Petitioner spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with
the RTC against respondents. In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents be held solidarily liable for
their loss. They pointed out that that proximate cause of Marvins death was Lozanos negligent and reckless
operation of the vehicle.

In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvins death. Apostol and Simbulan averred
that Lozano took the pick-up truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out that Marvins
sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board
the vehicle when it hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of Lozano and Miguel. As
for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is
contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured.

RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses Jayme. It ruled that he defendant Municipality of Koronadal cannot
be held liable for the damages incurred by other defendant being an agency of the State performing a
governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject
vehicle, he is absolved of any liability. The complaint against def endant First Integrated Bonding Insurance
Company, Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of action against said insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato, are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff.

In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that he was Lozanos employer and, hence,
solidarily liable for the latters negligent act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was the driver’s
true and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he did not exercise due care and diligence in the
supervision of Lozano. The incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be attributed to him.
The CA granted the appeal and held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages for the death of
Marvin Jayme. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could not thus be held liable for the damages
caused by the former. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the accident.
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of a vehicle who is jointly and severally
liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries or death
sustained in the operation of the vehicle.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in holding that mayor Fernando Miguel cannot be held liable for the death of
Marvin Jayme?

RULING: The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application in the present case. Article
2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one’s own quasi-delictual acts, but also for
those persons for whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability.
To sustain claims against employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2) That the service to be

122 |AL YC A B S
rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at all times; and (3) That the
illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.

Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it must be established that
the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the employee was performing his functions. Furthermore,
the employer-employee relationship cannot be assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
relationship by preponderant evidence. In Belen v. Belen, this Court ruled that it was enough for defendant to
deny an alleged employment relationship. The defendant is under no obligation to prove the negative averment.

In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor Miguel is, indeed, the employer of
Lozano and therefore liable for the negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an employment
relationship, the Court rely on the four-fold test. This involves: (1) the employers power of selection; (2)
payment of wages or other remuneration; (3) the employers right to control the method of doing the work; and
(4) the employers right of suspension or dismissal.

Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the Municipality of Koronadal which was the
lawful employer of Lozano at the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver
by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of
no moment. This Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee relationship still exists
even if the employee was loaned by the employer to another person or entity because control over the
employee subsists.

Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and control over Lozano and how the latter
operated or drove the Isuzu pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still
cannot be held liable. In Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions
to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the
employer of the driver.

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the person may have the right
to control the manner of the vehicles operation. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship
establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only
happens to be an occupant of the vehicle.

In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor the vehicles registered owner. There existed
no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him accountable for Marvins
death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of the accident. Parenthetically, it has been held that the
failure of a passenger to assist the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not make
the passenger liable for the latters negligent acts. As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful
employer of Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses Jayme, the municipality may
not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from
suit.

Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.

Notes—
Handley v. Lombardi: Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but only an intermediate and
superior employee or agent. This being so, the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly
applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were
both employed by Kruse.

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 FILAMER CHRISTIAN INSTITUTE vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 75112; August 17, 1992

The private respondents, heirs of the late Potenciano Kapunan, seek reconsideration of the decision rendered by
this Court on October 16, 1990 (Filamer Christian Institute v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 477) reviewing the
appellate court's conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the petitioner and its
codefendant Funtecha. The Court ruled that the petitioner is not liable for the injuries caused by Funtecha on
the grounds that the latter was not an authorized driver for whose acts the petitioner shall be directly and
primarily answerable, and that Funtecha was merely a working scholar who, under Section 14, Rule X, Book
III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code is not considered an employee of the petitioner.

Funtecha was a working student, being a part-time janitor and a scholar of petitioner Filamer. He was, in relation
to the school, an employee even if he was assigned to clean the school premises for only two (2) hours in the
morning of each school day. Having a student driver's license, Funtecha requested the driver, Allan Masa, and
was allowed, to take over the vehicle while the latter was on his way home one late afternoon. It is significant
to note that the place where Allan lives is also the house of his father, the school president, Agustin Masa.
Moreover, it is also the house where Funtecha was allowed free board while he was a student of Filamer
Christian Institute.

Allan Masa turned over the vehicle to Funtecha only after driving down a road, negotiating a sharp dangerous
curb, and viewing that the road was clear. According to Allan's testimony, a fast moving truck with glaring
lights nearly hit them so that they had to swerve to the right to avoid a collision. Upon swerving, they heard a
sound as if something had bumped against the vehicle, but they did not stop to check. Actually, the Pinoy jeep
swerved towards the pedestrian, Potenciano Kapunan who was walking in his lane in the direction against
vehicular traffic, and hit him. Allan affirmed that Funtecha followed his advice to swerve to the right. At the
time of the incident (6:30 P.M.) in Roxas City, the jeep had only one functioning headlight.

Allan testified that he was the driver and at the same time a security guard of the petitioner-school. He further
said that there was no specific time for him to be off-duty and that after driving the students home at 5:00 in the
afternoon, he still had to go back to school and then drive home using the same vehicle. It is indubitable under
the circumstances that the school president had knowledge that the jeep was routinely driven home for the said
purpose. Moreover, it is not improbable that the school president also had knowledge of Funtecha's possession
of a student driver's license and his desire to undergo driving lessons during the time that he was not in his
classrooms.

ISSUE: WON Filamer is liable for the acts of Futencha?

RULING: In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha
definitely was not having a joy ride. Funtecha was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment or for a "frolic
of his own" but ultimately, for the service for which the jeep was intended by the petitioner school. Therefore,
the Court is constrained to conclude that the act of Funtecha in taking over the steering wheel was one done for
and in behalf of his employer for which act the petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility by arguing that
it was done beyond the scope of his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope of their assigned tasks" for
purposes of raising the presumption of liability of an employer, includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of the
injury or damage.

Even if somehow, the employee driving the vehicle derived some benefit from the act, the existence of a
presumptive liability of the employer is determined by answering the question of whether or not the servant was
at the time of the accident performing any act in furtherance of his master's business.

Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules implementing the Labor Code, on which the petitioner anchors its
defense, was promulgated by the Secretary of Labor and Employment only for the purpose of administering and
enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code on conditions of employment. Particularly, Rule X of Book III
provides guidelines on the manner by which the powers of the Labor Secretary shall be exercised; on what
records should be kept; maintained and preserved; on payroll; and on the exclusion of working scholars from,

124 |AL YC A B S
and inclusion of resident physicians in the employment coverage as far as compliance with the substantive labor
provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages, is concerned.

The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee
and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently
negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the
implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to avoid liability
under the substantive provisions of the Civil
Code.
Funtecha is an employee of petitioner Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a driver's position
in order that the petitioner may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act
of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of the petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting within the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve the petitioner of the
burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of
a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its having
exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.

The Court reiterates that supervision includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance
of its employees and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons
with whom the employer has relations through his employees. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown
that it has set forth such rules and guidelines as would prohibit any one of its employees from taking control
over its vehicles if one is not the official driver or prohibiting the driver and son of the Filamer president from
authorizing another employee to drive the school vehicle. Furthermore, the petitioner has failed to prove that it
had imposed sanctions or warned its employees against the use of its vehicles by persons other than the driver.

The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay damages for injury arising from the unskilled manner by which
Funtecha drove the vehicle. The liability of the employer is, under Article 2180, primary and solidary. However,
the employer shall have recourse against the negligent employee for whatever damages are paid to the heirs of
the plaintiff.

125 |AL YC A B S
 CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORP. vs. VICENTE & LUISA VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS
HOSPITAL
G.R. No. 132266; December 21, 1999

On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle
around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda)
but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time.
Upon the other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation, registered
owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said
company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against
[the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with each other causing severe
injuries to the former. Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands Hospital and later
to the Cebu Doctors Hospital. On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It was there
that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills,
professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.

A Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the
present action for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the
deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same
action, Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense given to Romeo So
Vasquez

The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin
Abad and petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation to pay jointly and solidarily Spouses Vasquez. CASTILEX
and ABAD separately appealed the decision. Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding
ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the
former. It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity from P778,752.00 to
P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5
September 1988 until fully paid.

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the
case the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that as a
managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always acting within the scope of his assigned task
even outside office hours because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3) ruling that
petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was not acting within the scope of his assigned task.

On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their sons death was caused by the negligence of
petitioners employee who was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way home from
overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable for the resulting injury and subsequent death of
their son on the basis of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of Article 2180 were
applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor.

ISSUE: WON Castilex is vicariously liable?

RULING: Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply to
instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph
should apply. Petitioner’s interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase even though the former
are not engaged in any business or industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is
not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task.

A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine what is applicable. Both provisions apply
to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth

126 |AL YC A B S
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph
covers negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion of their
functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts included. Negligent
acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches
nor on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear different hats. They perform
functions which are beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still within the call of
duty.

Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or industry, an employer is
liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is necessary to establish
the employer-employee relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that
the employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed. It is
only then that the employer may find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee.

Petitioner did not present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time
of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that ABAD was acting within the
scope of his duties; petitioner was not under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove). The Court has consistently applied
the ancient rule that if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in
a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception
or defense.

Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting within
the scope of his assigned tasks. The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the driving
by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances. We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said
vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his employment. The
following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the employer’s liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employer’s motor vehicle:

I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who uses his employer’s vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within
the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer.

II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work

In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence
of some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment
even though he uses his employer’s motor vehicle.

III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours

An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter’s personal use outside
of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employees negligent operation of the
vehicle during the period of permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to the employer.

127 |AL YC A B S
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner’s office, which was
located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea, Cebu City,
which is about seven kilometers away from petitioner’s place of business. To the mind of this Court, ABAD
was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the time
he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal
working hours. ABADs working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being at a
place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had
no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager.

Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him,
petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

128 |AL YC A B S
 JOHN REYES and MERVIN JOSEPH REYES vs. ORICO DOCTOLERO
G.R. No. 185597; August 2, 2017

RES: ORICO DOCTOLERO, ROMEO A VILA, GRANDEUR SECURITY AND SERVICES

CORPORATION, and MAKATI CINEMA SQUARE

The case arose from an altercation between respondent Orico Doctolero (Doctolero ), a security guard of
respondent Grandeur Security and Services Corporation (Grandeur) and petitioners John E.R. Reyes (John) and
Mervin Joseph Reyes (Mervin) in the parking area of respondent Makati Cinema Square (MCS). Grandeur
advances a different version, one based on the Initial Report conducted by Investigator Cosme Giron. While
Doctolero was on duty at the ramp of the exit driveway of MCS's basement parking, John took over the left lane
and insisted entry through the basement parking's exit driveway. Knowing that this is against traffic rules,
Doctolero stopped John, prompting the latter to alight from his vehicle and confront Doctolero. With his wife
unable to pacify him, John punched and kicked Doctolero, hitting the latter on his left face and stomach.
Doctolero tried to step back to avoid his aggressor but John persisted, causing Doctolero to draw his service
firearm and fire a warning shot. John ignored this and continued his attack. He caught up with Doctolero and
wrestled with him to get the firearm. This caused the gun to fire off and hit John's leg. Mervin then ran after
Doctolero but was shot on the stomach by security guard Avila.

Petitioners filed with the RTC of Makati a complaint for damages against respondents Doctolero and Avila and
their employer Grandeur, charging the latter with negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
They likewise impleaded MCS on the ground that it was negligent in getting Grandeur's services. Respondents
Doctolero and Avila failed to file an answer despite service of summons upon them. Thus, they were declared
in default.

For its part, Grandeur asserted that it exercised the required diligence in the selection and supervision of its
employees. It likewise averred that the shooting incident was caused by the unlawful aggression of petitioners
who took advantage of their "martial arts" skills. On the other hand, MCS contends that it cannot be held liable
for damages simply because of its ownership of the premises where the shooting incident occurred. It argued
that the injuries sustained by petitioners were caused by the acts of respondents Doctolero and Avila, for whom
respondent Grandeur should be solely responsible. It further argued that the carpark was, at that time, being
managed by Park Asia Philippines and MCS had no control over the carpark when the shooting incident
occurred.

On January 18, 1999, RTC rendered judgment against respondents Doctolero and Avila, finding them
responsible for the injuries sustained by petitioners. The RTC ordered them to jointly and severally pay
petitioners. On April 15, 2005, the RTC rendered a decision dismissing the complaint against MCS. It, however,
held Grandeur solidarily liable with respondents Doctolero and Avila. According to the RTC, Grandeur was
unable to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employees
because it failed to prove strict implementation of its rules, regulations, guidelines, issuances and instructions,
and to monitor consistent compliance by respondents.

In reconsidering its Decision, the RTC held that it re-evaluated the facts and the attending circumstances of the
present case and was convinced that Grandeur has sufficiently overcome the presumption of negligence. It gave
credence to the testimony of Grandeur's witness, Eduardo Ungui, the head of the Human Resources Department
(HRD) of Grandeur, as regards the various procedures in its selection from and hiring of security guards. RTC
held that Grandeur was able to show that it observed diligence of a good father of the familymduring the
existence of the employment when it conducted regular and close supervision of its security guards assigned to
various clients. Petitioners assailed the RTC Order.

The CA dismissed petitioners' appeal and affirmed the RTC's Order. It agreed that Grandeur was able to prove
with preponderant evidence that it observed the degree of diligence required in both selection and supervision
of its security guards.

ISSUE: Whether Grandeur and MCS may be held vicariously liable for the damages caused by
respondents Doctolero and Avila to petitioners John and Mervin Reyes?

129 |AL YC A B S
RULING: Petition is denied. As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. The law,
however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another. One
exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee under paragraph
5 of Article 2180. It must be stressed, however, that the above rule is applicable only if there is an employer-
employee relationship.

In Mamaril v. The Boy Scout of the Philippines, we found that there was no employer-employee relationship
between Boy Scout of the Philippines (BSP) and the security guards assigned to it by an agency pursuant to a
Guard Service Contract. In the absence of such relationship, vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code cannot apply as against BSP. Similarly, we find no employer-employee relationship between MCS and
respondent guards. The guards were merely assigned by Grandeur to secure MCS' premises pursuant to their
Contract of Guard Services. Thus, MCS cannot be held vicariously liable for damages caused by these guards'
acts or omissions.

On the other hand, paragraph 5 of Article 2180 of the Civil Code may be applicable to Grandeur, it being
undisputed that respondent guards were its employees. When the employee causes damage due to his own
negligence while performing his own duties, there arises the Juris tantum presumption that the employer is
negligent, rebuttable only by proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family. The "diligence
of a good father" referred to in the last paragraph of Article 2180 means diligence in the selection and
supervision of employees.

Here, both the RTC and the CA found that Grandeur was able to sufficiently prove, through testimonial and
documentary evidence, that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and hiring
of its security guards. As testified to by its HRD head Ungui, and corroborated by documentary evidence
including clearances from various government agencies, certificates, and favorable test results in medical and
psychiatric examinations. The evidence presented by Grandeur consists not only in the testimony of its HRD
head but also by documentary evidence showing respondents Doctolero's and Avila's compliance with the above
hiring and selection process

Once evidence is introduced showing that the employer exercised the required amount of care in selecting its
employees, half of the employer's burden is overcome. The question of diligent supervision, however, depends
on the circumstances of employment. Ordinarily, evidence demonstrating that the employer has exercised
diligent supervision of its employee during the performance of the latter's assigned tasks would be enough to
relieve him of the liability imposed by Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.Here,
Grandeur's HRD head, Ungui, likewise testified on Grandeur's standard operational procedures, showing the
means by which Grandeur conducts close and regular supervision over the security guards assigned to their
various clients.

Considering all the evidence borne by the records, we find that Grandeur has sufficiently exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence, having successfully
overcome the legal presumption of negligence, it is relieved of liability from the negligent acts of its employees,
respondents Doctolero and Avila.

130 |AL YC A B S
 NOGALES vs. CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER
G.R. No. 142625; December 19, 2006

PET: ROGELIO P. NOGALES, for himself and on behalf of the minors, ROGER ANTHONY,
ANGELICA, NANCY, and MICHAEL CHRISTOPHER, all surnamed NOGALES

RES: CAPITOL MEDICAL CENTER, DR. OSCAR ESTRADA, DR. ELY VILLAFLOR, DR. ROSA
UY, DR. JOEL ENRIQUEZ, DR. PERPETUA LACSON, DR. NOE ESPINOLA, and NURSE J.
DUMLAO

Pregnant with her fourth child, Corazon Nogales (Corazon), who was then 37 years old, was under the exclusive
prenatal care of Dr. Oscar Estrada (Dr. Estrada) beginning on her fourth month of pregnancy or as early as
December 1975. While Corazon was on her last trimester of pregnancy, Dr. Estrada noted an increase in her
blood pressure and development of leg edema indicating preeclampsia, which is a dangerous complication of
pregnancy.

Around midnight of 25 May 1976, Corazon started to experience mild labor pains prompting Corazon and
Rogelio Nogales (Spouses Nogales) to see Dr. Estrada at his home. After examining Corazon, Dr. Estrada
advised her immediate admission to the Capitol Medical Center (CMC). On 26 May 1976, Corazon was
admitted at 2:30 a.m. at the CMC after the staff nurse noted the written admission request of Dr. Estrada. Upon
Corazons admission at the CMC, Rogelio Nogales (Rogelio) executed and signed the Consent on Admission
and Agreement and Admission Agreement.
Corazon was then brought to the labor room of the CMC.

Dr. Rosa Uy (Dr. Uy), who was then a resident physician of CMC, conducted an internal examination of
Corazon. Dr. Uy then called up Dr. Estrada to notify him of her findings.

According to the Nurses Observation Notes, Dr. Joel Enriquez (Dr. Enriquez), an anesthesiologist at CMC, was
notified at 4:15 a.m. of Corazons admission. Subsequently, when asked if he needed the services of an
anesthesiologist, Dr. Estrada refused. Despite Dr. Estradas refusal, Dr. Enriquez stayed to observe Corazons
condition.

At 6:00 Corazon was transferred to Delivery Room No. 1 of the CMC. At 6:10 a.m., Corazons bag of
a.m. water ruptured spontaneously.

At 6:12
Corazons cervix was fully dilated.
a.m.

At 6:13
Corazon started to experience convulsions.
a.m.

Dr. Estrada ordered the injection of ten grams of magnesium sulfate. However, Dr. Ely
At 6:15 a.m Villaflor (Dr. Villaflor), who was assisting Dr. Estrada, administered only 2.5 grams of
magnesium sulfate.

Dr. Estrada, assisted by Dr. Villaflor, applied low forceps to extract Corazon’s baby.
At 6:22 Cervical tissue was allegedly torn. The baby came out in an apnic, cyanotic, weak and
a.m. injured condition. Consequently, the baby had to be intubated and resuscitated by Dr.
Enriquez and Dr. Payumo.

At 6:27
Corazon began to manifest moderate vaginal bleeding which rapidly became profuse.
a.m.
Corazons blood pressure dropped from 130/80 to 60/40 within five minutes.

131 |AL YC A B S
 Dr. Estrada ordered blood typing and cross matching with bottled blood. It took
At 7:45
approximately 30 minutes for the CMC laboratory, headed by Dr. Perpetua Lacson (Dr.
a.m.
Lacson), to comply with Dr. Estradas order and deliver the blood.

Dr. Noe Espinola (Dr. Espinola), head of the Obstetrics-Gynecology Department of the
At 8:00 CMC, was apprised of Corazons condition by telephone. Upon being informed that Corazon
a.m. was bleeding profusely, Dr. Espinola ordered immediate hysterectomy. Rogelio was made to
sign a Consent to Operation.

Due to the inclement weather then, Dr. Espinola, who was fetched from his residence by an
At 9:00
ambulance, arrived at the CMC. He examined the patient and ordered some resuscitative
a.m.
measures to be administered.

At 9:15 Despite Dr. Espinolas efforts, Corazon died. The cause of death was hemorrhage, post
a.m. partum.

Petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC of Manila against CMC, Dr. Estrada, Dr. Villaflor, Dr.
Uy, Dr. Enriquez, Dr. Lacson, Dr. Espinola, and a certain Nurse J. Dumlao for the death of Corazon. Petitioners
mainly contended that defendant physicians and CMC personnel were negligent in the treatment and
management of Corazons condition. Petitioners charged CMC with negligence in the selection and supervision
of defendant physicians and hospital staff.

After more than 11 years of trial, the trial court rendered judgment on 22 November 1993 finding Dr. Estrada
solely liable for damages. The trial court ruled his fault began from his incorrect and inadequate management
and lack of treatment of the pre-eclamptic condition of his patient. It is not disputed that he misapplied the
forceps in causing the delivery because it resulted in a large cervical tear which had caused the profuse bleeding
which he also failed to control with the application of inadequate injection of magnesium sulfate by his assistant
Dra. Ely Villaflor. Dr. Estrada even failed to notice the erroneous administration by nurse Dumlao of hemacel
by way of side drip, instead of direct intravenous injection, and his failure to consult a senior obstetrician at an
early stage of the problem.

Petitioners appealed the trial court’s decision. Petitioners claimed that aside from Dr. Estrada, the remaining
respondents should be held equally liable for negligence. Petitioners pointed out the extent of each respondent’s
alleged liability. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court of Appeals rejected
petitioner’s view that the doctrine in Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital applies to this case.
According to the Court of Appeals, the present case differs from the Darling case since Dr. Estrada is an
independent contractor-physician whereas the Darling case involved a physician and a nurse who were
employees of the hospital. Citing other American cases, the Court of Appeals further held that the mere fact that
a hospital permitted a physician to practice medicine and use its facilities is not sufficient to render the hospital
liable for the physician’s negligence. A hospital is not responsible for the negligence of a physician who is an
independent contractor.

Quoting Campbell v. Emma Laing Stevens Hospital, the Court of Appeals stated that where there is no proof
that defendant physician was an employee of defendant hospital or that defendant hospital had reason to know
that any acts of malpractice would take place, defendant hospital could not be held liable for its failure to
intervene in the relationship of physician-patient between defendant physician and plaintiff.

132 |AL YC A B S
On the liability of the other respondents, the Court of Appeals applied the borrowed servant doctrine
considering that Dr. Estrada was an independent contractor who was merely exercising hospital privileges. This
doctrine provides that once the surgeon enters the operating room and takes charge of the proceedings, the acts
or omissions of operating room personnel, and any negligence associated with such acts or omissions, are
imputable to the surgeon. While the assisting physicians and nurses may be employed by the hospital, or
engaged by the patient, they normally become the temporary servants or agents of the surgeon in charge while
the operation is in progress, and liability may be imposed upon the surgeon for their negligent acts under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether CMC is vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Estrada. The resolution of this issue
rests, on the other hand, on the ascertainment of the relationship between Dr. Estrada and CMC?

