mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the presumption being that
[G.R. No. 93239. March 18, 1991.] police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDISON SUCRO, Accused-
Appellant.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Fidencio S. Raz Accused-Appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL.
— Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rules states: "Arrest without warrant, when
lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in
his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; AN OFFENSE COMMITTED IN THE PRESENCE OR WITHIN THE VIEW OF AN
OFFICER, CONSTRUED. — An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an
officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer
sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and
proceeds at once to the scene thereof (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v.
Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910]).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OF ACTUAL COMMISSION OF CRIME. — The court
earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that police
officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had earlier
conducted surveillance activities of the accused.
4. ID.; ID.; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, AS A GENERAL RULE MUST BE SUPPORTED BY A VALID
WARRANT; EXCEPTION. — That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is
not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the
exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the
Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
5. ID.; EVIDENCE; FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY ENTITLED TO
GREAT WEIGHT. — Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are
entitled to great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial
court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the
court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to
evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, Et Al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing
People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v.
Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).
6. ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; PRESUMPTION THAT POLICE OFFICERS
PERFORM THEIR DUTIES REGULARLY; APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. — There is nothing in the
record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive than to accomplish their
(Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supra citing People v.
Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986]).
7. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; ALIBI; UNAVAILING IN THE FACE OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION. —
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, Accused-appellant’s defense is alibi
which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person
from whom he bought marijuana.
8. ID.; ID.; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; MERE DENIALS CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE
IDENTIFICATION. — It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive
identification of the appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161
SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989]).
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in the Poblacion, Municipality of
Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, acting as a pusher or broker in the business of
selling, administering, delivery, giving away to another and - or distributing prohibited drugs, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law have in his
possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags
of dried marijuana leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities of Kalibo,
Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried marijuana leaves to a customer." (Rollo, p.
9)
Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "not guilty" to
the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was rendered, the pertinent
portion of which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison Sucro guilty of the sale of
prohibited drug under Section 4, Article II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000, and costs.
He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of his sentence with the period for which he has
undergone preventive imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All the items
of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared forfeited in favor of the State." (Rollo, p. 41)
From the foregoing judgment of conviction, Accused-appellant interposes this appeal, assigning
the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION EXHIBITS
"E" - "E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI; FURTHERMORE,
THAT THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF SEARCH AND ARREST
SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF
HIS ARREST.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE
OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDER SECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
AND SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT AND TO PAY A FINE
OF P20,000.00. (Appellant’s Brief, p. 1)
The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by
P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities
of appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling
marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2, 1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio positioned himself under the house
of a certain Arlie Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2
meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking
something which turned out later to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found inside
the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer, Aldie
Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana
which he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, ibid). It was at this instance that Pat.
Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the activity going on P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat.
Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat. Fulgencio again called
up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting
with appellant. (pp. 18-19, ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were
at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and
appellant. P/ Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and
Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw
something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp 6-8, TSN, June 19,
1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant
(Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to
overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered
19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and another teabag from
Macabante. The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at
Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-
4") were all found positive of marijuana. (pp. 4-7, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee’s Brief, pp. 3-
6)
As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest without
warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the evidence resulting from
such arrest is admissible.
We rule in the affirmative.
The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his rights granted
under Section 2, Artilce III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that there was sufficient time
for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest warrants considering that Fulgencio
informed his Station Commander of the activities of the accused two days before March 21,
1989, the date of his arrest.
This contention is without merit.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest
without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant,
arrest a person:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;" (Emphasis supplied).
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of
the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees the offense, although at
a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof
(U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910]).
The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado’s house at C. Quimpo Street to monitor
the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be selling marijuana at a chapel two (2)
meters away from Regalado’s house.
Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity. He saw
Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and exchange some
things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was being monitored. Fulgencio
would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt. Seraspi.
Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the police, was
caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily admitted that he bought the
same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to
Macabante, and therefore, had just committed an illegal act of which the police officers had
personal knowledge, being members of the team which monitored Sucro’s nefarious
activity.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27, 1990) that
police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would take place
and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez
by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them (the public officers). They
saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez
who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while Bati, on
his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket. (p. 2)
x       x       x
. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the same and their testimonies were
 based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that took place leading to
appellant’s arrest. They may not have been within hearing distance, specially since conversation
would expectedly be carried on hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe
the movements of the appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all
law enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of proof to the contrary (People v. Bati, supra citing People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786,
October 12, 1987)
The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant considering that
Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro’s activities even prior to the former s joining the police force.
Fulgencio reported Sucro’s activities only three days before the incident.
As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their childhood years
and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the accused-appellant not to sell drugs
in their locality. Hence, it is possible that because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to
report his childhood friend and merely advised him not to engage in such activity. However,
because of reliable information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he
was constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.
On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from the fact that
their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to fulfill the requirements for the
issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is that probable cause existed. Thus, it has
been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, Et. Al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21,
1991):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the trial court that the
authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in
contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based on intelligence reports
gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted
to be a member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the expected date and time of
arrival of the accused from China. But such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to
fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present in
such a case."cralaw virtua1aw library
As the Solicitor General has pointed out:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest provided the same is effected on the basis of probable
cause (e.g. stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between warrantless searches and
seizures at checkpoints and in the case at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that
unlike in the former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the circumstances
(monitoring of transactions) there existed probable cause for the arresting officers, to arrest
appellant who was in fact selling marijuana and to seize the contraband."cralaw virtua1aw
library
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule
(Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that
the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with
the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are
admissible in evidence.chanrobles law library : red
Edison Sucro assails the trial court’s reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for
testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.
We quote the trial court’s finding as to the testimony of Macabante:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of marijuana may have been the
reason of (sic) his willingness to testify in court against the accused. But this does not
necessarily taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As explained by Lt. Seraspi, the best
sources of information against drug pushers are usually their customers, especially if as in this
case, there is no other direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the buyer. We
accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a situation in which drug users are, and should
be employed by law enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who are the
real felons in our society. We have observed the demeanor of the witness in court, and found
him to be straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his declarations, so that we are
satisfied as to his intention and disposition to tell the truth" (Rollo, p. 40)
Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to great weight
and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial court had overlooked
certain facts of weight and importance, it being acknowledged that the court below, having seen
and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies
(People v. Umali, Et Al., G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA
745 [1988]; People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970])
Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points by public officers
Fulgencio and Seraspi.
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by any motive
than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the execution of the crime, the
presumption being that police officers perform their duties regularly in the absence of any
evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m), Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller,
supra citing People v. Natipravat, 145 SCRA 483 [1986])
The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic Chemist that the
items seized were all positive for marijuana.
In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, Accused-appellant’s defense is alibi
which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by Macabante to be the person
from whom he bought marijuana.
Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his uncle and
cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie’s candidacy. The fact, however, remains that it does
not preclude the possibility that he was present in the vicinity as established by his admission
that he moved a lot and even had the occasion to meet Macabante on the street.
It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification of the
appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161 SCRA 406 [1988]; and
People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])
Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed committed
 the offense charged. The trial court’s decision must be upheld.
G.R. No. 116001. March 14, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUISITO GO y KO alias KING
LOUIE, Accused-Appellant.
[G.R. No. 123943. March 14, 2001
LUISITO GO y CO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 22, 1992, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, SPO1 Mauro Piamonte and SPO3
Candido Liquido, members of the Intelligence and Follow-up Unit of the Calamba Police, went to
the police outpost at Crossing, Calamba, Laguna, to follow up an intelligence report that
methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, a regulated drug, was being supplied there. Police
civilian agent Ronnie Panuringan arrived and reported to them that he saw accused-appellant
Luisito Go, also known as King Louie, enter the Flamingo Disco House with two women.
Panuringan said that he spotted a gun tucked in accused-appellants waist. Together, the three
policemen proceeded to the Flamingo, which was located about a hundred meters away from
the outpost.
When they arrived at the Flamingo, the police officers informed the owner that they were
conducting an Operation Bakal, whereby they search for illegally possessed firearms. The owner
allowed them in and told a waiter to accompany them. They went up to the second floor of the
disco. The waiter turned on the lights, and the police officers saw accused-appellant and his
lady companions seated at a table. They identified themselves and asked accused-appellant to
stand up. When the latter did so, the policemen saw the gun tucked in his waist. SPO1 Piamonte
asked for the license of the gun, but accused-appellant was unable to produce any. Instead,
accused-appellant brought out the drivers license of a certain Tan Antonio Lerios. SPO1
Piamonte confiscated the gun, which was later identified as a 9mm Walther P88, Serial Number
006784, with a magazine containing ten (10) rounds of live ammunition. Accused-appellant was
invited to the police precinct for questioning.
On the way out of the disco, accused-appellant asked permission to bring his car, which was
parked outside. The police officers accompanied accused-appellant to his car, a Honda Civic with
license plate number TCM-789. Through the windshield, SPO3 Liquido noticed a Philippine
National Police identification card hanging from the rearview mirror. He asked accused-appellant
if he was a member of the PNP, and he said no. The police officers asked accused-appellant for
his drivers license and the registration papers of the vehicle, but he was unable to produce
them. When accused-appellant opened the door, SPO3 Liquido took the ID card and found that
the same belonged to SPO4 Zenaida Bagadiong. The police officers saw pieces of glass tooters
and tin foils on the backseat and floor of the car. They asked accused-appellant why he had
these items, but he did not say anything. Instead, accused-appellant suggested that they talk
the matter over, and intimated that he had money. SPO3 Liquido replied that they should talk at
the police headquarters. Accused-appellant took out an attach case from the car and opened it.
There were two black clutch bags inside. Accused-appellant opened the first bag, which
contained shiny white substance wrapped in cellophane. The second bag contained P120,000.00
in cash.
The police officers brought accused-appellant to the police station. When they arrived at the
precinct, they turned over the attach case together with the two black clutch bags to the
investigator. The investigator found eight cellophane bags containing granules suspected to be
shabu in one of the clutch bags. When the attach case was opened, the police officers found
that it also contained three glass tooters, tin foils, an improvised burner, magazines and
newspapers. 1cräläwvirtualibräry
Consequently, two Informations were filed against accused-appellant before the Regional Trial
Court of Calamba, Laguna, Branch 34. The first Information, which was docketed as Criminal
Case No. 3308-92-C, charged accused-appellant with violation of Article III of R.A. 6452
(Dangerous Drugs Act), committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992 at Brgy. I, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba, province of
Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not
being authorized/permitted by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession, control and custody 750 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride known as
SHABU, a regulated drug, in violation of the above-stated law. 2cräläwvirtualibräry
The other Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, charged accused-appellant
with violation of P.D. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about October 22, 1992, at Flamingo Beerhouse, Crossing, Municipality of Calamba,
Province of Laguna and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused above-
named not being licensed or authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control one (1) caliber .9mm marked WALTHER
with serial number 006784 with one (1) magazine loaded with ten (10) live ammunitions of
same caliber, in violation of the aforementioned law. 3cräläwvirtualibräry
After a joint trial, the lower court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant in the two
criminal cases, to wit:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused in Criminal Case No. 3308-92-C,
to be GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of having in his possession of 750.39 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug. He is hereby sentenced to a penalty of
imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS; and in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C, the accused is also found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm, and is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of reclusion perpetua.
Considering that the accused appears to be detained at the Makati Police Station, jailer, Makati
Police Station is hereby ordered to commit the accused to the New Bilibid Prison, Bureau of
Correction, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The bond posted by the accused in Criminal Cases No.
3308-92-C & 3309-92-C, are hereby ordered cancelled. 4cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant appealed his conviction in Criminal Case No. 3309-92-C directly to this Court,
considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua, which appeal was docketed as
G.R. No. 116001.
On the other hand, accused-appellant brought his appeal of the judgment in Criminal Case No.
3308-92-C before the Court of Appeals. 5 In an Amended Decision dated February 21, 1996, the
Court of Appeals affirmed accused-appellants conviction but modified the penalty imposed by
the trial court by sentencing him, in addition to imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years, to pay a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000.00), citing Section 8 of R.A. 6425,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. 6 Hence, this petition for review, docketed as
G.R. No. 123943.
The two cases were consolidated. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant assails the validity of his arrest and his subsequent convictions for the two
crimes. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the arrest and subsequent
seizure were legal. A review of the records at bar shows no reason to depart therefrom.
The constitutional proscription, that no person shall be arrested without any warrant of arrest
having been issued prior thereto, 8 is not a hard-and-fast rule. The Rules of Court and
jurisprudence recognize exceptional cases where an arrest may be effected without a
warrant. 9 Among these are when, in the presence of a peace officer, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; or when an
offense has in fact just been committed, and the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the cases at bar, the police saw the gun tucked in appellants waist when he stood up. The
gun was plainly visible. No search was conducted as none was necessary. Accused-appellant
could not show any license for the firearm, whether at the time of his arrest or thereafter. Thus,
he was in effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant of arrest
was necessary in such a situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the Rules.
As a consequence of appellants valid warrantless arrest, he may be lawfully searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense,
without a search warrant, as provided in Rule 126, Section 12. This is a valid search incidental
to the lawful arrest. 10 The subsequent discovery in his car of drug paraphernalia and the
crystalline substance, which was later identified as shabu, though in a distant place from where
the illegal possession of firearm was committed, cannot be said to have been made during an
illegal search. As such, the seized items do not fall within the exclusionary clause, which states
that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against warrantless arrest cannot be used for
any purposes in any proceeding. 11 Hence, not being fruits of the poisonous tree, so to speak,
the objects found at the scene of the crime, such as the firearm, the shabu and the drug
paraphernalia, can be used as evidence against appellant. Besides, it has been held that drugs
discovered as a result of a consented search is admissible in evidence. 12cräläwvirtualibräry
Under P.D. 1866, the essence of the crime is the accuseds lack of license or permit to carry or
possess firearm, ammunition, or explosive. Possession by itself is not prohibited by law. 13 In
prosecutions for illegal possession of firearm, the element of absence of license to possess the
firearm may be established through the testimony of or a certification from a representative of
the Firearms and Explosives Bureau 14of the Philippine National Police (FEB-PNP), attesting that
a person is not a licensee of any firearm. 15 In this case, a representative of the FEB-PNP
testified that accused-appellant was not a holder of any gun license. 16 Moreover, a
certification 17to that effect was presented to corroborate his testimony. These pieces of
evidence suffice to establish the second element of the offense of possession of unlicensed
firearms. 18 However, in a vain attempt to exculpate himself, accused-appellant presented for
the first time an alleged firearm license, which was described as Annex 2 of his petition.
Accused-appellants counsel admitted that said document was not presented below for some
reason. 19 Whatever those reasons are, he did not specify. The document, however, is dubious.
It is too late in the day for accused-appellant to proffer this very vital piece of evidence which
might exculpate him. First, the reception of evidence is best addressed to the trial court because
it entails questions of fact. It should be emphasized that this Court is not a trier of
facts. 20 Second, the document marked as Annex 2 of the petition in G.R. No. 123943 is not the
license referred to, but an order of the trial court resetting the date of arraignment. 21 Third,
there is attached to the petition a firearm license 22 which is a mere photocopy and, as such,
cannot be appreciated by this Court. Indeed, considering that this was the one piece of evidence
which could spell accused-appellants acquittal of the unlicensed firearm charge, and assuming
that, as shown in the face of the license, it was issued on October 7, 1992, there should be no
reason for its non-production during the trial. Fourth, and most importantly, the genuineness of
the purported license becomes all the more suspect in view of the Certification issued by the
FEO-PNP that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm holder.
Anent the certification issued by the FEO-PNP to the effect that Luisito Go y Ko was not a
licensed gun holder, accused-appellant claims that he was not the person alluded to therein
because the correct spelling of his middle name is not Ko but Co. Whatever the correct spelling
of his name is, the fact remains that he had no license on the day the gun was found in his
possession. All that he could present then was a photocopy of his application for gun
license, 23 which is not the equivalent of a license. Appellant testified that he presented a firearm
license to the police, 24 but he could not produce that alleged license in court. If appellant was
indeed a licensed gun holder and if that license existed on October 22, 1992, he could have
easily presented it to the police when he was asked for his papers inside the disco, or if the
alleged license was in his car, he could have easily shown it to them when they went to his car.
Otherwise, he could have easily asked his lawyer or relative to bring the license to the police
precinct when he was being investigated. Despite several opportunities to produce a license, he
failed to do so. In fact, during trial, he never presented any such license. And on appeal, he
could only submit for the first time and for unknown reasons an alleged photocopy of a
purported license. The only plausible conclusion that can be drawn is that there was no such
license in the first place. Hence, his guilt of illegal possession of firearm was duly established.
Accused-appellants guilt for illegal possession of shabu has likewise been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. The white crystalline substance found in his possession, upon laboratory
examination, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
regulated drug. 25cräläwvirtualibräry
The bulk of accused-appellants defense revolves around the factual findings of the trial court. It
should be recalled that factual findings of the trial court, if supported by evidence on record,
and particularly when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court. 26 As discussed
above, the records substantiate the trial courts and the appellate courts findings as to accused-
appellants culpability. There is no reason to depart from these findings as no significant facts
and circumstances were shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which, if considered,
would have altered the outcome of the case. 27 Moreover, questions as to credibility of witness
are matters best left to the appreciation of the trial court because of its unique opportunity of
having observed that elusive and incommunicable evidence of the witness deportment on the
stand while testifying, which opportunity is denied to the reviewing tribunal. 28cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, the trial court found:
The narration of the incident by the police is far more worthy of belief coming as it does from
law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties and were not
demonstrated to have been unduly biased against the accused. 29cräläwvirtualibräry
Similarly, the Court of Appeals held that:

