Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Introduction to Risk Management
Definitions
Risk Terminology
Risk Management Process
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Risk Assessment Planning
What is a risk assessment?
Why is risk assessment important?
How do you do a risk assessment?
When doing an assessment?
How are the hazards identified?
How do you rank or prioritize the risks?
Why it’s important to review and monitor your assessment?
Risk Analysis
Definition for Risk Level
Risk Criteria
Consequence Analysis
Probability Analysis
Risk Assessment Methodology
Quantitative
Qualitative
- Scenario Based Risk Assessment
- Task Risk Assessment (TRA)
Risk control
Risk Control Hierarchy
Action Plan Development and Implementation
Appendix A How to develop a risk assessment procedure
Appendix B “Control Measures Guidance”
Appendix C “Hazard and aspect Checklist”
Appendix D Risk assessment Matrix & risk assessment form
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Introduction to Risk Management
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Definitions
Hazard
A condition of the workplace or an equipment item, or method of carrying out an activity, which
has the potential to cause harm.
Hazard Effect
The consequences, which could result from a Hazard being realized.
Consequence (or severity) is the loss that can be inflicted if the hazard event occurs.
Consequence is a description of how bad and how severe the event might be. The process is
started by identifying hazards, then by evaluating the risks arising from those hazards and finally
by taking necessary measures to reduce the risks to persons to the lowest level that is reasonably
practicable (ALARP).
Probability
The likelihood of a Hazard being realized, based on the Frequency
Frequency
is the number of occurrences of an event per unit time.
Risk
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired event and
the potential adverse consequences which this event may have upon:
- People - injury or harm to physical or psychological health
- Assets (or revenue) - damage to property (assets) or loss of production
- Environment - water, air, soil, animals, plants and social
- Reputation - employees and third parties.
RISK = FREQUENCY X CONSEQUENCES
Where the:-
Likelihood is the description of how often an event will occur in terms of occasions per period of
time and is usually based on historical data and statistics.
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Competent Person
A person who, by reason of his training, knowledge, experience and judgement, is considered by
management to be capable of adequately assessing health and safety risks for the activity in
question.
Worker - anybody who is directly employed by your company or contractors (including sub-
contractors) working for EGPC Companies.
As Low As reasonably Practicable (ALARP), is determined when it can be shown that no more
measures can reasonably be taken in order to reduce the risks further.
ALARP- means to reduce a risk to a level which is ‘as low as reasonably practicable’ and
involves balancing reduction in risk against the time, trouble, difficulty and cost of achieving
it. This level represents the point, objectively assessed, at which the time, trouble, difficulty
and cost of further reduction measures become unreasonably disproportionate to the
additional risk reduction obtained.
Safety Measures
A precautionary measure which prevents or reduces a risk. Safety measures can be classified as
physical, procedural, human, time-related or contingency.
Contingency
A Safeguard, which is intended to control or mitigate a Hazard Effect.
Task
An individual work assignment carried out by one or more persons.
Significant
Indicates that a Hazard or a Risk is anything other than trivial. A significant risk is one which
requires some form of positive safeguard to eliminate it or reduce it to an acceptable level.
Risk Management is the systematic process of:
- Identifying potential hazardous events and their potential consequences (hazard analysis)
- Evaluating the risk potential of the hazardous event occurring (risk analysis)
- Managing the risk at an ALARP risk level, which may be achieved reducing the
probability of a hazardous event occurring or mitigating its potential consequences
- Reviewing the hazards and risks on a periodic basis.
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Risk Terminology
Risk Acceptance – decision to accept a risk (Note: risk acceptance depends on risk criteria)
Risk Analysis – systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk (Note:
risk analysis provides a basis for risk evaluation, risk treatment and risk acceptance)
Risk Criteria – terms of reference by which the significance of the risk is assessed.
Risk Transfer – sharing with another party the burden of loss or benefit of gain, for a risk.
Risk meaning
Acceptability of risk may differ for different people; the worker in industry may be prepared to
accept certain risks as part of their job; the home user may wish as low a risk as possible,
especially where children are concerned.
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Risk Management Process
Figure 1 highlights the stages to the Risk Management Process – planning, identification,
assessment, options evaluation, and implementation of an action plan. The overall purpose of any
risk assessment activity is to provide insight to decision-makers the magnitude of identified
hazards and to ensure the correct option is selected and implemented to reduce the risk. Following
the planning process, the activity of Risk Assessment has four major components.
Identification – “You can only manage what you know”. Prior to a successful assessment of
risk, the hazards must be identified. The main focus is to identify the threats to business
objectives of safety, health, and environment as well as impacts to personnel, public, and company
assets. Included in this activity is the assessment of the magnitude of the consequences of various
hazards. Determining the scale of the hazards (e.g. fires or explosions) occasionally requires
additional insight.
Assessment – “How bad is it?” To determine the magnitude of the risk, an assessment must be
made that accounts for the severity as well as the likelihood of the hazard. Several tools are used
to facilitate this process step. The Scenario-Based Risk Assessment is a powerful tool to represent
and communicate the risk to management and determine the utility of various options. While all
hazards should be identified, the risk assessment is only required where insight is required to
making a decision or the level of risks within a facility need to be communicated to management.
This is typically done by determining a risk level (Higher Risk, Medium Risk, Lower Risk) on the
company risk matrix.
Options Evaluation – “What can I do about it?” Evaluation of prevention and mitigation
measures available to mitigate the risk is an essential component of any risk management plan.
Comparing the current operation with industry standards or best practice operating procedures can
provide the correct level of insight into risk reduction. Occasionally, cost-benefit analysis and
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quantification of risk reduction may be necessary (e.g. in evaluating replacement of underground
storage tanks).
Development and Implementation of an Action Plan – To ensure risks are managed, the cost-
effective option should be implemented in a timely manner. This requires management
commitment and buy-in to the options evaluated and timeline for risk mitigation. In some cases,
the risk mitigation plan requires integration into the planning and budgeting cycles as some
mitigation measures require a timeline to complete.
Hazards range from chronic issues (e.g. slips, trips & falls) to more acute High Potential Hazards
(HPHs). It is important to distinguish with these process steps the difference between hazards and
risks. A Hazard has been defined as the ability to cause harm (regardless of the likelihood). In
contrast, risks are the magnitude of the hazard combined with the likelihood that the hazard will
be realized. Not all hazards pose a risk. The level of risk within the activity or operation is
dependent upon the amount of prevention and mitigation measures which exist. Therefore it is a
key to identifying the hazards prior assessing the risks to ensure the prevention and mitigation
measures are in place.