RULING: Dr. Estradas negligence in handling the treatment and management of Corazons condition which
ultimately resulted in Corazons death is no longer in issue. Dr. Estrada did not appeal the decision of the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the ruling of the trial court finding Dr. Estrada solely liable for damages.
Accordingly, the finding of the trial court on Dr. Estradas negligence is already final.

The petition is partly meritorious. Petitioners maintain that CMC is vicariously liable for Dr. Estradas negligence
based on Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

The Court had the occasion to determine the relationship between a hospital and a consultant or visiting
physician and the liability of such hospital for that physician’s negligence in Ramos v. Court of Appeals: private
hospitals, hire, fire and exercise real control over their attending and visiting consultant staff. While consultants
are not, technically employees, a point which respondent hospital asserts in denying all responsibility for the
patient’s condition, the control exercised, the hiring, and the right to terminate consultants all fulfill the
important hallmarks of an employer-employee relationship, with the exception of the payment of wages. In
assessing whether such a relationship in fact exists, the control test is determining. Accordingly, on the basis of
the foregoing, we rule that for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence cases, an employer-
employee relationship in effect exists between hospitals and their attending and visiting physicians.

While the Court in Ramos did not expound on the control test, such test essentially determines whether an
employment relationship exists between a physician and a hospital based on the exercise of control over the
physician as to details. After a thorough examination of the voluminous records of this case, the Court finds no
single evidence pointing to CMCs exercise of control over Dr. Estradas treatment and management of Corazons
condition. It is undisputed that throughout Corazons pregnancy, she was under the exclusive prenatal care of
Dr. Estrada. At the time of Corazons admission at CMC and during her delivery, it was Dr. Estrada, assisted by
Dr. Villaflor, who attended to Corazon. There was no showing that CMC had a part in diagnosing Corazons
condition. While Dr. Estrada enjoyed staff privileges at CMC, such fact alone did not make him an employee
of CMC. CMC merely allowed Dr. Estrada to use its facilities when Corazon was about to give birth, which
CMC considered an emergency.

The question now is whether CMC is automatically exempt from liability considering that Dr. Estrada is an
independent contractor-physician.

In general, a hospital is not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor-physician. There is, however,
an exception to this principle. The hospital may be liable if the physician is the ostensible agent of the hospital.
This exception is also known as the doctrine of apparent authority. In Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital,
the Illinois Supreme Court explained that under the doctrine of apparent authority a hospital can be held
vicariously liable for the negligent acts of a physician providing care at the hospital, regardless of whether the
physician is an independent contractor, unless the patient knows, or should have known, that the physician is an
independent contractor.

For a hospital to be liable under the doctrine of apparent authority, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the
hospital, or its agent, acted in a manner that would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the individual who

133 |AL YC A B S
was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital; (2) where the acts of the agent create the
appearance of authority, the plaintiff must also prove that the hospital had knowledge of and acquiesced in them;
and (3) the plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care
and prudence. The element of holding out on the part of the hospital does not require an express representation
by the hospital that the person alleged to be negligent is an employee. Rather, the element is satisfied if the
hospital holds itself out as a provider of emergency room care without informing the patient that the care is
provided by independent contractors.

The doctrine of apparent authority essentially involves two factors to determine the liability of an
independent-contractor physician. The first factor focuses on the hospitals manifestations and is sometimes
described as an inquiry whether the hospital acted in a manner which would lead a reasonable person to conclude
that the individual who was alleged to be negligent was an employee or agent of the hospital. In this regard,
the hospital need not make express representations to the patient that the treating physician is an
employee of the hospital; rather a representation may be general and implied.

In the instant case, CMC impliedly held out Dr. Estrada as a member of its medical staff. Through CMCs acts,
CMC clothed Dr. Estrada with apparent authority thereby leading the Spouses Nogales to believe that Dr.
Estrada was an employee or agent of CMC. CMC cannot now repudiate such authority. First, CMC granted
staff privileges to Dr. Estrada. CMC extended its medical staff and facilities to Dr. Estrada. Second, CMC made
Rogelio sign consent forms printed on CMC letterhead. Prior to Corazons admission and supposed
hysterectomy, CMC asked Rogelio to sign release forms, the contents of which reinforced Rogelios belief that
Dr. Estrada was a member of CMCs medical staff. Third, Dr. Estradas referral of Corazons profuse vaginal
bleeding to Dr. Espinola, who was then the Head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology Department of CMC, gave
the impression that Dr. Estrada as a member of CMCs medical staff was collaborating with other CMC-
employed specialists in treating Corazon.

The second factor focuses on the patient’s reliance. It is sometimes characterized as an inquiry on whether the
plaintiff acted in reliance upon the conduct of the hospital or its agent, consistent with ordinary care and
prudence. The records show that the Spouses Nogales relied upon a perceived employment relationship with
CMC in accepting Dr. Estradas services. Rogelio testified that he and his wife specifically chose Dr. Estrada to
handle Corazons delivery not only because of their friends recommendation, but more importantly because of
Dr. Estradas connection with a reputable hospital. In other words, Dr. Estradas relationship with CMC played a
significant role in the Spouses Nogales decision in accepting Dr. Estradas services as the obstetrician-
gynecologist for Corazons delivery.

CMCs defense that all it did was to extend to [Corazon] its facilities is untenable. The Court cannot close its
eyes to the reality that hospitals, such as CMC, are in the business of treatment. Present day hospitals, as their
manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly
employ on a salary basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes [sic], as well as administrative and
manual workers, and they charge patients for medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if
necessary, by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of hospital facilities expects that the hospital
will attempt to cure him, not that its nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.

Likewise unconvincing is CMCs argument that petitioners are estopped from claiming damages based on the
Consent on Admission and Consent to Operation. Both release forms consist of two parts. The first part gave
CMC permission to administer to Corazon any form of recognized medical treatment which the CMC medical
staff deemed advisable. The second part of the documents, which may properly be described as the releasing
part, releases CMC and its employees from any and all claims arising from or by reason of the treatment and
operation.

The documents do not expressly release CMC from liability for injury to Corazon due to negligence during her
treatment or operation. Neither do the consent forms expressly exempt CMC from liability for Corazons death
due to negligence during such treatment or operation. Such release forms, being in the nature of contracts of
adhesion, are construed strictly against hospitals.

The Court finds respondent Capitol Medical Center vicariously liable for the negligence of Dr. Oscar Estrada.

134 |AL YC A B S
 SPOUSES JOSE and VIRGINIA FONTANILLA vs. HO NORABLE INOCENCIO D. MALIAMAN
and NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. L-55963; December 1, 1989

It appears that on August 21, 1976 at about 6:30 P.M., a pickup owned and operated by respondent National
Irrigation Administration, a government agency bearing Plate No. IN-651, then driven officially by Hugo
Garcia, an employee of said agency as its regular driver, bumped a bicycle ridden by Francisco Fontanilla, son
of herein petitioners, and Restituto Deligo, at Maasin, San Jose City along the Maharlika Highway. As a result
of the impact, Francisco Fontanilla and Restituto Deligo were injured and brought to the San Jose City
Emergency Hospital for treatment. Fontanilla was later transferred to the Cabanatuan Provincial Hospital where
he died.

Garcia was then a regular driver of respondent National Irrigation Administration who, at the time of the
accident, was a licensed professional driver and who qualified for employment as such regular driver of
respondent after having passed the written and oral examinations on traffic rules and maintenance of vehicles
given by National Irrigation Administration authorities.

This petition is thus an off-shot of the action (Civil Case No. SJC-56) instituted by petitioners-spouses on April
17, 1978 against respondent NIA before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch VIII at San
Jose City, for damages in connection with the death of their son resulting from the aforestated accident.

After trial, the trial court rendered judgment on March 20, 1980 which directed respondent National Irrigation
Administration to pay damages (death benefits) and actual expenses to petitioners. Respondent National
Irrigation
Administration thus appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals where it filed its brief for appellant in support
of its position. Instead of filing the required brief in the aforecited Court of Appeals case, petitioners filed the
instant petition with this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees is legally
proper in a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict which resulted in the death of the son of herein
petitioners?

RULING: The liability of the State has two aspects, namely: 1. Its public or governmental aspects where it is
liable for the tortious acts of special agents only; 2. Its private or business aspects (as when it engages in private
enterprises) where it becomes liable as an ordinary employer. In this jurisdiction, the State assumes a limited
liability for the damage caused by the tortious acts or conduct of its special agent. The State's agent, if a public
official, must not only be specially commissioned to do a particular task but that such task must be foreign to
said official's usual governmental functions. If the State's agent is not a public official, and is commissioned to
perform non-governmental functions, then the State assumes the role of an ordinary employer and will be held
liable as such for its agent's tort. Where the government commissions a private individual for a special
governmental task, it is acting through a special agent within the meaning of the provision.

The National Irrigation Administration is an agency of the government exercising proprietary functions, by
express provision of Rep. Act No. 3601. Indubitably, the NIA is a government corporation with juridical
personality and not a mere agency of the government. Since it is a corporate body performing non-governmental
functions, it now becomes liable for the damage caused by the accident resulting from the tortious act of its
driver-employee. In this particular case, the NIA assumes the responsibility of an ordinary employer and as
such, it becomes answerable for damages.

This assumption of liability, however, is predicated upon the existence of negligence on the part of respondent
NIA. The negligence referred to here is the negligence of supervision. At this juncture, the matter of due
diligence on the part of respondent NIA becomes a crucial issue in determining its liability since it has been
established that respondent is a government agency performing proprietary functions and as such, it assumes
the posture of an ordinary employer which, under Par. 5 of Art. 2180, is responsible for the damages caused by
its employees provided that it has failed to observe or exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the driver.

135 |AL YC A B S
The lower court further that "a speeding vehicle coming in contact with a person causes force and impact upon
the vehicle that anyone in the vehicle cannot fail to notice. As a matter of fact, the impact was so strong as
shown by the fact that the vehicle suffered dents on the right side of the radiator guard, the hood, the fender
and a crack on the radiator as shown by the investigation report.

It should be emphasized that the accident happened along the Maharlika National Road within the city limits of
San Jose City, an urban area. Considering the fact that the victim was thrown 50 meters away from the point of
impact, there is a strong indication that driver Garcia was driving at a high speed. This is confirmed by the fact
that the pickup suffered substantial and heavy damage as above-described and the fact that the NIA group was
then "in a hurry to reach the campsite as early as possible", as shown by their not stopping to find out what they
bumped as would have been their normal and initial reaction.

Evidently, there was negligence in the supervision of the driver for the reason that they were travelling at a high
speed within the city limits and yet the supervisor of the group, Ely Salonga, failed to caution and make the
driver observe the proper and allowed speed limit within the city. Under the situation, such negligence is further
aggravated by their desire to reach their destination without even checking whether or not the vehicle suffered
damage from the object it bumped, thus showing imprudence and reckelessness on the part of both the driver
and the supervisor in the group.

Considering the foregoing, respondent NIA is hereby directed to pay herein petitioners-spouses the amounts of
P12,000.00 for the death of Francisco Fontanilla; P3,389.00 for hospitalization and burial expenses of the
aforenamed deceased; P30,000.00 as moral damages; P8,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees of
20% of the total award.

136 |AL YC A B S
 ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased) vs. HOSPICIO DE
SAN JOSE
G.R. No. 201787; September 25, 2013

On 1 March 1946, Hospicio de San Jose (HDSJ) leased a parcel of land located in Pasay City to German
Inocencio (German). The lease contract was effective for a period of one year, and was renewed for one-year
periods several times. The last written contract was executed on 31 May 1951. In 1946, German constructed
two buildings on the parcel of land which he subleased. He also designated his son Ramon Inocencio (Ramon)to
administer the said property. On 21 September 1990, German received a letter from HDSJ informing him that
the increased rentals shall take effect in November 1990instead of August 1990, "to give him ample time to
make the necessary rental adjustments with his sublessees."

German passed away in 1997. Evidence on record shows that Ramon did not notify HDSJ of German’s death.
After German’s passing, Ramon collected the rentals from the sublessees, and paid the rentals to HDSJ, and the
taxes on the property. On 1 March 2001, HDSJ’s property administrator, Five Star Multi-Services, Inc., notified
Ramon that HDSJ is terminating the lease contract effective 31 March 2001. Ramon then sent a letter to HDSJ
dated 12 March 2001, suggesting that the lease contract be renegotiated for the welfare of the sublessees
occupying the parcel of land. HDSJ notified Ramon that the lease contract shall not be renewed because Ramon
has "continually subleased the subject premises to about 20 families (in addition to a commercial establishment)
x x x without the knowledge and consent of the lessor, [HDSJ]."

HDSJ filed a Complaint before Branch 48 of the MeTC Pasay for unlawful detainer against Ramon and his
sublessees. The complaint alleged that Ramon and his sublessees have been illegally occupying the leased
premises since 31 March 2001. HDSJ sought damages. Ramon claimed that German was the owner of the two
buildings constructed on the leased property as evidenced by the building permits obtained from the government
agencies and the tax declarations covering the buildings and HDSJ is estopped from raising the issue of non-
transferability of the lease contract because it admitted in its letter to Ramon that there is an existing lease
agreement between the parties, even after German’s death. He also averred that there is no prohibition against
subleasing in the lease contract.

MeTC-Pasay ruled in favor of HDSJ. It held that the lease contract could not be transmitted to Ramon as
German’s heir in view of the express stipulation found therein. Since there was "no lease contract between
HDSJ and Ramon, the latter cannot sublease the property." RTC-Pasay affirmed in toto the decision of the
MeTCPasay. It held that "even before the termination of the contract, [Ramon] had no right to sublease the said
property due to the intransferability clause in the contract." CA affirmed the decision of the RTC-Pasay but
modified the award for damages.

ISSUE: WON there was no tortious interference on the part of HDSJ?

RULING: We have previously ruled that lease contracts, by their nature, are not personal. The general rule,
therefore, is lease contracts survive the death of the parties and continue to bind the heirs except if the contract
states otherwise. A lease contract is not essentially personal in character. Thus, the rights and obligations therein
are transmissible to the heirs. The general rule, therefore, is that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by
their predecessors-ininterest except when the rights and obligations arising therefrom are not transmissible by
(1) their nature, (2) stipulation or (3) provision of law. In the subject Contract of Lease, not only were there no
stipulations prohibiting any transmission of rights, but its very terms and conditions explicitly provided for the
transmission of the rights of the lessor and of the lessee to their respective heirs and successors. The contract is
the law between the parties. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract, which involves
a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the successors or representatives of the
deceased.

The Court holds that the sublease contracts executed by Ramon were valid. HDSJ did not commit tortious
interference. Article1314 of the Civil Code states: Any third person who induces another to violate his contract
shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party.

137 |AL YC A B S
As correctly pointed out by the Inocencios, tortious interference has the following elements: (1) existence of
a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract; and (3)
interference of the third person without legal justification or excuse. The facts of the instant case show that there
were valid sublease contracts which were known to HDSJ. However, we find that the third element is lacking
in this case.

In So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, we held that there was no tortious interference if the intrusion was impelled
by purely economic motives. In So Ping Bun, we explained that:

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the
sole purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general
rule, justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actor’s
motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause
harm to the other. Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the
interferer’s interest outweighs that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual
acts under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful
and malicious motives are negatived, for he acts in self- protection. Moreover, justification for
protecting one’s financial position should not be made to depend on a comparison of his
economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if the impetus of his
conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.

The evidence shows that HDSJ entered into agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic
reasons (payment of rentals). HDSJ had a right to collect the rentals from the sublessees upon termination of
the lease contract. It does not appear that HDSJ was motivated by spite or ill will towards the Inocencios.

138 |AL YC A B S
 ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style ACG Express Liner vs. MORTIMER F.
CORDERO
G.R. No. 164703; May 4, 2010

Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured
into the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry
manufacturers from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in
Brisbane, Australia, who is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA). Robinson
signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry
vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor,
Cordero offered for sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the
SEACAT 25.

After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator
of ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase
of two (2) SEACAT 25. Accordingly, the parties executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) highspeed
catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of US$1,465,512.00. Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the
latter shall receive commissions totalling US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of
each vessel.

Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1) occasion even
accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He
shouldered all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment during
these trips. He also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson
and Landicho. However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was
informed by Dennis Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from
their company which provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Cordero tried to contact Go and
Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to answer his calls.
Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go and Landicho
were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated follow-up
calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe there
would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.

Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson violated his exclusive distributorship and
demanded that they respect the same, without prejudice to legal action against him and Robinson should they
fail to heed the same.

Corderos lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing
the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho
and Tecson) in breach of Corderos exclusive distributorship appointment. Having been apprised of Corderos
demand letter, Thyne & Macartney, the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a letter to ACCRA law firm
asserting that the appointment of Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose of one (1) transaction only,
that is, the purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel by ACG Express Liner in August 1997. The letter further
stated that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the terms of which were contained in a draft
agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable time, and which offer is already
being revoked by AFFA.

Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that
they will get a cut of 20%. And so it was agreed between him, Landicho and Tecson that the latter would give
him a weekly status report and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to four (4) weeks and neither party will
file an action against each other until a final report on the proposed settlement. No such report was made by
either Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had no intention to do so and were just buying time as the
catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia.

On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive

139 |AL YC A B S
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions
(balance of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid
commission for the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral
and exemplary damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia,
telecommunications bills and entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely cancellation of the exclusive
distributorship agreement. Cordero also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Trial court rendered its decision in favor of Plaintiff and against defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe
Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new trial, claiming that
they have been unduly prejudiced by the negligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware that the pre-
trial conference. The trial court denied the motion for new trial. The trial court also denied the motion for
reconsideration. CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari and setting aside the trial courts orders
of execution pending appeal.

ISSUE: WON the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero for his unpaid commissions
and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA?

RULING: In Yu v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the right to perform an exclusive distributorship
agreement and to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may
protect. Thus, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by
strangers to such contracts where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In that
case, We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the exclusive distributorship agreement may not be
diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or firm to obtain goods
for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole authorized distributor.

In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the balance of his commission by
respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent
Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of
AFFA in the Philippines, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other
words, Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which
was sold through his efforts. When Cordero complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts
prejudicial to his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers
led by Landicho and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount and to
purchase high-speed catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and worse, AFFA
through its lawyer in Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were engaged
for only one (1) transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.

The Court finds that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no sufficient evidence that
respondents actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not
absolve respondents from liability for invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship. Respondents
clearly acted in bad faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without
advising him and furnishing him with copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt
with AFFA through Robinson regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and
negotiations for the purchase of the second vessel. As a result of respondents actuations, Cordero incurred losses
as he was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship
revoked by AFFA.

While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to
commit such breach. Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides: Any third person who induces another to violate
his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party. The elements of tort interference are:
(1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of a contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.

140 |AL YC A B S
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting
that Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of the
contract between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that
respondents initially dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran
vessels in the Philippines.

As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals is instructive:

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in the interference
of a contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather
than in wrongful nmotives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged
interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said
that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler. In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner
So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of
respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful
motives or malice in him.

Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal
liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.

Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. In the case of Lagon v. Court of
Appeals, we held that to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or
must have been driven by purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference
cannot be justified. We further explained that the word induce refers to situations where a person causes another
to choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation.

The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract directly
with ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual
obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Corderos
appointment as exclusive distributor. Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy, such act may not be
deemed malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant
circumstances, however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest
to benefit themselves at the expense of Cordero.

While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25,
which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of Agreement, Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho clearly
connived not
only in ensuring that Cordero would have no participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25,
but also that Cordero would not be paid the balance of his commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25.
This, despite their knowledge that it was commission already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and
appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho were without legal
justification and intended solely to prejudice Cordero.

The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court. We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero
under the exclusive distributorship agreement. The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with
fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA,
to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the
Civil Code.

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for
more than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable. Respondents
Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission

141 |AL YC A B S
from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of
6% per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid. Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral
damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.

142 |AL YC A B S
 JOSE V. LAGON vs. H COURT OF APPEALS and MENANDRO V. LAPUZ
G.R. No. 119107; March 18, 2005

Private respondent, as then plaintiff, claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina
Sepi Mengelen Guiabar over three parcels of land (the property) in Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao beginning
1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for private respondent to put up commercial buildings which
would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent private
respondent was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but
since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly
renewed.

When Bai Tonina Sepi died, private respondent started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator
of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings
he constructed, he discovered that petitioner, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been
collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing petitioner of inducing
the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it.

Petitioner denied that he induced the heirs of Bai Tonina to sell the property to him, contending that the heirs
were in dire need of money to pay off the obligations of the deceased. He also denied interfering with private
respondents leasehold rights as there was no lease contract covering the property when he purchased it.

Petitioner claimed that before he bought the property, he went to Atty. Benjamin Fajardo, the lawyer who
allegedly notarized the lease contract between private respondent and Bai Tonina Sepi, to verify if the parties
indeed renewed the lease contract after it expired in 1974. Petitioner averred that Atty. Fajardo showed him four
copies of the lease renewal but these were all unsigned. Petitioner added that he only learned of the alleged lease
contract when he was informed that private respondent was collecting rent from the tenants of the building.

Finding the complaint for tortuous interference to be unwarranted, petitioner filed his counterclaim and prayed
for the payment of actual and moral damages. Judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff: Petitioner appealed
the judgment to the Court of Appeals. In a decision dated January 31, 1995, the appellate court modified the
assailed judgment: The award for moral damages, compensatory damages, exemplary damages, temperate or
moderate damages, and nominal damages as well as expenses of litigation in the amount of P62,500.00 and
interests are deleted, award for attorney’s fees is reduced to P30,000.0; defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
the plaintiff by way of actual damages the sum of P178,425.00 representing the amount of rentals he collected.

Petitioner disclaimed knowledge of any lease contract between the late Bai Tonina Sepi and private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent insisted that it was impossible for petitioner not to know about the contract
since the latter was aware that he was collecting rentals from the tenants of the building. While the appellate
court disbelieved the contentions of both parties, it nevertheless held that, for petitioner to become liable for
damages, he must have known of the lease contract and must have also acted with malice or bad faith when he
bought the subject parcels of land.

ISSUE: WON the purchase by petitioner of the subject property, during the supposed existence of private
respondents lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which
petitioner should be held liable for damages?

RULING: The Court, in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, laid down the elements of tortuous
interference with contractual relations: (a) existence of a valid contract; (b) knowledge on the part of the third
person of the existence of the contract and (c) interference of the third person without legal justification or
excuse. As regards the first element, the existence of a valid contract must be duly established. To prove this,
private respondent presented in court a notarized copy of the purported lease renewal. While the contract
appeared as duly notarized, the notarization thereof, however, only proved its due execution and delivery but
not the veracity of its contents. The notarized copy of the lease contract presented in court appeared to be
incontestable proof that private respondent and the late Bai Tonina Sepi actually renewed their lease contract.
Settled is the rule that until overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence, a notarized document continues
to be prima facie evidence of the facts that gave rise to its execution and delivery.

