G.R. No.
132305      December 4, 2001 Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner,
vs.
NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO, AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision dated
March 4, 1997,1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817,
which reversed and set aside the judgment dated October 17, 1990,2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 54, in Civil Case No.87-
41515, finding herein petitioner to be the owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share
in a parcel of land.  belonging to his "poor and unschooled sisters who. ..sacrificed for his
1âwphi1.nêt
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729,
located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila. Alleging that Jose
had fraudulently registered it in his name alone, his sisters Nicolasa and
Amanda (now respondents herein) sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share
of the property.3 On April 20, 1981, the trial court in that case decided in
favor of the sisters, recognizing their right of ownership over portions of
the property covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in
the certificate of title to said property.4
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from her the 1/3 portion of
said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs of their
brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that the
purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner
sometime in March 19795 was executed through petitioner's
machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 1723346) in
petitioner's name alone.7
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed
showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but respondents
averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose never put
his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name
in full. They claimed that Jose could not have sold the property
studies and personal welfare."8 Respondents also pointed out that it is
highly improbable for petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration
of P150,000 for the sale of the subject property because petitioner was
unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the time of
the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite unusual and
questionable that petitioner registered the deed of sale only on January
26, 1987, or almost eight years after the execution of the sale.9
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C.
Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C. Santiago. She claimed
not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to
be the daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject
property. She maintained that she had always stayed on the property,
ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the
property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have
precluded Jose from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead
of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that
respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented that
1
respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain ownership of
the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two ejectment
cases against her and other occupants of the property. The first was
decided in her and the other defendants' favor, while the second was
dismissed. Yet respondents persisted and resorted to the present
action.
Petitioner recognized respondents' ownership of 2/3 of the property as
decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused the issuance of a
title in her name alone, allegedly after respondents refused to take
steps that would prevent the property from being sold by public auction
for their failure to pay realty taxes thereon. She added that with a title
issued in her name she could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner,
decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership
and possession each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the
property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein
defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A
Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint,
and the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No.
56226 of this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third
(1/3) pro indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant
Jose T. Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and
adjudicated to herein defendant as owner and entitled to
possession of said share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge
damages, attorney's fees and costs. Upon finality of this
judgment, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334 is ordered
cancelled and a new title issued in the names of the two (2)
plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in equal shares, and the
Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to effect the same
upon payment of the proper fees by the parties herein.
SO ORDERED.10
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no consideration for
the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of petitioner, said deed
constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were not, petitioner would still be
entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property as Jose's daughter. The
trial court ruled that the following evidence shows petitioner to be the
daughter of Jose: (1) the decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by
respondents which stated that petitioner is Jose's daughter, and (2)
Jose's income tax return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It
further said that respondents knew of petitioner's existence and her
being the daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases
they filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents were
not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida C.
Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus affecting their
credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is
entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago
the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso
share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building covered
by TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Manila is directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new
one reflecting this decision.
2
 SO ORDERED.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the
birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents showed that
Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his wife. It also took into
account the statement made by Jose in Civil Case No. 56226 that he
did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are raised for
consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant evidence to
prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation of the
petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling that she had
adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by Jose Santiago,
making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit his 1/3 portion. She
points out that respondents had, before the filing of the instant case,
previously "considered"11 her as the daughter of Jose who, during his
lifetime, openly regarded her as his legitimate daughter. She asserts
that her identification as Jose's daughter in his ITR outweighs the
"strange" answers he gave when he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her filiation
collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of Appeals12 in which we
held that "(t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be impugned only in a direct
action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the
period limited by law."13 Petitioner also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code
in support of this contention.14
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the daughter of
Jose, per her birth certificate that indicates her parents as Leo Labagala
and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas.15 They argue that the provisions of Article 263 of the Civil
Code do not apply to the present case since this is not an action
impugning a child's legitimacy but one for recovery of title, ownership,
and possession of property .
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1) whether or not
respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery
of title and possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to
Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-owned with respondents,
through succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil
Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall
be brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the
Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in
a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months
if they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad.
If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be
counted from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in the
same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A careful
reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations
where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and
the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies the child's filiation. It
does not refer to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at
all of a particular couple.16
3
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, to
assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy.
Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is not a legitimate
child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all.17 Moreover, the
present action is one for recovery of title and possession, and thus
outside the scope of Article 263 on prescriptive periods.
Petitioner's reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual milieu
present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What was being
challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity of the adoption
of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro and Isabel Sayson,
and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel Sayson. While asserting that
Delia and Edmundo could not have been validly adopted since Doribel
had already been born to the Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at
the same time made the conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child
of the couple. The Court ruled in that case that it was too late to
question the decree of adoption that became final years before.
Besides, such a challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be
made collaterally but in a direct proceeding.18
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status
but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all their brother's child. The
birth certificate presented by respondents support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19 plainly states
that... Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and
[Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and
therefore the supplier of the entries in said Certificate.
Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists
that she is not Ida Labagala but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not
her birth certificate, then where is hers? She did not present any
though it would have been the easiest thing to do considering
that according to her baptismal certificate she was born in
Manila in 1969. This court rejects such denials and holds that
Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of birth of appellee Ida...
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her
testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that
appellee's parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a
baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the
baptized person. This document can only prove the identity of
the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities of
the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the
sacrament -- nothing more.20 (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioner's counsel
admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she
is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.21
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove her
relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her baptismal
certificate.22 However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of
Appeals :
...a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein specified,
but not the veracity of the declarations therein stated with
respect to [a person's] kinsfolk. The same is conclusive only of
the baptism administered, according to the rites of the Catholic
Church, by the priest who baptized subject child, but it does not
prove the veracity of the declarations and statements contained
4
 in the certificate concerning the relationship of the person
baptized.23
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of
filiation.24 More so are the entries made in an income tax return, which
only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount thereof.25
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a copy of her
birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any reason therefor,
failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a certification that no record
of her birth could be found in the civil registry, if such were the case. We
find petitioner's silence concerning the absence of her birth certificate
telling. It raises doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would
show petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be adverse
to her claim. Petitioner's counsel argued that petitioner had been using
Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name certainly does not
establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida Santiago, has the
same birthdate as Ida Labagala.26 The similarity is too uncanny to be a
mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied knowing
Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the birth certificate
of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court, however, she stated
that Cornelia is the sister of her mother, Esperanza. It appears that
petitioner made conflicting statements that affect her credibility and
could cast along shadow of doubt on her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court
of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon Labagala and
Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose Santiago
and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that
petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate succession. It now
remains to be seen whether the property in dispute was validly
transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with
the Court of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic
defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the conclusion
that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable from the
following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to donate the
properties in question to Ida, what was the big idea of hiding the
nature of the contract in the facade of the sale? b) If the deed is
a genuine document, how could it have happened that Jose
Santiago who was of course fully aware that he owned only
1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered by his title sold or
donated the whole properties to Ida? c) Why in heaven's name
did Jose Santiago, a college graduate, who always signed his
name in documents requiring his signature (citation omitted)
[affix] his thumbmark on this deed of sale? d) If Ida was [the]
child of Jose Santiago, what was the sense of the latter donating
his properties to her when she would inherit them anyway upon
his death? e) Why did Jose Santiago affix his thumbmark to a
deed which falsely stated that: he was single (for he was earlier
married to Esperanza Cabrigas ); Ida was of legal age (for [ s ]
he was then just 15 years old); and the subject properties were
free from liens and encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice
of Adverse Claim and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens
were already annotated in the title of said properties). If the
deed was executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984
after the death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in
possession was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?27
5
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to SO ORDERED.
transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof
belonged to his sisters.28 Petitioner could not have given her consent to
the contract, being a minor at the time.29 Consent of the contracting
parties is among the essential requisites of a contract,30 including one of
sale, absent which there can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner
admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property,31 which makes the
sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act
may be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other
act or contract.

Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation.

Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:

...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid

donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art.
725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of
the donation should have been made by her father, Leon
Labagala or [her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal
representative pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of
those mentioned in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the
"donation" for Ida.32

In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed decision

of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.  1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CY No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

6
G.R. No. 168220. August 31, 2005
SPS. rudy Paragas and Corazon B. Paragas, Petitioners,
vs.
Hrs. of Dominador Balacano, namely: Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette
and Cyric, all surnamed Balacano, represented by NANETTE
BALACANO and ALFREDO BALACANO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review seeks to annul the Decision dated 15 February
1 
2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048, affirming with
modification the 8 March 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
2 
(RTC), Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela, in Civil Case No. 21-2313.
The petition likewise seeks to annul the Resolution dated 17 May 2005
3 
denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The factual antecedents were synthesized by the Court of Appeals in its
decision.
Gregorio Balacano, married to Lorenza Sumigcay, was the registered
owner of Lot 1175-E and Lot 1175-F of the Subd. Plan Psd-38042
[located at Baluarte, Santiago City, Isabela] covered by TCT No. T-
103297 and TCT No. T-103298 of the Registry of Deeds of the Province
of Isabela.
Gregorio and Lorenza had three children, namely: Domingo, Catalino
and Alfredo, all surnamed Balacano. Lorenza died on December 11,
1991. Gregorio, on the other hand, died on July 28, 1996.
Prior to his death, Gregorio was admitted at the Veterans General
Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28, 1996 and stayed
there until July 19, 1996. He was transferred in the afternoon of July 19,
1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where he was
confined until his death.
Gregorio purportedly sold on July 22, 1996, or barely a week prior to his
death, a portion of Lot 1175-E (specifically consisting of 15,925 square
meters from its total area of 22,341 square meters) and the whole Lot
1175-F to the Spouses Rudy ("Rudy") and Corazon Paragas
(collectively, "the Spouses Paragas") for the total consideration of
₱500,000.00. This sale appeared in a deed of absolute sale notarized
by Atty. Alexander V. de Guzman, Notary Public for Santiago City, on
the same date – July 22, 1996 – and witnessed by Antonio Agcaoili
("Antonio") and Julia Garabiles ("Julia"). Gregorio’s certificates of title
over Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were consequently cancelled and new
certificates of title were issued in favor of the Spouses Paragas.
The Spouses Paragas then sold on October 17, 1996 a portion of Lot
1175-E consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for the total
consideration of ₱60,000.00.
Domingo’s children (Dominic, Rodolfo, Nanette and Cyric, all surnamed
Balacano;…) filed on October 22, 1996 a complaint for annulment of
sale and partition against Catalino and the Spouses Paragas. They
essentially alleged – in asking for the nullification of the deed of sale –
that: (1) their grandfather Gregorio could not have appeared before the
notary public on July 22, 1996 at Santiago City because he was then
confined at the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City; (2) at the
time of the alleged execution of the deed of sale, Gregorio was
seriously ill, in fact dying at that time, which vitiated his consent to the
disposal of the property; and (3) Catalino manipulated the execution of
the deed and prevailed upon the dying Gregorio to sign his name on a
paper the contents of which he never understood because of his serious
7
condition. Alternatively, they alleged that assuming Gregorio was of
sound and disposing mind, he could only transfer a half portion of Lots
1175-E and 1175-F as the other half belongs to their grandmother
Lorenza who predeceased Gregorio – they claimed that Lots 1175-E
and 1175-F form part of the conjugal partnership properties of Gregorio
and Lorenza. Finally, they alleged that the sale to the Spouses Paragas
covers only a 5-hectare portion of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F leaving a
portion of 6,416 square meters that Catalino is threatening to dispose.
They asked for the nullification of the deed of sale executed by Gregorio
and the partition of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. They likewise asked for
damages.
Instead of filing their Answer, the defendants Catalino and the Spouses
Paragas moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1)
the plaintiffs have no legal capacity - the Domingo’s children cannot file
the case because Domingo is still alive, although he has been absent
for a long time; (2) an indispensable party is not impleaded – that
Gregorio’s other son, Alfredo was not made a party to the suit; and (3)
the complaint states no cause of action – that Domingo’s children failed
to allege a ground for the annulment of the deed of sale; they did not
cite any mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud, but
merely alleged that Gregorio was seriously ill. Domingo’s children
opposed this motion.
The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, but directed the plaintiffs-
appellees to amend the complaint to include Alfredo as a party. Alfredo
was subsequently declared as in default for his failure to file his Answer
to the Complaint.
The defendants-appellees filed their Answer with Counterclaim on May
7, 1997, denying the material allegations of the complaint. Additionally,
they claimed that: (1) the deed of sale was actually executed by
Gregorio on July 19 (or 18), 1996 and not July 22, 1996; (2) the Notary
Public personally went to the Hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on
