405 2020 | SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS |
GRAVADOR the obligations of their predecessor YES
MODULE 1: INTRODUCTION
MODULE 2: CONCEPT OF SUCCESSION;
BASIS OF SUCCESSION
Topic: Transmissible rights and obligations
Alvarez v. IAC
GR No. 68053 | May 7, 1990
FACTS:
● Yanes was survived by her 3 children
leaving them with 2 parcels of land. Private
respondents (PR) in this case, are the
children of the heirs of Yanes.
● PR never visited the land since Japanese
times but after liberation they went there
to get their share of the sugar produced
therein only to be informed that Santiago,
Fuentabella and Alvarez were in possession
of the land.
● It was found that a TCT of the land was
issued in the name of Santiago who later
on sold it to Fuentabella and upon
Fuentabella’s death and during the
settlement of his estate the land was finally
sold to Alvarez.
● PR filed a complaint against Santiago,
Fuentabella, and Alvarez and the ROD for
the return of the ownership and possession
of the land, as well as the accounting of its
fruits.
● During the pendency of the case, Alvarez
sold the land to Siason who were then
issued a TCT.
● Siason was considered to be a buyer in
good faith by the court, so the court
ordered the heirs of Alvarez (after the
death of Alvarez) to pay the heirs of Yanes
the value of the land plus damages.
● Petitioners disclaim the liability contending
that it should be the sole liability of their
predecessor Alvarez or his estate, after his
death
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ISSUES: WON the heirs of Alvarez are liable for
RULING:
● The doctrine in this jurisdiction is that
generally the rights and obligations of the
deceased is transmissible to his legitimate
children and heirs.
● The binding effect of contracts upon the
heirs of the deceased party is not altered
by the provision of our Rules of Court that
money debts of a deceased must be
liquidated and paid from his estate before
the residue is distributed among said heirs
( Rule 89).
● The reason is that whatever payment is
thus made from the estate is ultimately a
payment by the heirs or distributees, since
the amount of the paid claim in fact
diminishes or reduces the shares that the
heirs would have been entitled to receive.
● Petitioners being the heirs of the late
Rosendo Alvarez, they cannot escape the
legal consequences of their father's
transaction, which gave rise to the present
claim for damages. That petitioners did not
inherit the property involved herein is of no
moment because by legal fiction, the
monetary equivalent thereof devolved into
the mass of their father's hereditary estate,
and we have ruled that the hereditary
assets are always liable i n their totality for
the payment of the debts of the estate.
● It must, however, be made clear that
petitioners are liable only to the extent of
the value of their inheritance. Petitioners’
admitted that there are other properties
left by the deceased which are sufficient to
cover the amount adjudged in favor of PR
Rabadilla v. CA
GR 113725 | June 29, 2000
FACTS:
● In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and
Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of
the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla,
 was instituted as a devisee of 511,855 sq.
m. of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre.
● Subject Codicil provides that the instituted
heir is under obligation to deliver 100 piculs
of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza
Coscuella (PR). Such obligation is imposed
on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease,
mortgage or otherwise negotiate the
property involved.
● The Codicil further provides that in the
event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, PR Marlena Belleza
shall seize the property and turn it over to
the testatrix's near descendants.
● To summarize, Dr. Rabadilla died in 1983
and his heirs failed to comply with the
yearly obligation to deliver the sugar (from
1985 to 1989) which caused PR Marlena to
institute a complaint before the RTC of
Bacolod Branch 52 against Rabadilla’s
heirs. In her complaint, she prayed for the
enforcement of the provisions of the
Codicil---to reconvey the subject lot to the
late Aleja Belleza’s surviving heirs.
● In 1988, Alan Azurin, son-in-law of the
Petitioner Johnny Rabadilla and lessee of
the subject property entered into a
compromise agreement with PR Marlena to
deliver the sugar but again, there was no
full compliance with said agreement.
