ARC Guidelines

ARC International
Safety & Security Guidelines

June 01, 2004
SAFETY & SECURITY GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose
This document sets forth the safety and security policy of the American Refugee Committee
(ARC International) and establishes the framework and guidelines for the development,
implementation, and management of safety and security for ARC programs. Furthermore, it
formalizes ARC safety and security strategy, processes, and mechanisms at all levels.
B. Goal
ARC International recognizes the value of human life and is committed to ensuring the safety
and security of its staff as it accomplishes its humanitarian mandate. The goal of ARC Safety &
Security Program is to minimize risk to staff while improving the integrity of its programs.
Achieving this goal is the responsibility of every member of ARC International.
C. Scope and Compliance
1. ARC safety and security standards and procedures are developed to ensure health, welfare,
and security of its entire staff worldwide; and to maintain and/or enhance the viability,
integrity, and effectiveness of its programs, activities, and field operations. It is applicable
to all ARC HQ and field staff.
2. Initial compliance with the guidelines will be phased in over a 12-month period from the
date of adoption with annual review thereafter. This document will be reviewed every 12
months from the date of adoption to ensure currency and applicability.
D. Authorities & References
1. ARC Strategic Vision (revised: June 2003)
2. ARC Security Strategy (undated)
3. ARC Security Protocol (undated)
4. ARC International Operations - Extended Program Document (March 2004)
5. ARC Security Plan (undated draft)
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6. InterAction Security Planning Guidelines (undated – endorsed by ARC Board March
2004)
7. The Security of National Staff: Towards Good Practices, A Report for InterAction (July
2001)
8. The Security of National Staff: Essential Steps, InterAction (July 2001)
9. Security in the Field; United Nations Manual (1998)
E. Key Terms
Security Protection of aid personnel, facilities, and materiel from violence,

threat of violence, theft, etc.
Safety Protection of aid personnel from accidents resulting from nature or
non-violent circumstances (i.e., illness, road accidents, workplace
incidents).
Expatriate (“Expat”) Professional staff member hired by ARC to fill an “international”
Staff position that ARC assumes responsibility for returning to his /her
home of record at the completion of employment.
Local (“national”) Staff member hired by ARC from the local area.
Staff
Stand-down Temporary suspension (normally lasting one to several days) of
operations or activities due to unsafe or not secure conditions (e.g.,
civil unrest, riots, demonstrations).
Restricted Movement Limited activities due to unsafe or not secure conditions.
Movement is limited to “essential” personnel and/or activity.
Hibernation Suspension of all operations and reduction of visible signs of
presence due to serious security concerns. This stage may be for an
indefinite period until either condition improves for resumption of
activities/operation, or relocation/evacuation can be implemented.
Relocation Withdrawal of staff from an area due to grave security concerns.
Evacuation Withdrawal of staff across an international border due to grave
security concerns.
CD Country Director has overall responsibility for the direction and
management of a ARC field program
SMT Security Management Team designated by ARC President to
manage day-to-day safety and security issues.
CMT Crisis Management Team responsible for coordinating information,
guidance and support to CD in times of crisis. It has the same
composition as SMT.
SM Security Manager is designated by the ARC President to serve as
the HQ focal point for safety and security related matters.
FSO Field Security Officer is usually an international staff (“expat”)
designated by CD to serve as the field focal point for all safety and
security related matters impacting on a specific country program,
activity, or operation. A local staff may function as FSO and LSO.
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LSO Local Security Officer is a local/national member of staff
designated by FSO to serve as the focal point for safety and
security matters specific to local/national staff members.
ROE “Rules of Engagement” – set of established and approved
responses to specific events, scenarios, contingencies, etc
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II. RESPONSIBILITIES
A. President
The President of ARC International has the overall responsibility for the safety and security of
ARC staff and programs. He has the final decision-making authority, and is responsible for
appointing members to the Security Management Team and selecting the ARC headquarters
security focal point.
B. Security Management Team (SMT) and Crisis Management Team (CMT)
1. SMT is responsible for the management and supervision of the ARC safety and security
program. The team makes recommendations to the President and the Board of Directors
regarding issues related to safety and security. In addition, the SMT has the authority of
the President to issue directives and instructions to headquarters and field staff. In times of
crisis or heightened security alert/condition, the SMT assumes crisis management
functions as Crisis Management Team (CMT) assisting country directors in implementing
appropriate response measures to mitigate adverse impact of security threats on ARC staff
and operations.
2. SMT consists of: (pending final determination)

Vice President (team chairman)
Senior Advisor to the President
Director of Operations or Regional Director for Africa
Director of Human Resources
Security Manager
External advisors as applicable
3. Specific responsibilities of the SMT include:

Making recommendations to the President and Board relating to security matters
Establishing ARC safety and security standards
Publishing ARC Security Strategy yearly
Reviewing and approving ARC Safety and Security Guidelines document
Establishing priorities for safety and security funding
Establishing priorities for safety and security assistance visits (SAV)
Reviewing all aspects of programs to ensure compliance with ARC safety and
security standards
Supporting the safety and security requirements of field
Providing guidance to field staff as needed
Functioning as CMT in times of crisis or elevated security conditions
C. Security Manager (SM)
1. The SM is the ARC headquarters security focal point. The SM, in consultation with the
SMT, is responsible for the direct management of ARC safety and security program.
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2. Specific responsibilities of the SM include:

Continually assessing ARC-wide safety and security program
Conducting initial and periodic security assessment of ARC programs and areas of
operations, and make recommendations to enhance program safety and security
Identifying safety and security requirements at the HQ and the field
Developing, revising, and updating ARC safety and security policies, plans, and
procedures that serve as framework for the development of field security plans and
standard operating procedures
Assisting Country Directors and Field Security Officers in developing field security
strategies and measures
Refining and integrating safety and security policies and procedures at all levels of
ARC
Maintaining a security information management system
Reviewing and maintaining safety and security plans for all country programs
Recommending CMT activation
Developing and conducting a comprehensive training program for Field Security
Officers (FSO), Local Security Officers (LSO), and field security personnel
Assisting FSO and LSO in developing AOR-specific security plans and training
program
D. Country Director (CD)
1. The CD has supervisory responsibility for the safety and security of all ARC personnel and
operations in his/her country program. Using guidelines established by HQ, the CD
establishes guidelines, policies, and procedures for all aspects of safety and security in
his/her particular country program. Safety and security policies and procedures will be
formalized in a field security plan (FSP) maintained at the field offices and at ARC HQ.
2. The CD shall designate a Field Security Officer (FSO) to manage the planning and
implementation of field safety and security program.
E. Field Security Officer (FSO)
1. The FSO is normally an international (“expat”) member of field staff designated by the CD
to directly manage the operational and planning aspects of safety and security. The FSO
has full authority over safety and security in the field based on guidance from the CD and
established ARC guidelines. (This function may be performed by a capable local staff).
2. Specific responsibilities of the FSO include:

Assisting the CD in all aspects of the management of safety and security of the
country program
Collaborating with SM in assessing country program safety and security
requirements
Managing field safety and security program
Monitoring security conditions and advise/inform the CD, staff, and the HQ
(through the SM, SMT, and CMT) on response measures
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Developing and maintaining an up-to-date field security plan in accordance with
Annex A of ARC Safety and Security Guidelines
Serving as liaison with other agencies on matters regarding security
Implementing safety and security incident reporting, analysis, and assessment
systems in accordance with Annex B of this document
Designating and supervising a Local Security Officer (LSO) to represent the
local/national staff on safety and security matters
Recommending and implementing appropriate safety and security measures
Coordinating and supervising the implementation of stand-down, hibernation,
relocation, or evacuation operations when directed to do so
Developing, implementing, and conducting safety and security training program for
ARC staff (international and local/national)
Liaising with other NGO, UN agencies, and local authorities as necessary
Maintaining custody and serviceability of safety and security equipment
F. Local Security Officer (LSO)
1. The LSO is a local/national member of ARC staff that is appointed by the FSO to serve as
the focal point for security matters affecting local/national members of ARC staff. The
LSO receives guidance from the FSO and serves as the point of contact between the expat
and the local staff in the event of an emergency. (FSO and LSO functions may be
combined and performed by a capable local staff).
2. Specific responsibilities of the LSO include:

Assisting the FSO in managing the operational aspects of safety and security of the
country program.
Collaborating with the FSO in the development, implementation, and delivery of
safety and security training program tailored to the local/national staff’s specific
requirements.
Serving as an advisor to the FSO on local/national customs and culture as they
relate to safety and security matters affecting ARC staff and the country program.
Assisting the FSO in developing and maintaining an updated field security plan in
accordance with Annex A of this document.
Assisting the FSO in performing safety and security reporting in accordance with
Annex B of this document.
G. Field Staff
Staff members are responsible for ensuring that they fully understand the entire safety and
security plan, and comply with all aspects of safety/security. All staff members are required to
maintain a high level of safety and security awareness and report all related incidents to respective
FSO or designee. In addition, staff members should get familiarized with suggested and
established guidelines to ensure safety and security of facilities, operations, personnel,
information, and communication. Finally, staff members are responsible for any additional duties
they may be assigned by the FSO regarding security preparation, training, execution, or
supervision.
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III. SAFETY AND SECURITY MANAGEMENT
A. Security Strategy
1. ARC security program is based on a three-pronged strategy of acceptance, protection, and

deterrence. Effective planning for safety and security for ARC staff and programs should
include all three areas.
2. Acceptance – softening the threat: Success of ARC programs depends heavily on our
ability to go where the needs are. In situations where government or UN protection is
intermittent, weak, or non-existent, acceptance by the beneficiaries, the target community,
group, or area is the key. This means that the community ARC is working in supports our
presence and out of that support security follows. Simply put, it is “winning the hearts and
minds of the people”. The following are some of elements of acceptance:
The community has a stake in the program and participates actively
The community has been involved in the assessment and design of the program
The community is involved in the evaluation of the program
ARC mission is transparent and broadly communicated
ARC activities are impartial
ARC staff and presence are culturally and politically sensitive
ARC program reflects local priorities
ARC has developed good working relationships with local governmental
authorities, including the police and the military where appropriate
ARC programs reflect basic development concepts and a willingness to invest the
time and effort to involve the community in every facet of project assessment,
planning, implementation, and evaluation
Examples of steps to employing this strategy are knowledge and sensitivity to the
local culture/customs, neutrality, employing local personnel, working within the
context of the local customs, etc.
3. Protection – hardening the target: This consists of strategies to reduce target

vulnerability (personnel, facilities, assets, equipment, operations, information,
beneficiaries, etc.). Protective measures fall under one of the following headings.
a. Protective devices refer to equipment needed to provide adequate security.

Examples include:
o Communications equipment including: High Frequency (HF) radios,
(“Codan”-type radios used in longer distance communication), Very High
Frequency (VHF) radios (“hand-held” radios used in local and
intermediate distances), satellite telephones (“sat phone”), beepers, “land-
line” telephones, cellular phones, etc.
o Reliable vehicles and maintenance facility
o Perimeter security devices including walls, barbed wire, alarm systems,
surveillance cameras, flood lights, motion detectors, etc.
o Flak vests, Kevlar helmets
o Use (or non-use) of ARC emblem or other symbols
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b. Organizational policies and procedures are institutional mechanisms which
enhance security. Some examples:
o Clear and equitable national staff personnel policies – including grievance
procedures – which are communicated to staff and implemented
consistently (incidents involving disgruntled staff are one of the leading
causes of security infractions for NGOs)
o Clear financial policies and procedures including division of
responsibility in accounting; prudent cash transfer procedures
o Clear vehicle operations policies and strict discipline regarding vehicle
operations
o Curfews and “no-go” zones where appropriate
o Development of and/or participation in a “warden system” or
communications pyramid for conveying emergency messages
o Communications protocol, training, and disciplined radio usage
o Security orientation for incoming staff and routing security briefings for
staff including personal security training
o Convoy operations protocol
o Visitor screening
o Clear and consistent discipline for infractions of security policy, including
the inclusion of security compliance in routine performance reviews
c. Coordinated operations are activities which NGOs can carry out together, thereby
creating ‘strength in numbers’ strategy.
o Active membership in NGO coordinating bodies
o Active relationship and coordination with the UN
o Collaborative convoy operations
o Integrated communications
o Collaborative monitoring, community policing, etc.
4. Deterrence – posing a counter threat: Deterrence is the ability to pose a credible counter
threat. Since ARC is not large enough or appropriately suited to pose a credible counter
threat, our deterrent strategies are based on the relationships we are able to build with the
larger regional and/or international institutions.
a. Diplomatic deterrence is the product of ARC relationship with larger international

actors who can exert diplomatic pressure on our behalf, influencing local
authorities and actors who either pose security threats themselves or who are well-
placed to promote the security interests of NGOs. Elements include:
o The quality of ARC relationship with American and European diplomatic
missions
o The quality of ARC relationship with the UN
o The quality of ARC participation in NGO coordinating bodies which are
capable of presenting a unified front
b. Guards are a deterrent strategy that ARC may employ for its facilities.
i. Use of armed protection (“armed” defined here as employment of lethal

weapon) has found some support among humanitarian organizations
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operating in highly dangerous areas; however, ARC policy does not
advocate use of armed protection as a standing strategy, except in extreme
circumstances. While use of armed protection/guards can provide
additional deterrence, the disadvantages of using such a strategy far
outweigh the benefits.
1) Use of armed guards may send conflicting messages about ARC’s

humanitarian mandate. It may also put ARC’s neutrality into
question, thus jeopardizing its being accepted by the community it is
trying to reach.
2) The presence of weapons may place the staff at a greater risk as they
become more likely targets of armed violence.
3) Use of deadly force in any form would require a more stringent

oversight or control. That would require clear “rules of
engagement” or ROE on the use of force.
4) The heavy responsibility associated with the employment of force

and the corresponding liability that ARC may incur in the use of
deadly force are often cost-prohibitive.
5) Finding well-trained, reliable, and trustworthy armed security

personnel in areas where ARC operates is often problematic.
ii. Country directors, in consultation with ARC headquarters, may consider use
of armed protection if all of the following criteria are met.
1) It is imperative that ARC staff continue operating in the extremely

dangerous area (i.e., hibernation, relocation, or evacuation is not an
option).
2) It is reasonable to expect that ARC staff will be routinely exposed to

violence and life-threatening risks.
3) Armed security is the only way to ensure protection of ARC staff,

operations, and facilities.
4) Country director and/or designated Field Security Officer can and

will provide oversight and clear “rules of engagement” on use of
deadly force, to include when and what degree of force can and will
be used. ROEs will be in accordance with the criminal justice
system of the local or host community or government, and subject to
approval by the President of ARC International.
iii. All requests for use of armed guards must be approved by the President,
ARC International, prior to implementation.
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c. Military is the least common form of deterrence. This strategy usually appears in
conjunction with peacekeeping missions when NGOs formally coordinate activities
with international military forces. Use of military deterrence is the least used for
the main reason that it jeopardizes ARC position of neutrality. It should only be
pursued when the other legs of the security triad are clearly insufficient.
B. Program Development and Implementation
1. An effective safety/security program hinges on detailed planning and preparation at all