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ASSESSMENT
PLANNING
Planning
HAZARD
Identification IDENTIFICATION
CONSEQUENCE PROBABILITY
ANALYSIS ANALYSIS
RISK
Assessment DETERMINATION
RANK ALTERNATIVES
Options
Action Plan
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Introduction to Hazard Identification
Hazard Identification Methodology
Checklist Technique
What If Methodology
HAZOP study
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Job Safety Analysis
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Introduction to Hazard Identification
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Job Safety Analysis
Job Safety Analysis (JSA), also known as Safe Activity Worksheet (SAW) and Task Risk
Assessment (TRA) is a behavior based safety hazard identification tool. It is a systematic process
that can be used principally by operators and maintenance workers for identifying hazards
associated with each step of a job and determining measures for controlling or eliminating the
hazards identified. The JSA is performed by:
A JSA should be conducted by those conducting the activity (e.g. maintenance installing new
pump), including the supervisor and should be performed by a group. Where practical a Safety
representative may be involved. The work group supervisor is then responsible for ensuring the
JSA is completed, the work progresses as described and the output is documented.
The extent to which a JSA is conducted is determined based upon the needs of the business line;
however, JSAs should be conducted for the following activities:
non-routine jobs
permit-to-work jobs and activities
activities that are not covered by existing work procedures
jobs that have resulted in previous incidents or have a high risk potential
Jobs with unknown risk potential.
Approved JSA should be displayed at the site for personnel to refer to and validate pre-job
analyses have been conducted.
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4- Checklist Technique
The checklist technique involves a check for compliance with standard practices and documented
experience. The checklist technique generally provides the minimum acceptable level of analysis
for the comprehensive identification of hazards. A good checklist takes advantage of the
experience gained by the company and industry in design and operation. Many checklists are
available for checking compliance with standard procedures, recommended practices, industry and
company standards and regulatory requirements representing time-tested good practices.
One function of the checklist is to capture the knowledge and experience of skilled persons at the
time the checklist is developed. The checklist can then be applied by employees with relatively
less experience and knowledge to ensure the hazards of the facility are controlled. Facilitation of
a checklist based hazard identification study does not typically require any specialized facilitator
training however it does require the understanding of the company standards in relation to the
equipment under study. The primary weakness of the checklist techniques is that it requires that
the information on the subject matter is contained within the checklist. Thus the checklist
technique is not appropriate as the sole basis of review for new or novel designs, equipment not
covered by the checklist or complex facilities.
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Hazard Identification Cont……
- What If Methodology
The What-If Analysis provides a structured review through questions that propose deviations from
design or operational intent. When conducted by an experienced, disciplined team, it can provide a
thorough review of a process or operation with significantly less resource commitment than a
more formal traditional Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP). To apply the technique, the
facility is divided into manageable systems for study (e.g. tankage, pumping). For each of these
systems a series of “What-if” questions are proposed, such as:
What if the hose fails?
What if the tank leaks?
What if the meter fails or reports the incorrect flow?
What if a fire occurs in the building?
What if the vessel leaks / ruptures?
What if the truck overfills the tankage?
For each question, the team evaluates the potential causes, consequences, and existing safeguards.
It then makes recommendations
for improvement, where
necessary. While the evaluation
of each question is structured, the
development of the questions is
relatively unstructured. To meet
the description of an “acceptable
technique” described above, it is
essential that the team have a
higher level of experience to
Figure 2 – Example of What-If Hazard Identification Process
ensure the right questions are
asked. The “systematic” quality
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of the review can be enhanced through the use of checklists and documented experience to
develop questions. This more structured approach is called a “What-if/Checklist” review.
A strength of the What-if technique is its flexibility. It can be applied in any project development
stage, even before detailed design information exists. It can be applied in the concept phase to
evaluate concept hazards and risks with very little information available, and it can be applied in
the detailed design phase with equal analytical rigor as a traditional Hazard and Operability Study
(HAZOP). Its flexibility can be used by an experienced team to focus on problematic areas while
skipping those areas the team knows do not present hazards, thus increasing efficiency of the
review. Other strengths include its application to human factors and non-process related subject
matter. It also requires less facilitator training compared to some other methods.
However, its flexibility can also be its biggest weakness. Unlike a traditional HAZOP, the What-
if technique does not demand any given level of rigor in analysis or discipline on the part of the
team. Since the analysis depends on the questions asked, a What-if review is difficult to audit for
thoroughness. Also, since the technique relies on the experience of the team to ask appropriate
what-if questions, it is not always an appropriate technique for new equipment or processes with
which there is little previous experience.
Documenting these What-if sessions could be accomplished through the use of a simple Excel
spreadsheet or by specialized software.
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Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
The FMEA is a systematic method for examining the effects of component failures on equipment
related system performance. The technique requires a tabulation of system components
(hardware) within the scope of the study. Then for each component, the possible failure modes
are determined. An FMEA team:
FMEA strength is its strong focus on hardware. It is also a systematic process with little training
required on the methodology. It is easily audited and easily updated for design changes. Its
recommendations often result in improved hardware reliability. FMEA can be used in the design
phase to identify the need for additional protective systems or redundancy. It can be used during
operation to identify single failures that could result in significant accidents.
FMEA is limited in that certain types of failures, such as multiple or simultaneous equipment
failures and operator error are not addressed. Some potential concerns that would arise during
normal operation will not be explored. Missing equipment, i.e. equipment that should be present
but isn’t, may not be readily identifiable and so may be overlooked in the analysis.
Considering its strengths and weaknesses, FMEA is best applied in conjunction with or to follow
up on another form of hazard identification or for special investigations. For example, FMEA can
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be utilized effectively in specific components such as underground storage tanks to ensure the
proper protective systems are provided to adequately address each failure mode.
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Additional Considerations for Selecting a Hazard Identification Technique
For Team assessments such as the periodic review of a typical store or the special reviews, the
following guidelines are provided:
Sometimes, a hazard study will identify certain areas requiring more detailed review. In such
cases where a narrower scope has been defined, methods such as Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis can be effectively and efficiently applied.
For purposes of a project risk assessment plan, hazard identification methods should be selected to
best meet objectives given the amount of information available at a point in the project timeline.
For example, a simplified checklist can be used early in project development when little
information is available. Other methods such as the What-If checklist can be applied when more
information comes available.
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Risk Assessment Planning
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3.1 Risk Assessment
All company owned equipment or operations should be assessed for risk.. The base business
hazards are identified and should be assessed in all company operated sites by applying behavior
based safety systems. This document describes some of the tools and techniques to increase
hazard awareness.
For new projects, concepts of hazard awareness and behavior based safety should be integrated
into the project process.
As part of the ongoing management of risk it is useful to occasionally get the snapshot in time of
the risks at a given facility or operation. Therefore STANDARDS recommend each facility
conduct a survey on a periodic basis.
“A risk assessment is a process to identify potential hazards and analyze what could happen if a
hazard occurs. “
There are many “assets” at risk from hazards. First and foremost, injuries to people should be the
first consideration of the risk assessment. Hazard scenarios that could cause significant injuries
should be highlighted to ensure that appropriate emergency plans are in place. Many other
physical assets may be at risk. These include buildings, information technology, utility systems,
machinery, raw materials and finished goods. The potential for environmental impact should also
be considered. Consider the impact an incident could have on your relationships with customers,
the surrounding community and other stakeholders. Consider situations that would cause
customers to lose confidence in your organization and its products or services.