(T)he findings of fact of the trial court are generally respected by the appellate court, unless
they are found to be clearly biased or arbitrary. We do not find any in these
cases.30cräläwvirtualibräry

The crime of illegal possession of firearm, committed in 1992, regardless of whether the firearm
is low powered or high powered, was punished with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death,
as provided in P.D. 1866. However, under R.A. No. 8294, which took effect on July 6,
1997, 31 the penalty was lowered to prision correcional in its maximum period and a fine of
P30,000.00, if the firearm 32 is classified as low powered. In this case, the unlicensed firearm
found in appellants possession was a 9mm Walther pistol, which under the amendatory law, is
considered as low powered. Inasmuch as the new law imposes a reduced penalty and is, thus,
more favorable to accused-appellant, the same may be given retroactive effect. 33 Therefore,
accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00.

On the other hand, the crime of illegal possession of regulated drug, under the law in force at
the time of the commission of the offense in this case, was punished by imprisonment of from
six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from P6,000.00 to
P12,000.00, 34 regardless of the amount of drugs involved. Hence, accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00.

WHEREFORE , the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearm is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that he
is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as maximum, and a fine of P30,000.00. The decision of the trial court
finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of 750.39 grams
of shabu and drug paraphernalia, is likewise AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twelve
(12) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P12,000.00. The shabu and subject drug
paraphernalia seized from appellant shall be destroyed as provided by law.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229380, June 06, 2018
LENIZA REYES Y CAPISTRANO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Leniza
Reyes y  Capistrano (Reyes) assailing the Decision2 dated May 20, 2016 and the
Resolution3 dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821,
which affirmed the Decision4 dated June 16, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court of Binangonan,
Rizal, Branch 67 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. 12-0627 finding Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002."
The Facts
This case stemmed from an Information 6 filed before the RTC charging Reyes with Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs, defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165,
the accusatory portion of which states:
That on or about the 6th day of [November] 2012 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having been authorized by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
possess and have in her custody and control 0.04 gram of white crystalline substance contained
in one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet which substance was found positive to the test
for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, which is a dangerous drug, in violation of the above cited
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
The prosecution alleged that at around eight (8) o'clock in the evening of November 6, 2012, a
group of police officers from Cardona, Rizal, including Police Officer 1 (PO1) Jefferson Monteras
(PO1 Monteras), was patrolling the diversion road of Barangay Looc, Cardona, Rizal when two
(2) teenagers approached and informed them that a woman with long hair and a dragon tattoo
on her left arm had just bought shabu in Barangay Mambog. After a few minutes, a woman,
later identified to be Reyes, who matched the said description and smelled like liquor passed by
the police officers. The latter asked if she bought shabu and ordered her to bring it out. Reyes
answered, "Di ba bawal kayong magkapkap ng babae?"  and at that point, turned her back,
pulled something out from her breast area and held a small plastic sachet on her right
hand.8 PO1 Monteras immediately confiscated the sachet and brought it to the police station
where he marked it with "LRC-1." Thereat, he prepared the necessary documents, conducted
the inventory and photography before Barangay Captain Manolito Angeles. 9 Thereafter, PO1
Monteras proceeded to the Rizal Provincial Crime Laboratory and turned over the seized item for
examination to Police Senior Inspector Beaune Villaraza (PSI Villaraza), who confirmed 10 that the
substance inside the sachet tested positive for 0.04 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu,  a dangerous drug.11
For her part, Reyes denied the charges, claiming that the incident happened on November 5,
2012 and not November 6. On said date, she came from a drinking spree and was about to
board a jeepney, when a man approached and asked if she knew a certain person. After
answering in the negative, she rode the jeepney until it was blocked by two (2) civilian men in
motorcycles whom she identified to be one PO1 Dimacali. The latter ordered her to alight and
bring out the shabu in her possession which she denied having. She was then brought to the
police station where the police officers extorted from her the amount of P35,000.00 in exchange
for her freedom. But since she failed to give the money, the police officers took her to Taytay
for inquest proceedings.12
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision13 dated June 16, 2014, the RTC found Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of 0.11 gram of shabu defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of RA
9165. Accordingly, she was sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an
indeterminate term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of P300,000.00, with an order for her immediate arrest. 14
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that Reyes was validly arrested and
thereupon, found to be in possession of shabu, which she voluntarily surrendered to the police
officers upon her arrest. Likewise, it observed that the chain of custody of the seized item was
sufficiently established through the testimony of PO1 Monteras, which was not ill-motivated. 15
Aggrieved, Reyes appealed16 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision17 dated May 20, 2016, the CA affirmed Reyes's conviction for the crime
charged.18 It held that the search made on Reyes's person yielding the sachet of shabu was
valid as she was caught in flagrante delicto in its possession and was legally arrested on account
thereof.19 The CA likewise found substantial compliance with the chain of custody rule and that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated item were properly preserved. 20
However, it corrected the quantity of shabu  stated in the RTC's dispositive portion to 0.04 gram
in order to conform with the findings of PSI Villaraza and accordingly, modified the penalty
imposed to twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months, as maximum.21
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not Reyes's conviction for Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 should be upheld.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for
review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in
the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 22 "The appeal confers the
appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine
records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision
of the penal law."23
"Section 2,24 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be
carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the
existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure [become]
'unreasonable' within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2),25 Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and seizures
shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other words,
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable searches and seizures
are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. 26
One of the recognized exceptions to the need [of] a warrant before a search may be [e]ffected
is a search incidental to a lawful arrest.27In this instance, the law requires that there first
be a lawful arrest before a search can be made – the process cannot be reversed. 28
A lawful arrest may be effected with or without a warrant. With respect to the latter, the
parameters of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should – as a
general rule – be complied with:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.  — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending,
or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall
be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
The aforementioned provision identifies three (3) instances when warrantless arrests may be
lawfully effected. These are: (a) an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto; (b)  an arrest of a
suspect where, based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is probable cause
that said suspect was the perpetrator of a crime which had just been committed; and (c) an
arrest of a prisoner who has escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily
confined during the pendency of his case or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.29
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5
(b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just
been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
accused had committed it.30
In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of
an offense is essential. [The scenario under] Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure [contemplates that] the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section
5 (b) of the same, [the officer] knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed." 31
Essentially, the validity of this warrantless arrest requires compliance with the overt act test,
showing that "the accused x x x exhibit an overt act within the view of the police
officers suggesting that [she] was in possession of illegal drugs at the time [she]
was apprehended."32 Absent any overt act showing the commission of a crime, the
warrantless arrest is rendered invalid, as in a case where a person was apprehended for merely
carrying a bag and traveling aboard a jeepney without acting suspiciously. 33 Similarly, in People
v. Racho,34 a search based solely on a tip describing one of the passengers of a bus was
declared illegal, since at the time of apprehension, the said accused was not "committing a
crime in the presence of the police officers," nor did he commit a crime or was about to commit
one.35
In this case, Reyes argues that no valid warrantless arrest took place as she did not do anything
as to rouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that she had just committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime when she was just passing by. 36 During cross-
examination, PO1 Monteras revealed:
[Atty. Cynthia D. Iremedio]: Mister Witness these two youngsters, the only information that
they gave you is that there is a woman with a tattoo?
[PO1 Monteras]: Yes ma'am.
Q: No further description regarding this woman was given to you?
A: Long haired and with tattoo on the left arm ma'am.
Q: And no description of the tattoo on her left hand?
A: None ma'am.
COURT: What is the tattoo on her left arm?
A: I think it was a Dragon sir.
Q: These two persons did not mention to you the name of the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
Q: Aside from those description, you will agree with me that this long hair and a dragon tattoo
can be possessed by any other person aside from the accused?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx

Q: Now Mister Witness you did not conduct further investigation on these two persons?
A: Not anymore ma'am.
xxxx
Q: Now, Mister Witness, can you describe to us when you saw this accused?
A: While we were at the corner of the Diversion Road we saw a female persons (sic) coming
towards us who fits the description given by the two teenagers ma'am.
Q: And despite the description, this accused merely passes in front of you and did
nothing wrong against you?
A: Yes ma'am.
xxxx
Q: But when you greeted her "good evening" there is nothing unsual with this accused?
A: She smelled of liquor ma'am.
Q: She was not holding anything or acting in a suspicious manner which will elicit a
response from you?
A: None ma'am.
x x x x37 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds that no lawful arrest was made on Reyes. PO1
Monteras himself admitted that Reyes passed by them without acting suspiciously or doing
anything wrong, except that she smelled of liquor.38 As no other overt act could be properly
attributed to Reyes as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO1 Monteras that she had just
committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime, the arrest is bereft of any legal
basis. As case law demonstrates, the act of walking while reeking of liquor per se  cannot be
considered a criminal act.39
Neither has the prosecution established the conditions set forth in Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
particularly, that the arresting officer had personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance
indicating that the accused had just committed a crime. "Personal knowledge" is determined
from the testimony of the witnesses that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that a crime
was committed by the accused.40 As ruled by the Court, "[a] hearsay tip by itself does not justify
a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts, based on their
observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime." 41 In this case,
records failed to show that PO1 Monteras had any personal knowledge that a crime had been
committed by Reyes, as in fact, he even admitted that he merely relied on the two (2)
teenagers' tip and that, everything happened by "chance." 42 Surely, to interpret "personal
knowledge" as to encompass unverified tips from strangers would create a dangerous precedent
and unnecessarily stretch the authority and power of police officers to effect warrantless arrests,
rendering nugatory the rigorous requisites under Section 5 (b), Rule 113. 43
Moreover, the Court finds the version of the prosecution regarding the seizure of the subject
item as lacking in credence. To recapitulate, the prosecution, through the testimony of PO1
Monteras, claimed that when the police officers asked Reyes if she purchased shabu,  she turned
her back and voluntarily showed the plastic sachet containing the same which she retrieved
from her brassiere. According to jurisprudence, the issue of credibility of a witness's testimony is
determined by its conformity with knowledge and consistency with the common experience of
mankind.44 As the Court observes, it is rather contrary to ordinary human experience for a
person to willfully exhibit incriminating evidence which would result in his or her conviction for a
crime, absent any impelling circumstance which would prompt him or her to do so.
In addition, the Court notes the inconsistencies in the claim of the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) that Reyes consented to the search when she voluntarily showed the sachet of shabu to
the police officers. In their Comment,45 the OSG stated that at the time of arrest, Reyes was so
intoxicated that she "simply let her senses down" and showed the shabu to PO1 Monteras;46 but
later, in the same Comment, the OSG argued that Reyes was actually "in her right senses when
she reminded the police officers" that they were not allowed to frisk a woman. 47 These material
inconsistencies clearly render suspect the search conducted on Reyes's person and likewise,
destroy the credibility of the police officers who testified against Reyes.48 In order to deem as
valid a consensual search, it is required that the police authorities expressly ask, and in no
uncertain terms, obtain the consent of the accused to be searched and the consent
thereof established by clear and positive proof,49 which were not shown in this case.
In fine, there being no lawful warrantless arrest, the sachet of shabu purportedly seized from
Reyes on account of the search is rendered inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.50 And since the shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged,
Reyes must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated from criminal liability.
Besides, the Court finds the police officers to have committed unjustified deviations from the
prescribed chain of custody rule under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, through their admission
that only the Barangay Captain was present during the marking and inventory of the seized
items.51 Records are further bereft of any showing that efforts were made by the police officers
to secure the presence of the other necessary personalities under the law or provide any
justification for their absence, which could have excused their leniency in strictly complying with
the said procedure.52 Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, prior to its amendment by RA
10640,53 requires, among others, that the apprehending team shall immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in
the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, or his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 54 It is
well-settled that unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody procedure would result in
the acquittal of the accused,55 as in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May 20, 2016 and the Resolution
dated January 11, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 36821 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Leniza Reyes y  Capistrano
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to
cause her immediate release, unless she is being lawfully held in custody for any other reason.
SO ORDERED.
 vs.
THE STATION COMMANDER OF THE MUNTINGLUPA POLICE STATION, Muntinglupa,
Metro Manila, P/SGT. JACINTO MEDINA, P/SGT. ELADIO TAGLE, P/SGT. LEVI
SOLEDAD, and P/SGT. MAURO AROJADO, respondents.