levels and in all phases of operation. No planning methodology or formula can predict all
possible scenarios and contingencies to ensure absolute safety and security of personnel
and assets. Neither can an effective organizational safety and security program immunize
an organization, its members, and its operations from safety and security risks. However,
absence of a security plan is courting disaster. Effective safety and security planning
means that an organization is better prepared and equipped to respond to threats, minimize
vulnerabilities, reduce damage, and recover from adverse impacts should safety or security
incidents occur.
2. The key to successfully managing risk is being able to identify the threats you face and
determining your vulnerability to those threats.
a. Threat Assessment
i. This initial step entails identifying various agents, materiel, events, and/or
safety hazards that may pose a danger to personnel, assets, facilities, and/or
operations. An agent is a person or an entity that can effect a dangerous or
unsafe action/activity. Materiel refers to implements, tools, weapons,
devices, substances, equipment, vehicles, etc., used to deliver or effect
intended threat. Events are occurrences that are not intended to cause
damage or harm, but may pose a danger to personnel facilities due to other
external factors. For example a peaceful demonstration may escalate into
violence when opposing groups come in contact and controls are
insufficient. Hazards usually refer to situations, conditions, or
environmental factors that act as catalysts for accidents.
ii. It is also necessary to determine the type and the nature of each threat.
Knowing the type and nature of the threat expands the range of choices of
response measures. Types or categories of threat may include non-violent
crimes (e.g., burglary, theft), violent crimes (e.g., robbery, assault,
abduction, murder, rape), political/legal (e.g., partnership with terrorist
groups or individuals affiliated to terrorist groups, unwittingly),
indiscriminate violence, safety, etc. The nature of a threat refers to its
characteristics such as the frequency and probability of its occurrence, its
magnitude (e.g., force involve), its speed of onset (this impacts on warning),
and its effects or lethality (e.g., degree of injuries, number of deaths, extent
of damage to facilities/assets, etc.).
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b. Vulnerability Analysis
i. Vulnerability refers to the level or degree of susceptibility to the threat,

damage, or other adverse effects of the threat. Vulnerability analysis
generally focuses on several areas of an organization – areas that usually
coincide with the types of security.
Physical
Operational
Personnel
Communications
Information
ii. Vulnerability depends on many factors. For example, vulnerability of

individuals may be influenced by age, gender, ethnic background, physical
health/makeup, and/or training. Lack of protective measures, such as
fences, increases the physical security of a facility. The viability or
integrity of the operations or programs may be jeopardized by lack or
insufficient fiscal controls. Confidential communications and information
may be compromised by lack of secure communications or lax procedures.
iii. Vulnerability analysis must take into consideration the program

mission/objectives, current/proposed activities, organizational composition
(number and type of personnel), location/s of activities, scale of
presence/visibility (also known as “footprint”), potential
clients/beneficiaries, potential partners, potential supply sources, etc.
iv. An effective security plan should address all areas of security and include
measures and procedures to mitigate the risks.
c. Risk Assessment and Mitigation
i. The key to successful security management lies in objective risk

assessment. Simply, risk is defined as “threat times vulnerability”
(R=TxV).
ii. While anyone can conduct a risk assessment, experienced and trained field
level personnel are more often effective in performing risk assessments.
Hence, CDs and FSOs have the primary responsibility for risk assessments
of their programs.
iii. A good technique in assessing risk is to list all the threats a program or
activity faces (refer to preceding paragraph B.2.a.). Once listed, the threats
should be rated according to its lethality and probability of occurrence.
This will provide a picture of the dangers and hazards facing ARC
personnel in a given environment.
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Sample Threat List
Threat Probability Lethality
Vehicle Accidents Very High Serious Injury/Death
Demonstrations/Riots Medium Serious Injury/Death
Armed Conflict Low Death/Serious Injury
Land Mines Medium Death/Serious Injury
Floods Very Low Equipment Loss
Fire Low Death/Equipment Loss
Theft High Injury/Equipment Loss
iv. Once the threat list is completed, vulnerability for each threat can then be
analyzed/assessed. (refer to the preceding paragraph B.2.b) The
vulnerability list will aid in risk mitigation.
Sample Vulnerability List

Burglary - Unarmed
- No warning/alert system
- High theft/burglary incident area
- Low or no fence
Vehicle Accidents - Required to travel long distances
- Frequent travel
- Nighttime travel
- Unreliable vehicles
v. After all the threats and vulnerabilities have been identified and analyzed,
the Risk Assessment Matrix (Annex C-1) can then be applied. This
matrix shows how the threats, when taken together, correspond to the
acceptable level of risk. Threats that are located in a shaded area indicate
that that particular program is operating at that risk level. Based on this risk
assessment, the field staff can explore the different risk mitigation measures
that can be adopted or implemented.
vi. Risk mitigation is the formulation, adoption, and implementation of

measures (to include systems and procedures) to either eliminate or reduce
the risk on the staff, assets, and operations. Generally risk mitigation
planning focuses on the elimination/reduction of either the threat (T-factor),
or the vulnerability (V-factor), or both. Because of the nature of our
mission/mandate, ARC capability to directly eliminate or reduce threats is
limited to a small number of safety- and health-related hazards. Therefore
greater emphasis is placed on vulnerability reduction, which the key to
ARC overall approach to safety and security.
vii. Risk mitigation measures should be developed based on the context and
environment of a particular program, and formalized in field security plans
that reflect procedures based on ARC strategic triad.
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ACCEPTANCE
DETERRENCE
PROTECTION
d. Other Assessment and Warning/Alerting Systems
i. While the risk management tools discussed above provide a methodology

for deliberate planning, not all contingencies can be predicted and planned
for. Situations change and evolve, sometimes at a moment’s notice. At
times, limited access to an area precludes first hand survey and analysis.
ii. In these situations, ARC employs the following mechanisms.
1) The ARC Security Level I-IV (see Annex C-2) provides a tool for
assessing quickly changing/evolving security situations and
recommends security steps or measures to take. Depending on the
situation, the security levels defined in this matrix may or may not
coincide with the UN Security Phase System
2) The UN Security Phase System (I-V) provides a general security

advisory and serves as an indicator of current overall security
conditions (see Annex C-3). This system should not be employed as
a sole determinant for ARC programs and activities.
3) Another mechanism that can be used is the US government’s 4-tier

evacuation process. This tool intended for US embassy staff
members and dependents can provide numerous indicators to trigger
the ARC staff to make an informed decision on evacuation. The
warden system provides accurate, timely information on USG
evacuation plans. (see Annex C-4)
C. Field Security Plan (FSP)
1. All country programs are required to maintain an accurate, up-to-date security plan based
on the format set forth in this safety and security program document. A copy of current
FSP will be maintained at the headquarters.
2. Both the field and the headquarters will review the security plans. Country directors will
determine a schedule for reviewing their plans to ensure plans meet the requirements of the
current situation. The security management team at the headquarters will review all
country plans at least once every six months to ensure that all country programs have valid
and viable security plans.
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3. FSPs will include key areas stated below. The Security Manager will assist the CD and
FSO, as required, in developing the plans. (see Annex A for format)
Purpose
Scope and Compliance Policy
Authorities and References
Mission and Related Activities
Area Security Assessment
Responsibilities
o CD and Deputy CD
o FSO/LSO
o Administrative Officer
o Logistics
o Finance
o Field Staff
Standard Operating Procedures (Annex D provides some guidelines and procedures
that may be adopted)
o Physical Security
o Communications
o Movement and Transport
o Safety and Security Incident Reporting
o Medical Response/Evacuation
o Emergency Response
o Stand-down Procedures
o Hibernation and/or Relocation Procedures
o Staff Evacuation Procedures
o Other procedures deemed applicable for a particular area or program
Training Program Implementation and Documentation
o Area Threats/Hazards
o Personnel Security
o Safety Standards
o Radio Communication Protocol
o Other specialized training deemed necessary for effective safety and
security
Emergency contact numbers
o Phone tree, warden system, government officials, hospitals, partner
agencies, etc.
Personnel Data
Maps of routes, assembly points, evacuation areas, etc.
4. ARC policy is to relocate its expat staff members in times of increased instability and
insecurity in order to provide for their personal safety. The decision to relocate staff rests
with the CD and may be delegated to the FSO. In the event of relocation, ARC operations
in the insecure area will be suspended temporarily, and all expat staff members will be
consolidated in a more secure region for eventual return to area of operations when
security conditions become more favorable, or for evacuation should security situation
continue to deteriorate.
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5. ARC will evacuate expat staff members when it is determined that it is too dangerous to
maintain a presence in the local area. Prior to any evacuation, all ARC operations will be
suspended indefinitely in the area, and all local and/or refugee staff members will be
informed that their employment with ARC is temporarily suspended. Depending on the
situation, the country director will evacuate the staff to a nearby, stable country in the
region in order to establish a short-term headquarters in anticipation of return upon
improvement of the security situation. If determined by ARC Headquarters that operations
in the country are to be terminated, commercial transportation will be provided for expat
staff members to their home of record.
6. In some cases, ARC operations may have to continue even when it is too dangerous for the
expatriates. In these situations, ARC will have to rely on the local staff only. Decisions to
employ this approach will be determined on a case-by-case basis after the following
considerations are taken into account:
ARC field activities are critical to life-saving operations
The lives and well-being of the local staff are not at risk
An effective mechanism can be implemented to monitor the activities/operations
(e.g., phone contact, regular visits/audits, etc.)
The donors are consulted with the plan to continue operations using local staff
Other NGOs or implementing partners are adopting similar arrangements
7. The US government is only responsible for evacuating employees and dependents of the
US government, although in dire situations evacuation of all US citizens is a possibility.
Evacuation by the US embassy should not be planned for, and should be considered only
as a last resort. However, there are numerous indicators that the USG will provide to
trigger the ARC staff to make an informed decision on evacuation. The warden system
provides accurate, timely information on USG evacuation plans. (see Annex C-4 for
specific information and conditions)
D. Special Planning Considerations for National/Local Staff
1. National and/or local staff members are crucial to ARC’s ability to execute its mandate and
fulfill its mission. They often have an understanding of the local society that expatriates
rarely achieve. Not using them as an integral part of security planning means that field
offices ignore one of the best – if not the best – resource they have.
2. Along with the risks that they share with expatriate staff, national staff also comes under
additional threats that stem from being members of the local society. They are often
vulnerable to pressures that expatriates are largely immune to. As much as possible and in
accordance with ARC policies, steps must taken to ensure safety of national/local staff.
3. Every effort must be exerted to identify those threats and vulnerabilities unique or specific
to national staff. Risk mitigation measures and appropriate training must be provided.
However, adopted measures must take into consideration the following ARC policies.
a. ARC International is not authorized to relocate local or refugee staff in emergency

situations, although there may be unique circumstances where ARC may facilitate
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the relocation of specific local staff member(s) due to program requirements or
special security needs. These specific exceptions need to be coordinated with ARC
HQ. Actions should be taken to ensure that all staff members understand that these
exceptions do not change the ARC policy.
b. A feeling of abandonment among the local staff should be taken into consideration
when planning for evacuation contingency. It must be made clear that ARC has no
authority to evacuate local/national/refugee staff to another part of the country or
across an international border. Country directors should seriously consider
developing special contingency plans for local staff – e.g., stipend, option of
immediate rehire upon resumption of operations, referrals/recommendations, etc.
c. ARC staff does not have the authority to relinquish control of ARC program
equipment. ARC vehicles and equipment belong to the donors, and ARC staff
cannot ethically hand over this equipment to the local staff or anyone else,
regardless of the emergency. During relocation or evacuation, it is the
responsibility of the CD to consolidate all of the sensitive equipment and
documents and attempt to bring these items with him/her. All remaining equipment
will be secured to the greatest extent possible at the ARC office and residences for
the eventuality of resumption of operations. If not already done so, an LSO will be
appointed to maintain custody of and accountability for the left-behind equipment.
However, it must be made clear in such situations that no staff member should, or
is expected to, put their lives at risk for the purpose of protecting equipment or
materials.
E. Reporting and Information Management
1. Information is the key to safety, security, and survival of humanitarian aid workers. Rapid
dissemination of critical safety and security information will enable timely response which
enhances survival.
2. It is imperative that ARC field programs maintain a flexible, functional, and redundant
communication infrastructure and information management system to ensure the
continuous, timely, and accurate flow of information to the all staff members and to the
HQ.
3. Another important area of ARC security information management is the reporting and
analysis of security-related incidents. This provides a vehicle for ARC staff to review,
update, and enhance its safety and security plans and procedures based on analysis of
incidents and observation. In addition, it provides HQ a picture of the current situation “on
the ground”, thus enabling HQ to provide effective guidance and assistance.
4. ARC reporting system has two components. The first component, situation report
(SITREP), is for routine reporting of overall situation in a particular program (see Annex
B-1). This will ensure that ARC HQ has an accurate situational picture of each country
program. The second component is for the reporting of safety-related incidents (Incident
Report) and changes in security condition (Security Notice) as they occur (see Annex B-2
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and B-3). This will keep ARC headquarters aware of safety and security issues affecting
field activities and will allow ARC to leverage the resources of the organization to assist as
needed.
5. Reports will be forwarded to ARC HQ on a routine basis.
a. At a minimum, FSOs will submit situation a SITREP twice a month (15th and 30th
of each month), except in insecure areas or areas at ARC Security Level II and
above where SITREP will be submitted weekly or daily depending on the gravity
of the security situation.
b. Incident Reports and Security Notices will be submitted immediately as they occur.
Under grave security conditions (such as Security levels III and IV), where time is
of the essence, reporting may be done by phone to HQ.
c. Variations to reporting schedule will be coordinated with the SM prior to

implementation.
F. Training Program and Documentation
1. Any security plan is only as good as the preparation and training of the individuals
carrying out the plan. While it is not possible to fully train all staff members on the myriad
of scenarios that could potentially arise, it is critical that the staff be prepared for the most
likely and most dangerous possibilities.
2. The Country Director or designated Field Security Officer will ensure that all field staff
members are familiar with the contents of their FSPs and their specific responsibilities
relative to safety and security. In addition, all field staff should be familiar with personnel
security measures.
3. Training should be conducted regularly to all staff members and visitors, and will be
properly documented.
4. Specialized training for specific positions will be provided.
Drivers
o Safe driving procedures
o Vehicle inspection and preventive maintenance
o Driving in a convoy
o Navigation and map reading
o Radio procedures
o Evasive driving techniques
Guards
o What to do in case of attack
o Alert procedures
o Radio procedures
o Log keeping
Radio Operators
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o Advanced radio operations
o Log keeping and operations monitoring procedures
5. Specialized FSO training will be coordinated by ARC HQ Security Manager. Skill

building for this position will include:
ARC security strategy

Threat assessment, vulnerability analysis, and risk mitigation for physical,
operational, personnel, information, and communications security
Field safety and security plan development
Communication systems design and implementation
Staff training development, implementation, and documentation
Reporting procedures
External agency coordination
Crisis management and emergency response
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ANNEX A – FIELD SECURITY PLAN (sample format)
ARC (country) FIELD SECURITY PLAN
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Purpose (state what this document intends to establish)
B. Scope and Compliance Policy (statement of whom and what the document applies to;
includes review process)
C. Authority and References (List the documents and policies used to formulate this field
security plan)
D. Mission and Related Activities (Provide a brief description of the goals of the program
and activities employed to achieve the goals)
E. Area Security Assessment (Brief description of the safety and security situation to
include the prevailing threats to ARC program in the country/area)
II. RESPONSIBILITIES (State duties and responsibilities of each position relative to safety and
security)
A. CD and Deputy CD
B. FSO/LSO
C. Administrative Officer
D. Logistics
E. Finance
F. Field Staff
III. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES
A. Physical Security (Address procedures such as issuing and tracking of keys, equipment
inventory, responsibilities and procedures for opening and closing facilities, etc.)
B. Communications (Include procedures for start/end of day checking in, reporting during
elevated security conditions, etc.)
C. Movement and Transport (Address procedures for vehicle use, convoy travel, personnel
movement, travel restrictions, designated off-limits areas, etc.)
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D. Safety and Security Incident Reporting (“Who, what, when, how” of reporting forms –
see Annex B)
E. Medical Emergencies/Evacuation (What to do in case of illness: non-life threatening to

serious that may entail medical evacuation)
F. Emergency Response (other than medical, e.g., crime-related, violence, etc.)
G. Stand-down Procedures (Procedures in case of restriction of movement, lock-down

procedures during elevated security conditions)
H. Hibernation
I. Relocation
J. Staff Evacuation
IV. TRAINING (Guidelines provided in Annex D may be used as starting point to expand on).
A. Area Threats and Hazards
B. Personnel Security
C. Safety Standards
D. Radio Protocol
APPENDICES
Appendix A – ARC Security Levels
Appendix B – Map of Areas of Operation/Responsibility
Appendix C – List of Staff (name, nationality, address, contact nos., special needs)
Appendix D – Map of Routes, Assembly Points, Relocation, and Evacuation Areas
Appendix E – Communications (frequencies, call signs, code words, distress signal, etc.)
Appendix F – Emergency Contact Numbers (police, military, rescue units, medical, etc.)
Appendix G – Reporting Forms
Appendix H – Training Program and Documentation
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ANNEX B – REPORTING FORMS
B-1 – Situation Report (SITREP)
B-2 – Security Notice
B-3 – Incident Report
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ANNEX B-1
SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)
ORIGINATOR: (Select) DATE/TIME OF REPORT: (mo/day/yr)
REPORTING (name of member completing the report) CONTACT (phone/email)