As you conduct the risk assessment, look for vulnerabilities—weaknesses—that would make an
asset more susceptible to damage from a hazard. Vulnerabilities include deficiencies in building
construction, process systems, security, protection systems and loss prevention programs. They
contribute to the severity of damage when an incident occurs. For example, a building without a
fire sprinkler system could burn to the ground while a building with a properly designed, installed
and maintained fire sprinkler system would suffer limited fire damage.
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The impacts from hazards can be reduced by investing in mitigation. If there is a potential for
significant impacts, then creating a mitigation strategy should be a high priority.
Identify hazards.
Analyze or evaluate the risk associated with that hazard.
Determine appropriate ways to eliminate or control the hazard.
In practical terms, a risk assessment is a thorough look at your workplace to identify those things,
situations, processes, etc that may cause harm, particularly to people. After identification is made,
you evaluate how likely and severe the risk is, and then decides what measures should be in place
to effectively prevent or control the harm from happening.
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Why is risk assessment important?
Risk assessments are very important as they form an integral part of a good occupational health
and safety management plan. They help to:
The aim of the risk assessment process is to remove a hazard or reduce the level of its risk by
adding precautions or control measures, as necessary. By doing so, you have created a safer and
healthier workplace.
Assessments should be done by a competent team of individuals who have a good working
knowledge of the workplace. Staff should be involved always include supervisors and workers
who work with the process under review as they are the most familiar with the operation.
Identify hazards.
Evaluate the likelihood of an injury or illness occurring, and its severity.
Consider normal operational situations as well as non-standard events such as
shutdowns, power outages, emergencies, etc.
Review all available health and safety information about the hazard such as
MSDSs, manufacturers’ literature, and information from reputable organizations,
results of testing, etc.
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Identify actions necessary to eliminate or control the risk.
Monitor and evaluate to confirm the risk is controlled.
Keep any documentation or records that may be necessary. Documentation may
include detailing the process used to assess the risk, outlining any evaluations, or
detailing how conclusions were made.
By determining the level of risk associated with the hazard, the employer and the joint health and
safety committee can decide whether a control program is required.
Overall, the goal is to find and record possible hazards that may be present in your workplace. As
mentioned, it may help to work as a team and include both people familiar with the work area, as
well as people who are not - this way you have both the "experienced" and "fresh" eye to conduct
the inspection.
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To be sure that all hazards are found:
Delivering product to Drivers work alone May be unable to call for help if
customers needed
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How do you know if the hazard is serious (poses a risk)?
Each hazard should be studied to determine its' level of risk.
To research the hazard, you can look at:
Remember to include factors that contribute to the level of risk such as the:
Ranking or prioritizing hazards is one way to help determine which hazard is the most serious and
thus which hazard to control first. Priority is usually established by taking into account the
employee exposure and the potential for accident, injury or illness. By assigning a priority to the
hazards, you are creating a ranking or an action list. The following factors play an important role:
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degree of harm likely to result from the exposure
probability of occurrence
There is no one simple or single way to determine the level of risk. Ranking hazards requires the
knowledge of the workplace activities, urgency of situations, and most importantly, objective
judgement.
Once you have established your top priorities, you can decide on ways to control each specific
hazard. Hazard control methods are often grouped into the following categories:
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Why is it important to review and monitor your assessment?
It is important to know if your risk assessment was complete and accurate. It is also essential to be
sure those changes in the workplace have not introduced new hazards or changed hazards that
were once ranked as lower priority to a higher priority.
It is good practice to review your assessment on a regular basis to be sure that nothing has
changed and that your control methods are effective. Triggers for a review can also include:
Keeping records of your assessment and any control actions taken is very important. You may be
required to store assessments for a specific number of years. Check for local requirements in your
jurisdiction.
The level of documentation or record keeping will depend on:
level of risk involved,
legislated requirements, and/or
Requirements of any management systems that may be in place.
Your records should show that you:
conducted a good hazard review,
determined the risks of those hazards,
implemented control measures suitable for the risk,
Reviewed and monitored all hazards in the workplace.
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Risk Analysis
Risk is defined as the magnitude of the hazard combined with the likelihood that it will occur.
For many activities, Hazard Identification may be sufficient to address the concerns at the facility.
The team may conclude that suitable prevention and mitigation measures are already in place or
may be developed to reduce the risk. Risk Assessments are typically performed to provide
additional insight by examining the hazard and takes into account the likelihood of an event
occurring.
Very low - These risks are considered acceptable. No further action is necessary other than to
ensure that the controls are maintained.
Low - No additional controls are required unless they can be implemented at very low cost (in
terms of time, money, and effort). Actions to further reduce these risks are assigned low priority.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that the controls are maintained.
Medium - Consideration should be as to whether the risks can be lowered, where applicable, to a
tolerable level and preferably to an acceptable level, but the costs of additional risk reduction
measures should be taken into account. The risk reduction measures should be implemented
within a defined time period. Arrangements should be made to ensure that controls are maintained,
particularly if the risk levels area associated with harmful consequences.
High - Substantial efforts should be made to reduce the risk. Risk reduction measures should be
implemented urgently within a defined time period and it might be necessary to consider
suspending or restricting the activity, or to apply interim risk control measures, until this has been
completed. Considerable resources might have to be allocated to additional control measures.
Arrangements should be made to ensure that controls are maintained, particularly if the risk levels
are associated with extremely harmful consequences and very harmful consequences.
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Very high - These risk are unacceptable. Substantial improvements in risk control measures are
necessary so that the risk is reduced to a tolerable or acceptable level. The work activity should be
halted until risk controls are implemented that reduces the risk so that it is no longer very high. If
it is not possible to reduce the risk, the work should remain prohibited.
Note: Where the risk is associated with extremely harmful consequences, further assessment is
necessary to increase confidence in the likelihood of harm.
The formal assessment of the risk would only be required for two reasons:
1. To help evaluate the effectiveness of additional risk reducing options being proposed
2. To help communicate the current status or noted concerns to management
Several tools have been developed to facilitate the appreciation of both the magnitude of the
hazard as well as the likelihood of incidents.
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Typically an event tree analysis consists of four steps:
1. Identify an initiating event of interest (e.g. loss of containment)
2. Identify the barriers in place to address such an event once it occurs, including potential
intermediate events or conditions, and physical circumstances
3. Construct the event tree
4. Describe the resulting incident scenarios and consequences
In Figure 3, the initiating event is tank overfill. The success or failure of the barriers (e.g.
operator intervention, firefighting) is depicted, as is other logical steps that are required to
generate the scenario (e.g. ignition, personnel in area). The likelihood of each of these
branches or steps can be estimated using historical information or personnel experience.
