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April 2019
Vol 36 Issue 4 ISSN: 0265-9093
Contents
Latin America Monitor

Venezuela: Crib Sheet – Guaidó
and Maduro Making Moves 6
Colombia: Tensions With
Andean Guerrilla Groups And Venezuela
Highlight Security Risks 9
Venezuela: What Comes After A Peru: Export Growth Will Narrow
Change In Government? Current Account Deficit In
Key View Long Term 12
• In the event of a regime change in Venezuela, we at Fitch Solutions believe that the Bolivia: Set To Pace South America
successor to the PSUV-led government will face massive political and economic In 2019 Growth 15
challenges in the following years.
• In particular, rebuilding institutions, combatting hyperinflation, reviving the oil
sector and reducing crime will be among the most important challenges for a new
government.
• We believe it will take several years for most of these challenges to be addressed, and
we see significant risk of backsliding on reforms throughout the process.
Increased diplomatic recognition of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim

president, combined with growing fractures within sections of the armed forces, suggest
that the odds of regime change in Venezuela are currently at the highest point since the
Copy Deadline: 22 February 2019
failed coup against former president Hugo Chávez in 2002. This article by Fitch Solutions
...continued on page 2 Analysts: Lee Sutton, Andrew Trahan and

Jesse Wheeler
Editor: Katherine Weber

Peru: Modest Rate Hikes In 2019 Despite Downside Risks 11
Sub-Editor: Margeaux Erasmus
We expect that the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú will hike its benchmark interest
rate from the current 2.75% in the coming quarters due to higher energy prices and rising Subscriptions Manager: Lyan Chan
inflation. However, a more dovish US Federal Reserve monetary policy stance and weaker
Marketing Manager: Julia Consuegra
inflation readings in recent months will ease pressure on the central bank to raise rates.
Production: Kavita Saini
Ecuador: Bond Issue Will Give Government Breathing Room 13

On January 28, Ecuador tapped into international capital markets with an issuance of
USD1.0bn of 10-year bonds, with a coupon rate of 10.75%. Continued borrowing at such
a high cost is likely unsustainable, with the high yield required by international markets
supporting our view that Ecuador is likely to reach an agreement with the IMF in 2019.
REGIONAL INDICATORS
Andean 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f
Nominal GDP, USDbn 700.9 728.4 733.8 816.1 Head Office
Population, mn 140.9 142.5 144.0 145.6 30 North Colonnade, London
GDP per capita, USD 4,975.0 5,112.1 5,094.0 5,605.4
Real GDP growth, % 1.8 2.4 2.9 3.6
E14 5GN, UK
Inflation, % 3.0 2.0 2.8 3.1
Goods exports, USDbn 143.8 154.4 154.7 165.1
Goods imports, USDbn 123.8 139.3 147.0 163.8 Company Locations
Notes: e/f = estimate/forecast. Andean = Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela. Weighted by nominal GDP. London | New York | Singapore
Source: Fitch Solutions
Hong Kong | Dubai | Pretoria
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Andean | April 2019
ANDEAN RISK INDEX

Our Country Risk Index scores countries on a 0-100 scale, evaluating short-term and long-term political stability, short-term economic
outlook, long-term economic potential and operational barriers to doing business. For a detailed methodology, visit fitchsolutions.com
or contact us using the details on page 1.
RISK INDEX TABLE

Short Term Long Term Operational Country
Political Economic Political Economic Risk Risk
Peru 58.8 68.5 62.5 67.6 48.8 59.1
Colombia 63.2 65.8 60.4 64.2 48.4 58.4
Ecuador 51.3 58.3 49.1 58.3 45.8 51.4
Bolivia 51.5 55.8 50.0 62.5 35.3 48.4
Venezuela 29.2 25.6 44.8 24.9 30.8 31.0
Regional Average 50.8 54.8 53.4 55.5 41.8 49.7
Global Average 63.1 52.8 62.0 54.0 49.7 55.1
Source: Fitch Solutions
VENEZUELA – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