● RTC then dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action. On appeal by PR Marlena,
the CA set aside the decision of the RTC
and ordered Rabadilla’s heirs to reconvey
title together with its fruits and interests to
the estate of testatrix Aleja Belleza. Hence,
this petition for review by Johnny Rabadilla
before the SC.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in ruling that heirs of
Rabadilla had the obligation to deliver
sugar PR Marlena from the moment of
death of the modal heir, Dr. Rabadilla (NO.
CA ruling is CORRECT.)
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2. WON by virtue of the amicable settlement,
the said obligation imposed by the Codicil
has been assumed by the lessee, and
whatever obligation petitioner had become
the obligation of the lessee; that petitioner
is deemed to have made a substantial and
constructive compliance of his obligation
through the consummated settlement
(NO.)
RULING:
1. NO. The CA did not err in ruling that the
heirs of Rabadilla must comply with the
provisions of the Codicil to deliver the sugar
to PR Marlena.
It is a general rule under the law on
succession that successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of
the decedent and compulsory heirs are
called to succeed by operation of law. Thus,
the petitioner, his mother and sisters, as
compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by
operation of law, without need of further
proceedings. Conformably, under Art. 776,
since obligations not extinguished by death
also form part of the estate of the
decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Codicil on the deceased Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted
to his compulsory heirs upon his death.
2. NO. The amicable settlement did not serve
as substantial compliance with the
obligation found in the Codicil.
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal,
solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take
effect after his death. Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person
intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be
strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
subject of a compromise agreement which
would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
Topic: Rights and obligations extinguished by
death
NHA v. Almeida
GR 162784 | June 27, 2007
FACTS: Land Tenure Administration (LTA)
awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of
land with her children as her heirs. The first child,
Beatriz Herrera-Mercado, predeceased her
mother and left heirs. When the mother passed
away, the other remaining child, Francisca
Herrera, filed Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming
to be the exclusive and remaining heir of the
deceased, which was based on a Sinumpaang
Salaysay of the latter.
The heirs of the first child filed an annulment of
the Deed of Self-Adjudication which was declared
null and void by the Court of First Instance. On the
other hand, the living child of Herrera filed an
application with National Housing Authority (NHA)
to purchase the same lots which was granted by
the same. This was affirmed by the Office of the
President. When Francisca Herrera died, her heirs
executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate,
approved by NHA and directed the heir of Beatriz
Herrera-Mercado the leave the property.
In RTC, they raised that the Deed of Self-
Adjudication was declared of nullity since the other
heirs were disregarded. The heirs of Francisca
Herrera countered that the transfer of the
purchase of the subject lots was valid since there
was consideration paid. RTC set aside the decision
of NHA and Office of the President, declaring the
Deeds of Sale to be null and void. This was
affirmed by CA.
ISSUES: Was NHA correct in its resolution in
granting the application of the purchase of lots by
Francisca Herrera?
RULING:
NO. The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Margarita
Herrera was in fact a will which effectivity
commences at her time of death which means that
all her interests as a person should cease to be to
hers and shall be in the possession of her estate
until transferred to the heirs by virtue of Art. 774:
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“Succession is a mode of acquisition by
virtue of which property, rights and
obligations to the extent of the value of the
inheritance, of a person are transmitted
through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.”
Margarita Herrera is under a contract to sell with
NHA such that upon her death, this obligation does
not cease since it is transmissible either by will or
by operation of law. NHA cannot make another
contract to sell to other parties since the property
was already initially paid for by the decedent.
What NHA should have done was to consider the
estate of the decedent as the next person to fulfill
the obligation to pay the remaining purchase
price. NHA should have been alert to note that
there are other heirs to the interests and
properties of the decedent who may claim the
property after testate or intestate proceedings.
Estate of Hemady v. Luzon Srety
100 Phil 389 (1956)
FACTS: Luzon Surety Co. filed a claim against the
Estate of K.H. Hemady based on 20 different
agreements or counterbonds wherein the
deceased was a surety solidary guarantor for
various principals. The court dismissed the claims
on the ground that the premiums due and the cost
of documentary stamps were not contemplated by
the indemnities and that whatever losses may
occur after Hemady’s death are not chargeable to
his estate because upon his death he ceased to be
a guarantor.