Incident information collected can be analyzed for historical company information. Industry
has developed several databases of failures and incidents that can be used.
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Risk Assessment Methodology
There are different risk assessment methods widely used in the Petro-chemical industry:
- Quantitative (QRA)
- Semi-qualitative
- Qualitative
Once the hazards have been identified utilizing tools noted above, a selection of issues should be
chosen by the team for further evaluation. A specific scenario is generated based upon the
existing conditions of the facility and what the team feels is a reasonable worst-case event taking
into account existing prevention and
mitigation measures. The likelihood is Figure 4- Risk Matrix
A B C D E
consequences (i.e. Health / Safety, Public I
Disruption, Environmental, Financial). II
The risk is then evaluated utilizing the
III
risk matrix (Figure 4).
IV
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Table 1 – Frequency Working Definitions
Category The company Definition
E Practically Impossible
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The Risk Matrix can be used at any time in both base business activities as well as more formal
exercises to help provide perspective to the issues of concern. Specifically, the Last Minute Risk
Assessment (behavior based safety tool) can be effective in ensuring the risks associated with the
task about to be completed have been contemplated.
Screening tools can provide insight by reducing the population of stores which require in-depth
review to a manageable level and would be preferred over the structured SBRA method which is
typically applied to specific facilities. The SBRA method is also applied to more complex
decisions as the team based approach can enhance objectivity and include decision-makers into
the process.
Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment should be part of Project Planning for new facility
capital expenditure. The focus should be on hazard identification, however difficult decisions may
require the insight of risk assessment, either through the matrix or other techniques. The detailed
procedure should be part of the project gating process and the assessment should include members
from operations, maintenance, and the construction contractor fabricating the equipment.
As part of the hazard identification and risk assessment process, safeguards are assessed for their
ability to reduce the risk. Checklists as well as more complex methods can be used to determine
the appropriate risk reduction. Principally, the risk reduction options should focus on the
following:
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Table 2 – Examples of Risk Reduction Measures
Prevention Mitigation
Occasionally, a clear cut decision to mitigate the risk is not readily apparent. These risks tend to
lie in the higher to medium range risk and prove difficult on consensus building. Evaluating the
project costs including capital and operational expenditure and then comparing it to the risk
reduction could provide enough insight into how to address the risk.
In performing cost benefit analysis, the benefit of the operation (in terms of revenue, etc) should
be compared with the costs which include capital and operational expense requirements as well as
all HSE risks. If necessary, several HSE risks can be quantified (e.g. environmental costs, public
disruption costs). The US government (office of Management and Budget) has utilized this
method in evaluating several EPA impact assessments and the methodology can be followed. A
health and safety risks may be quantified (in terms of potential for loss of life), implicit judgement
should be used when evaluating the benefits in financial terms.
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Module Six: Risk Reduction Options
Risk Control Hierarchy
Hierarchy of hazard control is a system used in industry to minimize or eliminate
exposure to hazards. It is a widely accepted system promoted by numerous safety
organizations. This concept is taught to managers in industry, to be promoted as
standard practice in the workplace. Various illustrations are used to depict this
system, most commonly a triangle.
The hazard controls in the hierarchy are, in order of decreasing effectiveness:
Elimination
Substitution
Isolation
Engineering controls
Administrative controls
Personal protective equipment
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Elimination
Physically removed the hazard is the most effective hazard control. For example, if
employees must work high above the ground, the hazard can be eliminated by
moving the piece they are working on to ground level to eliminate the need to work
at heights
Substitution
Substitution, the second most effective hazard control, involves replacing something
that produces a hazard (similar to elimination) with something that does not produce
a hazard—for example, replacing lead-based paint with titanium white. To be an
effective control, the new product must not produce another hazard. Because
airborne dust can be hazardous, if a product can be purchased with a larger particle
size, the smaller product may effectively be substituted with the larger product
Engineering controls
The third most effective means of controlling hazards is engineered controls. These
do not eliminate hazards, but rather isolate people from hazards. Capital costs of
engineered controls tend to be higher than less effective controls in the hierarchy,
however they may reduce future costs. For example, a crew might build a work
platform rather than purchase, replace, and maintain fall arrest equipment.
"Enclosure and isolation" creates a physical barrier between personnel and hazards,
such as using remotely controlled equipment. Fume hoods can remove airborne
contaminants as a means of engineered control.
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Administrative controls
Administrative controls are changes to the way people work. Examples of
administrative controls include procedure changes, employee training, and
installation of signs and warning labels (such as those in the Workplace Hazardous
Materials Information System). Administrative controls do not remove hazards, but
limit or prevent people's exposure to the hazards, such as completing road
construction at night when fewer people are driving
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Action Plan Development and Implementation
Upon review of risk assessments and evaluation of options, the most critical stage of
the risk management process is to implement the action plan. Depending upon the
nature of risks, the action plan may be as straightforward as implementing a
procedure or as complex as a large hardware modification. Regardless, each action
plan should have an owner, a deadline and a priority. Action plans may be
classified into capital expenditure, operational expenditure, long term or short term
to ensure the focus is correctly applied.
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Appendix A: How to develop a risk assessment procedure
1. Purpose
Risk assessment is a qualitative method of assessing the risks and environmental impacts
associated with a particular job, activity or task in order to identify the control and contingency
measures that should be taken to manage the risks .This procedure provides a framework for
conducting risk assessments. In this procedure, the emphasis is placed on the risks to people, the
approach can also be applied to the assessment and management of environmental, asset and other
risks associated with work activities with suitable modification of the judgment criteria.
2. Scope
This procedure is applicable to all company activities and processes.
3. Definitions
As Low As reasonably Achievable (ALARA): is determined when it can be shown that no more
measures can reasonably be taken in order to reduce the risks further.
A hazard and aspect: is an article substance or situation that has the potential to cause harm. This
can include materials, machines, and methods of work and other aspects of work organization
Aspects: is an element of an organization activities ,products that can interact the environmental .
A risk: is the Probability that the harm from a particular hazard and aspect will be realized. The
product of this probability and the severity of the outcome determine the magnitude of risk.
Risk = (Probability) X (Severity)
Probability: is the description of how often an event will occur in terms of occasions per period
of time and is usually based on historical data and statistics.
Severity: is a description of how bad and how severe the event might be.
4. Responsibilities
Managers & Section Heads are responsible for ensuring hazard and aspects are identified, the
associated risk assessed and suitable control measures implemented.
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5-1 Risk Assessment Process
The risk assessment process consists of five essential steps. Each step of the assessment process
should be completed before going onto the next.
Step 3 -Evaluate the risks arising from the hazard and aspects and decide whether existing
precautions are adequate or more should be done
Risks can be reduced by using the following :
Eliminate the hazard and aspect to remove the risk; e.g. use Explosion proof radios
instead of normal radios
Reduce or substitute the hazard and aspect with an alternative.
