G.R. No.
171631               November 15, 2010 notorious possession and occupation of the land in question for a period of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ARSENIO R. DELA PAZ, JOSE R. DELA PAZ, and
GLICERIO R. DELA PAZ, represented by JOSE R. DELA PAZ, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, which affirmed the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC
Case No. N-11514, granting respondents’ application for registration and
confirmation of title over a parcel of land located in Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila.
The factual milieu of this case is as follows:
On November 13, 2003, respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela Paz,
Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, represented by Jose R. dela Paz
(Jose), filed with the RTC of Pasig City an application for registration of
land3 under Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) otherwise known as the
Property Registration Decree. The application covered a parcel of land with
an area of 25,825 square meters, situated at Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro
Manila, described under survey Plan Ccn-00-000084, (Conversion
Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234, MCADM 590-D, Taguig
Cadastral Mapping). Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following documents: (1) Special power of
attorney showing that the respondents authorized Jose dela Paz to file the
application; (2) Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 and 3234,
MCADM 590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping (Ccn-00-000084) with the
annotation that the survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B
classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development,
Quezon City on January 03, 1968; (3) Technical Descriptions of Ccn-00-
000084; (4) Geodetic Engineer's Certificate; (5) Tax Declaration No. FL-018-
01466; (6) Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob dated June 18, 1987; (7) Sinumpaang
Pahayag sa Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pagaari ng Namatay dated March 10,
1979; (8) Certification that the subject lots are not covered by any land
patent or any public land appilcation; and (9) Certification by the Office of the
Treasurer, Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila, that the tax on the real
property for the year 2003 has been paid.
Respondents alleged that they acquired the subject property, which is an
agricultural land, by virtue of Salaysay ng Pagkakaloob 4 dated June 18, 1987,
executed by their parents Zosimo dela Paz and Ester dela Paz (Zosimo and
Ester), who earlier acquired the said property from their deceased parent
Alejandro dela Paz (Alejandro) by virtue of a "Sinumpaang Pahayag sa
Paglilipat sa Sarili ng mga Pag-aari ng Namatay 5 dated March 10, 1979. In
their application, respondents claimed that they are co-owners of the subject
parcel of land and they have been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public,
adverse possession of the same, in the concept of owner since they acquired
it in 1987. Respondents further averred that by way of tacking of possession,
they, through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, public,
adverse, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of the same, in the
concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, or for a period of more than
fifty (50) years since the filing of the application of registration with the trial
court. They maintained that the subject property is classified as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain.
The case was set for initial hearing on April 30, 2004. On said date,
respondents presented documentary evidence to prove compliance with the
jurisdictional requirements of the law.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the application for registration on the
following grounds, among others: (1) that neither the applicants nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
not less than thirty (30) years; (2) that the muniments of title, and/or the tax
declarations and tax payments receipts of applicants, if any, attached to or
alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the land applied for; and (3) that the
parcel of land applied for is a portion of public domain belonging to the
Republic not subject to private appropriation. Except for the Republic, there
was no other oppositor to the application.
On May 5, 2004, the trial court issued an Order of General Default6 against
the whole world except as against the Republic. Thereafter, respondents
presented their evidence in support of their application.
In its Decision dated November 17, 2004, the RTC granted respondents'
application for registration of the subject property. The dispositive portion of
the decision states:
WHEREFORE, affirming the order of general default hereto entered,
judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING and CONFIRMING the title of
AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, Arsenio R. dela Paz, Jose R. dela Paz and Glicerio R.
dela Paz, all married and residents of and with postal address at No. 65
Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, over a parcel of land described and
bounded under Plan Ccn-00-000084 (consolidation of Lots No. 3212 and
3234, Mcadm-590-D, Taguig, Cadastral Mapping, containing Twenty-Five
Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty-Five (25,825) Square Meters, more or less,
situated at Barangay Ibayo, Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, under the
operation of P.D. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree.
After the decision shall have been become final and executory and, upon
payment of all taxes and other charges due on the land, the order for the
issuance of a decree of registration shall be accordingly undertaken.
SO ORDERED.7
Aggrieved by the Decision, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal.8 The CA, in its
Decision dated February 15, 2006, dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The CA ruled that respondents were able to show that
they have been in continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession of
the subject property through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest.
The CA found that respondents acquired the subject land from their
predecessors-in-interest, who have been in actual, continuous,
uninterrupted, public and adverse possession in the concept of an owner
since time immemorial. The CA, likewise, held that respondents were able to
present sufficient evidence to establish that the subject property is part of
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Hence, the instant
petition raising the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
GRANTING RESPONDENTS' APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT CONSIDERING THAT THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD FAILED TO
ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT LOT IN THE
CONCEPT OF AN OWNER.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE REGISTRATION OF THE
SUBJECT LOT IN RESPONDENTS' NAME CONSIDERING THAT NO EVIDENCE
WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT THE SAME IS WITHIN THE
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE AREA OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN.9
In its Memorandum, petitioner claims that the CA's findings that respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, uninterrupted, public,
and adverse possession in the concept of owners, for more than fifty years or
even before June 12, 1945, was unsubstantiated. Respondents failed to show
actual or constructive possession and occupation over the subject land in the
concept of an owner. Respondents also failed to establish that the subject
property is within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
The subject property remained to be owned by the State under the Regalian
Doctrine.
In their Memorandum, respondents alleged that they were able to present
evidence of specific acts of ownership showing open, notorious, continuous
and adverse possession and occupation in the concept of an owner of the
subject land. To prove their continuous and uninterrupted possession of the
subject land, they presented several tax declarations, dated 1949, 1966,
1974, 1979, 1980, 1985, 1991, 1994 and 2000, issued in the name of their
predecessors-in-interest. In addition, respondents presented a tax clearance
issued by the Treasurer's Office of the City of Taguig to show that they are up
to date in their payment of real property taxes. Respondents maintain that
the annotations appearing on the survey plan of the subject land serves as
sufficient proof that the land is within the alienable and disposable portion of
the public domain. Finally, respondents assert that the issues raised by the
petitioner are questions of fact which the Court should not consider in a
petition for review under Rule 45.
The petition is meritorious.
In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless
the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.10 It
is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again,
unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally
devoid of support or are glaringly erroneous as to constitute palpable error
or grave abuse of discretion.11
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA
that the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the
public domain.
Section 14 (1) of PD 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration
Decree provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership from June 12, 1945 or
earlier.12 These the respondents must prove by no less than clear, positive
and convincing evidence.13
Under the Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all lands
of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of any asserted
right to any ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public
lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land, or alienated to a private person by the State, remain part of
the inalienable public domain.14 The burden of proof in overcoming the
presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove
that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To
overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established
that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.15
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for
registration is alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-
00008416 (Conversion Consolidated plan of Lot Nos. 3212 & 3234, MCADM
590-D, Taguig Cadastral Mapping) prepared by Geodetic Engineer Arnaldo C.
Torres with the following annotation:
This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623 Proj. No. 27-B clasified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development, Quezon City on
Jan. 03, 1968.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced.
In Republic v. Sarmiento,17 the Court ruled that the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer on the blue print copy of the conversion and subdivision
plan approved by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Center, that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area,
Project No. 27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the
Bureau of Forestry," is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible
evidence to overcome the presumption that the land remains part of the
inalienable public domain.
Further, in Republic v. Tri-plus Corporation,18 the Court held that:
In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject
lands as required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating
in effect that the said properties are alienable and disposable. However, this
is hardly the kind of proof required by law. To prove that the land subject of
an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the
existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation
reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The
applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands
applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the
Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management
Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness
of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with
the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to
submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the
lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable.
Furthermore, in Republic of the Philippines v. Rosila Roche,19 the Court held
that the applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind
of proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the
alienable and disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification
from the proper government agency to establish that the subject land are
part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. In the
absence of incontrovertible evidence to prove that the subject property is
already classified as alienable and disposable, we must consider the same as
still inalienable public domain.20
Anent respondents’ possession and occupation of the subject property, a
reading of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject
land since June 12, 1945 or earlier.1avvphil
The evidence submitted by respondents to prove their possession and
occupation over the subject property consists of the testimonies of Jose and
Amado Geronimo (Amado), the tenant of the adjacent lot. However, their
testimonies failed to establish respondents’ predecessors-in-interest'
possession and occupation of subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Jose, who was born on March 19, 1939,21 testified that since he attained the
age of reason he already knew that the land subject of this case belonged to
them.22 Amado testified that he was a tenant of the land adjacent to the
subject property since 1950,23 and on about the same year, he knew that the
respondents were occupying the subject land.24

Jose and Amado's testimonies consist merely of general statements with no

specific details as to when respondents' predecessors-in-interest began
actual occupancy of the land subject of this case. While Jose testified that the
subject land was previously owned by their parents Zosimo and Ester, who
earlier inherited the property from their parent Alejandro, no clear evidence
was presented to show Alejandro's mode of acquisition of ownership and
that he had been in possession of the same on or before June 12, 1945, the
period of possession required by law. It is a rule that general statements that
are mere conclusions of law and not factual proof of possession are
unavailing and cannot suffice.25 An applicant in a land registration case
cannot just harp on mere conclusions of law to embellish the application but
must impress thereto the facts and circumstances evidencing the alleged
ownership and possession of the land.26

Respondents’ earliest evidence can be traced back to a tax declaration issued

in the name of their predecessors-in-interest only in the year 1949. At best,
respondents can only prove possession since said date. What is required is
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession by respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest, under a bona fide claim of ownership, since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.27 Respondents failed to explain why, despite their
claim that their predecessors-in interest have possessed the subject
properties in the concept of an owner even before June 12, 1945, it was only
in 1949 that their predecessors-in-interest started to declare the same for
purposes of taxation. Well settled is the rule that tax declarations and
receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership or of the right to possess
land when not supported by any other evidence. The fact that the disputed
property may have been declared for taxation purposes in the names of the
applicants for registration or of their predecessors-in-interest does not
necessarily prove ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of
ownership.28

The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear

picture that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land, under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Evidently, since respondents failed to prove that (1) the subject property was
classified as part of the disposable and alienable land of the public domain;
and (2) they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation thereof
under a bonafide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their
application for confirmation and registration of the subject property under
PD 1529 should be denied.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals

dated February 15, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 84206, affirming the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 167, in LRC Case No. N-11514,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application for registration and
confirmation of title filed by respondents Avelino R. dela Paz, Arsenio R. dela
Paz, Jose R. dela Paz, and Glicerio R. dela Paz, as represented by Jose R. dela
Paz, over a parcel of land, with a total area of twenty-five thousand eight
hundred twenty-five (25,825) square meters situated at Barangay Ibayo,
Napindan, Taguig, Metro Manila, is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 108998 August 24, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES MARIO B. LAPIÑA AND FLOR DE
VEGA, respondents.
Byron V. Belarmino and Juan B. Belarmino for private respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
Can a foreign national apply for registration of title over a parcel of land
which he acquired by purchase while still a citizen of the Philippines, from a
vendor who has complied with the requirements for registration under the
Public Land Act (CA 141)?
The Republic would have us rule on the negative and asks this Court to nullify
the decision of the appellate court which affirmed the judgment of the
court a quo in granting the application of respondent spouses for
registration over the lots in question.
On June 17, 1978, respondent spouses bought Lots 347 and 348, Cad. s38-D,
as their residence with a total area of 91.77 sq. m. situated in San Pablo City,
from one Cristeta Dazo Belen (Rollo, p. 41). At the time of the purchase,
respondent spouses where then natural-born Filipino citizens.
On February 5, 1987, the spouses filed an application for registration of title
of the two (2) parcels of land before the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo
City, Branch XXXI. This time, however, they were no longer Filipino citizens
and have opted to embrace Canadian citizenship through naturalization.
An opposition was filed by the Republic and after the parties have presented
their respective evidence, the court a quo rendered a decision confirming
private respondents' title to the lots in question, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby approves the said
application and confirms the title and possession of herein applicants over
Lots 347 and 348, Ap-04-003755 in the names of spouses Mario B. Lapiña
and Flor de Vega, all of legal age, Filipino citizens by birth but now Canadian
citizens by naturalization and residing at 14 A. Mabini Street, San Pablo City
and/or 201-1170-124 Street, Edmonton, Alberta T5M-OK9, Canada.
Once this Decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued. In the certificate of title to be issued, there shall be
annotated an easement of .265 meters road right-of-way.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 25)
On appeal, respondent court affirmed the decision of the trial court based on
the following ratiocination:
In the present case, it is undisputed that both applicants were still Filipino
citizens when they bought the land in controversy from its former owner. For
this reason, the prohibition against the acquisition of private lands by aliens
could not apply. In justice and equity, they are the rightful owners of the
subject realty considering also that they had paid for it quite a large sum of
money. Their purpose in initiating the instant action is merely to confirm
their title over the land, for, as has been passed upon, they had been the
owners of the same since 1978. It ought to be pointed out that registration is
not a mode of acquiring ownership. The Torrens System was not established
as a means for the acquisition of title to private land. It is intended merely to
confirm and register the title which one may already have (Municipality of
Victorias vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-31189, March 31, 1987). With
particular reference to the main issue at bar, the High Court has ruled that
title and ownership over lands within the meaning and for the purposes of
the constitutional prohibition dates back to the time of their purchase, not
later. The fact that the applicants-appellees are not Filipino citizens now
cannot be taken against them for they were not disqualified from acquiring
the land in question (Bollozos vs. Yu Tieng Su, G.R. No. L-29442, November
11, 1987). (Rollo, pp. 27-28)
Expectedly, respondent court's disposition did not merit petitioner's
approval, hence this present recourse, which was belatedly filed.
Ordinarily, this petition would have been denied outright for having been
filed out of time had it not been for the constitutional issue presented
therein.
At the outset, petitioner submits that private respondents have not acquired
proprietary rights over the subject properties before they acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization to justify the registration thereof in their
favor. It maintains that even privately owned unregistered lands are
presumed to be public lands under the principle that lands of whatever
classification belong to the State under the Regalian doctrine. Thus, before
the issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the jurisdical
sense the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State. Petitioner
further argued that it is only when the court adjudicates the land to the
applicant for confirmation of title would the land become privately owned
land, for in the same proceeding, the court may declare it public land,
depending on the evidence.
As found by the trial court:
The evidence thus presented established that applicants, by themselves and
their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the two
adjacent parcels of land applied for registration of title under a bona-fide
claim of ownership long before June 12, 1945. Such being the case, it is
conclusively presumed that all the conditions essential to the confirmation of
their title over the two adjacent parcels of land are sought to be registered
have been complied with thereby entitling them to the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree.
(Rollo, p. 26)
Respondent court echoed the court a quo's observation, thus:
The land sought to be registered has been declared to be within the alienable
and disposable zone established by the Bureau of Forest Development
(Exhibit "P"). The investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Natural
Resources District (IV-2) reveals that the disputed realty had been occupied
by the applicants "whose house of strong materials stands thereon"; that it
had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of applicants-spouses
since 1979; that they acquired the same by means of a public instrument
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan" duly executed by the vendor,
Cristeta Dazo Belen, on June 17, 1978 (Exhibits "I" and "J"); and that
applicants and their predecessors in interest had been in possession of the
land for more than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for
registration. But what is of great significance in the instant case is the
circumstance that at the time the applicants purchased the subject lot in
1978, both of them were Filipino citizens such that when they filed their
application for registration in 1987, ownership over the land in dispute had
already passed to them. (Rollo, p., 27)
The Republic disagrees with the appellate court's concept of possession and
argues:
17. The Court of Appeals found that the land was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of respondent spouses only since 1979. However, tax
declarations or reality tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership. (citing cases)
18. Then again, the appellate court found that "applicants (respondents) and
their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more
than 30 years prior to the filing of the application for registration." This is not,
however, the same as saying that respondents have been in possession
"since June 12, 1945." (PD No. 1073, amending Sec. 48 [b], CA NO. 141; sec.
also Sec. 14, PD No. 1529). So there is a void in respondents' possession.
They fall short of the required possession since June 12, 1945 or prior
thereto. And, even if they needed only to prove thirty (30) years possession
prior to the filing of their application (on February 5, 1987), they would still
be short of the required possession if the starting point is 1979 when,
according to the Court of Appeals, the land was declared for taxation
purposes in their name. (Rollo, pp. 14-15)
The argument is myopic, to say the least. Following the logic of petitioner,
any transferee is thus foreclosed to apply for registration of title over a
parcel of land notwithstanding the fact that the transferor, or his
predecessor-in-interest has been in open, notorious and exclusive possession
thereof for thirty (30) years or more. This is not, however, what the law
provides.
As petitioner itself argues, Section 48 of the Public Land Act (CA 141) reads:
Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
of the public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
wars or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
supplied)
As amended by PD 1073:
Sec. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the
Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall
apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945.
It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the
terms "by themselves", "the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-
interest". Thus, it matters not whether the vendee/applicant has been in
possession of the subject property for only a day so long as the period and/or
legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by his
predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the
case at bar, respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the disputed land not only
since June 12, 1945, but even as early as 1937. Petitioner does not deny this
except that respondent spouses, in its perception, were in possession of the
land sought to be registered only in 1978 and therefore short of the required
length of time. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by
private respondents through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn,
have been in open and continued possession thereof since 1937. Private
respondents stepped into the shoes of their predecessors-in-interest and by
virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to confirm what could
otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
At this juncture, petitioner's reliance in Republic v. Villanueva (114 SCRA 875
[1982]) deserves scant consideration. There, it was held that before the
issuance of the certificate of title, the occupant is not in the juridical sense
the true owner of the land since it still pertains to the State.
Suffice it to state that the ruling in Republic v. Villanueva (supra), has already
been abandoned in the 1986 case of Director of Lands v. Intermediate
Appellate Court (146 SCRA 509; and reiterated in Director of Lands v. Iglesia
ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 [1991]) where the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Narvasa, declared that:
(The weight of authority is) that open, exclusive and undisputed possession
of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal
fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso
jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public
land and becomes private property. . . .
Herico in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
. . . Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act
No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the
petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more
than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title
over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public
Land Act as by free patent . . .
x x x           x x x          x x x
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the
foregoing provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have
acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases
to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands
to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of
which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced
by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering
possession of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed
by the statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the
dictum of the statute itself (Section 48 [b]) that the possessor(s) ". . . shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title ..." No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most
limited to ascertaining whether the possession claims is of the required
character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer
title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not
originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such
a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Cariño,
". . .(There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be
lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.
(Emphasis supplied)
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open,
continuous and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public
land ipso jure converts the same to private property (Director of Lands v. IAC,
214 SCRA 604 [1992]; Pineda v. CA, 183 SCRA 602 [1990]). This means that
occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years by an applicant and his
predecessors-in-interest, vest title on such applicant so as to segregate the
land from the mass of public and (National Power Corporation v. CA, 218
SCRA 41 [1993]).
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is
alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated,
must be either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the
Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]). When the
conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by
operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the
necessity of a certificate of title being issued (National Power Corporation v.
CA, supra). As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and
goes beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In other words, the Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land (Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA
32 [1987]). It merely confirms, but does not confer ownership. As could be
gleaned from the evidence adduced, private respondents were able to
establish the nature of possession of their predecessors-in-interest. Evidence
was offered to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on
the subject land and introduced improvements thereon (Exhibits "F" to "F9").
A certified true copy of the affidavit executed by Cristeta Dazo and her sister
Simplicia was also formally offered to prove that the subject parcels of land
were inherited by vendor Cristeta Dazo from her father Pedro Dazo with the
conformity of her only sister Simplicia (Exhibit "G"). Likewise, a report from
the Bureau of Lands was presented in evidence together with a letter from
the Bureau of Forest Development, to prove that the questioned lots were
part of the alienable and disposable zone of the government and that no
forestry interest was affected (CA GR No. 28953, Records, p. 33).
In the main, petitioner seeks to defeat respondents' application for
registration of title on the ground of foreign nationality. Accordingly, the
ruling in Director of Lands v. Buyco (supra) supports petitioner's thesis.
We disagree.
In Buyco, the applicants therein were likewise foreign nationals but were
natural-born Filipino citizens at the time of their supposed acquisition of the
property. But this is where the similarity ends. The applicants in Buyco sought
to register a large tract of land under the provisions of the Land Registration
Act, and in the alternative, under the provisions of the Public Land Act. The
land registration court decided in favor of the applicants and was affirmed by
the appellate court on appeal. The Director of Lands brought the matter
before us on review and we reversed.
This Court, speaking through Justice Davide, Jr., stated:
As could be gleaned from the evidence adduced, the private respondents do
not rely on fee simple ownership based on a Spanish grant or possessory
information title under Section 19 of the Land Registration Act; the private
respondents did not present any proof that they or their predecessors-in-
interest derived title from an old Spanish grant such as (a) the "titulo real" or
royal grant (b) the "concession especial" or especial grant; (c) the
"composicion con el estado" title or adjustment title; (d) the "titulo de
compra" or title by purchase; and (e) the "informacion posesoria" or
possessory information title, which could become a "titulo gratuito" or a
gratuitous title (Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 [1968]). The
primary basis of their claim is possession, by themselves and their
predecessors-in-interest, since time immemorial.
If indeed private respondents and their predecessors have been in
possession since time immemorial, the rulings of both courts could be upheld
for, as this Court stated in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands (75 Phil. 890 [1946]):
. . . All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by
purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule
would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant
and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such
possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part
of the public domain or that if had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest (Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935 [1909]; 212 U.S.
449; 53 Law. Ed., 594) The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest began in
1880.
. . . alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under the Public Land Act, as amended)
is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said
period, ipso jure. (Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, supra)
It is obvious from the foregoing rule that the applicant must prove that (a)
the land is alienable public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above
stated, must be either since time immemorial, as ruled in both Cariño and
Susi, or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. As to the latter, this
Court, in Gutierrez Hermanos v. Court of Appeals (178 SCRA 37 [1989]),
adopted the rule enunciated by the Court of Appeals, per then Associate
Justice Hugo R. Gutierrez, Jr., . . ., that an applicant for registration under
Section 48 of the Public Land Act must secure a certification from the
Government that the lands which he claims to have possessed as owner for
more than thirty (30) years are alienable and disposable. It is the burden of
the applicant to prove its positive averments.
In the instant case, private respondents offered no evidence at all to prove
that the property subject of the application is an alienable and disposable
land. On the contrary, the entire property . . . was pasture land (and
therefore inalienable under the then 1973 Constitution).
. . . (P)rivate respondents' evidence miserably failed to establish their
imperfect title to the property in question. Their allegation of possession
since time immemorial, . . ., is patently baseless. . . . When referring to
possession, specifically "immemorial possession," it means possession of
which no man living has seen the beginning, and the existence of which he
has learned from his elders (Susi v. Razon, supra). Such possession was never
present in the case of private respondents. . . .
. . ., there does not even exist a reasonable basis for the finding that the
private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest possessed the land
for more than eighty (80) years, . . .
xxx xxx xxx
To this Court's mind, private respondents failed to prove that (their
predecessor-in-interest) had possessed the property allegedly covered by Tax
Declaration No. 15853 and made the subject of both his last will and
testament and the project of partition of his estate among his heirs — in such
manner as to remove the same from the public domain under the Cariño and
Susi doctrines. Thus, (when the predecessor-in-interest) died on 31 May
1937, he transmitted no right whatsoever, with respect to the said property,
to his heirs. This being the case, his possession cannot be tacked to that of
the private respondents for the latter's benefit pursuant to Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, the alternative ground relied upon in their
application . . .
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that the private respondents became American citizens before
such filing, it goes without saying that they had acquired no vested right,
consisting of an imperfect title, over the property before they lost their
Philippine citizenship. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the application in Buyco were denied registration of title not merely
because they were American citizens at the time of their application
therefor. Respondents therein failed to prove possession of their
predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial or possession in such a
manner that the property has been segregated from public domain; such
that at the time of their application, as American citizens, they have acquired
no vested rights over the parcel of land.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born
Filipino citizens at the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue
thereof, acquired vested rights thereon, tacking in the process, the
possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed period of time held by
their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In addition, private
respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the contested
property, now occupied by respondent Lapiñas mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that
the Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested
parcels of land in their favor. Sections 7 and 8 of Article XII of the
Constitution contain the following pertinent provisions, to wit:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations
qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Sec. 8. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 7 of this Article, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a
transferee of private lands, subject to limitations provided by law. (Emphasis citizenship and the country of which he is presently a citizen; and such other
supplied) information as may be required under Section 8 of this Act.