ISSUE: Is the estate of K.H. Hemady liable for
the bonds?
RULING: YES, the solidary guarantor’s liability is
not extinguished by his death, and Luzon Surety
Co. had the right to file against the estate a
contingent claim for reimbursement.
Article 1131 of the Civil Code provides that
“Contracts take effect only as between the parties,
their assigns and heirs, except in the case where
the rights and obligations arising from the contract
 are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law.”
Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of
which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of a person
are transmitted through his death to another or
others either by his will or by operation of law. The
inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person which are not extinguished
by his death.
The general rule is that a party’s contractual rights
and obligations are transmissible to the
successors. The contracts of suretyship entered
into by Hemady in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not
being rendered intransmissible due to the nature
of the undertaking, nor by the stipulations of the
contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his
eventual liability thereunder necessarily passed
upon his death to his heirs.
The nature of the obligation of the surety or
guarantor is to reimburse the money whether
made by Hemady himself or by someone else on
his behalf, so long as the money was paid to it. As
to stipulation, under the law a person who enters
into a contract is deemed to have contracted for
himself and his heirs and assigns, it is unnecessary
for him to expressly stipulate to that effect; hence
his failure to do so is no sign that he intended his
bargain to terminate upon his death. As to
intransmissibility by operation of law, the
provision makes reference to those cases where
the law expresses that the rights or obligations are
extinguished by death, as is the case in legal
support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts for
a piece of work, partnership, and agency. By
contract, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate
guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that
the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the
guarantor or the surety.
MODULE 3: WILLS AND ITS
CHARACTERISTICS
Topic: Characteristics; disposition of
property
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Seangio v. Reyes
GR No. 140371-72 | Nov. 27, 2006
FACTS:
1. Private respondents filed a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the late
Segundo Seangio (Sp. Proc. No. 98-90870) of the
RTC, and praying for the appointment of private
respondent Elisa D. Seangio- Santos as special
administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner
Dy Yieng Seangio.
2. However, petitioners opposed the petition.
They contended among others that the deceased
Segundo executed a general power of attorney in
favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage
his business in the Philippines, and left a
holographic will, dated disinheriting Alfredo
Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported
holographic will, petitioners averred that in the
event the decedent is found to have left a will, the
intestate proceedings are to be automatically
suspended and replaced by the proceedings for
the probate of the will.
3. A petition for the probate of the
holographic will of Segundo (SP. Proc. No. 99-
93396), was filed by petitioners before the RTC.
Consequent, upon motion of petitioners, both
cases were consolidated.
4. Private respondents moved for the
dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on
the ground that the document purporting to be the
holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus
does not meet the definition of a will (Article 783
CC). They averred that the will only shows an
alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his
eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other
compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition
which would result to intestacy.
5. Petitioners filed their opposition to the
motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally,
the authority of the probate court is limited only to
a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will;
2) private respondents question the intrinsic and
not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the
estate of a decedent; and, 4) the rule on
preterition does not apply because Segundo's will
does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.
6. The RTC dismissed the petition for probate
proceedings as it clearly shows that there is
preterition, as the only heirs mentioned thereat
are Alfredo and Virginia, and on its face, it appears
to be intrinsically void.
ISSUES:
1. WON the will executed by Segundo can be
considered as a holographic will.
2. WON there is preterition in the will when
Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion
of his other compulsory heir.
RULING:
1. Yes, the document executed by Segundo
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law.
A holographic will, as provided under Article 810
of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It
is subject to no other form, and may be made in
or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed.
Segundo's document, although it may initially
come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will
prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed
by the hand of Segundo himself. An intent to
dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from
the terms of the instrument, and while it does not
make an affirmative disposition of the latter's
property, the disinheritance of Alfredo,
nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In
other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo
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in favor of those who would succeed in the
absence of Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the
intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the
form and within the limits prescribed by law, must
be recognized as the supreme law in succession.
All rules of construction are designed to ascertain
and give effect to that intention. It is only when
the intention of the testator is contrary to law,
morals, or public policy that it cannot be given
effect.