...continued from front page
addresses the most pressing challenges that would face a successor to President Nicolás Risk Of Regime Change Extremely High
Latin America – Short-Term Political Risk Index,
Maduro and the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV)-led government, and the Out Of 100
likely next steps to address these challenges.
Acquire Humanitarian Aid: The most likely first step for a successor government would
be to seek humanitarian aid to address the perilous living conditions in the country. Years of
economic mismanagement have left the country with significant shortages of basic goods
such as food and medicine. Guaidó is already attempting to organise aid from international
donors, though it is unclear if this aid will be allowed into the country. Given the intensity
of Venezuela's humanitarian crisis, we at Fitch Solutions expect that a new government
would seek aid from any source willing to offer it. Aid is most likely to come from the UN,
Note: Higher scores indicates lower risk. Source: Fitch Solutions
multilateral institutions (including the IMF and World Bank), the US, the EU and other Latin
American countries, though Russia and China may also be involved in order to preserve ties
to the government.
That said, it is unclear how much aid the next government will be able to acquire. While we
are confident that aid to ease the humanitarian crisis in the short term will be forthcoming,
it is not clear whether foreign countries will be willing to offer larger sums to help revitalise
the economy over the long term. In early 2018, the Colombian government reportedly
contacted international lending agencies about crafting a recovery plan worth USD60.0bn.
Given the massive investment needs of the Venezuelan economy, access to international
financing will be essential to adjusting the country's economic trajectory.
Hold New Elections: Elections are essential to ensure the democratic legitimacy of the
next government, particularly given the potentially disruptive impact of the economic
reforms the next government is likely to pursue. As a result, we expect elections to be
held as soon as is feasible in the wake of a transition. However, we note several logistical
challenges to holding new elections:
1. The National Electoral Council (CNE) is controlled by PSUV loyalists, and thus is likely to
be replaced in order to ensure fairness and transparency.
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THIS COMMENTARY IS PUBLISHED BY FITCH SOLUTIONS MACRO RESEARCH and is NOT a comment on Fitch Ratings’ Credit Rating. Any comments or data included in the report are
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Andean | April 2019
2. Voter rolls are reportedly outdated, and voting machines will need to be audited Monetisation Of Fiscal Deficit Driving Hyperinflation
Venezuela – M2 Money Supply, VESmn
following allegations that the machines were tampered with in past elections.
International observers will also be needed to verify the results.
3. It is unclear which offices will be contested. The next legislative elections are set for late
2020, and the next presidential election for 2024. While we expect that all seats will be
contested, this is not yet clear.
4. It is unclear whether an opposition government would allow the PSUV to field candidates.
Not allowing certain groups to participate would undermine the democratic legitimacy
of the election and likely alienate a significant portion of the population.
5. Unrest is highly possible in the run-up to elections. Supporters of the current regime
would likely view Maduro's ouster as a foreign-backed coup, and would protest or Source: BCV, Fitch Solutions
potentially boycott future elections.
What Becomes Of The PSUV After A Political Transition? The PSUV is unlikely to be
wiped away as a political force in the event of regime change (see 'Massive Governance
Challenges Await PSUV's Successor In Venezuela', November 9 2018). While the
government is much less popular than during its peak under former president Hugo
Chávez (1999-2013), it retains a considerable amount of support due to its previous
success in reducing poverty as well as its dominance of the media in recent years.
Moreover, most of the public appears to blame the crisis on Maduro, rather than Chavismo
as a political ideology.
The PSUV's support base would react negatively to the party being removed from power,
raising the possibility of a civil conflict. Even if a conflict can be avoided, the perception
that the successor government used non-democratic tactics to remove the PSUV would
undermine its legitimacy with PSUV supporters. The party would likely paint the Maduro
era as an aberration and promise to bring back the relative prosperity that existed under
Chávez. Future elections could see the PSUV or its successor party returned to power.
Can The Opposition Maintain Its Unity Post-Maduro Government? We see a PdVSA Mismanagement Has Caused
Collapse In Oil Production
significant risk that the opposition coalition fractures in the months following the removal Venezuela – Oil Production & Exports
of the PSUV regime. The opposition is made up of parties whose positions range from left-
wing to centre-right, with little to unite them apart from opposition to the PSUV. Moreover,
it is unclear if the opposition will be able to unite behind one leader in the post-Maduro
era. While Guaidó has assumed that role for the time being, it is unclear if he will run in
future elections. Numerous other figures – including Guaidó's mentor Leopoldo López,
Henrique Capriles, Freddy Guevara, María Corina Machado and Henry Ramos Allup – have
been floated as potential future presidential candidates, raising the risk of intra-coalition
fractures in the run-up to elections.
Even if the opposition is able to coalesce around a single candidate during the election, we e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: EIA, Fitch Solutions
see a significant risk that policy differences drive apart the coalition in the months afterward,
particularly without the unifying threat of the PSUV. The Venezuelan economy requires
extensive reforms, many of which are unlikely to be popular, which will create incentives for
opposition parties to campaign against them. This raises the possibility that needed reforms
will not be passed, potentially undermining the prospects for an economic recovery.
End Deficit Monetisation: Amid a collapse in revenues and without access to international
capital markets, the government has turned to printing money in order to fund expensive
Andean | April 2019
social programmes and a sprawling public sector. This has driven hyperinflation, which the opposition-controlled National Assembly
estimates had surpassed 1,000,000% y-o-y by the end of 2018.
Our core view at Fitch Solutions is that economic activity will take years to recover, suggesting that revenues will remain low for the
foreseeable future. As a result, the most likely path to reducing the budget deficit will involve cuts to public spending, allowing the country
to reduce money printing and help to slow inflation. In the event that Venezuela dollarises or adopts a currency board, the country would
face a hard budget constraint that would force it to reduce spending.
However, cuts are likely to prove deeply unpopular, given widespread reliance on government support in order to meet basic needs. As a
result, we see a strong chance that the next government will seek foreign aid to cushion the blow of fiscal austerity in the short term. In
addition, we note that the next government will have to restore basic public services such as mass transit, education, law enforcement
and healthcare, which have deteriorated in recent years, and this will limit its ability to cut spending in those areas.
Stabilise The Currency: The Venezuelan bolívar has collapsed in value over recent years amid hyperinflation and a severe erosion of
confidence. Broadly, we expect the next government will pursue one of three options to address this:
1. Create a new currency and let it float freely, improving the unit's competitiveness and allowing reserves to be rebuilt. Gradual
reductions in the money supply and an influx of foreign aid and investment will likely strengthen the unit over time. This would still
enable the government to print money at its discretion, which poses risks to the credibility of reform efforts.
2. Abandon the bolívar for the US dollar or another currency. This option has been floated for some time, such as by the economic
advisors to opposition presidential candidate Henri Falcón before the 2018 presidential elections. This would require a substantial
increase in Venezuela's reserves to be feasible, likely via aid through the IMF. Dollarisation would likely bring inflation down at a rapid
pace, though it would also bring with it a host of other challenges, such as a reduction in competitiveness for Venezuela's non-oil
exports and a loss of control of monetary policy.
3. Create a currency board. This would require that every note issued by the central bank be fully backed by a foreign 'reserve' currency,
and that the notes can be converted into the foreign currency at a fixed rate at any time. This system would also likely require
significant assistance from the IMF. We note that the viability of either dollarisation or a currency board is dependent on political
developments, as a lack of confidence in the durability of the policy could result in capital flight.
Address The Decline Of The Oil & Gas Sector: Years of underinvestment and increasing government interference have left
infrastructure in the sector in extremely poor condition, caused national oil company PdVSA's joint venture partners to flee and resulted
in severe brain drain, as skilled managers and technicians have been replaced by military loyalists. We estimate that production will fall to
1.02mn barrels per day (b/d) in 2019, down from 2.59mn b/d in 2011.
We expect the oil and gas sector to remain in decline for several years into the future, even with a new government in power. PdVSA's
executive leadership would probably have to be replaced, and it would take time to rebuild the ranks of its engineers and operators. In
addition, oil field service providers have by-and-large left the country due to deteriorating conditions and irregular payments for their
services, and will need to be lured back if production is to be recovered.
Finally, given the scale of investment that will be necessary to repair and upgrade infrastructure in the sector, and the government's
history of mismanagement, privatisation of large segments of the sector will likely be necessary. This may attract a nationalistic backlash,
as opening the sector to foreign investors would invite accusations that the new government removed the PSUV in order to sell off the
sector to foreign investors. We note that security risks, for both workers and physical infrastructure, will remain an ongoing concern,
potentially deterring foreign investors.
Negotiate With Creditors: The Venezuelan government, as well as PdVSA, has been in default on most of its debt obligations since
November 2017, accumulating billions of dollars in arrears. The next government will enter into negotiations with the country's creditors,
likely with the goal of delaying future payments from both the sovereign and PdVSA, and reducing the principal the country must repay.
Andean | April 2019
These negotiations can only occur if the current PSUV government is replaced, given that US sanctions on its senior leadership and on
the provision of new debt to Venezuela make a traditional debt refinancing or restructuring virtually impossible.
We at Fitch Solutions expect these negotiations will be incredibly complex, and will likely play out over a multi-year time frame. While we
do not have a view on likely recoveries for investors, Harvard economist Ricardo Hausmann, an informal adviser to Guaido, has hinted that
creditors can expect significant haircuts, given the need to revive Venezuela's economy. This suggests that Venezuela and its creditors
may have a lengthy restructuring process in the years ahead (see 'Venezuela Debt Scenario: Consensual Renegotiation Would Support
Stability', September 7 2018).
Restore The Independence Of Venezuela's Institutions: Most institutions in the country, including PdVSA, the National Electoral
Council, the Banco Central de Venezuela, the court system, the armed forces and most media are controlled by loyalists to the Maduro
regime. Media reports also allege that government officials are deeply involved in corruption and the drug trade, reflected in Venezuela's
rank of 168th of 180 countries in Transparency International's 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index. While we note that the lower ranks of
most institutions are likely staffed by 'careerists' – rather than political appointees – who could retain their roles under a new government,
most institutions will have to be rebuilt effectively from scratch, which will likely take years.
Address Pro-PSUV Armed Groups: We at Fitch Solutions see a risk that Chavista supporters arm themselves in the event of a
government transition, which they would view as illegitimate. Pro-government paramilitaries known as colectivos are already well-armed
and often seen working alongside official state security forces. Addressing violent unrest would depend on the support of the armed
forces, which is not a guarantee in the wake of a change in leadership. As a result of these uncertainties, we see a risk that even a
negotiated transition could eventually break down into a low-level civil conflict, which would be exacerbated by relatively limited rule of
law in many rural regions in Venezuela.
Combat Crime: The next government will have to address crime and security issues in order to retain popular support. The collapse
in living standards in Venezuela has resulted in a massive increase in crime, including a murder rate that independent estimates place
among the highest in the world. This is compounded by an overcrowded prison system and the wide availability of illegal weapons. Media
reports indicate that organised crime groups such as the FARC and ELN have made inroads in Venezuela, particularly along the borders
with Colombia and Guyana, contributing to Venezuela becoming one of the largest drug-transit countries in the region.
Entice The Diaspora To Return: According to UN estimates, the number of Venezuelan refugees and migrants worldwide reached
3.0mn as of the end of 2018, with the majority leaving since 2015. We expect that significant numbers of Venezuelans will ultimately
return to the country following a change in government. In particular this may include former employees of PdVSA, many of whom
moved to Colombia following the 2002-2003 oil strike. Additionally, we expect remittances from abroad will remain a key source of hard
currency inflows for the foreseeable future.
While the return of significant numbers of migrants, many of whom are educated according to anecdotal evidence, offers upside to our
economic forecasts, we note that this is contingent on economic improvements and relative political stability. Additionally, we see a risk
that a sudden influx of migrants returning to the country could create a massive increase in labour supply, pushing down wages and
increasing unemployment. This would in turn create risks to social stability.
Andean | April 2019
VENEZUELA – POLITICAL OUTLOOK
Crib Sheet: Guaidó And Maduro Making Moves