July 18, 1996 to notarize the deed of sale already subject of a
previously concluded covenant between Gregorio and the Spouses
Paragas; (3) at the time Gregorio signed the deed, he was strong and of
sound and disposing mind; (4) Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio’s
separate capital and the inscription of Lorenza’s name in the titles was
just a description of Gregorio’s marital status; (5) the entire area of Lots
1175-E and 1175-F were sold to the Spouses Paragas. They interposed
a counterclaim for damages.
At the trial, the parties proceeded to prove their respective contentions.
Plaintiff-appellant Nanette Balacano testified to prove the material
allegations of their complaint. On Gregorio’s medical condition, she
declared that: (1) Gregorio, who was then 81 years old, weak and sick,
was brought to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on June 28,
1996 and stayed there until the afternoon on July 19, 1996; (2)
thereafter, Gregorio, who by then was weak and could no longer talk
and whose condition had worsened, was transferred in the afternoon of
July 19, 1996 to the Veterans Memorial Hospital in Quezon City where
Gregorio died. She claimed that Gregorio could not have signed a deed
of sale on July 19, 1996 because she stayed at the hospital the whole of
that day and saw no visitors. She likewise testified on their agreement
for attorney’s fees with their counsel and the litigation expenses they
incurred.
Additionally, the plaintiffs-appellees presented in evidence Gregorio’s
medical records and his death certificate.
Defendants-appellees, on the other hand, presented as witnesses
Notary Public de Guzman and instrumental witness Antonio to prove
Gregorio’s execution of the sale and the circumstances under the deed
was executed. They uniformly declared that: (1) on July 18, 1996, they
went to the hospital in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya – where Gregorio
was confined – with Rudy; (2) Atty. De Guzman read and explained the
8
contents of the deed to Gregorio; (3) Gregorio signed the deed after
receiving the money from Rudy; (4) Julia and Antonio signed the deed
as witnesses. Additionally, Atty. De Guzman explained that the
execution of the deed was merely a confirmation of a previous
agreement between the Spouses Paragas and Gregorio that was
concluded at least a month prior to Gregorio’s death; that, in fact,
Gregorio had previously asked him to prepare a deed that Gregorio
eventually signed on July 18, 1996. He also explained that the deed,
which appeared to have been executed on July 22, 1996, was actually
executed on July 18, 1996; he notarized the deed and entered it in his
register only on July 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not find it
necessary to state the precise date and place of execution
(Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, instead of Santiago City) of the deed of
sale because the deed is merely a confirmation of a previously agreed
contract between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas. He likewise
stated that of the stated ₱500,000.00 consideration in the deed, Rudy
paid Gregorio ₱450,000.00 in the hospital because Rudy had previously
paid Gregorio ₱50,000.00. For his part, Antonio added that he was
asked by Rudy to take pictures of Gregorio signing the deed. He also
claimed that there was no entry on the date when he signed; nor did he
remember reading Santiago City as the place of execution of the deed.
He described Gregorio as still strong but sickly, who got up from the bed
with Julia’s help.
Witness for defendants-appellants Luisa Agsalda testified to prove that
Lot 1175-E was Gregorio’s separate property. She claimed that
Gregorio’s father (Leon) purchased a two-hectare lot from them in 1972
while the other lot was purchased from her neighbor. She also declared
that Gregorio inherited these lands from his father Leon; she does not
know, however, Gregorio’s brothers’ share in the inheritance.
Defendant-appellant Catalino also testified to corroborate the testimony
of witness Luisa Agsalda; he said that Gregorio told him that he
(Gregorio) inherited Lots 1175-E and 1175-F from his father Leon. He
also stated that a portion of Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416 square
meters was sold to him by the Spouses Paragas and that he will pay the
Spouses Paragas ₱50,000.00, not as consideration for the return of the
land but for the transfer of the title to his name.
Additionally, the defendants-appellants presented in evidence the
pictures taken by Antonio when Gregorio allegedly signed the deed. 4
The lower court, after trial, rendered the decision declaring null and void
the deed of sale purportedly executed by Gregorio Balacano in favor of
the spouses Rudy Paragas and Corazon Paragas. In nullifying the deed
of sale executed by Gregorio, the lower court initially noted that at the
time Gregorio executed the deed, Gregorio was ill. The lower court’s
reasoning in declaring the deed of sale null and void and this
reasoning’s premises may be summarized as follows: (1) the deed of
sale was improperly notarized; thus it cannot be considered a public
document that is usually accorded the presumption of regularity; (2) as
a private document, the deed of sale’s due execution must be proved in
accordance with Section 20, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence either: (a) by anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker; and (3) it was incumbent upon the Spouses
Paragas to prove the deed of sale’s due execution but failed to do so –
the lower court said that witness Antonio Agcaoili is not credible while
Atty. Alexander De Guzman is not reliable. 5
The lower court found the explanations of Atty. De Guzman regarding
the erroneous entries on the actual place and date of execution of the
deed of sale as justifications for a lie. The lower court said –
The Court cannot imagine an attorney to undertake to travel to another
province to notarize a document when he must certainly know, being a
lawyer and by all means, not stupid, that he has no authority to notarize
a document in that province. The only logical thing that happened was
that Rudy Paragas brought the deed of sale to him on July 22, 1996
9
already signed and requested him to notarize the same which he did,
