IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T.

SANTIAGO
and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila.
Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and
Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. The trial
court in that case decided in favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over
portions of the property. The Register of Deeds of Manila was required to include the names of
Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said property.
Jose died intestate. Later, respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into
petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law,
because they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner was executed
through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The deed showed that Jose affixed his
thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose
never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full.
Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed
consideration of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was unemployed
and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of the alleged sale. They also stressed
that it was quite unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only almost
eight years after the execution of the sale.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by
respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C.
Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject
property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child.
She argued that the purported sale of the property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing
could have precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his
signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never acknowledged respondents' claim
over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that
respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had filed two ejectment cases against her and other
occupants of the property. The first was decided in her and the other defendants' favor, while the
second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as decreed by the RTC. But
she averred that she caused the issuance of a title in her name alone, allegedly after respondents
refused to take steps that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction for their
failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she could avail
of a realty tax amnesty.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
RTC - recognizes herein respondents as being entitled to the ownership and possession each of
one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the property and the remaining one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T. Santiago in said case, is
hereby adjudged and adjudicated to herein petitioner as owner and entitled to possession of said
share. While there was indeed no consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of
petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be
entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter.
The trial court ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1)
the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose's
daughter, and (2) Jose's income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said
that respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her being the daughter of Jose, per records of
the earlier ejectment cases they filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents were
not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C. Santiago and insisting that
she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their credibility.
CA - appealed decision is REVERSED and one is entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and
Amanda Santiago the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the
late Jose Santiago in the land and building. It noted that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala
presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It
also took into account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he did not have
any child.

ARGUMENTS:
Petitioner - trial court was correct in ruling that she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her
filiation by Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally, citing the case
of Sayson v. Court of Appeals in which we held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law." Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this
contention.
Respondent - contend that petitioner is not the daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that
indicates her parents as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and
Esperanza Cabrigas. They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply
to the present case since this is not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery
of title, ownership, and possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not respondents may
impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or
not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents,
through succession, sale, or donation.

ISSUE:
WON petitioner has the right on the 1/3 share of the property Jose Santiago co-owned with
respondents, through succession, sale, or donation

RULING:
NO. We find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals,
hence it must be upheld.
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Aside from the fact that legal documents state that
petitioner is not a child of Jose Santiago, the latter also did not have the right to transfer
ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.
Another thing, petitioner could not have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the
time. Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential requisites of a contract, including
one of sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property, which makes the sale void.
Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides: If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may
be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Even assuming that the deed
is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.
725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the donation should have been
made by her father, Leon Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative
pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at
all - accepted the "donation" for Ida.
EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL
CAPALUNGAN, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, and FELIPE C. RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R. RIGONAN, respondents.

FACTS:
Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte,
including the house and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private
respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives.
Herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and Samuel Capalungan, who claim to
be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by means of stealth,
force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same.
Consequently, herein respondent Felipe Rigonan and his wife Concepcion Rigonan filed a
complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos
Norte. They alleged that they were the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of
sale executed by Paulina Rigonan; that since then, they had been in continuous possession of the
subject properties and had introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that herein
petitioners entered the properties illegally, and they refused to leave them when asked to do so.
According to herein petitioners, the alleged deed of absolute sale was void for being spurious as
well as lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not sell her properties to
anyone. As her nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited the
three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died. They said they had been
in possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years.

RESPONDENTS’ ARGUMENTS:
Juan Franco testified that he was a witness to the execution of the questioned deed of absolute
sale. However, when cross-examined and shown the deed he stated that the deed was not the
document he signed as a witness, but rather it was the will and testament made by Paulina
Rigonan.
Atty. Tagatag testified that he personally prepared the deed, he saw Paulina Rigonan affix her
thumbprint on it and he signed it both as witness and notary public. He further testified that he
also notarized Paulina's last will and testament. The will mentioned the same lots sold to private
respondents. When asked why the subject lots were still included in the last will and testament,
he could not explain. Atty. Tagatag also mentioned that he registered the original deed of
absolute sale with the Register of Deeds.
Plaintiff Felipe Rigonan claimed that he was Paulina's close relative. Their fathers were first
cousins. However, he could not recall the name of Paulina's grandfather. His claim was disputed
by defendants, who lived with Paulina as their close kin. He admitted the discrepancies between
the Register of Deeds' copy of the deed and the copy in his possession. But he attributed them to
the representative from the Office of the Register of Deeds who went to plaintiff’s house after
that Office received a subpoena duces tecum. According to him, the representative showed him
blanks in the deed and then the representative filled in the blanks by copying from his (plaintiffs)
copy.

PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS:
Jose Flores testified that he knew defendants, herein petitioners, who had lived on the land with
Paulina Rigonan since he could remember and continued to live there even after Paulina's death.
He said he did not receive any notice nor any offer to sell the lots from Paulina, contrary to what
was indicated in the deed of sale that the vendor had notified all the adjacent owners of the sale.
He averred he had no knowledge of any sale between Paulina and private respondents.
Ruben Blanco, the acting Registrar of Deeds, testified that only the carbon copy, also called a
duplicate original, of the deed of sale was filed in his office, but he could not explain why.
Zosima Domingo testified that her husband, Eugenio Domingo, was Paulina's nephew. Paulina
was a first cousin of Eugenio's father. She also said that they lived with Paulina and her husband,
Jose Guerson. They took care of her, spent for her daily needs and medical expenses, especially
when she was hospitalized prior to her death. She stated that Paulina was never badly in need of
money during her lifetime.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:
RTC - judgment is hereby rendered in favor of herein petitioners. They are hereby declared, by
virtue of intestate succession, the lawful owners and possessors of the house including the
bodega and the three (3) parcels of land in suit.
CA - reversed the trial court's decision, herein defendants Felipe Rigonan and Concepcion
Rigonan are declared the owners of the properties under litigation and the herein petitioners are
hereby ordered to VACATE the subject properties and SURRENDER the possession thereof.

ISSUE:
Did private respondents sufficiently establish the existence and due execution of the Deed of
Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property?

RULING:
Our finding is in the negative.
First, note that private respondents as plaintiffs below presented only a carbon copy of this deed.
When the Register of Deeds was subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten deed
but only a carbon copy was presented to the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a
"duplicate original," the deed contained filled in blanks and alterations. None of the witnesses
directly testified to prove positively and convincingly Paulina's execution of the original deed of
sale.
Secondly, we agree with the trial court that irregularities abound regarding the execution and
registration of the alleged deed of sale. The deed was apparently registered long after its alleged
date of execution and after Paulina's death. Furthermore, it appears that the alleged vendor was
never asked to vacate the premises she had purportedly sold. Felipe testified that he had agreed
to let Paulina stay in the house until her death. Noteworthy. These circumstances, taken together,
militate against unguarded acceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed
of sale.
Thirdly, we have to take into account the element of consideration for the sale. The price
allegedly paid by private respondents for nine (9) parcels, including the three parcels in dispute,
a house and a warehouse, raises further questions. Consideration is the why of a contract, the
essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter into the contract. On record, there is
unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She loaned money to
several people. We see no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of
land with a house and warehouse at a meager price of P850 only.
In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was
already of advanced age and senile. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities. However, when
such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as to prevent the person from
properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the
alleged execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She
narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in bed.
Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she
consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to
show that said price was paid to and received by her.
The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration
was ever delivered to the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9)
parcels of land including the house and bodega is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale
is null and void ab initio.