The years-long economic and political crisis in Venezuela has reached a potential turning US Oil Sanctions To Exacerbate PdVSA's
Production Declines
point. With the opposition unified behind Speaker of the National Assembly Juan Guaidó, Venezuela – Oil Production & Exports
who has been declared interim president with the backing of much of the international
community, the odds of regime change are as high as they have been at any point in recent
years. However, President Nicolás Maduro of the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela
(PSUV) retains the support of the armed forces, and appears unwilling to bow to external
pressure to step down. Below, we discuss the most significant recent developments in the
country's crisis, and lay out our core views on how events will progress.
Recent Developments
• US sanctions on PdVSA have cut off the company's primary source of export revenue
and imported diluents. The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: EIA, Fitch Solutions
blocked Venezuelan crude imports from entering the US, with certain exceptions,
while US exports to the country will be prohibited. The restrictions will be lifted in
the event of a power transition to interim president Guaidó or to a democratically-
elected government. This will severely reduce PdVSA's ability to generate revenue
given the US's role as its largest cash-paying importer, putting its patronage network at
significant risk. A lack of access to the diluent naphtha, primarily sourced from the US,
will also inhibit the company's ability to transport its ultra-heavy supplies to market,
thereby forcing PdVSA to turn to more costly alternatives.
• International importers are turning their back on Venezuela in response to sanctions.
Importing countries outside of the US are suspending their contracts with the country
rather than threatening their access to the US financial system. Notably, Lukoil, one
of PdVSA's main suppliers of refined products, froze all transactions with the company
following the announcement. We expect other companies to follow suit in the coming
weeks, threatening Venezuela's access to fuel, diluent and other critical oil sector
supplies. In response PdVSA has proposed either bartering crude for imports of food
and medicine or using intermediaries in an effort to sidestep US sanctions, though it
is unclear if the use of these measures will offset the impacts of the new restrictions.
• Crude production declines are accelerating. Output has fallen by a staggering 500,000 Economy To Remain In Deep Depression Until
Reforms Are Made
barrels per day (b/d) since January 2018, with significant losses in recent months. Venezuela – Real GDP Growth
OPEC secondary source data show a 33,000b/d decline in December 2018, following
a 25,000b/d loss in November and a 12,000b/d loss in October. We expect output will
fall by steeper rates in the months ahead as a lack of export revenue eats into PdVSA's
ability to reinvest funds upstream or maintain existing facilities.
• On January 29, the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) banned Guaidó from leaving the
country and froze his bank accounts. The TSJ, which is loyal to Maduro, approved the
measures at the request of Attorney General Tarek William Saab, who announced an
investigation into Guaidó on charges of promoting unrest. This could be a precursor
to arresting Guaidó, though it remains unclear if the regime is willing to take that step.
e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: BCV, Fitch Solutions
We expect that any effort would attract significant backlash, both from the Venezuelan
public and foreign observers, similar to the reaction to the arrest of opposition leader
Leopoldo López in 2014, which sparked mass protests.
Andean | April 2019
• The Maduro government has used targeted repression of protesters and media blackouts to attempt to suppress recent dissent.
In particular, the government has used police special forces units, known as FAES, to repress protests in poor and working class
regions of Caracas, which have historically supported the PSUV. Estimates put the number of deaths in recent unrest at 35, with
hundreds more arrested. In addition, the regime has used rolling internet blackouts as well as social media bans to control the flow
of information. These are the same tactics used by the Maduro regime in mass protests in mid-2017, intended to cripple opposition
coordination and sap the morale of protesters.
• President Maduro indicated that he is willing to talk with the opposition, but ruled out early presidential elections. In an interview
with Russian news agency RIA, Maduro stated that he would be willing to have Mexico, Uruguay, Bolivia, Russia or the Vatican act
as mediators. He also stated that he would support early parliamentary elections, though he ruled out early presidential elections
despite threats from the EU on January 26 that it would recognise Guaidó if elections were not called by February 3. We note that
attempts at negotiations have failed repeatedly in the past, most recently in late 2017. It is unclear if the opposition would consent to
such talks, given concerns that the Maduro government would not come to the table in good faith.
• On January 26, the Venezuelan government suspended a demand that US diplomats leave the country for 30 days. Maduro had
given the diplomats 72 hours to leave, a deadline that would have expired late on January 26, which the US stated it would ignore.
This had raised the prospect of a confrontation between the two countries, with Venezuelan government officials threatening to
cut power and water to the embassy. The delay is reportedly to allow time for negotiations between the two countries, though we
believe that it primarily reflects concerns that using force against US diplomats could provoke a military response from the US.
• The opposition reiterated its offer of amnesty to military members who turn against the Maduro regime. The opposition-
controlled National Assembly passed a bill guaranteeing amnesty to any civilian or military officer who acts 'in defence of the
constitution', which it believes the Maduro government is currently violating. Over recent days opposition supporters brought
copies of the law to military barracks, hoping to spread awareness and encourage future defections. This is in line with broader
efforts by the opposition to cause fractures between the PSUV and the armed forces, with the ultimate goal of bringing about a
transition to a new government.
• At least two Venezuelan diplomatic personnel in the US have defected to the opposition. The military attaché in Washington, DC,
Colonel Jose Luis Silva, and Miami consul, Scarlet Salazar, both publicly broke with the Maduro regime. While these defections on
their own will have little impact on events on the ground in Venezuela, they hint at divisions within the Venezuelan government, and
could be a precursor to more widespread defections in the weeks ahead.
• On January 29, the US announced that it would hand control of Venezuela's bank accounts to the opposition. This includes all
resources in accounts held by the government of Venezuela or the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) in any US-insured bank.
This move, alongside recently-instituted oil sanctions re-directing the funds from sales of Venezuelan crude to the opposition, is
intended to cut the Maduro regime off from access to the hard currency needed to fund the existing patronage structure, thus
reducing the military's incentive to remain loyal to the regime.
• More foreign countries have recognised Guaidó as the legitimate president of Venezuela. In addition to the US, Canada and much of Latin
America, who recognised Guaidó on January 23, countries including Australia, Japan and the European Parliament have since expressed
support. The EU as a whole will likely recognise Guaidó in the days ahead, given the Maduro government's refusal to call new elections.
• Russia has repeatedly indicated its support for the Maduro government. The regime has also received the backing of China, Turkey
and Mexico, among others. Russian private military contractors are reportedly serving as security for Maduro in response to recent
protests. That said, we believe tensions between the two countries may be growing over unpaid loans. Russian Deputy Finance
Minister Sergey Storchak acknowledged on January 29 that Venezuela may struggle to make repayments under an USD3.2bn debt-
restructuring deal reached in 2017. The next installment, for USD100mn, is due in March. We see scope for talks between Russia and
the opposition if it becomes clear that the current government has become unable to meet its obligations.
• The Bank of England (BoE) refused on January 25 to allow the Venezuelan government to withdraw USD1.2bn worth of gold. The
BoE's decision followed a request from US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo that the bank help the US cut the Maduro regime off from
its overseas assets. The gold stored at the BoE is a significant portion of Venezuela's USD8.0bn in foreign reserves. It is unclear where
the remainder of the reserves is stored, though Turkey, a Maduro ally, has reportedly received freshly mined gold from Venezuela in
recent months.
• On January 29, Venezuelan opposition lawmaker Jose Guerra tweeted that a Russian plane that landed in Caracas on January 28 was
to remove 20 tonnes of gold from the BCV's vaults. Guerra's comments were backed by subsequent reporting that indicated that 20
Andean | April 2019
tonnes of gold, representing roughly 20% of the BCV's holdings of the metal in Venezuela, had in fact been set aside at the central
bank. While it is unclear where the gold is headed, it is notable that Venezuela owes several billion dollars to both Russia and China
for previous loans.
• US National Security Advisor John Bolton appeared to hint at possible deployment of US troops in Colombia. During the announcement
of sanctions on Venezuela's oil sector on January 28, Bolton held visible notes that suggested plans to move 5,000 military personnel
to Colombia. While both Acting US Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan and the Colombian government denied knowledge of such
plans, the US continues to proclaim that 'all options are on the table'.
Core Views
• The economic crisis will continue unabated. We expect that Venezuela will remain mired in a deep depression in 2019, as hyperinflation
and a collapse in oil production bring consumption, investment and exports to a standstill. A lack of inputs, most of which must
be imported, has led to the shuttering of a vast portion of the country's factories. These trends will be exacerbated by recent US
sanctions on the oil sector, which will reduce hard currency inflows into the country.
• There is a significant risk of regime change in the months ahead. Opposition-led protests, growing international isolation, sanctions
on the oil sector and the looming risk of creditor action have placed significant pressure on the ruling elite in Venezuela, raising the
possibility of a fracture with the armed forces. This would then lead to a military coup that would bring a transitional government to
power, or potentially a civil conflict as elements of the military choose different sides.
• Policy direction will remain unchanged while the PSUV holds executive authority. Over the last year, the government has continued
to nationalise private enterprises, often using a factory's closure as a pretext for intervention. Moreover, the government has
reiterated its commitment to the elevated spending, reflected in massive increases in the money supply in recent months. With little
domestic activity left to tax and PdVSA under sanction, government spending is likely to continue to be funded through currency
creation, a core driver of runaway inflation.
• Protests will continue to rise in intensity and number. In addition to nationwide protests called by the opposition, we expect that the
ongoing economic crisis, characterised by hyperinflation and severe shortages of basic goods across the country, will keep public
discontent at a fever pitch. This will likely see spontaneous protests against the government and looting continue to break out in the
months ahead.
• We do not expect a US military intervention. A lack of domestic support and the operational difficulties such action would create
make it highly unlikely that the US will follow through with its more belligerent threats.
VENEZUELA – DATA & FORECASTS