143 |AL YC A B S
The second element, on the other hand, requires that there be knowledge on the part of the interferer that the
contract exists. Knowledge of the subsistence of the contract is an essential element to state a cause of action
for tortuous interference. A defendant in such a case cannot be made liable for interfering with a contract he is
unaware of. While it is not necessary to prove actual knowledge, he must nonetheless be aware of the facts
which, if followed by a reasonable inquiry, will lead to a complete disclosure of the contractual relations and
rights of the parties in the contract.

Petitioner claims that he had no knowledge of the lease contract. His sellers (the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi)
likewise allegedly did not inform him of any existing lease contract. After a careful perusal of the records, we
find the contention of petitioner meritorious. He conducted his own personal investigation and inquiry, and
unearthed no suspicious circumstance that would have made a cautious man probe deeper and watch out for any
conflicting claim over the property. An examination of the entire propertys title bore no indication of the
leasehold interest of private respondent. Even the registry of property had no record of the same. Assuming ex
gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to make him
liable for tortuous interference. Which brings us to the third element. According to our ruling in So Ping Bun,
petitioner may be held liable only when there was no legal justification or excuse for his action or when his
conduct was stirred by a wrongful motive.

The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct by
persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the
property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely nothing to influence their
judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In short, even assuming
that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina Sepi, the fact was
that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the property. Therefore,
the claim of tortuous interference was never established.

In our view, petitioner’s purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or
economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of
Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a
proper business interest. In other words, a financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an
officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved.

In sum, we rule that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold petitioner liable for tortuous interference are
present, petitioner cannot be made to answer for private respondents losses. This case is one of damnun absque
injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or
harm which results from the injury. Lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages.

144 |AL YC A B S
 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 141309; June 19, 2007

Petitioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato was then the Commissioner of Internal Revenue while respondent Fortune
Tobacco Corporation is an entity engaged in the manufacture of different brands of cigarettes, among which are
"Champion," "Hope," and "More" cigarettes. On June 10, 1993, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7654
(RA 7654), which took effect on July 3, 1993. Prior to its effectivity, cigarette brands ‘Champion," "Hope," and
"More" were considered local brands subjected to an ad valorem tax at the rate of 20-45%. However, on July 1,
1993, or two days before RA 7654 took effect, petitioner issued RMC 37-93 reclassifying "Champion,"
"Hope," and "More" as locally manufactured cigarettes bearing a foreign brand subject to the 55% ad
valorem tax.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration requesting the recall of RMC 37-93, but was denied in a letter
dated July 30, 1993. On August 3, 1993, respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), which on September 30, 1993, issued an injunction enjoining the implementation of RMC 37-93. In its
decision dated August 10, 1994, the CTA ruled that RMC 37-93 is defective, invalid, and unenforceable and
further enjoined petitioner from collecting the deficiency tax assessment issued pursuant to RMC No. 37-93.
This ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Respondent filed before the RTC a complaint11 for damages against petitioner in her private capacity.
Respondent contended that the latter should be held liable for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code
considering that the issuance of RMC 37-93 violated its constitutional right against deprivation of property
without due process of law and the right to equal protection of the laws.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss12 contending that: (1) respondent has no cause of action against her because
she issued RMC 37-93 in the performance of her official function and within the scope of her authority. She
claimed that she acted merely as an agent of the Republic and therefore the latter is the one responsible for her
acts; (2) the complaint states no cause of action for lack of allegation of malice or bad faith; and (3) the
certification against forum shopping was signed by respondent’s counsel in violation of the rule that it is the
plaintiff or the principal party who should sign.

RTC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss holding that to rule on the allegations of petitioner would be to
prematurely decide the merits of the case without allowing the parties to present evidence. The case was elevated
to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. However, same was dismissed on the ground
that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, liability may arise even if the defendant did not act with malice or bad
faith. The appellate court ratiocinated that Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code is the general law on
the civil liability of public officers while Article 32 of the Civil Code is the special law that governs the instant
case. Consequently, malice or bad faith need not be alleged in the complaint for damages.

Petitioner filed the instant recourse contending that the suit is grounded on her acts done in the performance of
her functions as a public officer, hence, it is Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code which should be
applied. Under this provision, liability will attach only when there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice, or
gross negligence. She further averred that the Civil Code, specifically, Article 32 which allows recovery of
damages for violation of constitutional rights, is a general law on the liability of public officers; while Section
38, Book I of the Administrative Code is a special law on the superior public officers’ liability, such that, if the
complaint, as in the instant case, does not allege bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, the same is dismissible
for failure to state a cause of action.

Conversely, respondent argued that Section 38 which treats in general the public officers’ "acts" from which
civil liability may arise, is a general law; while Article 32 which deals specifically with the public officers’
violation of constitutional rights, is a special provision which should determine whether the complaint states a
cause of action or not.

ISSUE: May a public officer be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts done in connection with
the discharge of the functions of his/her office? Which as between Article 32 of the Civil Code and Section

145 |AL YC A B S
38, Book I of the Administrative Code should govern in determining whether the instant complaint states
a cause of action?

RULING: On the first issue, the general rule is that a public officer is not liable for damages which a person
may suffer arising from the just performance of his official duties and within the scope of his assigned tasks.15
An officer who acts within his authority to administer the affairs of the office which he/she heads is not liable
for damages that may have been caused to another, as it would virtually be a charge against the Republic, which
is not amenable to judgment for monetary claims without its consent.16 However, a public officer is by law not
immune from damages in his/her personal capacity for acts done in bad faith which, being outside the scope of
his authority, are no longer protected by the mantle of immunity for official actions.

Specifically, under Section 38, Book I of the Administrative Code, civil liability may arise where there is bad
faith, malice, or gross negligence on the part of a superior public officer. And, under Section 39 of the same
Book, civil liability may arise where the subordinate public officer’s act is characterized by willfulness or
negligence. Thus –

Sec. 38. Liability of Superior Officers. – (1) A public officer shall not be civilly liable for acts done in
the performance of his official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross
negligence.

Section 39. Liability of Subordinate Officers. – No subordinate officer or employee shall be civilly
liable for acts done by him in good faith in the performance of his duties. However, he shall be liable for
willful or negligent acts done by him which are contrary to law, morals, public policy and good customs
even if he acts under orders or instructions of his superior.

Thus, the rule in this jurisdiction is that a public officer may be validly sued in his/her private capacity for acts
done in the course of the performance of the functions of the office, where said public officer: (1) acted with
malice, bad faith, or negligence; or (2) where the public officer violated a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

Anent the second issue, we hold that the complaint filed by respondent stated a cause of action and that the
decisive provision thereon is Article 32 of the Civil Code. A general law and a special law on the same subject
are statutes in pari materia and should, accordingly, be read together and harmonized, if possible, with a view
to giving effect to both. The rule is that where there are two acts, one of which is special and particular and the
other general which, the special law must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than that of
a general statute. Where the special law is later, it will be regarded as an exception to, or a qualification of, the
prior general act; and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an
exception to its terms, unless repealed expressly or by necessary implication.

The rationale for its enactment was explained by Dean Bocobo of the Code Commission, as follows:

The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary therefore that
there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the main purpose of Article
32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials in the past have abused their
powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of their duties. Precisely, the
object of the Article is to put an end to official abuse by the plea of good faith. In the United States this
remedy is in the nature of a tort.

The Code Commission deemed it necessary to hold not only public officers but also private individuals civilly
liable for violation of the rights enumerated in Article 32 of the Civil Code. It is not necessary that the defendant
under this Article should have acted with malice or bad faith, otherwise, it would defeat its main purpose. Article
32 was patterned after the "tort" in American law. A tort is a wrong, a tortious act which has been defined as
the commission or omission of an act by one, without right, whereby another receives some injury, directly or
indirectly, in person, property, or reputation. Presence of good motive, or rather, the absence of an evil motive,
does not render lawful an act which is otherwise an invasion of another’s legal right; that is, liability in tort is
not precluded by the fact that defendant acted without evil intent.

146 |AL YC A B S
The clear intention therefore of the legislature was to create a distinct cause of action in the nature of tort for
violation of constitutional rights, irrespective of the motive or intent of the defendant. This is a fundamental
innovation in the Civil Code, and in enacting the Administrative Code pursuant to the exercise of legislative
powers, then President Corazon C. Aquino, could not have intended to obliterate this constitutional protection
on civil liberties.

On the other hand, Sections 38 and 39, Book I of the Administrative Code, laid down the rule on the civil
liability of superior and subordinate public officers for acts done in the performance of their duties. For both
superior and subordinate public officers, the presence of bad faith, malice, and negligence are vital elements
that will make them liable for damages.

Contrarily, Article 32 of the Civil Code specifies in clear and unequivocal terms a particular specie of an "act"
that may give rise to an action for damages against a public officer, and that is, a tort for impairment of rights
and liberties. Indeed, Article 32 is the special provision that deals specifically with violation of constitutional
rights by public officers. All other actionable acts of public officers are governed by Sections 38 and 39 of the
Administrative Code. While the Civil Code, specifically, the Chapter on Human Relations is a general law,
Article 32 of the same
Chapter is a special and specific provision that holds a public officer liable for and allows redress from a
particular class of wrongful acts that may be committed by public officers. Compared thus with Section 38 of
the Administrative Code, which broadly deals with civil liability arising from errors in the performance of
duties, Article 32 of the Civil Code is the specific provision which must be applied in the instant case precisely
filed to seek damages for violation of constitutional rights.

The complaint in the instant case was brought under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Considering that bad faith
and malice are not necessary in an action based on Article 32 of the Civil Code, the failure to specifically allege
the same will not amount to failure to state a cause of action. The courts below therefore correctly denied the
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, since it is enough that the complaint avers
a violation of a constitutional right of the plaintiff.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 7, 1999 which affirmed the Order of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, denying petitioner’s
motion to dismiss, is AFFIRMED. The Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Marikina, Branch 272, is
hereby DIRECTED to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 97-341-MK with dispatch.

147 |AL YC A B S
 LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO vs. FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION
G.R. No. 141309; December 23, 2008

By this token, the Court reconsiders its June 19, 2007 Decision.
Petitioner, on July 20, 2007, subsequently moved for the reconsideration of the said decision. After respondent
filed its comment, the Court, in its April 14, 2008 Resolution, denied with finality petitioners motion for
reconsideration. Undaunted, petitioner filed, on April 29, 2008 her Motion to Refer [the case] to the Honorable
Court En Banc. She contends that the petition raises a legal question that is novel and is of paramount
importance. The earlier decision rendered by the Court will send a chilling effect to public officers, and will
adversely affect the performance of duties of superior public officers in departments or agencies with rule-
making and quasi-judicial powers. With the said decision, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue will have
reason to hesitate or refrain from performing his/her official duties despite the due process safeguards in Section
228 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioner hence moves for the reconsideration of the June 19, 2007
Decision.

There are two kinds of duties exercised by public officers: the duty owing to the public collectively (the body
politic), and the duty owing to particular individuals, thus:

1. Of Duties to the Public. The first of these classes embraces those officers whose duty is
owing primarily to the public collectively --- to the body politic --- and not to any particular
individual; who act for the public at large, and who are ordinarily paid out of the public
treasury. The governor owes a duty to the public to see that the laws are properly executed,
that fit and competent officials are appointed by him, that unworthy and ill-considered acts of
the legislature do not receive his approval, but these, and many others of a like nature, are
duties which he owes to the public at large and no one individual could single himself out and
assert that they were duties owing to him alone.

2. Of Duties to Individuals. The second class above referred to includes those who, while they
owe to the public the general duty of a proper administration of their respective offices, yet
become, by reason of their employment by a particular individual to do some act for him in
an official capacity, under a special and particular obligation to him as an individual.

In determining whether a public officer is liable for an improper performance or non-performance of a duty, it
must first be determined which of the two classes of duties is involved. For, indeed, as the eminent Floyd R.
Mechem instructs, the liability of a public officer to an individual or the public is based upon and is coextensive
with his duty to the individual or the public. If to the one or the other he owes no duty, to that one he can incur
no liability. Stated differently, when what is involved is a duty owing to the public in general, an individual
cannot have a cause of action for damages against the public officer, even though he may have been injured by
the action or inaction of the officer.

The exception to this rule occurs when the complaining individual suffers a particular or special injury on
account of the public officers’ improper performance or non-performance of his public duty. An individual can
never be suffered to sue for an injury which, technically, is one to the public only; he must show a wrong which
he specially suffers, and damage alone does not constitute a wrong. Contrary precept (that an individual, in the
absence of a special and peculiar injury, can still institute an action against a public officer on account of an
improper performance or non-performance of a duty owing to the public generally) will lead to a deluge of suits,
for if one man might have an action, all men might have the like the complaining individual has no better right
than anybody else. If such were the case, no one will serve a public office. Thus, the rule restated is that an
individual cannot have a particular action against a public officer without a particular injury, or a particular
right, which are the grounds upon which all actions are founded.

Juxtaposed with Article 32 of the Civil Code, the principle may now translate into the rule that an individual
can hold a public officer personally liable for damages on account of an act or omission that violates a
constitutional right only if it results in a particular wrong or injury to the former.

148 |AL YC A B S
It may be recalled that in tort law, for a plaintiff to maintain an action for damages for the injuries of which he
complains, he must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed the
plaintiff, meaning a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.

In the instant case, what is involved is a public officer’s duty owing to the public in general. A public officer,
such as the petitioner, vested with quasi-legislative or rule-making power, owes a duty to the public to
promulgate rules which are compliant with the requirements of valid administrative regulations. But it is a duty
owed not to the respondent alone, but to the entire body politic who would be affected, directly or indirectly, by
the administrative rule. Furthermore, as discussed above, to have a cause of action for damages against the
petitioner, respondent must allege that it suffered a particular or special injury on account of the non-
performance by petitioner of the public duty. A careful reading of the complaint filed with the trial court reveals
that no particular injury is alleged to have been sustained by the respondent. The phrase financial and business
difficulties. With no particular injury alleged in the complaint, there is, therefore, no delict or wrongful act or
omission attributable to the petitioner that would violate the primary rights of the respondent.

The June 19, 2007 Decision and the dissent herein reiterates that under Article 32 of the Civil Code, the liability
of the public officer may accrue even if he/she acted in good faith, as long as there is a violation of constitutional
rights, citing Cojuangco, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, where we said: Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary
that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith. To be liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the
constitutional rights of petitioners, even on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of
duties.

But in CIR v. CA, this Court did not declare RMC 37-93 unconstitutional; certainly not from either the due
process of law or equal protection of the laws perspective. On due process, the majority, after determining that
RMC 37-93 was a legislative rule, cited an earlier Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC No. 10-86) requiring
prior notice before RMCs could become operative. However, this Court did not make an express finding of
violation of the right to due process of law. On the aspect of equal protection, CIR v. CA said: Not insignificantly,
RMC 37-93 might have likewise infringed on uniformity of taxation; a statement that does not amount to a
positive indictment of petitioner for violation of respondents constitutional right. This Courts own summation
in CIR v. CA: All taken, the Court is convinced that the hastily promulgated RMC 37-93 has fallen short of a
valid and effective administrative issuance, does not lend itself to an interpretation that the RMC is
unconstitutional.

Webster Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Investigation, has emerged as the leading
case on the victim’s entitlement to recover money damages for any injuries suffered as a result of flagrant and
unconstitutional abuses of administrative power. the U.S. Supreme Court held that Bivens is entitled to recover
damages for injuries he suffered as a result of the agents violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, it is
extremely dubious whether a Bivens action against government tax officials and employees may prosper, if we
consider the pronouncement of the U.S. Supreme Court in Schweiker v. Chilicky, that a Bivens remedy will not
be allowed when other meaningful safeguards or remedies for the rights of persons situated as (is the plaintiff)
are available. It has also been held that a Bivens action is not appropriate in the civil service system or in the
military justice system.

In Frank Vennes v. An Unknown Number of Unidentified Agents of the United States of America, “the district
court dismissed these claims on the ground that a taxpayers remedies under the Internal Revenue Code preclude
such a Bivens action. Vennes cites to us no contrary authority, and we have found none. When the design of a
Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for
constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens
remedies.”

Because the respondent’s complaint does not impute negligence or bad faith to the petitioner, any money
judgment by the trial court against her will have to be assumed by the Republic of the Philippines. As such, the
complaint is in the nature of a suit against the State.

149 |AL YC A B S
 CARMEN L. MADEJA vs. FELIX T. CARO and EVA ARELLANO-JAPZON
G.R. No. L-51183; December 21, 1983

Dr. Eva Arellano-Japzon is accused of homicide through reckless imprudence for the death of Cleto Madeja
after an appendectomy. The complaining witness is the widow of the deceased, Carmen L. Madeja. The criminal
case still pending, Carmen L. Madeja sued Dr. Eva A. Japzon for damages in Civil Case No. 141 of the same
court. She alleged that her husband died because of the gross negligence of Dr. Japzon. The respondent judge
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss which motion invoked Section 3(a) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.

Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. — In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed:

(a) Criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the
criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
rendered in the criminal action.

According to the respondent judge, "under the foregoing Sec. 3 (a), Rule 111, New Rules of Court, the instant
civil action may be instituted only after final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action.

ISSUE: WON petition has merit?

RULING: The instant petition which seeks to set aside the order of the respondent judge granting the
defendant's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 141 is highly impressed with merit. Section 2, Rule 111 of the
Rules of Court in relation to Article 33 of the Civil Code is the applicable provision. The two enactments are
quoted herein below:

Sec. 2. Independent civil action. — In the cases provided for in Articles 31,32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the
criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided
the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence."

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

There are at least two things about Art. 33 of the Civil Code which are worth noting, namely:

1. The civil action for damages which it allows to be instituted is ex-delicto. This is manifest from the
provision which uses the expressions "criminal action" and "criminal prosecution." This conclusion is
supported by the comment of the Code Commission, thus:

The underlying purpose of the principle under consideration is to allow the citizen to enforce
his rights in a private action brought by him, regardless of the action of the State attorney. It
is not conducive to civic spirit and to individual self-reliance and initiative to habituate the
citizens to depend upon the government for the vindication of their own private rights. It is
true that in many of the cases referred to in the provision cited, a criminal prosecution is
proper, but it should be remembered that while the State is the complainant in the criminal
case, the injured individual is the one most concerned because it is he who has suffered
directly. He should be permitted to demand reparation for the wrong which peculiarly affects
him.

And Tolentino says:

The general rule is that when a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action,

150 |AL YC A B S
 unless the offended party reserves his right to institute it separately; and after a criminal action
has been commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted. The
present articles creates an exception to this rule when the offense is defamation, fraud, or
physical injuries, In these cases, a civil action may be filed independently of the criminal
action, even if there has been no reservation made by the injured party; the law itself in this
article makes such reservation; but the claimant is not given the right to determine whether
the civil action should be scheduled or suspended until the criminal action has been
terminated. The result of the civil action is thus independent of the result of the civil action

2. The term "physical injuries" is used in a generic sense. It is not the crime of physical injuries defined in
the Revised Penal Code. It includes not only physical injuries but consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide.

The Article in question uses the words 'defamation', 'fraud' and 'physical injuries.' Defamation and fraud are
used in their ordinary sense because there are no specific provisions in the Revised Penal Code using these terms
as means of offenses defined therein, so that these two terms defamation and fraud must have been used not to
impart to them any technical meaning in the laws of the Philippines, but in their generic sense. With this apparent
circumstance in mind, it is evident that the terms 'physical injuries' could not have been used in its specific sense
as a crime defined in the Revised Penal Code, for it is difficult to believe that the Code Commission would have
used terms in the same article-some in their general and another in its technical sense. In other words, the term
'physical injuries' should be understood to mean bodily injury, not the crime of physical injuries, bacause the
terms used with the latter are general terms. In any case the Code Commission recommended that the civil action
for physical injuries be similar to the civil action for assault and battery in American Law, and this
recommendation must hove been accepted by the Legislature when it approved the article intact as
recommended.

In the light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the civil action against Dr. Japzon may proceed independently
of the criminal action against her.

151 |AL YC A B S
 DULAY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 108017; April 3, 1995

PET: MARIA BENITA A. DULAY, in her own behalf and in behalf of the minor children KRIZTEEN
ELIZABETH, BEVERLY MARIE and NAPOLEON II, all surnamed DULAY

RES: TH E COURT OF APPEALS, Former Eighth Division, HON. TEODORO P. REGINO, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court National Capital Region, Quezon City, Br. 84,
SAFEGUARD INVESTIGATION AND SECURITY CO., INC., and SUPERGUARD SECURITY
CORPORATION

On December 7, 1988, an altercation between Benigno Torzuela and Atty. Napoleon Dulay occurred at the "Big
Bang Sa Alabang," Alabang Village, Muntinlupa as a result of which Benigno Torzuela, the security guard on
duty at the said carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon Dulay. Herein petitioner Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow
of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own behalf and in behalf of her minor children, filed on February 8,
1989 an action for damages against Benigno Torzuela and herein private respondents Safeguard Investigation
and Security Co., Inc., ("SAFEGUARD") and/or Superguard Security Corp. ("SUPERGUARD"), alleged
employers of defendant Torzuela.

Private respondent SUPERGUARD filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a
valid cause of action. SUPERGUARD claimed that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of
his duties, and that since the alleged act of shooting was committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil
liability therefor is governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code.

Respondent SUPERGUARD further alleged that a complaint for damages based on negligence under Article
2176 of the New Civil Code, such as the one filed by petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil liability under Article
2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. In addition, the private
respondent argued that petitioners' filing of the complaint is premature considering that the conviction of
Torzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employer's subsidiary liability. Respondent
SAFEGUARD also filed a motion praying that it be excluded as defendant on the ground that defendant
Torzuela is not one of its employees. Petitioners opposed both motions, stating that their cause of action against
the private respondents is based on their liability under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code.

Respondent Judge Regino issued an order granting SUPERGUARD'S motion to dismiss and SAFEGUARD'S
motion for exclusion as defendant. The respondent judge held that the complaint did not state facts necessary
or sufficient to constitute a quasi-delict since it does not mention any negligence on the part of Torzuela in
shooting Napoleon Dulay or that the same was done in the performance of his duties. Respondent judge ruled
that mere allegations of the concurring negligence of the defendants (private respondents herein) without stating
the facts showing such negligence are mere conclusions of law.

Petitioners take exception to the assailed decision and insist that quasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
negligence but also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary. Petitioners further contend that under Article
2180 of the New Civil Code, private respondents are primarily liable for their negligence either in the selection
or supervision of their employees. This liability is independent of the employee's own liability for fault or
negligence and is distinct from the subsidiary civil liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
Moreover, petitioners argue that Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay is also actionable under Article 33 of the New
Civil Code.