OFFICER: INFO:
I. CURRENT ARC SECURITY LEVEL: (Select)
NOTE: (See Annex C-2 of Safety and Security Guidelines for specific security control measures)
Level 1 – Normal Operations: The work environment is stable with no heightened tension. Humanitarian personnel are not specifically
at risk. General personal safety and security procedures are in effect. Color Code: GREEN
Level 2 – Controlled Operations: Instability in the area is causing safety and security concern. While humanitarian personnel are not
directly at risk, ARC personnel may be caught in indiscriminate violence. Color Code: YELLOW
Level 3 – Restricted Operations: There is an increased and immediate danger to humanitarian personnel. Hostile incidents are occurring
in the ARC areas of operation. Situation is very unstable. Color Code: ORANGE
Level 4 – Suspended Operations: The security situation is grave. Continued presence in the area will jeopardized the lives of ARC
personnel. Color Code: RED
II. SITUATION:
(Summary of situation affecting current security level)
III. INCIDENTS:
(list incidents since last reporting period; burglary, harrassment, accidents, illnesses, etc.; details of incidents will be
reported in separate incident report forms)
IV. OTHER ISSUES:

(discuss other issues such as logistics requirements, personnel issues, general information you would like to relay,
etc.)
V. REQUEST FOR HQ ACTION/GUIDANCE:

(self-explanatory)
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ANNEX B-2
SECURITY NOTICE
REPORTING (name of member completing report) CONTACT (phone/e-mail)

OFFICER: INFO:
I. CURRENT SITUATION:
(describe current security situation, to include changes in UN Security Levels and ARC Security Levels,
and the immediate impact on staff, assets and operations)
II. MEASURES TAKEN:

(state actions/measures being implemented: stand-down, restricted movement, more frequent contact,
armed protection, etc.)
III. RECOMMENDATIONS:
(steps, measures, actions being considered: hibernation, relocation, evacuation, etc.)
IV. REQUEST FOR HQ ACTION/GUIDANCE:

(self-explanatory)
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ANNEX B-3
INCIDENT REPORT
REPORTING (name of member completing the report) CONTACT (phone/e-mail)

OFFICER: INFO:
INCIDENT TYPE: (Select) INJURY TYPE: (Select) STAFF CLASS: (Select)
NAMES OF STAFF INVOLVED: (enter names of staff involved in the incident)
DATE/TIME OF INCIDENT: (mo/day/yr) NOTIFICATIONS: (agencies notified, if any)
I. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT:

(self-explanatory)
II. ACTIONS TAKEN:

(self-explanatory)
III. REQUEST FOR HQ ACTION/GUIDANCE:

(self-explanatory)
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ANNEX C – INDICATORS AND DECISION MATRICES
C-1 – ARC Risk Assessment Matrix
C-2 – ARC Security Levels
C-3 – UN Security Phases
C-4 – US Four-Tier Evacuation Process
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ANNEX C-1 – ARC RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
Probability of Threat Lethality of Threat

5 – Has occurred to ARC in the last 30 days and is 5 – Results in death or property loss greater
likely to occur again than/equal to $25,000
4 – Occurs more than 1/week in ARC areas and has 4 – Results in serious bodily injury or property
occurred to ARC within the last 12 months loss of $1,000 and above
3 – Occurs more than 1/month in ARC areas but has 3 – Results in minor bodily injury or property loss
not occurred to ARC between $100 and $1000
2 – Occurs in country but not in ARC areas within 2 – Results in physical harassment, threat of
the last month violence, or property loss of less than $100
1 – Occurs in country but not in ARC areas within 1 – Results in inconvenience or disruption of ARC
12 months activities
5
Probability of Threat
1 2 3 4 5
Lethality of Threat
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ANNEX C-2 – ARC SECURITY LEVELS
SECURITY CHARACTERISTICS THREATS CONTROL MEASURES
LEVEL
I The working environment is stable • Normal incidents of crime • In accordance with generally established safety and
Normal Operations with no heightened tensions. • Vehicle and personnel safety hazards security standards
Humanitarian personnel are not
Color Code: GREEN specifically at risk, and general
personal safety procedures are in
place. Security situation is
unrestricted.
II Instability in the area is causing • Uncontrollable armed soldiers at large • Immediately notify ARC HQ of elevated security
Controlled Operations safety and security concern. While • Demonstrations that may escalate to violence condition
humanitarian personnel are not • Uncertainty at vehicle checkpoints • Operations may continue but at an increased level of
Color Code: YELLOW directly at risk, they may be caught in • Indiscriminate terrorist acts such as mines, situational awareness
indiscriminate violence. booby traps, roadblocks • Implement frequent communications and backup
• Sporadic and indiscriminate artillery barrages transportation
• Increased criminal activity • Get frequent security updates from UN security
• Flood of desperate refugees officer and maintain liaison with other NGOs
• Disgruntled local staff workers • Provide frequent security update to personnel
• Equip vehicles, residences, and offices with
emergency rations, water, fuel, and equipment (e.g.,
flashlights, batteries, etc.)
• Maintain 24-hr communications and constant
contact with staff members
• Review relocation/evacuation procedures
• Identify safe havens and be ready to seek safety
III There is an increased and immediate • Targeting of humanitarian personnel for • Continue to inform ARC HQ of developments
Restricted Operations danger to humanitarian personnel. questioning and/or harassment • Restrict movement to those absolutely essential; all
Hostile incidents are occurring in the • Targeting of refugees/beneficiaries for movements must be approved by the FSO
Color Code: ORANGE immediate vicinity of ARC violence • Assemble/consolidate personnel at designated
operations. Situation is very • Mining of public roadways assembly point
unstable. • Indiscriminate sniper, aircraft, or artillery fire • Maintain positive redundant communications among
in the AOR staff and external organizations
• Increased likelihood of being caught in • Prepare for relocation/evacuation; brief local staff
hostilities
IV The situation is so grave that • Specific targeting of humanitarian personnel, • Suspend operations; release all local and refugee
Suspended Operations continued presence in the area will assets, and facilities for violence staff members from duty
jeopardize the lives of ARC • Hostilities in ARC AOR, offices, and/or • Implement appropriate contingency plan (i.e.,
Color Code: RED personnel. residences hibernation, relocation, or evacuation)
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ANNEX C-3 – UN SECURITY PHASE SYSTEM
Phase I – Precautionary: This phase is designed to staff members that the security in the country
or a portion of the country is such that caution should be exercised.
Phase II – Restricted Movement: This signifies a much higher level of alert and imposes major
restrictions on the movement of all staff members and their families. Movement is limited to
essential travel as deemed by designated official.
Phase III – Relocation: This indicates a substantial deterioration in the security situation which
may result in the relocation of staff members or dependents.
Phase IV – Program Suspension: At this level, Designated Official may recommend to the
Secretary-General, through the UNSECOORD, the relocation outside the country of all remaining
international staff members except those directly concerned with emergency or humanitarian
relief operations or security matters.
Phase V – Evacuation: This signifies that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that all
remaining international staff members are required to leave.
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ANNEX C-4 – US GOVERNMENT EVACUATION PROCESS
The US embassy evacuations consist of a 4-tier process:
1. USG personnel/dependents are authorized to leave. Dependents and select non-

essential personnel are permitted to leave the country by commercial means at USG
expense. This signifies that tensions have increased and there is a possibility of further
evacuation.
2. USG non-essential personnel/dependents are required to leave. All non-essential

personnel and any remaining dependents must leave the country. This is normally done by
commercial airlines; although, depending on the situation and cost, it may be done by a
chartered commercial carrier. If this occurs, ARC should seriously consider leaving the
country. If the aircraft is chartered, the USG will often allow US citizens to purchase a
seat, although there is no guarantee.
3. All USG personnel must evacuate. The embassy will be closed, and all remaining
essential personnel will be evacuated. Again, this is normally done by contracted
commercial carrier, although it is sometimes accomplished by a chartered military aircraft.
In many instances, US citizens are authorized to board the aircraft, although ARC will be
billed for each seat. Non-US citizens have a very slim chance of boarding the aircraft.
4. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO). This is a military operation conducted to