2015 2016 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f
Population, mn 31.16 31.57 31.98 32.38 32.78 33.17 33.56
Nominal GDP, USDbn 957.6 19.0 30.7 27.1 11.1 29.6 56.2
GDP per capita, USD 30,736 600 961 836 337 891 1,673
Real GDP growth, % y-o-y -6.2 -16.5 -10.6 -12.6 -13.9 8.1 7.1
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, ave 116.2 219.5 1,243.2 225,538.2 2,662,975.3 200.0 35.0
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, eop 180.9 376.0 3,979.0 1,117,690.1 4,208,260.5 20.0 15.0
Exchange rate VES/USD, ave 0.00 0.01 0.21 157.28 40,586.40 16,234.56 11,364.19
Exchange rate VES/USD, eop 0.00 0.11 78.75 20,371.84 28,410.48 13,799.38 10,511.88
Budget balance, VESbn 0.0 0.0 -0.7 -521.3 -90,728.4 -36,493.9 -17,827.0
Budget balance, % of GDP -14.2 -13.9 -10.8 -12.2 -20.2 -7.6 -2.8
Goods and services exports, USDbn 38.8 29.1 32.8 31.1 22.0 21.5 20.5
Goods and services imports, USDbn 50.8 24.8 20.1 24.2 23.0 31.1 41.9
Current account balance, USDbn -20.4 1.1 3.8 4.9 -2.0 -8.6 -22.4
Current account balance, % of GDP -2.1 6.0 12.4 18.1 -18.4 -29.0 -40.0
Foreign reserves ex gold, USDbn 16.4 11.0 5.0 8.0 11.0 14.0 17.0
Import cover, months 3.9 5.3 3.0 4.0 5.7 5.4 4.9
Total external debt stock, USDbn 175.1 184.6 135.2 116.5 125.9 204.5 361.3
Total external debt stock, % of GDP 18.3 973.2 439.8 429.9 1,138.6 691.6 643.3
Crude, NGPL & other liquids prod, 000b/d 2,536.0 2,337.0 2,070.8 1,460.4 1,020.6 867.6 817.8
Total net oil exports (crude & products), 000b/d 1,951.6 1,836.6 1,657.1 1,137.4 750.3 611.2 564.2
Dry natural gas production, bcm 22.9 23.4 23.0 22.5 22.2 22.6 23.0
Dry natural gas consumption, bcm 16.7 14.5 13.3 11.8 11.0 10.7 11.0
e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: National sources, Fitch Solutions
Andean | April 2019
COLOMBIA – POLITICAL OUTLOOK
Tensions With Guerrilla Groups And Venezuela