Section 8, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution above quoted is similar to
Section 15, Article XIV of the then 1973 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 15. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14 of this Article, a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his citizenship may be a
transferee of private land, for use by him as his residence, as the Batasang
Pambansa may provide.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant
provision of which provides:
Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area
of one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in
the case of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of
married couples, one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted;
Provided, That if both shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall
not exceed the maximum herein fixed.
In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall still be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or
rural lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already
owned by him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized.
The Court is of the view that the requirements in Sec. 6 of BP 185 do not
apply in the instant case since said requirements are primarily directed to the
register of deeds before whom compliance therewith is to be submitted.
Nowhere in the provision is it stated, much less implied, that the
requirements must likewise be submitted before the land registration court
prior to the approval of an application for registration of title. An application
for registration of title before a land registration court should not be
confused with the issuance of a certificate of title by the register of deeds. It
is only when the judgment of the land registration court approving the
application for registration has become final that a decree of registration is
issued. And that is the time when the requirements of Sec. 6, BP 185, before
the register of deeds should be complied with by the applicants. This decree
of registration is the one that is submitted to the office of the register of
deeds for issuance of the certificate of title in favor of the applicant. Prior to
the issuance of the decree of registration, the register of deeds has no
participation in the approval of the application for registration of title as the
decree of registration is yet to be issued.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law
has been passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs
the disposition of private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has lost his Philippine citizenship remains to be BP 185.

Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they
applied for registration of the properties in question, said properties as
discussed above were already private lands; consequently, there could be no
legal impediment for the registration thereof by respondents in view of what
the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land sought to be registered no
longer form part of the public domain. They are already private in character
since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of
ownership prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship
may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq.m., if
urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to be used by him as his
residence (BP 185).

It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were

natural-born citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or
acquisition of a parcel of residential land, it is not significant whether private
respondents are no longer Filipino citizens at the time they purchased or
registered the parcels of land in question. What is important is that private
respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the Philippines, and as
transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in accordance
with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and
character of possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject
lots, their application for registration of title must perforce be approved.

The dissenting opinion, however, states that the requirements in BP 185,

must also be complied with by private respondents. Specifically, it refers to
Section 6, which provides:

Sec. 6. In addition to the requirements provided for in other laws for the
registration of titles to lands, no private land shall be transferred under this
Act, unless the transferee shall submit to the register of deeds of the
province or city where the property is located a sworn statement showing
the date and place of his birth; the names and addresses of his parents, of his
spouse and children, if any; the area, the location and the mode of [G.R. NO. 160421 : October 4, 2004]
acquisition of his landholdings in the Philippines, if any; his intention to
reside permanently in the Philippines; the date he lost his Philippine
SPOUSES PHILIP RECTO and ESTER C. RECTO, represented by their Attorney-
in-Fact, GENEROSO R. GENEROSO, Petitioners, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari challenging the January 16, 2003
decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 which reversed the
September 7, 1998 decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320. Likewise assailed is
the appellate court's October 17, 2003 resolution3 denying petitioners'
motion for reconsideration.
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas, Branch 6, an
application for registration of title over a 23,209 square meter
lot,4 designated as Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-
010485, situated in Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of Batangas, under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the
alternative that their petition for registration be granted pursuant to
Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.5
Petitioners alleged that on June 4, 1996, they purchased Lot 806 from sisters
Rosita Medrana Guevarra and Maria Medrana Torres for the amount of
P6,943,534.40.6 The two, in turn, inherited the lot from their deceased
parents, Vicente and Eufemia Medrana. Maria, born on October 22, 1917,
declared that since 1945, her father was already the owner of Lot 806. She
became aware of her father's possession of the subject lot in the concept of
owner in 1930 when she was 13 years of age. The possession of the subject
lot by the Medrana family prior to 1945 was corroborated by Rosita,7 who
testified that in 1935 when she was 13 years of age, she first came to know
that her father was the owner of Lot 806. The sisters added that during the
lifetime of Vicente, he planted rice and corn on the lot with the help of their
tenant. After his demise, they continued to plant the same crops through
hired farmers.8
Petitioners presented the following documentary evidences '
(1) Blue Print Copy of the Plan9 and Technical Description10 of Lot 806, both
certified by Land Management Services (formerly the Bureau of Lands), of
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR);
(2) Tax Declarations11 of the lot for the years 1948, 1955, 1968, 1974, 1980,
1987, 1989 and 1994 (in the name of Vicente Medrana); 1996 (in the name
of Rosita Guevarra and Maria Torres); and 1998 (in the name of Philip and
Ester Recto).
(3) Certification of Non-Delinquency for the year 1998 from the Municipal
Treasurer of Sto. Tomas, Batangas;12
(4) Report13 from the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) stating, among
others, that '
(a) the entire area is within the alienable and disposable zone as classified
under Project No. 30 L.C. Map No. 582 and released and certified as such on
December 31, 1925; (Emphasis, supplied)
(b) the lot is not within a reservation area nor within the forest zone;
(c) the lot is not within a previously issued patent, decree or title.
(d) there is no public land application filed for the same land by the applicant
or any other person;
(e) the land is covered by Tax Declaration No. 021-02166-A in the name of
the predecessor-in-interest and that there is no difference in area;
(f) the lot is agricultural in nature; andcralawlibrary
(g) the lot does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed and
river bank protection.
(5) Report from the Land Management Bureau that the land involved is not
covered by any land patent or by land application pending issuance of
patent.14
(6) Report from the Forest Management Service, DENR that the subject lot
falls within Alienable and Disposable lands, Project No. 30 of Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, per BFD LC Map No. 582 certified on December 31, 1925.15
(7) Report from the Land Management Sector, DENR that Plan Ap-04-010485,
Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San
Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province of Batangas, is not a portion of
nor identical to any previously approved isolated survey.16
There being no opposition to the petition from any private individual, an
Order of General Default was issued by the trial court.17
On September 7, 1998, the court a quo rendered a decision granting the
petition for registration. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
WHEREFORE, and upon previous confirmation of the Order of General
Default, this Court hereby adjudicates and decrees Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto.
Tomas Cadastre on plan Ap-04-010485, situated in San Rafael, Sto. Tomas,
Batangas, with an area of 23,209 square meters, in favor of and in the names
of Spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, Filipino citizens and residents of
1322 Palm Avenue, Dasmariñas Village, Makati City.
Once this Decision shall have become final let the corresponding decree of
registration be issued.
SO ORDERED.18
The Republic, represented by the Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals contending that petitioners failed to - (1) offer in evidence the
original tracing cloth plan of the land; (2) prove possession of the lot for the
period required by law; and (3) overthrow the presumption that subject
property forms part of the public domain.19
On January 16, 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court on the sole ground of failure to offer in evidence the original tracing
cloth plan of the land.20
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration praying that in view of their
compliance with all the substantive and procedural requirements for
registration, save for the submission of the tracing cloth plan, the case be
remanded to the trial court for the presentation of the said tracing cloth
plan. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, interposed no objection to
petitioners' motion for reconsideration.21
On October 17, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.22 Hence, the instant petition praying for the remand of the
case before the trial court.
In its Comment, the Solicitor General manifested that in the interest of
justice, he will not to oppose the petition.23
Section 14 (1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 states:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance [now the Regional Trial Court] an application for registration
of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
On the other hand, Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1073, provides:
The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII, of the Public
Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply
only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation by
the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.
Thus, before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant
must show that - (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest,
has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier; and (b) the land subject of the application is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.24
In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of
petitioners, categorically testified that they, and prior to them their father,
had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners. Maria,
having been born on October 22, 1917, and Rosita on October 29, 1922,
were 13 years of age when they became aware of their family's possession of
Lot 806 in 1930 and 1935, respectively. At 13, they were undoubtedly
capable and competent to perceive their father's possession of Lot 806 in the
concept of owner. Moreover, the trial court found their testimonies to be
worthy of belief and credence. Considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue, having personally heard the
witnesses testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying,
her findings deserve the highest respect.25
The fact that the earliest Tax Declaration of the subject lot was for the year
1948 will not militate against petitioners. Note that said 1948 Tax Declaration
cancels a previous Tax Declaration (No. 26472),26 thus substantiating
petitioners' possession of Lot 806 through their predecessor-in-interest even
prior to said date. At any rate, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,27 it was held
that the belated declaration of the lot for tax purposes does not necessarily
mean that possession by the previous owners thereof did not commence in
1945 or earlier. As long as the testimony supporting possession for the
required period is credible, the court will grant the petition for registration.
Pertinent portion of the decision, reads '
Petitioner questions the credibility of claimant Divinaflor who testified on the
possession of Marcial Listana for the period required by law. The issue of
credibility is unavailing considering that the judge below is in a better
position to pass judgment on the issue having personally heard the witnesses
testify and observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Being in a
better position to observe the witnesses, the trial court's appreciation of the
witness' testimony, truthfulness, honesty, and candor, deserves the highest
respect.
xxx
'[A] person is competent to be a witness if (a) he is capable of perceiving at
the time of the occurrence of the fact and (b) he can make his perception
known. True, in 1939, Divinaflor was not born yet, but in 1945, he was four
years old, residing in Maramba, Oas, Albay, where the subject lot is located.
As his testimony goes, he and Marcial Listana were barrio mates, and that he
usually passes by the subject land. The fact that Divinaflor was only a child at
the required inception of possession does not render him incompetent to
testify on the matter. It is well-established that any child regardless of age,
can be a competent witness if he can perceive, and perceiving can make
known his perception to others and that he is capable of relating truthfully
facts for which he is examined. The requirements of a child's competence as
a witness are: (a) capacity of observation; (b) capacity of recollection; and (c)
capacity of communication. There is no showing that as a child, claimant did
not possess the foregoing qualifications. It is not necessary that a witness'
knowledge of the fact to which he testifies was obtained in adulthood. He
may have first acquired knowledge of the fact during childhood, that is, at
the age of four, which knowledge was reinforced through the years, up until
he testified in court in 1990. There is reason to reject petitioner's claim that
Divinaflor is incompetent to testify regarding Listana's possession since it
appears undisputed that Divinaflor grew up in Maramba, Oas, Albay, and had
occasion to see Listana possessing the land.
Finally, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the belated declaration of
the property for tax purposes does not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that the predecessors were not in possession of the land as required by law
since 1945. Petitioner capitalizes on the fact that the earliest tax declaration
presented took effect only in 1980 while the certificate of tax payment is
dated 1990. While this Court has held in a long line of cases that tax
declarations or tax receipts are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, it does not necessarily follow that belated declaration of the same for
tax purposes negates the fact of possession, especially in the instant case
where there are no other persons claiming any interest in Lot 10739.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public
domain having been released and certified as such on December 31, 1925. As
further certified by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an agricultural land; within
an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor within a
forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed,
and riverbank protection.28 Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet
the requisite for original registration of title, to wit: open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of an alienable and
disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court
granting the petition for registration on the ground of petitioners' failure to
submit in evidence the original tracing cloth plan of Lot 806. Indeed, the
submission of the tracing cloth is a mandatory requirement for
registration.29 However, it was held that while the best evidence to identify a
piece of land for registration purposes is the original tracing cloth plan from
the Bureau of Lands, blue print copies and other evidence could also provide
sufficient identification.30 In Republic v. Court of Appeals,31 the Court ruled
that the blueprint copy of the cloth plan together with the lot's technical
description duly certified as to their correctness by the Bureau of Lands (Now
the Land Management Bureau of the DENR)32 are sufficient to identify the
land applied for registration, thus '
On the first challenge, the petitioner invokes the case of Director of Lands v.
Reyes, where it was held that "the original tracing cloth plan of the land
applied for which must be approved by the Director of Lands" was "a
statutory requirement of mandatory character" for the identification of the
land sought to be registered. As what was submitted in the case at bar to
identify the subject property was not the tracing cloth plan but only the
blueprint copy of the survey plan, the respondent court should have rejected
the same as insufficient.
We disagree with this contention. The Court of Appeals was correct when it
observed that in that case the applicant in effect "had not submitted
anything at all to identify the subject property" because the blueprint
presented lacked the approval of the Director of Lands. By contrast '
In the present case, there was considerable compliance with the requirement
of the law as the subject property was sufficiently identified with the
presentation of blueprint copy of Plan AS-06-000002 (San Pedro v. Director
of Lands, CA-G.R. No. 65332-R, May 28, 1981). It should be noted in this
connection that the Bureau of Lands has certified to the correctness of the
blueprint copy of the plan including the technical description that go with
it. Hence, we cannot ignore the fact, absent in the Reyes case, that
applicant has provided ample evidence to establish the identity of the
subject property. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
Such a view was affirmed by the Court in Republic of the Philippines v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, where we held that while the best evidence to
identify a piece of land for registration purposes was the original tracing
cloth plan from the Bureau of Lands, blueprint copies and other evidence
could also provide sufficient identification. This rule was bolstered only
recently in the case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, where the Court
declared through Chief Justice Marcelo B. Fernan:
We affirm. No reversible error was committed by the appellate court in ruling
that Exhibit "O," the true certified copy of the white paper plan, was
sufficient for the purpose of identifying the land in question. Exhibit "O" was
found by the appellate court to reflect the land as surveyed by a geodetic
engineer. It bore the approval of the Land Registration Commission, and was
re-verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands on April 25, 1974 pursuant
to the provisions of P.D. No. 239 withdrawing from the Land Registration
Commission the authority to approve original survey plans. It contained the
following material data: the barrio (poblacion), municipality (Amadeo) and
province (Cavite) where the subject land is located, its area of 379 square
meters, the land as plotted, its technical descriptions and its natural
boundaries. Exhibit "O" was further supported by the Technical Descriptions
signed by a geodetic surveyor and attested by the Land Registration
Commission. In fine, Exhibit "O" contained all the details and information
necessary for a proper and definite identification of the land sought to be
registered, thereby serving the purpose for which the original tracing cloth
plan is required. The fact therefore that the original survey plan was
recorded on white paper instead of a tracing cloth should not detract from
the probative value thereof. x x x.

In the case at bar, Lot 806 was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of
the plan (Exhibit "R")33 and the technical description (Exhibit "S")34 thereof
both approved by Land Management Services, DENR. Also, per report of the
Land Management Sector, Plan Ap-04-010485, Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, situated in the Barangay of San Rafael, Municipality of Sto. Tomas,
Province of Batangas, is not a portion of, nor identical to any previously
approved isolated survey.35 Petitioners also submitted before the Court of
Appeals a certified true copy36 of the original tracing cloth plan as well as a
certification37 from the Land Registration Authority attesting to the fact that
the original plan of Plan-Ap-04-010485 in Diazo Polyester film is on file with
their office. Under the circumstances, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred
in reversing the decision of the trial court solely on the ground that
petitioners failed to present the original tracing cloth plan.

Having met all the requirements for registration of title including the
presentation of sufficient evidence to identify the land sought to be
registered, there is no more need to remand the case before the trial court
for the presentation of the tracing cloth plan.

WHEREFORE, the January 16, 2003 decision and October 17, 2003 resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65407 are reversed and set aside.
the September 7, 1998 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tanauan,
Batangas, Branch 6 in Land Registration Case No. T-320, ordering the
issuance of a decree of registration over Lot 806, Cad-424, Sto. Tomas
Cadastre, Plan Ap-04-010485 in the name of petitioners is REINSTATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 156888             November 20, 2006