evacuate US government employees from a critical situation. It is very rare (only 3 in last
10 years), and is specifically for USG personnel. However, in dire circumstances, US
citizens may be evacuated as well. If ARC were still in country when this occurs, the key
is to find out the location of the marshalling areas, and to get to those marshalling areas as
fast as possible, with all proper documentation (e.g. US passport). Only one small bag per
person is allowed on board. Non-US citizens should not plan on this mode of evacuation.
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ANNEX D – SAFETY AND SECURITY MEASURES
D-1 – Security in the Field (adopted from UN Manual)
Personal Security Guidelines
Surviving as a Hostage
Security for Children
Security Concerns for Women
Coping with Stress
D-2 – Additional Security Guidelines
Criminal Confrontation
Armed Soldiers/Personnel
Checkpoints and Roadblocks
Vehicle Hijacking
Traffic Accidents
Traveling in Convoy
Bomb Threats
Suspicious Parcels and Letters
D-3 – Terrorism
Biological
Nuclear
Incendiary
Chemical
Explosives
D-4 – Landmines
Recognition
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Preparation and Observation
Avoidance
Response to Landmine Incidents
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ANNEX D-1 – SECURITY IN THE FIELD (adopted from UN Field Security Manual)
I. PERSONAL SECURITY GUIDELINES
INTRODUCTION
Personal security is an individual responsibility. The security risk can be reduced by using
common sense and precautionary actions. You – the individual – play the most important role in
maintaining your personal security. These guidelines are provided to assist you in developing
good security practices. They are not all-inclusive. You should adopt these guidelines to your
own duty station, situation, and abilities; and use them to assist you in planning your security.
GENERAL
The best way to be safe is to avoid trouble in the first place, rather than try to extract yourself later.
This means that you should develop a strong sense of security awareness and adjust your behavior
to take into account the environment in which you find yourself and the possible risk related to it.
Consideration of the following points will increase your own personal security awareness.
Do:
o Follow your instincts. If you feel uncomfortable about a location or a situation, leave
immediately.
o Learn to notice details about people. In the event of an incident, this will help in giving a
good description.
o Always know where you are going. Always behave as though you know where you are
going. Demonstrate a confidence that you may not necessarily feel.
o Become knowledgeable about your neighborhood. Where is the nearest police station?
Which stores, restaurants, businesses are open late at night? Is there a telephone nearby?
o Keep a low profile.
o Establish several routes to work and vary your selection of them and the time you depart
for work and return home. Most incidents take place as the individual either leaves or
returns home.
o Identify routine activities.
o Be alert to any evidence of surveillance of your house, office, or travel route between the
two; serious attacks are usually preceded by a period of surveillance.
o Know your own ability. Be honest with yourself and be aware of your capabilities. You
should always try to maintain yourself in good physical condition.
o Call attention to yourself if you are in danger; shout or blow the horn of your vehicle.
o Be sure that you know what specific security arrangements are in place at your duty
station; know how the walkie-talkie system operates.
o Find out about customs, how to behave, potential threats, and areas to avoid.
o Learn a few phrases in the local language so that you can signal your need for help.
o Rehearse what actions you would take if you were to be confronted. There is no right or
wrong way to respond to an attack. Each situation will be different. Whether or not to
resist an attacker can only be your decision. Generally, the following options will be open
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to you: talk your way out of it; give in to the demands made of you; shout for help; flee;
fight. Remember, your life is not worth losing for material possessions.
o Make sure your level of security is balanced by the level of threat at your duty station.
Do not:
o Place yourself in situations which may be expected to attract threats, e.g., political rallies.
o Ignore unusual or strange circumstances.
o Display cash, keys, or other valuables, as this may attract potential robbers.
o Establish routines, as they make your movements easy to predict for any observer.
AT HOME
Do not be complacent about your security because you are at home! Your home may be the target
of robbers who might harm you during the commission of a crime. You should carefully assess
the physical security of your home and make improvements as necessary. Considering the
following points will increase your home security.
Do:
o Be sure your doors and locks are strong, and lock your doors, even if you are home and
even if you leave only for a few minutes.
o Make sure your entrance area is well-lit.
o Consider making one area of your home a safe haven – some place where you and your
family can secure yourselves against attack and call for help. This might be a bedroom
with a strong door and a bolt, or possibly a bathroom. Make sure you have a possible fire
exit.
o Place shades, curtains, or blinds on every window.
o Ensure that servants know what security measures you want implemented, such as
identifying all callers before opening doors; never allowing access to unauthorized visitors
without your specific approval; never providing information about you over the telephone
to anyone; alerting you if they see someone suspicious near the residence.
o Ensure your guard knows exactly what you expect; what his patrol should include how
often he should patrol, and how he should give an alarm in case of trouble. The guard
must also know what to do in case he is forced to leave the property by intruders, where he
should go, and what he should do when he gets there.
o Get to know your neighbors.
o Place telephones away from windows and doors through which you can be observed.
o Be wary of unexpected visitors, especially after dark.
o Cut back or remove bushes/trees close to the house which might hide an intruder.
o In an elevator, stand near the control panel. If threaten, hit the alarm button and press as
many as you can reach, enabling the door to open at any of several floors.
o Before hiring servants, do a background check on the person. Ask for references and
check them.
o If you find a servant to be dishonest or a thief, dismiss him or her immediately and escort
the person out of the house. Immediately notify all places where the servant may be
purchasing on your account (such as stores) that the servant has been fired.
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Do not:
o Put your name on a mailbox or on a gate post.
o Leave valuable items outside and do not leave potential tools for criminals to use against
you where they can find them, e.g., if you have a ladder, lock it up.
o Open your door to strangers.
o Permit a stranger to use your telephone; offer to make the call for the person.
o Sleep with your windows open unless they have secure bars.
o Entrust servants with keys to your residence; if this is unavoidable, have a special lock to
which your servants do not have a key and use this lock when you are at home.
TRAVELLING
Travelers are often exposed to particular risk, as they are known to be carrying money, passports,
and valuables. They are vulnerable because they are often disoriented and unsure of the safety of
their surroundings. Consideration of the following points will improve your security while
traveling.
Do:
o Always check the security situation of the area to which you are traveling.
o Before you leave home, let someone know your plans. Leave contact numbers. If you
change plans, let someone know.
o Stay alert – watch your belongings. Keep your passport, laissez-passer, airline tickets,
money, and traveler’s checks safe; it is preferable to keep them on your person.
o Photocopy airline tickets, passport identification page, and relevant visa page, driver’s
license, and credit cards you plan to take. Leave one set at home and keep another with
you in a separate place from the valuables. Leave a copy of traveler’s check serial
numbers at home and take a copy with you.
o If possible, schedule direct flights. Try to minimize time spent in unsecured airport public
areas. Move quickly from the check-in counter to the secured area.
o At the airport be calm, do not allow people to rush you, keep your possessions under
control.
o Know exactly how you will travel from the airport to the hotel or first business
appointment. If you are being met at the airport, ensure the person waiting for you have
the proper identification.
o Stay in larger hotels which have more elaborate security.
o Choose a room near the elevator to avoid having to walk down a long, empty corridor. If
you feel uncomfortable, ask a hotel employee to escort you to your room.
o Keep the balcony door or window locked and draw the curtains.
o Use a rubber doorstop for added safety (recommended that your carry one as a part of
your luggage). If not available, use a chair to jam the door.
o Upon arrival in your room, find the nearest fire escape. Walk from your room counting
the doors until the fire escape. Imagine how you would reach it if you were crawling in
darkness and smoke. Read the hotel’s fire instructions.
o Park in well-lit areas.
o If you are attending a conference, remove your name tag as soon as possible to avoid
being identified.
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o When first entering your room, check the closets, bathroom, and balcony to make sure
they are not occupied.
o Be wary of con artists and people offering to exchange money for you at black market
rates.
o Beware of individuals posing as police or security officers who want you to accompany
them to another location. Obtain proper identification and call the local police to verify.
Ask the hotel desk to assist you in verifying identities.
Do not:
o If someone knocks on your door, assume the person is who he/she claims to be; call the
desk to double-check. Always use the deadbolt and chain.
o Enter your room if you find the door open or unlocked. Return to the desk and ask
someone to accompany you to your room.
o Stay on the ground floor or in a room facing an outside corridor. If possible, book a room
between the second and seventh floors – above ground level to prevent easy entrance from
outside and low enough for fire equipment to reach in an emergency.
o Display your room key to strangers.
o Leave the “Please clean my room” sign on your door. It tells people the room is empty.
Call housekeeping instead.
WALKING
Consider the following points to improve your security while walking.
Do:
o As you prepare to go out, check that all closures on your bags are shut. Put your wallet in
a front pocket or under clothing. Carry only the cash you need and divide it.
o Always be aware and alert to our surroundings.
o Walk nearer to the curb to avoid passing too close to shrubbery, dark doorways, and other
places of concealment.
o If your must use a personal stereo, i.e., walkman, keep the volume low enough so that you
can hear your surroundings.
o Keep only those keys on your key chain that your use.
o If someone suspicious is behind you or ahead of you, cross and recross the street to the
other side. If in doubt, use whatever means necessary to draw attention to yourself and
remember that it is much better to suffer the embarrassment of being wrong than to fail to
take action if you feel threatened.
o Mark your keys so they can be identified in the dark; this makes it easier to find the
appropriate keys quickly.
o Carry identification, preferably with blood type indicated.
Do not:
o Approach the vehicle if a driver pulls up next to you asking for directions, and beware of
the suggestion to “look at this map”.
o Be afraid to yell and run in the opposite direction if a car approaches and the driver
threatens you.
o Hitchhike or accept a ride from a stranger.
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o Jiggle your keys in your hand unnecessarily; it announces that you are on your way home.
o Take shortcuts through isolated areas.
o Walk alone at night.
o Talk to strangers.
o Have your name or address on your key chain.
DRIVING
Being in a vehicle can give you a false sense of security and can possibly make you a target of
hijackers.
Do:
o Whenever possible, travel on well-lit, populated streets. Keep windows rolled up, except
for a small ventilation space. Keep the doors locked.
o Be especially alert when you are at a red light or a stop sign. Develop the habit of
adjusting driving speed to avoid stopping at the traffic lights. Be prepared to drive away,
sounding the horn, if you are threatened.
o Keep your car in good working order. Make sure you have a full tank of gas, flashlight,
inflated spare tire, jack, tire iron, basic tool kit, and a gallon of potable water. Know where
you are going and how to get there. Carry a map with you.
o When parking at night, select a place that will be lit when you return. Check for loiterers
before leaving the car. Do not park your car on the street if you have access to a garage or
a secure parking area.
o Before getting into your car, look inside first to make sure no one is hiding in the back
seat. Check underneath the car from a distance. When leaving your car, make sure it is
locked.
o Think twice before deciding to offer assistance to what may appear to be a stranded
motorist, regardless of gender.
Do not:
o Drive into your own driveway or park in a deserted area if you suspect that someone is
following you. Make a few turns down active streets. If the car continues to follow you,
drive to a location where you know you can get help, such as the nearest police station.
o Drive alone at night.
o Panic if someone attempts to force you off the road. Blow your horn constantly to attract
attention. If you are forced over, as soon as you stop, put your car in reverse and back
away. Blow your horn and keep the car in motion.
o Pick up hitchhikers.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
If using public transportation, consider the following points when applicable.
Do:
o Wait for your train in a designated waiting area during off-hours.
o Sit in the train car that is occupied by the conductor or driver.
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o Know the hours of operation so that you do not need to wait on deserted areas.
o After getting off the bus or leaving a subway station, always look around to see whether
you are being followed.
Do not:
o Ride in compartments of trains that are deserted.
II. SURVIVING AS A HOSTAGE
INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years the number of international workers and staff members who have been
kidnapped or taken hostage has increased substantially. Every hostage or kidnap situation is
different. There are no strict rules of behavior; however, there are a number of steps which you
can take to minimize the effects of detention and enhance your ability to cope and to see the
incident through to a successful release.
SURVIVAL CONSIDERATIONS
These techniques have been successfully employed by others who have been taken hostage
o No one can tell an individual whether he or she should resist or not if taken
hostage/kidnapped. This decision must be made by each person’s own assessment of the
circumstances. Resisting the attempt may be extremely risky. You may be injured if you
attempt to resist armed individuals. It is possible you will immediately be blindfolded and
drugged.
o Being taken hostage is probably one of the most devastating experiences a staff member
can undergo. The first 15 to 45 minutes of a hostage situation are the most dangerous.
Follow the instructions of your captors. They are in a highly emotional state, regardless of
whether they are psychologically unstable or caught in an untenable situation. They are in
a fight or flight reactive state and could strike out. Your job is to survive. After the initial
shock wears off, your captors are able to better recognize their position. Be certain you
can explain everything on your person.
o Immediately after you have been taken, pause, take a deep breath and try to relax. Fear of
death or injury is a normal reaction to this situation. Recognizing your reactions may help
you adapt more effectively. A hostage usually experiences greatest anxiety in the hours
following the incident. This anxiety will begin to decline when the person realizes he/she
is still alive – at least for now – and a certain routine sets in. Feelings of depression and
helplessness will continue throughout captivity and most hostages will feel deeply
humiliated by what they undergo during captivity. Most hostages, however, will quickly
adapt to the situation. Remember your responsibility is to survive.
o Do not be a hero; do not talk back or act “tough”. Accept your situation. Any action on
your part could bring a violent reaction from your captors.
o Keep a low profile. Avoid appearing to study your abductors, although, to the extent
possible, you should make mental notes about their mannerisms, clothes, and apparent rank
structure. This may help the authorities after your release.
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o Be cooperative and obey hostage-takers’ demands without appearing either servile or
antagonistic. Be conscious of your body language as well as your speech. Do not say or
do anything to arouse the hostility or suspicions of your captors, as you may be held
responsible if something you suggest goes wrong.
o Anticipate isolation and possible efforts by the hostage-takers to disorient you. Your
watch may be taken away so you are unable to determine whether it is night or day.
Nevertheless, try to maintain a routine.
o Try to keep cool by focusing your mind on pleasant scenes or memories or prayers. Try to
recall the plots of movies or books. This will keep you mentally active. You must try to
think positively. Try to maintain a sense of humor. It will lessen anxiety.
o Ask for anything you need or want (medicines, books, paper, etc.). All they can say is no.
o Build rapport with your captors. Find areas of mutual interest which emphasize personal
rather than political interests. An excellent topic of discussion is family and children. If
you speak their language, use it – it will enhance communications and rapport.
o Bear in mind that hostages often develop a positive attitude towards their captors. This is
known as “Stockholm Syndrome”, after an incident involving hostages at a Swedish bank.
In addition, as the hostage identifies with his/her captors, a negative attitude towards those
on the outside may develop.
o You may be asked to sign notes verifying that your are alive or you may be asked to write
a “confession” that you or the organization have been involve in nefarious activities. The
decision to sign these is an individual one based on the situation. Some hostages refuse to
sign unless the language of the note is changed. This may help bolster your morale and
make your feel less helpless. It can also serve to command a certain degree of respect from
the captors.
o Exercise daily. Develop a daily physical fitness program and stick to it. If possible, stay
well-groomed and clean.
o As a result of a hostage situation, you may have difficulty retaining fluids and may
experience a loss of appetite and weight. Try to drink water and eat even if you are not
hungry. It is important to maintain your strength.
o Do not make threat against hostage-takers or give any indication that you would testify
against them. If hostage-takers are attempting to conceal their identity, give no indication
that your recognize them.
o Try to think of persuasive reasons why hostage-takers should not harm you. Encourage
them to let authorities know your whereabouts and condition. Suggest ways in which you
may benefit your captors in negotiations that would free you. It is important that your
abductors view you as a person worthy of compassion and mercy. Never beg, plead, or
cry. You must gain your captors’ respect as well as sympathy.
o If you end up serving as a negotiator between hostage-takers and authorities, make sure the
messages are conveyed accurately. Be prepared to speak on the radio or telephone.
o Escape only if you are sure you will be successful. If you are caught, your captors may use
violence to teach you and the others a lesson.
o At every opportunity, emphasize that, as an INGO staff member, you are neutral and not
involved in politics.
o If there is a rescue attempt by force, drop quickly to the floor and seek cover. Keep your
hands over your head. When appropriate, identify yourself.
o Be patient.
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AIRLINE HIJACKING
Statistics seem to indicate that airline hijacking is on the decline; however, the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, has shown a radical departure of hijackers’ employment of this crime from
bargaining tool to instrument for suicide missions. Unfortunately, responding to and surviving in
this type of situation is problematic to say the least. The best one can do is to maintain a high
level of awareness even in areas that seem secure, and identify potential dangers before they
materialize. Be vigilant of your surrounding and immediately report individuals acting
suspiciously to authorities or airline personnel. Remain calm and be ready to act appropriately to
evolving situations. Be ready to assist immediately as needed.
The following guidelines are designed for traditional airline hijacking (i.e., not use as a flying
bomb):
Do:
o Consider requesting a window or center seat since passengers in such seats are less
accessible to the questions and interests of hijackers. In addition, should there be a rescue,
those sitting in window or center seats will be less vulnerable to gunfire in the aisles. On
the other hand, it is easier to exit an aircraft if you are sitting in an aisle seat.
o Get rid of anything that you cannot explain or which might offend the hijackers. If you are
wearing or carrying anything which could provoke or irritate the hijackers, discreetly
remove it and get rid of it.
o Try to remain calm and obey the hijackers.
o Have your passport protected with a leather passport case to make the nationality less
prominent to hijackers.
o Respond simply if you are asked questions by the hijackers.
o Try to appear uninterested as to what is going on around you. Sleep, read a book, etc.
When so occupied, you will be less influenced by what is going on around you, and
hijackers would not bother people who are not a threat to them.
o Try to maintain your composure. Fear of death or injury is natural. Recognizing this may
help you manage the crisis more effectively. Pause, take a breath and attempt to organize
your thoughts.
o Attempt to do exercises in your seat if the hijacking continues beyond a day; such
exercises will keep your mind off the incident and will keep your body stimulated.
o In the event of a rescue attempt, slide down in your seat as far as you can or get on the
floor, and cover your head and arms with a pillow to avoid being injured.
Do not:
o Say or do anything which might cause the hijackers to take an interest in you.
o Resist the hijackers. Past experience shows that those who react aggressively place
themselves at greater risk than those who behave passively.
o Make the fact known that you speak the hijackers’ language, if this is the case. Although it
is often assumed that speaking the language could enhance your rapport with the hijackers,
prior experience indicates that you are better off speaking your native tongue and acquiring
information by listening to the hijackers’ conversations. This could also provide you with
information as to what the hijackers intend to do next.
o Appear sullen or uncommunicative. Doing so depersonalizes you in the eyes of the
hijackers and could increase your risks.
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POST-RELEASE REACTIONS
In many cases, former hostages feel bitter about the treatment they receive after their release.
Most hostages feel a strong need to tell their story in detail. If assistance in this regard is not
provided, request a post-traumatic stress debriefing. Bear in mind that the emotional problems of
a former hostage do not appear immediately. Sometimes they appear months late. Whatever
happens, readjustment after the incident is a slow process requiring patience and understanding.
As soon as the hostage realizes that he or she is a normal person having a normal reaction to an
abnormal situation, the healing process can begin.
III. SECURITY FOR CHILDREN
INTRODUCTION
It is important to remember that at some duty stations children are present. Special efforts must be
made to ensure that made to ensure that the children are protected.
RULES FOR THE CHILDREN
Children must be taught:

o To keep a parent in sight in public places and to go to a policeman or a store clerk if lost
and in need of help.
o Not to go anywhere with anyone without a parent’s permission.
o A password known only to family and close friends.
o Not to accept packages or letters from people they don’t know.
o To know at least key phrases in the local language.
o To let someone know their location and plans.
o To travel in groups or, at a minimum, in pairs.
o To use heavily traveled streets and avoid isolated areas to the extent possible.
o To report immediately anyone who molests or annoys them.
RULES FOR PARENTS
Parents need to:

o Teach your child never to get into car or go into a house without your permission. Never
leave your child alone in a public place.
o Teach your child your home address and telephone number. Children should know how to
use public telephones. Keep a list of emergency numbers by your phone and make
children aware of them.
o Train children not to give personal information over the phone, even though the caller
purports to be a friend.
o Explain the importance of never divulging any information in front of strangers.
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o Caution children to always keep doors locked and never unlock a door to a stranger
without adult approval.
o Listen when your child tells you he/she does not want to be with someone – there may be a
reason. Have the child present when you interview a servant/babysitter who will be caring
for him/her; observe the child’s reaction.
CHECKLIST FOR BABYSITTERS
Babysitters and /or caregivers should be instructed to:

o Ensure that all doors and windows are locked and that doors are not opened to anyone.
o Not give out any information over the telephone. They should simply state that you can
not come to the phone and that they should take a message.
o Never leave children alone, even for one minute.
o Know the dangers to children posed by matches, gasoline, stoves, deep water, poison, and
falls.
o Know the locations of all exits (stairs, doors, windows, fire escapes) and telephones in case
of emergency.
o Ask the parent to leave a telephone number where they can be reached.
o Know the names and ages of the children.
CHILDWATCH
Post an information list by each telephone. Your babysitter/caregiver should be familiar with
every item, if applicable at the duty station.
o Family name
o Address
o Telephone number
o Fire
o Police
o Medical
o Parents’ office numbers
o Poison control center
o Neighbors’ name, telephone, and address
IV. SECURITY CONCERNS FOR WOMEN
INTRODUCTION
In spite of all the security precautions which are taken, it is possible that you will become a victim.
The following section outlines some specific concerns ranging from sexual harassment to rape.
The purpose of this section is to increase your awareness and understanding of these issues and
provide you with information which may be useful should you or anyone you know be affected by
such incidents.
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SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE STREET
You are sitting on a bus. The man opposite is staring hard. His eyes follow you as you get off.
You are waiting at a stoplight. A man brushes past, lets loose of mouthful of obscenities and
melts into the crowd. You are walking home at night. You hear soft footsteps behind you,
footsteps that quicken when yours do.
There probably isn’t a woman alive who has not had one or more of these experiences. In
crowded cities they are often a way of life. “Psychological rape” is the term one sociologist uses
to describe there actions – the stares, leers, crude remarks, and other behavior with which men
terrorize and intimidate women without laying a finger on them. Emotionally, it can be as
destructive as its physical counterpart.
The reaction of women – fear, anger, humiliation, vulnerability – is common. Part of the distress
springs from the impersonality of the attack. It is degrading.
How do you cope with stares, leers, muttered obscenities, and the like? The only hard and fast
rule is stay out of danger. If, however, you are reasonably safe, you may consider responding with
the following:
a) Ignore the advance. If a man is just trying to get a reaction from you and finds he
can not, he may stop.
b) If you are in a familiar environment, you may consider answering in kind. If a man
is trying shock you with his words, a response in a similar vein may stop him.
However, ensure you are not within striking distance when you do this.
c) Confront him. If you stop and politely ask, “Were you speaking to me?”, the
annoying party may feel embarrassed, especially if his acts were based on fear or
insecurity,.
d) Most important, release your feelings of anger and indignity fast so that you can put
the incident out of your mind as soon as possible.
SEXUAL HARRASSMENT AT WORK
Sexual harassment extends to a range of behavior. In all cases, it refers to conduct which is
unwanted by the recipient. It can be define as any unwelcome sexual advance, request for sexual
favor, or other verbal or physical conduct of sexual nature which interferes with work, is made a
condition of employment or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment.
Sexual harassment is contrary to the policies of ARC International. Procedures for dealing with
cases of sexual harassment may be obtained from ARC Director of Human Resources. The basic
tactic is to be alert and prepared.
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INDICATIONS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
What is the attitude towards women in your workplace? Are there jokes, comments, graffiti, or
cartoons that put women down? Are you referred to as someone’s “girl” or called “honey” instead
of your name?
Are you taken seriously as worker? Are you treated like someone’s daughter, wife, girlfriend,
mother? Are you complimented more for your looks than for your work: Are you told that a job
is too dangerous or complicated for you? Are you accused of taking a job away from a man?
Does your supervisor, co-worker, colleague use hugs, pats on your back, arm around your
shoulder to make a business-related point? Are sexually suggestive tones, descriptions, or body
language a part of work-related discussions?
Are you asked questions about your social or personal life or told about theirs? Is there a
supervisor, co-worker, or colleague known for his “harmless flirtation” or “playboy reputation”?
Is there a high rate of turnover among women working for the same man? Do you hear constant
compliments about your clothing, looks, body?
Some common forms of sexual harassment:

o Constant invitations for drinks, dinner, dates
o Close physical contact while you work
o Kisses at office parties
o Receiving lewd cartoons, cards, presents
o Obvious sexual gestures directed at you
o Uninvited visits to your hotel room during out-of-town trips/missions
o Staring at your breasts or other parts of your body
o Touches or grabs at your body
o Sexual invitations or remarks
o Obvious graffiti
o Threats or physical assault
o Subtle or forced pressure for sexual favors
Some common work-related problems that may follow objections to sexual harassment:
o Sudden criticism of your work
o No work/too much work/dangerous work
o Denial of training or educational opportunities
o Written up for insubordination or issued warnings
o Pressure to quit
o Inaccurate job evaluation
o Refusal of co-workers to provide training or information
o Denial of increment or promotion
In facing sexual harassment on the job, remember that each job situation is unique. In deciding
what action to take in the short and long term, take time to think about what you want as an
outcome and what risks are involved. Make sure that you feel comfortable with the strategies you
decide to follow. What works best for someone else may not work for you or in your
circumstances.
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Do let your objections to the sexual harassment be known as soon as possible. Tell the harasser
directly that you do not like what he is doing. How you will phase it and when you will say it is
up to you, but do not ignore sexual harassment – it would not go away.
If the harasser is not your supervisor, discuss the issue with your immediate supervisor, being
specific as to the type, time, and place of the incident. You may also wish to share your
experience with someone in whom you have confidence. This would not only alleviate isolation
and self-doubt, and perhaps be a source of helpful advice, but communicating the information to a
third party would also help corroborate your statements if a formal complaint is made afterwards.
However, until you are certain of what you want to do and what your rights are, do not move too
fast or hint at any of your intentions. Trust your instincts and make decisions that make sense for
your situation.
It is essential that you document each incident. Keep a personal log or diary of incidents, dates,
actual conversations, witnesses. Do not leave it at work. Keep lewd cards, notes, presents; take
pictures of graffiti. Voice your objections to the harasser verbally and, if possible, do so in the
presence of a witness. Include statements that indicate your discomfort and link it to the
comments or behavior which interfere with your job. Follow this up with some form of written
correspondence summarizing this objection. Keep copies for your records. If you have an
answering machine/voice mail which provides you with evidence of sexual harassment, keep the
tapes.
Get copies of positive work evaluations or other evidence indicating you are doing a good job.
Keep copies of reports completed; take pictures of projects completed. Think about the way
sexual harassment is affecting you. What combination of emotional/physical/job-related stress
symptoms are you feeling? Seek medical attention from a private doctor and have these job-
related stress symptoms indicated in your records. If necessary, go up the ladder and make a
complaint about sexual harassment verbally and in writing. Keep a record of your
correspondence. “Test the waters” for sympathetic co-workers. Find out if other women have
experienced sexual harassment.
RAPE AWARENESS
Rape is considered the second most violent crime. Homicide is number one. Rape is
psychologically devastating, and it can take years for the victim to recover. Only recently has it
become acceptable to openly discuss this problem. As a result, misconceptions concerning rape
and sexual assault and its victims are being identified and dealt with.
Sexual assault:
Any non-consensual sexual act which is forced by one or more persons upon another.
Rape:
Sexual intercourse which is achieved without the victim’s consent.
Everyone is a potential victim of sexual assault. Sexual assault is a threat to all women.
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Sexual assault is a crime of violence. Sexual assault is any sexual act committed against the will
of another person. This can include physical force and coercion. People who force sex on others
are not motivated by sex; they are acting out their desire to hurt and control another person.
Most sexual assaults are committed by an acquaintance of the victim. Sexual offenders are not
always strangers. Many victims have had some prior contact with their attackers. Sex offenders
may be casual acquaintances, neighbors, dates, or family members. Knowing the attacker does not
make it any less a violent crime.
Sexual assault is one of the most under-reported of all violent crimes. Sexual assault is not an
infrequent crime. It is just infrequently reported.
TACTICS USED BY RAPISTS
The sexual assault attack cycle is divided into five parts:

o Victim selection: Depending on his motivation, the would-be offender selects his victim.
The individual is either pre-selected or the target of opportunity. In either case, the
offender will wait until the potential victim is vulnerable or isolated.
o Approach the victim: The would-be offender approaches his victim by (1) tricking the
victim into accompanying the offender; (2) overwhelming the victim; (3) surprising and
jumping the victim.
o Initiation of the assault: The offender maintains control of the victim through mere
presence, threats, force.
o Assault
o Push-off: It is here that the attacker decides whether to further physically punish or kill his
victim.
COMMOM PSYCHOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS OF THE RAPIST
No single profile provides an answer to why rape occurs. Opportunity, emotional illness, lust – it
happens for all of these reasons, yet often for none of them. Anger is a common thread among all
the types of sexual assault. Broadly speaking, offenders fall into four types: anger, power,
sadistic, and opportunistic rapists.
The anger rapist is the most ruthless. Sexual assault becomes a means of expressing and
discharging feelings of intense anger, rage, contempt, hatred, and frustration; the assault is
characterized by excessive brutality. Far more physical force is used in the commission of the
offense than would be required simply to overpower and subdue the victim. Sexual assault for this
type of offender appears impulsive more than premeditated. Quite often a precipitating stress can
be identified which involves a significant woman in the offender’s life – his mother, wife,
girlfriend. The resulting fury is released and discharged in a sexual assault against a victim who
may not be the actual person towards whom the offender harbors such feelings. Sex becomes a
weapon, and rape is the means by which he can hurt and degrade his victim and, through her, the
significant other. Satisfaction and relief result from the discharge of anger rather than from sexual
gratification.
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The power rapist employs whatever force is necessary to overpower his victim and gain control
over her. The offender places his victim in a situation through verbal threat, intimidation with a
weapon, and/or physical force where she cannot refuse him or resist him, and this provides the
offender with a reassuring sense of power, security, strength, mastery, and control. In this fashion,
he compensates for underlying feelings of inadequacy, vulnerability, and helplessness. Rapes
committed under war conditions usually fall in this category. The assault is usually premeditated
and preceded by an obsessional fantasy in which, although the victim may initially resist him,
once overpowered, she will submit gratefully. A power rapist may actually look for an easy
victim.
The sadistic rapist eroticizes aggression through a sexual assault. The offender derives
satisfaction in the abuse of his victim. This assault is deliberate, calculated, and premeditated. For
this offender, anger and control become sexualized in terms of the offender’s finding intense
gratification in controlling, hurting, and degrading his victim.
Perhaps the most common reason for rape is opportunity. Frequently, the opportunistic rapist
carries out the assault during the commission of another crime, e.g., a robbery or carjacking.
OPTIONS FOR THE VICTIM DURING THE ASSAULT
A rape victim may choose to take any of a number of actions during an assault. In considering
what action to take, the victim must take into consideration the type of rapist, the environment,
and the person’s own capabilities. A victim may choose one or a combination of the following
options:
Submit: The victim is in fear of losing her life. The objective here is to survive.
Passive resistance: Do or say anything to ruin that attacker’s desire to have sexual contact
with you.
Active resistance: Any type of physical force used to fight off the attacker, including
yelling for help, running away, or fighting back.
Pro/Cons of self-defense and use of weapons
There are conflicting opinions regarding self-defense and the use of weapons. The following
considerations must be borne in mind.
Self-defense techniques: Require training and practice. It is a personal decision which

each staff member must make. It gives you self-confidence and cannot be used against
you. It is legal and always accessible.
Improvised weapons: This can be anything accessible. It requires no special training.
Mace: There are local laws regarding the use of mace which must be respected. It requires
familiarity and training. Mace has a limited shelf-life. It is not always accessible.
Guns: It is against ARC policy for a staff member to carry a lethal weapon. In addition,
weapons can give you a false sense of security and could be used against you.
The use of mace or firearms could result in criminal charges and/or civil claim being lodged
against the user even if the individual felt justified in its use.
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AFTER AN ATTACK
After a woman is raped, she must make the decision whether to report the crime. If she chooses to
do so, in most cases the police will question her very carefully on the circumstances of the event.
Sometimes the police are very professional, treat the victim with dignity and respect, and explain
exactly why they must ask certain questions. In other instances, policemen have been known to be
less sensitive to the victim. After talking to the police, the individual will be taken to a hospital
for an examination which may help to prove that a rape occurred. It is critical that she try to
preserve any evidence of the rape, including clothing. A rape victim should not wash until after
she has been examined. Following the examination, she will be provided with treatment for any
injuries. Some hospitals may offer counseling.
If a woman does not choose to report her rape to the police, one can only guess what happens to
her. It is well-known that many women do not report the crime because of the difficulties with the
police they have heard about or because they are feeling guilty, upset, frightened, or weak to talk
about the rape. Sometimes they seek help on their own.
STAGES OF RECOVERY
The emotional impact of rape on its victims was first studied in the 1970s. It was found that most
of the victims suffered from an acute stress reaction to a life-threatening situation. While each
victim’s specific emotional and physical symptoms varied, they fell into a discernable patter which
became known as the Rape Trauma Syndrome. It is virtually identical to Critical Incident Stress.
There are four stages the victim goes through to recover from the experience.
Acute phase: disorganization
The victim may experience an extremely wide range of emotions. The impact of the rape may be
so severe that feelings of shock or disbelief are expressed. Feelings of fear, anger, and anxiety
may show through such behavior as crying, sobbing, smiling, restlessness, and tenseness.
Alternatively, the victim may be controlled with her feelings masked or hidden and a calm,
composed, or subdued demeanor exhibited.
In many cases, the victim is in a state of shock, is simply unable to believe that the attack has
happened. Some women experience a detached, super-alert state during or just after the attack.
Even while it is occurring they may be memorizing their assailants’ physical features or details
about his clothing. While this may be a victim’s way of distancing herself from the experience, it
also has real survival benefits. Physical symptoms during the first several weeks following a
sexual assault may be evident:
Physical trauma from the physical attack

Skeletal muscle tension
Tension headaches and fatigue
Disruption of sleep pattern
Irritability
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Gastro-intestinal problems
Emotional reactions will also be apparent. Women express a wide range of feelings as they begin
to deal with the after-effects of rape. These feelings range from fear, humiliation, and
embarrassment to anger, revenge, and self-blame. Fear of physical violence and death may also be
manifested.
The victim should be encouraged to talk about the assault as much as possible to her friends and
family or, if this would be embarrassing for her, to someone she trusts. As the victim turns from
fantasy to handling the realistic problems, there may be decline in non-specific anxiety.
Outward Adjustment
The victim appears to have dealt successfully with the experience, but this phase contains a heavy
measure of denial and suppression. The victim begins to resume her normal activities, and this
healthy response should be encouraged. This is perhaps the most problematic time and the stage
most likely to last, because it is heavily dependent on the victim’s state of mind prior to the assault
and because she is extremely vulnerable to the opinions of those around her. She may feel guilty,
blaming herself endlessly for walking down a certain street or acknowledging a greeting. In other
words, she turns her anger at the assailant inward.
Long-term process: reorganization
All victims will experience disorganization in their lifestyles following the sexual assault. Various
factors will affect their coping behavior regarding the trauma, e.g., ego strength, social network
support, and the way people treat them. This coping and reorganization process begins at different
times for different women. The same symptoms are not experienced in the same sequence. This
stage is characterized by:
A need to change residence