Holographic wills, therefore, being usually
prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as
illustrated in the present case, should be
construed more liberally than the ones drawn by
an expert, taking into account the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the instrument and
the intention of the testator. In this regard, the
Court is convinced that the document, even if
captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana, was
intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary
act and was executed by him in accordance with
law in the form of a holographic will. Unless the
will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given
effect.
2. No. The compulsory heirs in the direct line
were not preterited in the will when Segundo
executed the document without instituting an heir.
Article 854 of the Civil Code states: "The
preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after
the death of the testator, shall annul the institution
of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. If the omitted
compulsory heirs should die before the testator,
the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice
to the right of representation."
In addition, in Article 841 of the Civil Code states:
"A will is valid even though it should not contain
an institution of an heir, or such institution should
not comprise the entire estate, and even though
the person so instituted should not accept the
inheritance or should be incapacitated to succeed.
In such cases the testamentary dispositions made
in accordance with law shall be complied with and
the remainder of the estate shall pass to the legal
heirs."
It was Segundo's last expression to bequeath his
estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the sole
exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not
institute an heir to the exclusion of his other
compulsory heirs. The mere mention of the name
of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document
did not operate to institute her as the universal
heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness
to the altercation between Segundo and his son,
Alfredo.
3. (not an issue) WON probate of the will
can be dispensed in Segundo’s holographic will.
No. Considering that the questioned document is
Segundo's holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will
cannot be dispensed with.
Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will
shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated,
the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory.
In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore,
should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose.
4. (not an issue) WON there is valid
disinheritance in the Kasulatan ng Pag-Alis ng
Mana executed by Segundo.
Yes, there is valid disinheritance in the document
as it unmistakably showed Segundo's intention of
excluding his eldest son, Alfredo, as an heir to his
estate for the reasons that he cited therein. In
effect, Alfredo was disinherited by Segundo.
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Article 919. The following shall be sufficient causes
for the disinheritance of children and descendants,
legitimate as well as illegitimate:
(1) When a child or descendant has been found
guilty of an attempt against the life of the testator,
his or her spouse, descendants, or ascendants;
(2) When a child or descendant has accused the
testator of a crime for which the law prescribes
imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless;
(3) When a child or descendant has been convicted
of adultery or concubinage with the spouse of the
testator;
(4) When a child or descendant by fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence causes the
testator to make a will or to change one already
made;
(5) A refusal without justifiable cause to support
the parents or ascendant who disinherit such child
or descendant;
(6) Maltreatment of the testator by word or deed,
by the child or descendant;
(7) When a child or descendant leads a
dishonorable or disgraceful life;
(8) Conviction of a crime which carries with it the
penalty of civil interdiction.
For disinheritance to be valid, Article 916 of the
Civil Code requires that the same must be effected
through a will wherein the legal cause therefore
shall be specified. With regard to the reasons for
the disinheritance that were stated by Segundo in
his document, the Court believes that the
incidents, taken as a whole, can be considered a
form of maltreatment of Segundo by his son,
Alfredo, and that the matter presents a sufficient
cause for the disinheritance of a child or
descendant under Article 919 of the Civil Code.
Topic: Characteristics; mortis causa
Vitug v. CA
183 SCRA 755
FACTS:
This case is a continuation in an earlier suit involving the
probate of the two wills of the late Dolores Luchangco
Vitug, who died in New York, USA sometime November
1980. The decedent named private respondent Rowena
Faustino-Corona (PR) as executrix.
● Petitioner along with a certain Nenita Alonte were
appointed as administrator and co-administrator of
Mrs. Vitug’s estate pending probate.
● Petitioner filed a motion asking for authority from the
probate court to sell certain shares of stock and real
properties belonging to the estate to cover allegedly
his advances to the estate in the sum of
P667,731.66, plus interests, which he claimed were
personal funds.
● The alleged advances consisted of several amounts
which according to Mr. Vitug, he withdrew from
savings account No. 35342-038 of the Bank of
America, Makati, Metro Manila.