PEDRO R. SANTIAGO, Petitioner,
vs.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The Case
For Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is the 3
December 20021 and 7 January 20032 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 126-0-2002 entitled
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Pedro R. Santiago and Armando G. Mateo versus Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority. In the assailed Orders, the RTC denied the
application for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed
the complaint for lack of cause of action.
The Facts
This case stemmed from a Complaint3 for Recovery of Possession of Property,
filed by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and herein petitioner
Pedro R. Santiago against respondent Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority
(SBMA) on 12 March 2002, before the RTC of Olongapo City, Zambales,
Branch 74. Included in said complaint was a prayer for the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order.
In their Complaint filed before the RTC, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G.
Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago, alleged that:
Plaintiff (Victoria M. Rodriguez) is the sole heir and administrator of the
estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez by virtue of the Order, dated February,
1994 in Spec. Proc. No. IR-1110, "In the Matter of the Settlement of the
Estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes, etc.", (sic) of Branch 34 of the
Regional Trial Court at Iriga City x x x.
xxxx
In his lifetime, the late Hermogenes Rodriguez y Reyes was the owner of
parcels of land registered in his name under that (sic) certificate of title
denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No.
01-4-Protocol x x x.
xxxx
On January 31, 2002, plaintiff Victoria M. Rodriguez, in her capacity as heir
and administrator of the estate of Hermogenes Rodriguez, leased to Pedro R.
Santiago and Armando G. Mateo, for a period of 50 years, two parcels of land
of Hermogenes Rodriguez covered by his aforesaid title, x x x.
xxxx
By virtue of the aforesaid lease contract, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago is
presently occupying the aforesaid parcel of land consisting of 2.5 hectares,
more particularly the improvements located at 717 Sta. Rita Road.
Despite the fact that defendant is not the owner of the two aforesaid parcels
of land leased to plaintiffs Santiago and Mateo, defendant is claiming
possessory, if not proprietary, rights over them. More particularly, defendant
is using these two parcels of land for its (sic) own commercial and other
purposes.
It is now the desire of plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez to recover possession of the
property from the defendant so that she could comply with her contractual
commitments to her co-plaintiffs.
xxxx
[D]efendant is claiming possessory, if not proprietary, rights over the parcels
of land described in paragraph 7 hereof. Lately, plaintiff Pedro R. Santiago
was informed by purported agents or employees of the defendant that he
should vacate the premises he and his family are occupying since defendant
would be needing the same for its own use. Defendant has no authority to do
this since it is not the owner of the premises, and the owner, Victoria
Rodriguez (sic) has already leased the premises to plaintiffs Santiago and
Mateo.4
Respondent SBMA, in its counter statement of facts,5 contends that
sometime in 1998, Liwanag Santiago, wife of herein petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago, by virtue of her employment with respondent SBMA, availed
herself of the housing privilege accorded to the latter’s employees; that due
to said privilege, she was allowed to lease a housing unit6 inside the Subic
Bay Freeport Zone; that the lease agreement, however, "shall be terminated
if the lessees are no longer employed with SBMA;"7 that on 31 January 2002,
Liwanag Santiago’s employment contract concluded; that since said contract
was not renewed, Liwanag Santiago ceased to be an employee of respondent
SBMA; and that as a consequence thereof, as mandated by the SBMA
Housing Policy, she and her family were asked8 to vacate and return
possession of the subject housing unit.
On 13 March 2002, the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order[9] against
respondent SBMA from ousting petitioner Santiago and his family from the
premises of the subject housing unit within seventy two (72) hours from
receipt. Further, it was likewise restrained and enjoined from committing any
other acts that would prevent the latter and his family from occupying the
premises they have allegedly leased from Victoria Rodriguez.
Thereafter, the RTC conducted hearings on the application for the issuance of
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
On 5 April 2002, instead of filing an Answer, respondent SBMA filed a Motion
to Dismiss10 the abovementioned complaint on the argument, inter
alia,11 that the latter failed to state a valid cause of action.
On 3 December 2002, the RTC issued its first assailed order. In denying and
dismissing the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and complaint respectively, the RTC stated that since the alleged right of
complainant Rodriguez stemmed from a Spanish Title, specifically the Titulo
de Propriedad de Terrenos of 1891, it cannot be considered a right in esse.
The RTC took judicial notice of Presidential Decree No. 892,12 which required
all holders of Spanish titles or grants to apply for registration of their lands
under Republic Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act,13 within six months from effectivity of the decree, or until 16 August
1976. After such time, Spanish titles or grants could no longer be used as
evidence of land ownership in any registration proceedings under the
Torrens System. Significant parts of the assailed Order of the RTC read:
Plaintiffs’ complaint is anchored on a Spanish title which they claim is still a
valid, subsisting and enforceable title. Despite the fact that said title was
never registered under Act 496, the land Registration Act (later PD 1529),
plaintiffs still claim that they have a cause of action.
The court is not convinced.
The action filed by plaintiffs is for recovery of possession based on the
ownership by plaintiff Rodriguez of the disputed property evidenced by a
Spanish title. Clearly, by the sheer force of law particularly the enabling
clauses of PD 892, said type of title can no longer be utilized as evidence of
ownership. Verily, Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as
indubitable evidence of land ownership. (Citation omitted.)
As such and on its face, the complaint indeed failed to state a cause of action
simply because the court can take judicial notice of the applicability of PD
892 and of the pertinent decisions of the Supreme Court to the case at
bench.14
Therein plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in the
second assailed Order dated 7 January 2003.
The Issues
Hence, petitioner Santiago’s immediate resort to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, raising the following issues:15
I.
WHETHER OR NOT SPANISH TITLES ARE STILL ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE OF
OWNERSHIP OF LANDS;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT WAS PROPER IN
VIEW OF THE FACT THAT PLAINTIFFS COULD STILL PROVE THEIR CLAIMS ON
THE BASIS OF EVIDENCE OTHER THAN THE SPANISH TITLE; and
III.
WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT, BY FILING A MOTION TO DISMISS INSTEAD
OF AN ANSWER, WAS DEEMED TO HAVE ADMITTED HYPOTHETICALLY
PLAINTIFFS’ ALLEGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP.
In essence, the present petition poses as fundamental issue for resolution by
the Court the question of whether or not the RTC committed reversible error
in denying the application for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
as well as dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
The Court’s Ruling
As the appeal of respondent Santiago involves only questions of law, the
Court took cognizance of the instant petition.16
Petitioner Santiago maintains that "x x x P.D. No. 892 merely disallowed the
use of Spanish titles as evidence of land ownership in any registration
proceedings under the Torrens system. In other words, Spanish titles can still
be used as evidence of land ownership in any other proceedings except
registration under the Torrens system. Since the instant case is not one for
registration under the Torrens system, but x x x who should be entitled to the
possession thereof, then the presentation as evidence of land ownership of
the Spanish title in question is permissible." As to the non-presentation of
the Titulo de Propriedad de Terrenos, petitioner Santiago had this to say:
As the trial court stated, "(F)undamental is the rule that a defendant moving
to dismiss a complaint for lack of cause of action is regarded as having
admitted all the allegations thereof, at least hypothetically". (sic) The
Complaint specifically alleged that plaintiff Victoria Rodriguez was the great-
great-great granddaughter of and the sole heir and administrator of the late
spouses Hermogenes Rodriguez and Erlinda Flores and that in his lifetime
Hermogenes Rodriguez was the owner of parcels of land registered in his
name under that certificate of title denominated as a Titulo de Propriedad de
Terrenos of 1891 Royal Decree No. 01-4-Protocol. Defendant was, therefore,
deemed to have admitted these allegations. And, with such admissions, then
there would be no more need, at least at this stage of the case, for the
plaintiffs to present the Spanish title. In other words, the inadmissibility of
the title, as argued by the defendant, becomes immaterial since there is no
more need to present this title in view of the admissions."
Citing the case of Intestate Estate of the Late Don Mariano San Pedro y
Esteban v. Court of Appeals, et al.,[17]respondent SBMA, however, stresses
that "Spanish titles can no longer be countenance as indubitable evidence of
land ownership by sheer force of law, particularly, the enabling clause of P.D.
892 in expressly providing that, if not accompanied by actual possession of
the land, said type of title x x x can no longer be utilized as proof or evidence
of ownership x x x."
A priori, before the Court goes into the resolution of the fundamental issue
raised by the instant petition, a critical matter must be dealt with – the fact
that the assailed orders of dismissal of the complaint and denial of the
motion for reconsideration, respectively, of the RTC had already become final
and executory against Victoria M. Rodriguez due to her failure to appeal the
case. It must be remembered that petitioner Santiago is merely the alleged
lessee of part of the claimed parcel of land. In the scheme of things, so to
speak, his right to recover possession is anchored on the alleged ownership
of Victoria M. Rodriguez, which right to the claimed parcel of land is not in
esse. As such, petitioner Santiago is equally bound by the final and executory
order of the RTC dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action.
Nevertheless, even if we were to overlook the foregoing grievous error, we
would be hard pressed to find fault in the assailed orders of the RTC. The
present petition is substantially infirm as this Court had already expressed in
the case of Nemencio C. Evangelista, et al. v. Carmelino M. Santiago,18 that
the Spanish title of Don Hermogenes Rodriguez, the Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos of 1891, has been divested of any evidentiary value to establish
ownership over real property.
Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R. Santiago
anchor their right to recover possession of the subject real property on claim
of ownership by Victoria M. Rodriguez being the sole heir of the named
grantee, Hermogenes Rodriguez, in the Spanish title Titulo de Propriedad de
Torrenos. Promulgated on 29 April 2005, in the aforementioned Evangelista
Case, we categorically stated that:
P.D. No. 892 became effective on 16 February 1976. The successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez had only until 14 August 1976 to apply for a Torrens
title in their name covering the Subject Property. In the absence of an
allegation in petitioners’ Complaint that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest
complied with P.D. No. 892, then it could be assumed that they failed to do
so. Since they failed to comply with P.D. No. 892, then the successors of Don
Hermogenes Rodriguez were already enjoined from presenting the Spanish
title as proof of their ownership of the Subject Property in registration
proceedings.
Registration proceedings under the Torrens system do not create or vest
title, but only confirm and record title already created and vested. (Citation
omitted.) By virtue of P.D. No. 892, the courts, in registration proceedings
under the Torrens system, are precluded from accepting, confirming and
recording a Spanish title. Reason therefore dictates that courts, likewise, are
prevented from accepting and indirectly confirming such Spanish title in
some other form of action brought before them (i.e., removal of cloud on or
quieting of title), only short of ordering its recording or registration. To rule
otherwise would open the doors to the circumvention of P.D. No. 892, and
give rise to the existence of land titles, recognized and affirmed by the
courts, but would never be recorded under the Torrens system of
registration. This would definitely undermine the Torrens system and cause
confusion and instability in property ownership that P.D. No. 892 intended to
eliminate.
Petitioners argued that the Spanish title may still be presented as proof of
ownership on the basis of the exception provided in the fourth whereas
clause of P.D. No. 892, which reads:
WHEREAS, Spanish titles to lands which have not yet been brought under the
operation of the Torrens system, being subject to prescription, are now
ineffective to prove ownership unless accompanied by proof of actual
possession; . . .
Since Petitioners alleged that they were in actual possession of the Subject
Property, then they could still present the Spanish title as evidence of their
ownership of the Subject Property. (Citation omitted.)
This Court cannot sustain petitioners’ argument. Actual proof of possession
only becomes necessary because, as the same whereas clause points out,
Spanish titles are subject to prescription. A holder of a Spanish title may still
lose his ownership of the real property to the occupant who actually
possesses the same for the required prescriptive period. (Citation omitted.)
Because of this inherent weakness of a Spanish title, the applicant for
registration of his Spanish title under the Torrens system must also submit
proof that he is in actual possession of the real property, so as to discount
the possibility that someone else has acquired a better title to the same
property by virtue of prescription.
Moreover, legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the
statute as a whole, and not just a particular provision alone. A word or
phrase taken in the abstract may easily convey a meaning quite different
from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. An apparently general
provision may have a limited application if read together with other
provisions of the statute. (Citation omitted.)
The fourth whereas clause of P.D. No. 892 should be interpreted and
harmonized with the other provisions of the whole statute. (Citation
omitted.) Note that the tenor of the whole presidential decree is to
discontinue the use of Spanish titles and to strip them of any probative value
as evidence of ownership. It had clearly set a deadline for the filing of
applications for registration of all Spanish titles under the Torrens system
(i.e., six months from its effectivity or on 14 August 1976), after which, the
Spanish titles may no longer be presented to prove ownership.
All holders of Spanish titles should have filed applications for registration of
their title on or before 14 August 1976. In a land registration proceeding, the
applicant should present to the court his Spanish title plus proof of actual
possession of the real property. However, if such land registration
proceeding was filed and initiated after 14 August 1976, the applicant could
no longer present his Spanish title to the court to evidence his ownership of
the real property, regardless of whether the real property was in his actual
possession.
Therefore, the fact that petitioners were in actual possession of the Subject
Property when they filed the Complaint with the trial court on 29 April 1996
does not exclude them from the application of P.D. No. 892, and their
Spanish title remain inadmissible as evidence of their ownership of the
Subject Property, whether in a land registration proceeding or in an action to
remove a cloud on or to quiet title.
The preceding discussion does not bar holders of Spanish titles from claiming
ownership of the real property on some other basis, such as those provided
in either the Land Registration Decree (Citation omitted.) or the Public Land
Act.42 Petitioners though failed to allege any other basis for their titles in their
Complaint aside from possession of the Subject Property from time
immemorial, which this Court has already controverted; and the Spanish
title, which is already ineffective to prove ownership over the Subject
Property.
Therefore, without legal or equitable title to the Subject Property, the
petitioners lacked the personality to file an action for removal of a cloud on,
or quieting of, title and their Complaint was properly dismissed for failing to
state a cause of action. In view of the dismissal of the case on this ground, it
is already unnecessary for this Court to address the issue of prescription of
the action.19
Prescinding from the foregoing, the instant petition must be denied by virtue
of the principle of stare decisis. Not only are the legal rights and relations of
herein parties substantially the same as those passed upon in the
aforementioned 2005 Evangelista Case, but the facts, the applicable laws, the
issues, and the testimonial and documentary evidence are identical such that
a ruling in one case, under the principle of stare decisis, is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issue.
The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established) is well entrenched in Article
8 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.
With the above provision of law and preceding discussions, in tandem with
the Court’s pronouncements in numerous cases, i.e., Director of Forestry v.
Muñoz;20 Antonio v. Barroga;21 Republic v. Court of Appeals.;22 National
Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals;23 Carabot v. Court of
Appeals;24 Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court;25 Widows and Orphans
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals;26 Director of Lands v. Heirs of Isabel
Tesalona;27 and Intestate Estate of Don Mariano San Pedro y Esteban v. Court
of Appeals,28 it is quite evident that the RTC committed no reversible error in
taking heed of our final, and executory, decisions – those decisions
considered to have attained the status of judicial precedents in so far as the
use of Spanish titles to evidence ownership are concerned. For it is the better
practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable to a
certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future
cases where the facts are substantially the same.291âwphi1
The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of
controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar
situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in
the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.30 This is
unmistakable from the wordings of Article 8 of the Civil Code. It is even said
that such decisions "assume the same authority as the statute itself and, until
authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are
applicable, the criteria which must control the actuations not only of those
called upon to decide thereby but also of those in duty bound to enforce
obedience thereto."31 Abandonment thereof must be based only on strong
and compelling reasons, otherwise, the becoming virtue of predictability
which is expected from this Court would be immeasurably affected and the
public’s confidence in the stability of the solemn pronouncements
diminished.32
It has long been settled that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 892 which
took effect on 16 February 1976, the system of registration under the
Spanish Mortgage Law was abolished and all holders of Spanish titles or
grants should cause their lands covered thereby to be registered under the
Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) within six months from the date of
effectivity of the said Decree or until 16 August 1976.33 If not, non-
compliance therewith will result in a reclassification of the real property.
In the case at bar, we have no alternative but to uphold the ruling
that Spanish titles can no longer be countenanced as indubitable evidence of
land ownership.34 And, without legal or equitable title to the subject
property, Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago lacked the personality to claim entitlement to possession of the
same. Title to real property refers to that upon which ownership is based. It
is the evidence of the right of the owner or the extent of his interest, by
which means he can maintain control and, as a rule, assert right to exclusive
possession and enjoyment of the property.35
Therefore, the RTC correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of
action.
Anent the argument of petitioner Santiago that by filing the Motion to
Dismiss, respondent SBMA already admitted all the allegations of the
complaint such that the question of whether or not the subject Spanish Title
was inadmissible or not had become immaterial.
We do not agree.
Basic is the rule that in a motion to dismiss complaint based on lack of cause
of action, the question posed to the court for determination is the sufficiency
of the allegation of facts made in the complaint to constitute a cause of
action. It is beside the point whether or not the allegations in the complaint
are true, for with said motion, the movant only hypothetically admits the
truth of the facts alleged in the complaint, that is, assuming arguendo that
the facts alleged are true, the facts alleged are insufficient for the court to
render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.
Consequently, by anchoring their right to recover possession of property on
the subject Spanish title that has been divested of any legal force and effect
in establishing ownership over the subject real property, the complaint filed
by Victoria M. Rodriguez, Armando G. Mateo and petitioner Pedro R.
Santiago was correctly dismissed by the RTC for lack of cause of action.
In fine, there is nothing more left to be argued as regards the Spanish title of
Don Hermogenes Rodriguez. The issue has been settled and this Court’s final
decision in the said cases must be respected.36 This Court’s hands are now
tied by the finality of the abovementioned decisions. The Court has no
alternative but to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed 3 December 200237 and 7 January 200338 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales, Branch 74, in Civil Case No.
126-0-2002, are hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218269, June 06, 2018
IN RE: APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
SUPREMA T. DUMO, Petitioner, v. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:*
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner Suprema T. Dumo (Dumo) challenges the 28 January 2014
Decision1 and the 19 May 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 95732, which modified the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 67, Bauang, La Union, in Civil Case No. 1301-Bg
for Accion Reivindicatoria3 and LRC Case No. 270-Bg for Application for Land
Registration.4
The Facts
Severa Espinas, Erlinda Espinas, Aurora Espinas, and Virginia Espinas filed a
Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages with Prayer
for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the heirs of Bernarda M. Trinidad
(Trinidad), namely, Leticia T. Valmonte, Lydia T. Nebab, Purita T. Tanag,
Gloria T. Antolin, Nilo Trinidad, Elpidio Trinidad, Fresnida T. Saldana,
Nefresha T. Tolentino, and Dumo. The plaintiffs are the heirs of Marcelino
Espinas (Espinas), who died intestate on 6 November 1991, leaving a parcel
of land (Subject Property) covered by Tax Declaration No. 13823-A, which
particularly described the property as follows:
A parcel of land located [in] Paringao, Bauang, La Union classified as
unirrigated Riceland with an area of 1,065 square meters covered by Tax
Declaration No. 13823-A, bounded on the North by Felizarda N. Mabalay; on
the East by Pedro Trinidad; on the South by Girl Scout[s] of the Philippines
and on the West by China Sea and assessed at P460.00.5
The Subject Property was purchased by Espinas from Carlos Calica through a
Deed of Absolute Sale dated 19 October 1943. Espinas exercised acts of
dominion over the Subject Property by appointing a caretaker to oversee and
administer the property. In 1963, Espinas executed an affidavit stating his
claim of ownership over the Subject Property. Espinas had also been paying
realty taxes on the Subject Property.
Meanwhile, on 6 February 1987, the heirs of Trinidad executed a Deed of
Partition with Absolute Sale over a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 17276, which particularly described the property as follows:
A parcel of sandy land located [in] Paringao, Bauang, La Union, bounded on
the North by Emiliana Estepa, on the South by Carlos Calica and Girl Scout[s]
Camp and on the West by China Sea, containing an area of 1[,]514 square
meters more or less, with an assessed value [of] P130.00.6
Finding that the Deed of Partition with Absolute Sale executed by the heirs of
Trinidad included the Subject Property, the heirs of Espinas filed a Complaint
for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages to protect their
interests (Civil Case No. 1301-Bg). The heirs of Espinas also sought a
Temporary Restraining Order to enjoin the Writ of Partial Execution of the
Decision in Civil Case No. 881, a Forcible Entry complaint filed by the heirs of
Trinidad against them.
In the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages,
Dumo, one of the defendants therein, filed a Motion to Dismiss based on res
judicata. Dumo argued that Espinas had already applied for the registration
of the Subject Property and that such application had been dismissed. The
dismissal of the land registration application of Espinas was affirmed by the
CA, and attained finality on 5 December 1980.
The Motion to Dismiss filed by Dumo was denied by the RTC, which held that
the land registration case cannot operate as a bar to the Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership, Possession and Damages because the decision in the
land registration case did not definitively and conclusively adjudicate the
ownership of the Subject Property in favor of any of the parties.
The heirs of Trinidad thereafter filed their collective Answer, where they
denied the material allegations in the complaint.
Additionally, Dumo filed an application for registration of two parcels of land,
covered by Advance Plan of Lot Nos. 400398 and 400399 with a total area of
1,273 square meters (LRC Case No. 270-Bg). Dumo alleged that the lots
belonged to her mother and that she and her siblings inherited them upon
their mother's death. She further alleged that through a Deed of Partition
with Absolute Sale dated 6 February 1987, she acquired the subject lots from
her siblings. Dumo traces her title from her mother, Trinidad, who purchased
the lots from Florencio Mabalay in August 1951. Mabalay was Dumo's
maternal grandfather. Mabalay, on the other hand, purchased the properties
from Carlos Calica.
The heirs of Espinas opposed Dumo's application for land registration on the
ground that the properties sought to be registered by Dumo are involved in
the accion reivindicatoria case. Thus, the RTC consolidated the land
registration case with the Complaint for Recovery of Ownership, Possession
and Damages.
The Office of the Solicitor General entered its appearance and filed its
opposition for the State in the land registration case.
The Ruling of the RTC
On 2 July 2010, the RTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the Subject
Property was owned by the heirs of Espinas. The RTC ordered the dismissal
of Dumo's land registration application on the ground of lack of registerable
title, and ordered Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots to
the heirs of Espinas. The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] judgment is rendered:
In LRC Case No. 270-Bg: Ordering the dismissal of the land registration on
[the] ground of lack of registerable title on the part of Suprema Dumo.
In Civil Case No. 1301-Bg: Declaring the Heirs of Marcelino Espinas as the
owners of the lots subject of [the] application; ordering the applicant-
defendant Suprema Dumo to restore ownership and possession of the lots in
question to the Heirs of Marcelino Espinas.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC found that based on the evidence presented, the heirs of Espinas
had a better right to the Subject Property. In particular, the RTC found that
based on the records of the Bureau of Lands, the lot of Espinas was
previously surveyed and approved by the Bureau of Lands and when the
survey was made for Trinidad, there was already an approved plan for
Espinas. Also, the RTC found that the tax declarations submitted by Dumo in
support of her application failed to prove any rights over the land.
Specifically, the tax declaration of Mabalay, from whom Dumo traces her
title, showed that the land was first described as bounded on the west by
Espinas. The subsequent tax declaration in the name of Trinidad, which
cancelled the tax declaration in the name of Mabalay, showed that the land
was no longer bounded on the west by Espinas, but rather, by the China Sea.
The area of the lot also increased from 3,881 to 5,589 square meters. All of
the subsequent tax declarations submitted by Dumo covering the lot in the
name of her mother stated that the lot was no longer bounded on the west
by Espinas, but rather, by the China Sea. The RTC held that the only logical
explanation to the inconsistency in the description of the land and the
corresponding area thereof is that the lot of Espinas was included in the
survey conducted for Trinidad.
The RTC also rejected the theory of Dumo that the lot of Espinas was eaten
by the sea. The RTC found that during the ocular inspection, it was
established that the lots adjoining the lot of Espinas on the same shoreline
were not inundated by the sea. To hold the theory posited by Dumo to be
true, the RTC reasoned that all the adjoining lots should also have been
inundated by the sea. However, it was established through the ocular
inspection that the lots adjoining the property of Espinas on the same
shoreline remained the same, and thus the Subject Property had not been
eaten by the sea.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA rendered its Decision dated 28 January 2014, affirming the RTC's
decision dismissing the application for land registration of Dumo, and finding
that she failed to demonstrate that she and her predecessors-in interest
possessed the property in the manner required by law to merit the grant of
her application for land registration.
The CA, however, modified the decision of the RTC insofar as it found that
the Subject Property belonged to the heirs of Espinas. The CA found that
since the property still belonged to the public domain, and the heirs of
Espinas were not able to establish their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier, it was erroneous for the RTC to
declare the heirs of Espinas as the owners of the Subject Property.
The dispositive portion of the Decision of the CA reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is PARTLY GRANTED and the
assailed Joint Decision issued by the court a quo is hereby MODIFIED in that
the Complaint for Accion Reivindicatoria (Civil Case No. 1301-Bg) filed by
plaintiffs-appellees is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action.
The Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.8
Dumo filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration and subsequently, an
Omnibus Motion for Entry of Judgment and to Resolve, asking the CA to issue
an entry of judgment insofar as the civil case is concerned and to declare the
land registration case submitted for resolution without any
comment/opposition. The CA denied both motions in a Resolution dated 19
May 2015.9
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
In this petition, Dumo seeks a reversal of the decision of the CA, and raises
the following arguments:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT WENT
BEYOND THE ISSUES RAISED, THEREBY VIOLATING OR CONTRAVENING THE
RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN, AMONG OTHERS, "LAM V. CHUA,
426 SCRA 29; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM V. FRANCO, 471 SCRA
74; BERNAS V. COURT OF APPEALS, 225 SCRA 119; PROVINCE OF QUEZON V.
MARTE, 368 SCRA 145 AND FIVE STAR BUS CO., INC. V. COURT OF APPEALS,
259 SCRA 120."
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN, IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND [REGISTRATION], IT RULED
THAT PETITIONER AND HER PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST FAILED TO PROVE
CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE, AND ADVERSE POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION OF
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IN THE CONCEPT OF [AN] OWNER FROM JUNE 12,
1945 OR EARLIER, THEREBY VIOLATING OR CONTRAVENING THE RULING OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN "REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VERSUS COURT
OF APPEALS, 448 SCRA 442."
C. THAT, IN ANY EVENT, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF AP[P]EALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN,
IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
PETITIONER'S EXHIBIT 'A' WHICH WAS FORMALLY OFFERED TO PROVE THAT
THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS DISPOSIBLE [sic] AND ALIENABLE TO WHICH
THE RESPONDENT MADE NO OBJECTION[.]
D. THAT FURTHER, AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE FOREGOING, THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN,
IN DENYING THE PETITION FOR LAND REGISTRATION, IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE THEREFOR, AGAIN, WITHOUT OBJECTION FROM
THE RESPONDENT, THEREBY DEPRIVING PETITIONER OF HER FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.10
The Ruling of the Court
Essentially, Dumo argues that the CA committed a reversible error because
(1) the issue of whether she was in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of the land since 12 June 1945 was not an issue in the RTC; (2) the
requirement of possession and occupation from 12 June 1945 is not essential
to her application since she has acquired title over the land by prescription;
(3) she has proven that the land applied for has already been declared
alienable and disposable; and (4) her right to due process was violated since
the issues considered by the CA were not properly raised during the trial.
We find that none of Dumo's arguments deserve any merit.
Going beyond the issues raised in the RTC and due process of law
Dumo argues that the issue of whether the possession started on 12 June
1945 or earlier was never raised in the RTC. She also argues that no issue was
raised as to whether or not the land that she seeks to register is alienable
and disposable. Thus, Dumo argues that the CA erred, and also violated her
right to due process, when it considered these issues in determining whether
or not the application for land registration should be granted.
We do not agree.
In an application for land registration, it is elementary that the applicant has
the burden of proving, by clear, positive and convincing evidence, that her
alleged possession and occupation were of the nature and duration required
by law.11 Thus, it was upon Dumo to prove that she and her predecessors-in-
interest possessed and occupied the land sought to be registered in the
nature and duration required by law.
Dumo cannot validly argue that she was not afforded due process when the
CA considered to review the evidence she herself offered to support her
application for land registration. On the contrary, she was given every
opportunity to submit the documents to establish her right to register the
land. She simply failed to do so.
When Dumo filed with the RTC the application for registration of her land,
she was asking the RTC to confirm her incomplete title. The requirements for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title are found in Section 14 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (PD No. 1529), which provides:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner
provided for by law.
xxxx
Thus, it is necessary in an application for land registration that the court
determines whether or not an applicant fulfills the requirements under any
of the paragraphs of Section 14 of PD No. 1529.
Simply put, when Dumo filed her application for the registration of the lots
she claims to have inherited from her mother and bought from her siblings,
the issue of whether she complied with all the requirements was the very
crux of the application. It cannot be argued that because the Republic failed
to oppose or raise the issue in the RTC, the CA may no longer consider this
issue. On the contrary, the classification of the land sought to be registered,
and the duration and nature of the possession and occupation have always
been, and will always be the issues in an application for land registration. It
would truly be absurd for Dumo, or any other applicant for land registration,
to expect the courts to grant the application without first determining if the
requisites under the law have been complied with.
The CA had every right to look into the compliance by Dumo with the
requirements for the registration of the land, and we find that the CA
correctly found that Dumo has acquired no registerable title to the lots she
seeks to register.
Registration of land under Section 14(1)
To reiterate, under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529, Dumo had the burden of
proving the following:
(1) that the land or property forms part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain;
(2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and
(3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945,
or earlier.12
The first requirement is to prove that the land sought to be registered is
alienable and disposable land of the public domain. This is because under the
Regalian Doctrine, as embodied in the 1987 Philippine Constitution, lands
which do not clearly appear to be within private ownership are presumed to
belong to the State.13 Thus, in an application for land registration, the
applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption that the State owns
the land applied for, and proving that the land has already been classified as
alienable and disposable.14 To overcome the presumption that the land
belongs to the State, the applicant must prove by clear and incontrovertible
evidence at the time of application that the land has been classified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain.
Classification of lands of the public domain may be found under Article XII of
the 1987 Philippine Constitution. More specifically, Section 3 of Article XII
classifies lands of the public domain into (1) agricultural, (2) forest or timber,
(3) mineral lands, and (4) national parks.15 Of these four classifications, only
agricultural lands may be alienated and disposed of by the State.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution also provides that "agricultural lands of the
public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to
which they may be devoted."16 Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the
classification of lands of the public domain is first and foremost provided by
the Constitution itself. Of the classifications of lands of the public domain,
agricultural lands may further be classified by law, according to the uses it
may be devoted to.
The classification of lands of the public domain into agricultural lands, as well
as their further classification into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, is a legislative prerogative which may be exercised only through the
enactment of a valid law. This prerogative has long been exercised by the
legislative department through the enactment of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (CA No. 141) or the Public Land Act of 1936.17 Section 6 of CA No. 141
remains to this day the existing general law governing the classification of
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.18
Section 182719of the Revised Administrative Code of 191720 merely
authorizes the Department Head to classify as agricultural lands those forest
lands which are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural purposes.
Section 1827 does not authorize the Department Head to classify agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable lands as this power is expressly delegated
by the same Revised Administrative Code of 1917 solely to the Governor-
General.
The existing administrative code under the 1987 Philippine Constitution is
Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987. This existing
code did not reenact Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917. Nevertheless, in the absence of incompatibility between Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 and the provisions of the
Administrative Code of 1987, we can grant that Section 1827 has not been
repealed.21 This is in view of the repealing clause in Section 27, Final
Provisions, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987, which provides:
Section 27. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The authority of the Department Head under Section 1827 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 is merely to classify public forest lands as public
agricultural lands. Agricultural lands of the public domain are, by themselves,
not alienable and disposable. Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 provides:
Section 1827. Assignment of Forest Land for Agricultural Purposes. – Lands in
public forests, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the
Director of Forestry that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests
to be kept under forest, shall be declared by the Department Head to be
agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied)
There is nothing in Section 1827 that authorizes the Department Head to
classify agricultural lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. The power to classify public lands as agricultural lands is separate
and distinct from the power to declare agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable. The power to alienate agricultural lands of the public domain can
never be inferred from the power to classify public lands as agricultural.
Thus, public lands classified as agricultural and used by the Bureau of Plant
Industry of the Department of Agriculture for plant research or plant
propagation are not necessarily alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain despite being classified as agricultural lands. For such agricultural
lands to be alienable and disposable, there must be an express proclamation
by the President declaring such agricultural lands as alienable and disposable.
Agricultural land, the only classification of land which may be classified as
alienable and disposable under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, may still be
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes which would prohibit the
alienation or disposition of such land. Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides:
Section 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or
concession which have been officially delimited and classified and, when
practicable, surveyed, and which have not been reserved for public or quasi-
public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any manner
become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which,
having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so. However, the
President may, for reasons of public interest, declare lands of the public
domain open to disposition before the same have had their boundaries
established or been surveyed, or may, for the same reason, suspend their
concession or disposition until they are again declared open to concession
or disposition by proclamation duly published or by Act of the National
Assembly. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, to be alienable and disposable, lands of the public domain must be
expressly declared as alienable and disposable by executive or administrative
proclamation pursuant to law or by an Act of Congress.
Even if the Department Head has the power to classify public forest lands as
agricultural under Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
this does not include the power to classify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The power
to further classify agricultural lands as alienable and disposable has not been
granted in any way to the Department Head under the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. This authority was given only to the Governor-
General under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, as
superseded by Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) No. 2874 (Public Land Act of
1919), and as in turn further superseded by Section 6 of CA No. 141 (Public
Land Act of 1936), which is the existing specific provision of law governing
the classification of lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain. This delegated power is a discretionary power, to
be exercised based on the sound discretion of the President.
Under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, the
classification of lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain could only be made by the Governor-General.
While Section 1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 gave to the
Department Head the power to classify public forest lands as public
agricultural lands, the very same law in its Section 64 expressly reserved to
the Governor-General the power to declare for "public sale x x x any of the
public domain of the Philippines." Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917 provides:
Section 64. Particular powers and duties of Governor-General of the
Philippines. – In addition to his general supervisory authority, the Governor-
General of the Philippines shall have such specific powers and duties as are
expressly conferred or imposed on him by law and also, in particular, the
powers and duties set forth in this chapter.
Among such special powers and duties shall be:
(a) x x x
xxxx
(d) To reserve from settlement or public sale and for specific public uses any
of the public domain of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines the use of which
is not otherwise directed by law, the same thereafter remaining subject to
the specific public uses indicated in the executive order by which such
reservation is made, until otherwise provided by law or executive order.
(e) To reserve from sale or other disposition and for specific public uses or
service, any land belonging to the private domain of the Government of the
(Philippine Islands) Philippines, the use of which is not otherwise directed by
law; and thereafter such land shall not be subject to sale or other disposition
and shall be used for the specific purposes directed by such executive order
until otherwise provided by law.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, under Section 9 of RA No. 2874, the classification of lands of public
domain into alienable and disposable lands could only be made by the
Governor-General, thus:
Section 9. For the purposes of their government and disposition, the lands of
the public domain alienable or open to disposition shall be classified,
according to the use or purposes to which such lands are destined, as
follows:
(a) Agricultural
(b) Commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes.
(c) Educational, charitable, and other similar purposes.
(d) Reservations for town sites, and for public and quasi-public uses.
The Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time make the
classification provided for in this section, and may, at any time and in a
similar manner, transfer lands from one class to another. (Emphasis
supplied)
Similarly, under Section 6 of CA No. 141, the existing law on the
matter, only the President can classify lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable lands, thus:
Section 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class
to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under all laws during the American regime, from the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917 up to and including CA No. 141, only the
Governor-General or President could classify lands of the public domain into
alienable and disposable lands. No other government official was
empowered by statutory law during the American regime. Under the
1935,22 197323 and 198724 Philippine Constitutions, the power to declare or
classify lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable lands
belonged to Congress. This legislative power is still delegated to the
President under Section 6 of CA No. 141 since this Section 6 was never
repealed by Congress despite successive amendments to CA No. 141 after
the adoption of the 1935, 1973 and the 1987 Philippine Constitutions.25
Under Section 13 of PD No. 705, otherwise known as the Revised Forestry
Code of the Philippines, the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Secretary has been delegated by law the discretionary
power to classify as alienable and disposable forest lands of the public
domain no longer needed for forest reserves. Section 13 of the Revised
Forestry Code of the Philippines, which was enacted on 19 May 1975,
provides:
Section 13. System of Land Classification.– The Department Head shall study,
devise, determine and prescribe the criteria, guidelines and methods for the
proper and accurate classification and survey of all lands of the public
domain into agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement,
mineral, timber or forest, and grazing lands, and into such other classes as
now or may hereafter be provided by law, rules and regulations.
In the meantime, the Department Head shall simplify through inter-bureau
action the present system of determining which of the unclassified lands of
the public domain are needed for forest purposes and declare them as
permanent forest to form part of the forest reserves. He shall declare those
classified and determined not to be needed for forest purposes as alienable
and disposable lands, the administrative jurisdiction and management of
which shall be transferred to the Bureau of Lands: Provided, That mangrove
and other swamps not needed for shore protection and suitable for fishpond
purposes shall be released to, and be placed under the administrative
jurisdiction and management of, the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources. Those still to be classified under the present system shall continue
to remain as part of the public forest. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states: "x x x.
Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. x x
x." Thus, the unclassified lands of the public domain, not needed for forest
reserve purposes, must first be declared agricultural lands of the public
domain before the DENR Secretary can declare them alienable and
disposable. Under the foregoing Section 13 of PD No. 705, the DENR
Secretary has no discretionary power to classify unclassified lands of the
public domain, not needed for forest reserve purposes, into agricultural
lands. However, the DENR Secretary can invoke his power under Section
1827 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 to classify forest lands into
agricultural lands. Once so declared as agricultural lands of the public
domain, the DENR Secretary can then invoke his delegated power under
Section 13 of PD No. 705 to declare such agricultural lands as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.
This Court has recognized in numerous cases the authority of the DENR
Secretary to classify agricultural lands of the public domain as alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain.26 As we declared in Republic of the
Philippines v. Heirs of Fabio,27 "the DENR Secretary is the only other public
official empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such
land as alienable and disposable."
Consequently, as the President's and the DENR Secretary's discretionary
power to classify land as alienable and disposable is merely delegated to
them under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705, respectively, they may not
redelegate the same to another office or officer. What has once been
delegated by Congress can no longer be further delegated or redelegated by
the original delegate to another, as expressed in the Latin maxim — Delegata
potestas non potest delegari.28 Thus, in Aquino-Sarmiento v. Morato,29 this
Court ruled:
The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General
Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself
and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive
Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the
implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions
or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a], Ibid.). The power of classification having
been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no
choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law, i.e., as a collegial
body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the
intervening mind of another. Delegata potestas non potest delegari —a
delegated power cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification
involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason
the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power
for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary
authority cannot be a subject of delegation. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the 1987 Philippine Constitution, the power to classify agricultural
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain is exercised "by law" or through legislative enactment. In accordance
with Section 6 of CA No. 141, this power is delegated to the President who
may, based on his sound discretion, classify agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. This delegated power to so
classify public agricultural lands may no longer be redelegated by the
President – what has once been delegated may no longer be delegated to
another. Likewise, the same discretionary power has been delegated "by
law" to the DENR Secretary who, of course, cannot redelegate the same to
his subordinates.
As it is only the President or the DENR Secretary who may classify as
alienable and disposable the lands of the public domain, an applicant for land
registration must prove that the land sought to be registered has been
declared by the President or DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable land
of the public domain. To establish such character, jurisprudence has been
clear on what an applicant must submit to clearly establish that the land
forms part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,30 this Court has held
that an applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of
the official records. Additionally, a certificate of land classification status
issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO)
or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of the
DENR and approved by the DENR Secretary must also be presented to prove
that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable and
disposable) and that it falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO.31 In Republic of the Philippines v. Roche,32 we
clearly stated:
[T]he applicant bears the burden of proving the status of the land. In this
connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) or the Provincial Environment and Natural
Resources Office (PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR
Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land as
alienable and disposable, and that it is within the approved area per
verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO. Further, the applicant
must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR
Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the
land is alienable and disposable.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To repeat, there are two (2) documents which must be presented: first, a
copy of the original classification approved by the Secretary of the DENR and
certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records,
and second, a certificate of land classification status issued by the CENRO or
the PENRO based on the land classification approved by the DENR Secretary.
The requirement set by this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N
Properties, Inc. that both these documents be based on the land classification
approved by the DENR Secretary is not a mere superfluity. This requirement
stems from the fact that the alienable and disposable classification of
agricultural land may be made by the President or DENR Secretary. And while
the DENR Secretary may perform this act in the regular course of business,
this does not extend to the CENRO or PENRO – the DENR Secretary may no
longer delegate the power to issue such certification as the power to classify
lands of the public domain as alienable and disposable lands is in itself a
delegated power under CA No. 141 and PD No. 705.
Moreover, we have repeatedly stated that a CENRO or PENRO certification is
not enough to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the property
sought to be registered because the only way to prove the classification of
the land is through the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
or the President himself. This Court has clearly held:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is
alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove
that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released
the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per
verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to
prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so
because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves,
prove that the land is alienable and disposable.34 (Emphasis supplied)
A CENRO or PENRO certification is insufficient to prove the alienable and
disposable nature of the land sought to be registered it is the original
classification by the DENR Secretary or the President which is essential to
prove that the land is indeed alienable and disposable. This has been
consistently upheld by this Court in subsequent land registration cases.
Recently, in Republic of the Philippines v. Nicolas,35 which cited Republic of
the Philippines v. Lualhati,36 the Court rejected the attempt of the applicant
to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land through PENRO
or CENRO certifications. The Court held:
[N]one of the documents submitted by respondent to the trial court
indicated that the subject property was agricultural or part of the alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. At most, the CENRO Report and
Certification stated that the land was not covered by any kind of public land
application. This was far from an adequate proof of the classification of the
land. In fact, in Republic v. Lualhati, the Court rejected an attempt to prove
the alienability of public land using similar evidence:
Here, respondent failed to establish, by the required evidence, that the land
sought to be registered has been classified as alienable or disposable land of
the public domain. The records of this case merely bear certifications from
the DENR-CENRO, Region IV, Antipolo City, stating that no public land
application or land patent covering the subject lots is pending nor are the
lots embraced by any administrative title. Said CENRO certifications,
however, do not even make any pronouncement as to the alienable
character of the lands in question for they merely recognize the absence of
any pending land patent application, administrative title, or government
project being conducted thereon. But even granting that they expressly
declare that the subject lands form part of the alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain, these certifications remain insufficient for
purposes of granting respondent's application for registration. As
constantly held by this Court, it is not enough for the CENRO to certify that
a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and
that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or
CENRO. Unfortunately for respondent, the evidence submitted clearly falls
short of the requirements for original registration in order to show the
alienable character of the lands subject herein. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, Dumo failed to submit any of the documents required to prove
that the land she seeks to register is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
Response to the Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa
The Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa suggests that
certifications of land classification status issued by the CENRO and PENRO
should be deemed sufficient to prove the alienable and disposable character
of the property if these certifications bear references to the land
classification maps and the original classification issued and signed by the
DENR Secretary. This suggestion clearly undermines the requirements set by
this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.37 where the
Court expressly stated that it is not enough for the CENRO or PENRO to
certify that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable.
What is required from the applicant in a land registration proceeding is to
prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that
the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. Quite clearly,
the Court definitively stated that to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable, the applicant must present a certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the proclamation made by
the President. Only the certified true copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary or the President will prove to the courts
that indeed, the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable.
That the certifications of the CENRO or PENRO contain references to the
original classification approved by the DENR Secretary is not enough to prove
that the land is alienable and disposable. Mere references made in the
certifications to the classification of land as approved by the DENR Secretary
are simply insufficient. The trial court must be given a certified true copy of
the classification made by the DENR Secretary or the President because it is
the only acceptable and sufficient proof of the alienable and disposable
character of the land. In Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.,38the Court required the submission of the certified true copy of the
land classification approved by the DENR Secretary precisely because mere
references made by the CENRO and PENRO to the land classification were
deemed insufficient. For instance, CENRO and PENRO may inadvertently
make references to an original classification approved by the DENR Secretary
which does not cover the land sought to be registered, or worse, to a non-
existent original classification. This is the very evil that the ruling in Republic
of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.39 seeks to avoid. Justice Caguioa's
suggestion resurrects the very evil banished by this Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc. 40
Decisions of this Court form part of the legal system of the Philippines 41 and
thus the CENRO, PENRO, and the DENR must follow the decision made by
this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc.42The ruling of
this Court requiring the submission of the certified true copy of the original
classification as approved by the DENR Secretary cannot be overturned or
amended by the CENRO or PENRO or even by the DENR. The DENR, CENRO,
and PENRO must follow the law as laid down by this Court in Republic of the
Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.43 It is not this Court that should amend its
ruling in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N Properties, Inc.44 to conform to
the administrative rules of the DENR, CENRO, or PENRO reversing the final
ruling of this Court in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N. Properties,
Inc.45 The authority given by the Administrative Order of the DENR to the
CENRO and PENRO to issue certifications of land classification status does not
and cannot reverse the clear requirement laid down by the Court for
applicants of land registration to submit the certified true copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary to prove the alienable and
disposable character of the land.
To repeat, in a judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 14(1) of
PD No. 1529, the applicant has the burden of proving that the land sought to
be registered is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. In turn,
the best evidence of the alienable and disposable nature of the land is the
certified true copy of the original proclamation made by the President or
DENR Secretary, in accordance with CA No. 141 or PD No. 705. Submitting a
mere certification by the CENRO or PENRO with references to the original
classification made by the President or the DENR Secretary is sorely
inadequate since it has no probative value as a public document to prove the
alienable and disposable character of the public land.
Under Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign
authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the
Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by
law to be entered therein.
In turn, for the record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, Rule 132 to be admissible, it must be evidenced by an official
publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody of the record, or by his deputy.46Moreover, to be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated in public documents, such documents
must consist of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty
by a public officer.47 This requirement can be satisfied only if a certified true
copy of the proclamation by the President or the order of the DENR Secretary
classifying the land as alienable and disposable is presented to the trial court.
Quite clearly, certifications by the CENRO or PENRO do not comply with the
conditions for admissibility of evidence. The CENRO or the PENRO is not the
official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the President or
DENR Secretary classifying lands as alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain. Thus, the certifications made by the CENRO or PENRO cannot
prove the alienable and disposable character of the land, which can only be
ascertained through the classification made by the President or DENR
Secretary, the only public officials who may classify lands into alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain. The Concurring and Dissenting
Opinion alleges that the CENRO serves as a repository of the land
classification maps, and as such, authorizes the CENRO to issue certified true
copies of the approved land classification maps. While the CENRO may issue
certified true copies of these land classification maps, these maps are not the
required certified true copy of the original proclamation or order classifying
the public land as alienable and disposable. Moreover, these maps are not in
the possession of the officials who have custody of the original proclamation
or order classifying the public land as alienable and disposable. Again, the
best evidence of the alienable and disposable nature of the land is the
certified true copy of the classification made by the President or the DENR
Secretary – not the certified true copy issued by the CENRO of its land
classification maps.
It is also worthy to note that in Republic of the Philippines v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,48 we have already discussed the value of certifications issued
by the CENRO or PENRO in land registration cases:
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
fall within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence
of Section 23 of Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public
records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer", such as
entries made by the Civil Registrar in the books of registries, or by a ship
captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are not the certified copies
or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the legal
custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of
public documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by
adequate proof, and thus have no probative value. Certainly, the
certifications cannot be considered prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not
prove that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as
proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by
their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such government
certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the
second sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications
are prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they
do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.49 (Emphasis supplied)
The certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO, by itself, does not prove the
alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The
certification should always be accompanied by the original or certified true
copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary or the
President.
Substantial Compliance with the Requirements of Section 14(1)
Dumo argues that the Certification from the Regional Surveys Division, which
was formally offered as Exhibit "A" and not opposed by the Republic, should
be considered substantial compliance with the requirement that the
applicant must submit the certified true copy of the original classification of
the land as approved by the DENR Secretary.
We do not agree.
The fact that the Republic did not oppose the formal offer of evidence of
Dumo in the RTC does not have the effect of proving or impliedly admitting
that the land is alienable and disposable. The alienable and disposable
character of the land must be proven by clear and incontrovertible evidence.
It may not be impliedly admitted, as Dumo vehemently argues. It was the
duty of Dumo to prove that the land she sought to register is alienable and
disposable land of the public domain. This burden would have been
discharged by submitting the required documents – a copy of the original
classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by
the legal custodian thereof, and a certificate of land classification status
issued by the CENRO or the PENRO based on the approved land classification
by the DENR Secretary. Without these, the applicant simply fails to prove
that the land sought to be registered forms part of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain and thus, it may not be susceptible to
private ownership. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the land is presumed
to belong to the State as part of the public domain.
Another requirement under Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 is to prove that the
applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land under
a bonafide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
In this case, the CA found that Dumo and her predecessors-in-interest have
been in possession of the land only from 1948, which is the earliest date of
the tax declaration presented by Dumo. This fact is expressly admitted by
Dumo. Thus, from this admission alone, it is clear that she failed to prove her
and her predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation of the land for
the duration required by law — from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Dumo, however, argues that it does not matter that her possession dates
only back to 1948 because this Court has allegedly stated that even if the
possession or occupation started after 12 June 1945, this does not bar the
grant of an application for registration of land.
Again, we do not agree with Dumo.
To determine whether possession or occupation from 12 June 1945 or earlier
is material, one has to distinguish if the application for the registration of
land is being made under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of Section 14 of PD No.
1529. The relevant paragraphs provide:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
Thus, it is clear that if the applicant is applying for the registration of land
under paragraph 1, possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
should have commenced from 12 June 1945 or earlier. If, however, the
applicant is relying on the second paragraph of Section 14 to register the
land, then it is true that a different set of requirements applies, and
possession and occupation from 12 June 1945 or earlier are not required.
The reliance of Dumo on Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 50 is
misplaced. The pronouncement of the Court in relation to the phrase "June
12, 1945 or earlier" was that the alienable and disposable classification of the
land need not be from 12 June 1945 or earlier, and that as long as such land
is classified as alienable and disposable when the application is filed, then the
first requirement under the law is fulfilled. The Court held:
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable
character of the land should have already been established since June 12,
1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1).
"Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bona fide claim of ownership." Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they
are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad
proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt
petitioner's position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be,
adopting the OSG's view, that all lands of the public domain which were not
declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of
Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from
giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as
alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even
be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not
yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely
requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and
disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the
State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to
release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need
to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been
classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is
already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.51
Thus, it did not state that the possession and occupation from 12 June 1945
or earlier are no longer required. It merely clarified when the land should
have been classified as alienable and disposable to meet the requirements of
Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529. The property sought to be registered must be
declared alienable and disposable at the time of the filing of the application
for registration.52 This does not require that the land be declared alienable
and disposable from 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Registration of land under Section 14(2)
Dumo also argues that she has the right to register the land because she and
her predecessors-in-interest have already acquired the land through
prescription. She states that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the land for fifty-six (56) years, and thus she
has already acquired ownership of the land by prescription.
Again, we disagree.
It is true that under Section 14 of PD No. 1529, one may acquire ownership of
the land by prescription. Particularly, paragraph 2 of Section 14 provides that
"those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws" may file an application for registration of title
to land. The existing law mentioned in PD No. 1529 is the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,53 we applied
the civil law concept of prescription as embodied in the Civil Code to
interpret Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529. This Court held:
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication,
as it applies the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly
Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there are two kinds of
prescription under the Civil Code – ordinary acquisitive prescription and
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed "through uninterrupted adverse possession... for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith."54 (Boldfacing and underscoring
supplied)
Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529 puts into operation the entire regime of
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to
Article 1137.55 Article 1113 provides that "[p]roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription." Thus, it is clear that the land must be patrimonial before it may
be susceptible of acquisitive prescription. Indeed, Section 14(2) of PD No.
1529 provides that one may acquire ownership of private lands by
prescription.
Land of the public domain is converted into patrimonial property when there
is an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national
wealth.56 Without such declaration, acquisitive prescription does not start to
run, even if such land is alienable and disposable and the applicant is in
possession and occupation thereof. We have held:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly
declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.57
Mere classification of agricultural land as alienable and disposable does not
make such land patrimonial property of the State – an express declaration by
the State that such land is no longer intended for public use, public service or
the development of national wealth is imperative. This is because even with
such classification, the land remains to be part of the lands of the public
domain. In Navy Officers' Village Association, Inc. v. Republic of the
Philippines,58 we stated:
Lands of the public domain classified as reservations for public or quasi-
public uses are non-alienable and shall not be subject to disposition,
although they are, by the general classification under Section 6 of C.A. No.
141, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, until declared
open for disposition by proclamation of the President. (Emphasis supplied)
Under CA No. 141, the power given to the President to classify lands as
alienable and disposable extends only to lands of the public domain. Lands
of the public domain are public lands intended for public use, or without
being for public use, are intended for some public service or for the
development of national wealth. Lands of the public domain, like alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, are not private lands. Article 420 of
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others
of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth.
Classifying lands as alienable and disposable does not take away from the
fact that these lands still belong to the public domain. These lands belonged
to the public domain before they were classified as alienable and disposable
and they still remain to be lands of the public domain after such
classification. In fact, these lands are classified in Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Philippine Constitution as "[a]lienable lands of the public
domain." The alienable and disposable character of the land merely gives the
State the authority to alienate and dispose of such land if it deems that the
land is no longer needed for public use, public service or the development of
national wealth.
Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are those that are to be
disposed of to private individuals by sale or application, because their
disposition to private individuals is for the development of the national
wealth. Thus, homesteads, which are granted to individuals from alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain, are for the development of
agriculture which would redound to the development of national
wealth. However, until the lands are alienated or disposed of to private
individuals, they remain "alienable lands of the public domain," as
expressly classified by the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Lands of the public domain become patrimonial property only when they are
no longer intended for public use or public service or the development of
national wealth. Articles 421 and 422 of the Civil Code expressly provide:
Article 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character
stated in the preceding article, is patrimonial property
Article 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public
use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the
State.
In turn, the intention that the property is no longer needed for public use,
public service or the development of national wealth may only be
ascertained through an express declaration by the State. We have clearly
held:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the
public dominion property is no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by
prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of
for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive only as follows, and not otherwise:
prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law
duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the (1) For homestead settlement;
President is duly authorized by law.59 (Emphasis supplied)