G.R. No. 81567 July 9, 1990 Efren H. Mercado for petitioners in G.R. No. 81567.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ROBERTO UMIL, Ricardo C. Valmonte for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 84581-82.
ROLANDO DURAL and RENATO VILLANUEVA. MANOLITA O. UMIL, and NICANOR P.
DURAL, FELICITAS V. SESE, petitioners, Ramon S. Esguerra, Barbara Anne C. Migallos and Agripino G. Morga for petitioners in G.R. Nos.
vs. 84583-84.
FIDEL V. RAMOS, MAJ. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA, BRIG. GEN. RAMON MONTANO,
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, respondents.
Efren H. Mercado for petitioner in G.R. No. 83162.

G.R. Nos. 84581-82 July 9, 1990

Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy, Taquio & Association for petitioner in G.R. No. 85727.

AMELIA ROQUE and WILFREDO BUENAOBRA, petitioners,

Josefina G. Campbell-Castillo for petitioners in G.R. No. 86332.
vs.
GEN. RENATO DE VILLA and GEN. RAMON MONTANO, respondents.
The Solicitor General for the respondents.
G.R. Nos. 84583-84 July 9, 1990

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF ATTY. DOMINGO T.

ANONUEVO and RAMON CASIPLE. DOMINGO T. ANONUEVO and RAMON PER CURIAM:
CASIPLE, petitioners,
vs.
The are eight (8) petitioners for habeas corpus filed before the Court, which have been
HON. FIDEL V. RAMOS, GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, COL. EVARISTO CARINO, LT. COL.
consolidated because of the similarity of issues raised, praying for the issuance of the writ
REX D. PIAD, T/SGT. CONRADO DE TORRES, S/SGT. ARNOLD DURIAN, and
of habeas corpus, ordering the respective respondents to produce the bodies of the persons
Commanding Officer, PC-INP Detention Center, Camp Crame, Quezon
named therein and to explain why they should not be set at liberty without further delay.
City, respondents.

In their respective Returns, the respondents uniformly assert that the privilege of the writ
G.R. No. 83162 July 9, 1990
of habeas corpus is not available to the petitioners as they have been legally arrested and are
detained by virtue of valid informations filed in court against them.
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF VICKY A. OCAYA
AND DANNY RIVERA. VIRGILIO A. OCAYA, petitioner,
The petitioners counter that their detention is unlawful as their arrests were made without
vs.
warrant and, that no preliminary investigation was first conducted, so that the informations filed
BRIG. GEN. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, COL. HERCULES CATALUNA, COL. NESTOR
against them are null and void.
MARIANO, respondents.

