EN BANC

[G.R. No. 149453. May 28, 2002.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., petitioners, vs . PANFILO M.

LACSON, respondent.

Solicitor General for petitioner.

Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, Gilbert V. Santos and Floresita C. Gan for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

The Ombudsman led before the Sandiganbayan eleven informations for murder
against respondent Pan lo M. Lacson and 25 other accused. They were all charged as
principals in the alleged "rub-out" of eleven members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. Upon
motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for
reinvestigation. After reinvestigation, the case against Lacson was downgraded from
principal to accessory. With the downgrading of charges against him, Lacson questioned
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the cases as none of the accused was a
government o cial with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. However, before the accused
could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses recanted their a davits implicating respondent
Lacson in the murder cases. Meanwhile, the other private complainants executed their
respective a davits of desistance. Because of these developments, the cases against the
26 accused were dismissed on March 29, 1999. In 2001, the same criminal cases were
again ordered to be investigated on the strength of a davits of new witnesses.
Thereafter, eleven informations for murder were led before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The new informations charged as principals 34 people, including the 26
original accused in the previous criminal cases. Respondent Lacson led a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court Appeals issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining the issuance of a warrant of arrest and conducting hearing on the criminal
charges led. Then the Court of Appeals issued a decision which made permanent the
temporary restraining order earlier issued and also dismissed all the 11 criminal cases
led, stating that the ling of the 11 informations falls within the purview of the
prescriptive period barring a revival of the earlier cases led against the respondent in
accordance with the amendments on the Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari to reverse and set aside the above decision of the Court of
Appeals.
According to the Supreme Court, the issue herein was whether or not the
amendment on the Rules of Criminal Procedure involving prescriptive period bars the ling
of 11 informations against respondent Lacson. However, the Court ruled that it cannot rule
on the issue herein due to the lack of su cient factual bases. Hence, the Court ordered
that the case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City so that the State
Prosecutors and the respondent can adduce evidence and be heard on whether the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with on the basis of the evidence,
of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the informations should be
dismissed or not.
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 SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROVISIONAL DISMISSAL;

RETROACTIVITY OF NEW RULE; COURT CANNOT RESOLVE ISSUE OF WHETHER NEW
RULE BARS FILING OF ELEVEN INFORMATIONS AGAINST RESPONDENT. — The issue is
whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the ling of the eleven (11) informations against the
respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang.
This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides: Like any other favorable
procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, this Court cannot
rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of su cient factual bases. Thus, there is need of
proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the
express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the
offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether
there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period.
TIaCHA

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION OF THE RECKONING OF THE TWO-YEAR BAR
CAN BEST BE DONE BY THE TRIAL COURT. — Indeed, the records of this case are
inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent
Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year
bar has to be rst determined — whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge
Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order were received by the various
offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. If the cases were
revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its
failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule xes a timeline to penalize the State for
its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already led in courts. It can therefore present
compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. In light of the lack
of or the con icting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of
Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re- ling of the
cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental
fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded
the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the
predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed
facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues
cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. acSECT

RESOLUTION

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated August 24, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034. 2 The
said Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacson's Second Amended
Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order,
(1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying
for the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-01-101102 to Q-01-101112 entitled "People of
the Philippines v. Pan lo Lacson, et al. " pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon
City.
The following appear in the records of this case:
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 (1) On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II announced,
in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang
(KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the y-over along Commonwealth Avenue,
Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. 3
(2) On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos
Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a "rub-out" or
summary execution and not a shootout. 4
(3) In an a davit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated, among others,
that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region
Command (NCRC) and headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Tra c
Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.;
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Pan lo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de
Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo
Acop. Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in
early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gang's safe house in Superville Subdivision,
Parañaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their
hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to
summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were
shot to death by elements of ABRITFG. 5
(4) On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an
a davit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes. Dela Cruz claimed that she
was with delos Reyes from the time the eleven (11) KBG members were arrested up to the
time they were killed in Commonwealth Avenue. 6
(5) On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an a davit
stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville
Subdivision. 7
(6) On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for
Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven
(97) o cers and personnel of ABRITFG. The next-of-kin of the slain KBG members also
filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. 8
(7) Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a
preliminary investigation of the murder charges. The panel was headed by Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs Bienvenido Blanca or. On October 20, 1995, the panel
issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable
cause. AECacS