Highlight Security Risks
Key View
• In Colombia, security risks are rising due to the incomplete implementation of the 2016 Security Threats And Social Issues Unemployment
Underpin Lower Overall Score
peace accord with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia, the ongoing Colombia – Short-Term Political Risk Index (STPRI),
conflict with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional leftist insurgency and President Iván Out Of 100
Duque's stance against the Maduro government in Venezuela.

• Despite President Duque's rhetorical opposition to the Venezuelan government, we
believe it is very unlikely that the two countries engage in open conflict.
• At Fitch Solutions, we have revised down Colombia's score in our Short-Term Political
Risk Index to 63.2 out of 100, from 64.1 previously, to reflect a more challenging
security environment and a higher risk of unrest.
We at Fitch Solutions maintain our long-held view that the Colombian government will
not fully implement the FARC peace accord, increasing the risks that former Fuerzas Note: Higher scores indicate lower risk. Source: Fitch Solutions
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) members re-form guerrilla units. Duque and
his centre-right Centro Democrático (CD) party have long opposed the deal, finalised by
Duque's predecessor, Juan Manuel Santos (see 'Conflict To End, But Peace Implementation
Incomplete', February 28 2017). The CD, which draws support from landholders upset with
the peace accord's promise of land reform, also opposes the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
(JEP) legal framework. The JEP grants former guerrillas leniency if they confess to crimes
committed before the peace deal was completed in 2016. To that end, we expect that the
CD and its allies in Congress will appropriate the least amount of resources mandated by law,
undermining the vocational training and land reform provisions. This will likely destablise
rural areas formally controlled by the FARC. In the last two years, over 80 former FARC
members and 400 community leaders have been killed, reflecting a lack of government
control and the risks posed to left-wing activists in rural areas.
The government's aggressive recent actions towards remnants of the group support our
view. On February 2, a Colombian military operation, code named 'Zeus', killed Rodrigo
Cadete, a leader of a dissident FARC faction, and 13 other combatants in the south-western
department of Caquetá. Since 2017, an estimated 1,800 dissidents have reportedly formed
into 30 separate units, reviving previous FARC revenue streams from drug trafficking, illegal
gold mining and extortion.
At the same time, prospects for peace with the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) are
fading. On January 17, an ELN member detonated a car bomb outside a police academy
in Bogota, killing 21 and injuring over 65 (see 'Quick View: Colombian Government
Likely To Target ELN After Bogota Bombing', January 18). Before the January bombing in
Bogota, Duque had insisted that the ELN unilaterally suspend all criminal activity before
his government would resume peace talks. Since the attack, the Duque government has
accused the Venezuelan government of harbouring the ELN and sought the extradition of
ELN negotiators based in Cuba, which the Cuban government is unlikely to grant.
We believe it is highly unlikely that the Colombian government and ELN will reach a
settlement in the coming years. The ELN is more ideological and more decentralised than
Andean | April 2019
the FARC, which will make it harder to ensure that ELN soldiers will buy into and remain committed to a peace agreement. Moreover, the
incomplete implementation of the FARC peace deal, negotiated over 10 years and several presidential administrations, makes it less likely
that more guerrilla groups choose to demobilise, given the lack of benefits for and increasing attacks against former FARC members.
Tensions with Venezuela are also rising. While Duque accuses the Maduro government of harbouring the ELN, Duque has played a leading
role in supporting the Venezuelan opposition leader, Juan Guaidó (see 'Quick View: Massive Uncertainty In Venezuela In The Coming
Days', January 24). On February 6, the Venezuelan government installed barriers on the Tienditas Bridge that connects Colombia and
Venezuela to block humanitarian aid from the US and other Western countries. Guaidó, whom Duque recognised as the legitimate leader
of Venezuela on January 23, has called on the Venezuelan army to remove the barriers and allow aid into the country.
Despite the growing tensions, we do not anticipate an armed conflict between the two countries. A Colombia-led offensive against
Venezuelan armed forces would likely spur additional immigration into Colombia, where over one million Venezuelans currently reside
due to the ongoing economic crisis. In addition, Colombia's armed forces are more suited for counterinsurgency operations, rather than
interstate conflict.
COLOMBIA – DATA & FORECASTS