not knowing that at that time the vendor was already in a hospital and
[sic] Quezon City. Of course had he known, Atty. De Guzman would not
have notarized the document. But he trusted Rudy Paragas and
moreover, Gregorio Balacano already informed him previously in June
that he will sell his lands to Paragas. In addition [sic, (,) was omitted]
Rudy Paragas also told him that Balacano received an advance of
₱50,000.00.
The intention to sell is not actual selling. From the first week of June
when, according to Atty. De Guzman, Gregorio Balacano informed him
that he will sell his land to Rudy Paragas, enough time elapsed to the
time he was brought to the hospital on June 28, 1996. Had there been a
meeting of the minds between Gregorio Balacano and Rudy Paragas
regarding the sale, surely Gregorio Balacano would have immediately
returned to the office of Atty. De Guzman to execute the deed of sale.
He did not until he was brought to the hospital and diagnosed to have
liver cirrhosis. Because of the seriousness of his illness, it is not
expected that Gregorio Balacano would be negotiating a contract
of sale. Thus, Rudy Paragas negotiated with Catalino Balacano, the
son of Gregorio Balacano with whom the latter was staying. 6
The lower court also did not consider Antonio Agcaoili, petitioner Rudy
Paragas’s driver, a convincing witness, concluding that he was telling a
rehearsed story. The lower court said –
The only portion of his testimony that is true is that he signed the
document. How could the Court believe that he brought a camera with
him just to take pictures of the signing? If the purpose was to record the
proceeding for posterity, why did he not take the picture of Atty. De
Guzman when the latter was reading and explaining the document to
Gregorio Balacano? Why did he not take the picture of both Gregorio
Balacano and Atty. de Guzman while the old man was signing the
document instead of taking a picture of Gregorio Balacano alone
holding a ball pen without even showing the document being signed?
Verily there is a picture of a document but only a hand with a ball pen is
shown with it. Why? Clearly the driver Antonio Agcaoili must have only
been asked by Rudy Paragas to tell a concocted story which he himself
would not dare tell in Court under oath. 7
The lower court likewise noted that petitioner Rudy Paragas did not
testify about the signing of the deed of sale. To the lower court, Rudy’s
refusal or failure to testify raises a lot of questions, such as: (1) was he
(Rudy) afraid to divulge the circumstances of how he obtained the
signature of Gregorio Balacano, and (2) was he (Rudy) afraid to admit
that he did not actually pay the ₱500,000.00 indicated in the deed of
sale as the price of the land? 8
The lower court also ruled that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F were Gregorio’s
and Lorenza’s conjugal partnership properties. The lower court found
that these lots were acquired during the marriage because the
certificates of title of these lots clearly stated that the lots are registered
in the name Gregorio, "married to Lorenza Sumigcay." Thus, the lower
court concluded that the presumption of law (under Article 160 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines) that property acquired during the marriage
is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership fully applies to Lots
1175-E and 1175-F. 9
Thus, on 8 March 1999, the RTC, Branch 21, of Santiago City, Isabela,
rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 21-2313, the dispositive portion
10 
of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE in the light of the foregoing considerations judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. DECLARING as NULL and VOID the deed of sale purportedly
executed by Gregorio Balacano in favor of the spouses Rudy Paragas
10
and Corazon Paragas over lots 1175-E and 1175-F covered by TCT
Nos. T-103297 and T-103298, respectively;
2. ORDERING the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-258042 and T-258041
issued in the name of the spouses Rudy and Corazon Paragas by virtue
of the deed of sale; and
Declaring the parcel of lands, lots 1175-E and 1175-F as part of the
estate of the deceased spouses Gregorio Balacano and Lorenza
Balacano. 11
In the assailed Decision dated 15 February 2005, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the Decision of the trial court, with the modification that Lots
1175-E and 1175-F were adjudged as belonging to the estate of
Gregorio Balacano. The appellate court disposed as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the appeal is hereby dismissed. We
AFFIRM the appealed Decision for the reasons discussed above, with
the MODIFICATION that Lots 1175-E and 1175-F belong to the estate
of Gregorio Balacano.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant
for whatever action her Office may take against Atty. De
Guzman. (Emphasis in the original.)
12  E. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE
Herein petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was met with similar lack
of success when it was denied for lack of merit by the Court of Appeals
in its Resolution dated 17 May 2005.
13 
Hence, this appeal via a petition for review where petitioners assign the
following errors to the Court of Appeals, viz:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE
WAS NO PERFECTED AND PARTIALLY EXECUTED CONTRACT OF
SALE OVER LOTS 1175-E AND 1175-F PRIOR TO THE SIGNING OF
THE DEED OF SALE.
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION ON THE
AUTHENTICITY AND DUE EXECUTION OF THE DEED OF SALE
MADE BY THE RESPONDENTS DURING THE PRE-TRIAL
CONFERENCE.
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, BASED ITS CONCLUSION THAT GREGORIO’S
CONSENT TO THE SALE OF THE LOTS WAS ABSENT MERELY ON
SPECULATIONS AND SURMISES.
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF RESPONDENTS’ LACK OF LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE
FOR NOT BEING THE PROPER PARTIES IN INTEREST.
OF DISCRETION, SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISMISSING ATTY.
ALEXANDER DE GUZMAN AND ANTONIO AGCAOILI AS NOT
CREDIBLE WITNESSES. 14
At bottom is the issue of whether or not the Court of Appeals committed
reversible error in upholding the findings and conclusions of the trial
court on the nullity of the Deed of Sale purportedly executed between