Without an express declaration that the land is no longer needed for public (2) By sale;
use, public service or the development of national wealth, it should be
presumed that the lands of the public domain, whether alienable and (3) By lease; and
disposable or not, remain belonging to the State under the Regalian
Doctrine. We have already recognized that the classification of land as
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles:
alienable and disposable does not make such property patrimonial. In Dream
Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. v. Bases Conversion Development
Authority,60 the Court held: (a) By judicial legalization; or

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent). (Emphasis
susceptible of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
supplied)
Republic, it was pointed out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was
enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila became alienable and
disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby In turn, Section 48 of the same law provides for those who may apply for
become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title by judicial application:
they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines,
American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or
law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of national
an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
property of the public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon their sale to a
title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion: xxxx

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified (b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if x x been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
x it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a
national wealth." bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title,
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
chapter. (Emphasis supplied)
development of national wealth. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear from the foregoing provisions that for lands of the public domain,
The alienable and disposable character of public agricultural land does not
one may apply for an administrative grant from the government, through
convert the land to patrimonial property. It merely gives the State the
homestead, sale, lease or free patent, or apply for the confirmation of their
authority to alienate or dispose the agricultural land, in accordance with law.
title in accordance with the conditions provided under Section 48(b) of CA
It is only when (1) there is an express government manifestation that the
No. 141. PD No. 1529 provides for the original registration procedure for the
land is already patrimonial or no longer intended for public use, public
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. It must also be
service or the development of national wealth, or (2) land which has been
noted that the wording in Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 is similar to that found
classified as alienable and disposable land is actually alienated and disposed
in Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529. The similarity in wording has already been
of by the State, that such land becomes patrimonial.
explained by this Court when it recognized that Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529
In the present case, Dumo not only failed to prove that the land sought to be works in relation to Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 in the registration of
registered is alienable and disposable, but also utterly failed to submit any alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
evidence to establish that such land has been converted into patrimonial
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the
property by an express declaration by the State. To repeat, acquisitive
nature of the right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property
prescription only applies to private lands as expressly provided in Article
Registration Decree, which seems to presume the pre-existence of the right,
1113 of the Civil Code. To register land acquired by prescription under PD No.
rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert
1529 (in relation to the Civil Code of the Philippines), the applicant must
that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25
prove that the land is not merely alienable and disposable, but that it has
January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen who
also been converted into patrimonial property of the State. Prescription will
has been in "open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
start to run only from the time the land has become patrimonial.61 Unless the
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
alienable and disposable land of the public domain is expressly converted
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" to perfect
into patrimonial property, there is no way for acquisitive prescription to set
or complete his title by applying with the proper court for the confirmation
in under Article 1113 of the Civil Code.
of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding certificate of
However, another mode of prescription specifically governs the acquisitive title.
prescription of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. CA No.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of
141 provides for the modes of disposing alienable and disposable agricultural
the Public Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural
lands of the public domain:
purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the
Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the
possessor who has been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In
turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well
as provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the
judicial confirmation of an imperfect or incomplete title. 62 (Emphasis
supplied)

Thus, the applicant for registration of the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain claims his right to register the land under Section 48(b) of
CA No. 141 and the procedure for registration is found under Section 14(1) of
PD No. 1529 which provides that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier" may file in the proper court their application for land registration.
The basis for application of judicial confirmation of title over alienable and
disposable land of the public domain is not acquisitive prescription under the
Civil Code, but rather, the fulfillment of the requirements under Section 48(b)
of CA No. 141.

To summarize the discussion and reiterate the guidelines set by this Court
in Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines,63 we state:

1. If the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land
sought to be registered under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June
1945 or earlier, the applicant must prove that the land has been classified by
the Executive department as alienable and disposable land of the public
domain. This is covered by Section 14(1) of PD No. 1529 in relation to Section
48(b) of CA No. 141.

While it is not necessary that the land has been alienable and disposable
since 12 June 1945 or earlier, the applicant must prove that the President or
DENR Secretary has classified the land as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain at any time before the application was made.

2. If the occupation and possession of the land commenced at any time after
12 June 1945, the applicant may still register the land if he or his
predecessors-in-interest have complied with the requirements of acquisitive
prescription under the Civil Code after the land has been expressly declared
as patrimonial property or no longer needed for public use, public service or
the development of national wealth. This is governed by Section 14(2) of PD
No. 1529 in relation to the Civil Code.

Under the Civil Code, acquisitive prescription, whether ordinary or

extraordinary, applies only to private property. Thus, the applicant must
prove when the land sought to be registered was expressly declared as
patrimonial property because it is only from this time that the period for
acquisitive prescription would start to run.

Based on the foregoing, we find that the CA committed no reversible error in

finding that Dumo had no registerable title over the land she seeks to
register. She failed to prove her right under either Section 14(1) or Section
14(2) of PD No. 1529. She failed to prove that the land she seeks to register
was alienable and disposable land of the public domain. She failed to prove
her and her predecessors-in-interest's possession and occupation since 12
June 1945 or earlier. Thus, she has no right under Section 14(1) of PD No.
1529. While she argues that she and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession and occupation of the land for 56 years, she failed to prove that
the land has been expressly declared as patrimonial property. Therefore, she G.R. No. 159595             January 23, 2007
also has no right under Section 14(2) of PD No. 1529.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of vs.
the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. LOURDES ABIERA NILLAS, Respondent.