2015 2016 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f
Population, mn 48.23 48.65 49.07 49.46 49.85 50.22 50.58
GDP per capita, USD 6,035 5,806 6,407 6,685 6,592 7,133 7,473
Real GDP growth, % y-o-y 3.0 2.0 1.8 2.6 3.2 3.6 3.7
Industrial production, % y-o-y, ave -25.3 3.3 5.3 5.5 5.3 5.0 5.0
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, ave 5.0 7.5 4.3 3.2 3.4 3.3 3.3
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, eop 6.8 5.7 4.1 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.5
Central bank policy rate, % eop 5.75 7.50 4.75 4.25 4.75 5.25 4.75
Exchange rate COP/USD, ave 2,745.77 3,053.42 2,951.80 2,956.25 3,172.89 3,113.18 3,156.76
Exchange rate COP/USD, eop 3,174.50 3,002.00 2,937.83 3,254.25 3,091.54 3,134.82 3,178.71
Budget balance, COPbn -27,079.3 -34,925.5 -33,636.0 -30,535.2 -26,983.7 -24,309.5 -23,478.0
Current account balance, USDbn -18.6 -12.2 -10.6 -8.7 -8.7 -8.0 -7.2
Current account balance, % of GDP -6.4 -4.3 -3.4 -2.6 -2.6 -2.2 -1.9
Total external debt stock, % of GDP 38.9 42.6 39.6 38.6 39.4 37.1 35.5
Crude, NGPL & other liquids prod, 000b/d 1,026.0 906.3 874.1 879.0 869.3 864.9 869.7
Total net oil exports (crude & products), 000b/d 695.2 567.7 524.8 520.3 500.0 478.1 467.1
Andean | April 2019
PERU – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Modest Rate Hikes In 2019 Despite Greater Downside Risks

Key View
• We at Fitch Solutions expect the Banco Central de Reserva del Perú to hike its Little Pressure To Hike Rates With
benchmark interest rate from the current 2.75% in the coming quarters due to higher Inflation Well Within Target
Peru – Inflation & Benchmark Interest Rate
energy prices and rising inflation.
• However, a more dovish US Federal Reserve monetary policy stance and weaker
inflation readings in recent months will ease pressure on the central bank to raise rates.
• We have revised down our end 2019 interest rate forecast to 3.25%, from 3.50%
previously, reflecting our revised US Federal Reserve view and a lower inflation outlook.
The Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) will begin a rate-hiking cycle in the coming
quarters, raising its benchmark interest rate to 3.25% by end 2019. Higher global energy
prices, increasing inflation and strong real GDP growth will prompt the rate hikes. Our Oil &
team is bullish on oil prices in the coming years, which will increase fuel and transport costs in Source: BCRP, Fitch Solutions
Peru. We forecast Brent oil prices will average USD75.0/barrel (bbl) in 2019 and USD82.0/bbl
in 2020, from a current spot price of USD64.2/bbl (see 'Brent: Scenarios For 2019', February 1).
In addition, Peru will see real GDP growth of 3.9% y-o-y in 2019, as rising private consumption,
investment into the mining sector and construction spur economic activity, putting upwards
pressure on inflation.
However, the central bank will be less aggressive in raising rates than we previously thought.
Two major factors led us to revise down our end 2019 forecast to 3.25%, implying 50 basis
points (bps) of hikes from the current rate of 2.75%. First, inflation has remained firmly in the
central bank's 1.0-3.0% target range in the last six months, easing price growth pressures
that we previously expected (see 'Peru To Hike Interest Rates In 2019', November 16 2018).
Second, we have revised down our end 2019 US interest rate forecast as the US Federal
Reserve (Fed) has adopted a more neutral stance (see 'Moving To One 25bps Hike In 2019
As Fed Shifts Language To Neutral', February 5). Our previous view was that a series of Fed
rate hikes would force the BCRP to substantially raise rates to maintain a competitive real
interest rate versus the US.
Risks to our view are weighted to the downside, underpinned by moderate downside risks
to our energy price and global growth forecasts. The primary downside risks are:
• A weak global energy market that keeps oil prices low, limiting the price inflation of fuel
and transport services in Peru.
• Increasing trade tensions between the US and China, or a broader slowdown in global
growth, undermining demand for commodities and weighing on Peruvian growth.
• The US Fed holding the Fed funds rate at 2.25-2.50% through to the end of 2019,
alleviating the modest upside pressure on borrowing costs in emerging markets.
If these risks play out, we expect that the BCRP would delay rate hikes until H219, or hold
its benchmark rate at 2.75% through to the end of 2019, in order to support Peruvian
economic output.
Andean | April 2019
PERU – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Export Growth Will Narrow Current Account