Isolate the hazard and aspect from people; e.g. fencing of excavations.
Control the hazard and aspect by introducing suitable measures; e.g. Permit-to-
Work system.
Personal protective equipment; e.g. use of safety harness when working at height.
Discipline - personal discipline which is competence based (e.g. well trained staff)
and organizational discipline which is rule based (e.g. adherence to work
procedures).
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Step 4 – Record
Record the findings, write down the more significant hazard and aspects e.g. above ground
power cables.
Step 5 - Monitor and Review
Review your assessment from time to time and revise if necessary. If there is any significant
change, you should add to the assessment to take account of the new hazard and aspects.
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Stage3: Identify Hazard and aspect Effects on People
Having identified the hazard and aspects, the next step is to identify the people who are at risk
from each hazard and aspect and its effect(s) on them. In most cases those affected will be the
persons involved in the tasks. In other cases it may be other personnel not directly involved with
the task e.g. cleaners, neighbors, visitors etc.
Stage 4: Estimate Consequence (Severity) Rating
The judgment about the consequence (severity) rating of the hazard and aspect, with or without
any control measures in place, should be entered on the Risk Assessment form as a number using
the following scale shown in Table 1 for Injury.
Hazard and aspect Outcome Rating
Description(Asset Consequence Image"Company
Injury
Damage) (Environmental Damage) Reputation"
Multiple Massive leak/spill. Major
Extensive damage. Shut- A problem take
fatalities. e.g. public concern. Major
down. Substantial loss of place on the 5
release of high clean up. e.g. well
plant .e .g. gas explosion. International News
toxic gas. blowout.
Single fatality
Massive leak/spill. Non-
or permanent Major damage. Partial
conformance with A problem take
disability. e.g. shutdown of part of plant
regulations. E.g. diesel place on the Local 4
release of or facility. e.g.
damped overboard supply News only
carcinogenic condensate fire.
vessel.
substance.
Major injury, Localized leak/spill. Non-
Lost time Localized damage. conformance with
A problem only
accident >3 Partial shutdown of part regulations. E.g.
may take place on 3
days. e.g. of plant or facility. e.g. discharge of process
the city News
falling from glycol blow-by. water into rain water
height. drain.
Minor/serious
Minor leak/spill. Public
injury. e.g. burn Minor damage. Parts A problem that
concern. No lasting
with caustic, replacement. e.g. pump other companies 2
effect. e.g. condensate
back or limb or compressor failure. know about it
leak from road tanker.
strain.
Slight damage to Slight leak. Spill A problem that the
Slight injury.
equipment. Minimal cost. minimal. Effect contained people inside the
First Aid Case. 1
No down-time. e.g. locally. e.g. leak from a company only
e.g. finger cut.
gasket failure. chemical drum. know about it
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The use of numbers for consequence rating from the above scale does not make the risk
assessment quantitative. The use of numbers from the scale, merely, provides a shorthand way of
recording the judgment of severity and their priority for control measures
The person(s) carrying out the risk assessment should not become too obsessed with the figures;
part of the purpose of the risk assessment is to identify the control measures that need to be
implemented and these figures are designed to assist with the prioritization of such measures. The
objective of this process is not to arrive at a certain number but to provide a systematic method of
ensuring that Severity "consequence" and Probability "likelihood" ratings are analyzed carefully
and a record made of the analysis for future reference and review
Stage 5): Estimate Probability Rating
The judgment regarding the likelihood of the hazard and aspect actually causing harm is more
difficult than deciding on the Severity of the hazard and aspect. Typical factors affecting the
analysis of probability are:-
a) The number of times the situation occurs;
b) Duration of exposure;
c) Quantities of materials involved;
d) Environmental conditions;
e) Competence of people involved;
f) Condition of equipment;
g) Lighting;
h) Distractions
The other important factors to take into account are the control measures already provided or to be
provided. In analyzing the likelihood of harm, the risk assessor(s) must take into account the
possibility of control measures not being implemented due to human error, lack of maintenance,
difficulty in compliance, complexity of instructions, etc
It is essential to discover how the task is actually carried out and base the assessment on this,
rather than assessing the probability "likelihood" on how the task is supposed to be carried out.
When all factors have been considered and a decision made on the probability "likelihood" of the
hazard and aspect actually causing harm, a number can be entered in the probability column on the
risk assessment form using the scale shown in Table 2.
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Table 2 - Probability Rating Guidance
Probability
Description
Rating
Certain or Imminent
Harm from a hazard and aspect is certain or imminent if no control measures
are provided at all and/or if one or more of the following factors also apply:-
a) the hazard and aspect is a cause of large numbers of injuries or ill
health in national or location statistics e.g. cholera epidemic;
5
b) people are exposed to the hazard and aspect continuously e.g. noise
level above 85 dB;
c) the hazard and aspect is difficult to see e.g. H2S gas;
d) safety is not considered high priority by those involved including
manager and supervisors. E.g. non adherence to PTW system.
Very Likely
Harm is very likely if the control measures provided depend on an individual
using them on every occasion (e.g. personal protective equipment, PTW 4
system) or if training and supervision are minimal, and/or if one or more of
the above factors are present.
Likely
Harm is likely if the control measures provided depend on an individual
using them or adjusting them on every occasion (e.g. portable gas detectors, 3
safe working procedures), or if training is provided and work supervised,
and/or if any of the factors given for certain or imminent harm also apply.
May Happen
Harm may happen if control measures include measures that do not depend
on the operator but can break down or be removed or defeated (e.g. pressure
safety valve), or if there is no defined system of maintenance or supervision 2
of the control measures. Other factors include hazard and aspects, which are
a significant cause of injury or ill health, or those to which a number of
people are often exposed.
Unlikely
The circumstances under which harm may happen will reduce to harm being
unlikely if there is a defined system of supervision and maintenance, or if
1
training is provided and repeated regularly. Other factors making harm
unlikely include hazard and aspects, which are a cause of few injuries or
cases of ill health, or those to which a few people are occasionally exposed.
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Risk Rating Without Any Control Measures
The next stage is to multiply the Severity number by the Probability number to arrive at a risk
rating (or ranking) for each hazard and aspect. This produces a number on a scale of 1 to 25.
This number should be entered in the Risk column on the Risk Assessment Form. The
numbers in the Risk column provide an indication of priority and of the extent of the risk
without any specific control measures.
Control Measures
The next step is to consider the preventative and/or protective control measures needed to
reduce or minimize the risk for each identified hazard and aspect. The preferred hierarchy for
the control measures should be as follows:-
a) Elimination or minimization of hazard and aspect;
b) Engineering design;
c) Suitable systems of working - procedures, competency, training etc.;
d) Provision of suitable personal protective equipment
The control measures may address the Severity "consequence", the probability "likelihood" or
both. The required control measures for each hazard and aspect should be recorded alongside
each hazard and aspect on the Risk Assessment Form. Appendix B provides guidance on the
type of control measures that can be employed for the various hazard and aspects.