● PR opposed such motion to sell on the ground that
the same funds withdrawn from the savings account
were conjugal partnership properties and part of the
estate, thus there is no ground for a reimbursement.
● Further, PR assailed that the petitioner failed to
include the sums in question for inventory and for
concealment of funds belonging to the estate.
● Petitioner, however, insisted that the funds
withdrawn from the said savings account are his
exclusive property having acquired the same through
a survivorship agreement executed with his late wife
and the bank.
● Essentially, the agreement provides that the joint
savings current account shall be the property of both
the spouses and shall be payable to and collectible or
withdrawable by either of the spouses during their
lifetime. It added that the bank account shall belong
to and be the sole property of the survivor or
survivors, and shall be payable to and and
collectible or withdrawable by such survivor or
survivors.
● The trial court upheld the validity of the survivorship
agreement and granted Petitioner’s motion to sell
some of the estate of his late wife, the proceeds of
which shall be used to pay the personal funds of the
Petitioner (from the abovementioned savings
account) in the sum of P667,731.66.
● PR filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. It
ruled that the survivorship agreement constitutes a
conveyance mortis cause which did not comply with
the formalities of a valid will as prescribed by Art.
805, NCC.
● The petitioner assailed the ruling relying on this
Court’s decision in Rivera v. People’s Bank and Trust
Co. where the exclusive owner of the funds-
deposited in the bank subsequently transferred the
account to the name of himself and/or to his servant
and executed with the latter the survivorship
agreement which was sustained by the Court,
although there was no relation of kinship between
EH 405 2020: SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS-GRAVADOR| PAGE 7
them but only that of master-servant. This nullifies
the assumption that the master was the exclusive
owner of the bank account. Consequently, in Macam
V. Gatmaitan the Court sustained the survivorship
agreement entered by parties who agreed to become
the owner of the specified property upon the death
of the other.
● It is for this reason that hereby Petitioner in his
petition assailed the ruling of the appellate court.
ISSUES:
WON the survivorship agreement entered by petitioner,
his wife - during her lifetime, and the bank, had the
effect of validly making the funds in the savings account
exclusively owned by the Petitioner upon the death of
his wife.
RULING:
● A survivorship agreement is in the nature of an
aleatory contract where one or both reciprocally
bind themselves to give or do something in
consideration of what the other shall give or do
upon the happening of an event which is uncertain,
or which is to occur at an indeterminate time. (Art.
2010,NCC)
● The Court further stressed that fulfillment of an
aleatory contract depends on either the happening
of an event which is “uncertain” or one “which is to
occur at an indeterminate time.”
● In this case, the uncertain happening is the death
of one of the party and survivorship of the other.
● In the absence of showing that the funds in the
savings account in question is exclusively owned by
one of the spouses, it is presumed to be conjugal,
as it was acquired during the existence of the
marital relations of petitioner.
● Here, the conveyance cannot be that of mortis
causa. It must be noted that a mortis cause
transfer requires that it shall be embodied in a will.
- A will is defined as “ a personal, solemn,
revocable and free act by which a capacitated
person disposes of his property and rights and
declares or complies with duties to take effect
after his death." In other words, the bequest
or device must pertain to the testator which is
not the case at bar.
● Neither is it an intervivos transfer because: 1) the
transfer shall only take effect after the death of one
party; and 2) it is not a donation between spouses
because it involved no conveyance of a spouse’s
own properties to another.
● The survivorship agreement shows no reason that
it had been executed for the purpose of
 circumventing the law. However, the Court warns
that although a survivorship agreement is not
contrary to law, its effect may be violative of the
law such as when it be shown that the agreement
is a mere cloak to hide an inofficious donation.
● Thus, the motion to sell by the petitioner was
granted and appellate court’s decision set aside
Topic: Law governing form; as to time of
execution
Enriquez v. Abadia
GR No. L-7188| Aug 9, 1954
FACTS:
● On Sep. 6, 1923, Father Abadia executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and
Testament known here as “Exhibit A”.