Deficit In Long Term
Key View
• Peru will run modest current account deficits in the coming quarters as a wide primary Current Account Balance Will Follow Copper Prices
Peru – Current Account & Copper, USD/tonne
income shortfall and increasing demand for imports will offset export growth.
• In the longer term, however, increasing extractive sector production will help narrow
the current account deficit.
• At Fitch Solutions, we have revised our 2019 and 2020 current account deficit forecasts
to 1.7% and 1.6% of GDP respectively, from 1.4% and 1.2% previously, reflecting a less
bullish outlook for copper prices.
Recent foreign investment in Peru's mining sector will support export growth. Many
foreign mining companies have increased investment in Peru in recent years to capitalise
on higher commodity prices and boost production. In particular, a USD1.3bn investment e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: National sources,
Fitch Solutions
by Southern Copper Corporation at the Toquepala mine is expected to come online in
2019, offering tailwinds to copper production, which we expect will increase by 5.0% y-o-y
in 2019 and 6.0% in 2020. Peru remains an attractive destination for investment by foreign
mining companies for its business-friendly policies and low operating costs, which will drive
long-term export growth.
However, our less bullish forecast for global metal prices will hold back Peruvian exports.
Slowing demand for industrial metals in China, largely stemming from the US-China trade
dispute, has prompted our Mining team to revise down its short-to-medium term price
forecast for copper (see 'Copper Prices: Downside Revision As Trade Dispute Continues To
Impact Prices', December 19 2018). That said, we expect that prices will trend higher from
spot levels in the coming quarters, averaging USD6,900/tonne in 2019 and USD7,100/
tonne in 2020, from USD6,545/tonne in 2018.
Furthermore, we expect that import growth will accelerate as private consumption and Investment Income Deficit Will Far
Exceed Trade Surplus
investment pick up. Favourable monetary conditions, strong real GDP growth and rising Peru – Current Account Breakdown, USDbn
wages will boost demand for manufactured goods, which account for nearly three-quarters
of all imports (see 'Peruvian Economic Growth Will Remain Strong In 2019', November 29
2018). In the year through to November 2018, imports were up 9.6%, a trend we expect will
continue in the coming quarters.
The repatriation of profits by foreign firms will keep Peru's current account in deficit.
Foreign mining companies own substantial chunks of Peru's mining sector, causing
significant capital outflows as these firms repatriate profits. We expect the estimated
USD12.6bn investment income deficit in 2018 will widen further in the coming years as
metal prices trend higher and Peruvian mines boost production, increasing profits for e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: BCRP, Fitch Solutions
foreign companies.
Robust foreign direct investment (FDI) and substantial foreign reserves will support
Peru's external accounts. Net FDI totalled USD6.6bn in Q118-Q318, an 89.8% y-o-y
increase from 2017. Capital inflows will likely increase in 2019 as commodity prices head
Andean | April 2019
higher and President Martín Vizcarra works to stabilise the political environment and reassure investors after he took power during a
tumultuous 2018 (see 'Exit Of Attorney General, Reform Referendum Strengthen Peruvian President', January 14). In addition, a sizable
stock of foreign reserves, equivalent to 14.0 months of import cover, will provide support should Peru see a reversal of capital inflows
or a drop in exports.
PERU – DATA & FORECASTS

2015 2016 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f
Population, mn 31.38 31.77 32.17 32.55 32.93 33.31 33.69
Central bank policy rate, % eop 3.75 4.25 3.25 2.75 3.25 4.00 4.25
Exchange rate PEN/USD, ave 3.18 3.38 3.26 3.29 3.28 3.20 3.13
Exchange rate PEN/USD, eop 3.41 3.36 3.24 3.37 3.24 3.15 3.10
Budget balance, PENbn -12.6 -16.9 -22.8 -20.5 -21.3 -19.4 -19.5
Crude, NGPL & other liquids prod, 000b/d 151.9 136.3 136.1 141.5 144.9 148.6 151.2
Total net oil exports (crude & products), 000b/d -77.5 -106.9 -115.1 -122.5 -128.5 -132.8 -137.9
ECUADOR – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Bond Issue Will Give Government Breathing Room

The Latest: On January 28, Ecuador tapped into international capital markets with an Yields Heading Higher
Ecuador & Argentina – 2028 USD Sovereign Bond Yield
issuance of USD1.0bn of 10-year bonds, with a coupon rate of 10.75%. The move surprised
investors, as finance ministry officials had previously suggested that issuing above 10.0%
interest was off the table.
Implications: Continued borrowing at such a high cost is likely unsustainable, with the
high yield required by international markets supporting our view that Ecuador is likely to
reach an agreement in 2019 with the IMF, with which it has been in talks in recent weeks.
The Ecuadorian government has already taken extraordinary measures to meet financing
needs in recent quarters, including tapping into funds from state-owned utilities and
orchestrating repurchase agreements with international creditors. Ecuador also secured a Source: Bloomberg, Fitch Solutions
USD900.0mn loan from China that President Lenín Moreno negotiated in December, along
with a USD3.5bn line of credit.
The USD1.0bn issuance will likely enable President Moreno to hold off on any IMF
agreement, and the likely unpopular restrictions attached to it, until at least after March
regional elections. We estimate Ecuador will require USD9.0bn in financing in 2019.
What's Next: On January 29, Finance Minister Richard Martínez announced the
government would ramp up talks with the IMF in the coming months, and that the Moreno
Andean | April 2019
administration would seek funding if it were deemed beneficial to both sides. We note that an IMF agreement likely represents a last
resort for the Ecuadorian government, due to the likely policy constraints and potential political backlash.
Even if a deal is reached, sovereign bond prices are unlikely to recover in the near term. Ecuador's fiscal position will remain precarious
over the coming years, even as near-term liquidity risks subside and the Moreno administration adopts more orthodox economic policies
and reins in the deficit. Comparable Argentine bond yields have remained in a broad uptrend after the Macri government reached a
record-setting deal with the IMF in September 2018. Despite the alleviation of near-term risks due to its IMF deal, investors continue to
demand a substantial risk premium on Argentine debt.
ECUADOR – DATA & FORECASTS