ISSUE: WON Petitioner is correct?

RULING: We find for petitioners. It is well-settled that the filing of an independent civil action before the
prosecution in the criminal action presents evidence is even far better than a compliance with the requirement
of express reservation. This is precisely what the petitioners opted to do in this case. However, the private
respondents opposed the civil action on the ground that the same is founded on a delict and not on a quasi-delict
as the shooting was not attended by negligence. What is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitioner's
cause of action.

152 |AL YC A B S
The nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of
Action. An examination of the complaint in the present case would show that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein,
are invoking their right to recover damages against the private respondents for their vicarious responsibility for
the injury caused by Benigno Torzuela's act of shooting and killing Napoleon Dulay

Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for limiting the scope of Article 2176 of
the Civil
Code to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176 covers
not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional.. Since Article 2176
covers not only acts of negligence but also acts which are intentional and voluntary, it was therefore erroneous
on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitioner's complaint simply because it failed to make allegations of
attendant negligence attributable to private respondents.

With respect to the issue of whether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the general rule is
that the allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein.

This Court finds, under the foregoing premises, that the complaint sufficiently alleged an actionable breach on
the part of the defendant Torzuela and respondents SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD. It is enough that the
complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting
occurred while Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD was Torzuela's
employer and responsible for his acts. This does not operate however, to establish that the defendants below are
liable.

Whether or not the shooting was actually reckless and wanton or attended by negligence and whether it was
actually done within the scope of Torzuela's duties; whether the private respondents SUPERGUARD and/or
SAFEGUARD failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family; and whether the defendants are
actually liable, are questions which can be better resolved after trial on the merits where each party can present
evidence to prove their respective allegations and defenses. In determining whether the allegations of a
complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have
to establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done
at the trial on the merits of the case.

Since the petitioners clearly sustained an injury to their rights under the law, it would be more just to allow them
to present evidence of such injury.

153 |AL YC A B S
 ALMARIO T. SALTA vs. HON. JUDGE JESUS DE VEYRA and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK
G.R. No. L-37733; September 30, 1982

Petitioner, Almario T. Salta, was an employee of the PNB assigned as Manager of the Malolos' branch. As such,
his duty was, among others, to himself grant loans, or only to recommend the granting of loans, depending on
the amount of the loan applied for. In the performance of this particular duty, he is supposed to exercise care
and prudence, and with utmost diligence, observe the policies, rules and regulations of the bank.

In disregard of the pertinent rules, regulations and policies of the respondent bank, petitioner indiscriminately
granted certain loans mentioned in the complaints filed by PNB, in a manner characterized by negligence, fraud
and manifest partiality, and upon securities not commensurate with the amount of the loans. This is how the
respondent bank found petitioner to have discharged his duties as branch manager of the bank, and so it filed a
civil action in the CFI of Manila (Civil Case No. 79583, Branch XIV) on April 22, 1970, and another case (Civil
Case No. 88343, Branch VII) on September 23, 1972, to recover losses the bank suffered.

In the criminal case, the Court, on motion to dismiss filed by the defense, after the prosecution has rested,
granted the motion in a 64-page Resolution. the Motion to Dismiss (Demurrer) to Evidence)is granted and
accused ALMARIO T. SALTA ACQUITTED of the offense charged in the Information the prosecution having
failed to prove the essential ingredient and/or elements of the crime charged.

With his acquittal in the criminal case, petitioner filed Motions to Dismiss in each of the two civil cases, based
on Section 3(c), Rule I I I of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: (c) extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. It is in the resolution of the motions to dismiss that
Judges de Veyra and Purisima of the CFI of Manila took diametrically opposing views, the former denying the
motion, the latter granting it.

ISSUE: WON the motion to dismiss should be granted?

RULING: We sustain the order denying the motion to dismiss as issued by Judge de Veyra, which, for its
brevity, but clear and convincing, We quote as follows:

Having been acquitted by the Circuit Court of the charges of violation of the Anti-Graft Law,
Defendant now seeks the dismissal of the civil case which arose from the same set of facts.
The motion to dismiss must be denied for the reason that acquittal in the criminal case will
not be an obstacle for the civil case to prosper unless in the criminal case the Court makes a
finding that even civilly the accused would not be liable-there is no such a finding. Apart
from this, Plaintiff in this present civil case bases its case either on fraud or negligence-
evidence that only requires a preponderance, unlike beyond reasonable doubt which is the
requisite in criminal cases.

To begin with, the filing in this case of a civil action separate from the criminal action is fully warranted under
the provision of Article 33 of the New Civil Code. The criminal case is for the prosecution of an offense the
main element of which is fraud, one of the kinds of crime mentioned in the aforecited provision. Based on the
same acts for which the criminal action was filed, the civil actions very clearly alleged fraud and negligence as
having given rise to the cause of action averred in the complaints. It needs hardly any showing to demonstrate
this fact, which petitioner disputes, particularly as to the sufficiency of the allegation of fraud in the civil
complaints. Definitely, We hold that the following allegation in the complaints unmistakably shows that the
complaints do contain sufficient averment of fraud

It is significant to note that under Article 31 of the New Civil Code, it is made clear that the civil action permitted
therein to be filed separately from the criminal action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
"regardless of the result of the latter." It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the civil actions mentioned
in Article 33, permitted in the same manner to be filed separately from the criminal case, may proceed similarly
regardless of the result of the criminal case. Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related to a criminal
case, to be filed separately and to proceed independently even during the pendency of the latter case, the

154 |AL YC A B S
intention is patent to make the court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect whatsoever on the separate
civil case. This must be so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of such a nature, unlike other offenses
not mentioned, that they may be made the subject of a separate civil action because of the distinct separability
of their respective juridical cause or basis of action.

155 |AL YC A B S
 ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a. ART BORJAL and MAXIMO SOLIVEN vs. CA and FRANCISCO
WENCESLAO
G.R. No. 126466; January 14, 1999

In this petition for review, the Court is asked to reverse the Court of Appeals in "Francisco Wenceslao v. Arturo
Borjal and Maximo Soliven," CA-G.R. No. 40496, holding on 25 March 1996 that petitioners Arturo Borjal and
Maximo Soliven are solidarily liable for damages for writing and publishing certain articles claimed to be
derogatory and offensive to private respondent Francisco Wenceslao.

Petitioners Arturo Borjal and Maximo Soliven are among the incorporators of Philippines Today, Inc. (PTI),
now PhilSTAR Daily, Inc., owner of The Philippine Star, a daily newspaper. At the time the complaint was
filed, petitioner Borjal was its President while Soliven was (and still is) Publisher and Chairman of its Editorial
Board. Among the regular writers of The Philippine Star is Borjal who runs the column Jaywalker. Private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao, on the other hand, is a civil engineer, businessman, business consultant and
journalist by profession. In 1988 he served as a technical adviser of Congressman Fabian Sison, then Chairman
of the House of Representatives Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy.

During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988 undertaken by the House
Sub- Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to organize the First National Conference on
Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by the private sector in the transport industry and
government agencies concerned in order to find ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More
importantly, the objective of the FNCLT was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land
transportation policy for presentation to Congress. On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the
FNCLT, private respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference.

Between May and July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in
his column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a conference"
without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as the conference therein
mentioned.

Private respondent reacted to the articles. He sent a letter to The Philippine Star insisting that he was the
organizer alluded to in petitioner Borjals columns. In a subsequent letter to The Philippine Star, private
respondent refuted the matters contained in petitioner Borjals columns and openly challenged him. Private
respondent filed a complaint with the National Press Club (NPC) against petitioner Borjal for unethical conduct.
He accused petitioner Borjal of using his column as a form of leverage to obtain contracts for his public relations
firm, AA Borjal Associates. In turn, petitioner Borjal published a rejoinder to the challenge of private respondent
not only to protect his name and honor but also to refute the claim that he was using his column for character
assassination.

Not satisfied with his complaint with the NPC, private respondent filed a criminal case for libel against
petitioners Borjal and Soliven, among others. However, in a Resolution dated 7 August 1990, the Assistant
Prosecutor handling the case dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. On 31 October 1990 private
respondent instituted against petitioners a civil action for damages based on libel subject of the instant case. In
their answer, petitioners interposed compulsory counterclaims for actual, moral and exemplary damages, plus
attorney’s fees and costs. After due consideration, the trial court decided in favor of private respondent
Wenceslao and ordered petitioners Borjal and Soliven to indemnify private respondent.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court a quo but reduced the amount of the monetary award
to P110,000.00 actual damages, P200,000.00 moral damages and P75,000.00 attorney's fees plus costs. In a 20-
page Decision promulgated 25 March 1996, the appellate court ruled inter alia that private respondent was
sufficiently identifiable, although not named, in the questioned articles; that private respondent was in fact
defamed by petitioner Borjal by describing him variously as a "self-proclaimed hero," "a conference organizer
associated with shady deals who has a lot of trash tucked inside his closet," "thick face," and "a person with
dubious ways;" that petitioners claim of privilege communication was unavailing since the privileged character
of the articles was lost by their publication in a newspaper of general circulation.

156 |AL YC A B S
Private respondent manifested his desire to appeal that portion of the appellate court’s decision which reduced
the amount of damages awarded him by filing with this Court a Petition for Extension of Time to File Petition
and a Motion for Suspension of Time to File Petition. However, in a Resolution dated 27 May 1996, the Second
Division denied both motions: the first, for being premature, and the second, for being a wrong remedy.

On their part, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the motion in its
Resolution of 12 September 1996. Hence the instant petition for review. The petitioners contend that the Court
of Appeals erred: (a) in ruling that private respondent Wenceslao was sufficiently identified by petitioner Borjal
in the questioned articles; (b) in refusing to accord serious consideration to the findings of the Department of
Justice and the Office of the President that private respondent Wenceslao was not sufficiently identified in the
questioned articles, this notwithstanding that the degree of proof required in a preliminary investigation is
merely prima facie evidence which is significantly less than the preponderance of evidence required in civil
cases; (c) in ruling that the subject articles do not constitute qualifiedly privileged communication; (d) in
refusing to apply the "public official doctrine" laid down in New York Times v. Sullivan; (e) in ruling that the
questioned articles lost their privileged character because of their publication in a newspaper of general
circulation; (f) in ruling that private respondent has a valid cause of action for libel against petitioners although
he failed to prove actual malice on their part, and that the prosecutors of the City of Manila, the Department of
Justice, and eventually, the Office of the President, had already resolved that there was no sufficient evidence
to prove the existence of libel; and, (g) assuming arguendo that Borjal should be held liable, in adjudging
petitioner Soliven solidarily liable with him.

ISSUE: WON petition has merit?

RULING: The petition is impressed with merit. In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim
be identifiable although it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a third person could
identify him as the object of the libelous publication. Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with
in the case at bar.

In ruling for private respondent, the Court of Appeals found that Borjal's column writings sufficiently identified
Wenceslao as the "conference organizer." It cited the First National Conference on Land Transportation, the
letterheads used listing different telephone numbers, the donation of P100,000.00 from Juliano Lim and the
reference to the "organizer of the conference" - the very same appellation employed in all the column items - as
having sufficiently established the identity of private respondent Wenceslao.

We hold otherwise. These conclusions are at variance with the evidence at hand. The questioned articles written
by Borjal do not identify private respondent Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. The first of the
Jaywalker articles of The Philippine Star yielded nothing to indicate that private respondent was the person
referred to therein. Surely, as observed by petitioners, there were millions of "heroes" of the EDSA Revolution
and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an "organizer of seminars and conferences." As a matter of
fact, in his column petitioner Borjal wrote about the "so-called First National Conference on Land
Transportation whose principal organizers are not specified.” Neither did the FNCLT letterheads disclose the
identity of the conference organizer since these contained only an enumeration of names where private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was described as Executive Director and Spokesman and not as a conference
organizer. No less than private respondent himself admitted that the FNCLT had several organizers and that he
was only a part of the organization.

Significantly, private respondent himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's columns.
Identification is grossly inadequate when even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the
object of the verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person alluded to came not
from petitioner Borjal but from private respondent himself when he supplied the information through his 4 June
1989 letter to the editor. Had private respondent not revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred
to in the Borjal articles, the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity.

157 |AL YC A B S
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth assigned errors all revolve around the primary question of whether the disputed
articles constitute privileged communications as to exempt the author from liability.

The trial court ruled that petitioner Borjal cannot hide behind the proposition that his articles are privileged in
character under the provisions of Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which state:

Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following
cases:

1) A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
or social duty; and
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.

A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged. Absolutely privileged
communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith. An example is
found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts a member of Congress from liability for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged
communications containing defamatory imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without
good intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report
without any comments or remarks."

Indisputably, petitioner Borjals questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354 of The Revised
Penal Code for, as correctly observed by the appellate court, they are neither private communications nor fair
and true report without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. The rule on
privileged communications had its genesis not in the nation's penal code but in the Bill of Rights of the
Constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press.

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an
action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable
imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially
proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is
directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from
the facts.

There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest. The declared objective of
the conference, the composition of its members and participants, and the manner by which it was intended to be
funded no doubt lend to its activities as being genuinely imbued with public interest. An organization such as
the FNCLT aiming to reinvent and reshape the transportation laws of the country and seeking to source its funds
for the project from the public at large cannot dissociate itself from the public character of its mission. As such,
it cannot but invite close scrutiny by the media obliged to inform the public of the legitimacy of the purpose of
the activity and of the qualifications and integrity of the personalities behind it.

New York Times v. Sullivan was decided by the U. S. Supreme Court in the 1960s at the height of the bloody
rioting in the American South over racial segregation. The then City Commissioner L. B. Sullivan of
Montgomery, Alabama, sued New York Times for publishing a paid political advertisement espousing racial
equality and describing police atrocities committed against students inside a college campus. As commissioner
having charge over police actions Sullivan felt that he was sufficiently identified in the ad as the perpetrator of

158 |AL YC A B S
the outrage; consequently, he sued New York Times on the basis of what he believed were libelous utterances
against him.

The U. S. Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. ruled against Sullivan holding
that honest criticisms on the conduct of public officials and public figures are insulated from libel judgments.
The guarantees of freedom of speech and press prohibit a public official or public figure from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with actual malice, i.e., with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not.

The raison d'etre for the New York Times doctrine was that to require critics of official conduct to guarantee
the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would lead to self-censorship, since would-be
critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if such were believed to be true, or were in fact
true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because of fear of the expense of having to prove it.

In the present case, we deem private respondent a public figure within the purview of the New York Times ruling.
At any rate, we have also defined "public figure" in Ayers Production Pty., Ltd. v. Capulong as: a person who,
by his accomplishments, fame, mode of living, or by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs and his character, has become a public personage. He is, in other
words, a celebrity. Obviously, to be included in this category are those who have achieved some degree of
reputation by appearing before the public, as in the case of an actor, a professional baseball player, a pugilist,
or any other entertainer.

But even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that private respondent, despite the position he occupied in the FNCLT,
would not qualify as a public figure, it does not necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a
public comment even if he was not a public official or at least a public figure, for he could be, as long as he was
involved in a public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot suddenly become less
so merely because a private individual is involved or because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily
choose to become involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus is on the conduct of
the participant and the content, effect and significance of the conduct, not the participant's prior anonymity or
notoriety. There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.

The Court of Appeals concluded that since malice is always presumed in the publication of defamatory matters
in the absence of proof to the contrary, the question of privilege is immaterial. We reject this postulate. While,
generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of a communication
destroys the presumption of malice.The onus of proving actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent
Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the
true motive of his conduct. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty but merely to
injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.
Malice is bad faith or bad motive. It is the essence of the crime of libel.

Primarily, private respondent failed to substantiate by preponderant evidence that petitioner was animated by a
desire to inflict unjustifiable harm on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good
motives or justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find petitioner Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by
a sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to expose and denounce
what he perceived to be a public deception. Surely, we cannot begrudge him for that. Every citizen has the right
to enjoy a good name and reputation, but we do not consider that petitioner Borjal has violated that right in this
case nor abused his press freedom.

Furthermore, to be considered malicious, the libelous statements must be shown to have been written or
published with the knowledge that they are false or in reckless disregard of whether they are false or not.
"Reckless disregard of what is false or not" means that the defendant entertains serious doubt as to the truth of
the publication, or that he possesses a high degree of awareness of their probable falsity.

The articles subject of the instant case can hardly be said to have been written with knowledge that these are
false or in reckless disregard of what is false or not. This is not to say however that the very serious allegations

159 |AL YC A B S
of petitioner Borjal assumed by private respondent to be directed against him are true. But we nevertheless find
these at least to have been based on reasonable grounds formed after the columnist conducted several personal
interviews and after considering the varied documentary evidence provided him by his sources.

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate.
Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account, to a point of suppression,
for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language.

160 |AL YC A B S
 MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 135306; January 28, 2003

PET: MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.
BINEGAS, JR.

RES: ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDUL-RAHMAN R.T.

LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and
IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO

ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., a local federation of more than seventy (70)
Muslim religious organizations, and individual Muslims ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P.
ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in
the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of
the Muslim members nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C.
AGUJA and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., arising from an article published in the 1 August 1992 issue of
Bulgar, a daily tabloid.

The complaint alleged that the libelous statement was insulting and damaging to the Muslims; that these words
alluding to the pig as the God of the Muslims was not only published out of sheer ignorance but with intent to
hurt the feelings, cast insult and disparage the Muslims and Islam, as a religion in this country, in violation of
law, public policy, good morals and human relations; that on account of these libelous words Bulgar insulted
not only the Muslims in the Philippines but the entire Muslim world, especially every Muslim individual in non-
Muslim countries.
MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense, contended that the article
did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore were not entitled to damages; and, that the
article was merely an expression of belief or opinion and was published without malice nor intention to cause
damage, prejudice or injury to Muslims.

The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their cause of action since
the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not specifically identified. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. It opined that it was "clear from the disputed article that the defamation was directed
to all adherents of the Islamic faith. It stated that pigs were sacred and idolized as god by members of the Muslim
religion. This libelous imputation undeniably applied to the plaintiff-appellants who are Muslims sharing the
same religious beliefs." It added that the suit for damages was a "class suit" and that ISLAMIC DA'WAH
COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.'s religious status as a Muslim umbrella organization gave it the
requisite personality to sue and protect the interests of all Muslims.

Hence, the instant petition for review assailing the findings of the appellate court (a) on the existence of the
elements of libel, (b) the right of respondents to institute the class suit, and, (c) the liability of petitioners for
moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit.

ISSUE: WON the statements made by MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC. in an issue of Bulgar are libelous?

RULING: Defamation, which includes libel and slander, means the offense of injuring a person's character,
fame or reputation through false and malicious statements.[5] It is that which tends to injure reputation or to
diminish the esteem, respect, good will or confidence in the plaintiff or to excite derogatory feelings or opinions
about the plaintiff. It is the publication of anything which is injurious to the good name or reputation of another
or tends to bring him into disrepute. Defamation is an invasion of a relational interest since it involves the
opinion which others in the community may have, or tend to have, of the plaintiff.

It must be stressed that words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere
words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not
constitute a basis for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The fact that
the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself.

161 |AL YC A B S
Declarations made about a large class of people cannot be interpreted to advert to an identified or identifiable
individual. Absent circumstances specifically pointing or alluding to a particular member of a class, no member
of such class has a right of action[11] without at all impairing the equally demanding right of free speech and
expression, as well as of the press, under the Bill of Rights.

Thus, in Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we dismissed a complaint for libel against Newsweek,
Inc., on the ground that private respondents failed to state a cause of action since they made no allegation in the
complaint that anything contained in the article complained of specifically referred to any of them. We
ratiocinated—

Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the
statement must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class,
or sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can prove that the defamatory
statement specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action separately, if need be. The case
at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all, or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is indispensable to make each
member of the class an actual party. We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has a separate
and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general interest in the subject
matter of the controversy.

In the present case, there was no fairly identifiable person who was allegedly injured by the Bulgar article. Since
the persons allegedly defamed could not be identifiable, private respondents have no individual causes of action;
hence, they cannot sue for a class allegedly disparaged. Private respondents must have a cause of action in
common with the class to which they belong to in order for the case to prosper.

An individual Muslim has a reputation that is personal, separate and distinct in the community. Each Muslim,
as part of the larger Muslim community in the Philippines of over five (5) million people, belongs to a different
trade and profession; each has a varying interest and a divergent political and religious view -some may be
conservative, others liberal. A Muslim may find the article dishonorable, even blasphemous; others may find it
as an opportunity to strengthen their faith and educate the non-believers and the "infidels." There is no injury to
the reputation of the individual Muslims who constitute this community that can give rise to an action for group
libel. Each reputation is personal in character to every person.

If the group is a very large one, then the alleged libelous statement is considered to have no application to
anyone in particular, since one might as well defame all mankind. Not only does the group as such have no
action; the plaintiff does not establish any personal reference to himself. At present, modern societal groups are
both numerous and complex. The same principle follows with these groups: as the size of these groups increases,
the chances for members of such groups to recover damages on tortious libel become elusive. This principle is
said to embrace two (2) important public policies: first, where the group referred to is large, the courts presume
that no reasonable reader would take the statements as so literally applying to each individual member; and
second, the limitation on liability would satisfactorily safeguard freedom of speech and expression, as well as
of the press, effecting a sound compromise between the conflicting fundamental interests involved in libel cases.

In the instant case, the Muslim community is too vast as to readily ascertain who among the Muslims were
particularly defamed. The size of the group renders the reference as indeterminate and generic as a similar attack
on Catholics, Protestants, Buddhists or Mormons would do. The word "Muslim" is descriptive of those who are
believers of Islam, a religion divided into varying sects, such as the Sunnites, the Shiites, the Kharijites, the
Sufis and others based upon political and theological distinctions. "Muslim" is a name which describes only a
general segment of the Philippine population, comprising a heterogeneous body whose construction is not so
well defined as to render it impossible for any representative identification.

Consequently as a prerequisite to recovery, it is necessary for the plaintiff to prove as part of his prima facie
case that the defendant (1) published a statement that was (2) defamatory (3) of and concerning the plaintiff.
The rule in libel is that the action must be brought by the person against whom the defamatory charge has been
made. In the American jurisdiction, no action lies by a third person for damages suffered by reason of
defamation of another person, even though the plaintiff suffers some injury therefrom.

162 |AL YC A B S
In fine, in order for one to maintain an action for an alleged defamatory statement, it must appear that the
plaintiff is the person with reference to whom the statement was made. This principle is of vital importance in
cases where a group or class is defamed since, usually, the larger the collective, the more difficult it is for an
individual member to show that he was the person at whom the defamation was directed.