The Court has carefully reviewed the contentions of the parties in their respective pleadings, and
G.R. No. 85727 July 9, 1990
it finds that the persons detained have not been illegally arrested nor arbitrarily deprived of their
constitutional right to liberty, and that the circumstances attending these cases do not warrant
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: DEOGRACIAS their release on habeas corpus.
ESPIRITU, petitioner,
vs.
The arrest of a person without a warrant of arrest or previous complaint is recognized in law.
BRIG. GEN. ALFREDO S. LIM, COL. RICARDO REYES, respondents.
The occasions or instances when such an arrest may be effected are clearly spelled out in
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, which provides:
G.R. No. 86332 July 9, 1990
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF NARCISO B. NAZARENO. person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
ALFREDO NAZARENO, petitioner,
 (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed
it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112,
Section 7.
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, is justified when the person arrested is caught in  flagranti
delicto, viz., in the act of committing an offense; or when an offense has just been committed
and the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person
arrested has committed it. The rationale behind lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated by
this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui Malasugui 1 thus:
To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the
evidence and tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave
society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert,
and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape in many
instances.
The record of the instant cases would show that the persons in whose behalf these petitions
for habeas corpus have been filed, had freshly committed or were actually committing an
offense, when apprehended, so that their arrests without a warrant were clearly justified, and
that they are, further, detained by virtue of valid informations filed against them in court.
A brief narration of the facts and events surrounding each of the eight (8) petitions is in order.
I therewith under Presidential Proclamation No. 2045, are all in the nature of
In G.R. No. 81567 (Umil vs. Ramos), the record shows that, on 1 February 1988, the Regional
Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command (RIOU-CAPCOM) received confidential
information about a member of the NPA Sparrow Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a
gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City. Upon verification, it
was found that the wounded person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is
actually Rolando Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two
(2) CAPCOM soldiers the day before, or on 31 January 1988, in Macanining Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While confined thereat, or on 4 February
1988, Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman who went on top
of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers seated
inside the car identified as T/Sgt. Carlos Pabon and CIC Renato Manligot.
As a consequence of this positive identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City
Fiscal who conducted an inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City an information charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of "Double
Murder with Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority." The case was docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. On 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing of the
original information, was still unidentified.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf
of Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural, and Renato Villanueva. The Court issued the writ of habeas
corpus on 9 February 1988 and the respondents filed a Return of the Writ on 12 February 1988.
Thereafter, the parties were heard on 15 February 1988.
On 26 February 1988, however, Roberto Umil and Renato Villanueva posted bail before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where charges for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act had
been filed against them, and they were accordingly released. The petition for habeas corpus,
insofar as Umil and Villanueva are concerned, is now moot and academic and is accordingly
dismissed, since the writ of habeas corpus does not lie in favor of an accused in a criminal case
who has been released on bail. 2
As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the
two (2) CAPCOM soldiers aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the
said offense for his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest
without warrant is unjustified.
However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), an
outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando
Dural without warrant is justified as it can be said that he was committing an offense when
arrested. The crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and
crimes or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct
assaults against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes. As stated by the Court in
an earlier case:
From the facts as above-narrated, the claim of the petitioners that they
were initially arrested illegally is, therefore, without basis in law and in fact.
The crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal
to commit such crimes, and other crimes and offenses committed in the
furtherance, on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
continuing offenses which set them apart from the common offenses, aside
from their essentially involving a massive conspiracy of nationwide
magnitude. Clearly then, the arrest of the herein detainees was well within
the bounds of the law and existing jurisprudence in our jurisdiction.
2. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting
armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of
the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed
conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore,
need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which
requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause
before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if
the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no
 legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of Regional Trial Court of Pasig, a search of the house was conducted at about 5:00 o'clock in the
violence against government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in afternoon, by a combined team of the Criminal Investigation Service, National Capital District
pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest or capture is thus (CIS-NCD) and the Constabulary Security Group (CSG). In the course of the search, the
impelled by the exigencies of the situation that involves the very survival of following articles were found and taken under proper receipt:
society and its government and duly constituted authorities. If killing and
other acts of violence against the rebels find justification in the exigencies
a) One (1) Colt M16A1 long rifle with defaced serial number;
of armed hostilities which is of the essence of waging a rebellion or
insurrection, most assuredly so in case of invasion, merely seizing their
persons and detaining them while any of these contingencies continues b) One (1) Cal. .380 ACT/9mm Model PPK/8 SN: 260577 & 2605778;
cannot be less justified. . . . 3
c) Two (2) fragmentation hand grenades;
The record, moreover, shows that the criminal case filed against Rolando Dural and Bernardo
Itucal, Jr. for "Double Murder, etc." was tried in the court below and at the conclusion thereof, d) Fifty-six (56) live ammunition for Cal. 5.56 mm;
or on 17 August 1988, Rolando Dural and Bernardo Itucal, Jr. were found guilty of the charge
and sentenced accordingly. Rolando Dural is now serving the sentence imposed upon him by the
trial court. Thus, the writ of habeas corpus is no longer available to him. For, as held in the early e) Five (5) live ammunition for Cal. .380;
case of U.S. vs. Wilson: 4
f) One (1) ICOM VHF FM Radio Transciever SN: 14903
In this case, whatever may be said about the manner of his arrest, the fact
remains that the defendant was actually in court in the custody of the law g) One (1) Regulated power supply 220V AC;
on March 29, when a complaint sufficient in form and substance was read
to him. To this he pleaded not guilty. The trial followed, in which, and in the
judgment of guilty pronounced by the court, we find no error. Whether, if h) One (1) Antennae (adjustable);
there were irregularities in bringing him personally before the court, he
could have been released on a writ of habeas corpus or now has a civil i) One (1) Speaker with cord ALEXAR;
action for damages against the person who arrested him we need not
inquire. It is enough to say that such irregularities are not sufficient to set
aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial j) Voluminous Subversive documents.
free from error.
When confronted, Renato Constatino could not produce any permit or authority to possess the
II firearms, ammunition, radio and other communications equipment. Hence, he was brought to
the CIS Headquarters for investigation. When questioned, he refused to give a written
statement, although he admitted that he was a staff member of the executive committee of the
In G.R. Nos. 84581-82 (Roque vs. De Villa), the arrest of Amelia Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra, NUFC and a ranking member of the International Department of the Communist Party of the
without warrant, is also justified. When apprehended at the house of Renato Constantino in Philippines (CPP).
Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, Wilfredo Buenaobra admitted that he was an NPA
courier and he had with him letters to Renato Constantino and other members of the rebel
group. Amelia Roque, upon the other hand, was a member of the National United Front At about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day (12 August 1988), Wilfredo Buenaobra
Commission, in charge of finance, and admitted ownership of subversive documents found in arrived at the house of Renato Constantino in the Villaluz Compound. When accosted, he
the house of her sister in Caloocan City. She was also in possession of ammunition and a readily admitted to the military agents that he is a regular member of the CPP/NPA and that he
fragmentation grenade for which she had no permit or authority to possess. went to the place to deliver letters to "Ka Mong", referring to Renato Constatino, and other
members of the rebel group. On further questioning, he also admitted that he is known as "Ka
Miller" and that he was from Barangay San Pedro, Lopez, Quezon. Among the items taken from
The record of these two (2) cases shows that on 27 June 1988, one Rogelio Ramos y Ibanes, a him were the following:
member of the NPA, who had surrendered to the military authorities, told military agents about
the operations of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and the New Peoples Army
(NPA) in Metro Manila. He identified some of his former comrades as "Ka Mong", a staff member (1) Handwritten letter addressed to "Ka Bing & Co. from A & Co." dated
of the Communications and Transportation Bureau; "Ka Nelia", a staff member in charge of August 11, 1988;
finance; "Ka Miller", an NPA courier from Sorsogon and Lopez, Quezon; "Ka Ted", and "Ka
Totoy". He also pointed to a certain house occupied by Renato Constantino located in the (2) Handwritten letter addressed to "ROD from VIC (Schell datre)" dated
Villaluz Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, which is used as a August 11, 1988;
safehouse of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP-NPA.
(3) Handwritten letter addressed to "Suzie" from "Vic", dated August 11,
In view of these revelations, the Constantino house was placed under military surveillance and 1988.
on 12 August 1988, pursuant to a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of the
Also found Buenaobra's possession was a piece of paper containing a written but jumbled
telephone number of Florida M. Roque, sister of Amelia Roque alias "Ka Nelia", at 69 Geronimo
St., Caloocan City. Acting on the lead provided as to the whereabouts of Amelia Roque, the
military agents went to the given address the next day (13 August 1988). They arrived at the
place at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning. After identifying themselves as military agents and
after seeking permission to search the place, which was granted, the military agents conducted
a search in the presence of the occupants of the house and the barangay captain of the place,
one Jesus D. Olba.
The military agents found the place to be another safehouse of the NUFC/CPP. They found
ledgers, journals, vouchers, bank deposit books, folders, computer diskettes, and subversive
documents as well as live ammunition for a .38 SPL Winchester, 11 rounds of live ammunition
for a cal. .45, 19 rounds of live ammunition for an M16 Rifle, and a fragmentation grenade. As a
result, Amelia Roque and the other occupants of the house were brought to the PC-CIS
Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, for investigation. Amelia Roque admitted to the
investigators that the voluminous documents belonged to her and that the other occupants of
the house had no knowledge of them. As a result, the said other occupants of the house were
released from custody.
On 15 August 1988, Amelia Roque was brought to the Caloocan City Fiscal for inquest after
which an information charging her with violation of PD 1866 was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Caloocan City. The case is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-1196. Another
information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Amelia Roque before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City, which is docketed therein as Criminal Case No. C-
150458.
An information for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against Wilfredo
Buenaobra before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Marikina, Metro Manila. The case is docketed
therein as Criminal Case No. 23715. Bail was set at P4,000.00.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed before this Court on behalf of Amelia
Roque and Wilfredo Buenaobra. At the hearing of the case, however, Wilfredo Buenaobra
manifested his desire to stay in the PC-INP Stockade at Camp Crame, Quezon City. According,
the petition for habeas corpus filed on his behalf is now moot and academic. Only the petition of
Amelia Roque remains for resolution.
The contention of respondents that petitioners Roque and Buenaobra are officers and/or
members of the National United Front Commission (NUFC) of the CPP was not controverted or
traversed by said petitioners. The contention must be deemed admitted. 5 As officers and/or
members of the NUFC-CPP, their arrest, without warrant, was justified for the same reasons
earlier stated vis-a-vis Rolando Dural. The arrest without warrant of Roque was additionally
justified as she was, at the time of apprehension, in possession of ammunitions without license
to possess them.
III
In G.R. Nos. 84583-84 (Anonuevo vs. Ramos), the arrest of Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon
Casiple, without warrant, is also justified under the rules. Both are admittedly members of the
standing committee of the NUFC and, when apprehended in the house of Renato Constatino,
they had a bag containing subversive materials, and both carried firearms and ammunition for
which they had no license to possess or carry.
The record of these two (2) cases shows that at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of 13 August
1988, Domingo T. Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple arrived at the house of Renato Constatino at
Marikina Heights, Marikina, which was still under surveillance by military agents. The military
agents noticed bulging objects on their waist lines. When frisked, the agents found them to be
loaded guns. Anonuevo and Casiple were asked to show their permit or license to possess or
carry firearms and ammunition, but they could not produce any. Hence, they were brought to
PC Headquarters for investigation. Found in their possession were the following articles:
a) Voluminous subversive documents
b) One (1) Cal. 7.65 MOD 83 2C Pistol SN: 001412 with one (1) magazine
for Cal. 7.65 containing ten (10) live ammunition of same caliber;
c) One (1) Cal. 7.65 Pietro Barreta SN; A18868 last digit tampered with one
(1) magazine containing five (5) live ammunition of same caliber.
At the PC Stockade, Domingo Anonuevo was identified as "Ka Ted", and Ramon Casiple as "Ka
Totoy" of the CPP, by their comrades who had previously surrendered to the military.
On 15 August 1988, the record of the investigation and other documentary evidence were
forwarded to the Provincial Fiscal at Pasig, Metro Manila, who conducted an inquest, after which
Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple were charged with violation of Presidential Decree No.
1866 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The cases are docketed therein as
Criminal Cases Nos. 74386 ad 74387, respectively. No bail was recommended.
On 24 August 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Domingo
Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, alleging that the said Anonuevo and Casiple were unlawfully
arrested without a warrant and that the informations filed against them are null and void for
having been filed without prior hearing and preliminary investigation. On 30 August 1988, the
Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, and after the respondents had filed a Return of the Writ,
the parties were heard.
The petitioners' (Anonuevo and Casiple) claim that they were unlawfully arrested because there
was no previous warrant of arrest, is without merit The record shows that Domingo Anonuevo
and Ramon Casiple were carrying unlicensed firearms and ammunition in their person when
they were apprehended.
There is also no merit in the contention that the informations filed against them are null and
void for want of a preliminary investigation. The filing of an information, without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted, is sanctioned by the Rules. Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court, as amended, reads:
Sec. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without a warrant. — When a
person is lawfully arrested without a warrant for an offense cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court the complaint or information may be filed by the
offended party, peace officer or fiscal without a preliminary investigation
having been first conducted, on the basis of the affidavit of the offended
party or arresting officer or person.
However, before the filing of such complaint or information, the person
arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation by a proper officer in
 accordance with this Rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with the assistance of a
lawyer and in case of non-availability of a lawyer, a responsible person of
his choice. Notwithstanding such waiver, he may apply for bail as provided
in the corresponding rule and the investigation must be terminated within
fifteen (15) days from its inception.
If the case has been filed in court without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted, the accused may within five (5) days from the time he
learns of the filing of the information, ask for a preliminary investigation
with the same right to adduced evidence in his favor in the manner
prescribed in this Rule.
The petitioners Domingo Anonuevo and Ramon Casiple, however, refused to sign a waiver of
the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In the informations filed
against them, the prosecutor made identical certifications, as follows:
This is to certify that the accused has been charged in accordance with Sec.
7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, that no preliminary
investigation was conducted because the accused has not made and signed
a waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended; that based on the evidence presented, there is reasonable
ground to believe that the crime has been committed, and that the accused
is probably guilty thereof.
Nor did petitioners ask for a preliminary investigation after the informations had been filed
against them in court. Petitioners cannot now claim that they have been deprived of their
constitutional right to due process.
IV
In G.R. No. 83162 (Ocaya vs. Aguirre), the arrest without warrant, of Vicky Ocaya is justified
under the Rules, since she had with her unlicensed ammunition when she was arrested. The
record of this case shows that on 12 May 1988, agents of the PC Intelligence and Investigation
of the Rizal PC-INP Command, armed with a search warrant issued by Judge Eutropio Migrino of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila, conducted a search of a house located at Block
19, Phase II, Marikina Green Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila, believed to be occupied by Benito
Tiamson, head of the CPP-NPA. In the course of the search, Vicky Ocaya arrived in a car driven
by Danny Rivera. Subversive documents and several rounds of ammunition for a .45 cal. pistol
were found in the car of Vicky Ocaya. As a result, Vicky Ocaya and Danny Rivera were brought
to the PC Headquarters for investigation. When Vicky Ocaya could not produce any permit or
authorization to possess the ammunition, an information charging her with violation of PD 1866
was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila. The case is docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 73447. Danny Rivera, on the other hand, was released from custody.
On 17 May 1988, a petition for habeas corpus was filed, with this Court on behalf of Vicky Ocaya
and Danny Rivera. It was alleged therein that Vicky Ocaya was illegally arrested and detained,
and denied the right to a preliminary investigation.
It would appear, however, that Vicky Ocaya was arrested in  flagranti delicto so that her arrest
without a warrant is justified. No preliminary investigation was conducted because she was
arrested without a warrant and she refused to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code, pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the Rule of Court, as amended.
V
The petitioners Vicky Ocaya, Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, and Amelia Roque claim that
the firearms, ammunition and subversive documents alleged to have been found in their
possession when they were arrested, did not belong to them, but were "planted" by the military
agents to justify their illegal arrest.
The petitioners, however, have not introduced any evidence to support their aforesaid claim. On
the other hand, no evil motive or ill-will on the part of the arresting officers that would cause
the said arresting officers in these cases to accuse the petitioners falsely, has been shown.
Besides, the arresting officers in these cases do not appear to be seekers of glory and bounty
hunters for, as counsel for the petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple say, "there is absolutely
nothing in the evidence submitted during the inquest that petitioners are on the 'AFP Order of
Battle with a reward of P150,000.00 each on their heads.'" 6 On the other hand, as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, the arrest of the petitioners is not a product of a witch hunt or a fishing
expedition, but the result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safehouses pointed to by no less
than former comrades of the petitioners in the rebel movement.
The Solicitor General, in his Consolidated Memorandum, aptly observes:
. . . . To reiterate, the focal point in the case of petitioners Roque,
Buenaobra, Anonuevo and Casiple, was the lawful search and seizure
conducted by the military at the residence of Renato Constantino at Villaluz
Compound, Molave St., Marikina Heights, Marikina, Metro Manila. The raid
at Constantino's residence, was not a witch hunting or fishing expedition on
the part of the military. It was a result of an in-depth military surveillance
coupled with the leads provided by former members of the underground
subversive organizations. That raid produced positive results. to date,
nobody has disputed the fact that the residence of Constantino when raided
yielded communication equipment, firearms and ammunitions, as well as
subversive documents.
The military agents working on the information provided by Constantino
that other members of his group were coming to his place, reasonably
conducted a "stake-out" operation whereby some members of the raiding
team were left behind the place. True enough, barely two hours after the
raid and Constantino's arrest, petitioner Buenaobra arrived at Constantino's
residence. He acted suspiciously and when frisked and searched by the
military authorities, found in his person were letters. They are no ordinary
letters, as even a cursory reading would show. Not only that, Buenaobra
admitted that he is a NPA courier and was there to deliver the letters to
Constantino.
Subsequently, less than twenty four hours after the arrest of Constantino
and Buenaobra, petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple arrived at Constantino's
place. Would it be unreasonable for the military agents to believe that
petitioners Anonuevo and Casiple are among those expected to visit
Constantino's residence considering that Constatino's information was true,
in that Buenaobra did come to that place? Was it unreasonable under the
 circumstances, on the part of the military agents, not to frisk and search
anyone who should visit the residence of Constantino, such as petitioners
Anonuevo and Casiple? Must this Honorable Court yield to Anonuevo and
Casiple's flimsy and bare assertion that they went to visit Constantino, who
was to leave for Saudi Arabia on the day they were arrested thereat?
As to petitioner Roque, was it unreasonable for the military authorities to
effect her arrest without warrant considering that it was Buenaobra who
provided the leads on her identity? It cannot be denied that Buenaobra had
connection with Roque. Because the former has the phone number of the
latter. Why the necessity of jumbling Roque's telephone number as written
on a piece of paper taken from Buenaobra's possession? Petitioners Roque
and Buenaobra have not offered any plausible reason so far.
In all the above incidents, respondents maintain that they acted reasonably,
under the time, place and circumstances of the events in question,
especially considering that at the time of petitioner's arrest, incriminatory
evidence, i.e, firearms, ammunitions and/or subversive documents were
found in their possession.
Petitioners, when arrested, were neither taking their snacks nor innocently
visiting a camp, but were arrested in such time, place and circumstances,
from which one can reasonably conclude tat they were up to a sinister plot,
involving utmost secrecy and comprehensive conspiracy.
IV
In. G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs. Lim), the release on habeas corpus of the petitioner Deogracias
Espiritu, who is detained by virtue of an Information for Violation of Article 142 of the Revised
Penal Code (Inciting to Sedition) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is similarly not
warranted.
The record of the case shows that the said petitioner is the General Secretary of the
Pinagkaisahang Samahan ng Tsuper at Operators Nationwide (PISTON), an association of
drivers and operators of public service vehicles in the Philippines, organized for their mutual aid
and protection.
Petitioner claims that at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of 23 November 1988, while he was
sleeping in his home located at 363 Valencia St., Sta. Mesa, Manila, he was awakened by his
sister Maria Paz Lalic who told him that a group of persons wanted to hire his jeepney. When he
went down to talk to them, he was immediately put under arrest. When he asked for the
warrant of arrest, the men, headed by Col. Ricardo Reyes, bodily lifted him and placed him in
their owner-type jeepney. He demanded that his sister, Maria Paz Lalic, be allowed to
accompany him, but the men did not accede to his request and hurriedly sped away.
He was brought to Police Station No. 8 of the Western Police District at Blumentritt, Manila
where he was interrogated and detained. Then, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, he
was brought before the respondent Lim and, there and then, the said respondent ordered his
arrest and detention. He was thereafter brought to the General Assignment Section,
Investigation Division of the Western Police District under Police Capt. Cresenciano A. Cabasal
where he was detained, restrained and deprived of his liberty. 7
The respondents claim however, that the detention of the petitioner is justified in view of the
Information filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. 88-683-85, charging him with violation of Art. 142 of the Revised Penal Code
(Inciting to Sedition).
The respondents also claim that the petitioner was lawfully arrested without a judicial warrant of
arrest since petitioner when arrested had in fact just committed an offense in that in the
afternoon of 22 November 1988, during a press conference at the National Press Club.
Deogracias Espiritu through tri-media was heard urging all drivers and
operators to go on nationwide strike on November 23, 1988, to force the
government to give into their demands to lower the prices of spare parts,
commodities, water and the immediate release from detention of the
president of the PISTON (Pinag-isang Samahan ng Tsuper Operators
Nationwide). Further, we heard Deogracias Espiritu taking the place of
PISTON president Medardo Roda and also announced the formation of the
Alliance Drivers Association to go on nationwide strike on November 23,
1988. 8
Policemen waited for petitioner outside the National Pres Club in order to investigate him, but he
gave the lawmen the slip. 9 He was next seen at about 5:00 o'clock that afternoon at a
gathering of drivers and symphatizers at the corner of Magsaysay Blvd. and Valencia Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila where he was heard to say:
Bukas tuloy ang welga natin, sumagot na ang Cebu at Bicol na kasali sila, at
hindi tayo titigil hanggang hindi binibigay ng gobyerno ni Cory ang gusto
nating pagbaba ng halaga ng spare parts, bilihin at and pagpapalaya sa
ating pinuno na si Ka Roda hanggang sa magkagulo na. 10 (emphasis
supplied)
The police finally caught up with the petitioner on 23 November 1988. He was invited for
questioning and brought to police headquarters after which an Information for violation of Art.
142 of the Revised Penal Code was filed against him before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. 11
Since the arrest of the petitioner without a warrant was in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 113, Sec. 5(b) of the Rules of Court and that the petitioner is detained by virtue of a valid
information filed with the competent court, he may not be released on habeas corpus. He may,
however be released upon posting bail as recommended. However, we find the amount of the
recommended bail (P60,000.00) excessive and we reduce it to P10,000.00 only.
VII
In G.R. No. 86332 (Nazareno vs. Station Commander), we also find no merit in the submission
of Narciso Nazareno that he was illegally arrested and is unlawfully detained. The record of this
case shows that at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning of 14 December 1988, one Romulo Bunye
II was killed by a group of men near the corner of T. Molina and Mendiola Streets in Alabang,
Muntinglupa, Metro Manila. One of the suspects in the killing was Ramil Regal who was arrested
by the police on 28 December 1988. Upon questioning, Regal pointed to Narciso Nazareno as on
of his companions in the killing of the said Romulo Bunye II. In view thereof, the police officers,
without warrant, picked up Narciso Nazareno and brought him to the police headquarters for
questioning. Obviously, the evidence of petitioner's guilt is strong because on 3 January 1989,
an information charging Narciso Nazareno, Ramil Regala, and two (2) others, with the killing of
Romulo Bunye II was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila. The case is
docketed therein as Criminal Case No. 731.
On 7 January 1989, Narciso Nazareno filed a motion to post bail, but the motion was denied by
the trial court in an order dated 10 January 1989, even as the motion to post bail, earlier filed
by his co-accused, Manuel Laureaga, was granted by the same trial court.
On 13 January 1989, a petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court on behalf of Narciso
Nazareno and on 13 January 1989, the Court issued the writ of habeas corpus, returnable to the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna, Branch 24, ordering said court to
hear the case on 30 January 1989 and thereafter resolve the petition.
At the conclusion of the hearing, or on 1 February 1989, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna issued a resolution denying the petition for habeas corpus, it
appearing that the said Narciso Nazareno is in the custody of the respondents by reason of an
information filed against him with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila which had
taken cognizance of said case and had, in fact, denied the motion for bail filed by said Narciso
Nazareno (presumably because of the strength of the evidence against him).
The findings of the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan, Laguna are based upon
the facts and the law. Consequently, we will not disturb the same. Evidently, the arrest of
Nazareno was effected by the police without warrant pursuant to Sec. 5(b), Rule 113, Rules of
Court after he was positively implicated by his co-accused Ramil Regala in the killing of Romulo
Bunye
II; and after investigation by the police authorities. As held in People vs. Ancheta: 12
The obligation of an agent of authority to make an arrest by reason of a
crime, does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment
thereof, the indubitable existence of a crime. For the detention to be
perfectly legal, it is sufficient that the agent or person in authority making
the arrest has reasonably sufficient grounds to believe the existence of an
act having the characteristics of a crime and that the same grounds exist to
believe that the person sought to be detained participated therein.
VIII
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have been filed in the
proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court judge, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process or make the order, of  if such person is charged
before any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court, as amended is quite explicit in providing that:
Sec. 4. When writ is allowed or discharge authorized. — If it appears that
the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall
not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the
process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with a convicted of an offense
in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment. (emphasis supplied)
At this point, we refer to petitioner's plea for the Court of re-examine and, thereafter, abandon
its pronouncement in Ilagan vs. Enrile, 13 that a writ of habeas corpus is no longer available after
an information is filed against the person detained and a warrant of arrest or an order of
commitment, is issued by the court where said information has been filed. 14 The petitioners
claim that the said ruling, which was handed down during the past dictatorial regime to enforce
and strengthen said regime, has no place under the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and constitutional rights of the people. Petitioners point out
that the said doctrine makes possible the arrest and detention of innocent persons despite lack
of evidence against them, and, most often, it is only after a petition for habeas corpus is filed
before the court that the military authorities file the criminal information in the courts of law to
be able to hide behind the protective mantle of the said doctrine. This, petitioners assert, stands
as an obstacle to the freedom and liberty of the people and permits lawless and arbitrary State
action.
We find, however, no compelling reason to abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon express
provision of the Rules of Court and the exigencies served by the law. The fears expressed by the
petitioners are not really unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-examination or reappraisal, with
a view to its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine is not the answer. The answer and the
better practice would be, not to limit the function of the habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the process, judgment or order of commitment or before
whom the detained person is charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the process, judgment or
order or to take cognizance of the case, but rather, as the Court itself states in Morales,
Jr. vs. Enrile, 15 "in all petitions for habeas corpus the court must inquire into every phase and
aspect of petitioner's detention-from the moment petition was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits of the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny can
the court satisfy itself that the due process clause of our Constitution has in fact been satisfied ."
This is exactly what the Court has done in the petitions at bar. This is what should henceforth
be done in all future cases of habeas corpus. In Short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly brought to the courts for their immediate scrutiny and
disposition.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED, except that in G.R. No. 85727 (Espiritu vs.
Lim), the bail bond for petitioner's provisional liberty is hereby ordered reduced from P60,000.00
to P10,000.00. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 197788               February 29, 2012 shabu. The RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and
unsubstantiated. The dispositive portion of its Decision held:
RODEL LUZ y ONG, Petitioner,
vs. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused RODEL LUZ y ONG GUILTY beyond
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,1 Respondent. reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12)
years and (1) day, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three
DECISION
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱ 300,000.00).