2015 2016 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f
Population, mn 16.14 16.39 16.62 16.86 17.10 17.34 17.57
Real GDP growth, % y-o-y 0.1 -1.6 3.0 1.4 0.8 1.8 2.4
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, ave 4.0 1.7 0.4 -0.2 1.4 3.0 3.9
Consumer price inflation, % y-o-y, eop 3.4 1.1 -0.2 0.3 2.5 3.5 4.0
Exchange rate USD/USD, ave 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Exchange rate USD/USD, eop 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Budget balance, USDbn -5.1 -7.3 -4.7 -4.0 -3.6 -3.3 -2.9
Current account balance, USDbn -2.1 1.4 -0.3 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1
Current account balance, % of GDP -2.1 1.5 -0.2 -0.4 -0.1 0.2 0.1
Total net oil exports (crude & products), 000b/d 297.3 313.9 305.3 299.5 310.2 316.1 317.0
Andean | April 2019
BOLIVIA – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK
Set To Pace South America In 2019 Growth

Key View
• Strong private consumption, higher energy prices and improving economic activity in Region-Leading Growth Likely To Fade
In Coming Years
neighbouring Brazil and Argentina will support growth in Bolivia in 2019. Bolivia – Real GDP Growth, % y-o-y
• In addition, we expect the Bolivian government to increase public spending to bolster
the candidacy of President Evo Morales, ahead of the October 2019 general election.
• At Fitch Solutions, we have revised up our real GDP growth forecasts for 2019 and 2020
to 4.4% and 3.9% y-o-y, from 4.2% and 3.7% previously, reflecting higher growth in
public spending and private consumption.
We at Fitch Solutions estimate that Bolivia likely led South America in real GDP growth
in 2018. Even as economic headwinds weighed down growth in neighbouring Brazil and
Argentina, Bolivia grew at 4.4% y-o-y, compared to the Latin American average of 1.8% (see
'GDP Roundup: Political Risks Becoming More Present', August 16 2018). Higher energy e/f = Fitch Solutions estimate/forecast. Source: National sources,
Fitch Solutions
prices boosted Bolivian exports, while the construction and agricultural sectors both saw
impressive growth in 2018 data.
Higher government spending, private consumption and investment will drive growth
in the coming quarters. We forecast that the Bolivian government, led by President Evo
Morales, will increase spending in 2019 to shore up political support ahead of the October
2019 election. In Q418, Morales announced that the government would double year-
end bonuses for all public employees and spend USD200mn on health care coverage
for Bolivians without formal insurance (see 'Evonomics' Likely To Produce Wide Fiscal
Deficit In Bolivia In 2019', November 30 2018). A tight labour market, with unemployment
at 3.5%, combined with robust remittance inflows from Bolivians working abroad, will
further boost consumption.
Moreover, higher global energy prices and Bolivia's vast mineral resources will attract Brazil And Argentina Are Primary Export Markets
Bolivia – 2017 Major Export Destinations, FOB
investment. Our Oil & Gas team forecasts that global energy prices will trend higher in
2019 (see 'Brent: OPEC Holds The Line For 2019', December 11 2018), which will draw in
foreign capital to help modernise Bolivia's natural gas fields. National energy company
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) announced a USD2.5bn
agreement with UAE-based Kampac Oil and UK investment firm Milner Capital for
exploration and production. In addition, the Chinese Export-Import Bank extended a
USD546.0mn loan for the Mutún iron ore mine, part of an increasing Chinese presence in
Bolivia's extractive sectors.
Stronger economic activity in Argentina and Brazil will bolster Bolivian exports. While Bolivia Source: BCB, Fitch Solutions
saw goods exports increase by 17.2% y-o-y in the first three quarters of 2018, sluggish growth
in Brazil and a recession in Argentina likely undermined demand in the months thereafter.
Brazil and Argentina are Bolivia's largest markets, receiving 18.0% and 15.7% of exports in
2017. We expect both economies to register improvements in the coming quarters, which
will increase demand for Bolivian natural gas and agricultural products.
Over the longer term, growth will likely decelerate as energy prices plateau and the
investment climate remains subpar. We expect energy price growth will likely level off in the
Andean | April 2019
long term, weighing on government revenue growth and public spending. In addition, Bolivia's operating environment will detract from
further production gains in its energy, mining and agricultural sectors. Even though Bolivia has seen an uptick in investment in recent
years, it is ranked last in Latin America in the 'Trade and Investment Risk' sub-component in our Operational Risk Index.
BOLIVIA – DATA & FORECASTS

2015 2016 2017 2018e 2019f 2020f 2021f
Population, mn 10.72 10.89 11.05 11.22 11.38 11.54 11.71
Exchange rate BOB/USD, ave 6.90 6.91 6.91 6.91 7.01 7.16 7.29
Exchange rate BOB/USD, eop 6.90 6.93 6.91 6.91 7.10 7.22 7.36
Budget balance, BOBbn -15.7 -16.9 -20.3 -19.6 -20.7 -19.5 -19.3
Total net oil exports (crude & products), 000b/d -8.7 -15.9 -14.7 -17.8 -19.3 -19.9 -20.8

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Latin America Monitor

Increased diplomatic recognition of Venezuelan opposition leader Juan Guaidó as interim

...continued on page 2 Analysts: Lee Sutton, Andrew Trahan and

Editor: Katherine Weber

Ecuador: Bond Issue Will Give Government Breathing Room  13

ANDEAN RISK INDEX

RISK INDEX TABLE

VENEZUELA – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

VENEZUELA – POLITICAL OUTLOOK

Crib Sheet: Guaidó And Maduro Making Moves

VENEZUELA – DATA & FORECASTS

COLOMBIA – POLITICAL OUTLOOK

Tensions With Guerrilla Groups And Venezuela

Duque's stance against the Maduro government in Venezuela.

COLOMBIA – DATA & FORECASTS

PERU – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Modest Rate Hikes In 2019 Despite Greater Downside Risks

PERU – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Export Growth Will Narrow Current Account

PERU – DATA & FORECASTS

ECUADOR – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Bond Issue Will Give Government Breathing Room

ECUADOR – DATA & FORECASTS

BOLIVIA – ECONOMIC OUTLOOK

Set To Pace South America In 2019 Growth

BOLIVIA – DATA & FORECASTS

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Ecuador: Bond Issue Will Give Government Breathing Room 13