SO ORDERED. DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The central question raised in this Petition for Review is whether prescription
or laches may bar a petition to revive a judgment in a land registration case.
It is a hardly novel issue, yet petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic)
pleads that the Court rule in a manner that would unsettle precedent. We
deny certiorari and instead affirm the assailed rulings of the courts below.
The facts bear little elaboration. On 10 April 1997, respondent Lourdes
Abiera Nillas (Nillas) filed a Petition for Revival of Judgment with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Dumaguete City. It was alleged therein that on 17 July
1941, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Negros Oriental rendered
a Decision Adicional in Expediente Cadastral No. 14, captioned as El Director
De Terrenos contra Esteban Abingayan y Otros.1 In the decision, the CFI,
acting as a cadastral court, adjudicated several lots, together with the
improvements thereon, in favor of named oppositors who had established
their title to their respective lots and their continuous possession thereof
since time immemorial and ordered the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office, upon the finality of the decision, to issue the
corresponding decree of registration.2 Among these lots was Lot No. 771 of
the Sibulan Cadastre, which was adjudicated to Eugenia Calingacion (married
to Fausto Estoras) and Engracia Calingacion, both residents of Sibulan,
Negros Oriental.3
Nillas further alleged that her parents, Serapion and Josefina A. Abierra,
eventually acquired Lot No. 771 in its entirety. By way of a Deed of Absolute
Sale dated 7 November 1977, Engracia Calingacion sold her undivided one-
half (1/2) share over Lot No. 771 to the Spouses Abierra, the parents of
Nillas. On the other hand, the one-half (1/2) share adjudicated to Eugenia
Calingacion was also acquired by the Spouses Abierra through various
purchases they effected from the heirs of Eugenia between the years 1975 to
1982. These purchases were evidenced by three separate Deeds of Absolute
Sale all in favor of the Spouses Abierra.4
In turn, Nillas acquired Lot No. 771 from her parents through a Deed of
Quitclaim dated 30 June 1994. Despite these multiple transfers, and the fact
that the Abierra spouses have been in open and continuous possession of the
subject property since the 1977 sale, no decree of registration has ever been
issued over Lot No. 771 despite the rendition of the 1941 CFI Decision. Thus,
Nillas sought the revival of the 1941 Decision and the issuance of the
corresponding decree of registration for Lot No. 771. The records do not
precisely reveal why the decree was not issued by the Director of Lands,
though it does not escape attention that the 1941 Decision was rendered a
few months before the commencement of the Japanese invasion of the
Philippines in December of 1941.
No responsive pleading was filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
although it entered its appearance on 13 May 1997 and simultaneously
deputized the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City to appear whenever the
case was set for hearing and in all subsequent proceedings.5
Trial on the merits ensued. The RTC heard the testimony of Nillas and
received her documentary evidence. No evidence was apparently presented
by the OSG. On 26 April 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision6 finding merit in
the petition for revival of judgment, and ordering the revival of the 1941
Decision, as well as directing the Commissioner of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of confirmation and
registration based on the 1941 Decision.1avvphi1.net
The OSG appealed the RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, arguing in main
that the right of action to revive judgment had already prescribed. The OSG
further argued that at the very least, Nillas should have established that a
request for issuance of a decree of registration before the Administrator of
the LRA had been duly made. The appeal was denied by the appellate court
in its Decision7 dated 24 July 2003. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals
reiterated that the provisions of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which impose a prescriptive period for enforcement of judgments by motion,
refer to ordinary civil actions and not to "special" proceedings such as land
registration cases. The Court of Appeals also noted that it would have been
especially onerous to require Nillas to first request the LRA to comply with
the 1941 decision considering that it had been established that the original
records in the 1941 case had already been destroyed and could no longer be
reconstructed.
In the present petition, the OSG strongly argues that contrary to the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, the principles of prescription and laches do apply to
land registration cases. The OSG notes that Article 1144 of the Civil Code
establishes that an action upon judgment must be brought within ten years
from the time the right of action accrues.8 Further, Section 6 of Rule 39 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure establishes that a final and executory judgment
or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of its
entry, after which time it may be enforced by action before it is barred by
statute of limitations.9 It bears noting that the Republic does not challenge
the authenticity of the 1941 Decision, or Nillas's acquisition of the rights of
the original awardees. Neither does it seek to establish that the property is
inalienable or otherwise still belonged to the State.
The OSG also extensively relies on two cases, Shipside Inc. v. Court of
Appeals10 and Heirs of Lopez v. De Castro.11 Shipside was cited since in that
case, the Court dismissed the action instituted by the Government seeking
the revival of judgment that declared a title null and void because the
judgment sought to be revived had become final more than 25 years before
the action for revival was filed. In Shipside, the Court relied on Article 1144 of
the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in
declaring that extinctive prescription did lie. On the other hand, Heirs of
Lopez involved the double registration of the same parcel of land, and the
subsequent action by one set of applicants for the issuance of the decree of
registration in their favor seven (7) years after the judgment had become
final. The Court dismissed the subsequent action, holding that laches had set
in, it in view of the petitioners' omission to assert a right for nearly seven (7)
years.
Despite the invocation by the OSG of these two cases, there exists a more
general but definite jurisprudential rule that favors Nillas and bolsters the
rulings of the lower courts. The rule is that "neither laches nor the statute of
limitations applies to a decision in a land registration case."12
The most extensive explanation of this rule may be found in Sta. Ana v.
Menla,13 decided in 1961, wherein the Court refuted an argument that a
decision rendered in a land registration case wherein the decree of
registration remained unissued after 26 years was already "final and
enforceable." The Court, through Justice Labrador, explained:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the
assignment [of error], except insofar as it supports his theory that after a
decision in a land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced
after the lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to
enforce the judgment or decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in
the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5
years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6,
Rule 39). This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so
because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the
same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings[,] the
purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration
proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary,
except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land
and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal. x x x
x x x x There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the
court may order or issue a decree. The reason is xxx that the judgment is
merely declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or
enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree
is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the Land Registration
Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the decree for the
reason that no motion therefor has been filed can not prejudice the owner,
or the person in whom the land is ordered to be registered.14
The doctrine that neither prescription nor laches may render inefficacious a
decision in a land registration case was reiterated five (5) years after Sta.
Ana, in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos, etc., et al. v. De Banuvar, et al. 15 In that
case, it was similarly argued that a prayer for the issuance of a decree of
registration filed in 1962 pursuant to a 1938 decision was, among others,
barred by prescription and laches. In rejecting the argument, the Court was
content in restating with approval the above-cited excerpts from Sta. Ana. A
similar tack was again adopted by the Court some years later in Rodil v.
Benedicto.16 These cases further emphasized, citing Demoran v. Ibanez, etc.,
and Poras17 and Manlapas and Tolentino v. Llorente,18 respectively, that the
right of the applicant or a subsequent purchaser to ask for the issuance of a
writ of possession of the land never prescribes.19
Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the
rules on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been
repeatedly affirmed. Apart from the three (3) cases mentioned earlier,
the Sta. Ana doctrine was reiterated in another three (3) more cases later,
namely: Vda. de Barroga v. Albano,20 Cacho v. Court of
Appeals,21 and Paderes v. Court of Appeals.22 The doctrine of stare
decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy
employed by the Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine
and the cases that spawned and educed it never existed at all. Instead, it is
insisted that the Rules of Court, which provides for the five (5)-year
prescriptive period for execution of judgments, is applicable to land
registration cases either by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.23 The Republic further observes that
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 has no provision on execution of final
judgments; hence, the provisions of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure should apply to land registration proceedings.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that
the principle enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current
arguments of the Republic.
Rule 39, as invoked by the Republic, applies only to ordinary civil actions, not
to other or extraordinary proceedings not expressly governed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure but by some other specific law or legal modality such as land
registration cases. Unlike in ordinary civil actions governed by the Rules of
Civil Procedure, the intent of land registration proceedings is to establish
ownership by a person of a parcel of land, consistent with the purpose of
such extraordinary proceedings to declare by judicial fiat a status, condition
or fact. Hence, upon the finality of a decision adjudicating such ownership,
no further step is required to effectuate the decision and a ministerial duty
exists alike on the part of the land registration court to order the issuance of,
and the LRA to issue, the decree of registration.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529)
does not contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the
application of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory
fashion. Quite the contrary, it is precisely because PD No. 1529 does not
specifically provide for execution of judgments in the sense ordinarily
understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no need for
the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the
title, that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to
land registration cases in the first place. Section 39 of PD No. 1529 reads:
SEC. 39. Preparation of Decree and Certificate of Title. - After the judgment
directing the registration of title to land has become final, the court shall,
within fifteen days from entry of judgment, issue an order directing the
Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration and
certificate of title. The clerk of court shall send, within fifteen days from entry
of judgment, certified copies of the judgment and of the order of the court
directing the Commissioner to issue the corresponding decree of registration
and certificate of title, and a certificate stating that the decision has not been
amended, reconsidered, nor appealed, and has become final. Thereupon, the
Commissioner shall cause to be prepared the decree of registration as well as
the original and duplicate of the corresponding original certificate of title.
The original certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of
registration. The decree of registration shall be signed by the Commissioner,
entered and filed in the Land Registration Commission. The original of the
original certificate of title shall also be signed by the Commissioner and shall
be sent, together with the owner’s duplicate certificate, to the Register of
Deeds of the city or province where the property is situated for entry in his
registration book.
The provision lays down the procedure that interposes between the
rendition of the judgment and the issuance of the certificate of title. No
obligation whatsoever is imposed by Section 39 on the prevailing applicant or
oppositor even as a precondition to the issuance of the title. The obligations
provided in the Section are levied on the land court (that is to issue an order
directing the Land Registration Commissioner to issue in turn the
corresponding decree of registration), its clerk of court (that is to transmit
copies of the judgment and the order to the Commissioner), and the Land
Registration Commissioner (that is to cause the preparation of the decree of
registration and the transmittal thereof to the Register of Deeds). All these
obligations are ministerial on the officers charged with their performance
and thus generally beyond discretion of amendment or review.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the
issuance of the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from
ownership of the land. Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with
said authorities can. The ultimate goal of our land registration system is
geared towards the final and definitive determination of real property
ownership in the country, and the imposition of an additional burden on the
owner after the judgment in the land registration case had attained finality
would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law
from the time decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in
itself and does not need to be filled in. From another perspective, the
judgment does not have to be executed by motion or enforced by action
within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would
have been no need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a
petition for revival of judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure
derived from civil procedure and proceeds from the assumption that the
judgment is susceptible to prescription. The primary recourse need not be
with the courts, but with the LRA, with whom the duty to issue the decree of
registration remains. If it is sufficiently established before that body that
there is an authentic standing judgment or order from a land registration
court that remains unimplemented, then there should be no impediment to
the issuance of the decree of registration. However, the Court sees the
practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number of
years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented
decision or order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a
cause to bar the issuance of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation
would allow for a thorough examination of the veracity of the judgment or
order sought to be effected, or a determination of causes other than
prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance of the decree of
registration.
What about the two cases cited by the Republic, Shipside and Heirs of Lopez?
Even though the Court applied the doctrines of prescription and laches in
those cases, it should be observed that neither case was intended to
overturn the Sta. Ana doctrine, nor did they make any express declaration to
such effect. Moreover, both cases were governed by their unique set of facts,
quite distinct from the general situation that marked both Sta. Ana and the
present case.
The judgment sought belatedly for enforcement in Shipside did not arise
from an original action for land registration, but from a successful motion by
the Republic seeking the cancellation of title previously adjudicated to a
private landowner. While one might argue that such motion still arose in a
land registration case, we note that the pronouncement therein that
prescription barred the revival of the order of cancellation was made in the
course of dispensing with an argument which was ultimately peripheral to
that case. Indeed, the portion of Shipside dealing with the issue of
prescription merely restated the provisions in the Civil Code and the Rules of
Civil Procedure relating to prescription, followed by an observation that the
judgment sought to be revived attained finality 25 years earlier. However,
the Sta. Ana doctrine was not addressed, and perhaps with good reason, as
the significantly more extensive rationale provided by the Court in barring
the revival of judgment was the fact that the State no longer held interest in
the subject property, having divested the same to the Bases Conversion
Development Authority prior to the filing of the action for
revival. Shipside expounds on this point, and not on the applicability of the
rules of prescription.
Notably, Shipside has attained some measure of prominence as precedent on
still another point, relating to its pronouncements relating to the proper
execution of the certification of non-forum shopping by a corporation. In
contrast, Shipside has not since been utilized by the Court to employ the
rules on prescription and laches on final decisions in land registration cases.
It is worth mentioning that since Shipside was promulgated in 2001, the
Court has not hesitated in reaffirming the rule in Sta. Ana as recently as in
the middle of 2005 in the Paderes case.
We now turn to Heirs of Lopez, wherein the controlling factual milieu proved
even more unconventional than that in Shipside. The property involved
therein was the subject of two separate applications for registration, one
filed by petitioners therein in 1959, the other by a different party in 1967. It
was the latter who was first able to obtain a decree of registration, this
accomplished as early as 1968.24 On the other hand, the petitioners were
able to obtain a final judgment in their favor only in 1979, by which time the
property had already been registered in the name of the other claimant, thus
obstructing the issuance of certificate of title to the petitioners. The issues of
prescription and laches arose because the petitioners filed their action to
enforce the 1979 final judgment and the cancellation of the competing title
only in 1987, two (2) years beyond the five (5)-year prescriptive period
provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court did characterize the
petitioners as guilty of laches for the delay in filing the action for the
execution of the judgment in their favor, and thus denied the petition on that
score.
decree of registration is homologous by legal design, has not been disturbed
by another ruling by a co-extensive or superior court. That presumption
obtains in this case as well. Unless that presumption is overcome, there is no
impediment to the continued application of Sta. Ana as precedent.25
We are not inclined to make any pronouncements on the doctrinal viability
of Shipside or Heirs of Lopez concerning the applicability of the rules of
prescription or laches in land registration cases. Suffice it to say, those cases
do not operate to detract from the continued good standing of Sta. Ana as a
general precedent that neither prescription nor laches bars the enforcement
of a final judgment in a land registration case, especially when the said
judgment has not been reversed or modified, whether deliberately or
inadvertently, by another final court ruling. This qualifier stands not so much
as a newly-carved exception to the general rule as it does as an exercise in
stating the obvious.
Finally, the Republic faults the Court of Appeals for pronouncing that the
1941 Decision constituted res judicata that barred subsequent attacks to the
adjudicates’ title over the subject property. The Republic submits that said
decision would operate as res judicata only after the decree of registration
was issued, which did not happen in this case. We doubt that a final
decision’s status as res judicata is the impelling ground for its very own
execution; and indeed res judicata is more often invoked as a defense or as a
factor in relation to a different case altogether. Still, this faulty terminology
aside, the Republic’s arguments on this point do not dissuade from our
central holding that the 1941 Decision is still susceptible to effectuation by
the standard decree of registration notwithstanding the delay incurred by
Nillas or her predecessors-in-interest in seeking its effectuation and the
reasons for such delay, following the prostracted failure of the then Land
Registration Commissioner to issue the decree of registration. In this case, all
that Nillas needed to prove was that she had duly acquired the rights of the
original adjudicates – her predecessors-in-interest-in order to entitle her to
the decree of registration albeit still in the names of the original prevailing
parties who are her predecessors-in interest. Both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals were satisfied that such fact was proven, and the Republic
does not offer any compelling argument to dispute such proof.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Lopez noted the settled rule that "when two certificates of title are
issued to different persons covering the same land in whole or in part, the
earlier in date must prevail x x x," and indeed even if the petitioners therein
were somehow able to obtain a certificate of title pursuant to the 1979
judgment in their favor, such title could not have stood in the face of the
earlier title. The Court then correlated the laches of the petitioners with their
pattern of behavior in failing to exercise due diligence to protect their
interests over the property, marked by their inability to oppose the other
application for registration or to seek enforcement of their own judgment
within the five (5) -year reglementary period.

Still, a close examination of Heirs of Lopez reveals an unusual dilemma that

negates its application as precedent to the case at bar, or to detract
from Sta. Ana as a general rule for that matter. The execution of the
judgment sought for belated enforcement in Heirs of Lopez would have G.R. No. 231116, February 07, 2018
entailed the disturbance of a different final judgment which had already
been executed and which was shielded by the legal protection afforded by a REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. CLARO YAP, Respondent.
Torrens title. In light of those circumstances, there could not have been a
"ministerial duty" on the part of the registration authorities to effectuate the DECISION
judgment in favor of the petitioners in Heirs of Lopez. Neither could it be said
VELASCO JR., J.:
that their right of ownership as confirmed by the judgment in their favor was
indubitable, considering the earlier decree of registration over the same Nature of the Case
property accorded to a different party. The Sta. Ana doctrine rests upon the
general presumption that the final judgment, with which the corresponding