SERENO, J.:
The subject shabu is hereby confiscated for turn over to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency for its proper disposition and destruction in accordance with law.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 dated 18 February 2011 2 and Resolution dated 8
SO ORDERED.6
July 2011.

Upon review, the CA affirmed the RTC’s Decision.

Statement of the Facts and of the Case

On 12 September 2011, petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on
The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which sustained the version of the
Certiorari dated 1 September 2011. In a Resolution dated 12 October 2011, this Court required
prosecution, are as follows:
respondent to file a comment on the Petition. On 4 January 2012, the latter filed its Comment
dated 3 January 2012.
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer, substantially testified that on March 10, 2003 at around 3:00 o’clock
Petitioner raised the following grounds in support of his Petition:
in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban Drive
and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this
prompted him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all (i) THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SHABU IS INVALID.
motorcycle drivers to wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the
accused to come inside their sub-station since the place where he flagged down the accused is
(ii) THE PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF DUTY OF THE
almost in front of the said sub-station; that while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a
POLICE OFFICER CANNOT BE RELIED UPON IN THIS CASE.
citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he noticed that the accused was uneasy and
kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted and so, he told the accused to
take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a weapon inside it; that (iii) THE INTEGRITY AND EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF THE ALLEGED SUBJECT SPECIMEN
the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket which was a HAS BEEN COMPROMISED.
nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size, including two (2)
cellphones, one (1) pair of scissors and one (1) Swiss knife; that upon seeing the said container, (iv) THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED-PETITIONER WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND THE
he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused opened the container, he noticed a REASONABLE DOUBT (sic).7
cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his instruction, the accused spilled out
the contents of the container on the table which turned out to be four (4) plastic sachets, the
two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained suspected shabu.3 Petitioner claims that there was no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful
arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not
even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of the city ordinance. Even assuming there
Arraigned on 2 July 2003, petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to the search conducted upon him.
charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Pretrial was terminated on 24 September 2003,
after which, trial ensued.
On the other hand, finding that petitioner had been lawfully arrested, the RTC held thus:
During trial, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Emmanuel Alteza and a forensic chemist testified for the
prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified for himself and raised the defense of It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and apprehended in this case by Police
planting of evidence and extortion. Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring
the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers and riders thereon in the City of Naga and
prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The accused himself admitted that he was not
In its 19 February 2009 Decision,4 the RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged down by the said police officers, albeit he
dangerous drugs5 committed on 10 March 2003. It found the prosecution evidence sufficient to had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is legal basis on the part of the apprehending
show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid officers to flag down and arrest the accused because the latter was actually committing a crime
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain in their presence, that is, a violation of City Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused,
being caught in flagrante delicto violating the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully
stopped or arrested by the apprehending officers. x x x.8
We find the Petition to be impressed with merit, but not for the particular reasons alleged. In
criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the reviewing tribunal
can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial
court’s decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. 9
First, there was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense.10 It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested
or by that person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither
the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal
declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of
the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit,
under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.11
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s
license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. — Law enforcement and peace officers of other
agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a driver for any violation of this
Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of local traffic rules and regulations not
contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate the license of the driver concerned and issue a
receipt prescribed and issued by the Bureau therefor which shall authorize the driver to operate
a motor vehicle for a period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of
said receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become invalid
thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the date of
apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual12 provides the following
procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in Mobile Car. This rule is a
general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit operations. The mobile car crew shall
undertake the following, when applicable: x x x
m. If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or Traffic
Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary conversation or argument with
the driver or any of the vehicle’s occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest
him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the
period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting
time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only reason they
went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down "almost in front" of
that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there. There
was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
In Berkemer v. McCarty,13 the United States (U.S.) Supreme Court discussed at length whether
the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be
considered custodial interrogation. The Court held that, such questioning does not fall under
custodial interrogation, nor can it be considered a formal arrest, by virtue of the nature of the
questioning, the expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length of time the
procedure is conducted. It ruled as follows:
It must be acknowledged at the outset that a traffic stop significantly curtails the "freedom of
action" of the driver and the passengers, if any, of the detained vehicle. Under the law of most
States, it is a crime either to ignore a policeman’s signal to stop one’s car or, once having
stopped, to drive away without permission. x x x
However, we decline to accord talismanic power to the phrase in the Miranda opinion
emphasized by respondent. Fidelity to the doctrine announced in Miranda requires that it be
enforced strictly, but only in those types of situations in which the concerns that powered the
decision are implicated. Thus, we must decide whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained
person pressures that sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-
incrimination to require that he be warned of his constitutional rights.
Two features of an ordinary traffic stop mitigate the danger that a person questioned will be
induced "to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely," Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S., at
467. First, detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and
brief. The vast majority of roadside detentions last only a few minutes. A motorist’s
expectations, when he sees a policeman’s light flashing behind him, are that he will be obliged
to spend a short period of time answering questions and waiting while the officer checks his
license and registration, that he may then be given a citation, but that in the end he most likely
will be allowed to continue on his way. In this respect, questioning incident to an ordinary traffic
stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in
which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his
interrogators the answers they seek. See id., at 451.
Second, circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist
feels completely at the mercy of the police. To be sure, the aura of authority surrounding an
armed, uniformed officer and the knowledge that the officer has some discretion in deciding
whether to issue a citation, in combination, exert some pressure on the detainee to respond to
questions. But other aspects of the situation substantially offset these forces. Perhaps most
importantly, the typical traffic stop is public, at least to some degree. x x x
In both of these respects, the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called "Terry stop,"
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest. x x x The comparatively
nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion in
our opinions that Terry stops are subject to the dictates of Miranda. The similarly noncoercive
aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to
such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of Miranda.
x x x           x x x          x x x
We are confident that the state of affairs projected by respondent will not come to pass. It is
settled that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable as soon as a suspect’s
freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, Second, there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise
463 U. S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam). If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a illegal.
traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him "in custody" for practical
purposes, he will be entitled to the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda. See
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed: (i) a warrantless search
Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U. S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam). (Emphasis supplied.)
incidental to a lawful arrest; (ii) search of evidence in "plain view;" (iii) search of a moving
vehicle; (iv) consented warrantless search; (v) customs search; (vi) a "stop and frisk" search;
The U.S. Court in Berkemer thus ruled that, since the motorist therein was only subjected to and (vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. 15 None of the above-mentioned instances,
modest questions while still at the scene of the traffic stop, he was not at that moment placed especially a search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.
under custody (such that he should have been apprised of his Miranda rights), and neither can
treatment of this sort be fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of a formal arrest.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was
Similarly, neither can petitioner here be considered "under arrest" at the time that his traffic
not in "plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket.
citation was being made.
Clearly, the evidence was not immediately apparent.16

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner,
Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly
the failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under
inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.17 It must be voluntary in order to validate
the Rules of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed
an otherwise illegal search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given
for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a
and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner
warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza, this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid
and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that petitioner was merely "told" to take out the
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic violation. Certainly, when contents of his pocket.18
there is an intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take
the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In this case,
Whether consent to the search was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from
however, the officer’s issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the possibility
the totality of all the circumstances. Relevant to this determination are the following
of an arrest for the same violation.
characteristics of the person giving consent and the environment in which consent is given: (1)
the age of the defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in a public or a secluded location; (3)
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was deemed "arrested" upon whether the defendant objected to the search or passively looked on; (4) the education and
being flagged down for a traffic violation and while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive police procedures; (6) the
requirements for a valid arrest were not complied with. defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found; (7) the nature of the police
questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place; and (9) the possibly
vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting. It is the State that has the burden of
This Court has held that at the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting
proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary consent was obtained, and was
officer to inform the latter of the reason for the arrest and must show that person the warrant
freely and voluntarily given.19 In this case, all that was alleged was that petitioner was alone at
of arrest, if any. Persons shall be informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent and to
the police station at three in the morning, accompanied by several police officers. These
counsel, and that any statement they might make could be used against them. 14 It may also be
circumstances weigh heavily against a finding of valid consent to a warrantless search.
noted that in this case, these constitutional requirements were complied with by the police
officers only after petitioner had been arrested for illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies
when a police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe
In Berkemer, the U.S. Court also noted that the Miranda warnings must also be given to a
that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer
person apprehended due to a traffic violation:
clothing for weapons.20

The purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police do not
In Knowles v. Iowa,21 the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the "inherently compelling pressures"
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure
"generated by the custodial setting itself," "which work to undermine the individual’s will to
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that
resist," and as much as possible to free courts from the task of scrutinizing individual cases to
there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the motorist.
try to determine, after the fact, whether particular confessions were voluntary. Those purposes
Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the motorist to
are implicated as much by in-custody questioning of persons suspected of misdemeanors as
alight from the car or doing a patdown:
they are by questioning of persons suspected of felonies.