(8) Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review by a panel composed of
Over-all Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa as head, and Special Prosecutor Leonardo
Tamayo and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera as members. On November 20,
1995, the review panel reversed the Blanca or resolution and found probable cause for the
prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) o cers and personnel of
ABRITFG. 9
(9) On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman led before the Sandiganbayan eleven
(11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against
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 respondent Pan lo M. Lacson and twenty- ve (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of
them were charged as principals. 1 0 The following appear to be the victims: Meleubren
Sorronda in Crim. Case No. 23047; Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048; Carlito Alap-
ap in Crim. Case No. 23049; Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050; Ray Abalora in Crim.
Case No. 23051; Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052; Alex Neri in Crim. Case No. 23053;
Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054; Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055;
Sherwin Abalora in Crim. Case No. 23056; and Pacifico Montero in Crim. Case No. 23057.
(10) Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the
Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were led
against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was
downgraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 1 1
(11) With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal cases as none of the "principal"
accused in the Amended Informations was a government o cial with a Salary Grade (SG)
27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court. 1 2
(12) The O ce of the Special Prosecutor led a motion for reconsideration of the
transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R.A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997,
amending R.A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word "principal" in
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or
accessory, is a government o cial of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is
made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the
date of its approval. 1 3
(13) I n Lacson v. Executive Secretary , 1 4 respondent Lacson challenged the
constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional
challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial
Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the
offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the o cial
functions of the respondent, as required by R.A. No. 8249.
(14) Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 were ra ed off to Branch 81 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr., and re-docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689.
(15) Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los
Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their a davits which
implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members.
On the other hand, private complainants Myrna Abalora, 1 5 Leonora Amora, 1 6 Nenita
Alap-ap, 1 7 Imelda Montero, 1 8 Margarita Redillas, 1 9 Carmelita Elcamel 2 0 and Rolando
Siplon 2 1 also executed their respective a davits of desistance declaring that they were
no longer interested to prosecute these cases. 2 2
(16) Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent
Lacson, led ve separate but identical motions to (1) make a judicial determination of the
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 existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest; (2) hold in abeyance
the issuance of the warrants, and (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court nd lack of
probable cause.
(17) The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended
parties were noti ed of the hearing on March 22, 1999 2 3 held by Judge Agnir to resolve
the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused.
(18) During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not
appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez
testi ed that he assisted them in preparing their a davits of desistance and that he
signed said a davits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine
Lawyer's League presented the a davits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo
de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la
Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit. 2 4
(19) On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution 2 5 dismissing Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, as follows:
"As already seen, the documents attached to the Informations in support
thereof have been rendered meaningless, if not absurd, with the recantation of the
principal prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private complainants.
There is no more evidence to show that a crime has been committed and that the
accused are probably guilty thereof. Following the doctrine above-cited, there is
no more reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose them to an open
and public accusation. It is time to write nis to these cases and lay to rest the
ghost of the incident of May 18, 1995 so that all those involved — the accused,
the prosecution witnesses and the private complainants alike — may get on with
their lives.

The Court is not unmindful of the admonition in the recent case of People
vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 126005, January 21, 1999) where the Supreme
Court said that the general rule is that 'if the Information is valid on its face and
there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion or prejudice on
the part of the public prosecutor, courts should not dismiss it for want of
evidence, because evidentiary matters should be presented and heard during the
trial,' and that the ruling in Allado vs. Diokno 'is an exception to the general rule
and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist.' CSDAIa

This Court holds that the circumstances in the case at bench clearly make
an exception to the general rule.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court nds no probable cause
for the issuance of the warrants of arrest against the accused or to hold them for
trial. Accordingly, the Informations in the above-numbered cases are hereby
ordered dismissed."