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court assailing the March 16, 2017 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491. The CA affirmed the October 20, 2011
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 6, granting
respondent's petition for registration of a parcel of land located in Carcar,
Cebu.
The Facts
On July 28, 2010, respondent Claro Yap (Yap) filed a petition3 for cancellation
and re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 of the Carcar
Cadastre, and for the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) pursuant to the re-issued decree. His petition alleged the
following:
1. Lot No. 922 with an area of thirty four (34) square meters is covered by
Decree No. 99500 issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez;
2. Ownership over Lot No. 922 was vested upon Yap by virtue of inheritance
and donation and that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the said lot since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, and/or by acquisitive prescription being possessors
in good faith in the concept of an owner for more than thirty (30) years;
3. While a valid decree was issued for Lot No. 922, based on the certification
from the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, there is no showing or
proof that an OCT was ever issued covering the said lot;
4. Lot No. 922 was registered for taxation purposes in the name of Heirs of
Porfirio Yap; and
5. There is no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind affecting Lot No. 922, or
any other person having any interest therein, legal or equitable, in
possession, reversion or expectancy, other than Yap.4
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC issued an
Order5 dated August 3, 2010 setting the case for hearing on August 3, 2011
and ordering the requisite publication thereof. Since no oppositors appeared
before the court during the said scheduled hearing, the RTC issued another
Order6 setting the case for hearing on petitioner's presentation of evidence.
During the ex parte hearing held on August 8, 2011, Yap presented the
following documents, among others, as proof of his claim:
1. Certified true copy of Decree No. 99500 issued by the authorized
officer of the Land Registration Authority (LRA);7
2. Index of decree showing that Decree No. 99500 was issued for Lot
No. 922;8
3. Certification from the Register of Deeds of Cebu that no certificate
of title covering Lot No. 922, Cad. 30 has been issued;9
4. Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Late Porfirio C. Yap
with Deed of Donation;10
5. Certification from the Office of the City Assessor of Carcar
indicating that the heirs of Porfirio Yap had been issued Tax
Declarations for Lot No. 922 since 1948;
6. Tax Declarations covering Lot No. 922 from 1948 up to 2002;11
7. Blueprint of the approved consolidation and subdivision plan; and
8. Certification from Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO), Cebu City stating that there is no
existing public land application for Lot No. 922.12
In its September 20, 2011 Order,13 the RTC admitted petitioner's evidence
and deemed the case submitted for decision.
RTC Ruling
The RTC found that Yap had sufficiently established his claims and was able
to prove his ownership and possession over Lot No. 922. As such, it granted
the petition and ordered the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to
cancel Decree No. 99500, re-issue a new copy thereof, and on the basis of
such new copy, issue an Original Certificate of Title in the name of Andres
Abellana, as administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. The dispositive
portion of the October 20, 2011 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the court grants the petition in favor of the petitioner Claro
Yap. The Land Registration Authority thru the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cebu is hereby directed to cancel Decree No. 99500 issued on
November 29, 1920 and to re-issue a new copy thereof in the name of
Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez, and on
the bases of the new copy of Decree No. 99500, to issue an Original
Certificate of Title covering Lot No. [922] in the name of Andres Abellana, as
administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.
Further, the Register of Deeds is directed to furnish the petitioner, Claro Yap,
with the re-issued copy ofDecree No. 99500 and the copy of its title upon
payment of any appropriate fees.
SO ORDERED.14
Since the order of the RTC was for the re-issuance of the decree under the
name of its original adjudicate, Yap filed a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration15 stating that the new decree and OCT should be issued
under his name instead of Andres Abellana.
On the other hand, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Comment16 mainly arguing that Yap's petition and motion
should be denied since the Republic was not furnished with copies thereof.
In its Joint Order17 dated August 26, 2014, the RTC denied Yap's motion ruling
that the law provides that the decree, which would be the basis for the
issuance of the OCT, should be issued under the name of the original
adjudicate. Likewise, the RTC also denied the OSG's motion finding that the
records of the case show that it was furnished with copies of the Petition as
well as the Partial Motion for Reconsideration.18
The OSG then interposed an appeal before the CA arguing that Yap's petition
should have been denied due to insufficiency of evidence and failure to
implead indispensable parties such as the heirs of Juan Rodriguez and/or
Andres Abellana.
CA Ruling
In its March 16, 2017 Decision, the CA upheld the RTC's ruling finding that
the pieces of evidence submitted by Yap were sufficient to support the
petition. It ruled that since it has been established that no certification of
title or patent had been issued over Lot No. 922, the RTC did not err in
ordering the re-issuance of Decree No. 99500 in the name of Andres
Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez.19
As regards the OSG's argument on non-joinder of indispensable parties, the
CA highlighted that it is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Nevertheless,
it ruled that the heirs of either Andres Abellana or Juan Rodriguez were not
deprived of the opportunity to be heard as the proceeding before the RTC
was an in rem proceeding. Thus, when the petition was published, all persons
including the said heirs were deemed notified.20
Lastly, while the CA delved into the issues ventilated by the OSG on appeal, it
also noted that it was too late to raise the same due to the latter's failure to
file a motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision or submit a comment
on the merits of Yap's Partial Motion for Reconsideration.21 The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated October 20,
2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 06, Cebu City, in LRC REC. NO. Lot
No. 922, Cad. 30, Carcar City, Cebu, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.22
Thus, the OSG filed the instant petition raising essentially the same
arguments but this time also advancing the theory that Yap's action had
already prescribed.
The Issue
The principal issue before this Court is whether or not the RTC correctly
ordered the cancellation of Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and
the issuance of the corresponding Original Certificate of Title covering Lot
No. 922.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the petition.
At the threshold, settled is the rule that prescription cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal;23 the general rule being that the appellate court is not
authorized to consider and resolve any question not properly raised in the
courts below.24
In any event, prescription does not lie in the instant case.
There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree
The OSG now postulates that the petition should be denied due to Yap and
his predecessors' failure to file the proper motion to execute Decree No.
99500 as prescribed under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.25 It also
subscribes that the petition is now barred by the statute of limitations26 since
nine (9) decades had already passed after the issuance of the said decree in
November 1920 without any action brought upon by Yap or his predecessors-
in-interest.27
Further, the OSG asseverates that there is no proof that Decree No. 99500
has attained finality and the decision granting the issuance thereof was not
appealed or modified.
The foregoing arguments are specious.
Decree No. 99500 covering Lot No. 922 had been issued on November 29,
1920 by the Court of First Instance, Province of Cebu pursuant to the court's
decision in Cadastral Case No. 1, GLRO Cadastral Record No. 58.28 The
issuance of the said decree creates a strong presumption that the decision in
Cadastral Case No. 1 had become final and executory. Thus, it is incumbent
upon the OSG to prove otherwise. However, no evidence was presented to
support its claims that the decision in Cadastral Case No. 1 and the issuance
of Decree No. 99500 had not attained finality.
The fact that the ownership over Lot No. 922 had been confirmed by judicial
declaration several decades ago does not, however, give room for the
application of the statute of limitations or laches, nor bars an application for
the re-issuance of the corresponding decree.
In the landmark case of Sta. Ana v. Menla,29 the Court elucidated the raison
d'etre why the statue of limitations and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court do not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a
land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the
lapse of a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the
judgment, which may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the
Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings, such
as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action must
immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party,
and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing
party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition
or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of
possession. The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or
losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon
the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
The third assignment of error is as follows:
THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE ISSUANCE OF A DECREE
OF REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE OPPOSITORS-APPELLEES BASED ON
A DECISION WHICH HAS ALLEGEDLY NOT YET BECOME FINAL, AND IN ANY
CASE ON A DECISION THAT HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
We also find no merit in the above contention. There is nothing in the law
that limits the period within which the court may order or issue a decree.
The reason is what is stated in the consideration of the second assignment
error, that the judgment is merely declaratory in character and does not
need to be asserted or enforced against the adverse party. Furthermore,
the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty both of the judge and of the
Land Registration Commission; failure of the court or of the clerk to issue the
decree for the reason that no motion therefore has been filed cannot
prejudice the owner, or the person in whom the land is ordered to be
registered. (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing pronouncements were echoed in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v.
de Banuvar30 and reiterated by the Court in the more recent Ting v. Heirs of
Diego Lirio31 wherein We ruled that a final judgment confirming land title and
ordering its registration constitutes res judicata against the whole world and
the adjudicate need not file a motion to execute the same, thus:
In a registration proceeding instituted for the registration of a private land,
with or without opposition, the judgment of the court confirming the title of
the applicant or oppositor, as the case may be, and ordering its registration
in his name constitutes, when final, res judicata against the whole world. It
becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from
a judgment of confirmation and registration.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court's
approval in LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza's
application for registration of the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on
the whole world including petitioner.
xxxx
The December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of
respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same
within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
For the past decades, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules
on prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly
affirmed. Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property
Registration Law32 from the time decisions in land registration cases become
final is complete in itself and does not need to be filled in. From another
perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by motion or
enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.33
The propriety of cancellation and reissuance of Decree No. 99500, to serve
as basis for the issuance of an OCT covering Lot No. 922, had been
sufficiently proven in the instant case
The OSG maintains that even assuming that Yap's petition is not barred by
the statute of limitations, there-issuance of Decree No. 99500 is still
improper due to the total lack of evidence presented before the court.34
We disagree.
At the outset, the Court need not belabor itself by enumerating and
discussing in detail, yet again, the pieces of evidence proffered in the instant
case. This matter had already been passed upon and settled by the courts a
quo and it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. Yet,
even if We take a second look at the facts of the case, the Court is still
inclined to deny the petition.
Records show that Yap sufficiently established that Decree No. 99500 was
issued on November 29, 1920 in the name of Andres Abellana, as
Administrator of the Estate of Juan Rodriguez. Further, it was also proven
during the proceedings before the court that no OCT was ever issued
covering the said lot. In this regard, Section 39 of Presidential Decree No.
152935 or the "Property Registration Decree" provides that the original
certificate of title shall be a true copy of the decree of registration. There is,
therefore, a need to cancel the old decree and a new one issued in order for
the decree and the OCT to be exact replicas of each other.
In Republic v. Heirs of Sanchez,36 the Court enunciated the necessity of the
petition for cancellation of the old decree and its re-issuance, if no OCT had
been issued pursuant to the old decree:
1. Under the premises, the correct proceeding is a petition for cancellation
of the old decree, re-issuance of decree and {or issuance of OCT pursuant to
that re-issued decree.
In the landmark decision of Teofilo Cacho vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R No.
123361, March 3, 1997, our Supreme Court had affirmed the efficacy of filing
a petition for cancellation of the old decree; the reissuance of such decree
and the issuance of OCT corresponding to that reissued decree.
"Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to
admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter
to his Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara,
G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court,
ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one
for re-issuance of decree under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 [1968], and the
lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus
motion should have been heard as a motion to reissue the decrees in order
to have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard
in their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to accept the
amended petition subject to the private respondent's being given. the
opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties."
Following the principle laid down in the above-quoted case, a question may
be asked: Why should a decree be canceled and re-issued when the same is
valid and intact? Within the context of this discussion, there is no dispute
that a decree has been validly issued. And in fact, in some instances, a copy
of such decree is intact. What is not known is whether or not an OCT is issued
pursuant to that decree. If such decree is valid, why is there a need to have it
cancelled and re-issued?
Again, we invite you back to the highlighted provision of Section 39 of PD
1529 which states that: "The original certificate of title shall be a true copy
of the decree of registration." This provision is significant because it
contemplates an OCT which is an exact replica of the decree. If the old
decree will not be canceled and no new decree issued, the corresponding
OCT issued today will bear the signature of the present Administrator while
the decree upon which it was based shall bear the signature of the past
Administrator. This is not consistent with the clear intention of the law which
states that the OCT shall be true copy of the decree of registration.
Ostensibly, therefore, the cancellation of the old decree and the issuance of
a new one is necessary.
xxxx
4. The heirs of the original adjudicate may file the petition in
representation of the decedent and the re-issued decree shall still he under
the name of the original adjudicate.
It is a well settled rule that succession operates upon the death of the
decedent. The heirs shall then succeed into the shoes of the decedent. The
heirs shall have the legal interest in the property, thus, they cannot be
prohibited from filing the necessary petition.
As the term connotes, a mere re-issuance of the decree means that the new
decree shall be issued which shall, in all respects, be the same as that of the
original decree. Nothing in the said decree shall be amended nor modified;
hence, it must be under the name of the original adjudicate. (Emphasis and
underscoring in tlie original)
Based from the foregoing, the RTC correctly ordered the cancellation of
Decree No. 99500, the re-issuance thereof, and the issuance of the
corresponding OCT covering Lot No. 922 in the name of its original
adjudicate, Andres Abellana, as Administrator of the Estate of Juan
Rodriguez.
Verily, this Court sees no reason to overturn the factual findings and the
ruling of the CA. Petitioner failed to show that the CA's decision was
arbitrarily made or that evidence on record was disregarded.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
March 16, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 05491 is
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. NO. 163751 : March 31, 2006]
ANECITO CALIMPONG and wife [NARCISA YGUAS], * Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF
FILOMENA GUMELA represented by FLAVIA MOLINA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Complying with the order issued on December 10, 1927 by Auxiliary Judge
Mariano Buyson Lampa of the then Court of First Instance of Zamboanga in
Cadastral Case No. 5, G.L.R.O. Record No. 757 for the registration, in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act, of Lot No. 3013
of the Cadastral Survey of Dipolog (the lot) located in Anastacio, Polanco,
Zamboanga del Norte in the names of Filomena, Dionisio, Eusebio, Victoria,
Fortunata, Serapio, Hipolito, Victor, Romualdo and Miguel, all surnamed
Gumela1 who were therein decreed "the owners in fee simple" of the lot,
Decree No. 342638 was issued on October 19, 1928, as attested by Enrique
Altavas, Chief of the General Land Registration Office. Despite the issuance of
the decree, it appears that no certificate of title was issued and registered in
the names of the Gumelas.
By the claim of the Heirs of the Gumelas (the heirs), they hired an overseer
in-charge of the cultivation of the lot.
In 1992, the heirs agreed to partition the estate of their predecessors-in-
interest which includes the lot. They soon learned, however, that the lot was
being occupied by Anecito Calimpong (Calimpong).
It turned out that Calimpong filed in 1976 an application for Free Patent over
the lot, which application he followed up with the Bureau of Lands when his
possession was "disturbed" by the heirs.
The heirs thus filed on July 27, 1993 before the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City a complaint2 for quieting of title, damages, with prayer for
preliminary injunction against Calimpong and his wife.
In the meantime, Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer
(PENRO) Hilarion L. Ramos approved Calimpong's Free Patent application, by
Order3 of August 17, 1993, in light of the following findings:
1. That the applicant is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and is
otherwise qualified to acquire public lands through Free Patent;
2. That the land applied for has been classified as alienable and
disposable and is subject to disposition under the public land laws;
3. That upon investigation conducted by Deputy Public Land Inspector
Marciano I. Carangan, whose report was duly indorsed by LMO-III Designate,
Ramon S. Pacatang, it was found out that the land applied for has been
occupied and cultivated by the applicant himself and/or through his
predecessor-in-interest, since July 4, 1945 or prior thereto;
4. That the Notice of the acquisition of the land by the Applicant under this
application has been published in accordance with Law and that no person
has proven a better right to the land applied for;
5. That the claim of the applicant is in all other respects, complete and there
is no records in this office or any obstacle to the issuance of patent;
andcralawlibrary
6. That there is no adverse claim involving the land applied for still pending
determination in this office; (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Accordingly, the Order disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the occupation and cultivation of the land applied for as
described in the caption hereof is hereby confirmed and this application is
then hereby entered in the records of this office as Free Patent Entry No.
372.
As the applicant has already complied with all the requirements of the law
for the issuance of the corresponding patent to the land, it is also
hereby ordered that the necessary patent be prepared for the issuance in
favor of the Applicant.4 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
On August 17, 1993, Patent No. 09721093961 was issued to Calimpong which
was forwarded to the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte for
registration and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title.5
On August 19, 1993, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-337806 was
issued by and registered in the Register of Deeds for the Province of
Zamboanga del Norte in the name of Calimpong.
To the complaint of the heirs, the spouses Calimpong alleged in their
September 3, 1993 Answer with Counterclaim7 that, inter alia, assuming that
the lot was adjudicated to the Gumelas, "the same ha[d] been considered
long abandoned because neither the adjudicatee[s] nor any of the heirs have
pursued the titling of the land, cultivation, improvement and possession." In
any event, the spouses Calimpong informed that a Free Patent and an OCT
over the lot had already been issued in the name of Calimpong by the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte.
The heirs thus filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint8 impleading as
additional defendants PENRO and the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del
Norte, seeking as additional reliefs the nullification of OCT No. P-33780 and
Free Patent No. 09721093961.
The amended complaint9 was admitted by the Dipolog RTC, by Resolution10 of
February 8, 1994.
After trial on the merits, the trial court, by Decision11 of February 28, 2001,
rendered judgment in favor of the heirs. It held that, among other things, the
title of the heirs is based on a grant thereof to their predecessors-in-interest
by the government in cadastral proceedings and by such grant, the lot ceased
to be part of public domain as it had become private property, hence, not
subject to free patent application. It thus concluded that the free patent and
the title issued to Calimpong were null and void. The decretal portion of the
trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court declares the herein plaintiffs
being the hereditary successors of the adjudicatees mentioned in the
Decree (Exhibit "L"), are the rightful owners of Lot No. 3013, Cad. Survey of
Dipolog under Cad. Case No. 5, L.R.C. Cad. Record No. 757, situated at
Anastacio, Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte and, as prayed for in the
complaint, in order to remove clouds cast on it by the claim of the
defendants Free Patent No. 09721093961 issued by the PENRO of
Zamboanga del Norte, as well as the Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780
issued by said office and the Office of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga
del Norte, are hereby declared null and void; the defendants are hereby
ordered to turn over the peaceful possession of the land in question unto
plaintiffs; the plaintiffs, upon proper petition filed in Court, may ask the
Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte to cause the issuance of a
Certificate of Title under the same terms and conditions as stated in the
Decree issued to Lot No. 3013, with such decree as basis thereof.
No damages awarded, the same not being proved.12 (Underscoring
supplied)cralawlibrary
On appeal, the appellate court, by the challenged Decision13 of January 26,
2004, affirmed in toto that of the trial court.
Hence, the present petition of the spouses Calimpong (hereafter petitioners)
faulting the appellate court in:
1. . . . [not] holding that [they are the] true and real owners of the land in
question[.]
2. . . . [not] declaring . . . Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 .. as valid
and legally issued[.]
3. . . . giving weight to the alleged title in the name of respondent's
predecessors in interest which was not found or existing in the records of the
Register of Deeds neither presented or offered in evidence by them[.]
4. . . . appreciating in respondents' favor their inability to show proof that
they ever filed a petition for judicial reconstitution of said title, if at all, it
actually existed[.]
5. . . . failing to consider respondents' alleged payment of taxes to the land
started only in 1993 at the time that this case had already been instituted in
court[.]
6. . . . [not] holding that laches, more than prescription, applies in this case[.]
7. . . . resolving that the existing Original Certificate of Title issued in favor of
petitioners coupled with the latter's actual possession, not the ghost, alleged
title of the respondents' predecessors[-]in[-]interest, should entitle the
indefeasibility of the torrens system[.]14
The petition fails.
It is undisputed that the lot was judicially adjudicated and an order for the
registration of the lot in the name of the predecessors-in-interest of the heirs
(hereafter respondent) as "owners in fee simple" was issued on December
10, 1927, and that a decree of registration was issued on October 19, 1928,
to wit:
xxx
Therefore, it is ordered by the Court that said land be registered in
accordance with the provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of
said Filomena Gumela, Dionisio Gumela, . . . subject, however, to such of the
[e]ncumbrances mentioned in article 39 of said Law as may be subsisting,
and to a first lien in favor of the Insular Government to guarantee the
payment of the special taxes assessed pursuant to the provisions of section
18 of Act 2259, as amended.
Lands is limited only to public lands and does not cover lands privately
owned. The purpose of the legislature in adopting the former Public Land
Act, Act No. 2874, was and is to limit its application to lands of the public
domain, and lands held in private ownership are not included therein and are
not affected in any manner whatsoever thereby. Land held in freehold or fee
title, or of private ownership, constitute no part of the public domain and
cannot possibly come within the purview of said Act No. 2874, inasmuch as
the "subject" of such freehold or private land is not embraced in any manner
in the title of the Act and the same are excluded from the provisions of the
text thereof. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) 18
Since the DENR had no authority to grant a free patent over the lot, Free
Patent No. 09721093961 issued on August 17, 1993 by the PENRO of
Zamboanga del Norte and Original Certificate of Title No. P-33780 issued on
August 19, 1993 by the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga del Norte in favor of
petitioner Calimpong are null and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Witness the Honorable Mariano Buyson Lampa, Auxiliary Judge of said Court,
the 10th day of December, A. D., nineteen hundred and twenty-seven.

Issued at Manila, P.I, the 19th day of October A. D. 1928, at 10:03 a.m.

x x x x15

Nothing in the records shows that the order of adjudication was appealed,
questioned or set aside.

In De la Merced v. Court of Appeals,16 this Court held:

. . . [T]he title of ownership on the land is vested upon the owner upon the

expiration of the period to appeal from the decision or adjudication by the
cadastral court, without such appeal having been perfected. The certificate
of title would then be necessary for purposes of effecting registration of
subsequent disposition of the land where court proceedings would no longer
be necessary.ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ

As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the

issuance to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No.
395 after the decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said
property had already become final, and there being no imputation of
irregularity in the said cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said
adjudicatee was vested as of the date of the issuance of such judicial
decree. The land, for all intents and purposes, had become from that
time, registered property which could not be acquired by adverse
possession.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

Following the immediately-quoted pronouncement in De la Merced, the title

of ownership on the adjudicatees, the Gumelas-predecessors-in-interest of
respondent, was vested on December 10, 1927.

Whether a certificate of title was issued in the name of respondent's

predecessors-in-interest is immaterial. For, following De la Merced, the title
of ownership on respondent's predecessors-in-interest was vested as of
1927. The lot, for all intents and purposes, had become from said date
registered property which could not be acquired by adverse possession and
was, therefore, beyond the jurisdiction of the Land Management Bureau of
the DENR (formerly the Bureau of Lands) to subject it to free patent.
Under the provision of Act No. 2874 pursuant to which the title of private
respondents' predecessor in interest was issued, the President of the
Philippines or his alter ego, the Director of Lands, has no authority to grant a
free patent for land that has ceased to be a public land and has passed to
private ownership, and a title so issued is null and void. The nullity arises
not, from the fraud or deceit, but from the fact that the land is not under
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands. The jurisdiction of the Director of
G.R. No. 101387 March 11, 1998
SPOUSES MARIANO and ERLINDA LABURADA, represented by their
attorney-in-fact, MANUEL SANTOS, JR., petitioner,
vs.
LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, respondent.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In an original land registration proceeding in which applicants have been
adjudged to have a registrable title, may the Land Registration Authority
(LRA) refuse to issue a decree of registration if it has evidence that the
subject land may already be included in an existing Torrens certificate of
title? Under this circumstance, may the LRA be compelled by mandamus to
issue such decree?
The Case
These are the questions confronting this Court in this special civil action
for mandamus 1 under Rule 65 which asks this Court to direct the Land
Registration Authority (LRA) to issue the corresponding decree of registration
in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-11022. 2
The Facts
Petitioners were the applicants in LRC Case No. N-11022 for the registration
of Lot 3-A, Psd-1372, located in Mandaluyong City. On January 8, 1991, the
trial court, acting as a land registration court, rendered its decision disposing
thus: 3
WHEREFORE, finding the application meritorious and it appearing that the
applicants, Spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, have a registrable
title over the parcel of land described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372, the Court
declares, confirms and orders the registration of their title thereto.
As soon as this decision shall become final, let the corresponding decree be
issued in the name of spouses Marciano [sic] and Erlinda Laburada, both of
legal age, married, with residence and postal address at No. 880 Rizal Ave.,
Manila.
After the finality of the decision, the trial court, upon motion of petitioners,
issued an order 4 dated March 15, 1991 requiring the LRA to issue the
corresponding decree of registration. However, the LRA refused. Hence,
petitioners filed this action for mandamus. 5
Attached to the LRA's comment on the petition is a report dated April 29,
1992 signed by Silverio G. Perez, director of the LRA Department of
Registration, which explained public respondent's refusal to issue the said
decree: 6
In connection with the Petition for Mandamus filed by Petitioners through
counsel, dated August 27, 1991 relative to the above-noted case/record, the
following comments are respectfully submitted:
On March 6, 1990, an application for registration of title of a parcel of land,
Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372, a portion of Lot 3, Block No. 159,
Swo-7237, situated in the Municipality of San Felipe Neri, Province of Rizal
was filed by Spouses Marciano [sic] Laburada and Erlinda Laburada;
After plotting the aforesaid plan sought to be registered in our Municipal
Index Sheet, it was found that it might be a portion of the parcels of land
decreed in Court of Land Registration (CLR) Case Nos. 699, 875 and 817, as
per plotting of the subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-319932, a copy of said
subdivision plan is Annex "A" hereof;
The records on file in this Authority show that CLR Case Nos. 699, 875 & 917
were issued Decree Nos. 240, 696 and 1425 on August 25, 1904, September
14, 1905 and April 26, 1905, respectively;
On May 23, 1991, a letter of this Authority was sent to the Register of Deeds,
Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "B" hereof, requesting for a certified
true copy of the Original Certificate of Title No. 355, issued in the name of
Compania Agricola de Ultramar;
On May 20, 1991, a certified true copy of the Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. 355 was received by this Authority, a copy is Annex "C" hereof, per
unsigned letter of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is
Annex "D" hereof;
After examining the furnished OCT NO. 355, it was found that the technical
description of the parcel of land described therein is not readable, that
prompted this Authority to send another letter dated April 15, 1992 to the
Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila, a copy is Annex "E" hereof,
requesting for a certified typewritten copy of OCT No. 355, or in lieu thereof
a certified copy of the subsisting certificate of title with complete technical
description of the parcel of land involved therein. To date, however, no reply
to our letter has as yet been received by this Authority;
After verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Rizal, it was found that Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-1372
being a portion of Lot No. 3, Block No. 159, Plan S.W.O. — 7237, is covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia
Vda. de Buenaflor, a copy is attached as Annex "F" hereof. Said TCT No.
29337 is a transfer from Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6595. However, the
title issued for Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan Psd-1372 cannot be located
because TCT No. 6595 consisting of several sheets are [sic] incomplete.
For this Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration sought by
the petitioners pursuant to the Decision dated January 8, 1991 and Order
dated March 15, 1991, it would result in the duplication of titles over the
same parcel of land, and thus contravene the policy and purpose of the
Torrens registration system, and destroy the integrity of the same (G.R. No.
63189, Pedro E. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio Migriño, et al.,); . . . .
In view of the foregoing explanation, the solicitor general prays that the
petition be dismissed for being premature.
After the filing of memoranda by the parties, petitioners filed an urgent
motion, dated September 4, 1995, 7 for an early resolution of the case. To
this motion, the Court responded with a Resolution, dated October 23, 1995,
which ordered: 8
. . . Acting on the urgent motion for early resolution of the case dated 04
September 1995 filed by petitioner Erlinda Laburada herself, the
Court resolved to require the Solicitor General to report to the Court in
detail, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, what concrete
and specific steps, if any, have been taken by respondent since 19 May 1993
(the date of respondent's Memorandum) to actually verify whether the lot
subject of LRC Case No. N-11022 (Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 68),
described as Lot 3A, Psd-1372 and situated in Mandaluyong City, might be a
portion of the parcels of land decreed in Court of Land Registration Case
(CLR) Nos. 699, 875 and 917.
On December 29, 1995, the solicitor general submitted his compliance with
the above resolution, to which was attached a letter, dated November 27,
1997, of Feline M. Cortez, chief of the LRA Ordinary and Cadastral Decree
Division, which states: 9
With reference to your letter dated November 13, 1995, enclosed herewith is
a copy of our letter dated 29 April 1992 addressed to Hon. Ramon S.
Desuasido stating among others that Lot 3-B, of the subdivision plan Psd-
1372, a portion of Lot 3, Blk. 159, Swo-7237 is really covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 29337 issued in the name of Pura Escurdia Vda. de
Bunaflor [sic] which was transfer[ed] from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
6395, per verification of the records on file in the Register of Deeds of Rizal.
However, the title issued for the subject lot, Lot 3-A of the subdivision plan
Psd-1372, cannot be located because TCT #6595 is incomplete.
It was also informed [sic] that for this Authority to issue the corresponding
decree of registration sought by the petitioners pursuant to the decision
dated January 9, 1991 and order dated March 15, 1991, would result in the
duplication of [the] title over the same parcel of land, and thus contravene
the policy and purposes of the torrens registration system, and destroy the
integrity of the same (O.R. No. 63189 Pedro K. San Jose vs. Hon. Eutropio
Migriño, et. al.).
Hence, this case will be submitted to the Court for dismissal to avoid
duplication of title over the same parcel of land.
Issue
Petitioners submit this lone issue: 10
Whether or not Respondent Land Registration Authority can be compelled to
issue the corresponding decree in LRC Case No. N-11022 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig, Branch LXVIII (68).
The Court's Ruling
The petition is not meritorious.
Sole Issue: Is Mandamus the Right Remedy?
Petitioners contend that mandamus is available in this case, for the LRA
"unlawfully neglect[ed] the performance of an act which the laws specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office . . . ." They cite four reasons why
the writ should be issued. First, petitioners claim that they have a "clear legal
right to the act being prayed for and the LRA has the imperative duty to
perform" because, as land registration is an in rem proceeding, the
"jurisdictional requirement of notices and publication should be complied
with." 11 Since there was no showing that the LRA filed an opposition in this
proceeding, it cannot refuse to issue the corresponding decree. Second, it is
not the duty of the LRA to "take the cudgels for the private persons in
possession of OCT No. 355, TCT No. 29337 snf [sic] TCT No. 6595." Rather, it
is the "sole concern of said private person-holders of said titles to institute in
a separate but proper action whatever claim they may have against the
property subject of petitioners' application for registration." Third,
petitioners contend that they suffered from the delay in the issuance of their
title, because of "the failure of the Register of Deeds of Pasig, Metro Manila
to furnish LRA of [sic] the certified copies of TCT No. 29337 and TCT No.
6595" notwithstanding the lack of opposition from the holders of said
titles. 12 Fourth, the State "consented to its being sued" in this case[;] thus,
the legislature must recognize any judgment that may be rendered in this
case "as final and make provision for its satisfaction." 13
On the other hand, the LRA, represented by the solicitor general, contends
that the decision of the trial court is not valid, considering that "[the] Court
of First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and [so] a second decree
for the same land is null and void." 14 On the question of whether the LRA
can be compelled to issue a decree of registration, the solicitor general
cites Ramos vs. Rodriguez 15 which held: 16
Nevertheless, even granting that procedural lapses have been committed in
the proceedings below, these may be ignored by the Court in the interest of
substantive justice. This is especially true when, as in this case, a strict
adherence to the rules would result in a situation where the LRA would be
compelled to issue a decree of registration over land which has already been
decreed to and titled in the name of another.
It must be noted that petitioners failed to rebut the LRA report and only
alleged that the title of the Payatas Estate was spurious, without offering any
proof to substantiate this claim. TCT No. 8816, however, having been issued
under the Torrens system, enjoys the conclusive presumption of validity. As
we declared in an early case, "(t)he very purpose of the Torrens system would
be destroyed if the same land may be subsequently brought under a second
action for registration." The application for registration of the petitioners in
this case would, under the circumstances, appear to be a collateral attack of
TCT No. 8816 which is not allowed under Section 48 of P.D. 1529. (Emphasis
supplied.)
We agree with the solicitor general. We hold that mandamus is not the
proper remedy for three reasons.
First: Judgment Is Not Yet Executory
Contrary to the petitioners' allegations, the judgment they seek to enforce in
this petition is not yet executory and incontrovertible under the Land
Registration Law. That is, they do not have any clear legal right to implement
it. We have unambiguously ruled that a judgment of registration does not
become executory until after the expiration of one year after the entry of the
final decree of registration. We explained this in Gomez vs. Court of
Appeals: 17
It is not disputed that the decision dated 5 August 1981 had become final
and executory. Petitioners vigorously maintain that said decision having
become final, it may no longer be reopened, reviewed, much less, set aside.
They anchor this claim on section 30 of P.D. No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree) which provides that, after judgment has become final and executory,
the court shall forthwith issue an order to the Commissioner of Land
Registration for the issuance of the decree of registration and certificate of
title. Petitioners contend that section 30 should be read in relation to section
32 of P.D. 1529 in that, once the judgment becomes final and executory
under section 30, the decree of registration must issue as a matter of course.
This being the law, petitioners assert, when respondent Judge set aside in his
decision, dated 25 March 1985, the decision of 5 August 1981 and the order
of 6 October 1981, he clearly acted without jurisdiction.
Petitioners' contention is not correct. Unlike ordinary civil actions, the
adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration proceeding does not
become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year after the entry of the final decree of registration. This Court, in
several decisions, has held that as long as a final decree has not been entered
by the Land Registration Commission (now NLTDRA) and the period of one
(1) year has not elapsed from date of entry of such decree, the title is not
finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues
to be under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it.
Second: A Void Judgment Is Possible
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its
duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the
integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
In Ramos vs. Rodriguez, 18 this Court ruled that the LRA is mandated to refer
to the trial court any doubt it may have in regard to the preparation and the
issuance of a decree of registration. In this respect, LRA officials act not as
administrative officials but as officers of said court, and their act is the act of
the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in
ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings."
True, land registration is an in rem proceeding and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
government and its branches, irrespective of whether they were personally
notified of the application for registration, and whether they filed an answer
to said application. This stance of petitioners finds support in Sec. 38 of Act
496 which provides:
Sec. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant
has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every
decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only
to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern."
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of
said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
with this section shall be incontrovertible. If there is any such purchaser, the
decree of registration shall not be opened, but shall remain in full force and
effect forever, subject only to the right of appeal hereinbefore
provided: Provided, however, That no decree or certificate of title issued to
persons not parties to the appeal shall be cancelled or annulled. But any
person aggrieved by such decree in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person for fraud in
procuring the decree. Whenever the phrase "innocent purchaser for value"
or an equivalent phrase occurs in this Act, it shall be deemed to include an
innocent lessee, mortgagee, or other encumbrancer for value. (As amended
by Sec. 3, Act No. 3621; and Sec. 1, Act No. 3630, and PD 1529, Sec. 39).
However, we must point out that the letters of Silverio G. Perez and Felino
M. Cortez, dated April 29, 1992 and November 27, 1995, respectively, clearly
stated that, after verification from the records submitted by the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal, the property which petitioners are seeking to register — Lot
3-A of Subdivision Plan Psd-1372 — is a portion of Lot No. 3, Block 159, Plan
S.W.O.-7237, over which TCT No. 6595 has already been issued. Upon the
other hand, in regard to Lot 3-B of said Lot 3, TCT No. 29337 was issued in
lieu of TCT No. 6595. Thus, the LRA's refusal to issue a decree of registration
is based on documents which, if verified, may render the judgment of the
trial court void.
It is settled that a land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the
registration of land already decreed in the name of another in an earlier land
registration case. A second decree for the same land would be null and
void, 19 since the principle behind original registration is to register a parcel
of land only once. 20 Thus, if it is proven that the land which petitioners are
seeking to register has already been registered in 1904 and 1905, the
issuance of a decree of registration to petitioners will run counter to said
principle. As ruled in Duran vs. Olivia: 21
As the title of the respondents, who hold certificates of title under the Land
Registration Act becomes indefeasible, it follows that the Court of First
Instance has no power or jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the
registration of the same parcels of land covered by the certificates of title of
the respondents. Such has been our express ruling in the case of Rojas, et
al. v. The City of Tagaytay, et al., G.R. No. L-13333, prom. November 24,
1959, in which this Court, through Mr. Justice Barrera, said:
As thus viewed, the pivotal issue is one of jurisdiction on the part of the
lower court. All the other contentions of respondent regarding possession in
good faith, laches or claims of better right, while perhaps valid in an
appropriate ordinary action, as to which we here express no opinion, can not
avail in the case at bar if the court a quo, sitting as land registration court,
had no jurisdiction over the subject matter in decreeing on June 30, 1957,
the registration, in favor of respondent city, of a lot already previously
decreed and registered in favor of the petitioners.
In a quite impressive line of decisions, it has been well-settled that a Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction to decree again the registration of land
already decreed in an earlier land registration case and a second decree for
the same land is null and void. This is so, because when once decreed by a
court of competent jurisdiction, the title to the land thus determined is
already a res judicata binding on the whole world, the proceedings being in
rem. The court has no power in a subsequent proceeding (not based on fraud
and within the statutory period) to adjudicate the same title in favor of
another person. Furthermore, the registration of the property in the name of
first registered owner in the Registration Book is a standing notice to the
world that said property is already registered in his name. Hence, the latter
applicant is chargeable with notice that the land he applied for is already
covered by a title so that he has no right whatsoever to apply for it. To
declare the later title valid would defeat the very purpose of the Torrens
system which is to quiet title to the property and guarantee its
indefeasibility. It would undermine the faith and confidence of the people in
the efficacy of the registration law.
Third: Issuance of a Decree Is Not a Ministerial Act
The issuance of a decree of registration is part of the judicial function of
courts and is not a mere ministerial act which may be compelled
through mandamus. Thus, this Court held in Valmonte and Jacinto
vs. Nable: 22
Moreover, after the rendition of a decision by a registration or cadastral
court, there remain many things to be done before the final decree can be
issued, such as the preparation of amended plans and amended descriptions,
especially where the decision orders a subdivision of a lot, the segregation
therefrom of a portion being adjudicated to another party, to fit the said
decision. As said by this Court in the case of De los Reyes vs. De Villa, 48 Phil.,
227, 234:
Examining section 40, we find that the decrees of registration must be stated
in convenient form for transcription upon the certificate of title and must
contain an accurate technical description of the land. This requires trained
technical men. Moreover, it frequently occurs that only portions of a parcel
of land included in an application are ordered registered and that the limits
of such portions can only be roughly indicated in the decision of the court. In
such cases amendments of the plans and sometimes additional surveys
become necessary before the final decree can be entered. That can hardly be
done by the court itself; the law very wisely charges the chief surveyor of the
General Land Registration Office with such duties (Administrative Code,
section 177).
Furthermore, although the final decree is actually prepared by the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office, the administrative officer, the issuance
of the final decree can hardly be considered a ministerial act for the reason
that said Chief of the General Land Registration Office acts not as an
administrative officer but as an officer of the court and so the issuance of a
final decree is a judicial function and not an administrative one (De los Reyes
vs. De Villa, supra). . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Indeed, it is well-settled that the issuance of such decree is not compellable
by mandamus because it is a judicial act involving the exercise of
discretion. 23 Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. 24 Under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious,
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. 25 But
where the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in
this case, mandamus cannot issue.
A court may be compelled by mandamus to pass and act upon a question
submitted to it for decision, but it cannot be enjoined to decide for or against
one of the parties. 26 As stated earlier, a judicial act is not compellable
by mandamus. 27 The court has to decide a question according to its own
judgment and understanding of the law. 28
In view of the foregoing, it is not legally proper to require the LRA to issue a
decree of registration. However, to avoid multiplicity of suits and needless
delay, this Court deems it more appropriate to direct the LRA to expedite its
study, to determine with finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property
described in TCT No. 6595, and to submit a report thereon to the court of
origin within sixty (60) days from receipt of this Decision, after which the said
court shall act with deliberate speed according to the facts and the law, as
herein discussed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED but the case is REMANDED to
the court of origin in Pasig City. The Land Registration Authority, on the other
hand, is ORDERED to submit to the court a quo a report determining with
finality whether Lot 3-A is included in the property described in TCT No.
6595, within sixty (60) days from notice. After receipt of such report, the land
registration court, in turn, is ordered to ACT, with deliberate and judicious
speed, to settle the issue of whether the LRA may issue the decree of
registration, according to the facts and the law as herein discussed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142549               March 9, 2010