In Robinson, supra, we noted the two historical rationales for the "search incident to arrest"
If it were true that petitioner was already deemed "arrested" when he was flagged down for a
exception: (1) the need to disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody, and (2) the
traffic violation and while he waiting for his ticket, then there would have been no need for him
need to preserve evidence for later use at trial. x x x But neither of these underlying rationales
to be arrested for a second time—after the police officers allegedly discovered the drugs—as he
for the search incident to arrest exception is sufficient to justify the search in the present case.
was already in their custody.
We have recognized that the first rationale—officer safety—is "‘both legitimate and weighty,’" x Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-
x x The threat to officer safety from issuing a traffic citation, however, is a good deal less than 0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is hereby ACQUITTED
in the case of a custodial arrest. In Robinson, we stated that a custodial arrest involves "danger and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued confinement is
to an officer" because of "the extended exposure which follows the taking of a suspect into warranted by some other cause or ground.
custody and transporting him to the police station." 414 U. S., at 234-235. We recognized that
"[t]he danger to the police officer flows from the fact of the arrest, and its attendant proximity,
SO ORDERED.
stress, and uncertainty, and not from the grounds for arrest." Id., at 234, n. 5. A routine traffic
stop, on the other hand, is a relatively brief encounter and "is more analogous to a so-called
‘Terry stop’ . . . than to a formal arrest." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U. S. 420, 439 (1984). See
also Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U. S. 291, 296 (1973) ("Where there is no formal arrest . . . a person
might well be less hostile to the police and less likely to take conspicuous, immediate steps to
destroy incriminating evidence").

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the case of a routine traffic
stop.1âwphi1 It plainly is not. See Mimms, supra, at 110; Wilson, supra, at 413-414. But while
the concern for officer safety in this context may justify the "minimal" additional intrusion of
ordering a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the often
considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search. Even without the search
authority Iowa urges, officers have other, independent bases to search for weapons and protect
themselves from danger. For example, they may order out of a vehicle both the driver, Mimms,
supra, at 111, and any passengers, Wilson, supra, at 414; perform a "patdown" of a driver and
any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and dangerous, Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968); conduct a "Terry patdown" of the passenger compartment of a vehicle
upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon, Michigan v. Long, 463 U. S. 1032, 1049 (1983); and even conduct a full search of the
passenger compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant to a custodial arrest, New
York v. Belton, 453 U. S. 454, 460 (1981).

Nor has Iowa shown the second justification for the authority to search incident to arrest—the
need to discover and preserve evidence. Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a
citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further
evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in
the passenger compartment of the car. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing considered, petitioner must be acquitted. While he may have failed to object to
the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest
does not, however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.22

The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.23 Any evidence obtained in
violation of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. While the power
to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised
and the law implemented without contravening the constitutional rights of citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.24

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. 25 The drugs are the very
corpus delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility
precludes conviction and calls for the acquittal of the accused. 26

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February 2009 of the
G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN
ARRESTING OFFICER HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS
COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR. — The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3)
hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital
and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece
of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The
eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had
personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two
others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had
postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two
companions did.
2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN
INCIDENT TO LAWFUL ARREST; RATIONALE. — The search conducted on Gerente's person was
likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides: "Section 12. Search incident
to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible
precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about
to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150,
it was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may
be used against the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found his person, or within his
immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. — There
is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of
Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted
by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person
dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance,
even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when
there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The
conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard
the appellant and his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked
their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper
motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith
and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving
full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. — The Solicitor General
correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for
the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in
People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Branch 172, which found the appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425
(Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for a
term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum;
and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal
Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve years and one day as
minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor
mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua; to
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00 as
funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The accused Gabriel Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive
imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425,
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his
possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a
transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was
charged with Murder in Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and
signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused
together with two (2) others who are still at large and against whom the preliminary
investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of
wood and hallow (sic) block and with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault
and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly
caused the death of the said victim." (p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel
Gerente, together with Fredo Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and
smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about six (6) meters away from the
house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo
Echigoren saying, "Gabriel, papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly
seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan mamaya." Appellant allegedly
agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00
p.m. of the same day. The prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed
the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy
Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head and when he
fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men
dragged Blace to a place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station
received a report from the Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the
Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought. He was informed by the hospital
officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police
Corporal Romeo Lima and Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling
incident took place. There they found a piece of wood with blood stains, a hollow block and two
roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, that
she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed
Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to
come out of the house and they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked
appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which contained dried leaves wrapped in
cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo
and Totoy Echigoren, are still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Benjamin Caraig against him for Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial
of the two cases was held. On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision
convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the
prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged
despite the absence of evidence required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence
in violation of his constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the
dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in the course of a warrantless arrest by the police
officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were
valid because they were incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; . . .'
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions
had killed Blace. They saw Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the
crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which
the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported
the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers.
Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of
Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully
arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a
warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one
(1) day after he had shot to death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court
upon the rationale stated by us in People vs. Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and
tokens of his crime without a warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy
of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved of criminals, facilitating their escape
in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched
for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an
offense, without a search warrant."

The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary
measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested
may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S.
143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that
"the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against
the arresting officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control
may be seized."

There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having
conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of
Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could have been inflicted
by one person only.

What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete
hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not
absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to
commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by the
eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his
companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece
of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that
the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the presumption is
that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs.
Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes'
testimony.

Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.