If the defamatory statements were directed at a small, restricted group of persons, they applied to any member
of the group, and an individual member could maintain an action for defamation. When the defamatory language
was used toward a small group or class, including every member, it has been held that the defamatory language
referred to each member so that each could maintain an action. This small group or class may be a jury, persons
engaged in certain businesses, professions or employments, a restricted subdivision of a particular class, a
society, a football team, a family, small groups of union officials, a board of public officers, or engineers of a
particular company.

In contrast, if defamatory words are used broadly in respect to a large class or group of persons, and there is
nothing that points, or by proper colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular member of the
class or group, no member has a right of action for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special,
personal application and was so general that no individual damages could be presumed, and where the class
referred to was so numerous that great vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no
private action could be maintained.

Our conclusion therefore is that the statements published by petitioners in the instant case did not specifically
identify nor refer to any particular individuals who were purportedly the subject of the alleged libelous
publication. Respondents can scarcely claim to having been singled out for social censure pointedly resulting in
damages.

Primarily, an "emotional distress" tort action is personal in nature, i.e., it is a civil action filed by an individual
to assuage the injuries to his emotional tranquility due to personal attacks on his character. It has no application
in the instant case since no particular individual was identified in the disputed article of Bulgar. Also, the
purported damage caused by the article, assuming there was any, falls under the principle of relational harm -
which includes harm to social relationships in the community in the form of defamation; as distinguished from
the principle of reactive harm - which includes injuries to individual emotional tranquility in the form of an
infliction of emotional distress.

Moreover, under the Second Restatement of the Law, to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress the plaintiff must show that: (a) The conduct of the defendant was intentional or in reckless disregard
of the plaintiff; (b) The conduct was extreme and outrageous; (c) There was a causal connection between the
defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's mental distress; and, (d) The plaintiff's mental distress was extreme and
severe.
Any party seeking recovery for mental anguish must prove more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation,
embarrassment, or anger. Liability does not arise from mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty
expressions, or other trivialities. In determining whether the tort of outrage had been committed, a plaintiff is
necessarily expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of criticism, rough language, and to
occasional acts and words that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind; the mere fact that the actor knows that
the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough.

In any case, respondents' lack of cause of action cannot be cured by the filing of a class suit. As correctly pointed
out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an element of a class suit is the adequacy of
representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court
must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members
of the class; (b) the proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c)
any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class

Notes—

163 |AL YC A B S
"Extreme and outrageous conduct" means conduct that is so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in civilized society. The
defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

"Emotional distress" means any highly unpleasant mental reaction such as extreme grief, shame, humiliation,
embarrassment, anger, disappointment, worry, nausea, mental suffering and anguish, shock, fright, horror, and chagrin.

"Severe emotional distress" in some jurisdictions, refers to any type of severe and disabling emotional or mental condition
which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so, including posttraumatic stress disorder,
neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia.

Two-Class Theory:
In this connection, the doctrines in Chaplinsky and Beauharnais had largely been superseded by subsequent First
Amendment doctrines. Supreme Court appeared to espouse a theory, known as the Two-Class Theory that treated certain
types of expression as taboo forms of speech, beneath the dignity of the First Amendment. This theory provides that there
are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or fighting words those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It
has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.

164 |AL YC A B S
 DAMAGES

SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 116100; February 9, 1996

PET: SPS CRISTINO & BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO & MARIA CRISTINA SANTOS
RES: COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181

On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C.
Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.

The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:

The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St.,
Palingon, Tipas, Taguig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of
sale with spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be
described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as
the point of reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff’s property, the row of houses will be as follows: That
of defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia
Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank.

As an access to P. Burgos Street from plaintiff’s property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasas residence to P.
Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway
is about 3 meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasas residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters.
In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in
length has to be traversed.

When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the premises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982. one of said tenants
vacated the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an
adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was
enclosed. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there was an incident
when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said apartment along the
first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway
such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of their footwear
were even lost.

A decision was rendered by the trial court, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Custodios and
Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access - ingress and egress, to the public street and ordering the plaintiff to
pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the
permanent use of the passageway. The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses. Not satisfied
therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of Appeals
raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. he Court
of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial court with modification which appellees to
pay plaintiffs-appellants the sum P65,000 as Actual Damages, P30,000 as Moral Damages, and P10,000 as
Exemplary Damages.

ISSUE: WON the award of damages is in order?

165 |AL YC A B S
RULING: We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private
respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff, Pacifico
Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason
of the closure of the passageway.

However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To
warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant,
and damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a
breach or wrong.

There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage
is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss
or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that
such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff – a concurrence of injury
to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not
sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and
suffering).

The law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only
hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains
actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act
or omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.

In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the
principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the
following requisites concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence
not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. It is within the right of petitioners,
as owners, to enclose and fence their property.

At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had
no existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a
compulsory right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation.

The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie,although the
act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action
arises in the latters favor. Any injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can
give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful end
by lawful means.

166 |AL YC A B S
 JOSEFINA ESTOLAS and RICARDO SALVADOR vs. RAYMUNDO ACENA
G.R. No. 157070; January 14, 2005

Raymundo Acena is appointed ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER WITH PERMANENT

18 October 1982 STATUS, of the Rizal Technological College (RTC) by Dr. Lydia Profeta, President of
said college. Such appointment is approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC)

Respondent Acena is extended a promotional appointment as ASSOCIATE

PROFESSOR
effective 01 November 1985
09 December 1985
Effective 30 October 1985, and in view of his promotion to Associate Professor,
respondent Acena is designated ACTING ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICER by President
Profeta in an undated letter

01 November Acena assumes his position as Associate Professor and receives the salary for such
1985 position per certification of the personnel officer of RTC dated 04 November 1985

Respondent Acena, thru a letter addressed to President Profeta, rejects his appointment
as
09 January 1986 Associate Professor because of the provisions of Memorandum Circular No. 4 of the
CSC which requires a masteral degree to qualify for permanent appointment as
Associate Professor

13 January 1986 President Profeta accepts the rejection

26 March 1986 Dr. Josefina Estolas is designated as Officer-in-charge of RTC in place of Dr. Profeta

Petitioner Estolas issues Memorandum Order No. 30, Series of 1986, revoking the
designation of respondent Acena as Acting Administrative Officer effective on even
date and designating Ricardo Salvador in his stead
08 April 1986
Respondent Acena institutes Civil Case No. 53327 for Injunction and Damages
enjoining petitioner Estolas from implementing and enforcing Memorandum Order No.
30 claiming that the same violated his rights to security of tenure

Respondent Acena likewise files a letter-complaint with the Merit Systems Protection
17 April 1986 Board
(MSPB) for alleged illegal termination of his services as Acting Administrative Officer

Appointment of respondent Acena as Associate Professor is approved by the CSC as

20 May 1986 temporary on the ground that respondent Acena does not meet the educational
requirement pursuant to CSC-Memorandum Circular Series of 1985

15 May 1987 The trial court issues an Order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction enjoining petitioner Estolas from implementing Memorandum Order No. 30

167 |AL YC A B S
 03 February 1988 The MSPB dismisses respondent Acenas complaint for illegal termination

23 March 1988 The MSPB sets aside its 03 February 1988 order

Aggrieved by the 23 March 1988 MSPB Order, petitioner Estolas goes to the Office of
15 June 1988 the
President on Petition for Review and the same is indorsed for disposition to the CSC

CSC issues Resolution No. 89-748 declaring that the action of petitioner Estolas in
revoking the designation of respondent Acena as Acting Administrative Officer is in
09 October 1989
order, thus setting aside the 23 March 1987 opinion of Commissioner Gotladera and the
23 March 1988 Order of the MSPB

The trial court renders the assailed Decision: defendants are hereby ordered to jointly
17 February 1993 and severally pay plaintiff the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00
as exemplary damages with costs against defendants

ISSUE: WON the award of moral and exemplary damages are in order

RULING: The law on damages prescribes that in order that one can have redress for an act which caused him
damage, the act must not only be hurtful, it must also be wrongful. There must be damnum et enjuria. All in all,
in order to recover moral damages, the claimant must prove the following: (1) there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) there must be a culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
of the Civil Code.

Insofar as petitioner Salvador is concerned, it is reversible error on the part of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals to have concluded that petitioner Salvador acted in bad faith as such conclusion is completely bereft of
any rational basis. The evidence before us simply does not support such valuation. Respondent Acena, grasping
at straws, tried to establish during the direct examination of petitioner Salvador that despite the preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court for the petitioners to refrain from enforcing Memorandum Order No. 30,
petitioner Salvador continued to perform the duties of Acting Administrative Officer through the signing of
payrolls, vouchers, requisitions. Petitioner Salvador denied the allegation which prompted respondent Acena,
through his lawyer, to remark that he will have these papers subpoenaed.

The records, however, do not reveal if, indeed, respondent Acena followed through with his plan for subpoena.
What is more, no other matters were hurled at petitioner Salvador that could establish acts of bad faith and
conspiracy with petitioner Estolas to illegally deprive petitioner Acena of his position as Administrative Officer.

Insofar as petitioner Estolas is concerned, however, we agree in the finding that she acted in bad faith. The
complaint for damages against petitioner Estolas was actually for the single act of having issued Memorandum
Order No. 30, allegedly in bad faith, on 08 April 1986. This complaint, it should be stressed, was filed the same
day as the issuance of Memorandum Order No. 30. Thus, acts of bad faith on the part of petitioner Estolas
committed after the filing of the complaint necessarily are extraneous matters that do not form part of

168 |AL YC A B S
respondent’s cause of action. Respondent Acena, however, went on to introduce acts, purportedly constituting
bad faith, which transpired days, months and even years after the filing of the complaint.

Moreover, we find inexcusable and laden with bad faith the actuation of petitioner Estolas in resubmitting to
the CSC for its approval the appointment papers of respondent Acena as Associate Professor despite the latters
vehement rejection of said position and despite the pendency of the case in the trial court. Worse still, petitioner
Estolas conveniently did not inform the CSC of the real picture of respondent Acenas appointment

The lower court, as well as the Court of Appeals, missed out one very crucial fact, i.e., damages are not
presumed; the first requisite for the recovery of moral damages is that there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant. There must be proof of physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, etc. The claimant must satisfactorily prove the factual basis and causal
connection thereof with the defendant’s acts.

Thus, the ultimate question that must be asked is: did respondent Acena suffer damages from petitioner Estolass
wrongful act of issuing Memorandum Order No. 30 and from her acts of bad faith as discussed above?
Parenthetically, is petitioner Salvador liable for damages considering that there is no adequate proof of
conspiracy with petitioner Estolas nor is there evidence of bad faith on his part?

The evidence supports respondent Acenas claim for moral damages against petitioner Estolas. The actuations
of petitioner Estolas in booting-out respondent Acena as Administrative Officer, which the latter held in a
permanent capacity, and in forcing the position of Associate Professor undisputedly a temporary position down
his throat, fall squarely within Article 21 of the Civil Code on human relations. On the witness stand, respondent
Acena testified that as a direct result of petitioner Estolass actuations, he felt insulted, embarrassed and
humiliated. He suffered serious anxiety, moral shock, sleepless nights and even had to resort to minimum
tanquilizer

Considering respondent Acenas high position in the RTC community and the long drawn out feud between him
and the president of the college, we find his claim of having suffered moral damages credible. The award of
exemplary damages in the amount of P10,000 is likewise justified to set an example for the public good and as
a form of deterrent to the repetition of the same act by others. Quite the contrary, petitioner Salvador cannot be
made liable for moral damages as it was not proved that he conspired with petitioner Estolas in issuing
Memorandum Order No. 30. Neither was it proved that he acted in bad faith during all time material to the case.

169 |AL YC A B S
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IRE NEO JUGUETA
G.R. No. 202124; April 5, 2016

The CA affirmed the judgments of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 61, Gumaca, Quezon, finding
accused-appellant Ireneo Jugueta y Flores guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Double Murder in Criminal Case
No. 7698-G and Multiple Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 7702-G.

That on or about the 6th day of June 2002, at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya,
Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, armed with a caliber.22 firearm, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said
firearm Mary Grace Divina, a minor, 13 years old and Claudine Divina, a minor, 3 ½ years of age. That the
crime committed in the dwelling of the offended party who had not given provocation for the attack and the
accused took advantage of nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense.

In Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel, was charged with
Multiple Attempted Murder, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of 6th day of June, 2002, at Barangay Caridad Ilaya, Municipality
of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with short
firearms of undetermined calibres, with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, with evident premeditation and
abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, and shoot with
the said firearms the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina, thereby commencing the commission of
the crime of Murder, directly by overt acts, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produced it by reason of some cause or accident other than the spontaneous desistance of the accused, that is,
the occupants Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children Elizabeth Divina and Judy Ann Divina,
both elementary pupils and who are minors, were not hit.

At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Norberto Divina, the victim, and Dr. Lourdes Taguinod
who executed the Medico-Legal Certificate and confirmed that the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace
and Claudine, died from gunshot wounds. Dr. Taguinod noted that the trajectory of the bullet wounds showed
that the victims were at a higher location than the shooter, but she could not tell what kind of ammunitions were
used.6

Norberto testified that the appellant is his brother-in-law. He recounted that in the evening of June 6, 2002, as
his entire family lay down on the floor of their one-room nipa hut to sleep, the "sack" walling of their hut was
suddenly stripped off, and only the supporting bamboo (fences) remained. With the covering of the wall gone,
the three (3) men responsible for the deed came into view. Norberto clearly saw their faces which were
illuminated by the light of a gas lamp hanging in their small hut. Norberto identified the 3 men as appellant,
Gilbert Estores and Roger San Miguel.

The 3 men ordered Norberto to come down from his house, but he refused to do so. The men then uttered,
"Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo na ngayon." Norberto pleaded with them, saying, "Maawa kayo sa amin,
matanda na ako at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?" Despite such plea for mercy, a gunshot
was fired, and Norberto immediately threw his body over his children and wife in an attempt to protect them
from being hit. Thereafter, he heard successive gunshots being fired in the direction where his family huddled
together in their hut

In answer to questions of what could have prompted such an attack from appellant, Norberto replied that he had
a previous altercation with appellant who was angered by the fact that he (Norberto) filed a case against
appellant's two other brothers for molesting his daughter. On the other hand, appellant was only able to proffer
denial and alibi as his defense. Appellant's testimony, along with those of Gilbert Estores, Roger San Miguel,
Isidro San Miguel and Ruben Alegre, was that he (appellant) was just watching TV at the house of Isidro San
Miguel, where he had been living for several years, at the time the shooting incident occurred. However, he and
the other witnesses admitted that said house was a mere five-minute walk away from the crime scene.

170 |AL YC A B S
Aggrieved by the trial court's judgments, appellant appealed to the CA. The CA rendered a Decision affirming
appellant's conviction for the crimes charged. Dissatisfied with the CA Decision, appellant elevated the case to
this Court.

ISSUE: The main issue advanced in the Appellant's Brief deals with the inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony,
such as his failure to state from the beginning that all three assailants had guns, and to categorically identify
appellant as the one holding the gun used to kill Norberto’s children.

RULING: The supposed inconsistencies in Norberto's testimony, i.e., that he failed to state from the very
beginning that all three assailants were carrying firearms, and that it was the shots from appellant’s firearm that
killed the children, are too trivial and inconsequential to put a dent on said witness's credibility. An examination
of Norberto's testimony would show that there are no real inconsistencies to speak of. As ruled in People v.
Cabtalan, "[m]inor inconsistencies and discrepancies pertaining to trivial matters do not affect the credibility
of witnesses, as well as their positive identification of the accused as the perpetrators of the crime." Both the
trial court and the CA found Norberto's candid and straightforward testimony to be worthy of belief and this
Court sees no reason why it should not conform to the principle

The facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive
and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only
Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at
a group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one
crime. What appellant and his cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime because as held in
People v. Nelmida, "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each
particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex
crime”

Furthermore, the Court notes that both the trial court and the CA failed to take into account dwelling as an
ordinary, aggravating circumstance, despite the fact that the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 7698-G and
7702-G contain sufficient allegations to that effect

In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on
appellant. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, thus, with an ordinary aggravating circumstance
of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death for each of two (2) counts of murder. However, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, proscribing the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be
reclusion perpetua for each of the two (2) counts of murder without eligibility for parole.

ANENT THE AWARD OF DAMAGES, the Court deems it proper to address the matter in detail as regards
criminal cases where the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Generally, in these types of criminal
cases, there are three kinds of damages awarded by the Court; namely: civil indemnity, moral, and exemplary
damages. Likewise, actual damages may be awarded or temperate damages in some instances.

First, civil indemnity ex delicto is the indemnity authorized in our criminal law for the offended party, in the
amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is
equivalent to actual or compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which
states, "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." It is to be noted that civil indemnity is,
technically, not a penalty or a fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.

In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in
addition to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution.

The second type of damages the Court awards are moral damages, which are also compensatory in nature.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical

171 |AL YC A B S
suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation.
These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or corrective in nature, calculated
to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary
loss is necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the
discretion of the court, it is imperative, nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant,
and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 221946 and Article 222047 of
the Civil Code.

Similarly, in American jurisprudence, moral damages are treated as "compensatory damages awarded for mental
pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong." The rationale for awarding moral damages has
been explained in Lambert v. Heirs of Rey Castillon: "[T]he award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration,
within the limits possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering
inflicted." Corollarily, moral damages under Article 222051 of the Civil Code also does not fix the amount of
damages that can be awarded. It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the suffering
of the private offended party.

Finally, in respect to exemplary damages, also known as "punitive" or "vindictive" damages, exemplary or
corrective damages are intended to serve as a deterrent to serious wrong doings, and as a vindication of undue
sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct.
These terms are generally, but not always, used interchangeably. In common law, there is preference in the use
of exemplary damages when the award is to account for injury to feelings and for the sense of indignity and
humiliation suffered by a person as a result of an injury that has been maliciously and wantonly inflicted,, the
theory being that there should be compensation for the hurt caused by the highly reprehensible conduct of the
defendant – associated with such circumstances as willfulness, wantonness, malice, gross negligence or
recklessness, oppression, insult or fraud or gross fraud – that intensifies the injury. The terms punitive or
vindictive damages are often used to refer to those species of damages that may be awarded against a person to
punish him for his outrageous conduct. In either case, these damages are intended in good measure to deter the
wrongdoer and others like him from similar conduct in the future.

The term aggravating circumstances used by the Civil Code, the law not having specified otherwise, is to be
understood in its broad or generic sense. The commission of an offense has a two-pronged effect, one on the
public as it breaches the social order and the other upon the private victim as it causes personal sufferings, each
of which is addressed by, respectively, the prescription of heavier punishment for the accused and by an award
of additional damages to the victim. The increase of the penalty or a shift to a graver felony underscores the
exacerbation of the offense by the attendance of aggravating circumstances, whether ordinary or qualifying, in
its commission. Unlike the criminal liability which is basically a State concern, the award of damages, however,
is likewise, if not primarily, intended for the offended party who suffers thereby. It would make little sense for
an award of exemplary damages to be due the private offended party when the aggravating circumstance is
ordinary but to be withheld when it is qualifying. Withal, the ordinary or qualifying nature of an aggravating
circumstance is a distinction that should only be of consequence to the criminal, rather than to the civil, liability
of the offender. In fine, relative to the civil aspect of the case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary
or qualifying, should entitle the offended party to an award of exemplary damages within the unbridled meaning
of Article 2230 of the Civil Code.

Being corrective in nature, exemplary damages, therefore, can be awarded, not only due to the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where the circumstances of the case show the highly reprehensible or
outrageous conduct of the offender. In much the same way as Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded, Article 2229, the main provision, lays down the very basis of the award.
Thus, in People v. Matrimonio, the Court imposed exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse
tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.

Existing jurisprudence pegs the award of exemplary damages at ₱30,000.00, despite the lack of any aggravating
circumstance. The Court finds it proper to increase the amount to ₱50,000.00 in order to deter similar conduct.
If, however, the penalty for the crime committed is death, which cannot be imposed because of the provisions
of R.A. No. 9346, prevailing jurisprudence sets the amount of ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

172 |AL YC A B S
Prescinding from the foregoing, for the two (2) counts of murder, attended by the ordinary aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, appellant should be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the following damages:
(1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity for each of the two children who died; (2) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages
for each of the two victims; (3) another ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the two victims; and (4)
temperate damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00 for each of the two deceased. For the four (4) counts of
Attempted Murder, appellant should pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱50,000.00 as exemplary damages for each of the four victims. In addition, the civil indemnity, moral damages,
exemplary damages and temperate damages payable by the appellant are subject to interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

(See full text for summary of penalties)

173 |AL YC A B S
 OCEANEERING CONTRACTORS (PHILS), INC. vs. NESTOR N. BARRETTO
G.R. No. 184215; February 9, 2011

Doing business under the name and style of N.N. B. Lighterage, respondent Nestor N. Barretto (Barretto) is the
owner of the Barge Antonieta which was last licensed and permitted to engage in coastwise trading for a period
of one year expiring on 21 August 1998. On 27 November 1997, Barretto and petitioner Oceaneering
Contractors (Phils.), Inc. (Oceaneering) entered into a Time Charter Agreement whereby, for the contract price
of P306,000.00, the latter hired the aforesaid barge for a renewable period of thirty calendar days, for the purpose
of transporting construction materials from Manila to Ayungon, Negros Oriental.

Brokered by freelance ship broker Manuel Velasco, the agreement included Oceaneerings acknowledgment of
the seaworthiness of the barge as well as the following stipulations, to wit: [Barreto] shall be responsible for the
salaries, subsistence, SSS premium, medical, workmens compensation contribution and other legal expenses of
the crew and Oceaneering shall be responsible for all port charges, insurance of all equipments, cargo loaded to
the above mentioned deck barge against all risks (Total or Partial), or theft, security and stevedoring during
loading and unloading operations and all other expenses pertinent to the assessment, fines and forfeiture for any
violation that may be imposed in relation to the operation of the barge. Damage to deck barge caused by
carelessness or negligence of stevedores hired by [Oceaneering] will be Oceaneering’s liability.

In accordance with the agreement, Oceaneerings hired stevedores who loaded the barge with pipe piles, steel
bollards, concrete mixers, gravel, sand, cement and other construction materials in the presence of and under
the direct supervision of the broker Manuel Velasco and Barrettos Bargemen.

On 5 December 1997, however, Barretto’s Bargeman, Eddie La Chica, executed a Marine Protest, reporting the
following circumstances under which the barge reportedly capsized which caused the steel pipes and various
construction materials to shift on the starboardside causing the breakdown of the steel stanchions welded on the
deck of the barge leaving holes on the deck that caused water to enter the hold in the vicinity of Cape Santiago,
Batangas.