FIDELA R. ANGELES, Petitioner,
vs.
The SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND REGISTRATION
AUTHORITY, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY, and SENATOR
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The property involved in this case is covered by Original Certificate of Title

(OCT) No. 994, which encompasses One Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Two
(1,342) hectares of the Maysilo Estate, previously described by this Court En
Banc as a "vast tract of land [that] stretches over three cities, comprising an
area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican."1 What we
have before us now is touted as "one of the biggest and most extensive land-
grabbing incidents in recent history."2
The existence of several cases already decided by this Court dealing with this
infamous estate has made the job of deciding this particular petition easy, on
one hand, as there are cases squarely on point and at the outset, applicable;
but complicated, on the other hand, as such applicability must be
determined with thoroughness and accuracy to come up with a just,
equitable, and fair conclusion to a controversy that has now lasted for almost
forty-five (45) years.
Submitted for Decision is a petition for mandamus seeking respondents
Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority
(LRA), and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City to comply with the
Order3 dated January 8, 1998 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-424, entitled Bartolome Rivera, et al. v.
Isabel Gil de Sola, et al. (the RTC Order), which was issued a Certificate of
Finality on March 12, 1998.
On May 3, 1965, petitioner, together with other individuals, all of them
claiming to be the heirs of a certain Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, and
alleging that they are entitled to inherit her proportional share in the parcels
of land located in Quezon City and in the municipalities of Caloocan and
Malabon, Province of Rizal, commenced a special civil action for partition and
accounting of the property otherwise known as Maysilo Estate covered by
OCT No. 994, allegedly registered on April 19, 1917 with the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. C-424 in the RTC
of Caloocan City, Branch 120.
Some of said alleged heirs were able to procure Transfer Certificates of Title
(TCTs) over portions of the Maysilo Estate. They also had led this Court to
believe that OCT No. 994 was registered twice, thus, in Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage Systems (MWSS) v. Court of Appeals,4 reiterated
in Heirs of Luis J. Gonzaga v. Court Of Appeals,5 the Court held that OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, and not May 3, 1917, was the valid title by virtue of
the prior registration rule.
In the RTC Order sought to be implemented, Judge Jaime D. Discaya granted
the partition and accounting prayed for by plaintiffs in that case; directed the
respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and Quezon City to issue
transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-owners, including
petitioner, for twelve (12) parcels of land with an aggregate area of One
Hundred Five Thousand and Nine Hundred Sixty-Nine square meters
(105,969 sq. m.), more or less; and ordered that said parcels of land be sold,
subject to the confirmation of the Court, and the proceeds be divided among
the plaintiffs in proportion to their respective interests in the property.
The dispositive portion of said Order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the recommendation of the
Commissioners in their Joint Commissioners’ Report dated October 21, 1997
and Supplemental Commissioners’ Report dated December 30, 1997 that the
following lots with transfer certificates of title to be issued by the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City in the names of all co-owners be sold and the
proceeds thereof divided among themselves in proportion to their respective
interest in the property, is approved.
The Register of Deeds of Caloocan City and of Quezon City are hereby
directed to issue transfer certificates of title in the names of all the co-
owners for the following lots, namely:
xxxx
Any sale of above-mentioned lots shall be subject to confirmation by this
Court pursuant to Section 11, Rule 69 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.6
Petitioner alleges that the respective Registers of Deeds of Caloocan City and
Quezon City refused to comply with the RTC Order because they were still
awaiting word from the LRA Administrator before proceeding. Counsel for
petitioner then requested the LRA Administrator to direct said Registers of
Deeds to comply with the Order.
The LRA Administrator, Mr. Alfredo R. Enriquez, sent counsel for petitioner a
letter-reply7 dated March 27, 2000, with two attachments: 1) the 1st
Indorsement8 dated September 22, 1997 (the 1st Indorsement) issued by
then Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr.
(respondent Guingona), and 2) LRA Circular No. 97-119 issued to all Registers
of Deeds. The letter-reply reads in part:
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted in view of the
directive of the Department of Justice in its 1st Indorsement dated 22
September 1997, copy enclosed, as a result of the inquiry conducted by the
Composite Fact-Finding Committee (created under DOJ Department Order
No. 137) finding that there is only one OCT No. 994 which was issued by the
Rizal Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917 (and not on 19 April 1919) pursuant to
Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429. Pursuant to this DOJ
directive, this Authority issued LRA Circular No. 97-11 to all Registers of
Deeds, copy attached, stating the following:
xxxx
In compliance with the DOJ directive, this Authority, in its 1st Indorsement
dated 27 March 1998, x x x had recommended to the Office of the Solicitor
General the filing of an appropriate pleading relative to the said Order dated
8 January 1998.
The findings of the DOJ on OCT No. 994 are in fact sustained by the Senate
Committee on Justice and Human Rights and Urban Planning in its Senate
Committee Report No. 1031 dated 25 May 1998 x x x.10 (Emphasis ours.)
The LRA Administrator likewise wrote that in Senate Committee Report No.
1031 dated May 25, 1998, the Senate Committees on Justice and Human
Rights and Urban Planning came up with the following findings:
i. There is only one Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 and this was
issued or registered on May 3, 1917[.]
ii. The [OCT] No. 994 dated April 19, 1917 is non-existent. It was a fabrication
perpetrated by Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds
of Caloocan City.
iii. The alleged surviving heirs could not have been the true and legal heirs of
the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal as government findings showed the
physical and genetic impossibility of such relationship[.]
iv. Mr. Norberto Vasquez, Jr., former Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan
City, acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, by issuing
"certifications" and/or written statements to the effect that OCT No. 994 was
issued or registered on April 19, 1917 when in truth and in fact it was issued
or registered on May 3, 1917.
v. Atty. Yolanda O. Alfonso, Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City, likewise
acted maliciously, fraudulently and in bad faith, when she signed the TCTs
issued in the name of Eleuteria Rivera which bear a wrong date of the
registration of OCT No. 994. Malice was evident because she had previously
issued certificates of title in the names of other individuals which were
derived from OCT No. 994 dated May 3, 1917 and she had in fact questioned
the falsity of April 19, 1917 as the correct date of the registration of OCT No.
994.11 (Underscoring in the original.)
The letter-reply further stated that OCT No. 994 was intact and was being
kept in the LRA "to prevent its alteration and tampering." We quote the last
portion of said letter-reply:
As found by the Senate Committees, the mess caused by the former Register
of Deeds and Deputy Register of Deeds in making it appear that OCT No. 994
was issued in 19 April 1917, thus giving the wrong impression that there
were two (2) OCT No. 994, resulted in the double, if not multiple, issuance of
transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided portions of the Maysilo
Estate, including the parcels of land mentioned in the subject Order dated 8
January 1998. Our Authority, as the protector of the integrity of the Torrens
title is mandated to prevent anomalous titling of real properties and put a
stop to further erode the confidence of the public in the Torrens system of
land registration.
With due respect, the Order dated 8 January 1998 which directs the issuance
of transfer certificates of title as direct transfer from OCT No. 994, suffers
from certain deficiencies, to wit: OCT No. 994 had long been cancelled totally
by the issuance of various certificates of title in the names of different
persons; and that the plan and descriptions of the lands were not based on a
subdivision plan duly approved by the proper government agency but merely
sketch plans, in violation of Section 50 of PD 1529. Obviously, compliance
with the Order will result to duplication of certificates of title covering land
previously registered in the names of other persons. Besides, in MWSS vs.
CA, the Supreme Court did not declare the nullity of the certificates of title
which emanated from OCT No. 994 issued on 3 May 1917. It merely
invalidates the title of MWSS and recognizes as valid the title of Jose B.
Dimson. There was no such declaration as to the various transfer certificates
of title emanating from OCT No. 994. Under the law, there must be a
separate action in court for the declaration of nullity of certificates of title
pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.
As observed by the Supreme Court in Republic vs. Court of Appeals (94 SCRA
874), "there are too many fake titles being peddled around and it behooves
every official of the government whose functions concern the issuance of
legal titles to see to it that this plague that has made a mockery of the
Torrens system is eradicated right now through their loyalty, devotion,
honesty and integrity, in the interest of our country and people at large."12
Petitioner avers that respondent Guingona, in issuing the 1st
Indorsement,13 made a substantive modification of the ruling made by this
Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Heirs of Luis Gonzaga v. Court of
Appeals. She further avers that "[n]ot even the Secretary of Justice has the
power or authority to set aside or alter an established ruling made by the
highest Court of the land." According to petitioner, respondent Guingona
claimed to have made his own finding that there is only one OCT No. 994
which was issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917, and not
on April 19, 1917, and this finding is a reversal of the decisions of this Court
on "what is the valid OCT No. 994." Petitioner contends that "[t]he rule is
well settled that once a decision becomes final[,] the Court can no longer
amend, modify, much less set aside the same" and that respondent
Guingona usurped judicial functions and did a prohibited act which rendered
the Order of no effect.14
Petitioner claims that respondent Guingona was the one who caused the
issuance by the LRA Administrator of Circular No. 97-11 dated October 3,
1997, which had the same legal effect on other cases similarly situated
without hearing or notice to the parties-in-interest, and that this was
contemptuous and contumacious and calls for "condemnation and reproof of
the highest degree."15
Petitioner alleges that compliance with a final judicial order is a purely
ministerial duty, that she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-424 cannot
avail of the benefits granted to them by the Order, and that she has no
"plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, other
than this action."
In his Comment,16 respondent Guingona raises the following grounds for
denial of the petition:
1. Petitioner has no cause of action against respondent Guingona in that the
latter is no longer the Secretary of Justice.
2. The issuance of the 1st Indorsement dated September 22, 1997 was
pursuant to the report dated August 27, 1997 made by the committee
created by Department Order No. 137 dated April 23, 1997 after conducting
an independent fact-finding investigation. It did not in any way alter or
modify any judgment of this Honorable Court.
3. Petitioner was not denied due process as her rights, if any, under the
Order dated January 18, 1998 were not yet in existence at the time the 1st
Indorsement was issued.
4. Mandamus is not the appropriate remedy to enforce claims of damages.17
Respondent Guingona contends that he was no longer the Secretary of
Justice, therefore, he did not anymore possess the mandatory duties being
compelled to be performed in this case by way of a writ of mandamus; he
had no more duty resulting from the said position and could not perform an
act that pertained to said duty, even if he wanted to; and since he did not
have the powers and duties of the Secretary of Justice, he was therefore not
a real party-in-interest in this case.
Respondent Guingona avers that he was prompted to issue DOJ Department
Order No. 137 dated April 13, 1997 creating a committee due to several
complaints received by the Office of the Secretary of Justice in February
1997. Among others, the complaints prayed for the investigation of certain
actions taken by the LRA officials and personnel in connection with
transactions involving the Maysilo Estate. According to him, the committee
was tasked for the purpose of initiating a fact-finding inquiry:
"(1) to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the issuance of original
Certificate(s) of Title (OCT) No. 994 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
purporting to cover a mass of land encompassing Malabon, Caloocan City
and Quezon City as well as the issuance and regularity of Transfer Certificates
of Titles (TCTs) derived therefrom; (2) in the event of a finding of the
irregular issuance of any such [TCTs], (a) to determine the involvement of
and to recommend the actions to be taken against person(s) and/or officials
and employees of this Department or its agencies who may appear to have
participated therein, and (b) to recommend the administrative and/or
judicial actions, if any, that may directly be undertaken by this Department,
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Land Registration Authority, and other
units and attached agencies of this Department, with respect to such
irregularly issued Transfer Certificates of Title, taking into account the final
decisions of the courts affecting the Maysilo Estate."18
Respondent Guingona contends that it can be gleaned from the purpose of
the creation of the committee that its fact-finding investigation was merely
administrative to formulate and recommend policies, procedures and
courses of action which the DOJ, the LRA, the Office of the Solicitor General
and other agencies of the DOJ can adopt with regard to the problem of the
proliferation of fake land titles, including those that relate to the Maysilo
Estate. He alleges that based on this committee’s report dated August 27,
1997, he issued the subject 1st Indorsement which spelled out the policies,
procedures, and courses of action which the LRA, an agency under the DOJ,
must follow not only with respect to OCT No. 994 and its derivative titles
covering the Maysilo Estate but to all other original or transfer certificates of
title as well. He contends that the 1st Indorsement was merely an
administrative issuance of the DOJ; thus, it could not be said that it altered or
supplanted any judgment of this Court.
Respondent Guingona further states that the 1st Indorsement dated
September 22, 1997 was issued long before the Order dated January 18,
1998, thus it could not be said that petitioner was denied due process as her
rights and interests were non-existent at that time. Furthermore, respondent
Guingona alleges that petitioner was accorded due process when the LRA
Administrator gave an opportunity to petitioner’s counsel to present
petitioner’s case to the LRA legal staff. Respondent Guingona claims that
such opportunity to be heard satisfies the requirements of due process, as
the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard. 19
With regard to the claim for damages, respondent Guingona argues that it is
a factual issue which the petitioner must prove in the course of a trial where
petitioner’s claim for damages can be fully litigated. This Honorable Court,
however, is not a trier of facts. Such being the case, it is inappropriate for
petitioner to include in her petition for mandamus a claim for damages the
amount of which she did not even specify. As it is, such claim should be
denied by this Honorable Court. There is also no showing that petitioner paid
the required docket fees for her claims for damages. On this score alone,
such a claim should be outrightly dismissed.20
In her Reply,21 petitioner contends that former DOJ Secretary Guingona has
to be named as private respondent because he was the cause of public
respondents’ failure to comply with their ministerial duty. A private
respondent is "the person interested in sustaining the proceedings in the
court; and it shall be the duty of such private respondent to appear and
defend, both in his own behalf and in behalf of the public respondents
affected by the proceedings x x x." He is not charged with any improper act,
but he is a necessary party as the grant of relief prayed for by petitioner shall
require private respondent’s active participation. 22
Anent private respondent’s argument that the 1st Indorsement did not in
any way alter or modify any judgment of this Honorable Court, petitioner
counters that the 1st Indorsement and "pertinent acts of private respondent
x x x resulted in the altering or supplanting of a judgment of this Court." The
complaints praying that an investigation be conducted on the irregular
issuance of titles in the Maysilo Estate were made to the private respondent
by parties who held titles derived from OCT No. 994 on May 3, 1917, after
the Supreme Court had rendered its decision in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
and Heirs of Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals.
Petitioner argues that contrary to private respondent’s claim, she is entitled
to file a petition for mandamus as she and her co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. C-
424 has been suffering from damages and losses incapable of quantification,
because of the wrongful act of the respondents. Petitioner cites the following
provisions of the Rules of Court in support of her argument:
RULE 65
xxxx
SECTION 9. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. — A certified copy
of the judgment rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall
be served upon the court, quasi-judicial agency, tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person concerned in such manner as the court may direct, and
disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt. An execution may issue
for any damages or costs awarded in accordance with Section 1 of Rule 39.
RULE 39
SECTION 1. Execution upon final judgments or orders. — Execution shall issue
as a matter of right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of
the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal
therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may
forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment
obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the judgment or
judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced and of the entry
thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Petitioner avers that private respondent seemed to assume a function that
did not belong to the Executive Department, because he had caused the
issuance of an LRA Circular that forbade compliance with a court order that
had already become final and executory. Petitioner likewise avers that the
doctrine of separation of powers called for each branch of government to be
left alone to discharge its functions within its jurisdiction, as it saw fit.23
Public respondents Secretary of Justice, the Administrator of the Land
Registration Authority, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City filed their
Comment24 on November 16, 2000. Public respondents claim that petitioner
and her co-plaintiffs are not the rightful owners of the property subject of
said complaint for partition. Their allegation in the complaint that they are
the heirs and successors-in-interest of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal,
co-owner of the parcels of land described in OCT No. 994, and are therefore
entitled to the proportionate share, ownership, and possession of the parcels
of land described in paragraphs XI to XV of the complaint, is an untrue
statement made with intent to deceive. This is because the findings
embodied in the Report of the Fact Finding Committee created by the DOJ,
which are the result of the joint undertaking of the Department proper, the
Office of the Solicitor General, and the LRA, support the conclusion that
petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are not entitled to the issuance of new
transfer certificates of title in their names.25
Public respondents claim the following as facts:
The DOJ Report became the subject of [a] Senate investigation. On May 25,
1998, the Honorable Senate of the Tenth Congress of the Republic of the
Philippines reached the conclusion that petitioner and her co-plaintiffs are
not and cannot be true heirs of the late Maria de la Concepcion Vidal (par. 3,
p. 33, Senate Report). x x x.
As early as 1917, subject property of the instant case had already been
partitioned and divided among the true owners, namely, Gonzalo Tuason y
Patino, Jose Rato y Tuason, Luis Vidal y Tuason, Concepcion Vidal y Tuason,
Pedro Baños, Maria de la Concepcion Vidal, Trinidad Jurado, Bernardino
Hernandez, Esperanza Tuason Chua Jap, Isabel Tuason Chua, Juan Jose
Tuason de la Paz, Maria Teresa Tuason y de la Paz, Mariano Severo Tuason y
de la Paz, Demetrio Asuncion Tuason y de la Paz, Augusto Hoberto Tuason y
de la Paz, Maria Soterrana Tuason y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y de la Paz,
Consuelo Legarda y de la Paz, Rita Legarda y de la Paz, Benito Legarda y
Tuason, Emilia Tuason y Patiño, Maria Rocha de Despujols, Sofia O’Farrell y
Patiño, German Franco y Gonzales, Concepcion Franco y Gonzales, Domingo
Franco y Gonzales, Guillerma Ferrer y Tuason, Vicente Ferrer y Tuason, Josefa
Tuason vda. de Flores, and heirs of Filemon Tuazon in proportion to their
respective shares, as evidenced by the document entitled PROYECTO DE
PARTICION DE LA HACIENDA DE MAYSILO (PARTITION PLAN OF HACIENDA
MAYSILO) consisting of fifty-two (52) pages which is attached as Annex "D",
and its faithful translation into English consisting of forty-nine (49) pages
attached as Annex "E", and both made integral parts hereof.
As a result of said partition, transfer certificates of titles covering the same
subject parcels of land were legally issued in the names of above-
enumerated true owners.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City and Caloocan City, through the
undersigned counsel, filed the aforestated Motion for Reconsideration of the
questioned Order of the lower court.
The resolution of said motion and other incidents in related cases pending
before the lower court has been held in abeyance to await the resolution by
higher courts of other cases involving the Maysilo Estate.26
We are thus faced with the issue of whether public respondents unlawfully
neglected to perform their duties by their refusal to issue the questioned
transfer certificates of title to petitioner and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case
No. C-424) or have unlawfully excluded petitioner from the use and
enjoyment of whatever claimed right, as would warrant the issuance of a
writ of mandamus against said public respondents.
Considering the factual background and recent jurisprudence related to this
controversy as will be discussed below, we find that it was not unlawful for
public respondents to refuse compliance with the RTC Order, and the act
being requested of them is not their ministerial duty; hence, mandamus does
not lie and the petition must be dismissed.
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SECTION 3. Petition for mandamus. — When any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court,
to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and
to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful
acts of the respondent.
It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when
refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to compel the performance of a
discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to enforce a right which is in
substantial dispute or to which a substantial doubt exists.27 It is nonetheless
likewise available to compel action, when refused, in matters involving
judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of judgment or
discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either.28
Therefore, we must look into the alleged right of petitioner and see if
compliance with the RTC Order is compellable by mandamus; or, in the
alternative, find out if substantial doubt exists to justify public respondents’
refusal to comply with said Order. Did public respondents have sufficient
legal basis to refuse to grant petitioner’s request?
In this regard, we find our discussion in Laburada v. Land Registration
Authority29 instructive, to wit:
That the LRA hesitates in issuing a decree of registration is understandable.
Rather than a sign of negligence or nonfeasance in the performance of its
duty, the LRA's reaction is reasonable, even imperative. Considering the
probable duplication of titles over the same parcel of land, such issuance
may contravene the policy and the purpose, and thereby destroy the
integrity, of the Torrens system of registration.
xxxx
x x x Likewise, the writ of mandamus can be awarded only when the
petitioners' legal right to the performance of the particular act which is
sought to be compelled is clear and complete. Under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, a clear legal right is a right which is indubitably granted by law or is
inferable as a matter of law. If the right is clear and the case is meritorious,
objections raising merely technical questions will be disregarded. But where
the right sought to be enforced is in substantial doubt or dispute, as in this
case, mandamus cannot issue.30 (Emphasis ours.)
As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA
officials of a decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases
where they find that such would result to the double titling of the same
parcel of land. In the same vein, we find that in this case, which involves the
issuance of transfer certificates of title, the Register of Deeds cannot be
compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order since there were
existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land and
there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance
of the TCTs. Neither could respondent LRA Administrator be mandated by
the Court to require the Register of Deeds to comply with said Order, for we
find merit in the explanations of respondent LRA Administrator in his letter-
reply that cites the 1st Indorsement issued by respondent Guingona, LRA
Circular No. 97-11, and Senate Committee Report No. 1031, as reasons for
his refusal to grant petitioner’s request.31 There was, therefore, sufficient
basis for public respondents to refuse to comply with the RTC Order, given
the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No. 994 dated April
19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case clearly
anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by
this Court En Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty
Development Corporation32 (the 2007 Manotok case), as well as the
succeeding resolution33 in the same case dated March 31, 2009 (the 2009
Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the
question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to
rest. All other cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case
at bar, are bound by the findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by
this Court34 which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated
differently, and the one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No.
C-424) derived their rights was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title.
Regrettably, petitioner’s claim no longer has a leg to stand on. As we held in
the 2007 Manotok case:
The determinative test to resolve whether the prior decision of this Court
should be affirmed or set aside is whether or not the titles invoked by the
respondents are valid. If these titles are sourced from the so-called OCT No.
994 dated 17 April 1917, then such titles are void or otherwise should not be
recognized by this Court. Since the true basic factual predicate concerning
OCT No. 994 which is that there is only one such OCT differs from that
expressed in the MWSS and Gonzaga decisions, said rulings have become
virtually functus officio except on the basis of the "law of the case" doctrine,
and can no longer be relied upon as precedents.35
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly
issued on April 19, 1917 validly and actually exists, given the following
conclusions made by this Court in the 2007 Manotok case:
First, there is only one OCT No. 994. As it appears on the record, that mother
title was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917,
and that should be the date which should be reckoned as the date of
registration of the title. It may also be acknowledged, as appears on the title,
that OCT No. 994 resulted from the issuance of the decree of registration on
[19] April 1917, although such date cannot be considered as the date of the
title or the date when the title took effect.
Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917
is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact that the Dimson and CLT
titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated [19] April 1917 casts
doubt on the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. x x x.
Third. The decisions of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals and Gonzaga
v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar, especially in regard to
their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, a title which we now
acknowledge as inexistent. Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or
Gonzaga with respect to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other
case operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at
bar.36 (Emphases supplied.)1avvphi1
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports
regarding OCT No. 994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a
Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the cases on remand,
declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the
findings made by the DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these
are admissible as evidence, though such questions may be considered by the
Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x x x The reports cannot
conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible they
may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces
of evidence submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by
the DOJ and the Senate should not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept
them without inquiry. The facts and arguments presented in the reports
must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the courts will
have the discretion to accept or reject them.
There are many factual questions looming over the properties that could only
be threshed out in the remand to the Court of Appeals. x x x.
xxxx
The Special Division is tasked to hear and receive evidence, conclude the
proceedings and submit to this Court a report on its findings and
recommended conclusions within three (3) months from finality of this
Resolution.37
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged
in by said Special Division, and adopted the latter’s conclusions as to the
status of the original title and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed
the earlier finding that "there is only one OCT No. 994, the registration date
of which had already been decisively settled as 3 May 1917 and not 19 April
1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which reflects the date
of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
In the case at bar, petitioner is the last surviving co-plaintiff in Civil Case No.
C-424 originally filed on May 3, 1965. The records bear several attempts of
different individuals to represent her as counsel, a matter that could be
attributed to her advanced age and potential access to a vast sum of money,
should she get a favorable decision from this case. It appears, however, that
the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate that she and
her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit
earlier registered, OCT No. 994, does not exist.