The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance
with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to
P50,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 136267. July 10, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FIDEL ABRENICA CUBCUBIN,
JR., Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here on automatic review of the decision, 1 dated October 5, 1998, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.
The information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about August 26, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed with an unlicensed
homemade (paltik) Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver, with no serial number, with intent to
kill, acting with treachery and evident premeditation and taking advantage of the darkness of
[the] night, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, assault, attack and shoot
with the aforesaid unlicensed firearm a certain HENRY PECHO PIAMONTE, hitting and inflicting
upon the latter gunshot wounds in the head which caused the latters instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge, whereupon trial on the merits ensued.
Eight witnesses were presented by the prosecution: police officers Florentino M. Malinao, Jr.,
Enrico A. Rosal, Raymundo D. Estoy, Jr., and Virgilio L. Pilapil, all of whom belong to the Cavite
City Police Department; National Bureau of Investigation ballistician Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr.; NBI
Forensic Chemist II Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum; Dr. Regalado D. Sosa, City Health Officer II and City
Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of Health (DOH) in Cavite City; and Danet D.
Garcellano, a food server at the Sting Cafe in San Antonio, Cavite City. The testimony of Police
Chief Inspector Edwin G. Nemenzo, Chief of the Records, Firearms and Explosives Division of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, was dispensed with in view of
his certification, dated October 7, 1997 (Exh. N), 3 that accused-appellant is not a
licensed/registered holder of firearm of any kind and caliber.
The prosecution evidence is to the following effect:
At about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997, Sgt. Rogel, desk officer of the Cavite City
police station, received a telephone call that a person had been shot near the cemetery along
Julian Felipe Boulevard in San Antonio, Cavite City. For this reason, a police team, composed of
SPO1 Malinao, Jr., PO3 Rosal, PO3 Estoy, Jr., PO3 Manicio, and SPO3 Manalo, responded to the
call and found Henry P. Piamonte slumped dead on his tricycle which was then parked on the
road. Police photographer Fred Agana took pictures of the crime scene (Exhs. A, A-1, A-2, and
A-3) 4 showing the victim slumped on the handle of the tricycle. 5 PO3 Rosal testified that a
tricycle driver, who refused to divulge his name, told him that accused-appellant and the victim
were last seen together coming out of the Sting Cafe, located in San Antonio near the gate of
Sangley Point, Cavite City, about a kilometer and a half away from the crime scene. Forthwith,
PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. went to the cafe and talked to Danet Garcellano, a food
server/waitress in Sting Cafe. 6 The other policemen at the police station called up City
Prosecutor Agapito Lu who also proceeded to Sting Cafe. Garcellano told the police investigators
that she had seen accused-appellant arrive at Sting Cafe at about 12:00 midnight and drink
beer; that at about 2:30 a.m., the victim arrived and joined accused-appellant; that the two
stayed in the cafe until 3:30 a.m.; and that she did not know if they left together as she was
serving other customers. Garcellano described accused-appellant as a lean, dark-complexioned,
and mustachioed man who had on a white t-shirt and brown short pants. 7cräläwvirtualibräry
Armando Plata, another tricycle driver, told PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. that Garcellanos
description fitted a person known as alias Jun Dulce. Armando Plata, who knew where accused-
appellant lived, led PO3 Rosal, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., and Prosecutor Lu to accused-appellants
house in Garcia Extension, Cavite City. The policemen knocked on the door for about three
minutes before it was opened by a man who answered the description given by Danet
Garcellano and who turned out to be accused-appellant. The police operatives identified
themselves and informed him that he was being sought in connection with the shooting near the
cemetery. Accused-appellant denied involvement in the incident. PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao,
Jr. then asked permission to enter and look around the house. 8cräläwvirtualibräry
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said that upon entering the house, he noticed a white t-shirt, bearing the
brand name Hanes (Exh. H) 9 and the name Dhenvher written in the inner portion of the shirts
hemline, placed over a divider near the kitchen. Upon close examination, he said that he found
it to be bloodied." When he picked up the t-shirt, two spent .38 caliber shells fell from it. PO3
Rosal stayed with accused-appellant while he conducted a search. They then took the t-shirt
and the two bullet shells. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. then asked accused-appellant to go with them to
Sting Cafe for purposes of identification. There, accused-appellant was positively identified by
Danet Garcellano as the victims companion. The police investigators asked accused-appellant
where the fatal gun was. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said accused-appellant refused to tell him where he
hid the gun so he sought his (accused-appellants) permission to go back to his house to conduct
a further search. Thereupon, SPO1 Malinao, Jr., accompanied by Prosecutor Lu, PO3 Estoy, Jr.,
PO3 Manicio, SPO3 Manalo, and PO3 Rosal, proceeded thereto. 10 Inside the house, they saw
accused-appellants 11-year old son Jhumar. PO3 Estoy, Jr. found on top of a plastic water
container (drum) outside the bathroom a homemade Smith and Wesson caliber .38 revolver (six
shooter), without a serial number (Exh. F). He found the gun loaded with five live bullets (Exhs.
M, M-1, M-2, M-3, and M-4). PO3 Estoy, Jr. said that he inscribed his initials RDE (for Raymundo
D. Estoy) on the cylinder of the gun with the use of a sharp object. While PO3 Estoy, Jr. was
conducting the search, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal stayed with accused-appellant in the
sala. 11 The .38 caliber gun (Exhs. B, B-1), 12 the white Hanes t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-
B), 13 and the two spent .38 caliber shells (Exhs. B-2, B-2-B) 14 were all photographed. Accused-
appellant was then taken to the police station, where he was photographed (Exh. B-3) 15 along
with the things seized from him.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, Chief Investigator of the Criminal Investigation Division, testified that on
August 26, 1997, the case involving the killing of Henry Pecho Piamonte was forwarded to him
by PO3 Rosal together with the evidence consisting of a bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt, a .38
revolver with five live ammunitions, and two deformed slugs. After an evaluation of the
evidence, he formally filed a criminal complaint for murder against accused-appellant. He took
blood samples of the victim and submitted the same to the NBI for laboratory
examination. 16cräläwvirtualibräry
Dr. Regalado Sosa, City Health Officer II and City Medico-Legal Officer of the Department of
Health in Cavite City, conducted a postmortem examination of the cadaver and prepared an
autopsy report (Exh. O) 17 which showed the following findings:
AUTOPSY REPORT
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
A medium built fair complexioned male adult human body in its cadaveric state with gunshot
wounds . . . described as follows:
= Gunshot wound, 1.5 cm. x 0.5 cm., oval in shape with powder burns more on top of the
wound to 2.5 cms. elevation/height located at the angle of the right jaw and/or 5 cms. below
the inferior level of the right ear. The wound has irregular and inverted borders. It is directed
inwards fracturing the lower edge of the angle of the right mandible and the lead slug is
embedded at the right lateral portion of the first (1st) cervical vertebrae hence extracted.
= Gunshot wound, 1 cm. in d[iameter] with inverted irregular borders located at the left frontal
region 5 cms. above the temporal end of the left eyebrow. It is directed inwards and downwards
fracturing the bone (frontal) underneath into [the] intracranial cavity.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
= Presence of circular complete fracture, 0.8 cm. in d[iameter] at the left frontal region.
= The left frontal lobe of the brain is perforated and the frontal lobe is enveloped with liquid and
clotted blood.
= The lead slug is found at the inner surface of the left frontal lobe.
= The right mandibular region was incised near the gunshot wound and the area is severely
hematomatous and explored until a lead slug [was] found at the 1st cervical vertebrae at the
right side.
= Stomach contains liquid and little rice and with alcoholic (beer) smell.
= Other internal organs are significantly normal.
Slugs extracted:
1. 0.6 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug with one end is markedly deformed. The length of the slug is
1.6 cms.
Note: One diagonal incised line was marked on the slug.
2. A 0.7 cm. in d[iameter] lead slug . . . roundly/ovally deformed [on] one end. The length of
the slug is 1.8 cm.
Note: Two diagonal incised lines [were] marked on the said slug.
Dr. Sosa testified that the victim sustained two gunshot wounds (Exh. R), 18 the first one located
on the right jaw below the ear while the second wound located at the left temporal side above
the left eyebrow. The slug from the first gunshot wound remained at the base of the neck, near
the spinal column. There were powder burns, called tatooing, surrounding the first wound which
showed that the victim was shot point-blank. The second slug was also embedded at the front
lobe of the brain. 19 Dr. Sosa indicated in the Certificate of Death (Exh. Q) that the victim died of
shock secondary to severe intracranial hemorrhage due to multiple gunshot
wounds. 20cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon written request (Exh. C) 21 of Prosecutor Lu, the NBI conducted a ballistics examination to
determine whether the two slugs taken from the body of the victim were fired from the firearm
recovered from accused-appellant.
Isabelo D. Silvestre, Jr., an NBI ballistician, conducted on September 10, 1997 a comparative
examination of the two evidence bullets, marked as HPP-1 (Exh. E) and HPP-2 (Exh. E-1), which
had been recovered from the victims head and the three test bullets (Exhs. G, G-1, G-2) fired
from the seized .38 caliber firearm. The tests showed that the evidence bullets were fired from
the subject firearm. 22 The empty shells from the three test bullets fired were duly marked
(Exhs. G-3, G-4, G-5). No photographs were taken. Silvestres findings were confirmed by four
other NBI ballisticians: Chief Ballistician Rogelio Munar, Supervising Ballistician Ernie Magtibay,
Senior Ballistician Elmer Pieded, and, Flor Landicho, another ballistician. The two .38 caliber
empty shells recovered from accused-appellant were no longer examined. 23cräläwvirtualibräry
Prosecutor Lu also made a written request (Exh. J) 24 for a laboratory examination of the
bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt of accused-appellant to determine whether such were
identical to the blood of the victim.
Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, NBI Forensic Chemist II, testified that on September 26, 1997, she
conducted three kinds of laboratory examinations, namely, (a) benzidine test, to determine the
presence of blood; (b) precipitin test, to determine if the bloodstains came from human or
animal blood; and (c) ABO grouping test, to determine the blood group. When tested and
matched together, the bloodstained white Hanes t-shirt and the blood sample of the victim
yielded positive results for human blood belonging to blood type O (Exh. K). 25cräläwvirtualibräry
For its part, the defense presented accused-appellant himself, his son Jhumar, and his sister
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua.
Accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. testified that he enlisted in the Philippine
Constabulary as a soldier in 1974 but was discharged in 1977 for being AWOL. He said he left
for Saudi Arabia where he worked as a driver and came back in 1979. He was later employed as
a driver by a friend, who owned a junk shop in Cavite City. He admitted knowing the victim
whom he addressed as Kuya. Accused-appellant testified that from 10:00 in the evening to
12:00 midnight of August 25, 1997, he and some friends played a card game called tong-its on
Molina Street, Cavite City. Afterwards, he proceeded to the Sting Cafe where he had some
drinks while waiting for food to be served. Henry Piamonte, a tricycle driver, arrived and had
drinks with him. After a while, the victim left as a passenger was waiting to be given a ride. The
victim came back to the restaurant before 1:00 a.m. and had another bottle of beer with
accused-appellant. At about 1:30 a.m., the victim again left to transport another passenger.
After that, the victim did not come back anymore. 26cräläwvirtualibräry
Accused-appellant said he left Sting Cafe at about 2:00 a.m. and took a tricycle home to 1151
Garcia Extension, San Antonio, Cavite City. He was sleeping on the sofa in his bedroom when he
was awakened by the arrival of three policemen, two of them he recognized as SPO1 Malinao,
Jr. and PO3 Estoy, Jr., who pointed their guns at him and told him to lie face down. He said he
was handcuffed while the policemen searched his room, turning the sala set upside down and
opening the cabinets. His son, Jhumar, stood beside him. Before leaving, the policemen took
from the clothes stand a white t-shirt belonging to his son Denver. Accused-appellant said that
he did not ask them why they were searching the place as he was afraid they would maltreat
him. He denied the claim of the policemen that the white t-shirt had blood stains. He claimed
that the policemen did not have any search warrant nor a warrant of arrest when they took him
into custody. Nor did they inform him of his constitutional right to remain silent and to be
assisted by counsel. He also said that he was made to stay in a police patrol car for almost two
hours before he was brought inside the police station. He denied owning the .38 caliber revolver
presented to him by Prosecutor Lu and SPO4 Pilapil or that the same had been recovered from
his house. He also denied the prosecutions claim that he was taken to the Sting Cafe where he
was allegedly identified by Danet Garcellano as the person last seen with the victim before the
latter was killed. 27cräläwvirtualibräry
Jhumar Cubcubin, son of accused-appellant, testified that at about 4:00 in the morning of
August 26, 1997, he was sleeping on the second floor of the house when he was roused from
his sleep by loud knocks on the door. When he opened the door, he saw three policemen who
were looking for his father. He told them that his father was not around, but he was shoved
away. They proceeded upstairs to the room of his father where they took from the clothes stand
a white Hanes t-shirt belonging to his brother Denver. They put his father in a police patrol car
waiting outside. Jhumar immediately went to his aunt, Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, and reported to
her what had happened. He went back to the house and saw some policemen still conducting a
search. As the policemen were about to leave, a van with some other policemen on board
arrived. They asked him where the water container was located. They went inside the house
and, when they came out, one of them announced that he had found a gun, which was then
photographed. Jhumar said that while his father was inside the police patrol car, his aunt was
arguing with the policemen. At that instance, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. spread the t-shirt and told
Jhumars aunt Eto, puro dugo damit niya, although the t-shirt had no bloodstains. He said that
he and his father never gave permission to the policemen to search their
house. 28cräläwvirtualibräry
Yolanda Cubcubin Padua, accused-appellants sister, testified that at about 5:30 in the morning
of August 26, 1997, she was told by her nephew, Jhumar, that accused-appellant had been
apprehended by some policemen. She and Jhumar then went to the police patrol car where she
saw her brother in handcuffs. She said she protested to the policemen that there was no
evidence that accused-appellant had killed the victim. Yolanda said she saw the confiscated
white Hanes t-shirt, but she claimed the same did not have any bloodstain on it. She went back
to her house to call up her mother in Gen. Trias, Cavite to let her know what had happened.
She then went out to see accused-appellant and saw Jhumar, who told her that some policemen
were searching accused-appellants house and found a gun. 29cräläwvirtualibräry
On October 5, 1998, the trial court rendered its decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder. It based its finding on circumstantial evidence, to wit: (1) That Danet Garcellano, a
waitress at the Sting Cafe, saw accused-appellant arrive at about 12:00 midnight of August 25,
1997 and drink beer, while the victim arrived at about 2:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997 and joined
accused-appellant in drinking beer at the bar. She said that she served them beer and they
stayed for about an hour, that the two later had an argument as accused-appellant wanted to
have two more bottles of beer which the victim paid for, and that at about 3:30 a.m., the victim
and accused-appellant left and boarded the victims tricycle; (2) That PO3 Rosal and SPO1
Malinao, Jr. testified that they saw the lifeless body of the victim, with bullet wounds on his
head, slumped on the handle of his tricycle, that the crime scene was about 50 meters away
from the house of accused-appellant, and that when they were told by an unidentified tricycle
driver that the victim and accused-appellant were seen leaving the Sting Cafe together, they
went to Sting Cafe and interviewed Danet Garcellano who described the appearance of the
victims companion. Armando Plata, another tricycle driver who knew accused-appellant as the
person being described by Garcellano, accompanied the policemen to the house of accused-
appellant; (3) That after SPO1 Malinao, Jr. was allowed to enter the house, he found a white
Hanes t-shirt with bloodstains on it and also recovered two spent .38 caliber shells; (4) That
when accused-appellant was taken to the Sting Cafe, he was positively identified by Danet
Garcellano as the victims companion moments prior to his death; (5) That when the
investigators returned to the house of accused-appellant, PO3 Estoy, Jr. found a .38 caliber
revolver placed on top of a plastic water container located outside the bathroom; (6) That
laboratory examination conducted by the forensic chemist, Juliet Gelacio-Mahilum, showed that
the bloodstains on the white Hanes t-shirt were human blood, type O, which matched the blood
type of the victim; and (7) That per ballistic examination of NBI ballistician, Isabelo D. Silvestre,
Jr., the two slugs recovered from the head of the victim were fired from the .38 caliber revolver
seized from accused-appellants house.
The trial court rejected accused-appellants alibi, giving full credence to the testimonies of Danet
Garcellano and the police investigators whom it found to have no motive to falsely implicate
accused-appellant. It admitted the prosecution evidence consisting of the white Hanes t-shirt,
two spent shells, and the .38 caliber revolver, on the ground that these items had been seized
as incident to a lawful arrest. It ruled that since Dr. Sosa testified that the victim was shot point-
blank while on his tricycle and was not in a position to see the assailant, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present, not to mention that the victim was unarmed and thus
totally defenseless. The trial court theorized that while the victim was on his tricycle, the
assailant went around and shot him on the left temple. It held that the use of an unlicensed
firearm in killing the victim constituted an aggravating circumstance. Hence, the trial court found
accused-appellant guilty of murder and accordingly imposed on him the penalty of death.
Hence, this appeal.
On April 18, 2000, the Court received a letter, dated April 5, 2000, 30 from Victoria Abrenica
Dulce, mother of accused-appellant, with an attached affidavit of desistance
entitled Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-Uurong , dated November 14, 1997, 31 executed by
Marilou B. Piamonte, widow of the victim, stating that accused-appellant had been mistakenly
identified as the assailant, and, by reason thereof, sought the dismissal of the criminal case
against him. In her letter, Dulce said that the affidavit of desistance was supposed to be
submitted to the trial court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, but, for
unknown reasons, the same was not done by accused-appellants counsel. This affidavit of
desistance, however, not being formally offered before the trial court, has no probative value.
We now consider accused-appellants assignment of errors.
First. Accused-appellant contends that his arrest, effected on August 26, 1997 without a
warrant, was illegal. On this point, Rule 113, 5(b) of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
Under 5(b), two conditions must concur for a warrantless arrest to be valid: first, the offender
has just committed an offense and, second, the arresting peace officer or private person has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. It has
been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without a warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. 32cräläwvirtualibräry
In this case, the arrest of accused-appellant was effected shortly after the victim was killed. The
question, therefore, is whether there was probable cause for PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr.,
the arresting officers, to believe that accused-appellant committed the crime. We hold that there
was none. The two did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that accused-appellant
had committed the crime. Their knowledge of the circumstances from which they allegedly
inferred that accused-appellant was probably guilty was based entirely on what they had been
told by others, to wit: by someone who called the PNP station in San Antonio, Cavite City at
about 3:30 in the morning of August 26, 1997 and reported that a man had been killed along
Julian Felipe Boulevard of the said city; by an alleged witness who saw accused-appellant and
the victim coming out of the Sting Cafe; by Danet Garcellano, waitress at the Sting Cafe, who
said that the man last seen with the victim was lean, mustachioed, dark-complexioned and was
wearing a white t-shirt and a pair of brown short pants; by a tricycle driver named Armando
Plata who told them that the physical description given by Garcellano fitted accused-appellant,
alias Jun Dulce and who said he knew where accused-appellant lived and accompanied them to
accused-appellants house. Thus, PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. merely relied on information
given to them by others.
In an analogous case, 33 the police was informed that the accused was involved in subversive
activities. On the basis of this information, the police arrested the accused and, in the course of
the arrest, allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and some subversive materials from the
latter. This Court held that the arresting officers had no personal knowledge since their
information came entirely from an informant. It was pointed out that at the time of his arrest,
the accused was not in possession of the firearm nor engaged in subversive activities. His arrest
without a warrant could not be justified under 5(b).
In another case, 34  the accused, in a case of robbery with rape, were arrested solely on the
basis of the identification given by one of the victims. This Court held the arrest to be illegal for
lack of personal knowledge of the arresting officers. More recently, in Posadas v.
Ombudsman  , 35 this Court, in declaring the arrest without warrant of two University of the
Philippines students to be illegal, held:
There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c). The arresting
officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students
fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement. The question is whether
paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that [the students] were probably guilty.
....
[T]he NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest [the students] four days after the commission
of the crime. They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two
students were probably guilty of the crime. What they had were the supposed positive
identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a
warrant by the NBI.
Indeed, at the time [the victim] was killed, these [NBI] agents were nowhere near the scene of
the crime. When [the NBI agents] attempted to arrest [the students], the latter were not
committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were
doing anything illegal. On the contrary, [they], under the supervision of the U.P. police, were
taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.
Nor can it be argued that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe accused-appellant
to be guilty of the killing of the victim because they found a bloodstained t-shirt, a .38 caliber
revolver, and two spent .38 caliber shells in his house. At the time accused-appellant was
arrested, he was not doing anything overtly criminal. The alleged discovery of the gun came
after his arrest. Moreover, as will presently be explained, the objects allegedly seized from
accused-appellant were illegally obtained without a search warrant.
Be that as it may, accused-appellant cannot now question the validity of his arrest without a
warrant. The records show that he pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on
November 11, 1997. It is true that on August 28, 1997, he filed a petition for reinvestigation in
which he alleged that he had been illegally detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest.
In its order, dated September 9, 1997, the trial court granted his motion and ordered the City
Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation and submit his findings within thirty (30) days
thereof. 36 On October 7, 1997, City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu moved for the resetting of
accused-appellants arraignment from October 8, 1997 to the first week of November, 1997 on
the ground that the findings on the laboratory and ballistics examinations had not yet been
received from the NBI. 37 Accused-appellant did not object to the arraignment. The City
Prosecutors request was, therefore, granted and the arraignment was reset to November 11,
1997. 38 Nor did accused-appellant move to quash the information on the ground that his arrest
was illegal and, therefore, the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person. Instead, on
November 11, 1997, at the scheduled arraignment, accused-appellant, with the assistance of
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the charge. 39 On the same day, the trial court issued an order
stating that, as a result of accused-appellants arraignment, his motion for preliminary
investigation had become moot and academic and, accordingly, set the case for trial. 40 Accused-
appellant thus waived the right to object to the legality of his arrest. 41cräläwvirtualibräry
Second. Accused-appellant contends that neither he nor his son gave permission to the arresting
police officers to search his house and, therefore, the Hanes t-shirt, the two spent slugs, and
the .38 caliber revolver allegedly found in his house are inadmissible in evidence. The
prosecution, on the other hand, insists that accused-appellant consented to the search of his
house.
To be sure, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may
be waived expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must
be persuasive evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. A mere failure on the part
of the accused to object to a search cannot be construed as a waiver of this privilege. For as
Justice Laurel explained in Pasion Vda de Garcia v. Locsin, 42 As the constitutional guaranty is
not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the
position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights;
but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not consent or an
invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration or regard for the supremacy of the law.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who
conduct it cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions and shift to the
accused the burden of proving that the search was unconsented. It is noteworthy that the
testimonies of the two prosecution witnesses, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. and PO3 Rosal, on the search
show laborious effort to emphasize that accused-appellant gave them permission to search his
house. At every turn, even when they were not being asked, they said the search was made
with the consent of the accused. As Shakespeare would put it, the lady doth protest too much,
methinks. Indeed, not only does accused-appellant stoutly deny that he ever consented to the
search of his dwelling but the prosecution has not shown any good reason why accused-
appellant might have agreed to the search.
The prosecution says the search can be justified as incidental to a valid arrest. Even assuming
the warrantless arrest to be valid, the search cannot be considered an incident thereto. A valid
arrest allows only the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either in the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The rationale for such search and seizure is
to prevent the person arrested either from destroying evidence or from using the weapon
against his captor. It is clear that the warrantless search in this case cannot be justified on this
ground. For neither the t-shirt nor the gun was within the area of accused-appellants immediate
control. In fact, according to the rosecution, the police found the gun only after going back to
the house of accused-appellant.
Nor were the police officers justified in seizing the white Hanes t-shirt placed on top of the
divider in plain view as such is not contraband nor is it incriminating in nature which would lead
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. to conclude that it would constitute evidence of a crime. Contrary to what
SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said, the t-shirt was not bloodied which could have directed his attention to
take a closer look at it. From the photograph of the t-shirt (Exh. B-2), it is not visible that there
were bloodstains. The actual t-shirt (Exh. H) merely had some small specks of blood at its lower
portion.
Third. There is no evidence to link accused-appellant directly to the crime. Danet Garcellano said
that accused-appellant arrived at about midnight of August 25, 1997; that the victim joined him
at about 2:30 a.m.; and that although both left the Sting Cafe at about 3:30 a.m., she really did
not know if they left together. Thus, Danet testified:
PROSECUTOR LU:
....
Q Were they together when they left Sting Cafe or they left one after the other?