Residual Risk
To assess the Residual Risk that remains with the control measures in place, the consequence
and likelihood ratings are again selected from the scales shown in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
The product of these two ratings provides a measure of the Residual Risk and completes the
risk analysis stage
The information provided in the Residual Risk box is used in the next stage of the Risk
Assessment to evaluate whether the risk is adequately controlled or not
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Stage 7 : Risk Evaluation
This is the final step in the risk assessment process and will require the assessor(s) to decide if the
hazard and aspects identified have been controlled to a suitable level. The risk analysis stage took
into account the control measures currently applied to the hazard and aspect and therefore, the
result of the analysis indicates the amount of risk that remains, or the residual risk. The system
used in this section will use this analysis to decide if the residual risk of each hazard and aspect
is:-
a) Low Risk
b) Medium Risk
c) High Risk
These results are recorded in the final column of the task risk assessment form.
Table 3 - The Severity/Probability Matrix shows the result of the risk analysis of severity and
probability and gives a rough guide to the size of the risk. The number in each box is the risk
rating number entered on the risk assessment form and arrived at by multiplying together the
severity and probability numbers .The higher the number the higher the risk. This will assist later
in deciding priorities for action and in deciding the authorization levels for the work
commensurate with the risk.
In general, high risks may require the provision of considerable additional resources involving
special equipment, training, high levels of supervision, and consideration of the most effective
methods of eliminating or controlling hazard and aspects. Lower level risks may be considered as
acceptable but actions should still be taken to try to reduce these risks further if possible within
reasonable limits.
Table 3 - Severity/Likelihood Matrix
Severity
Slight Major Injury Single Fatality/
Minor/Serious Multiple
Injury Lost Time > 3 Permanent
Injury Fatalities
First Aid days Disability
Probability 1 2 3 4 5
Certain 5 5 10 15 20 25
Very Likely 4 4 8 12 16 20
Likely 3 3 6 9 12 15
May
2 2 4 6 8 10
Happen
Unlikely 1 1 2 3 4 5
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1-8 Low Risk
No further improvements necessary provided control measures are maintained
9-12 Medium Risk
Further Risk Reduction Measures should be considered
13 – 25
High risk - Seek specialist advice/support.
5. Records
Department: ---------------------------------
Risk Assessment Total
Existing Required
Risk
Activities Hazards Severity Cautions cautions
P*S
Probability
People Assets Enviro Image
Severity = Chose the most higher number for (people, assets , Inviro ,Image) rating
Degrees for Severity & Probability
5= The worst case could be happened " For people is Death , for Assets is Great Damage ,
for Environment is great Pollution , For image is International effects"
4= less than worst case
3= Medium case
2= Low case
1= the lowest case
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Appendix B: Hazard and aspect Checklist
Hazard and aspect Checklist – 1
Hazard and aspects associated with plant (Including non-powered plant and hand tools)
Category Type of Harm Examples of Hazard and aspects
- Trapping:- Two moving parts or one moving part and a fixed
- Crushing surface
- Drawing-in Belt and drive
- Shearing Pulley
Hydraulic ram
"In-running nips"
Mangle
- Impact Something that may strike or stab someone or can
- Striking be struck against Moving vehicle/cart/trolley
- Stabbing Drill
- Puncturing Crane hook
- Contact Something sharp or with a rough surface
- Cutting Knife, chisel, saw, etc.
Mechanical
- Friction Blender blade
- Abrasion Circular saw blade
Sanding belt or Abrasive wheel
- Entanglement Rotating parts
Drill chuck and bit
Power take off shaft
Pipe threading machine
Abrasive wheel
- Ejection Work piece or part of tool
Cartridge tool (e.g. rivet gun, grease gun)
Mixing machine
Using hammer and chisel
Abrasive wheel
- Shock/Burn/ Electricity above 20 KV
Fire/Explosion Electricity - 20 KV
Electricity - 380 V
Electrical - Ignition sources Electricity under 380 V
Extra low volt electricity
Static
Batteries
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- Release of energy Compressed gas (e.g. air, bottled gas)
- Explosion Process streams (e.g. Propylene gas, Hydrogen Gas
- Injection ,condensate,)
Pressure - Implosion Utility streams (e.g. Hydrogen , heating medium)
Boiler
Vacuum
Hydraulic system
- Burns Hot / cold surface
- Fires Blow lamp
Thermal - Scalds Welding flame/arc
- Frostbite Refrigerant
Steam
Ionizing X Rays
- Burns Alpha or Beta Rays
- Cancers Naturally occurring radioactive material
- Blood disorders LSA
- Sickness Neutrons
Non-ionizing Micro wave
Radiation
- Burns Radio frequency
- Melanomas Laser
- Cataracts Ultra violet
- Static shock Infra red
- Induced body Electromagnetic (transformers, power cables)
currents
- Hearing loss Machine tools/equipment
Noise - Deafness Hand tools
- Tinnitus Pneumatic tools/equipment
- Vibration white Pneumatic drill
finger Operation of machinery
- Whole body
Vibration
effects
- Circulatory
disorders
Crushing Crane overload
Chain sling
Overload/defective due
Eye bolt overload
to mechanical failure
Scaffold overload
Lifeboat pendant
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Hazard and aspects associated with materials and substances
Category Type of Harm Examples of Hazard and aspects
Fire/Explosion Burns Timber stack (e.g. scaffold board store)
Combustion Paper store
Grease
Oily rags
Plastic foam
Burns Hydrocarbon gases, condensate, oils
Bottled hydrocarbon gases (e.g. acetylene)
Lubricants
Diesel
Flammable substances
Methanol
Paint/thinners/solvents
Hydrogen (e.g. battery room)
Aromatic hydrocarbons (benzene, toluene , etc)
Burns Explosive material
Oxidizing Substances Pyrotechnics (e.g. lifeboat flares)
Detonators
Acute :- Hydrogen Sulphide
- respiratory Benzene
irritation Methanol
- chemical Sulphuric Acid
asphyxiation Corrosion Inhibitors
Health Hazard and - nervous system Dust
aspects Toxic Material effects Paints
- narcotic effects Degreasing Solvents
- damage to eye Anaerobic sealants
- Chronic :- Primers
- Anemia
- Leukemia
Acute :- Sulphuric acid
- skin, eye, Caustic soda
respiratory Hydrochloric acid
Corrosive Material irritation Bleaches
- burns
- ulceration
- tissue destruction
Acute :- Man-made mineral fiber
- skin, eye and Sodium hypochlorite
Irritant Material
respiratory irritant
- dermatitis
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Category Type of Harm Examples of Hazard and aspects
Possible Carcinogens Chronic : Asbestos
- skin, lung cancers Polyromantic hydrocarbons
- asbestosis, Used engine oil
mesothelioma
- dermatitis
Asphyxiants Acute and chronic Nitrogen
effects on health Carbon dioxide
Argon
Contact Cuts, abrasions Rough timber
Burns, frostbite Concrete blocks
Molten polymer
Liquefied Gases
Frozen food
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Hazard and aspect Checklist – 3
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Hazard and aspect Checklist – 4
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Hazard and aspect Checklist – 5
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Hazard and aspect Checklist – 7