The requirements under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of mandamus
not having been proven by petitioner to exist, we dismiss the petition for lack
of merit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellee.

ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and BASILIO GAYARES, Petitioners-Appellants, v.
RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.

Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.

Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.

SYLLABUS

1. LAND REGISTRATION; TORRENS SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The prime purpose

of the Torrens System, as established in the Philippine Islands by the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496), is to decree land titles that shall be final,
irrevocable, and indisputable.
2. ID.; CADASTRAL SYSTEM; PURPOSE. — The purpose of the offspring of the
Torrens System here known as the Cadastral System, as established in the
Philippine Islands by the Cadastral Act (No. 2259), is, like the purpose of the
Torrens System, proper incontestability of title. As stated in Section 1 of the
Cadastral Act, the purpose is to serve the public interest, by requiring that
the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library
3. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS. — Many precautions are taken to guard against
injustice.
4. ID.; ID.; ID. — After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The
first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes
the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court. The second action is
the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration
Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of receipt of a
copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. The third and last
action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINALITY OF DECREE. — For a decree to exist in legal
contemplation, it is not necessary to await the preparation of a so-called
decree by the Land Registration Office.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. — Cadastral proceedings commenced. Notice published in
the Official Gazette. Trial judge also issued general notice. S asks for the
registration in his name of lot No. 1608. Hearing had. On September 21,
1916, the court in a decree awarded the lot to S. On November 23, 1916, the
time for an appeal having passed, the court declares the decree final. On July
23, 1917, before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the so-called
technical decree, V and G ask that the case be reopened to receive proof
relative to the ownership of the lot. Motion denied by the trial court. Held:
That since the judgment of the Court of First Instance of September 21, 1916,
has become final, and since no action was taken within the time provided by
law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill of exceptions, the Supreme Court
is without jurisdiction, and the appeal must be dismissed.
7. ID.; ID.; RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT. — Whether Sections 113 and 513 of the
Code of Civil Procedure apply to cadastral proceedings, quare.
8. GENERAL LAND REGISTRATION OFFICE. — The General Land Registration
Office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment of
the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
Sec. 174.)
DECISION
MALCOLM, J. :
The principal question which this appeal presents is — When does the
registration of title, under the Torrens System of Land Registration, especially
under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral System,
become final, conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions are
— At what stage of the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legal
contemplation? Does it exist from the moment that the court, after hearing
the evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and then, or later
decrees the land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the Chief of the
Land Registration Office transcribes the adjudication in the prescribed form?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran,
Province of Occidental Negros, upon an application of the Director of Lands,
on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in the Official
Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all
interested parties. Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer
asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608. The instant petitioners,
Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this
municipality, and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases,
did not enter any opposition as to this lot. Hearing was had during
September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued the
following decree:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, the
following lots be adjudged and registered in the names of those persons
whose names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with the
following conditions: . . .
"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of
Victoriano Siguenza and Marcela Guanzon."cralaw virtua1aw library
On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing
decree in the following language:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having
become final on September 21, 1916, it is hereby ordered that the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to the
lots adjudged by said decision.
"An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as
follows, the decrees thereon, must be suspended until further order by this
court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Lot No. 521.
Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the
Land Registration Office of the so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez
and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella Vazquez,
came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their
right of ownership in lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda
Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in complete ignorance of
the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that
the case be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot.
Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered by counter-motion, asking the
court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares.
The court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being a
decree already rendered and no allegation of fraud having been made, the
court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically that counsel
for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme
Court, through mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of
evidence.
In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear that
counsel for petitioners have not raised the question of fraud as provided for
in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they asked to be
relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect. As a matter of fact, they could not well claim fraud because all the
proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of chicanery. As a
matter of fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of the Code of Civil
Procedure would not get them anywhere because more than six months had
elapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case. The issue
fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over the appeal, since if the judgment and the supplemental
decree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance on September 21,
1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have become final, petitioners
may no bring their appeal before this court, because the time for the filing of
their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral proceedings did not
become final until the formal decree was issued by the Land Registration
Office, then it was proper for them to ask for a reopening of the case, and it
would, consequently, be just as proper for this court to order the trial court
to permit the same.
OPINION.
The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated,
to decree land titles that shall be final, irrevocable, and indisputable.
Incontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must accordingly be
taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good
reason, may not be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the
cost of possible cruelty which may result in exceptional cases, it does become
necessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce registration laws. No
stronger words can be found than those appearing in Section 38 of the Land
Registration Law (Act No. 496) wherein it is said that: "Every decree of
registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . . . It shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government
and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application,
notice, or citation, or included in the general description ’To all whom it may
concern,’ Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy,
or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in
any court for reversing judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right
of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree
of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration
(Court of First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entry of
the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an
interest."cralaw virtua1aw library
While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, they
become even more incisive and peremptory when we come to consider the
offspring of this system, here known as the Cadastral System. Under the
Torrens System proper, whether action shall or shall not be taken is optional
with the solicitant. Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the
part of the Government, titles for all the land within a stated area, are
adjudicated whether or not the people living within this district desire to
have titles issued. The purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act
(NO. 2259), is to serve the public interests, by requiring that the titles to any
lands "be settled and adjudicated."cralaw virtua1aw library
Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessive
interference with private property constitutes due process of law and that
the Acts providing for the same are constitutional, a question not here
raised, yet a study of the law indicates that many precautions are taken to
guard against injustice. The proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey.
When the lands have been surveyed and plotted, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Attorney General, files a petition in court praying that the
titles to the lands named be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of
the petition is then published twice in successive issues of the Official Gazette
in both the English and Spanish languages. All persons interested are given
the benefit of assistance by competent officials and are informed of their
rights. A trial is had. "All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court
and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the
various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the bases of
original certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No. 2259, Sec. 11.)
Aside from this, the commotion caused by the survey and a trial affecting
ordinarily many people, together with the presence of strangers in the
community, should serve to put all those affected on their guard.
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision —
the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its
order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of
receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This
again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment
of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor, has as
one of his duties "to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases."
(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 177.) This latter decree contains the
technical description of the land and may not be issued until a considerable
time after the promulgation of the judgment. The form for the decree used
by the General Land Registration Office concludes with the words: "Witness,
the Honorable (name of the judge), on this the (date)." The date that is used
as authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when, after hearing the
evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of the
land.
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office
is ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated, the
date on which the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the
running of the time for the interposition of a motion for a new trial or for the
perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the title prepared
by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place
and all that is left to be performed is the mere formulation of the technical
description. If an unknown individual could wait possibly years until the day
before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a technical description of a
piece of land, the defeated party could just as reasonably expect the same
consideration for his appeal. As a matter of fact, the so-called unknown is a
party just as much as the known oppositor for notice is to all the world, and
the decree binds all the world.
Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of this
court in the case of Tambunting v. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . That case
and the instant case are not the same. In the Tambunting case the contest
was really between two parties each claiming to have a Torrens title; here
one party has the title and the other is seeking to oust him from his fortress.
In the Tambunting case the declaration of ownership but not the decree of
registration had issued; here both declaration and decree have issued. The
doctrines announced in the decision in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz ([1910], 17
Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the indefensibility of land titles under
the Torrens system are much more applicable and can, with as much reason,
be applied to the cadastral system.
As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been
taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of
the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
providing for fraud.
Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able
arguments relative to the applicability of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of
Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the case would
make unprofitable any discussion of this question.
It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Negros of September 21, 1916, has become final, and that no action was
taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an appeal by bill
of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is
dismissed with costs against the appellants. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Street, Avanceña and Moir, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-17757             May 30, 1962

MAMERTA DE LA MERCED, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, EZEQUIEL M. SANTOS, and AMPARO
MACAPAGAL, respondents.

Meliton Pajarillaga for petitioner.

Esteban C. Manuel for respondents.

BARRERA, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the
original decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (in Civil Case No.
946), upholding the right of ownership of Ezequiel Santos over Lot No. 395 of
the Rizal (Nueva Ecija) Cadastre.

As may be gathered from the extant records, the facts of the case are:
In a complaint filed in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dated May 3,
1952, which was later amended, Ezequiel Santos (and his wife) claiming
ownership of Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre by virtue of an adjudication of
the cadastral court dated December 26, 1923, in favor of his father, sought
recovery of ownership and possession thereof from the named defendant,
and of the landlord's share in the harvests for the agricultural years 1950-
1956.
Defendants, in their answer, resisted plaintiffs' claim and asserted their
ownership over said property as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No.
3462 issued to their predecessor Juan de la Merced on October 10, 1931 and
their continuous possession of the land for more than 30 years.
In the course of the proceedings, Mamerta de la Merced, a legitimate
daughter of Juan de la Merced, was allowed to intervene and make common
cause with the defendants.
On January 16, 1957, the court rendered a decision for the plaintiffs after
making a finding that Lot No. 395 was part of the Original Certificate of Title
No. 425 issued on May 30, 1916 in the name of the spouses Inocencio de los
Santos and Victorina Macapagal, parents of plaintiff Ezequiel Santos; that in a
decision rendered by the cadastral court on December 26, 1923 (Cad. Case
No. 14, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281), the said lot was also adjudicated in favor of
the conjugal partnership of Inocencio de los Santos and Victorina Macapagal;
that pursuant to said decision, the cadastral court issued on December 17,
1925 an order for the issuance of a certificate of title for the said property;
that on December 8, 1926, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1971 was issued in
the name of Ezequiel Santos in lieu of Original Certificate of Title No. 425
which was cancelled; that on December 28, 1926, the cadastral court
declared lot 395 public land, as a consequence of which Juan de la Merced,
after filing a homestead application therefor, was able to obtain Original
Certificate of Title No. 3462 on October 10, 1931. Holding that the cadastral
court had no jurisdiction to issue the order declaring the lot public land, and,
therefore, the same as well as the certificate of title issued thereafter was
null and void, the court ordered the cancellation of OCT No. 3462 in the
name of Juan de la Merced; directed defendants to vacate Lot No. 395 of the
Rizal Cadastre and surrender possession thereof to plaintiffs; and to pay the
latter as the landlord's share, 50 cavans of palay yearly for the agricultural
years 1950 to 1956 or their equivalent, and costs of the suit; and the receiver
to deliver to plaintiffs the palay in his custody representing the harvest for
the agricultural years 1953-1955.
Upon defendants' motion for reconsideration, however, the promulgation of
the decision was ordered suspended and the case was re-set for hearing for
reception of additional evidence.
On August 6, 1957, the court amended its original decision, thus:
The plaintiffs now admit that the litigated "Lot No. 395 of the Rizal Cadastre,
Nueva Ecija, is outside the parcel of land described in Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 1971 and original Certificate of Title No. 425, both of which cover
Lot 3-6". They, however, claim ownership over said Lot 395 by virtue of the
decision rendered on December 26, 1923 in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, entitled "Government of the Philippines versus Justo Abacan, et
al.," (Exh. A-1), and the other dated December 17, 1925 directing the
issuance of a decree pursuant to said decision (Exh. V-2, p. 10, Rec. of
exhibits).
No decree has yet been issued pursuant to the said order, Exhibit B-2, much
less was there a title issued in the name of the plaintiffs over the said lot.
The defendants, on the other hand, predicate their claim of ownership over
the said lot on Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 issued on October 10,
1931 in favor of Juan de la Merced, their predecessor-in-interest, pursuant to
a homestead patent issued on September 15, 1931 (Exh. 1, for the
defendants and intervenor), contending that the decision of December 26,
1923, adjudicating the lot to the plaintiffs, was still subject to review since
there was no decree issued pursuant thereto.
The position of the defendants and intervenor would have been correct if
there was actually a petition for review of the decision of December 26,
1923, or a new trial or a reopening of the case concerning Lot No. 395. The
fact of the matter is that Original Certificate of Title No. 3462 was issued
pursuant to a homestead patent long after Lot No. 395 was declared a public
land in a decision dated March 29, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December
28, 1926 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and December 28, 1926 at Manila for
Cabanatuan City (Exh. 4) states that Lot No. 395, together with Lots Nos. 394
and 2044, was declared a public land and was the object of a homestead
application by the respective concessionaries (p. 21, rec. of exhibits). . . .
It would seem that the cadastral court in the same cadastral case No. 14,
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 281, entitled Government of the Philippines vs. Justo
Abacan, et al., erroneously re-opened the hearing of Lot 395 which was
already adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff by the decision dated December
26, 1923 (Exhs. A-1, and A-2, pp. 2 and 5, rec. of exhibits) and decreed that
Lot 395 is public land. The same cadastral court should have taken judicial
notice of the said decision and the other promulgated therein for the
issuance of a decree in favor of the plaintiffs over lot 395 (Exh. B-2).
While the court held that the land having ceased to be part of the public
domain, the Director of Lands no longer had authority to grant the
homestead patent over the same to Juan de la Merced, it declared
nevertheless that, inasmuch as no title was actually issued therefor, the said
lot may be acquired by adverse possession. And, as defendants had been in
possession of the property for over 20 years, they were declared to have
acquired the right over the same by prescription. The complaint was
consequently ordered dismissed; OCT No. 3462 cancelled and a new one
issued to defendants in lieu thereof; and plaintiffs were directed to vacate
the one-third portion of Lot No. 395 occupied by them, and to pay the costs.
Plaintiffs interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court,
in its decision of July 20, 1960, sustained the contention of appellants on the
basis of the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Government of
the Philippine Islands v. Abural (39 Phil. 997), that upon the finality of the
decree by the cadastral court, adjudicating ownership of the land, the title
thereto becomes incontrovertible and may no longer be acquired by
prescription. And, as the land was no longer part of the public domain when
the homestead patent was obtained by Juan de la Merced, the same can not
prevail over the cadastral court's decree of registration of Lot No. 395 in
favor of appellant Santos' predecessor.
Hence, the filing of the instant petition for review of the aforesaid decision of
the Court of Appeals.1äwphï1.ñët
The questions actually raised by the present appeal are: What is the effect of
the order of the cadastral court of December 26, 1923 adjudicating the lot in
favor of Santos, and the subsequent order dated December 17, 1925,
directing the issuance of a certificate of title to Inocencio Santos? Did those
orders constitute registration under the law even though the corresponding
certificate of title has not been issued? In the affirmative, could the property
thereby affected still be lost by adverse possession?
For purposes of resolving the above questions, these salient facts must be
considered:
By virtue of the final decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 14, G.L.R.O.
Rec. No. 21, dated December 26, 1923, Santos' title to Lot No. 395 was
definitely confirmed as against the whole world, including the Government;
That the same cadastral court issued a decree dated December 19, 1925
declaring its decision of December 26, 1923 final and directing the Chief of
the General Land Registration Office to issue the certificate of title to
Inocencio de los Santos, although no such certificate was actually issued;
That under date of December 28, 1926, the cadastral court, without
reopening the case, declared the same Lot 395 public land as a result of
which Juan de la Merced, after due application, was able to obtain therefor a
homestead patent and OCT No. 3462 on October 10, 1931;
That as found by the Court of Appeals, Juan de la Merced, until his death in
1931, was the overseer of Inocencio de los Santos for a big portion of land
which included Lot 395 in question and was, therefore, a trustee for said lot
at the time he applied for it as a homestead;
That the complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed in
1952.
There is no doubt that had the land involved herein been public, by specific
provision of Act 496, the act of registration shall be the operative act to
convey and affect the same, and such registration shall be made in the office
of the register of deeds for the province where the land lies. (Sec. 122, Act
496). In other words, in cases of public lands, the property is not considered
registered until the final act or the entry in the registration book of the
registry of deeds had been accomplished.
With respect to private lands, however, the pertinent provisions of Act 496
are:
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant
has title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for
registration, a decree of confirmation and registration shall be entered. Every
decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto, subject only
to the exception stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon
and against all persons including the Insular Government and all the
branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or
citation, or included in the general description "To all whom it may concern".
Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other
disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court
for reversing judgment or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any
person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of
registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of First Instance
a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree povided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. Upon the expiration of
said term of one year, every decree or certificate of title issued in accordance
with this section shall be incontrovertible. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
SEC. 40. Every decree of registration shall bear the day of the year, hour, and
minute of its entry, and shall be signed by the Chief of the General Land
Registration Office (now Land Registration Commissioner). . . . The decree
shall be stated in a convenient form for transcription upon the certificates of
titles hereinafter mentioned. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is apparent from the foregoing provisions that a decree of registration and
a certificate of title, under Act 496, are two different things. And it is the
decree of registration, to be issued by the Land Registration Commissioner,
which shall be the basis of the certificate of title to be issued subsequently by
the corresponding register of deeds, that quiets title to and binds the land.
But, it must be remembered that the abovementioned provisions apply only
to voluntary registration under the Land Registration Act. With respect to
lands titled through compulsory proceedings, the Cadastral Act prescribes:
SEC. 11. The trial of the case may occur at any convenient place within the
province in which the lands are situated or at such other place as the court,
for reasons stated in writing and filed with the record of the case, may
designate, and shall be conducted in the same manner as ordinary trials and
proceedings in the Court of First Instance and shall be governed by the same
rules. Orders of default and confession shall also be entered in the same
manner as in ordinary cases in the same court and shall have the same effect.
All conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees
awarded in favor of the persons entitled to the lands or the various parts
thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the basis for original
certificates of title in favor of said persons which shall have the same effect
as certificates of title granted on application for registration of land under
the Land Registration Act, . . . .
(Emphasis supplied.)
Confronted with the question of when title to the land in a cadastral
proceeding is vested, this Court, in the case of Government of the Philippine
Islands v. Abural,1 said:
After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates
ownership in favor of one of the claimants. This constitutes the decision —
the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial manner. The
second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its
order for the issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land
Registration Office. Such order is made if within thirty days from the date of
receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This
again is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.
The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office.
This office has been instituted "for the due effectuation and accomplishment
of the laws relative to the registration of land." (Administrative Code of 1917,
sec. 174.) . . . .
The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a
judicial act. As the law says, the judicial decree when final is the base of the
certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land Registration Office
is a ministerial act. The date of the title prepared by the Chief Surveyor is
unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of technical description. . . .
As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final,
conclusive, and indisputable, after the passage of the thirty-day period
allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of the
judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been
taken to perfect an appeal. The prevailing party may then have execution of
the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of title issued by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision
providing for fraud.
Under the foregoing pronouncement, the title of ownership on the land is
vested upon the owner upon the expiration of the period to appeal from the
decision or adjudication by the cadastral court, without such an appeal
having been perfected. The certificate of title would then be necessary for
purposes of effecting registration of subsequent disposition of the land
where court proceedings would no longer be necessary.
As we have here a decree issued by the cadastral court, ordering the issuance
to Inocencio de los Santos of the certificate of title over Lot No. 395 after the
decision adjudicating ownership to him of the said property had already
become final, and there being no imputation of irregularity in the said
cadastral proceedings, title of ownership on the said adjudicatee was vested
as of the date of the issuance of such judicial decree. The land, for all intents
and purposes, had become, from that time, registered property which could
not be acquired by adverse possession.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioner Mamerta de la Merced. So ordered.