● Fr. Abadia died on Jan. 14, 2943. He left
properties estimated as P8, 000.00.
● On Oct. 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of
the legatees in Exhibit A, filed a petition for
its probate in the CFI Cebu.
● Some cousins and nephews who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if Father
Abadia didn’t leave a will filed an
opposition.
● During the hearing, one of the attesting
witnesses testified without contradiction
that Father Sancho wrote out in longhand
Exhibit A in Spanish which Father Abadia
understood; and that Father Abadia signed
on left hand margin of the front page of
each of the folios of which the document is
composed, and signed his name at the end
of his writing at the last page – all this in
the presence of the three witnesses and the
said witnesses signed their names on the
last page after the attestation clause.
● The trial court declared that Exhibit A is a
holographic will – that it was in the
handwriting of the testator (Father Abadia)
and that although it was executed at the
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time of the testator’s death, holographic
wills were not permitted by law still.
● Take note that at the time of the hearing,
and when the case was to be decided, the
New Civil Code was already in force, which
permitted the execution of holographic
wills under a liberal view.
● The Trial Court admitted to probate the will
of Father Abadia in the view that the
intention of the testation is the controlling
factor and may override the defect of the
holographic will.
ISSUES: Is it correct for the RTC probate the
holographic will of the testator even when at the
time it was executed, holographic wills were still
not allowed?
In other words, what is the law to apply to the
probate of Exh. "A"?
RULING:
● The validity of the will is to be judged not
by the law inforce at the time of the
testator’s death or at the time the
supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by
the court but at the time the instrument
was executed.
● One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after
the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is
given solemn expression at the time the
will is executed, and in reality, the legacy
or bequest then becomes a completed act.
● Of course, there is the view that the
intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all
adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out
said intention, and that when statutes
passed after the execution of the will and
after the death of the testator lessen the
 formalities required by law for the
execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills
defectively executed according to the law
in force at the time of execution.
HOWEVER, we should not forget that from
the day of the death of the testator, if he
leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of
the constitution against a subsequent
change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which
would invalidate such a will.
● By parity of reasoning, when one executes
a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the
time of its execution then upon his death
he should be regarded and declared as
having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and
no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with
such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a
defective will and thereby divest the heirs
of their vested rights in the estate by
intestate succession. The general rule is
that the Legislature can not validate void
wills.
Topic: Law governing content
Jimenez v. Fernandez
GR No. L-46364| Apr. 6, 1990
FACTS:
● Land in question is a 436 sqm parcel of
residential land covered by a TCT in the name
of Petitioner Sulpicia Jimenez. (transferred in
her name upon the death of her uncle Carlos)
● Said land is part of a larger land (2,932 sqm)
which formerly belonged to Fermin Jimenez
who has two sons Fortunato and Carlos.
Sulpicia is the only daughter of Fortunato who
predeceased his father Fermin.
● After the death of Fermin the entire land was
registered in equal pro-indiviso shares
between Sulpicia and her uncle Carlos and an
EH 405 2020: SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS-GRAVADOR| PAGE 9
OCTs was issued. (Fermin -> Sulpicia &
Carlos -> Back to Sulpicia)
● Upon the death of Carlos in 1936, his
illegitimate daughter Melecia, took possession
of the land in question and executed a deed
of sale to Edilberto Cagampan who in turn
transferred the said land to Teodora Grado via
Deed of Exchange of Properties and occupied
the property ever since. (Melecia ->
Edilberto -> Teodora)
● In 1944, petitioner executed an affidavit
adjudicating unto herself the property
previously registered to her uncle Carlos
manifesting that she is the only heir of Carlos.
A TCT was subsequently issued in 1969 in her
name for the whole property of his
grandfather.
● In 1970, petitioner instituted an action for
recovery of the said 436sqm property
occupied by the respondents.
● CFI Pangasinan dismissed the complaint and
ruled in favor of respondents Grado, the CA
then affirmed in toto the said decision upon
appeal.