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Appendix C: Control Measures Guidance
Contents
1.Health Hazard and aspect
2.Falling/Swinging/Dropping
3.Electricity
4.Vibration/Noise
5.Emergency
6.Equipment Failure
7.Machinery/Equipment
8.Explosion
9.Fire
10. Human Error
11. Entry into Confined Space
12. Pressure
13. Ionizing Radiation
14. Slip/Trip/Fall
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2. Control Measures for Falling/Swinging/Dropping Loads
1) Additional Suspension/Support Devices
2) Adequate Lighting
3) Bumper Protection
4) Competent Lifting Operation
5) Competent Rigging
6) Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)
7) Fall Restraint Device
8) Load Monitoring
9) Maintenance Programs
10) Movement Restraint Device
11) Overhead Protection
12) Overload Warning System
13) Periodic Examination/Testing/Inspection
14) General Issue Personal Protective Equipment
15) Restricted Access to Safe Distances
16) Safety Watch
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4. Control Measures for Vibration/Noise
1) Design Out Noise from Equipment
2) Design Out Noise from Task
3) Detailed Noise Assessment
4) Enclose Noisy Equipment
5) Engineering Controls
6) Hearing Protection Zone
7) Noise Exposure Monitoring
8) Noise Survey
9) Restricted Access to Noisy Areas
10) Selection and use of Appropriate Hearing Protectors
11) Warning Signs
12) Work Patterns e.g.: Defined Spells of Exposure
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8) Warning Signs/Notices
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8) Adequate Supervision
9) Adequate Training
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14. Control Measures for Slip/Trip/Fall
1) Adequate Lighting
2) Appropriate Footwear
3) Openings Covered
4) Edge Protection/Rails/Barriers
5) Fixed Platform/Ladder
6) Good Housekeeping
7) Harness, Line and Attachment
8) Non-slip Surface
9) Periodic Cleaning
10) Periodic Inspection
11) General Issue Personal Protective Equipment
12) Warning Notices
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Appendix D: Risk assessment Matrix & risk assessment form
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CASE STUDY
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Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment
1- Define Hazard Assessment/Management Systems
Risk management can only be achieved via management of known and potential hazards and
this requires the definition of a Hazard Assessment/Management System. The Companies
HSEMS Guideline (risk management) requires that the Companies have programs and procedures
(e.g. management systems) which:
- identify hazardous activities, the potential hazardous event, and consequences
- assess and prioritise risks in cost effective manner
- ensure that design of new facilities incorporates HSE reviews
- ensure that acquisitions and asset disposal are evaluated for HSE risks
- ensure that HSE hazards from equipment and facility decommissioning are managed.
It is vital that the programs and procedures which are developed are assessed versus
risks, which are identified and managed.
Continuous improvement is the key to future HSE Performance. With reference to figure 1,
management of hazards is a 4 step closed loop continuous process:
2- Identification of Hazards
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Examples of hazard identification techniques include HSE audits, HSE inspections, peer
reviews, safe job reviews, task analysis, HAZOPs, HSEIAs, PHSERs, FMEAs, model
reviews, P&ID Reviews, accident/incident & near miss reporting. Failures of software and
hardware systems as well as incidents of human error should be considered in the
identification of hazards.
3- Evaluate (Analyze & Assess) Hazards
All identified hazards should be subject to an evaluation for risk potential. This means
analysing the hazard for its probability to actually progress to a loss event, as well as the
likely consequences of this event. There are 3 risk assessment methods widely used in the
Petro-chemical industry:
- Quantitative (QRA)
- Semi-qualitative
- Qualitative
- Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
QRA uses historical/statistical and failure data along with computer generated
consequence modelling to generate ‘people’ risk data. From QRAs one will get
individual risk (IR), public risk and/or societal risk (SR).
HSE risk assessment is required for new projects, in which the complexity and size of the project
will dictate the complexity of the assessment methodology. QRA should be considered as a single
component rather than as a replacement of the complex risk management framework.
- Semi -quantitative Risk Assessment
The semi-quantitative approach depends on a select team of experienced personnel
who have access to accident, historical and failure data to make “professional”
probability decisions. Semi-quantitative assessments might determine consequences
based upon in-house modelling or use of hazard impact tables such as depicted in
Figure 2. The probability categories relate to the theoretically calculated chance of
major incidents happening. They do not relate to actual events as experienced on
specific plants, locations or companies.
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The risk matrix is divided into three risk categories as defined below:
High Risk Unacceptably high
This level of risk exposes the Company to intolerable losses to People, Assets,
Environment or Reputation. The hazard should be eliminated or its risk reduced
to tolerable levels immediately.
ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY TO LOWER THE RISK.
Medium Risk Acceptable but must be managed at ALARP
The hazard(s) must be managed to reduce the frequency and/or the severity of the
hazardous events to ALARP.
RISK REDUCTION MEASURES MUST BE PLANNED AND DOCUMENTED.
Low Risk Acceptable without required further action.
Correction(s) may be applied as resources allow.
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Qualitative Risk Assessment
The qualitative approach also uses a risk potential matrix as a guide in determining
risk potential. The matrix as depicted in Figure 3 facilitates quick reference and
assignment of risk levels for each of the three risk categories (High, Medium, Low).
Thus hazards identified during audits, inspections, reviews, accident/incident
Investigation, qualitative risk assessment etc. may be assessed using this matrix.
When assessing risks associated with the consequences of an ‘incident’ such as a fire,
Explosion, oil spills, acute illnesses or fatality then the risk is ‘acute’ or ‘incidental’.
Plotting these risks on the Risk Matrix is relatively simple. There are also risks of a
long term nature relating to environmental discharges and emissions or exposure to
health hazards. These ‘chronic’ or ‘routine’ risks are the ones where the pre-defined
limits are exceeded over time, and can also be plotted on the Risk Matrix. The Risk
Matrix may also be used on a scenario by scenario basis to prioritise risk reduction
efforts. It is adaptable to varying levels of information and depths of evaluation
By adopting the qualitative Risk Matrix approach, a company will adopt transparent
risk tolerability criteria. It brings transparency into the evaluation, using the
experience and consensus of the risk assessment team, and thus an understanding of
the risk can be reached fairly easily. Company management can determine whether
the risk levels inherent in the company’s operations are tolerable and whether they fit
with current corporate policies and objectives.