SO ORDERED." 2 6

(20) On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the
Department of Justice the new a davits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo
Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the
strength of this indorsement, Secretary of Justice Hernando B. Perez formed a panel to
investigate the matter. On April 17, 2001, the respondent was subpoenaed to attend the
investigation of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. 2 7
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 (21) On May 28, 2001, respondent Lacson, et al., invoking, among others, their
constitutional right against double jeopardy, led a petition for prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, primarily to enjoin the State prosecutors from conducting the preliminary
investigation. The petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 01-100933 and ra ed to
Branch 40, presided by Judge Herminia V. Pasamba. 2 8
(22) The plea for temporary restraining order was denied by Judge Pasamba in an
Order 2 9 dated June 5, 2001, viz:
"After a study, this Court submits that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 is not one on the merits and without any recorded
arraignment and entered plea on the part of the herein petitioners. The dismissal
was a direct consequence of the nding of the Quezon City RTC that no probable
cause exists for the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners herein and
to hold them for trial. The arraignment had with the Sandiganbayan does not put
the case in a different perspective since the Sandiganbayan was adjudged to be
without any jurisdiction to try the cases. It is the People of the Philippines who is
the complainant in the Kuratong Baleleng case and remains to be the
complainant in the present investigation initiated thru a letter of PNP Chief
Mendoza dated March 27, 2001 (Exhibit "B") together with the sworn statements
of witnesses Ramos and Yu (Exhibits "2" and "3" — supportive of the refiling of the
case (Exhibit "9").
xxx xxx xxx

Above considered, this Court nds petitioners have not preliminarily

established that they have a right to be preserved pending hearing on the
injunctive relief.
WHEREFORE, the prayer for temporary restraining order is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED." 3 0

(23) On June 6, 2001, eleven (11) Informations for murder involving the killing of the
same members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang were filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. The
new Informations charged as principals thirty-four (34) people, including respondent
Lacson and his twenty- ve (25) other co-accused in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689. The criminal cases were assigned to Judge Ma. Theresa L. Yadao.
(24) On the same day, respondent Lacson led before the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari 3 1 against Judge Pasamba, the Secretary of Justice, the PNP Chief,
State Prosecutors Ong and Zacarias, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Jamolin, and the
People of the Philippines. The said petition was amended to implead as additional party-
respondents State Prosecutor Claro Arellano and the RTC, Quezon City, Branch 81 in which
the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 were filed. 3 2
(25) The Second Amended Petition 3 3 dated June 14, 2001 and admitted by the
Court of Appeals on June 26, 2001, alleged:
"The reliefs of certiorari, prohibition and injunction against the questioned
Order (Annex A) and the new Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to
01-101112 pending before respondent Yadao (Annex B) are founded upon the
grave abuse of discretion by respondent Judge Pasamba of her discretion in its
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 issuance, the illegality of the proceedings of the respondent State Prosecutors as
they cannot revive complaints which had been dismissed over two (2) years from
the date the dismissal order was issued, and the invalidity of the new
Informations for Murder led against petitioners and others, all in de ance of law
and jurisprudence as shown by the following:
(a) Respondent judge had ruled on the merits of the main
prohibition action a quo rendering the same moot and academic by
concluding that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 — Q-99-
81689 by the QC RTC was not nal and executory, hence [i] the complaints
therein can be reinvestigated, and [ii] petitioner's arraignment while the
case had not yet been remanded to the QC RTC and while the
Sandiganbayan had valid jurisdiction thereover [Criminal Cases No. 23047-
2048] was void, notwithstanding that the only issue in the TRO application
was the existence or lack of a valid complaint as de ned in S1 and S3,
Rule 110.
(b) Respondent Judge ruled that respondent State Prosecutors
could proceed to re-investigate and thereafter le new Informations on
June 6, 2001 covering those offenses subject of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 — Q-99-81689 on the basis of a davits led after said cases were
dismissed on March 29, 1999, despite the fact that under Section 8, Rule
117, cases similar to those led against the petitioner and others (where
the penalty imposable is imprisonment of six (6) years or more) cannot be
revived after two (2) years from the date the dismissal order was issued.
(c) Respondent Judge held that the petitioner had not shown a right
to be preserved despite evidence showing the short cuts taken by
respondent State prosecutors in re-investigating a dismissed case, in not
complying with Rules in respect of its re-opening, and in insisting that a
valid complaint was led in clear violation of the Rules and case law
thereon, and despite the fact that the petitioner had shown that an
inextendible deadline of June 5, 2001 was given him to le his counter-
a davit without which his indictment for a non-bailable offense is
assured because of DOJ Secretary Hernando Perez's political schemes." 3 4