A need to change telephone number
Nightmares
Fear of indoors
Fear of outdoors (seclusion)
Fear of crowds
Fear of people behind them
Sexual fears
Extreme depression
Anxiety
Insomnia
Apathy
An almost total inability to function normally
Resolution
During this phase the victim is able to cope with her trauma and integrate the experience into her
emotional make-up. The victim stops wondering “Why did this thing happen to me?” and instead
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says “Such things happen. It happened. It’s over and now I’m going on.” She also learns to
direct her rage at the assailant and not at herself.
V. COPING WITH STRESS
INTRODUCTION
Occupational stress is inherent in the type of work NGOs do. There is insufficient awareness of
the impact on alertness, performance, and judgment, and the resulting negative implications in
terms of operational mistakes and harmful effects on the health of the staff exposed to stressful
situations. This section provides basic information regarding stress management.
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Stress – any demand or change that the human system (mind, body, spirit) is require to meet or to
respond to.
Distress – any stress that occurs too often (frequency), lasts too long (duration), and is too severe
(intensity).
Critical incident – an event outside the range of normal human experience which is distressing to
almost everyone. Such events are usually sudden and life-threatening, and often involve physical
or emotional loss.
Cumulative stress – stress which builds up over time. Some issues may be large and of long
duration, while others may be small or just part of the problems of everyday life.
Defusing – a process which allows those individuals involved in a critical incident to describe
what happened and to talk about their reactions directly after the event; defusing is usually carried
out by one’s peers who have been trained in this area.
Debriefing – a process to lessen the impact of a critical incident. It is a structured intervention by

specially trained personnel. It occurs in an organized group meeting and is designed to allow and
encourage those involve in a critical incident to discuss their thoughts and reactions in a safe, non-
threatening environment. Ideally, it takes place 48 to 72 hours after the critical incident.
WHAT IS STRESS?
Stress can be defined as any change or demand that the human system (mind, body, and spirit) is
required to meet or to respond to. There are normal stressors such as those consistent with life:
breathing, blood circulation, walking, eating, talking, and playing. These functions are common to
everyone and are part of everyday life. Without these stressors and other physical demands on the
human system, you would not continue to live.
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The more you know and understand about stress, the better prepare you will be to manage and
control its effects. Stress becomes a problem when it occurs too often (frequency), last too long
(duration), and is too severe (intensity). In these circumstances, distress occurs. It is extremely
important to note that what may be distressful for one person may not necessarily be distressful for
someone else. Your perception of the event, the degree of threat you feel and the amount of
control you have over the circumstances most often determine the degree of distress you will
experience.
Some factors which influence your perception and your control of distress are who you are and
what your past experiences have been. Your education, your skills, your philosophical approach
to life, your age, your sex, your level of physical fitness, and your personal esteem are all factors
which can influence the degree to which you will be affected by a given distressful event or a
series of events.
Given the frequency, intensity, and duration of a situation, anyone can become a victim of stress.
In 1936, Dr. Hans Seyle made an important discovery: when threatened, the body always reacts
with the same general adaptive mechanism. He defined this concept as follows:
The alarm phase: In order to understand the effects of both useful and harmful stress, it is
necessary to understand the mechanisms of a basic life-protecting reaction. In the presence
of a threatening or dangerous situation, the person reacts with the “fight or flight”
response. This is a reaction which causes our adrenaline to increase and prepares us to run
or to fight. If we respond in a physical manner, such as running, fighting, or even with
verbal aggression, much of the stress-produced fear, anger, or hostility can be greatly
reduced or dissipated altogether. The “fight or flight” response is a primitive physical
protective reaction. In today’s society, it may not be appropriate to respond to some
threats in a physical manner.
The adaptation phase: When a stressor continues without being resolved, the intensity of
the alarm stimulus is often lessened but not lost, and the person enters what Seyle calls the
adaptation phase. In this phase, vital biochemical, physiological, psychological, and
spiritual resources are spent to sustain the person against the original distressors.
However, adaptation or adjustment to the situation is not a solution.
The exhaustion phase: After an undetermined period of time, which varies from person to
person, as a consequence of a long-term distressors or daily cumulative stress, an
individual may begin to exhibit signs of breaking down. This may be manifested in the
form of physical, mental, or behavioral syndromes which are symptoms of long-term,
unresolved distress. Some common symptoms are:
Physical Psychological Behavioral

Fatigue Memory loss Verbal outburst
Back pain Poor concentration Increased smoking
Headache Decrease in esteem Increased alcohol use
Ulcer Depression Eating disorder
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CUMULATIVE STRESS MANAGEMENT
What can be done about stress? Most people suffer from cumulative stress which results from a
build-up of stress over time. Some issues may be large and of long duration. Others may be small
stressors of everyday life. Cumulative stress must be recognized before it leads to burn-out.
Some of the small daily frustrations which can lead to cumulative stress are:
Housing (lack of privacy or comfort, noise, shortage of water, cold, heat)

Travel (risks, threats, roadblocks)
Food (shortages, lack of variety)
Immobility or lack of activity
Colleagues
What should you do?
Cumulative stress first leads to unproductive hyperactivity, then to physical and emotional
exhaustion and finally to burn-out. You must be self-disciplined and know your limits. Accept
the fact that you cannot take care of others without also taking care of yourself, and be aware that
everyone is primarily responsible for his/her own stress. Understand that stress is inherent to duty
in the field.
To manage stress, it is important to learn which distressors affect you most. Once the major
sources of distress are known, a management and control strategy can be developed to help you
avoid the potential distressors. As a rule, stress management plans will include learning to do
some old tasks in a new way. The following guidelines have been effective in stress management
strategy development.
Learn your major distressors.

Become assertive, not aggressive.
Manage your time well.
Get the sleep you require.
Exercise for endurance and strength at least three times a week.
Eat a balanced diet – portions consistent with your activities.
Avoid excessive use of alcohol, caffeine, and nicotine.
Know and practice your philosophical approach to life.
Accept creative challenges.
Plan your free time constructively and productively.
Learn the healing value of relaxation and meditation.
The more healthy, fit, and well you are, the more resilient you will be against all types of
distress.
CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS MANAGEMENT
Critical incident stress is an event outside the range of normal experience which is sudden and
unexpected, disrupts one’s sense of control, involves the perception of a threat to life, and may
include elements of physical or emotional loss. Examples of Critical Incidents are:
Natural disasters
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Multiple casualty accidents
Sexual or other assaults
Death of a child
Hostage taking
Suicide
Traumatic death in family
Duty-related death of co-worker
War-related civilian deaths
Bombing of buildings, mining of roads
Attacks on vehicles/convoys
Armed attacks/robberies
Direct/indirect intimidation/threats
While a critical incident may occur anywhere, anytime, there are occupational groups that are at
increased risk of exposure to psychologically traumatic events, including:
Firefighters
Emergency medical personnel
Police officers
Search and rescue personnel
Disaster relief and humanitarian aid workers
Critical incident stress is a normal reaction to an abnormal situation. Reactions may be physical,
cognitive, or emotional. Reactions may also develop over time. The table below outlines normal
immediate and delayed reactions to a critical incident.
Immediate reactions
Physical Emotional Cognitive

Nausea Anxiety Confusion
Muscle tremors Anger Inability to decide
Sweating Fear Impaired thinking
Dizziness Irritability Memory loss
Chills Guilt
Rapid heart rate Grief
Hyperventilation Hopelessness
High blood pressure
Delayed reactions
Physical Emotional Cognitive

Fatigue Feeling abandoned Decreased attention span
Startle response Resentment Poor concentration
Substance abuse Alienation Memory problems
Sleep difficulties Withdrawal Flashbacks
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Nightmares Numbness
Restlessness Depression
The severity of an individual’s reactions to a critical incident depends on several factors:
Factors related to the incident Factors related to the person

Suddenness Past experience
Intensity Personal loss
Duration Perception of threat
Available social support Personal coping abilities
Research and experience provide a variety of techniques to assist you during and after the event.
During the critical incident:
Recognize the signs of critical incident stress

Maintain a positive attitude
Try to control breathing – slow and regular
Focus on immediate task
Stay in contact with others by talking
Care for yourself – food, water, clothing, rest.
If prolonged exposure, take breaks and rotate tasks.
After a critical incident:
Talk about the event, what you saw, heard, smelled, did.
Talk about your reactions, particularly how you felt.
Practice stress management techniques such as:
o Deep breathing exercises
o Progressive relaxation
o Meditation
o Physical activity
o Music, reading
o Humor to facilitate acceptance of reactions
o Participate in critical incident stress defusing as soon as possible after the event and
later in critical incident stress debriefing.
CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEFUSING
Critical incident stress defusing occurs in a group meeting of those involve, directly after the
event. The purpose of critical incident stress defusing is to allow those involved to describe what
happened and to talk about their reactions, as well as to provide information about normal stress
reaction, support services, and details of the follow-up critical incident stress debriefing.
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CRITICAL INCIDENT STRESS DEBRIEFING
Debriefing is a military term for a report which a subordinate submits on his mission and the
conclusion drawn by his supervisor. By extension, it is used in psychology to describe the
detailed account which is given on return from a mission, concerning the facts and emotions
experienced in the field and the thought to which they give rise. Critical incident stress debriefing
(CISD) is a process designed to lessen the impact of a critical incident. It is not designed to
provide counseling, but rather to provide a safe opportunity to deal with immediate reactions to a
stressful, traumatic situation. It includes:
A structured intervention by specially trained members of a critical incident stress team.

An organized group meeting which allows and encourages those involved in a critical
incident to openly discuss their thoughts and reactions in a safe, non-threatening
environment 48 to 72 hours after the critical incident.
For most people, most symptoms will diminish both in intensity and in frequency within a few
days or weeks. The process will be greatly assisted by a formal debriefing and by discussing
concerns with trusted family members and friends.
POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
If the above symptoms last more than a month, they may lead to post-traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). This is a more serious condition, a complication of psychological stress which could be
compared to a wound that will not heal naturally. To be diagnosed, the following factors must be
present:
Trauma
A persistent tendency to relive the trauma in the form of memories, nightmares,
flashbacks, or intense emotional reactions to any event reminiscent of the trauma.
A tendency to avoid any though, emotion, or activity which reminds one of the traumatic
event.
A marked hyperactivity, accompanied by an exaggerated startle reaction, a quick temper,
and sleep disorders, particularly upon falling asleep.
A persistence of these symptoms for at least a month. Diagnosis and treatment of PTSD
must be carried out by a specialist.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FAMILY AND FRIENDS
Anyone who has undergone a traumatic experience will be changed by what he/she has
experienced. In the aftermath of this incident, the various emotions which the individual
experiences are perfectly normal. It is the experience/event which is abnormal. The emotional
reaction to this experience should be considered as a psychological wound. As with all wounds,
you can best help the individual by:
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Listening carefully. A person who has overcome a traumatic experience must learn to talk
about the event and the emotions he/she felt at the time with those closest to him/her.
Spending time with the affected person.
Offering your assistance and listening ear.
Reassuring them that they are safe and normal.
Helping them with routine tasks like cleaning, cooking, caring for the family.
Allowing them some private time.
Not taking their anger or other feelings personally.
Telling them you are sorry such an event has occurred, and you want understand and assist
them.
Calling for help or support as soon as you feel you need it.
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ANNEX D-2 – ADDITIONAL SECURITY GUIDELINES
Criminal Confrontation:
Remain calm and assess your situation before acting.

Pay attention, and try to determine your attacker’s agenda (it is important to understand the
pattern of crime in your local area).
Offer no resistance if you are in no threat of immediate harm.
Most criminals want only valuables, and the best way out of the situation is to give up your
valuables freely and quickly.
Do not allow yourself to be taken from a public area, as this is an indicator that the
criminal is going to harm you. If this happens, throw your valuables on the ground and
flee. Often the attacker will choose the valuables over you.
If you are forced to a secluded area from a public one, fall on the ground and begin yelling
to attract attention. If you truly feel the criminal is going to harm you, better to be harmed
in public than in a secluded spot.
If you feel self-defense is the only option left, make a decision and act swiftly and as
violently as possible. Shock is often a better weapon than might.
Armed Soldiers/Personnel
Remain calm and unthreatening at all times.

Ensure that the soldier understands that you are a humanitarian worker. (Have your ARC
identification in your person at all times).
If soldier acts as a criminal, react in accordance with above.
If soldier is doing his job, remember that he likely understands less of the situation than
you do. Try to figure out what he is looking for, and provide that to him immediately.
Being careful not to threaten him; try to convey that you are important, acting with the full
sponsorship of his government, and that you are fully in compliance with all laws (e.g.,
have your travel documents complete and available).
If possible, know the names of the local military commanders and freely drop those names
into the conversation.
Roadblocks/Checkpoints
Slow vehicle immediately upon sighting the roadblock. Remove seatbelt, turn down radio,
and have documentation readily available.
Assess roadblock – it is important to be aware of previous roadblock activities to make an
accurate assessment. For example, if roadblocks are normally harmless and simply a
check of documents, then assess whether this checkpoint fits into that mold. If certain
roadblocks have resulted in violent incidents, then know the indicators that made those
roadblocks different from the harmless ones (i.e. non-uniformed soldiers, unusual number
of soldiers, visible signs of violence such as wrecked vehicles or bodies).
If roadblock is assessed to be normal, stop vehicle, dim headlights, and turn on interior
light. Keep hands in view at all times, and have travel documents readily available.
Remain cooperative, and if vehicle is searched do not impede the search in any manner.
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If roadblock is assessed to be abnormal and potentially dangerous, take extra precautions.
Understand that most roadblocks are established so that once you can see them, you are
already in their control.
Do not overreact to the situation; let it develop and be ready to act at any time. Remember
that most soldiers are very afraid of harming foreigners; don’t provoke them in any way.
Calmly determine your escape route in the event of shooting so that you can act
immediately if the situation warrants.
If possible, remain with your vehicle and attempt to drive away from roadblock. Most
roadblocks do not have additional vehicles for pursuit. If fleeing in vehicle, concentrate on
driving safely and not at an excessive speed. Too many times people lose control of their
vehicles, crash, and are at the mercy of the people at the roadblock.
Vehicle Hijacking
This is potentially the most life threatening crime because the hijackers are usually armed and the
victim’s reactions can often worsen the situation. There is no foolproof way to beat this particular
type of crime but through observation and awareness, you might be able to discourage or avoid a
potential hijack. Criminals/Rebels/Extremists involved in this crime have shown no hesitation in
using the guns they carry.
Preventive measures:
o On long trips try to go with another vehicle.
o Choose stopping places with care and never leave a vehicle unattended.
o Travel well prepared with essential spare parts, tools, spare fuel and water.
o Travel on busy roads particularly after dark.
o Where possible, maintain a sufficient distance between your vehicle and the one in
front to avoid being boxed in.
o Keep an eye on your rear view mirror and note vehicles that might be following
you, especially if it is full of men.
If being followed:
o Stay calm; maintain your speed, so as not to alert the people who are following you
and not to increase the risk of an accident.
o Change direction to see if they are following you. Avoid small side roads or
unfamiliar areas. Try to remain on main roads.
o Do not drive to your home. Go to a police station, military checkpoints, gas
stations, etc.
o If the hijackers start closing up on you, try to keep to the center of the road to make
it harder for them to overtake and cut in front of you.
If you are hijacked:

o Forget bravado and do as you are told – mentally accept the loss of your car.
o You will be nervous; but so will the thieves. Do not do anything to make the
situation worse e.g., argue with them or stare angrily at them.
o Act as calmly as possible and make all your movements slow and deliberate. Do
not speak to them unless they demand an answer.
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o Keep your hands in sight and if you have to release a seatbelt, tell the thieves – they
might think that you are going for a weapon.
o Do not wait to be told to get out of the car, but get out slowly and calmly leaving
keys in the ignition and any property behind e.g., handbag.
o Tell your passengers to behave in the same way.
Traffic Accidents
If you are involved in a traffic accident:
You must stop and render assistance to any injured.