A When they were already bringing along with them the two bottles of beer, they talked and
Nor can the warrantless search in this case be justified under the plain view doctrine. As this afterwards, I already left them and I served the other customers.
Court held in People  v. Musa: 43cräläwvirtualibräry

Q Did you actually see Henry Piamonte leave the Sting Cafe?
The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence
of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not A They were about to leave already at that time because they were already bringing with them
searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an the two bottles of beer, Sir.
incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)]
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the Q But did you see Henry Piamonte actually leave the Sting Cafe?
doctrine:

A When Henry Piamonte left the Sting Cafe, Henry boarded a tricycle, Sir.
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification Q How about Cubcubin, how did he leave the Sting Cafe?
whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the A He followed Henry, Sir.
accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original
justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory Q How did he follow Henry, on foot, on board a vehicle or what?
search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.   [Id., 29 L.Ed.
2d 583. See  also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)] A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served the other customers
inside.44cräläwvirtualibräry
Here, the search of accused-appellants house was illegal and, consequently, the things obtained
as a result of the illegal search, i.e., the white Hanes t-shirt, two spent shells, and the .38 ....
caliber gun, are inadmissible in evidence against him. It cannot be said that the .38 caliber gun
was discovered through inadvertence. After bringing accused-appellant to the Sting Cafe where
On cross-examination, Danet said:
he was positively identified by a waitress named Danet Garcellano as the victims companion, the
arresting officers allegedly asked accused-appellant where he hid the gun used in killing the
victim. According to SPO1 Malinao, Jr., when accused-appellant refused to answer, he sought ATTY. BAYBAY:
accused-appellants permission to go back to his house and there found the .38 caliber revolver
on top of a plastic water container outside the bathroom. Thus, the gun was purposely sought Q When he left, he left alone?
by the police officers and they did not merely stumble upon it.
A I do not know anymore, Sir, because I already served inside.
Q Are you saying to us that you did not see him when he left?
A No, Sir, what I know is that he and Cubcubin were together because of the two bottles of
beer which were paid by Piamonte inside, Sir.
....
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q The accused Fidel Cubcubin left Sting Cafe at 3:30?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Now, how could you be sure of the time when you were serving other people at that time?
A That is only my estimation, Sir.
Q You only estimated?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And, what was the basis of your estimation?
A Because at that time there were only few customers in that place, Sir.
Q So, you are not really sure what time Fidel Cubcubin left?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You also did not see him leave?
A No, Sir.45cräläwvirtualibräry
In People v. Gallarde, 46 it was explained that positive identification refers essentially to proof of
identity and not per se  to that of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the
crime. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the perpetrator of the
crime. This constitutes direct evidence. Or, he may not have actually seen the crime committed,
but is nevertheless able to identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of the crime, as
when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before
and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type of positive identification,
which, when taken together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion
of all others.
This rule, however, cannot be applied in the present case because Danet Garcellano did not
actually see accused-appellant and the victim leave the Sting Cafe together. There is thus
serious doubt as to whether accused-appellant was really the last person seen with the victim.
Her testimony is insufficient to place accused-appellant in the scene of the crime so as to form
part of the chain of circumstantial evidence to show that accused-appellant committed the
crime. Suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond
reasonable doubt. 47cräläwvirtualibräry
Nor is there adequate evidence to prove any ill motive on the part of accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant testified that he could not have killed the victim because the latter was his
friend whom he considered his kuya or elder brother. 48 There is no showing that the killing of
the victim was by reason of a supposed altercation they had as to who would pay for the two
bottles of beer ordered while they were at the Sting Cafe. The beer was later paid for by the
victim. Motive is proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately after
the commission of the offense, i.e.,  by deeds or words that may express the motive or from
which his reason for committing the offense may be inferred. 49cräläwvirtualibräry
Rule 133, 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence requires the concurrence of the following in order
to sustain a conviction based on circumstantial evidence: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
In the case at bar, there are serious doubts as to whether the crime was committed by accused-
appellant in view of the following: (1) As already stated, Danet Garcellano, a waitress at the
Sting Cafe, did not actually see accused-appellant and the victim leaving the cafe together at
about 3:30 a.m. of August 26, 1997; (2) PO3 Rosal and SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that when
they arrived at the scene of the crime, they were informed by a tricycle driver that the victim
and the accused-appellant had earlier left the Sting Cafe together, but the tricycle driver was
not presented to confirm this fact; (3) SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that the white Hanes t-shirt
was bloodied, but the evidence shows that it had some bloodstains only on its lower portion
(Exh. H), while the photograph of the t-shirt (Exhs. B-2, B-2-A, B-2-B), supposedly taken at the
time of the search, shows that it had no bloodstains and this discrepancy was not explained by
SPO1 Malinao, Jr.; (4) The fact that the t-shirt was tested positive for type O blood does not
necessarily mean that the bloodstains came from the victim who also had a type O blood; (5)
Accused-appellant was never given a paraffin test to determine if he was positive for gunpowder
nitrates; (8) The .38 caliber gun allegedly found in his house was not examined for the possible
presence of accused-appellants fingerprints; and (9) The allegation that the gun was placed on
top of a water container in accused-appellants house is unbelievable as it is improbable that
accused-appellant could be so careless as to leave the fatal weapon there when he could have
hidden it or thrown it away.
Nor can we rest easy on the prosecutions claim as to where the two empty shells and the t-shirt
were allegedly found. SPO1 Malinao, Jr. testified that these were placed beside the white Hanes
t-shirt and fell when he took the shirt. On direct examination, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said:
PROSECUTOR LU:
Q What else did you tell Cubcubin at that time?
A We asked him to allow us to go inside the house and he let us go inside the house, then after Q Where in the kitchen area, on the floor or on the wall?
entering the same, while we were in the sala near the kitchen we saw the white Hanes t-shirt
there, Sir, that was near the kitchen.
A It was immediately in front of the door because the house has no divider anymore, Sir.

Q Where exactly was the white t-shirt placed at that time when you saw the same?
Q And that t-shirt was immediately near the door, on the floor?

A Because after entering the house you will see the entire portion of that house and there is a
A Yes, Sir.
table there and that t-shirt was placed on the table.

Q What did you do after that, when you saw the t-shirt there?
Q Was that t-shirt visible from the front door of the house?

A I asked his permission so that I could take a look at the t-shirt, Sir.
A Yes, Sir.

Q And you said, you looked at it?

Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?

A Yes, Sir.
A Before I got the t-shirt, I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt, Sir,
and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the t-shirt there were even 2
empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains. Q When you said, you looked at it, how did you look at it?

Q This white t-shirt, can you tell us the brand of the t-shirt? A I spread it out in front of him, Sir.

A Hanes, Sir. Q And when you spread it out in front of him, did you ask him whose t-shirt is it?

Q How about the blood spot or blood stains, can you tell us how many, if you can remember? A I asked him if that t-shirt belongs to him, Sir.

A We were in a hurry, I did not count the blood stains anymore but there were blood stains on
the t-shirt, Sir.
Q How about these 2 empty shells that fell when you lifted the t-shirt, can you describe to us
these 2 empty shells?
Q What did he say?
A According to him, the t-shirt does not belong to him, Sir.
Q You also testified that you found two empty shells?

A Empty shells of .38 cal. bullets, Sir. A Yes, Sir.

Q What did you do with the empty shells? Q Where did you find these two empty shells?

A I got the t-shirt as well as the 2 empty shells and I showed them to him, A From the bedroom upstairs, Sir.
Sir.50cräläwvirtualibräry

Q Bedroom upstairs?
However, on cross-examination, he said he found the empty shells on top of a cabinet ( tokador)
in the bedroom on the second floor of the house. Thus, he testified:
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. BAYBAY:
Q You mean, it is a two-storey house?
Q Where was this t-shirt again when you first saw it?
A Yes, Sir, there is a bedroom upstairs.
A In the kitchen area, Sir.
Q You found it when you went up?
A I first asked his permission to look around inside the house, Sir, because I was asking him
also about the whereabouts of the firearm he had.
Q And he allowed you?
A He allowed me, sir.
Q And when you went upstairs, you found the two empty shells?
A Yes, Sir, they were placed on their tokador on a place where there is a curtain.
Q In your previous testimony and this is found on page 41 of the TSN, you stated that you got
the t-shirt and when you lifted the t-shirt, two empty shells fell off?
A After finding the two empty shells for a .38 caliber, Sir, I placed them together with the t-
shirt.
Q What you are telling us now is that you went upstairs, you found two empty shells and you
put them together with the t-shirt, that is what you are telling us now?
A After finding and taking a look at the t-shirt, I put it on the original place where it was,
Sir, and after finding the two empty shells, it so happened that the investigator was behind me
so after that, I showed to him the t-shirt as well as the empty shells. 51
....
Q Also in your previous testimony, you got the t-shirt and you asked the permission to get the t-
shirt, after getting the t-shirt, there were 2 empty shells which fell. The question is, do you
remember that this happened?
A These two empty shells which I recovered upstairs, sir, I placed them on top of the t-shirt.
Q You said, when you got the t-shirt, something fell, in your direct testimony?
A While Fidel Cubcubin was just beside me, Sir, I got the t-shirt, I spread it out and nothing fell
yet at that time, then I asked him about the firearm that he used.
....
Q Do you remember having been asked this particular question:
Q Can you describe to us the t-shirt that you saw?
A Before I got the t-shirt I even asked his permission for me to be able to get the t-shirt, Sir,
and he even gave me the permission to get the same, after getting the t-shirt there were even 2
empty shells which fell, and I saw the t-shirt was with blood stains.
A Yes, Sir, I remember it.
Q I am just referring to two empty shells that fell, which you said, is that true?
A Yes, Sir, there were empty shells that fell, but I first placed them on top of the t-shirt because
I was planning to wrap these empty shells in the t-shirt.
Q You also testified here on page 40 that the t-shirt was visible from the front door of the
house, is that true?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were referring to the time that you entered the house?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And that was the time that you lift[ed] the t-shirt when you saw it and you got it?
A What I said before was that, I got the t-shirt, I lifted it, after that, I placed it on its original
place, Sir, and I asked him about the firearm but he was not commenting anything on that, so I
asked permission from him to go upstairs to look around.
Q When you said you placed that from the place where you found it, how did you put it on the
place where you found it?
A I placed it there the way I saw it before, the way it was previously placed there, Sir, because I
was planning to bring the t-shirt.52cräläwvirtualibräry
Thus, caught in his own contradiction, SPO1 Malinao, Jr. prevaricated but in the process
committed more contradictions. He said he found the empty shells on top of the tokador  on the
second floor of the house, brought them downstairs, and then placed them on the t-shirt. When
he got the t-shirt, the empty shells fell on the floor. But how could he have gotten the shells
from the second floor if, according to him, he found them by accident when they fell from the t-
shirt which he found immediately after entering accused-appellants house and before going up
to the second storey? It is also noteworthy that whereas at first SPO1 Malinao, Jr. said he found
the t-shirt placed on the table near the kitchen, he later said he found it on the floor.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, Cavite City, finding
accused-appellant Fidel Abrenica Cubcubin, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder, is REVERSED and
accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is being held for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is directed to implement this Decision and to
report to the Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.