petitioners and the late Gregorio Balacano.
11
To start, we held in Blanco v. Quasha that this Court is not a trier of
15 
facts. As such, it is not its function to examine and determine the weight
of the evidence supporting the assailed decision. Factual findings of the
Court of Appeals, which are supported by substantial evidence, are
binding, final and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, and carry even
16 
more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial
court. Moreover, well- entrenched is the prevailing jurisprudence that
only errors of law and not of facts are reviewable by this Court in a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
The foregoing tenets in the case at bar apply with greater force to the
petition under consideration because the factual findings by the Court of
Appeals are in full agreement with that of the trial court.
Specifically, the Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, found that
there was no prior and perfected contract of sale that remained to be
fully consummated. The appellate court explained -
In support of their position, the defendants-appellants argue that at least
a month prior to Gregorio’s signing of the deed, Gregorio and the
Spouses Paragas already agreed on the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-
F; and that, in fact, this agreement was partially executed by Rudy’s
payment to Gregorio of ₱50,000.00 before Gregorio signed the deed at
the hospital. In line with this position, defendants-appellants posit that
Gregorio’s consent to the sale should be determined, not at the time
Gregorio signed the deed of sale on July 18, 1996, but at the time when
he agreed to sell the property in June 1996 or a month prior to the
deed’s signing; and in June 1996, Gregorio was of sound and disposing
mind and his consent to the sale was in no wise vitiated at that time.
The defendants-appellants further argue that the execution or signing of
the deed of sale, however, irregular it might have been, does not affect
the validity of the previously agreed sale of the lots, as the execution or
signing of the deed is merely a formalization of a previously agreed oral
contract.
...
In the absence of any note, memorandum or any other written
instrument evidencing the alleged perfected contract of sale, we have to
rely on oral testimonies, which in this case is that of Atty. de Guzman
whose testimony on the alleged oral agreement may be summarized as
follows: (1) that sometime in the first week of June 1996, Gregorio
requested him (Atty. de Guzman) to prepare a deed of sale of two lots;
(2) Gregorio came to his firm’s office in the morning with a certain
Doming Balacano, then returned in the afternoon with Rudy; (3) he
(Atty. de Guzman) asked Gregorio whether he really intends to sell the
lots; Gregorio confirmed his intention; (4) Gregorio and Rudy left the law
office at 5:00 p.m., leaving the certificates of title; (5) he prepared the
deed a day after Rudy and Gregorio came. With regard to the alleged
partial execution of this agreement, Atty. de Guzman said that he was
told by Rudy that there was already a partial payment of ₱50,000.00.
We do not consider Atty. de Guzman’s testimony sufficient evidence to
establish the fact that there was a prior agreement between Gregorio
and the Spouses Paragas on the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F. This
testimony does not conclusively establish the meeting of the minds
between Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas on the price or
consideration for the sale of Lots 1175-E and 1175-F – Atty. de Guzman
merely declared that he was asked by Gregorio to prepare a deed; he
did not clearly narrate the details of this agreement. We cannot assume
that Gregorio and the Spouses Paragas agreed to a ₱500,000.00
consideration based on Atty. de Guzman’s bare assertion that Gregorio
asked him to prepare a deed, as Atty. de Guzman was not personally
aware of the agreed consideration in the sale of the lots, not being privy
to the parties’ agreement. To us, Rudy could have been a competent
12
witness to testify on the perfection of this prior contract; unfortunately, the
defendants-appellants did not present Rudy as their witness.
We seriously doubt too the credibility of Atty. de Guzman as a witness. We
cannot rely on his testimony because of his tendency to commit falsity. He
admitted in open court that while Gregorio signed the deed on July 18,
1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, he nevertheless did not reflect these
matters when he notarized the deed; instead he entered Santiago City and
July 22, 1996, as place and date of execution, respectively. To us, Atty. de
Guzman’s propensity to distort facts in the performance of his public
functions as a notary public, in utter disregard of the significance of the act
of notarization, seriously affects his credibility as a witness in the present
case. In fact, Atty. de Guzman’s act in falsifying the entries in his
acknowledgment of the deed of sale could be the subject of administrative
and disciplinary action, a matter that we however do not here decide.
Similarly, there is no conclusive proof of the partial execution of the contract
because the only evidence the plaintiffs-appellants presented to prove this
claim was Atty. de Guzman’s testimony, which is hearsay and thus, has no
probative value. Atty. de Guzman merely stated that Rudy told him that
Rudy already gave ₱50,000.00 to Gregorio as partial payment of the
purchase price; Atty. de Guzman did not personally see the payment being
made.17
But, did Gregorio give an intelligent consent to the sale of Lots 1175-E and
1175-F when he signed the deed of sale? The trial court as well as the
appellate court found in the negative. In the Court of Appeals’ rationale-
It is not disputed that when Gregorio signed the deed of sale, Gregorio was
seriously ill, as he in fact died a week after the deed’s signing. Gregorio
died of complications caused by cirrhosis of the liver. Gregorio’s death was
neither sudden nor immediate; he fought at least a month-long battle
against the disease until he succumbed to death on July 22, 1996. Given
that Gregorio purportedly executed a deed during the last stages of his
battle against his disease, we seriously doubt whether Gregorio could have