On 9 December 1997, Barretto apprised Oceaneering of the supposed fact that the mishap was caused by the
incompetence and negligence of the latters personnel in loading the cargo and that it was going to proceed with
the salvage, refloating and repair of the barge. In turn contending that the barge tilted because of the water which
seeped through a hole in its hull, Oceaneering caused its counsel to serve Barretto a letter dated 12 March 1998,
demanding the return of the unused portion of the charter payment amounting to P224,400.00 as well as the
expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 it purportedly incurred in salvaging its construction materials.

On 6 October 1998, Barretto commenced the instant suit with the filing of his complaint for damages against
Oceaneering, which was docketed as Civil Case No. LP-98-0244 before Branch 255 of the RTC of Las Pias
City. Contending that the accident was attributable to the incompetence and negligence which attended the
loading of the cargo by Oceaneerings hired employees, Barretto sought indemnities for expenses incurred and
lost income in the aggregate sum of P2,750,792.50 and attorney’s fees equivalent to 25% of said sum.

Specifically denying the material allegations of the foregoing complaint in its 26 January 1999 answer,
Oceaneering, on the other hand, averred that the accident was caused by the negligence of Barrettos employees
and the dilapidated hull of the barge which rendered it unseaworthy.

RTC rendered a decision, dismissing both Barrettos complaint and Oceaneering’s counterclaims for lack of
merit. While finding that Barretto failed to adduce sufficient and convincing evidence to prove that the accident
was due to the negligence of Oceaneering’s employees, the RTC nevertheless brushed aside the latters claim
that the barge was not seaworthy as acknowledged in the Time Charter Agreement. Dissatisfied, Oceaneering
perfected its appeal. Appeal was partially granted finding, among others, that the agreement executed by the
parties, by its express terms, was a time charter where the possession and control of the barge was retained by
Barretto; that the latter is, therefore, a common carrier legally charged with extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods transported by him; and, that the sinking of the vessel created a presumption of
negligence and/or unseaworthiness which Barretto failed to overcome and gave rise to his liability for
Oceaneerings lost cargo despite the latters failure to insure the same. Applying the rule, however, that actual

174 |AL YC A B S
damages should be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, the CA denied Oceaneering’s claim for the
value of its lost cargo and merely ordered the refund of the P306,000.00 it paid for the time charter, with
indemnity for attorney’s fees in the sum of P30,000.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in debying Oceaneerings’s claim for the value of its lost cargo?
RULING: In finding Oceaneerings petition impressed with partial merit, uppermost in our mind is the fact that
actual or compensatory damages are those damages which the injured party is entitled to recover for the wrong
done and injuries received when none were intended. Pertaining as they do to such injuries or losses that are
actually sustained and susceptible of measurement, they are intended to put the injured party in the position in
which he was before he was injured. Insofar as actual or compensatory damages are concerned, Article 2199 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines provides as follows:

Art. 2199. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is entitled to an adequate compensation only
for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual
or compensatory damages.

Conformably with the foregoing provision, the rule is long and well settled that there must be pleading and
proof of actual damages suffered for the same to be recovered. In addition to the fact that the amount of loss
must be capable of proof, it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon
competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. The burden of proof of the damage suffered is, consequently,
imposed on the party claiming the same who should adduce the best evidence available in support thereof, like
sales and delivery receipts, cash and check vouchers and other pieces of documentary evidence of the same
nature. In the absence of corroborative evidence, it has been held that self-serving statements of account are not
sufficient basis for an award of actual damages.

Corollary to the principle that a claim for actual damages cannot be predicated on flimsy, remote, speculative,
and insubstantial proof, courts are, likewise, required to state the factual bases of the award.

Applying the just discussed principles to the case at bench, we find that Oceaneering correctly fault the CA for
not granting its claim for actual damages or, more specifically, the portions thereof which were duly pleaded
and adequately proved before the RTC. While concededly not included in the demand letters dated 12 March
1998 and 13 July 1998 Oceaneering served Barretto, the formers counterclaims for the value of its lost cargo in
the sum of P4,055,700.00 and salvaging expenses in the sum of P125,000.00 were distinctly pleaded and prayed
for in the 26 January 1999 answer it filed a quo.
Rather than the entire P4,055,700.00 worth of construction materials reflected in the inventory which Engr.
Oracion claims to have prepared on 29 November 1997, based on the delivery and official receipts from
Oceaneerings suppliers, we are, however, inclined to grant only the following items which were duly proved by
the vouchers and receipts on record, viz.: (a) P1,720,850.00 worth of spiral welded pipes with coal tar epoxy
procured on 22 November 1997; (b) P629,640.00 worth of spiral welded steel pipes procured on 28 October
1997; (c) P155,500.00 worth of various stainless steel materials procured on 27 November 1997; (d) P66,750.00
worth of gaskets and shackles procured on 20 November 1997; and, (e) P4,880.00 worth of anchor bolt procured
on 27 November 1997.

For lack of sufficient showing of bad faith on the part of Barretto, we find that the CA, finally, erred in granting
Oceaneerings claim for attorneys fees, albeit in the much reduced sum of P30,000.00. In the absence of
stipulation, after all, the rule is settled that there can be no recovery of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
other than judicial costs except in the instances enumerated under Article 2208 of the Civil Code. Being the
exception rather than the rule,attorneys fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit, in view of the
policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s fees may not be awarded where, as
here, no sufficient showing of bad faith can be reflected in the partys persistence in a case other than an
erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

175 |AL YC A B S
 VICTORINO D. MAGAT vs. HO N. LEO D. MEDIALDEA and SANTIAGO A. GUERRERO
G.R. No. L-37120; April 20, 1983

Sometime in September 1972, respondent Santiago A. Guerrero entered into a contract with the U.S. Navy
Exchange, Subic Bay, Philippines, for the operation of a fleet of taxicabs, each taxicab to be provided with the
necessary taximeter and a radio transceiver for receiving and sending of messages from mobile taxicab to fixed
base stations within the Naval Base at Subic Bay, Philippines. The defendant herein and his agent Isidro Q.
Aligada were able to import from Japan with the assistance of the plaintiff and his Japanese business associates
the necessary taximeters for defendant's taxicabs in partial fulfillment of defendant's commitments with the U.S.
Navy Exchange, Subic Bay, Philippines, the plaintiff's assistance in this matter having been given to the
defendant gratis et amore.

Isidro Q. Aligada, also acting as agent of the defendant, made representations with the plaintiff herein to the
effect that defendant desired to procure from Japan thru the plaintiff herein the needed radio transceivers and to
this end, Isidro Q. Aligada secured a firm offer in writing dated September 25, 1972, a copy of which is hereto
attached marked as Annex 'A' and made an integral part of this complaint, wherein the plaintiff quoted in his
offer a total price of $77,620.59 [U.S. dollars] FOB Yokohama, the goods or articles therein offered for sale by
the plaintiff to the defendant to be delivered sixty to ninety [60-90] days after receipt of advice from the
defendant of the radio frequency assigned to the defendant by the proper authorities.

Believing that the defendant would faithfully fulfill his contract with the plaintiff herein, considering his signed
conformity appearing in Annex 'A' hereof as well as the letter dated October 4, 1972, of his agent
aforementioned which is attached hereto and marked as Annex 'B' and made an integral part of this complaint,
and in order that plaintiff's promised delivery would not be delayed, the plaintiff herein took steps to advise the
Japanese entity entrusted with the manufacture of the items listed in Annex 'A' to the effect that the contract
between the defendant herein and the plaintiff has been perfected and that advice with regards to radio frequency
would follow as soon as same is received by the plaintiff from the defendant.

It has come to the knowledge of the plaintiff herein that the defendant has been operating his taxicabs without
the required radio transceivers and when the U.S. Navy Authorities of Subic Bay, Philippines, were pressing
defendant for compliance with his commitments with respect to the installations of radio transceivers on his
taxicabs, he impliedly laid the blame for the delay upon the plaintiff herein, thus destroying the reputation of
the plaintiff herein with the said Naval Authorities of Subic Bay, Philippines, with whom plaintiff herein
transacts business.

On March 27, 1973, plaintiff wrote a letter thru his counsel, copy attached marked as Annex 'E', to ascertain
from the defendant as to whether it is his intention to fulfill his part of the agreement with the plaintiff herein
or whether he desired to have the contract between them definitely cancelled, but defendant did not even have
the courtesy to answer plaintiff's demand. in view of the defendant's failure to fulfill his contractual obligations
with the plaintiff herein, the plaintiff will suffer damages.

Respondent Guerrero filed a motion to dismiss said complaint for lack of cause of action alleging that plaintiff
was merely anticipating his loss or damage which might result from the alleged failure of defendant to comply
with the terms of the alleged contract. Hence, plaintiff's right of recovery under his cause of action is premised
not on any loss or damage actually suffered by him but on a non-existing loss or damage which he is expecting
to incur in the near future.

The respondent judge, over petitioner's opposition, issued a minute order dismissing the complaint

ISSUE: WON Plaintiff’s claim for damages is in order?

RULING: We find the test of legal sufficiency of the cause of action adequately satisfied. Indisputably, the
parties, both businessmen, entered into the aforesaid contract with the evident intention of deriving some profits
therefrom. Upon breach of the contract by either of them, the other would necessarily suffer loss of his expected
profits. Since the loss comes into being at the very moment of breach, such loss is real, "fixed and vested" and,
therefore, recoverable under the law.

176 |AL YC A B S
The damages which the obligor is liable for includes not only the value of the loss suffered by the obligee [daño
emergente] but also the profits which the latter failed to obtain [lucro cesante] 9. If the obligor acted in good
faith, he shall be liable for those damages that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was
constituted; and in case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, he shall be liable for all damages which
may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.

The same is true with respect to moral and exemplary damages. The applicable legal provisions on the matter,
Articles 2220 and 2232 of the Civil Code, allow the award of such damages in breaches of contract where the
defendant acted in bad faith. To Our mind, the complaint sufficiently alleges bad faith on the part of the
defendant.

In fine, We hold that on the basis of the facts alleged in the complaint, the court could render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer thereof.

177 |AL YC A B S
 REYNALDA GATCHALIAN vs. AR SENIO DELIM and COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-56487; October 21, 1991

At noon time on 11 July 1973, petitioner Reynalda Gatchalian boarded, as a paying passenger, respondent's
"Thames" mini bus at a point in San Eugenio, Aringay, La Union, bound for Bauang, of the same province. On
the way, while the bus was running along the highway in Barrio Payocpoc, Bauang, Union, "a snapping sound"
was suddenly heard at one part of the bus and, shortly thereafter, the vehicle bumped a cement flower pot on
the side of the road, went off the road, turned turtle and fell into a ditch. Several passengers, including petitioner
Gatchalian, were injured. They were promptly taken to Bethany Hospital at San Fernando, La Union, for
medical treatment. Upon medical examination, petitioner was found to have sustained physical injuries on the
leg, arm and forehead, specifically described as follows: lacerated wound, forehead; abrasion, elbow, left;
abrasion, knee, left; abrasion, lateral surface, leg, left.

While injured passengers were confined in the hospital, Mrs. Adela Delim, wife of respondent, visited them and
later paid for their hospitalization and medical expenses. She also gave petitioner P12.00 with which to pay her
transportation expense in going home from the hospital. However, before Mrs. Delim left, she had the injured
passengers, including petitioner, sign an already prepared Joint Affidavit stating, among others, “That we are
no longer interested to file a complaint, criminal or civil against the said driver and owner of the said Thames,
because it was an accident and the said driver and owner of the said Thames have gone to the extent of helping
us to be treated upon our injuries.”

Notwithstanding this document, petitioner Gathalian filed with the then Court of First Instance of La Union an
action extra contractu to recover compensatory and moral damages. She alleged in the complaint that her
injuries sustained from the vehicular mishap had left her with a conspicuous white scar measuring 1 by 1/2
inches on the forehead, generating mental suffering and an inferiority complex on her part; and that as a result,
she had to retire in seclusion and stay away from her friends. She also alleged that the scar diminished her facial
beauty and deprived her of opportunities for employment.

In defense, respondent averred that the vehicular mishap was due to force majeure, and that petitioner had
already been paid and moreover had waived any right to institute any action against him (private respondent)
and his driver, when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint Affidavit on 14 July 1973.

The trial court dismissed the complaint upon the ground that when petitioner Gatchalian signed the Joint
Affidavit, she relinquished any right of action (whether criminal or civil) that she may have had against
respondent and the driver of the mini-bus. On appeal by petitioner, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
conclusion that there had been a valid waiver, but affirmed the dismissal of the case by denying petitioner's
claim for damages.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s claim for damages is in order?

RULING: We agree with the majority of the Court of Appeals who held that no valid waiver of her cause of
action had been made by petitioner. A waiver, to be valid and effective, must in the first place be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a person to give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not casually be attributed to a person when the terms thereof do
not explicitly and clearly evidence an intent to abandon a right vested in such person.

The terms of the Joint Affidavit in the instant case cannot be regarded as a waiver cast in "clear and unequivocal"
terms. Moreover, the circumstances under which the Joint Affidavit was signed by petitioner Gatchalian need
to be considered. Petitioner testified that she was still reeling from the effects of the vehicular accident, having
been in the hospital for only three days, when the purported waiver in the form of the Joint Affidavit was
presented to her for signing; that while reading the same, she experienced dizziness but that, seeing the other
passengers who had also suffered injuries sign the document, she too signed without bothering to read the Joint
Affidavit in its entirety. Considering these circumstances there appears substantial doubt whether petitioner
understood fully the import of the Joint Affidavit (prepared by or at the instance of private respondent) she
signed and whether she actually intended thereby to waive any right of action against private respondent.

178 |AL YC A B S
We have already noted that a duty to exercise extraordinary diligence in protecting the safety of its passengers
is imposed upon a common carrier. 7 In case of death or injuries to passengers, a statutory presumption arises
that the common carrier was at fault or had acted negligently "unless it proves that it [had] observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." The driver did not stop to check if anything
had gone wrong with the bus. Moreover, the driver's reply necessarily indicated that the same "snapping sound"
had been heard in the bus on previous occasions. This could only mean that the bus had not been checked
physically or mechanically to determine what was causing the "snapping sound" which had occurred so
frequently that the driver had gotten accustomed to it. Such a sound is obviously alien to a motor vehicle in
good operating condition, and even a modicum of concern for life and limb of passengers dictated that the bus
be checked and repaired. The obvious continued failure of respondent to look after the roadworthiness and
safety of the bus, coupled with the driver's refusal or neglect to stop the mini-bus after he had heard once again
the "snapping sound" and the cry of alarm from one of the passengers, constituted wanton disregard of the
physical safety of the passengers, and hence gross negligence on the part of respondent and his driver.

We turn to petitioner's claim for damages. The first item in that claim relates to revenue which petitioner
said she failed to realize because of the effects of the vehicular mishap. Petitioner maintains that on the day that
the mini-bus went off the road, she was supposed to confer with the district supervisor of public schools for a
substitute teacher's job, a job which she had held off and on as a "casual employee." The Court of Appeals,
however, found that at the time of the accident, she was no longer employed in a public school since, being a
casual employee and not a Civil Service eligible, she had been laid off. Her employment as a substitute teacher
was occasional and episodic, contingent upon the availability of vacancies for substitute teachers. In view of
her employment status as such, the Court of Appeals held that she could not be said to have in fact lost any
employment after and by reason of the accident. Such was the factual finding of the Court of Appeals, a finding
entitled to due respect from this Court.

Petitioner Gatchalian has not submitted any basis for overturning this finding of fact, and she may not be
awarded damages on the basis of speculation or conjecture. Petitioner's claim for the cost of plastic surgery for
removal of the scar on her forehead, is another matter. A person is entitled to the physical integrity of his or her
body; if that integrity is violated or diminished, actual injury is suffered for which actual or compensatory
damages are due and assessable. Petitioner Gatchalian is entitled to be placed as nearly as possible in the
condition that she was before the mishap. A scar, especially one on the face of the woman, resulting from the
infliction of injury upon her, is a violation of bodily integrity, giving rise to a legitimate claim for restoration to
her conditio ante. If the scar is relatively small and does not grievously disfigure the victim, the cost of surgery
may be expected to be correspondingly modest. In Araneta, et al. vs. Areglado, et al., 15 this Court awarded
actual or compensatory damages for, among other things, the surgical removal of the scar on the face of a young
boy who had been injured in a vehicular collision.

Petitioner estimated that the cost of having her scar surgically removed was somewhere between P10,000.00 to
P15,000.00. 16 Upon the other hand, Dr. Fe Tayao Lasam, a witness presented as an expert by petitioner,
testified that the cost would probably be between P5,000.00 to P10,000.00. 17 In view of this testimony, and
the fact that a considerable amount of time has lapsed since the mishap in 1973 which may be expected to
increase not only the cost but also very probably the difficulty of removing the scar, we consider that the amount
of P15,000.00 to cover the cost of such plastic surgery is not unreasonable.

Turning to petitioner's claim for moral damages, the long-established rule is that moral damages may be awarded
where gross negligence on the part of the common carrier is shown. 18 Since we have earlier concluded that
respondent common carrier and his driver had been grossly negligent in connection with the bus mishap which
had injured petitioner and other passengers, and recalling the aggressive manuevers of respondent, through his
wife, to get the victims to waive their right to recover damages even as they were still hospitalized for their
injuries, petitioner must be held entitled to such moral damages. Considering the extent of pain and anxiety
which petitioner must have suffered as a result of her physical injuries including the permanent scar on her
forehead, we believe that the amount of P30,000.00 would be a reasonable award. Petitioner's claim for
P1,000.00 as atttorney's fees is in fact even more modest.

179 |AL YC A B S
 RODOLFO N. REGALA vs. FEDERICO P. CARIN
G.R. No. 188715; April 6, 2011

Petitioner and respondent are adjacent neighbors at Spirig Street, BF Resort Village, Las Piñas City. When
petitioner decided to renovate his one storey residence by constructing a second floor, he under the guise of
merely building an extension to his residence, approached respondent sometime in May 1998 for permission to
bore a hole through a perimeter wall shared by both their respective properties, to which respondent verbally
consented on condition that petitioner would clean the area affected by the work.

As earlier indicated, petitioners real intention was to build a second floor, in fact with a terrace atop the dividing
wall. In the course of the construction of the second floor, respondent and his wife Marietta suffered from the
dust and dirt which fell on their property. As petitioner failed to address the problem to respondents satisfaction,
respondent filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the City Engineer and Building Official of Las Piñas City
on June 9, 1998.

In his letter-complaint, respondent related that, despite the lack of a building permit for the construction of a
second floor, petitioner had demolished the dividing wall, failed to clean the debris falling therefrom, allowed
his laborers to come in and out of his (respondents) property without permission by simply jumping over the
wall, and trampled on his vegetable garden; and that despite his protestations, petitioner persisted in proceeding
with the construction, he claiming to be the owner of the perimeter wall.

As no satisfactory agreement was reached at the last barangay conciliation proceedings in December 1998, and
petitioner having continued the construction work despite issuance of several stop-work notices from the City
Engineers Office for lack of building permit, respondent filed on March 1999 a complaint for damages against
petitioner before the RTC of Las Piñas City. In his complaint, respondent alleged in the main that, instead of
boring just one hole as agreed upon, petitioner demolished the whole length of the wall from top to bottom into
five parts for the purpose of constructing a second floor with terrace; and that debris and dust piled up on
respondents property ruining his garden and forcing him to, among other things, shut some of the windows of
his house. Respondent thus prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages.

Petitioner, denying respondents allegations, claimed in his Answer that he was the sole and exclusive owner of
the wall referred to as a perimeter wall, the same having been built within the confines of his property and being
part and parcel of the house and lot package he purchased from the developer, BF Homes, Inc., in 1981. Further,
petitioner, denying that a demolition of the whole length of the wall took place, claimed that he and his
contractors laborers had been diligently cleaning respondents area after every days work until respondent
arrogantly demanded the dismantling of the scaffoldings, and barred the workforce from, and threatening to
shoot anyone entering the premises; and that the complaint was instituted by respondent as leverage to force
him to withdraw the criminal case for slander and light threats

RTC rendered judgment in favor of respondent whom it awarded moral damages in the sum of P100,000,
exemplary damages of P100,000 and attorneys fees of P50,000 plus costs of suit. In finding for respondent, the
trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the renovation of his house
without the requisite building permit from the City Engineers Office, he misrepresented to respondent his true
intent of introducing renovations. For, it found that instead of just boring a hole in the perimeter wall as
originally proposed, petitioner divided the wall into several sections to serve as a foundation for his firewall
(which ended up higher than the perimeter wall) and the second storey of his house. In finding for respondent,
the trial court declared that, apart from the fact that petitioner knowingly commenced the renovation of his
house without the requisite building permit from the City Engineers Office, he misrepresented to respondent his
true intent of introducing renovations. For, it found that instead of just boring a hole in the perimeter wall as
originally proposed, petitioner divided the wall into several sections to serve as a foundation for his firewall
(which ended up higher than the perimeter wall) and the second storey of his house.

Petitioner maintains that since moral and exemplary damages are compensatory in nature, being meant neither
to punish nor enrich, the claimant must establish that not only did he sustain injury but also that the other party
had acted in bad faith or was motivated by ill will. To petitioner, respondents failed to discharge this burden.

180 |AL YC A B S
He adds that the trial court did not delve into whether petitioner’s renovations were the primary cause of
respondents claimed injuries.

ISSUE: WON respondents are entitled to damages?

RULING: The petition is partly impressed with merit. The trial courts award of moral and exemplary damages,
as affirmed by the appellate court, was premised on the damage and suffering sustained by respondent arising
from quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

In prayers for moral damages, however, recovery is more an exception rather than the rule. Moral damages are
not meant to be punitive but are designed to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish,
fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar
harm unjustly caused to a person. To be entitled to such an award, the claimant must satisfactorily prove that he
has suffered damages and that the injury the cases listed in Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code. Moreover,
the damages must be shown to be the proximate result of a wrongful act or omission. The claimant must thus
establish the factual basis of the damages and its causal tie with the acts of the defendant.

In fine, an award of moral damages calls for the presentation of 1) evidence of besmirched reputation or physical,
mental or psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; 2) a culpable act or omission factually established;
3) proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by
the claimant; and 4) the proof that the act is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by
Article 2219 and Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

In the present case, respondent failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the injuries he sustained
were the proximate effect of petitioners act or omission. It thus becomes necessary to instead look into the
manner by which petitioner carried out his renovations to determine whether this was directly responsible for
any distress respondent may have suffered since the law requires that a wrongful or illegal act or omission must
have preceded the damages sustained by the claimant. It bears noting that petitioner was engaged in the lawful
exercise of his property rights to introduce renovations to his abode. While he initially did not have a building
permit and may have misrepresented his real intent when he initially sought respondents consent, the lack of
the permit was inconsequential since it only rendered petitioner liable to administrative sanctions or penalties.

Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or
moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a
state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. While the Court harbors no doubt that the
incidents which gave rise to this dispute have brought anxiety and anguish to respondent, it is unconvinced that
the damage inflicted upon respondents property was malicious or willful, an element crucial to merit an award
of moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil Code.

Necessarily, the Court is not inclined to award exemplary damages. Petitioner, however, cannot steer clear from
any liability whatsoever. Respondent and his family’s rights to the peaceful enjoyment of their property have,
at the very least, been inconvenienced from the incident borne of petitioners construction work. Any pecuniary
loss or damage suffered by respondent cannot be established as the records are bereft of any factual evidence to
establish the same. Nominal damages may thus be adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, respondent
herein, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, petitioner herein, may be vindicated or recognized,
and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.

181 |AL YC A B S
 EXPERTRAVEL & TOURS, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RICARDO LO
G.R. No. 130030; June 25, 1999

On 07 October 1987, Expertravel & Tours, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the travel agency business,
issued to private respondent Ricardo Lo four round-trip plane tickets for Hongkong, together with hotel
accommodations and transfers, for a total cost of P39,677.20. Alleging that Lo had failed to pay the amount
due, Expertravel caused several demands to be made. Since the demands were ignored by Lo, Expertravel filed
a court complaint for recovery of the amount claimed plus damages.

Respondent Lo explained, in his answer, that his account with Expertravel had already been fully paid. The
outstanding account was remitted to Expertravel through its then Chairperson, Ms. Ma. Rocio de Vega, who
was theretofore authorized to deal with the clients of Expertravel. The payment was evidenced by a Monte de
Piedad Check No. 291559 for P42,175.20 for which Ms. de Vega, in turn, issued City Trust Check No. 417920
in favor of Expertravel for the amount of P50,000.00, with the notation "placement advance for Ricardo Lo,
etc." Per its own invoice, Expertravel received the sum on 10 October 1987.

The trial court, affirmed by the appellate court, held that the payment made by Lo was valid and binding on
petitioner Expertravel. Even on the assumption that Ms. de Vega had not been specifically authorized by
Expertravel, both courts said, the fact that the amount "delivered to the latter remained in its possession up to
the present, meant that the amount redounded to the benefit of petitioner Expertravel, in view of the second
paragraph of Article 1241 of the Civil Code to the effect that payment made to a third person shall also be valid
in so far as it has redounded to the benefit of the creditor.

ISSUE: WON moral damages be recovered in a clearly unfounded suit?

RULING: There is merit in the petition. Moral damages are not punitive in nature but are designed to
compensate and alleviate in some way the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury unjustly caused
to a person. Although incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages, nevertheless, must somehow be
proportional to and in approximation of the suffering inflicted. Such damages, to be recoverable, must be the
proximate result of a wrongful act or omission the factual basis for which is satisfactorily established by the
aggrieved party. An award of moral damages would require certain conditions to be met; to wit: (1) First, there
must be an injury, whether physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second,
there must be a culpable act or omission factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the
defendant is the proximate cause of the injury sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages
is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219.

Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered
when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligation and, exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive
of tort resulting in physical injuries. By special rule in Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206, of the Civil
Code, moral damages may also be awarded in case the death of a passenger results from a breach of carriage.
In culpa aquiliana, or quasi-delict, (a) when an act or omission causes physical injuries, or (b) where the
defendant is guilty of intentional tort, moral damages may aptly be recovered. This rule also applies, as
aforestated, to contracts when breached by tort. In culpa criminal, moral damages could be lawfully due when
the accused is found guilty of physical injuries, lascivious acts, adultery or concubinage, illegal or arbitrary
detention, illegal arrest, illegal search, or defamation. Malicious prosecution can also give rise to a claim for
moral damages. The term "analogous cases," referred to in Article 2219, following the ejusdem generis rule,
must be held similar to those expressly enumerated by the law.

Although the institution of a clearly unfounded civil suit can at times be a legal justification for an award of
attorney's fees, such filing, however, has almost invariably been held not to be a ground for an award of moral
damages. The rationale for the rule is that the law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate. The anguish suffered by a person for having been made a defendant in a civil suit would be no different
from the usual worry and anxiety suffered by anyone who is haled to court, a situation that cannot by itself be a
cogent reason for the award of moral damages.

182 |AL YC A B S
 KIERULF vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 99301 March 13, 1997

PET: VICTOR KIERULF, LUCILA H. KIERULF and PORFIRIO LEGASPI

RES: COURT OF APPEALS and PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INCORPORATED

In G.R. No. 99301, the victims of the vehicular mishap pray for an increase in the award of damages, over and
above those granted by the appellate court. In this case, the husband of the victim of the vehicular accident
claims compensation/damages for the loss of his right to marital consortium which, according to him, has been
diminished due to the disfigurement suffered by his wife.

The initial investigation conducted by D.O. Cornelio disclosed that at about 7:45 p.m. of 28 February 1987, the
Pantranco bus, bearing plate number AVE-845 (TB PIL 86), was traveling along EDSA from Congressional
Avenue towards Clover Leaf, Balintawak. Before it reached the corner of Oliveros Drive, the driver lost control
of the bus, causing it to swerve to the left, and then to fly over the center island occupying the east-bound lane
of EDSA. The front of the bus bumped the front portion of an Isuzu pickup driven by Legaspi, which was
moving along Congressional Avenue heading towards Roosevelt Avenue. As a result, the points of contact of
both vehicles were damaged and physical injuries were inflicted on Legaspi and his passenger Lucila Kierulf,
both of whom were treated at the Quezon City General Hospital. The bus also hit and injured a pedestrian who
was then crossing EDSA.

Despite the impact, said bus continued to move forward and its front portion rammed against a Caltex gasoline
station, damaging its building and gasoline dispensing equipment. As a consequence of the incident, Lucila
suffered injuries, as stated in the medical report of the examining physician, Dr. Pedro P. Solis of the Quezon
City General Hospital. The injuries sustained by Lucila required major surgeries like "tracheotomy, open
reduction, mandibular fracture, intermaxillary repair of multiple laceration" and prolonged treatment by
specialists.

Pantranco, in its petition, adds that on said day, the abovementioned bus was driven by Jose Malanum. While
cruising along EDSA, a used engine differential accidentally and suddenly dropped from a junk truck in front
of the bus. Said differential hit the underchassis of the bus, throwing Malanum off his seat and making him lose
control of said bus. The bus swerved to the left, hit the center island, and bumped the pickup of the spouses.

Spouses Kierulf and their driver Legaspi raise that respondent court of appeals erred in awarding only
P200,000.00 and P25,000.00 as and for moral damages for the petitioners Kierulf and Legaspi respectively
when it should at least have been P1,000,000.00 and P100,000.00 respectively; that respondent court of appeals
erred in awarding only P100,000.00 to the petitioners Kierulf and nothing to petitioner Legaspi as and for
exemplary damages when it should have at least been P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 respectively; respondent
court of appeals erred in not awarding any amount for the lost income due to the petitioner Lucila H. Kierulf;
respondent court of appeals erred in not awarding the amount of P107,583.50 for the damages sustained by the
Isuzu carry-all pick-up truck.

ISSUE: WON moral damages awarded by Respondent Court are "clearly and woefully not enough"

RULING: The Kierulf spouses add that the Respondent Court should have considered another factor: the loss
of their conjugal fellowship and the impairment or destruction of their sexual life. The spouses aver that the
disfigurement of Lucila's physical appearance cannot but affect their marital right to "consortium" which would
have remained normal were it not for the accident. Thus the moral damages awarded in favor of Lucila should
be increased to P1,000,000.00, not only for Lucila but also for her husband Victor who also suffered
"psychologically." A California case, Rodriguez vs. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, is cited as authority for the
claim of damages by reason of loss of marital consortium, i.e. loss of conjugal fellowship and sexual relations.

Pantranco rebuts that Victor's claim of moral damages on alleged loss of consortium is without legal basis.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code provides that only the person suffering the injury may claim moral damages.
Additionally, no evidence was adduced to show that the consortium had indeed been impaired and the Court
cannot presume that marital relations disappeared with the accident.

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The Courts notes that the Rodriguez case clearly reversed the original common law view first enunciated in the
case of Deshotel vs. Atchison, that a wife could not recover for the loss of her husband's services by the act of a
third party. Rodriguez ruled that when a person is injured to the extent that he/she is no longer capable of giving
love, affection, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real
personal loss. The loss is immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable; it is personal to
the spouse and separate and distinct from that of the injured person. Rodriguez involved a couple in their early
20s, who were married for only 16 months and full of dreams of building a family of their own, when the
husband was struck and almost paralyzed by a falling 600-pound pipe.

Whether Rodriguez may be cited as authority to support the award of moral damages to Victor and/or Lucila
Kierulf for "loss of consortium," however, cannot be properly considered in this case. Victor's claim for
deprivation of his right to consortium, although argued before Respondent Court, is not supported by the
evidence on record. His wife might have been badly disfigured, but he had not testified that, in consequence
thereof, his right to marital consortium was affected. Clearly, Victor (and for that matter, Lucila) had failed to
make out a case for loss of consortium, unlike the Rodriguez spouse. Again, we emphasize that this claim is
factual in origin and must find basis not only in the evidence presented but also in the findings of the Respondent
Court. For lack of factual basis, such claim cannot be ruled upon by this Court at this time.

The social and financial standing of Lucila cannot be considered in awarding moral damages. The social and
financial standing of a claimant of moral damages may be considered in awarding moral damages only if he or
she was subjected to contemptuous conduct despite the offender's knowledge of his or her social and financial
standing. Be that as it may, it is still proper to award moral damages to Petitioner Lucila for her physical
sufferings, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety and wounded feelings. She sustained multiple injuries on the
scalp, limbs and ribs. She lost all her teeth. She had to undergo several corrective operations and treatments.
Despite treatment and surgery, her chin was still numb and thick. She felt that she has not fully recovered from
her injuries. She even had to undergo a second operation on her gums for her dentures to fit. She suffered
sleepless nights and shock as a consequence of the vehicular accident. In this light and considering further the
length of time spent in prosecuting the complaint and this appeal, we find the sum of P400,000.00 as moral
damages for Petitioner Lucila to be fair and just under the circumstances.

Complainants also pray for an increase of exemplary damages to P500,000.00 and P50,000.00 for Spouses
Kierulf and Legaspi, respectively. This prayer is based on the pronouncement of this Court in Batangas
Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal that "it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators
the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise
greater care in the selection of drivers and conductors.” Exemplary damages are designed to permit the courts
to mould behavior that has socially deleterious consequences, and its imposition is required by public policy to
suppress the wanton acts of an offender. However, it cannot be recovered as a matter of right. It is based entirely
on the discretion of the court. The claim of Lucila has been favorably considered in view of the finding of gross
negligence by Respondent Court on the part of Pantranco. To give teeth to this warning, the exemplary damages
awarded to Petitioner Lucila is increased to P200,000.00. The fact of gross negligence duly proven, we believe
that Legaspi, being also a victim of gross negligence, should also receive exemplary damages. Under the facts
proven, the Court awards him P25,000 as exemplary damages.

Lost income in the amount of P16,500.00 is also claimed by Legaspi stating that his "whole future has been
jeopardized." This, in turn, is not rebutted by Pantranco. We find, however, the claim of Legaspi to be duly
substantiated. Pantranco failed to rebut the claim of Porfirio that he had been incapacitated for ten (10) months
and that during said period he did not have any income. Considering that, prior to the accident, he was employed
as a driver and was earning P1,650.00 a month, his claim for P16,500.00 as compensation for loss of earning
capacity for said period is amply supported by the records and is demandable under Article 2205 of the Civil
Code.

Complainants contend that Lucila is also entitled to damages for "loss or impairment of earning capacity in
cases of temporary or permanent personal injury" under Article 2205 of the Civil Code. Notably, both the trial
court and public respondent denied this prayer because of her failure to produce her income tax returns for the
years 1985 and 1986, notwithstanding the production of her 1983 and 1984 income tax returns. We agree with

184 |AL YC A B S
the findings of Respondent Court that Lucila's claim of loss of earning capacity has not been duly proven. The
alleged loss must be established by factual evidence for it partakes of actual damages. A party is entitled to
adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered and duly proved. Such damages, to be
recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be shown with a reasonable degree of certainty.
We have emphasized that these damages cannot be presumed, and courts in making an award must point out
specific facts which can serve as basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne.

185 |AL YC A B S
 IGNACIO BARZAGA vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ANGELITO ALVIAR
G.R. No. 115129; February 12, 1997

The Fates ordained that Christmas 1990 be bleak for Ignacio Barzaga and his family. On the nineteenth of
December Ignacio's wife succumbed to a debilitating ailment after prolonged pain and suffering. Forewarned
by her attending physicians of her impending death, she expressed her wish to be laid to rest before Christmas
day to spare her family from keeping lonely vigil over her remains while the whole of Christendom celebrate
the Nativity of their Redeemer. Ignacio Barzaga set out to arrange for her interment on the twenty-fourth of
December in obedience semper fidelis to her dying wish. But her final entreaty, unfortunately, could not be
carried out. Dire events conspired to block his plans that forthwith gave him and his family their gloomiest
Christmas ever.

This is Barzaga's story. On 21 December 1990, at about three o`clock in the afternoon, he went to the hardware
store of respondent Angelito Alviar to inquire about the availability of certain materials to be used in the
construction of a niche for his wife. He also asked if the materials could be delivered at once. Marina Boncales,
Alviar's storekeeper, replied that she had yet to verify if the store had pending deliveries that afternoon because
if there were then all subsequent purchases would have to be delivered the following day. With that reply
petitioner left.

At seven o' clock the following morning, 22 December, Barzaga returned to Alviar's hardware store to follow
up his purchase of construction materials. He told the store employees that the materials he was buying would
have to be delivered at the Memorial Cemetery in Dasmarias, Cavite, by eight o'clock that morning since his
hired workers were already at the burial site and time was of the essence. Marina Boncales agreed to deliver the
items at the designated time, date and place. With this assurance, Barzaga purchased the materials and paid in
full the amount of P2,110.00. The construction materials did not arrive at eight o'clock as promised. At nine o'
clock, the delivery was still nowhere in sight. Barzaga returned to the hardware store to inquire about the delay.
Boncales assured him that although the delivery truck was not yet around it had already left the garage and that
as soon as it arrived the materials would be brought over to the cemetery in no time at all.

By ten o'clock, there was still no delivery. This prompted petitioner to return to the store to inquire about the
materials. But he received the same answer from respondent's employees who even cajoled him to go back to
the burial place as they would just follow with his construction materials. After hours of waiting - which seemed
interminable to him - Barzaga became extremely upset. He decided to dismiss his laborers for the day. He
proceeded to the police station, which was just nearby, and lodged a complaint against Alviar. He had his
complaint entered in the police blotter. When he returned again to the store he saw the delivery truck already
there but the materials he purchased were not yet ready for loading.

In the afternoon of that day, petitioner was able to buy from another store. But since darkness was already setting
in and his workers had left, he made up his mind to start his project the following morning, 23 December. But
he knew that the niche would not be finish in time for the scheduled burial the following day. His laborers had
to take a break on Christmas Day and they could only resume in the morning of the twenty-sixth. The niche was
completed in the afternoon and Barzaga's wife was finally laid to rest. However, it was 2 1/2 days behind
schedule.

Barzaga wrote private respondent Alviar demanding recompense for the damage he suffered. Alviar did not
respond. Consequently, petitioner sued him before the Regional Trial Court. Resisting petitioner's claim, private
respondent contended that legal delay could not be validly ascribed to him because no specific time of delivery
was agreed upon between them. He pointed out that the invoices evidencing the sale did not contain any
stipulation as to the exact time of delivery and that assuming that the materials were not delivered within the
period desired by petitioner, the delivery truck suffered a flat tire on the way to the store to pick up the materials.

The trial court ordered respondent Alviar to pay petitioner (a) P2,110.00 as refund for the purchase price of the
materials with interest per annum computed at the legal rate from the date of the filing of the complaint, (b)
P5,000.00 as temperate damages, (c) P20,000.00 as moral damages, (d) P5,000.00 as litigation expenses, and
(e) P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and ruled that

186 |AL YC A B S
there was no contractual commitment as to the exact time of delivery since this was not indicated in the invoice
receipts covering the sale.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in reversing the trial courts decision

RULING: We sustain the trial court. An assiduous scrutiny of the record convinces us that respondent Angelito
Alviar was negligent and incurred in delay in the performance of his contractual obligation. This sufficiently
entitles petitioner Ignacio Barzaga to be indemnified for the damage he suffered as a consequence of delay or a
contractual breach. The law expressly provides that those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty
of fraud, negligence, or delay and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.

Contrary to the appellate court's factual determination, there was a specific time agreed upon for the delivery of
the materials to the cemetery. Petitioner went to private respondent's store on 21 December precisely to inquire
if the materials he intended to purchase could be delivered immediately. But he was told by the storekeeper that
if there were still deliveries to be made that afternoon his order would be delivered the following day. With this
in mind Barzaga decided to buy the construction materials the following morning after he was assured of
immediate delivery according to his time frame. The argument that the invoices never indicated a specific
delivery time must fall in the face of the positive verbal commitment of respondent's storekeeper. Consequently
it was no longer necessary to indicate in the invoices the exact time the purchased items were to be brought to
the cemetery. In fact, storekeeper Boncales admitted that it was her custom not to indicate the time of delivery
whenever she prepared invoices.

We also find unacceptable respondent's justification that his truck had a flat tire, for this event, if indeed it
happened, was forseeable according to the trial court, and as such should have been reasonably guarded against.
The nature of private respondent's business requires that he should be ready at all times to meet contingencies
of this kind. This case is clearly one of non-performance of a reciprocal obligation. In their contract of purchase
and sale, petitioner had already complied fully with what was required of him as purchaser, i.e., the payment of
the purchase price of P2,110.00. It was incumbent upon respondent to immediately fulfill his obligation to
deliver the goods otherwise delay would attach.

We therefore sustain the award of moral damages. It cannot be denied that petitioner and his family suffered
wounded feelings, mental anguish and serious anxiety while keeping watch on Christmas day over the remains
of their loved one who could not be laid to rest on the date she herself had chosen. There is no gainsaying the
inexpressible pain and sorrow Ignacio Barzaga and his family bore at that moment caused no less by the
ineptitude, cavalier behavior and bad faith of respondent and his employees in the performance of an obligation
voluntarily entered into.

We also affirm the grant of exemplary damages. The lackadaisical and feckless attitude of the employees of
respondent over which he exercised supervisory authority indicates gross negligence in the fulfillment of his
business obligations. Respondent Alviar and his employees should have exercised fairness and good judgment
in dealing with petitioner who was then grieving over the loss of his wife. Instead of commiserating with him,
respondent and his employees contributed to petitioner's anguish by causing him to bear the agony resulting
from his inability to fulfill his wife's dying wish.

We delete however the award of temperate damages. Under Art. 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages are
more than nominal but less than compensatory, and may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty. In this case,
the trial court found that plaintiff suffered damages in the form of wages for the hired workers for 22 December
1990 and expenses incurred during the extra two (2) days of the wake. The record however does not show that
petitioner presented proof of the actual amount of expenses he incurred which seems to be the reason the trial
court awarded to him temperate damages instead. This is an erroneous application of the concept of temperate
damages. While petitioner may have indeed suffered pecuniary losses, these by their very nature could be
established with certainty by means of payment receipts. As such, the claim falls unequivocally within the realm
of actual or compensatory damages. Petitioner's failure to prove actual expenditure consequently conduces to a
failure of his claim.

187 |AL YC A B S
 FRANCISCO vs. FERRER
G.R. No. 142029; February 28, 2001

PET: ERLINDA FRANCISCO, doing business in the name and style of Cebu Fountainhead Bakeshop,
and JULIANA PAMAONG
RES: RICARDO FERRER, JR., ANNETTE FERRER, ERNESTO LO AND REBECCA LO

On November 19, 1992 Mrs. Rebecca Lo and her daughter Annette Ferrer ordered a three layered cake from
Fountainhead Bakeshop, Mango Avenue Branch. It was then agreed that the wedding cake shall be delivered at
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon at the Cebu Country Club, Cebu City, stating clearly that the wedding is scheduled
on December 14, 1992. They made their first deposit in the amount of P1,000.00 on November 19, 1992 and
two weeks thereafter made a full payment on the remaining balance.

On the day of the wedding, December 14, 1992, they arrived at the Cebu Country club around 6:00 o’clock in
the evening. They immediately notice the absence of the wedding cake. At 7:00 o’clock in the evening they
made a follow-up call to Fountainhead Bakeshop and was informed that it was probably late because of the
traffic. At 8:00 o’clock they were informed that no wedding cake will be delivered because the order slip got
lost. Plaintiffs (now respondents herein) were then compelled to buy the only available cake at the Cebu Country
Club which was a sans rival. Even though they felt that it was a poor substitute to a wedding cake, the cutting
of the cake is always a part of the ceremony. At 10:00 o’clock in the evening, the wedding cake arrived but
plaintiffs declined to accept it, besides their order was a three-layered cake and what was actually delivered was
a two-layered one.

Subsequently, defendant Erlinda Francisco sent a letter of apology accompanied with a P5,000.00 check,
however, the same was declined by plaintiffs because they felt it was inadequate. Two weeks after the wedding,
defendant Erlinda Francisco called Mrs. Rebecca Lo and apologized. Ricardo Ferrer, son-in-law of Rebecca Lo
corroborated the latter’s testimony, stating that two weeks after the wedding, as a result of the non-delivery of
the wedding cake, Ramon Montinola, the son-in-law of Erlinda Francisco, went to Rebecca Los residence and
offered the sum of P5,000.00 to indemnify for the damage done, but it was rejected.

On March 12, 1993, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City an action for breach of contract
with damages against petitioners. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs [herein defendants].
the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision modifying the appealed decision increasing the trial courts award
of moral damages to Ricardo Ferrer, Jr., Annette Ferrer, Ernesto Lo and Rebecca Lo to two hundred fifty
thousand pesos (P250,000.00) and awarding exemplary damages in the amount of one hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00), in addition to the following: the cost of the wedding cake in the amount of P3,175.00; attorneys
fees in the amount of P10,000.00 and costs of suit.

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of respondents?

RULING: To recover moral damages in an action for breach of contract, the breach must be palpably wanton,
reckless, malicious, in bad faith, oppressive or abusive. Under the provisions of this law, in culpa contractual or
breach of contract, moral damages may be recovered when the defendant acted in bad faith or was guilty of
gross negligence (amounting to bad faith) or in wanton disregard of his contractual obligation and,
exceptionally, when the act of breach of contract itself is constitutive of tort resulting in physical injuries. Moral
damages may be awarded in breaches of contracts where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Bad
faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence, it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral
obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty through some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.

