Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the
effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the
co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership. (Emphasis ours) Although Levi became a co-
owner of the conjugal partnership properties with Grace Joy and
Jill Frances, he could not yet assert or claim title to any specific
portion thereof without an actual partition of the property being
first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Before the
partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-
owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the
co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share
in the entire land or thing.
Same; Same; A co-owner could sell his undivided share.—A
co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence, Levi had the right
to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest. Thus, the sale
by Levi of his one-half undivided share in the subject property
was not necessarily void, for his right as a co-owner thereof was
effectively transferred, making the buyer, Rafael, a co-owner of
the subject property. It must be stressed that the binding force of
a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
so (quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest).
Same; Interest Rates; In Nacar v. Gallery Frames, et al., 703
SCRA 439 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) pointed out that
pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas-Monetary Board (BSP-MB), the interest rate of loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation shall be six
percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July 1,
2013, the rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in the
absence of stipulation, is still twelve percent (12%).—In Nacar v.
Gallery Frames, et al., 703 SCRA 439 (2013), the Court pointed
out that pursuant to Resolution No. 796 of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas Monetary Board, the interest rate of loans or
forbearance of money, in the absence of stipulation shall be six
percent (6%) effective only from July 1, 2013. Thus, prior to July
1, 2013, the rate of interest on loans or forbearance of money, in
the absence of stipulation, is still 12%. Accordingly, the amount of
P271,150.00, representing the unpaid rentals shall earn interest
at
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the rates of 12% per annum from the date of the last demand
on May 3, 2003 until June 30, 2013 and 6% per annum from July
1, 2013 until fully paid.
REYES, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision2 dated November 26, 2010 and Resolution3 dated
January 24, 2012 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 04481.
Facts
Vipa Fernandez Lahaylahay (Vipa) is the registered
owner of a parcel of land situated in Lopez Jaena Street,
Jaro, Iloilo City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-26576 (subject property).4 Vipa and her husband, Levi
Lahaylahay (Levi), have two children — Grace Joy
Somosierra (Grace Joy) and Jill Frances Lahaylahay (Jill
Frances).5
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VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 387
Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez
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6 Id., at p. 49.
7 Id., at p. 18.
8 Id., at p. 49.
9 Id., at pp. 131-132.
10 Id., at p. 131.
11 Id., at p. 132.
12 Id., at pp. 124-127.
13 Id., at p. 124.
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VOL. 822, APRIL 5, 2017 389
Uy vs. Estate of Vipa Fernandez
The RTC opined that Grace Joy was actually the
plaintiff in the case and not the Estate of Vipa. It then
pointed out that Grace Joy failed to bring the dispute to the
barangay for conciliation prior to filing the complaint for
unlawful detainer.22
The RTC further held that the MTCC erred in including
the entire subject property as part of the Estate of Vipa.
The
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18 Id., at p. 119.
19 Id., at p. 120.
20 Rendered by Judge Antonio M. Natino; id., at pp. 101-114.
21 Id., at p. 114.
22 Id., at p. 107.
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32 Id., at p. 52.
33 Id., at p. 53.
34 Id.
35 Id., at pp. 55-64.
36 Id., at pp. 45-46.
37 Id., at pp. 24-25.
392
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42 Sections 399 to 422, Chapter 7, Title One, Book III and Section 515,
Title One, Book IV of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government
Code).
43 Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation v. Heirs of Angel
Teves, 438 Phil. 26, 41; 389 SCRA 316, 327 (2002), citing Section 1, Rule
VI of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
44 See Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 (1948).
394
On the second issue, the records show that [Rafael] raised the
issue of ownership only for the first time on appeal; hence, the
[RTC] erred in deciding the appeal before it on the findings that
part of the subject premises is owned by petitioners, allegedly
having bought the same from [Levi], the husband of [Vipa].
The Court is not unmindful that in forcible entry and unlawful
detainer cases, the MTC may rule on the issue [of] ownership in
order to determine the issue of possession. However, the issue of
ownership must be raised by the defendant on the earliest
opportunity; otherwise, it is already deemed waived. Moreover,
the instant case was covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure, which expressly provide that affirmative and negative
defenses not pleaded therein shall be deemed waived, except for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Thus, the [RTC] erred
in resolving the issue of ownership for the first time on appeal.45
(Citations omitted)
It is true that fair play, justice, and due process dictate
that parties should not raise for the first time on appeal
issues that they could have raised but never did during
trial. However, before a party may be barred from raising
an issue for the first time on appeal, it is imperative that
the issue could have been raised during the trial.46 What
escaped the appellate court’s attention is that the sale of
the one-half
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45 Rollo, p. 53.
46 See Sañado v. Court of Appeals, 408 Phil. 669; 356 SCRA 546
(2001).
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47 Rollo, p. 21.
48 Certificate of Marriage; id., at p. 133.
49 CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Article 119.
50 Id., Article 160.
51 Id., Article 175(1).
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Article 130 of the Family Code is applicable to conjugal
partnership of gains already established between the
spouses prior to the effectivity of the Family Code pursuant
to Article 105 thereof, viz.:
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56 Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665, 676; 404 SCRA 540, 548
(2003).
57 See Lopez v. Cuaycong, et al., 74 Phil. 601 (1944).
399
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