read, or fully understood, the contents of the documents he signed or of the
consequences of his act. We note in this regard that Gregorio was brought
to the Veteran’s Hospital at Quezon City because his condition had
worsened on or about the time the deed was allegedly signed. This transfer
and fact of death not long after speak volumes about Gregorio’s condition
at that time. We likewise see no conclusive evidence that the contents of
the deed were sufficiently explained to Gregorio before he affixed his
signature. The evidence the defendants-appellants offered to prove
Gregorio’s consent to the sale consists of the testimonies of Atty. de
Guzman and Antonio. As discussed above, we do not find Atty. de Guzman
a credible witness. Thus, we fully concur with the heretofore-quoted lower
court’s evaluation of the testimonies given by Atty. de Guzman and Antonio
because this is an evaluation that the lower court was in a better position to
make.
Additionally, the irregular and invalid notarization of the deed is a falsity that
raises doubts on the regularity of the transaction itself. While the deed was
indeed signed on July 18, 1996 at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, the deed
states otherwise, as it shows that the deed was executed on July 22, 1996
at Santiago City. Why such falsity was committed, and the circumstances
under which this falsity was committed, speaks volume about the regularity
and the validity of the sale. We cannot but consider the commission of this
falsity, with the indispensable aid of Atty. de Guzman, an orchestrated
attempt to legitimize a transaction that Gregorio did not intend to be binding
upon him nor on his bounty.
Article 24 of the Civil Code tells us that in all contractual, property or other
relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his
moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or
other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.18
Based on the foregoing, the court of Appeals concluded that Gregorio’s
consent to the sale of the lots was absent, making the contract null and
void. Consequently, the spouses Paragas could not have made a
subsequent transfer of the property to Catalino Balacano. Indeed, nemo dat
13
quod non habet. Nobody can dispose of that which does not belong to
him.19
We likewise find to be in accord with the evidence on record the ruling of
the Court of Appeals declaring the properties in controversy as paraphernal
properties of Gregorio in the absence of competent evidence on the exact
date of Gregorio’s acquisition of ownership of these lots.
On the credibility of witnesses, it is in rhyme with reason to believe the
testimonies of the witnesses for the complainants vis-à-vis those of the
defendants. In the assessment of the credibility of witnesses, we are guided
by the following well-entrenched rules: (1) that evidence to be believed
must not only spring from the mouth of a credible witness but must itself be
credible, and (2) findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witness
are matters best left to the trial court who had the front-line opportunity to
personally evaluate the witnesses’ demeanor, conduct, and behavior while
testifying.20
In the case at bar, we agree in the trial court’s conclusion that petitioners’
star witness, Atty. De Guzman is far from being a credible witness. Unlike
this Court, the trial court had the unique opportunity of observing the
demeanor of said witness. Thus, we affirm the trial court and the Court of
Appeals’ uniform decision based on the whole evidence in record holding
the Deed of Sale in question to be null and void.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,21 the Court declared as null and void the
deed of sale therein inasmuch as the seller, at the time of the execution of
the alleged contract, was already of advanced age and senile. We held –
. . . She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when
the deed was allegedly executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of
the deed were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and June 10,
1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract
merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical infirmities.
However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties
so as to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting
her property rights then she is undeniably incapacitated. The unrebutted
testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged
execution of the deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and
mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste and urinated in
bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to
seriously doubt that she consented to the sale of and the price for her
parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price was
paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial court’s
finding and conclusion on the matter: . . .
In the case at bar, the Deed of Sale was allegedly signed by Gregorio on
his death bed in the hospital. Gregorio was an octogenarian at the time of
the alleged execution of the contract and suffering from liver cirrhosis at
that – circumstances which raise grave doubts on his physical and mental
capacity to freely consent to the contract. Adding to the dubiety of the
purported sale and further bolstering respondents’ claim that their uncle
Catalino, one of the children of the decedent, had a hand in the execution
of the deed is the fact that on 17 October 1996, petitioners sold a portion of
Lot 1175-E consisting of 6,416 square meters to Catalino for
₱60,000.00.22 One need not stretch his imagination to surmise that Catalino
was in cahoots with petitioners in maneuvering the alleged sale.
On the whole, we find no reversible error on the part of the appellate court
in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048 that would warrant the reversal thereof.
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision23 and the Resolution,24 dated 15 February 2005 and 17 May 2005,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 64048 are hereby
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
14
G.R. No. 143826               August 28, 2003 Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de
facto since 1974. Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned that on March 1,
9 