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Manage the risk to acceptable level
After the risk has been identified and analysed as per above, management decides what corrective
action is necessary to manage the hazard at an acceptable and ALARP risk level.
Depending on the nature of the specific hazard(s), this may require different steps to:
Prevent the hazards from occurring (eliminate) or to reduce the likelihood of the
incidents;
Mitigate the consequences of the hazards which are inherent to the type of
operation or working environment and which cannot be prevented altogether and
have a chronic likelihood to develop into incidents with harmful consequences.
Recover from the consequences of incidents. Recovery measures should be
developed for all foreseeable emergencies with the aim to prevent escalation e.g.
from critical into severe or worse severities.
If the risk is low, no action may be required. Medium and high risks require that
Management formulates a corrective action plan, which should include:
Agreed actions, responsible person(s), and completion date(s).
In formulating these plans, it is important to realize that risk management
measures include organizational and system measures, such as:
- Personnel training and qualification procedures
- Change control and documentation procedures
- Quality assurance, maintenance and inspection procedures
- Periodic personnel medical check-ups and prophylactic medical treatments such
as vaccination/immunization)
Follow up that includes regular updates for progress to ensure actions are closed
per the plan.
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Demonstrating ALARP
In all cases consideration should be given to reducing risk to a level deemed ALARP
reflecting among other factors local conditions and circumstances, the balance of cost
and benefits and the current state of scientific and technical knowledge. To reduce a
risk to an ALARP level involves balancing reduction in risk to a level, objectively
assessed, where the trouble, difficulty and cost of further reduction measures becomes
unreasonably disproportionate to the additional risk reduction obtained, as illustrated
in Figure 4.
Demonstrating ALARP requires consideration of all the hard and soft issues related
to a range of options. It requires a judgmental decision at the right level in the
organization with the full knowledge of all options, associated risks and costs.
Specifically in the context of project engineering, ALARP is not just a demonstration
that risks of the preferred or selected option are acceptable and/or comparable to
other similar developments. Demonstrating ALARP requires consideration of
fundamentally different options to provide assurance that the company gets best value
for money over the lifetime of a facility or operation.
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In defining ALARP risk reduction measures, the potential for changes in risk tolerability criteria
with time should be borne in mind for those projects or operations with a considerable life span.
Rather than applying fit-for-purpose now, the contingency should be built-in which allows for
seamless ALARP upgrade without costly retrofits. What is considered ALARP today may no
longer be acceptable in the future, for example:
the applicable legislation may change,
public awareness may increase and/or tolerance may decrease,
The company’s own HSE objectives may become more stringent.
Determining the exact level of ALARP is difficult and depends on many factors such as
internal/external influences and the nature of the hazards and associated risks.
One may arrive at different ALARP definitions for identical hazards/risks which occur at different
locations. As such it is critically important to fully understand the effects of risk reduction
measures, specifically for those risks which require multiple measures to achieve ALARP. The
effects of the individual measures should be fully explored with a view to avoiding potential
clashes and/or overlaps. Every effort should be made to ‘design out’ rather than add on mitigation
controls/measures. In the various attempts to achieve ALARP one should be cautions and not
over-complicate:
equipment and process control/shutdown system designs,
procedures for systems and processes, and
Personnel training and qualification criteria.
Specifically for projects, ALARP should be pursued with risk reduction measures that
have obvious, clear and measurable effects on the estimated risk level. Application of these
measures may initially appear expensive but should have preference over combinations or
multitudes of measures which, albeit easier and at less cost from a project perspective, have
obscure effects or require significant operations/maintenance effort in the medium/long term.
In addition to the long term cost liability, there is the danger that some of these overlapping
measures become neglected with time and possibly excessive reliance is put on what are deemed
to be the key risk reduction measures.
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Where quantitative risk assessment is used, then the costs of the various options can be compared
with the respective risks and ALARP illustrated in a graph similar to figure 4 above.
In qualitative analysis, ALARP is established using standards, legislative requirements and
judgement based on experience. Regardless of the risk assessment methodology used, it still needs
to be demonstrated, at a reasonable cost, that risks are ALARP from all points of view.
RISK TOLERABILITY
Introduction
The assessment and control of risk are essential requirements for a proactive HSE management
system. In order to make a value judgement and to decide on what risks are acceptable, an easily
understood set of criteria should be set and followed rigorously. Risk criteria are required to
promote consistency in evaluating the results of relevant studies and to formulate a proactive
approach to incident prevention. This document sets out the basis for selecting the risk acceptance
criteria and explains some of the techniques used to arrive.
The Framework for Risk Criteria
The two diagrams below are intended to guide ADNOC and Group Companies in decision
making in response to recommendations and feed-back from QRA and HSEIA reports.
Individual Risk Criteria (IR)
Ideally, there is a need to determine the limits for IR, based on numeric values (based on
QRA studies and HSEIAs) which would be regarded as intolerable. Figure 5 shows the
principle of this framework.
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The ALARP principle which underlines the regulation of risk depicts three particular regions viz.:
the unacceptable region, the ALARP region and the broadly acceptable region.
At the top of the triangle is the unacceptable level, on or above which the risk is so great or the
outcome so unacceptable that it must be refused altogether. At the other extreme is the broadly
acceptable region, where there is no requirement to undertake additional HSE measures, i.e. the
risk is, or has been made, so small that no further precaution is necessary. In between lies a wide
range of risk levels to which the ALARP principle applies, i.e. the risk must be reduced to the
lowest level practicable, bearing in mind the benefits flowing from its acceptance and taking
account of the costs of any further reduction. Thus for the risks which fall within the ALARP
region, some weighing of costs and benefits is necessary to determine compliance with the
ALARP principle.
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Societal Risk Criteria
The ALARP principle applies in the same way for societal risk as for Individual Risk
(Figure 5). Societal risk tolerability would be utilized in reporting QRA results.
Societal risk should not be confused as being the risk to society or the risk as being perceived by
society. The word “societal” is merely used to indicate a group of people and societal risk refers to
the frequency of multiple fatality incidents, which includes workers and the public.
Factors affecting the risk criteria
The risk criteria for numerical risk levels is generally based on risk comparisons. However, there
are some factors which need to be considered in order to ensure that the proposed risk criteria
reflects adequately the nature and risk levels for activities/processes used at work site.
These factors include the following:
i) Risks which may be tolerable for workers in a hazardous industry are not necessarily
tolerable for a member of the public who may be exposed to the work activity hazards.
ii) Risk criteria selected by different industries are not necessarily the same. Risk criteria
adopted by different countries may also not be the same.
iii) The concept of ALARP is based on cost - benefit assessment and requires explicit
valuation of a life. Refer to section 5.0.
iv) The QRA criteria for risk relates to Individual Risks to workers (and the public) as
well as to societal risks as a result of fatal accidents. Injuries and/or ill health are not
included in this method of risk assessment.
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