In Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del
Castillo.
FACTS: On 28 April 2010, the decision of the
case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was
promulgated with Justice Mariano del Castillo as
its ponente.  Motion for reconsideration was filed
by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds
but most notably on the ground that not only did
the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3
books and articles in discussing the principles
of jus cogens  and erga omnes, but have also
twisted such quotations making it appear
contrary to the intent of the original works.  The
authors and their purportedly plagiarized articles
are: 1) Evan J Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens  published in
2009 in the Yale Journal of International Law; 2)
Christian J. Tams’ Enforcing Erga Omnes
Obligations in Internation Law published by the
Cambridge University Press in 2005; and 3)
Mark Ellis’ Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an
International Crime published in the Case
Western Reserve Journal of Internation Law in
2006.  Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism
by the Supreme Court spread over the media
and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief
Justice expressing discontent by the questioned
act of Justice del Castillo.
On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty
members gave their opinion on the matter of
plagiarism by issuing an article titled “Restoring
Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the
University of the Philippines College of Law on
the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed
overall 37 faculty members.   In said article, the
faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that
the court had the hopes of relief from those
“comfort women” during the war “crushed by a
singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the
Land.”  “…the adversarial nature of our legal system has
In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as
appropriation and misrepresentation of another
person’s work as one’s own, is considered as
“dishonesty, pure and simple.”  Hence, it was
argued that since the decision in the Vinuya
case form part of the Philippine judicial system,
the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be
promulgated.  Furthermore, the plagiarism and
misrepresentation in the Vinuya case
undermines the judicial system of our country
and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the
Supreme Court, the article sought for the
In response to the said article, the Court issued
a resolution stating that the remarks and choice
of words used were such a great insult to the
members of the Court and a threat to the
independence of the judiciary, a clear violation of
Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and
11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to
show cause on why they should not be
disciplined as members of the Bar for such
alleged violations.
In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the
signatories passed a Common Compliance
stating therein that their intention in issuing the
article in question “was not to malign the Court
but rather to defend its integrity and credibility
and to ensure continued confidence in the legal
system” by the words used therein as “focusing
on constructive action.”  Also, it was alleged that
the respondents are correct in seeking
responsibility from Justice del Castillo for he,
indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying
their issuance of the article.  Furthermore, the
respondents argued that the article in question is
a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as
citizens of a democracy, and an exercise of
academic freedom.
ISSUE: W/N the UP Law Faculty’s actions
constitute violation of various Canons and Rules
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD: Yes.  The Court ruled that the Common
Compliance given by the respondent-signatories
in the questioned article is not sufficient in
reasoning why they should not be disciplined as
members of the Bar.
tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the
interests of their clients.
“However, while a lawyer is entitled to present
his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive.
“On many occasions, the Court has reminded
members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to
the honor or reputation of a party or witness,
unless required by the justice of the cause with
which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession, a lawyer’s language even
in his pleadings must be dignified.
“Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of
certain portions of the Statement exceeded the
limits of fair comment and cannot be deemed as
protected free speech.”
“In a democracy, members of the legal
community are hardly expected to have
monolithic views on any subject, be it a legal,
political or social issue. Even as lawyers
passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of
conduct for the legal profession. This Court is
certainly not claiming that it should be shielded
from criticism. All the Court demands is the
same respect and courtesy that one lawyer
owes to another under established ethical
standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges,
court employees, professors or private
practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable
qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts.
There is no exemption from this sworn duty for
law professors, regardless of their status in the
academic community or the law school to which
they belong.”
The Court further reminded the respondent law
professors “of their lawyerly duty, under Canons
1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court
and to refrain from intemperate and offensive
language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the Court and
the administration of justice and warned that the
same or similar act in the future shall be dealt
with more severely.”
DISSENTING OPINION
Sereno, J.:
The Court’s act in directing the law professors to
furnish the Show Cause Resolution is like the
little boy who exclaimed that the emperor has no
clothes in the Danish story be made to explain
why he should not be punished for his keen
observation which is an act of prematurely
judging them guilty.  The Court’s act of labelling
Justice del Castillo’s act as not plagiarism is
what makes this contempt case grave.  It should
not be the place of the Court to seek revenge
against those who have the courage to say what
is wrong with it. 