In this case, [w]e find no such fraud or bad faith. Moral damages are in the category of an award designed to
compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer. The person
claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing evidence for the law
always presumes good faith. It is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish, and
serious anxiety as the result of the actuations of the other party. Invariably such action must be shown to have
been willfully done in bad faith or with ill motive. Mere allegations of besmirched reputation, embarrassment

188 |AL YC A B S
and sleepless nights are insufficient to warrant an award for moral damages. It must be shown that the proximate
cause thereof was the unlawful act or omission of the [private respondent] petitioners. An award of moral
damages would require certain conditions to be met, to wit: (1) first, there must be an injury, whether physical,
mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; (2) second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; (3) third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and (4) fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code.

It must again stressed that moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of
the defendant. When awarded, moral damages must not be palpably and scandalously excessive as to indicate
that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court judge or appellate court
justices.
In the same fashion, to warrant the award of exemplary damages, [t]he wrongful act must be accompanied by
bad faith, and an award of damages would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless or malevolent manner.

The requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of example in
addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2) that they
cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a wanton,
fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Nevertheless, the facts show that when confronted with their failure to deliver on the wedding day the wedding
cake ordered and paid for, petitioners gave the lame excuse that delivery was probably delayed because of the
traffic, when in truth, no cake could be delivered because the order slip got lost. For such prevarication,
petitioners must be held liable for nominal damages for insensitivity, inadvertence or inattention to their
customer’s anxiety and need of the hour. Nominal damages are recoverable where a legal right is technically
violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any kind or
where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have been or
can be shown. Nominal damages may be awarded to a plaintiff whose right has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the plaintiff for any
loss suffered.

189 |AL YC A B S
 JUDITH D. DARINES AND JOYCE D. DARINES vs. EDUARDO QUIÑONES AND ROLANDO
QUITAN
G.R. No. 206468; August 02, 2017

Judith D. Darines (Judith) and her daughter, Joyce D. Darines (Joyce) (petitioners) alleged in their Complaint
that on December 31, 2005, they boarded the Amianan Bus Line with Plate No. ACM 497 and Body No. 808
as paying passengers enroute from Carmen, Rosales, Pangasinan to Baguio City. Respondent Rolando M.
Quitan (Quitan) was driving the bus at that time. While travelling on Camp 3, Tuba, Benguet along Kennon
Road, the bus crashed into a truck (with Plate No. XSE 578) which was parked on the shoulder of Kennon Road.
As a result, both vehicles were damaged; two passengers of the bus died; and the other passengers, including
petitioners, were injured. In particular, Joyce suffered cerebral concussion while Judith had an eye wound which
required an operation.

Petitioners argued that Quitan and respondent Eduardo Quinones (Quinones), the operator of Amianan Bus
Line, breached their contract of carriage as they failed to bring them safely to their destination. They also
contended that Quitan's reckless and negligent driving caused the collision. Consequently, they prayed for
actual, moral, exemplary and temperate damages, and costs of suit.

For their part, Quinones and Quitan (respondents) countered in their Answer that, during the December
31, 2005 incident, Quitan was driving in a careful, prudent, and dutiful manner at the normal speed of 40
kilometers per hour. According to them, the proximate cause of the incident was the negligence of the truck
driver, Ronald C. Fernandez, who parked the truck at the roadside right after the curve without having installed
any early warning device. They also claimed that Quinones observed due diligence in the selection and
supervision of his employees as he conducted seminars on road safety measures; and Quitan attended such
seminars including those required by the government on traffic safety. They likewise averred that Quitan was a
licensed professional driver who, in his 12 years as a public utility driver, had not figured in any incident like
the one at hand.

During the trial, Judith testified that Quitan was driving at a very fast pace resulting in a collision with the truck
parked at the shoulder of the road.6 Consequently, the bone holding her right eye was fractured and had to be
operated.7 She claimed that, as a result of incident, she failed to report for work for two months. To prove the
actual damages that she suffered, Judith presented receipts for medicine, and a summary of expenses, which
included those incurred for the ritual dao-is. She explained that she and Joyce are Igorots, being members of
Ibaloi, Kankanay-ey, an indigenous tribe;9 and as their customary practice, when a member who meets an
accident is released from the hospital, they butcher pigs to remove or prevent bad luck from returning to the
family. Moreover, to support her claim for moral damages, Judith testified that she suffered sleepless nights
since she worried about the result and possible effect of her operation.

RTC rendered its Decision ordering respondents to pay petitioners. RTC held that since the respondents already
paid the actual damages relating to petitioners' medical and hospitalization expenses, then the only remaining
matters for resolution were: whether respondents were liable to pay petitioners a) actual damages representing
the expenses incurred during the dao-isritual; and, Judith's alleged lost income; b) moral and exemplary
damages; and, c) attorney's fees. The RTC noted that petitioners did not present any receipt as regards the
expenses they incurred during the dao-is ritual. As regards their claim for Judith's lost income, the RTC held
that petitioners similarly failed to substantiate the same as there was no showing that Judith's failure to report
for work for two months was because of the incident. Thus, the RTC did not award actual damages for lack of
evidence.

The CA stressed that respondents did not dispute that they were liable for breach of contract of carriage; in fact,
they paid for the medical and hospital expenses of petitioners. Nonetheless, the CA deleted the award of moral
damages because petitioners failed to prove that respondents acted fraudulently or in bad faith, as shown by the
fact that respondents paid petitioners' medical and hospitalization expenses. The CA held that, since no moral
damages was awarded, then there was no basis to grant exemplary damages. Finally, it ruled that because moral
and exemplary damages were not granted, then the award of attorney's fees must also be deleted.

ISSUE: WON petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary damages?

190 |AL YC A B S
RULING: Petitioners contend that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees by the RTC
already attained finality because respondents did not dispute such grants when they appealed to the CA but only
the fact that the amounts were exorbitant. Such contention is without merit.

Going now to the main issue, the Court fully agrees with the CA ruling that in an action for breach of contract,
moral damages may be recovered only when a) death of a passenger results; or b) the carrier was guilty of fraud
and bad faith even if death does not result; and that neither of these circumstances were present in the case at
bar. The CA correctly held that, since no moral damages was awarded then, there is no basis to grant exemplary
damages and attorney's fees to petitioners.

To stress, this case is one for breach of contract of carriage (culpa contractual) where it is necessary to show
the existence of the contract between the parties, and the failure of the common carrier to transport its passenger
safely to his or her destination. An action for breach of contract differs from quasidelicts (also referred as culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra contractual) as the latter emanate from the negligence of the tort feasor17 including
such instance where a person is injured in a vehicular accident by a party other than the carrier where he is a
passenger. The principle that, in an action for breach of contract of carriage, moral damages may be awarded
only in case (1) an accident results in the death of a passenger; or (2) the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith,
is pursuant to Article 1764, in relation to Article 2206(3) of the Civil Code, and Article 2220 thereof.

The aforesaid concepts of fraud or bad faith and negligence are basic as they are distinctly differentiated by law.
Specifically, fraud or bad faith connotes "deliberate or wanton wrong doing" or such deliberate disregard of
contractual obligations while negligence amounts to sheer carelessness. More particularly, fraud includes
"inducement through insidious machination." In turn, insidious machination refers to such deceitful strategy or
such plan with an evil purpose. On the other hand, bad faith does not merely pertain to bad judgment or
negligence but relates to a dishonest purpose, and a deliberate doing of a wrongful act. Bad faith involves
"breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud."

In Viluan v. Court of Appeals, and Bulante v. Chu Liante, the Court disallowed the recovery of moral damages
in actions for breach of contract for lack of showing that the common carrier committed fraud or bad faith in
performing its obligation. Similarly, in Verzosa v. Baytan, the Court did not also grant moral damages in an
action for breach of contract as there was neither allegation nor proof that the common carrier committed fraud
or bad faith. The Court declared that "[t]o award moral damages for breach of contract, therefore, without proof
of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by [Article 2220 of the Civil Code], would be to
violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.

Meanwhile, in Gatchalian v. Delim, and Mr. & Mrs. Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the Court found the common
carriers liable for breach of contract of carriage and awarded moral damages to the injured passengers on the
ground that the common carrier committed gross negligence, which amounted to bad faith. Particularly, in Mr.
& Mrs. Fabre, Jr., the gross negligence of the common carrier was determined from the fact that its driver was
not engaged to drive long distance travels; he was also unfamiliar with the area where he detoured the bus as it
was his first time to ply such route; the road was slippery because it was raining, yet the bus was running at 50
kilometers per hour resulting in its skidding to the left shoulder of the road; and the bus hit the steel brace on
the road at past 11:30 p.m. The Court also noted that other than the imputation of gross negligence, the injured
passengers therein pursued their claim not on the theory of breach of contract of carriage alone but also on
quasi-delicts. Clearly, unless it is fully established (and not just lightly inferred) that negligence in an action for
breach of contract is so gross as to amount to malice, then the claim of moral damages is without merit.

Here, petitioners impute negligence on the part of respondents when, as paying passengers, they sustained
injuries when the bus owned and operated by respondent Quinones, and driven by respondent Quitan, collided
with another vehicle. Petitioners propounded on the negligence of respondents, but did not discuss or impute
fraud or bad faith, or such gross negligence which would amount to bad faith, against respondents. There being
neither allegation nor proof that respondents acted in fraud or in bad faith in performing their duties arising from
their contract of carriage, they are then not liable for moral damages.

191 |AL YC A B S
The Court also sustains the CA's finding that petitioners are not entitled to exemplary damages. Exemplary
damages may be awarded only in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages. Since
petitioners are not entitled to either moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages, then their claim for
exemplary damages is bereft of merit. Finally, considering the absence of any of the circumstances under Article
220833 of the Civil Code where attorney's fees may be awarded, the same cannot be granted to petitioners.

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 TAN vs. OMC CARRIERS, INC. and BONIFACIO ARAMBALA
G.R. No. 190521; January 12, 2011

PET: LETICIA TAN, MYRNA MEDINA, MARILOU SPOONER, ROSALINDA TAN, MARY JANE
TAN, MARY LYN TAN, CELEDONIO TAN, JR., MARY JOY TAN, AND MARK ALLAN TAN,
represented herein by their mother, LETICIA TAN

On September 27, 1996, the petitioners filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against OMC and Bonifacio
Arambala. The complaint states that on November 24, 1995, at around 6:15 a.m., Arambala was driving a truck
with a trailer owned by OMC, along Meralco Road, Sucat, Muntinlupa City. When Arambala noticed that the
truck had suddenly lost its brakes, he told his companion to jump out. Soon thereafter, he also jumped out and
abandoned the truck. Driverless, the truck rammed into the house and tailoring shop owned by petitioner Leticia
Tan and her husband Celedonio Tan, instantly killing Celedonio who was standing at the doorway of the house
at the time.

The petitioners alleged that the collision occurred due to OMCs gross negligence in not properly maintaining
the truck, and to Arambalas recklessness when he abandoned the moving truck. Thus, they claimed that the
respondents should be held jointly and severally liable for the actual damages that they suffered, which include
the damage to their properties, the funeral expenses they incurred for Celedonio Tans burial, as well as the loss
of his earning capacity. The petitioners also asked for moral and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.

RTC found OMC and Arambala jointly and severally liable to the petitioners for damages. Relying on the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the RTC held that it was unusual for a truck to suddenly lose its brakes; the fact
that the truck rammed into the petitioners house raised the presumption of negligence on the part of the
respondents. These, the respondents failed to refute. RTC did not agree with the respondents claim of a
fortuitous event, pointing out that even with oil on the road, Arambala did not slow down or take any
precautionary measure to prevent the truck from skidding off the road. The alleged oil on the road did not also
explain why the truck lost its brakes. Had OMC done a more rigid inspection of the truck before its use, the
defective brake could have been discovered.

CA affirmed the RTCs findings on the issues of the respondents negligence and liability for damages. However,
the CA modified the damages awarded to the petitioners by reducing the actual damages award from
P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The CA observed that only the latter amount was duly supported by official receipts.
The CA also deleted the RTCs award for loss of earning capacity. The CA explained that the petitioners failed
to substantiate Celedonio Tans claimed earning capacity with reasonable certainty; no documentary evidence
was ever presented on this point. Instead, the RTC merely relied on Leticia Tans testimony regarding Celedonio
Tans income. The CA characterized this testimony as self-serving. The CA further reduced the exemplary
damages from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00, and deleted the award of attorneys fees because the RTC merely
included the award in the dispositive portion of the decision without discussing its legal basis.

Petitioners assert that the CA erred when it modified the RTCs awarded damages. First, the CA erred when it
reduced the RTCs award of actual damages from P355,895.00 to P72,295.00. The petitioners claim that they
sought compensation for the damage done to petitioner Leticia Tans house, tailoring shop, sewing machines, as
well as other household appliances. Second, the petitioners are entitled to actual damages for the loss of
Celedonio Tans earning capacity. While they admit that they did not submit any documentary evidence to
substantiate this claim, the petitioners point out that Celedonio Tan was undisputably a self-employed tailor
who owned a small tailor shop; in his line of work, no documentary evidence is available. Third, the petitioners
maintain that they are entitled to exemplary damages in the amount of P500,000.00 because the RTC and the
CA consistently found that the collision was caused by the respondents gross negligence. Lastly, the petitioners
are entitled to attorneys fees based on Article 2208 of the Civil Code which provides, among others, that
attorneys fees can be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, and when the defendant acted in gross
and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.

ISSUE: WON the petition is impressed with merit?

RULING: The petition is partly meritorious.

193 |AL YC A B S
We begin by discussing the petitioners claim for actual damages arising from the damage inflicted on petitioner
Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop, taking into account the sewing machines and various household
appliances affected. Our basic law tells us that to recover damages there must be pleading and proof of actual
damages suffered. Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork
in determining the fact and amount of damages. To justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent
proof of the actual amount of loss, credence can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts.

The petitioners do not deny that they did not submit any receipt to support their claim for actual damages to
prove the monetary value of the damage caused to the house and tailoring shop when the truck rammed into
them. Thus, no actual damages for the destruction to petitioner Leticia Tans house and tailoring shop can be
awarded. Nonetheless, absent competent proof on the actual damages suffered, a party still has the option of
claiming temperate damages, which may be allowed in cases where, from the nature of the case, definite proof
of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party suffered some
pecuniary loss.

The photographs the petitioners presented as evidence show the extent of the damage done to the house, the
tailoring shop and the petitioners appliances and equipment. Irrefutably, this damage was directly attributable
to Arambalas gross negligence in handling OMCs truck. Unfortunately, these photographs are not enough to
establish the amount of the loss with certainty. From the attendant circumstances and given the property
destroyed, we find the amount of P200,000.00 as a fair and sufficient award by way of temperate damages.

Similarly, the CA was correct in disallowing the award of actual damages for loss of earning capacity. As a rule,
documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the claim for loss of earning capacity. By way of
exception, damages for loss of earning capacity may be awarded despite the absence of documentary evidence
when: (1) the deceased is self-employed and earning less than the minimum wage under current labor laws, in
which case, judicial notice may be taken of the fact that in the deceased's line of work, no documentary evidence
is available; or (2) the deceased is employed as a daily wage worker earning less than the minimum wage under
current labor laws.

According to the petitioners, prior to his death, Celedonio was a self-employed tailor who earned approximately
P156,000.00 a year, or P13,000.00 a month. Even if we take judicial notice of the fact that a small tailoring shop
normally does not issue receipts to its customers, and would probably not have any documentary evidence of
the income it earns, Celedonios alleged monthly income of P13,000.00 greatly exceeded the prevailing monthly
minimum wage; thus, the exception set forth above does not apply.

In the present case, the income-earning capacity of the deceased was never disputed. Petitioners Mary Jane Tan,
Mary Lyn Tan, Celedonio Tan, Jr., Mary Joy Tan and Mark Allan Tan were all minors at the time the petition
was filed on February 4, 2010, and they all relied mainly on the income earned by their father from his tailoring
activities for their sustenance and support. Under these facts and taking into account the unrebutted annual
earnings of the deceased, we hold that the petitioners are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of
P300,000.00 [or roughly, the gross income for two (2) years] to compensate for damages for loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased.

Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition
to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted
if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Celedonio Tans death and the destruction of the petitioners home
and tailoring shop were unquestionably caused by the respondents gross negligence. The law allows the grant
of exemplary damages in cases such as this to serve as a warning to the public and as a deterrent against the
repetition of this kind of deleterious actions. The grant, however, should be tempered, as it is not intended to
enrich one party or to impoverish another. From this perspective, we find the CAs reduction of the exemplary
damages awarded to the petitioners from P500,000.00 to P200,000.00 to be proper. In view of the award of
exemplary damages, we find it also proper to award the petitioners attorney's fees, in consonance with Article
2208(1) of the Civil Code. We find the award of attorneys fees, equivalent to 10% of the total amount adjudged
the petitioners, to be just and reasonable under the circumstances.

194 |AL YC A B S
 SEVEN BROTHERS SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. DMC-CONSTRUCTION RESOURCES
G.R. No. 193914; November 26, 2014

Petitioner Seven Brothers Shipping Corporation is the owner of the cargo ship M/V "Diamond Rabbit," (vessel),
while respondent DMC-Construction Resource, Inc. is the owner of coal-conveyor facility, which was destroyed
when the vessel became uncontrollable and unmanueverable during a storm. On 23 February 1996, the cargo
ship M/V "Diamond Rabbit" (the Vessel) owned and operated by defendant Seven Brothers Shipping
Corporation (Seven Brothers), was at the PICOP Pier in Mangagoy, Bislig, Surigao del Sur to dock there.
According to the record, the weather that day was windy with a wind force of 10 to 20 knots, and the sea
condition was rough, with waves 6 to 8 feet high. However, the parties also stipulated during pre-trial that prior
to the occurrence of the incident, the vessel was anchored at the causeway of the port of Bislig, where it was
safe from inclement weather.

According to the report of the Master, it heaved its anchor and left the causeway in order to dock at the PICOP
Pier. A lifeboat pulled the vessel towards the Pier with a heaving line attached to the vessel's astern mooring
rope, when suddenly, the heaving line broke loose, causing the astern mooring rope to drift freely. The mooring
rope got entangled in the vessel's propeller, thereby choking and disabling it, and preventing the further use of
its main engine for maneuvering.

Under the influence of the wind and current, the dead weight of the vessel caused it to swung from side to side
until the fender, where the mooring rope was attached, collapsed. The uncontrollable and unmaneuverable vessel
drifted and dragged its anchor until it hit several structures at the Pier, including the coal conveyor facility
owned by DMC Construction Equipment Resources, Inc. (DMC).

Respondent sent a formal demand letter to petitioner, claiming the amount above-stated for the damages
sustained by their vessel. When petitioner failed to pay, respondent filed with the RTC a Complaint for damages
against respondent on 23 March 1998. Based on the pieces of evidence presented by both parties, the RTC ruled
that as a result of the incident, the loading conveyor and related structures of respondent were indeed
damaged.8In the course of the destruction, the RTC found that no force majeure existed, considering that
petitioner's captain was well aware of the bad weather, and yet proceeded against the strong wind and rough
seas, instead of staying at the causeway and waiting out the passage of the typhoon.

RTC awarded respondent actual damages in the amount of P3,523,175.92 plus legal interest of 6%, based on
the testimony of respondent's engineer, Loreto Dalangin (Engr. Dalangin). The value represented 50% of the
P7,046,351.84 claimed by the respondent as the fair and reasonable valuation of the structure at the time of the
loss,11 because as manifested by Engr. Dalangin at the time of the incident, the loading conveyor and related
structures were almost five years old, with a normal useful life of 10 years. The CA affirmed the RTC's Decision
with respect to the finding of negligence on the part of the vessel's captain. However, the appellate court
modified the nature of damages awarded (from actual to nominal), on the premise that actual damages had not
been proved. Respondent merely relied on estimates to prove the cost of replacing the structures destroyed by
the vessel, as no actual receipt was presented.

Petitioner argues that under Articles 2221 and 2223 of the Civil Code, nominal damages are only awarded to
vindicate or recognize a right that has been violated, and not to indemnify a party for any loss suffered by the
latter. They are not awarded as a simple replacement for actual damages that were not duly proven during trial.
Assuming further that nominal damages were properly awarded by the CA, petitioner is of the belief that the
amount thereof must be equal or at least commensurate to the injury sustained by the claimant, as ruled in PNOC
Shipping and Transportation Corp. v. Court of Appeals (PNOC). Considering that respondent allegedly failed
to substantiate its actual loss, it was therefore improper for the CA to award nominal damages of P3,523,175.92,
which was based on respondent's "highly speculative claims."

Respondent, on the other hand, alleges that nominal damages were rightly assessed, since there was a categorical
finding that its "property right was indubitably invaded and violated when damage to its conveyor and port
equipment due to petitioner's negligence," was inflicted. Nominal damages are recoverable where some injury
has been done, but the evidence fails to show the corresponding amount thereof. Accordingly, the assessment
of damages is left to the discretion of the court

195 |AL YC A B S
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in awarding nominal damages to respondent after having ruled that the
actual damages awarded by the RTC was unfounded?

RULING: We rule that temperate, and not nominal, damages should be awarded to respondent in the amount
of P3,523,175.92.

Temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been
suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be provided with certainty. As we have stated in
Dee Hua Liong Electrical Equipment Corp., v. Reyes, "[a]ctual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed,
but must be duly proved, and proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they
have suffered and on evidence of the actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages
will be awarded."

Under Article 2221 of the Civil Code, nominal damages may be awarded in order that the plaintiff’s right, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. Nominal damages are 'recoverable where a legal right is
technically violated and must be vindicated against an invasion that has produced no actual present loss of any
kind or where there has been a breach of contract and no substantial injury or actual damages whatsoever have
been or can be shown.' Thus, in Saludo v. Court of Appeals, nominal damages were granted because while
petitioner suffered no substantial injury, his right to be treated with due courtesy was violated by the respondent,
Transworld Airlines, Inc.

Consequently, in computing the amount of temperate or moderate damages, it is usually left to the discretion of
the courts, but the amount must be reasonable, bearing in mind that temperate damages should be more than
nominal but less than compensatory. Here, we are convinced that respondent sustained damages to its conveyor
facility due to petitioner's negligence. Nonetheless, for failure of respondent to establish by competent evidence
the exact amount of damages it suffered, we are constrained to award temperate damages. Considering that the
lower courts have factually established that the conveyor facility had a remaining life of only five of its estimated
total life often years during the time of the collision, then the replacement cost of P7,046,351.84 should rightly
be reduced to 50% or P3,523,175.92. This is a fair and reasonable valuation, having taking into account the
remaining useful life of the facility.

196 |AL YC A B S