ISSUES:
● WON Melecia has the right to sell the land in
question and if she is the daughter of Carlos
Jimenez
● WON Teodora Grado became the owner of the
land by virtue deed of exchange with Edilberto
and Deed of sale between Edilberto and
Melecia.
● WON Sulpicia’s TCT over the land can be
defeated by the adverse open and notorious
possession of Teodora
RULING:
● The court finds merit in the petition and
declared Sulpicia to be the sole and absolute
owner of the land in question with right to its
possession and enjoyment. Upon the death of
her uncle Carlos, his share in the properties
descended by intestacy to Sulpicia.
● Respondents failed to present concrete
evidence to prove that Melecia was really the
daughter of Carlos Jimenez.
● Even assuming that Melecia was the
illegitimate daughter of Carlos, she still has no
right to succeed to the estate of Carlos and
therefore could not have validly acquired and
 transferred to Edilberto the property in
question.
● Rights to succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent. (Art. 777)
● Since Carlos died before the effectivity of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the successional
rights pertaining to his estate is governed by
the Civil Code of 1889.
● Under the 1889 Civil Code (Art. 807, 935): a
child must be either a child legitimate,
legitimated, adopted or an acknowledged
natural child - for illegitimate not natural are
disqualified to inherit. Melecia was born out of
the common-law relationship between her
mother and Carlos, however she could not be
considered acknowledged natural child
because Carlos was legally married to another
and hence not qualified to marry Melecia’s
mother.
● In the absence of any voluntary conveyance
to Melecia by Carlos or Sulpicia, she cannot
legally transfer said land to Edilberto and in
turn Edilberto cannot legally transfer the
same to respondent Teodora.
● Lower court also erred in ruling that Teodora
acquired the property via prescription since
the property in question is registered pro
indiviso under Sulpicia and Carlos hence
cannot be defeated by prescription.
Miciano v. Brimo
GR No. 22595 | Nov. 1, 1924
FACTS:
● The partition of the estate left by the
deceased Joseph G. Brimo, a Turkish national,
is in question.
● Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed the approved scheme of
partition and assigned errors: (1) denial of his
participation in the inheritance; and (2) the
declaration that the Turkish laws are
impertinent to this cause.
● His opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the
provisions of Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are
not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish
nationality, for which reason they are void as
EH 405 2020: SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS-GRAVADOR| PAGE 10
being in violation of Article 10 (now Article
16) of the Civil Code:
“Nevertheless, legal and testamentary
successions, in respect to the order of
succession as well as to the amount of the
successional rights and the intrinsic validity of
their provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession
is in question, whatever may be the nature of
the property or the country in which it may be
situated.”
● However, the oppositor did not prove that said
testamentary dispositions are not in
accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch
as he did not present any evidence showing
what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and
in the absence of evidence on such laws, they
are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim & Lim v. Collector of
Customs)
● The oppositor’s exclusion in the inheritance is
based on the last part of the will:
“I likewise desire to state that although, by
law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship
having been conferred upon me by conquest
and not by free choice, nor by nationality and,
on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine
Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of
the property that I now possess, it is my wish
that the distribution of my property and
everything in connection with this, my will, be
made and disposed of in accordance with the
laws in force in the Philippine Islands,
requesting all of my relatives to respect this
wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel
beforehand whatever disposition found in this
will favorable to the person or persons who
fail to comply with this request.”
● If such condition is legal and valid, any
legatee who fails to comply is prevented from
receiving his legacy.
ISSUE: Whether the decedent’s statement in the
will to distribute his property in accordance with
the laws of PH governs his testamentary
succession.

RULING:
● No, the national law of the testator is the one
to govern his testamentary provisions.
[Article 10 (now Art 16) of the Civil Code]
● The condition of the institution of the legatees
in the will that they must respect the
testator’s will to distribute his property in
accordance with the laws of the PH is void for
being contrary to law as it expressly ignores
the testator’s national law.
● Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in
said will is unconditional and consequently
valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
● All of the remaining clauses of said will with
all their dispositions and requests are
perfectly valid and effective it not appearing
that said clauses are contrary to the testator's
national laws.