(26) In the meantime, on June 8, 2001, respondent Lacson also led with the RTC-
QC Branch 81 (presided by Judge Ma. Theresa Yadao), a Motion for Judicial Determination
of Probable Cause and in the absence thereof, to dismiss the cases outright. Respondent
Lacson, however, led a Manifestation and Motion dated June 13, 2001 seeking the
suspension of the proceedings before the trial court. 3 5
(27) The Court of Appeals issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Yadao from issuing a warrant of arrest or conducting any proceeding or hearing in Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112. 3 6
(28) On August 24, 2001, the Court of Appeals (Special Third Division), rendered the
now assailed Decision. It characterized the termination of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 as "provisional dismissal," and considered Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 as mere revivals of the same. Applying Section 8, Rule 117 of the
2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it dismissed the criminal cases against the
respondent, viz:
"In sum, this Court is of the considered view that the subject dismissal of
[the] criminal cases was provisional in nature and that the cases presently sought
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 to be prosecuted by the respondents are mere revival or re-opening of the
dismissed cases. The present controversy, being one involving "provisional
dismissal" and revival of criminal cases, falls within the purview of the
prescriptive period provided under Section 8, Rule 117 of the 2000 Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure. The second paragraph of the said provision is couched in
clear, simple and categorical words. It mandates that for offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, as the subject criminal cases, their
provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after the issuance of
the order without the case having been revived. It should be noted that the revival
of the subject criminal cases, even if reckoned from the DOJ's issuance of
subpoenas to petitioner, was commenced only on April 19, 2001, that is, more
than two (2) years after the issuance, on March 29, 1999, of RTC-Quezon City's
Resolution, provisionally dismissing the criminal cases now sought to be revived.
Applying the clear and categorical mandate of Section 8, Rule 117, supra, such
efforts to revive the criminal cases are now de nitely barred by the two-year
prescriptive period provided therein.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. As prayed for, the Temporary
Restraining Order earlier issued against the conduct of further proceedings in
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, including the issuance of warrants
of arrest against the petitioner, PANFILO M. LACSON, is hereby made
PERMANENT. Accordingly, with respect to said accused, the proceedings
conducted by respondent State Prosecutors in respect of the said criminal cases
are declared NULL AND VOID and the corresponding Informations, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112, entitled 'People of the Philippines
vs. Pan lo M. Lacson, et al ." and led before respondent Judge Maria Theresa L.
Yadao of Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, are hereby ordered
DISMISSED
SO ORDERED." 3 7

The issue is whether Section 8, Rule 117 bars the ling of the eleven (11)
informations against the respondent Lacson involving the killing of some members of the
Kuratong Baleleng gang. This rule which took effect on December 1, 2000 provides:
"SEC. 8. Provisional dismissal. — A case shall not be provisionally
dismissed except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a ne of any amount, or both, shall become permanent
one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case having been revived.
With respect to offenses punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years,
their provisional dismissal shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance
of the order without the case having been revived."SDIaCT

Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive
effect. However, this Court cannot rule on this jugular issue due to the lack of su cient
factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts, viz: (1) whether the
provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused, (2) whether it
was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period
to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justi cation for the ling of the
cases beyond the 2-year period.
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 There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the
cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson
himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then
Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent.
The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and
conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases
against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the
resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not
appear during the hearing to a rm their a davits. Their a davits of desistance were only
presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testi ed that he assisted the private complainants
in preparing their a davits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only
seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance, namely:
a. Myrna Abalora, mother of the victims Sherwin Abalora and Rey Abalora
b. Carmelita Elcamel, wife of Wilbur Elcamel;
c. Leonora Amora, mother of victim Joel Amora;
d. Nenita Alap-ap, wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap;
e. Imelda Montero, wife of victim Manuel Montero;
f. Margarita Redillas, mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas; and
g. Rolando Siplon.
From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were
a davits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three (3) 3 8 other victims, namely:
Meleubren Soronda, Paci co Montero, Jr., and Alex Neri. The same records do not show
whether they were noti ed of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not
fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8,
Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time.
The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction
led by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, presided by Judge Pasamba, to enjoin the
prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in
said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson
against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by
Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants.
Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the
eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were
revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any
proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately led a petition for
certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to
entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him.
This is not to be wondered at. The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never
considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson
raised for the rst time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the
multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the
parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties
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 before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and
company. To be sure, there is a statement in the Decision of the appellate court to the
effect that "records show that the prosecution and the private offended parties were
noti ed of the hearing . . . ." 3 9 It is doubtful whether this nding is supported by the
records of the case. It appears to be contrary to Judge Agnir's nding that only seven (7)
of the complainants submitted affidavits of desistance.
Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the
multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the
2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be rst determined — whether it is
from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the
Order were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of
the new rule.
If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the
opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule xes a timeline
to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already led in courts.
It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-
year bar.
In light of the lack of or the con icting evidence on the various requirements to
determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule
whether or not the re- ling of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson
should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the
respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce
evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of
the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The
reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the
trial court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the case at bar is remanded to the RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 81 so that the State prosecutors and the respondent Lacson can adduce evidence
and be heard on whether the requirements of Section 8, Rule 117 have been complied with
on the basis of the evidence of which the trial court should make a ruling on whether the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 should be dismissed or not.
Pending the ruling, the trial court is restrained from issuing any warrant of arrest against
the respondent Lacson. Melo and Carpio, JJ., take no part.
SO ORDERED.

Footnotes
1. Penned by Associate Justice Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., Hilarion L. Aquino, and Jose na Guevara-Salonga, with
Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero dissenting, of the Special Third Division of
the Court of Appeals.
2. Entitled "Pan lo M. Lacson v. Honorable Herminia Pasamba, in her capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 40); Honorable Ma. Theresa L.
Yadao, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 81); The Secretary of Justice; The Chief, Philippine National Police; Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito Zuño; State Prosecutors Peter L. Ong, Ruben A. Zacarias, Conrado
M. Jamolin; City Prosecutor of Quezon City Claro Arellano; and the People of the
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 Philippines."
3. Resolution of Judge Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689,
dated March 29, 1999, p. 1; Annex "A" of the Petition.

4. Id., p. 2.
5. Ibid.
6. Id., p. 3.
7. Ibid.

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid., p. 4.
11. Ibid. See also CA Decision dated August 24, 2001, p. 5.
12. Id., p. 5. See also CA Decision, supra note 9, p. 5.

13. Id., p. 6.
14. 301 SCRA 298 (1999).

15. Mother of victims Sherwin Abalora and Ray Abalora in Crim. Cases Nos. 23056 and 23051
and redocketed as Q-99-81688 and Q-99-81683, respectively.

16. Mother of victim Joel Amora in Crim. Case No. 23052 and redocketed as Q-99-81684.

17. Wife of victim Carlito Alap-ap in Crim. Case No. 23049 and redocketed as Q-99-81681.
18. Wife of victim Manuel Montero in Crim. Case No. 23055 and redocketed as Q-99-81687.

19. Mother of victim Hilario Jevy Redillas in Crim. Case No. 23050 and redocketed as Q-99-
81682.
20. Wife of victim Welbor Elcamel in Crim. Case No. 23048 and redocketed as Q-99-81680.

21. Relationship with the victim Rolando Siplon in Crim. Case No. 23054 which was redocketed
as Q-99-81686 is not clear.
22. Resolution, supra note 1, p. 9.

23. Id., p. 1.

24. Id., pp. 8-9.

25. Ibid.

26. Id., p. 10.

27. Petition for Review on Certiorari, pp. 18-19; See also Annexes "F", "F-1" and "F-2" of the
Petition.

28. Ibid.
29. Civil Case No. 01-100933; see Annex to the Petition.

30. Id., at 3-4.

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 31. Annex "I" of the Petition.

32. Annex "J" of the Petition.

33. Annex "K" of the Petition.

34. Id., pp. 13-14.

35. Petition, pp. 23-24.

36. Id., p. 24.

37. CA Decision, pp. 17-22.

38. Only three (3) remain unaccounted for as Myrna Abalora desisted for the victims Sherwin
Abalora and Rey Abalora.

39. See page 14 of the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034.

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