Make your status as an ARC staff member clear to the police (carry your ARC identity
card in your person at all times).
Following an accident, there might be occasions when hostile crowd gather. If threatened,
drive IMMEDIATELY to the nearest police station.
Inform the Country Director immediately.
Traveling in Convoy
Convoys are organized groups of vehicles (passenger, cargo, or mix) that travel together from one
point to another for safety and security reasons. Convoys my be escorted by security personnel
(host country military, UN peacekeepers, multinational forces) or may be “protected” under UN
flag, Red Cross logo, or any other acknowledged symbol.
The requirement for traveling in convoys can add time to field travel, as there is waiting time to
organize the convoy. Another factor leading to the slower nature of convoy travel is that the
convoy can only travel as fast as its slowest member. Small group vehicle movements are
preferable for flexibility and efficiency but it may be necessary to drive in larger convoys for
safety and enhanced security.
One modification of the classical convoy is traveling in tandem. This is where two vehicles agree
to travel together for safety’s sake. This is suggested whenever possible, so that each vehicle can
count on some help in the event of an accident, breakdown, or something worse.
When weighing the merits of convoy travel, consider the image projected. The sight of a convoy
of ten, brightly painted four-wheel drive vehicles and trucks in good condition with healthy, well-
fed, well-clothed, relatively wealthy occupants will engender a range of mixed emotions by
observers and check-point personnel. This can be contrasted with the impact of two agency
vehicles traveling together might have. There are clearly good reasons to choose either of the two
options depending on the circumstances.
Follow clear procedures for traveling in convoy and stress the need for convoy discipline. Convoy
procedures will depend on each situation and support available. Examples of convoy procedures:
Arrive at the marshaling point early (one hour before). Organizing the departure of a
convoy can take some time and late arrivals will delay departure of the entire convoy.
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All drivers and members of the convoy should be briefed on the command structure, route,
convoy procedures (check-points, rest stops, etc.), contingency plans (in the event of a
security incident, medical emergency, or breakdown), action on arrival, radio or signaling
procedures, and timings.
All vehicles should be checked for road-worthiness and safety of loads.
Slower vehicles go towards the front. The drive of the vehicle in front should always keep
the vehicle behind in view. In dusty conditions, frequent stops may need to be made at
agreed intervals to ensure that everyone is still together. Driving with lights may assist in
keeping visual contact.
The convoy control vehicle travels at the rear.
The lead vehicle keeps to an agreed convoy speed.
And advance party may go ahead to check security and road conditions, and prepare for
arrival.
There should be agreed times to stop and check vehicles and loads.
Select stopping locations carefully – assess from a security point of view.
Expect breakdowns and have agreed procedures to deal with them. All vehicles must stop
while repairs are being made. Alternative decisions: tow, recover by base workshop,
temporarily abandon.
If a truck convoy is delivering to locations along a route, agree upon a waiting system so
that unloading truck drivers do not have to “catch up” or return to base on their own.
Avoid bunching up or tail-gating. Due to the slow speed of the convoy, rear-end accidents
are more frequent if vehicles travel too close together.
Avoid getting strung out, especially on mountainous or curvy roads where it is possible to
lose sight of leading or trailing vehicles. Vehicles should keep an agreed distance between
each other and follow in the tracks of the vehicle ahead.
One vehicle (the control vehicle) plus at least one other should have radio contact with the
base. For those vehicles not equipped with radio communications within the convoy, agree
to a system of signals using headlights and/or horns. These signals should indicate if a
stop is required, emergency repairs are needed, or if a consultation is required.
Upon arrival at the destination, the home base should be advised of time and condition of
arrival and informed of any problems encountered along the route.
Bomb Threats
If you receive a bomb threat, get as much information from the caller as possible. Keep the caller
on the line and record everything that is said. Notify the local police, military, UN security, etc.
Ask the caller:
Where the bomb is placed

When it is scheduled to explode
What it looks like
What will make it go off
How to get rid of it
Why it was planted
Who planted it
Observe/listen to the background noise; note mental state, peculiarities about the voice.
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If you are notified of a bomb threat, do not touch any suspicious packages. Clear the area around
suspicious packages and notify the appropriate agency (local police, military, UN security, etc.)
immediately. In evacuating a building, do not stand in front of windows, glass doors, or other
potentially hazardous areas. Do not block sidewalks or streets to be used by emergency officials
or others still exiting the building.
Sample form for suspicious/threatening phone call

Date: Time: Office:
Person receiving call:
Line receiving call: Location in office:
REMAIN AS CALM AS POSSIBLE.
DO NOT UPSET THE CALLER.
TELL THE CALLER THAT YOU WILL COOPERATE.
NOTIFY ANOTHER EMPLOYEE IF POSSIBLE.
ASK THESE QUESTIONS:
Who is this?
What number were you calling?
Why are you calling here?
Is this a prank?
Why are you doing this?
Do you have a complaint to talk about?
Will you talk with my supervisor?
Will you talk with anyone else?
What do you want?
Are you a part of a group?
Where are you calling from?
What do you want me to do?
IF THE CALLER THREATENS AN EMPLOYEE, ASK:

What has … done to make you so angry?
Do you know … personally?
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What do you want me to do?
How do you know …?
Would talking with …’s supervisor help?
Is there anything else I need to know?
Please tell me who you are.
CALLER FACTS
Male/Female/Child/Unknown Age range:
Local/Long distance call
Identity if known:
VOICE CHARACTERISTICS
Tone: Speech:
Language: Accent:
Manner: Other:
Names mentioned:
Locations mentioned:
Events mentioned:
Motive mentioned:
THE EXACT WORDS USED BY THE CALLER WERE:
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BACKGROUND NOISES
Machinery: People:
Airplane/train/bus:
Street traffic:
Animals: Music:
NOTIFICATIONS MADE
By: Time:
Law enforcement agency:
ARC Security Manager:
Other:
Company administration:
Suspicious parcels and letters
Be wary of suspicious packages and letters. They can contain explosives, chemical, or biological
agents. Be particularly cautious at your place of employment.
Some typical characteristics that should trigger suspicion include parcels that –
Are unexpected or from someone unfamiliar to you.
Have no return address, or have one that can’t be verified as legitimate.
Are marked with restrictive endorsements, such as “Personal”, “Confidential”, or “Do Not
X-ray”.
Have protruding wires or aluminum foil, strange odors, or stains.
Show a city or state in the postmark that does not match the return address.
Are of unusual weight, given their size, or are lopsided or oddly shaped.
Are marked with any threatening language.
Have inappropriate or unusual labeling.
Have excessive postage or excessive packaging material such as masking tape and string.
Have misspellings of common words.
Are addressed to someone no longer with your organization or are otherwise outdated.
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Have incorrect titles or title without a name.
Are not addressed to a specific person.
Have handwritten or poorly typed addresses.
With suspicious envelopes and packages other than those that might contain explosives, take these
additional steps against possible biological and chemical agents.
Place suspicious envelopes or packages in a plastic bag or some other type of container to
prevent leakage of contents. Never sniff or smell suspect mail.
If you do not have a container, cover the envelope or package with anything available (e.g.,
clothing, paper, trash can, etc.) and do not remove the cover.
Leave the room and close the door, or section off the area to prevent others from entering.
Wash your hands with soap and water to prevent spreading any powder to your face.
If you are at work, report the incident to your security officer or an available supervisor
who should notify the authorities without delay.
List all the people who were in the room or area when this suspicious letter or package was
recognized. Give a copy of this list to the health authorities and law enforcement officials
for follow-up investigations and advice.
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ANNEX D-3 – TERRORISM
A. Definition
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as “the unlawful use of force against
persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment
thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objectives. It includes three elements:
1. Terrorist activities are illegal and involve the use of force.
2. The actions intend to intimidate or coerce.
3. The actions are committed in support of political or social objectives.
The criminal component is the most important element separating a terrorist organization and its
actions from a legitimate organization. However, any organization, legitimate or not, can resort to
terrorist means to achieve its political or social agenda. We also need to remember that a terrorist
can act alone.
What makes a terrorist event so dangerous is that it is intended to cause damage, to inflict harm,
and in some cases kill. Terrorists will go to great lengths to make sure the event has the intended
impact.
B. Categories of Terrorist Weapons
Experts generally agree that there are five categories of terrorist weapons: biological, nuclear,
incendiary, chemical, and explosive.
1. Biological: Several biological agents can be adapted and used as terrorist weapons. These
include anthrax (sometimes found in sheep), tularemia (or rabbit fever), cholera,
encephalitis, the plague, and botulism. Biological agents pose very serious threats given
their fairly accessible nature, and the potential for their rapid spread. The potential for
devastating casualties is high in a biological incident. These agents are disseminated in the
following ways: by the use of aerosols (spray devices), oral (contaminating food or water
supplies), dermal (direct skin contact with the substance) exposure, or injection. There are
four common types of biological agents: bacteria, viruses, rickettsia, and toxins.
a. Bacteria and Rickettsia: Bacteria are single-celled organisms that multiply by

cell division and can cause disease in humans, plants, or animals. Although true
cells, rickettsia are smaller than bacteria and live inside individual host cells.
Examples of bacteria include anthrax (bacillus anthracis), cholera (Vibrio
cholerae), plague (Yersinia pestis), tularemia (Francisella tularensis); an example
of rickettsia is Q-fever (coxiella burnetii).
b. Virus: This is the simplest type of microorganisms. Viruses lack a system for
their own metabolism and therefore depend upon living cells to multiply. This
means that a virus will not live long outside of a host. Types of viruses that could
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serve as biological agents include smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, and
the viral hemorrhagic fevers such as the Ebola and Margburg viruses, and Lassa
fever.
c. Toxins: Toxins are toxic substances of natural origin produced by an animal,

plant, or microbe. They differ from chemical agents in that they are not manmade
and typically they are much more complex materials. Toxins, in several cases, are
easily extracted for use as a terrorist weapon, and, by weight, usually are more
toxic than many chemical agents. The four common toxins thought of as potential
biological agents are botulism (botulinum), SEB (staphylococcal enterotoxin B),
ricin, and mycotoxins. Ricin is a toxin derived from the castor bean plant,
available worldwide.
d. Routes of Exposure: The primary routes of exposure for biological agents are
inhalation and ingestion. Skin absorption and injection also are potential routes of
entry, but are less likely.
2. Nuclear: There are two fundamentally different threats in the area of nuclear terrorism.
One is the use, threatened use, or threatened detonation, of a nuclear bomb. The other is
the detonation, or threatened detonation, of a conventional explosive incorporating nuclear
materials (radiological dispersal devices or RDD). It is unlikely that any terrorist
organization could acquire or build a nuclear device, or acquire and use a fully functional
nuclear weapon.
The purpose of an attack where nuclear materials are incorporated into a conventional
explosive (RDD) would be to spread radioactive materials around a bomb site. This would
disrupt normal, day-to-day activities, and would raise the level of concern regarding long-
term health issues. It would prove to be difficult to perform complete environmental
decontamination.
There are three main types of nuclear radiation emitted from radioactive materials: alpha,
beta, and gamma.
a. Alpha particles are the heaviest and most highly charged of the nuclear particles.
However, alpha particles cannot travel more than a few inches in air and are
completely stopped by an ordinary sheet of paper. The outermost layer of dead
skin that covers the body can stop event the most energetic alpha particle.
However, if ingested through eating, drinking, or breathing contaminated materials,
they can become an internal hazard.
b. Beta particles are smaller and travel much faster than alpha particles. Typical beta
particles can travel several millimeters through tissue, but they generally do not
penetrate far enough to reach the vital inner organs. Exposure to beta particles
from outside the body is normally thought of as a slight hazard. However, if the
skin is exposed to large amounts of beta radiation for long periods of time, skin
burns may result. If removed from the skin shortly after exposure, beta-emitting
materials will not cause serious burns. Like alpha particles, beta particles are
considered to be an internal hazard if taken into the body by eating, drinking, or
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breathing contaminated materials. Beta-emitting contamination also can enter the
body through unprotected open wounds.
c. Gamma rays are a type of electromagnetic radiation transmitted through space in

the form of waves. Gamma rays are pure energy and therefore are the most
penetrating type of radiation. They can travel great distances and can penetrate
most materials. This creates a problem for humans because gamma rays can attack
all tissues and organs. Gamma radiation has very distinctive, short-term symptoms.
Acute radiation sickness occurs when an individual is exposed to a large amount of
radiation within a short period of time. Symptoms of acute radiation sickness
include skin irritation, high fever, hair loss, and dermal burns.
3. Incendiary: An incendiary device is any mechanical, electrical, or chemical device used

intentionally to initiate combustion and start a fire. A delay mechanism consists of
chemical, electrical, or mechanical elements. These elements may be used singly or in
combinations. Incendiary materials are materials that burn with a hot flame for a
designated period of time. Their purpose is to set fire to other materials or structures.
Incendiary devices may be simple or elaborate and come in all shapes and sizes. The type
of device is limited only by the terrorist’s imagination and ingenuity. An incendiary
device can be a simple match applied to a piece of paper, or a matchbook-and-cigarette
arrangement, or a complicated self-igniting chemical device. Normally, an incendiary
device is a material or mixture of materials designed to produce enough heat and flame to
cause combustible material to burn once it reaches its ignition temperature.
Each device consists of three basic components: an igniter or a fuse, a container or body,
and an incendiary material or filler. The container can be glass, metal, plastic, or paper,
depending on its desired use. A device containing chemical materials usually will be in a
metal or other non-breakable container. An incendiary device that uses a liquid a
accelerator usually will be in a breakable container, e.g., glass. Generally, there are three
types of incendiary devices: electrical, mechanical, or chemical. These may be used
singularly or in combinations.
4. Chemical: Chemical agents fall into five classes:

a. Nerve agents, which disrupt nerve impulse transmissions.
b. Blister agents, also called vesicants, which cause severe burns to eyes, skin, and
tissues of the respiratory tract.
c. Blood agents, which interfere with the ability of blood to transport oxygen.
d. Choking agents, which severely stress respiratory system tissues.
e. Irritating agents, which cause respiratory distress and tearing designed to
incapacitate. They also can cause intense pain to the skin, especially in moist areas
of the body. They are often called Riot Control Agents.
Nerve agents are similar in nature to organophosphate pesticides, but with a higher degree
of toxicity. All are toxic at small concentrations (a small drop can be fatal). The agents
include:
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Sarin (GB) used by terrorists against Japanese civilians and by the Iraqis against
Iran
Soman (GD)
Tabun (GA)
V-agent (VX)
These materials are liquids that typically are sprayed as an aerosol for dissemination. The
victims’ symptoms will be an early outward warning sign of the use of nerve agents. The
victims will salivate, lacrimate, urinate, and defecate without much control. Other
symptoms include:
Eyes: pinpointed pupils, dimmed and blurred vision, pain aggravated by sunlight
Skin: excessive sweating and fine muscle tremors
Muscles: involuntary twitching and contractions
Respiratory system: runny nose and nasal congestion, coughing and difficulty in
breathing
Digestive system: excessive salivation, abdominal pain, nausea and vomiting,
involuntary defecation and urination
Nervous system: giddiness, anxiety, difficulty in thinking and sleeping
(nightmares)
Nerve agents resemble water or light oil in pure form and possess no odor. The most
efficient distribution is as an aerosol. Small explosions and equipment to generate mists
(spray devices) may be present. Nerve agents kill insect life, birds, and other animals as
well as humans. Many dead animals at the scene of an incident may be another outward
warning sign or detection clue.
Blister agents are also referred to as mustard agents due to their characteristic smell. They
readily penetrate layers of clothing and are quickly absorbed into the skin. Mustard (H,
HD), and lewisite (L) are common blister agents. A few drops on the skin can cause severe
injury. Clinical symptoms may not appear for hours or days. The symptoms include:
Eyes: reddening, congestion, tearing, burning, and a “gritty” feeling; in severe

cases, swelling of the eyelids, severe pain, and spasm of the eyelids.
Skin: within 1 to 12 hours, initial mild itching followed by redness, tenderness, and
burning pain, followed by burns and fluid-filled blisters. The effects are enhanced
in the warm, moist areas of the groin and armpits.
Respiratory system: within 2 to 12 hours, burning sensation in the nose and throat,
hoarseness, profusely running nose, severe cough, and shortness of breath.
Digestive system: within 2-3 hours, abdominal pain, nausea, blood-stained
vomiting, and bloody diarrhea.
Blister agents are heavy, oily liquids, dispersed by aerosol or vaporization, so small
explosions or spray equipment may be present. In a pure state they are nearly colorless
and odorless, but slight impurities give them a dark color and an odor suggesting mustard,
garlic, or onions. Similar symptoms will occur among many individuals exposed.
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Blood agents interfere with the ability of the blood to transport oxygen, and result in
asphyxiation. Common blood agents include hydrogen cyanide (AC) and cyanogen
chloride (CK). CK can cause tearing of the eyes and irritate the lungs. All blood agents
are toxic at high concentrations and lead to rapid death. Affected persons require removal
to fresh air and respiratory therapy. Clinical symptoms include:
Respiratory distress
Vomiting and diarrhea
Vertigo and headaches
Under pressure, blood agents are liquids. In pure form, they are gasses. Precursor
chemicals are typically cyanide salts and acids. All have the aroma of bitter almonds or
peach blossoms.
Choking agents stress the respiratory tract. Severe distress causes edema (fluid in the
lungs), which can result in asphyxiation resembling drowning. Chlorine and phosgene,
common industrial chemicals, are choking agents. Clinical symptoms include severe eye
irritation and respiratory distress (coughing and choking). Most people recognize the odor
of chlorine. Phosgene has the odor of newly cut hay. As both are gases, they must be
stored and transported in bottles or cylinders.
Irritating agents, also known as riot control agents or tear gas, are designed to
incapacitate. Generally, they are non-lethal; however, they can result in asphyxiation
under certain circumstances. Common irritating agents include chloropicrin, MACE
(CN), tear gas (CS), capsicum/pepper spray, and dibenzoxazepine (CR). Clinical
symptoms include:
Eyes and throat: burning or irritation; tearing of the eyes.