● SC directed that the distribution of this estate
be made in such a manner as to include the
herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the
legatees.
Cayetano v. Leonidas
129 SCRA 522
Cayetano v. Leonidas
GR No. 54919| May. 30, 1984
FACTS:
 On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos
died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters,
private respondent Nenita C. Paguia,
Remedios C. Lopez and Marieta C. Medina
as the surviving heirs. As Hermogenes
Campos was the only compulsory heir, he
executed an Affidavit of Adjudication
whereby he adjudicated unto himself the
ownership of the entire estate of the
deceased Adoracion Campos.
 Eleven months after, on November 25,
1977, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for
EH 405 2020: SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS-GRAVADOR| PAGE 11
the reprobate of a will of the deceased,
Adoracion Campos, which was allegedly
executed in the United States and for her
appointment as administratrix of the estate
of the deceased testatrix.
 In her petition, Nenita alleged that the
testatrix was an American citizen at the
time of her death and was a permanent
resident of 4633 Ditman Street,
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; that
the testatrix died in Manila on January 31,
1977 while temporarily residing with her
sister at 2167 Leveriza, Malate, Manila;
that during her lifetime, the testatrix made
her last will and testament on July 10,
1975, according to the laws of
Pennsylvania, U.S.A., nominating Wilfredo
Barzaga of New Jersey as executor;
Clement L. McLaughlin, the administrator
who was appointed after Dr. Barzaga, is
also a resident of Philadelphia, U.S.A., and
that therefore, there is an urgent need for
the appointment of an administratrix to
administer and eventually distribute the
properties of the estate located in the
Philippines.
 On January 11, 1978, an opposition to the
reprobate of the will was filed by
Hermogenes alleging among other things,
that the will in question is a forgery; that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null
and void but later on filed a Motion to
Dismiss Opposition through his counsel,
Atty. Franco Loyola.
 Herein respondent judge rendered a
decision stating that the Last Will and
Testament of Adoracion C. Campos be
admitted and allowed probate in the
Philippines. Also appointing Nenita Campos
Peguia as Administratrix of the estate of
said decedent.
 Hermogenes filed a petition confirming the
withdrawal of his opposition on April 14,
1979. However, he then subsequently filed
a petition for relief, praying that the order
allowing the will be set aside on the ground
that the withdrawal was secured through
fraudulent means.
  Meanwhile, on June 6, 1982, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos died and left a will,
appointing Polly Cayetano as the executrix
of his last will and testament. Cayetano,
therefore, filed a motion to substitute
herself as petitioner in the instant case
which was granted by the court. She then
elevated the matter at hand to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
 Whether or not the respondent Judge erred
in ruling that the right of a forced heir to
his legitime can be divested by a decree
admitting a will to probate in which no
provision is made for the forced heir in
complete disregard of Law of Succession.
RULING:
 The issue raised deals with the validity of
the provisions of the will. As a general rule,
the probate court's authority is limited only
to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due
execution thereof, the testatrix's
testamentary capacity and the compliance
with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical
considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet
the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals,
114 SCRA 478).
 In the case at bar, the petitioner maintains
that since the respondent judge allowed
the reprobate of Adoracion's will,
Hermogenes C. Campos was divested of his
legitime which was reserved by the law for
him. This contention is without merit.
 Although on its face, the will appeared to
have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its
reprobate outright, the private respondents
have sufficiently established that Adoracion
was, at the time of her death, an American
citizen and a permanent resident of
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
EH 405 2020: SUCCESSION CASE DIGESTS-GRAVADOR| PAGE 12
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code which respectively
provide:
Art. 16 par. (2).
xxx xxx xxx
"However, intestate and testamentary
successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein
said property may be found."
Art. 1039.
"Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent."
 The law which governs Adoracion Campo's
will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for
legitimes and that all the estate may be
given away by the testatrix to a complete
stranger, the petitioner argues that such
law should not apply because it would be
contrary to the sound and established
public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
 It is a settled rule that as regards the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the
will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and
1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of
the decedent must apply.