The Resolution requiring the Show Cause
Resolution demonstrates nothing but an
abrasive flexing of the judicial muscle that could
hardly be characterized as judicious.  This knee-
jerk response from the Court stares back at its
own face, since this judicial act is the one that is
totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act
of misplaced vigilance.
Carpio, J.:
The Show Cause Resolution by the respondents
is sufficient and there is no need to admonish or
warn them of the use of disrespectful language.
The Court adheres to the clear and present
danger test and it appears that the evil
consequences of the statements are absent and
it does not exhibit that irrational obsession to
demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the
courts and their members.  There is only
contempt when the article is taken apart,
contrary to the practice of the Court which is to
read with contextual care making sure that
disparaging statements are not taken out of
context.
OCA v. Ladaga
FACTS: Atty. Ladaga, an RTC Branch Clerk of
Court, acted as pro bono counsel for a relative in
a criminal case, without the previous authority
from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as
required by the Administrative Code. An
administrative complaint was filed against Atty.
Ladaga for practicing law without permission
from the Department Head (CJ) as required by
law. Atty. Ladaga justified his appearance as he
merely gave a free legal assistance to a relative
and that he was on an approved leave of
absence during his appearances as such
counsel. Moreover, the presiding judge of the
court to which he is assigned knew his
appearances as counsel.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. Ladaga’s appearances as
a pro bono counsel for a relative constitutes
practice of law as prohibited by the
Administrative Code.
HELD: No. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of the statute should be customarily
or habitually holding one’s self to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. It does not pertain to isolated court
appearances as in this case. Nevertheless, for
his failure to obtain a prior permission from the
head of the Department (CJ) as required by law,
respondent was reprimanded.
Alawi v. Alauya
FACTS: Ashary Alauya transacted with Sophia
Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of
one housing unit from EB Villarosa & Partner
Co. Ltd., a real estate and housing company.
Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company
expressing his intent to render the contract void
ab initio.
Several correspondences ensued, all of which
were signed by Alauya as ATTY. ASHARY M.
ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar
and for that matter he is a counselor-at-law.
Alauya claims that he does not use the title of
counselor-at-law for fear of being mistaken as a
local legislator, i.e. councilor. Hence, he affixed
the title of attorney before his name.
Alawi filed a verified complaint against Alauya,
alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the
title of an attorney which is reserved only for the
members of the Philippine Bar.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alauya's membership in
the Sharia Bar endows him the title of an
attorney
HELD: No. Alauya is hereby reprimanded for
usurping the title of an attorney reserved for
those who, having obtained the necessary
degree in the study of law and had successfully
passed the bar examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and remain members thereof in good standing.
Persons who passed the Sharia Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Bar and may
only practice law before a Sharia Court,
Alauya's disinclination to use the title of
counselor-at-law does not warrant his use of the
title of an attorney.
People v. Tuanda
FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member
of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the
suspension from the practice of law imposed
upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals.
In 1983, Atty. Fe Tuanda received from one
Herminia A. Marquez several pieces
of jewelry with a total value of P36,000 for sale
on commission basis. In 1984, instead of
returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth
P26,250, she issued 3 checks. These checks
were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders
Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds.
Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor,
Tuanda made no effort to settle her obligation.
Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was
acquitted of estafa but was found guilty of
violation of BP 22 (The Anti-
Bouncing Check Law).
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court and imposed further suspension
against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the
ground that the offense involves moral turpitude.
Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court
for her suspension to be lifted arguing that her
suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the
fines imposed to her in violation of the
aforementioned law. Arguing further that she
intends no damage to the plaintiff-appellee
(Herminia A. Marquez) and she is not guilty of
the offense charged.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty.
Tuanda be lifted.
HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled
that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty
involved moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide
as follows:
  Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or practice of law until further orders from this
suspended by Supreme Court on what Court.
grounds.  A member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly
immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a
wilful disobedience of any lawful order of
a superior court, or for corruptly or
wilfully appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to
do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either
personally or through
paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Italics supplied)
 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the
Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. — The Court of Appeals or a
Court of First Instance may suspend an
attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last
preceding  section, and after such
suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in
the premises.
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude
relates to and affects the good moral character
of a person convicted of such offense. Herein,
BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense
which deleteriously affects public interest and
public order. The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check transcends the private interest
of parties directly involved in the transaction and
touches the interest of the community at large.
Putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the
public interest. The crimes of which respondent
was convicted also import deceit and violation of
her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was
bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY

the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
Respondent shall remain suspended from the