Respiratory system: respiratory distress, coughing, choking, and difficulty
breathing.
Digestive system: high concentrations may lead to nausea and vomiting.
The primary routes or exposure for chemical agents are inhalation, ingestion, and skin
absorption/contact. Injection is a potential source of entry, but is less likely. With the
exception of blister agents, inhalation is the primary route of exposure for chemical agents.
However, skin absorption/contact with irritant nerve agents and blister agents also is a
highly possible route of exposure.
5. Explosives: It is estimated that 70 percent of all terrorist attacks worldwide involve

explosives. Bombings are the types of terrorist attacks most likely to be encountered.
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ANNEX D-4 – LANDMINES
The Landmine Problem
Landmines are inexpensive, some available for as little as $3 each. Because they are so cheap,
they have been distributed by the millions. Estimates vary, but a figure of 110 million mines in
the ground worldwide is often quoted. Mines are generally distributed randomly and the
individuals who lay them do not keep records. Therefore, in many cases long after a conflict ends,
mines lay undetected waiting to be detonated. Mines are often used to cripple society’s
infrastructure and placed in locations that guarantee detonation by the civilian population. They
are often placed around water sources or in fertile fields used for growing crops.
Increasingly mines are manufactured from plastic with such small amounts of metal that they are
virtually undetectable. In addition to being dangerous, mine clearing is a very expensive process.
An estimated 2,000 people a month are injured by landmines. ARC personnel may find
themselves working or traveling in mine affected areas. It is therefore essential to become aware
of the dangers associated with landmines and how to minimize the risks.
Landmine Recognition
There are many different varieties of landmine produced worldwide (there are over 350 types of
anti-personnel mine alone). Below is a brief guide to the terms used and the main types of mine.
Anti-tank: Mines which are normally large in size and contain several kilograms of high
explosive. They are designed to disable battle-tanks and other armored military vehicles.
Most commonly buried several inches below the road surface, and activated by direct
pressure from the tank. They may be of metallic or plastic construction. Plastic mines
often contain so little metal that they cannot be detected except by the most sensitive
detection equipment. Although usually placed by hand, they can be deployed from aircraft
or by other means, like mortar or rocket.
Anti-vehicle: These are either small anti-tank mines, or large anti-personnel mines, which
can pose a threat to civilian traffic because they require less pressure than anti-tank mines
to detonate. They contain a greater explosive charge than is generally associated with anti-
personnel mines.
Anti-personnel: A mine which is made to kill or injure persons who come into contact
with it, e.g., through a trip-wire or direct pressure switch. Five main types of anti-
personnel mine:
o Blast: The most commonly found anti-personnel mines, they explode when
stepped on. Generally cylindrical in shape, ranging in size from 3 to 6 inches in
diameter and 2 to 4 inches in height. Some are slightly larger and rectangular or
“shoe box” shaped. Laid in the ground, they kill or inflict injury through the blast
of the explosion alone. Most modern blast mines are made of plastic and are
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therefore difficult to detect. They tend to be colored tan, olive, green, black,
brown, or gray.
o Fragmentation: This type is often placed on stakes so that the mine is resting
about 8 inches above ground or tied to trees. They are also known as stake mines.
Activated by trip wires just above the ground, they have metal casings designed to
rupture into fragments when the mine is detonated; or they are packed with metal
fragments which when dispersed by the force of the blast are the primary cause of
injury.
o Bounding fragmentation: These are generally triggered by trip wire and/or direct
pressure. Once triggered, the mine leaps into the air to about chest level before
fully detonating. The explosion shoots metal fragments in a 360-degree horizontal
arc. Bounding mines are usually shaped like a can, with a single spike or multiple
spikes protruding from the top. They are generally about 6 inches in diameter and
11 inches in height. When these mines are laid it is common to see the spikes
above the soil. Trip wires can run as far as 100 feet from these spikes.
o Directional fragmentation: These are triggered by trip wires or remote control.

They are placed to fire steel balls at high velocity in a predetermined direction.
o Scatterable: Mines scattered by aircraft, helicopter, or artillery. They settle on the

ground without exploding and some send out their own tripwires. They are small
enough to fit into the palm of your hand. The Soviet PFM-1 ‘butterfly’ blast mine,
found in Afghanistan, glides to the ground. The ‘wings’ of the mine tend to attract
the attention of children.
Preparation and Observation
According to international law, any area containing mines should be clearly marked as a minefield
with perimeter fences and markers. However in many conflicts, mines are laid without such
markers. Large areas of countryside may be potential minefields, with the evidence of mines
being a casualty – human, animal, or vehicle. Therefore, it is important that ARC personnel
follow some basic precautions:
Obtain specialist assistance to carry out a risk assessment.

Arrange for staff and those associated with the program to receive mine awareness training
Provide staff with guidelines supported, if possible, with maps of known areas of risk and
posters showing mines and procedures. Display posters and maps where staff will see
them.
Avoid high risk areas.
Establish a reporting procedure to record mine incidents.
Continuously update knowledge through local contacts.
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Preparation
Before entering any unfamiliar zone, gather as much information as possible. Ask if other
vehicles have recently passed safely over your intended route. It is becomes clear that mines are a
possibility and there is not alternative but to proceed, then make preparations and pay particular
attention to areas where mines are likely to be laid and watch out for signs of mines.
Preparations include:
Planning your route and giving your trip plan (at least you intended route and estimated
time of arrival) to your superiors
Carrying a radio and keeping in contact with the base
Ensuring that you have a good first aid kit in the vehicle and that you know how to use it
(large “shell dressings” are essential)
Carrying water, two spare wheels, and a tow rope
Ensuring that everyone is familiar with how to look for mines and what to do in case of a
landmine incident.
Observation
Likely areas for mine laying include:
Checkpoints
Bottlenecks such as narrow valleys
Bends or dips in the road
Road verges or ditches
Areas in and around craters or obstacles
Parking areas and road junctions
Areas around abandoned vehicles and equipment (attractive items)
Positions, including buildings, formerly occupied by troops
Any structure that has been used as a defensive position by troops (front and flanks)
Any building or structure that contains (or contained) vital equipment, such as power
stations, radio stations, warehouses, or government offices
Buildings likely to provide shelter
Bridges and approaches to bridges and crossings
Approach roads to important towns
Railways, on either side of the track
Airports and airstrips in battle zones
Land approaching canals and ditches
Areas which have been fought over by opposing forces, where each side has established
strong defensive positions (this is especially true of lowlands separating heavily defended
hill positions)
Indications of the presence of mines:
Standard mine signs (square or triangular bright red with a skull and crossbones; the
words “DANGER!” or “MINES!” will be written in the local language)
Improvised markings (piles of stones, crossed sticks, material on sticks or bushes, etc.)
Obstructions which dictate direction of passage
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Small irregular depressions in open ground
Unusual shapes or colors
Rotten wooden stakes, particularly with fishing line type wire attached
Dead animals or the remains of animals
Freshly disturbed earth or vegetation
Abandoned boxes or cans
Destroyed vehicles
Roads or paths that are avoided by the local population
Suspicious metal or wooden objects on the ground
Fences, which may at one time have been put up to mark a mined area
Characteristic crater that is round in shape (result of mine detonation)
Fertile land that is not used or fields of ripe crops that have not been harvested
Trip wires – usually strand of steel wire attached to a fragmentation AP mine and either
another mine or a solid object (if you see one, do not touch or attempt to cut it)
Landmine Avoidance
Seek ‘in-country’ mine awareness training on arrival in a region contaminated with landmines.
Ask questions whenever you are in a new area to determine landmine hazards. Continue to ask
questions when traveling. Regularly talk to other agencies, especially de-mining agencies,
surgical hospitals (ICRC), prostheses workshops, and the military.
Ask local people, especially farmers and animal herders, about areas you are unsure of. However,
do not trust local people blindly. It is possible they know less than they claim or they may have
become used to the presence of mines. Expatriates often assume that their interpreters or local
drivers have a comprehensive knowledge of the hazards in the area. So while it is important to ask
as many questions as possible, if you are in doubt, turn back.
Precautionary measures while driving:
Follow previous tire tracks. Never drive where there are no previous vehicle tracks or on
an unknown road.
If following another vehicle, leave plenty of space between them and yourself.
Avoid detours. Do not leave the road if a vehicle or obstacle bars the way. Rather that
turn around, it is better to reverse to a known safe area.
Avoid potholes, fresh earth spots, foreign objects, and brush or grass in the road.
Stay close to vehicles when stationary. Do not wander off the track or road. If you have to
go to the toilet, either overcome your shyness, or ask your colleagues to look away.
To dispel a common misconception, traveling fast will not enable the vehicle to escape the blast of
the explosion. A blast travels at several thousand meters per second. You cannot outrun this.
The practice of placing wet sandbags on the floor of the vehicle and partially filling the tires with
water to absorb some of the blast effect is debatable. Such measures are also likely to have an
adverse effect on the driving characteristics of the vehicle thereby compromising vehicle safety
and reliability.
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Response to Landmine Incidents
If precautions described previously are taken, the risk of an incident will be greatly reduced.
Know what precautions you can take – and take them! Unfortunately, despite taking the
precautions you may still encounter an incident involving landmines. Below are general
guidelines on what might be done. However, situations vary greatly and it is essential to identify
relevant and reliable local sources of information regarding landmines and recommendations for
dealing with landmine incident.
If you discover a landmine:
NEVER attempt to dismantle it.

Never touch it or try to move it.
Do not try to detonate it by any means.
If you discover a landmine while walking:
Keep as calm as possible and prevent others from panicking

STOP all movement immediately. Warn those that are with you to do the same by loudly
shouting a clear warning such as: “STOP! I’m in a minefield”.
Do not rush over to a casualty to administer first aid since this is likely to increase the
casualty list.
If possible, radio for help, giving information on time, location, identity of casualties, type
of injuries, what assistance is required, suggested means of evacuation (if known).
It is usually best to stay where you are and await help. Only consider sending for help if
radio contact cannot be made, or if you believe there is no other way help will be sent.
If available, allow trained mine clearance personnel to clear a safe passage to a safe
ground.
When safely out of the mined area do not forget to mark that area with whatever is
recognized locally as indicating landmines – crossed sticks, pile of rocks, etc.
If you encounter a landmine while driving:
Stop the vehicle.

Remove hands from the steering wheel.
Follow a similar procedure as given above for discovering a landmine while driving. It is
usually best to stay where you are and shout or radio for help. Only consider movement if
there is no chance of outside assistance.
If you have to leave the vehicle, exit through the back end, stepping to the ground only on
the wheel tracks.
If there are several occupants, leave one at a time and leave 20 yards between each person.
Follow that tracks out.
Clearly mark the area as mined.
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After the incident:
Report the incident as widely as necessary to ensure everyone knows the location of the
landmines.
Once immediate medical assistance has been given to the injured, ensure that appropriate post-
traumatic counseling is given to all those involved in the incident.
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DISTRIBUTION LIST
ARC HQ ARC FIELD OFFICES

Executive (4) Africa
President Guinea (5)
Vice President Sierra Leone (5)
Senior Advisor to the President Liberia (3)
Security Manager Sudan (3)
Rwanda (3)
International Operations (4)
Director Balkans
Regional Manager/Africa Kosovo (7)
Program Associate Serbia-Montenegro (2)
International Health Program Coordinator Macedonia (1)
Human Resources (2) Pakistan (5)

Director
Administration Thailand (5)
Finance (1)
Director
Development and Communications (1)

VP Domestic Operations
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ARC International

Safety & Security Guidelines

SAFETY & SECURITY GUIDELINES

C. Scope and Compliance

D. Authorities & References

1. ARC Strategic Vision (revised: June 2003)

2. ARC Security Strategy (undated)

3. ARC Security Protocol (undated)

4. ARC International Operations - Extended Program Document (March 2004)

5. ARC Security Plan (undated draft)

8. The Security of National Staff: Essential Steps, InterAction (July 2001)

9. Security in the Field; United Nations Manual (1998)

Security Protection of aid personnel, facilities, and materiel from violence,

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B. Security Management Team (SMT) and Crisis Management Team (CMT)

2. SMT consists of: (pending final determination)

3. Specific responsibilities of the SMT include:

C. Security Manager (SM)

2. Specific responsibilities of the SM include:

D. Country Director (CD)

E. Field Security Officer (FSO)

2. Specific responsibilities of the FSO include:

F. Local Security Officer (LSO)

2. Specific responsibilities of the LSO include:

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1. ARC security program is based on a three-pronged strategy of acceptance, protection, and

3. Protection – hardening the target: This consists of strategies to reduce target

a. Protective devices refer to equipment needed to provide adequate security.

a. Diplomatic deterrence is the product of ARC relationship with larger international

i. Use of armed protection (“armed” defined here as employment of lethal

1) Use of armed guards may send conflicting messages about ARC’s

3) Use of deadly force in any form would require a more stringent

4) The heavy responsibility associated with the employment of force

5) Finding well-trained, reliable, and trustworthy armed security

1) It is imperative that ARC staff continue operating in the extremely

2) It is reasonable to expect that ARC staff will be routinely exposed to

3) Armed security is the only way to ensure protection of ARC staff,

4) Country director and/or designated Field Security Officer can and

B. Program Development and Implementation

1. An effective safety/security program hinges on detailed planning and preparation at all

i. Vulnerability refers to the level or degree of susceptibility to the threat,

ii. Vulnerability depends on many factors. For example, vulnerability of

iii. Vulnerability analysis must take into consideration the program

c. Risk Assessment and Mitigation

i. The key to successful security management lies in objective risk

Sample Vulnerability List

vi. Risk mitigation is the formulation, adoption, and implementation of

d. Other Assessment and Warning/Alerting Systems

i. While the risk management tools discussed above provide a methodology

ii. In these situations, ARC employs the following mechanisms.

2) The UN Security Phase System (I-V) provides a general security

3) Another mechanism that can be used is the US government’s 4-tier

C. Field Security Plan (FSP)

D. Special Planning Considerations for National/Local Staff

a. ARC International is not authorized to relocate local or refugee staff in emergency

E. Reporting and Information Management

5. Reports will be forwarded to ARC HQ on a routine basis.

c. Variations to reporting schedule will be coordinated with the SM prior to

F. Training Program and Documentation

4. Specialized training for specific positions will be provided.

5. Specialized FSO training will be coordinated by ARC HQ Security Manager. Skill

ARC security strategy

ARC (country) FIELD SECURITY PLAN