HEIRS OF IGNACIA AGUILAR-REYES, Petitioners, 1983, Vicente sold Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses Cipriano
vs. and Florentina Mijares for P40,000.00. As a consequence thereof, TCT
10 

Spouses CIPRIANO MIJARES and FLORENTINA No. 205445 was cancelled and TCT No. 306087 was issued on April 19,
MIJARES, Respondents. 1983 in the name of respondent spouses. She likewise found out that
11 

Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian

DECISION with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXI. Vicente
misrepresented therein that his wife, Ignacia, died on March 22, 1982,
and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs. On 12 

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
September 29, 1983, the court appointed Vicente as the guardian of
their minor children. Subsequently, in its Order dated October 14, 1983,
13 

Under the regime of the Civil Code, the alienation or encumbrance of a the court authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia. 14

conjugal real property requires the consent of the wife. The absence of
such consent renders the entire transaction merely voidable and not
1 

On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to

void. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
2 

respondent spouses demanding the return of her ½ share in the lot.

transaction questioned, bring an action for the annulment of the contract
Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a
entered into by her husband without her consent. 3

complaint for annulment of sale against respondent spouses. The

15 

complaint was thereafter amended to include Vicente Reyes as one of

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari are the January 26, 2000 the defendants. 16

Decision and June 19, 2000, Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
4  5 

G.R. No. 28464 which declared respondents as purchasers in good

In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers
faith and set aside the May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990 Orders of the
in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-
by the court. Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he
17 

48018.
sold to the spouses was only his share in Lot No. 4349-B-2, excluding
the share of his wife, and that he never represented that the latter was
The controversy stemmed from a dispute over Lot No. 4349-B- already dead. He likewise testified that respondent spouses, through
18 

2, approximately 396 square meters, previously covered by Transfer

6 
the counsel they provided him, took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205445, located in Balintawak, Quezon petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of
City and registered in the name of Spouses Vicente Reyes and Ignacia guardian without his knowledge. 19

Aguilar-Reyes. Said lot and the apartments built thereon were part of
7 

the spouses’ conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal

On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring
funds from their garments business. 8

the sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 void with respect to the share of Ignacia. It
held that the purchase price of the lot was P110,000.00 and ordered

15
Vicente to return ½ thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent spouses. The
dispositive portion of the said decision, reads-
WHEREFORE, premises above considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March [1,]
1983 signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant
Cipriano Mijares NULL AND VOID WITH RESPECT TO ONE-HALF
(1/2) OF THE SAID PROPERTY;
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to cancel TCT
No. 306083 (sic) in the names of defendant spouses Cipriano Mijares
and Florentina Mijares and to issue a new TCT in the name of the
plaintiff Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes as owner in fee simple of one-half (1/2) of
said property and the other half in the names of defendant spouses
Cipriano Mijares and Florentin[a] Mijares, upon payment of the required
fees therefore;
Said defendant spouses Mijares are also ordered to allow plaintiff the
use and exercise of rights, as well as obligations, pertinent to her one-
half (1/2) ownership of the subject property;
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to reimburse P55,000.00
with legal rate of interest from the execution of the subject Deed of
Absolute Sale on March 1, 1983, to the defendant spouses Cipriano
Mijares and Florentina Mijares which corresponds to the one-half (1/2)
of the actual purchase price by the said Mijares but is annulled in this
decision (sic);
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby further ordered to pay plaintiff the
amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, plus
costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 20
Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the
sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered
to reimburse to her the rentals they collected on the apartments built on
Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983. 1âwphi1
On May 31, 1990, the trial court modified its decision by declaring the
sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse
respondent spouses the purchase price of P110,000, thus –
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the subject Deed of Absolute Sale, dated March 1, 1983
signed by and between defendants Vicente Reyes and defendant
Cipriano Mijares as null and void ab initio, in view of the absence of the
wife’s conformity to said transaction.
Consequent thereto, the Register of Deeds for Quezon City is hereby
ordered to cancel TCT No. 306083 (sic) in the name of Cipriano Mijares
and Florentin[a] Mijares and issue a new TCT in the name of the plaintiff
and defendant Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente Reyes as owners in
fee simple, upon payment of required fees therefore.
Defendant Vicente Reyes is hereby ordered to pay the amount of one
hundred ten thousand pesos (P110,000.00) with legal rate of interest at
12% per annum from the execution of the subject Deed of Absolute
Sale on March 1, 1983.
Further, defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the amount of
P50,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages, plus costs of this
suit.
SO ORDERED. 21
16
On motion of Ignacia, the court issued an Order dated June 29, 1990
22 
3. Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares P50,000.00 as moral
amending the dispositive portion of the May 31, 1990 decision by damages.
correcting the Transfer Certificate of Title of Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the
name of Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares, from TCT No. 306083 No pronouncement as to costs.
to TCT No. 306087; and directing the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
to issue a new title in the name of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and Vicente SO ORDERED. 27

Reyes. The Order likewise specified that Vicente Reyes should pay
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes the amount of P50,000.00 as moral and
Undaunted by the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners
28 

exemplary damages. 23

Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and
24 
filed the instant petition contending that the assailed sale of Lot No.
4392-B-2 should be annulled because respondent spouses were not
purchasers in good faith.

she was substituted by her compulsory heirs. 25

Petitioners contended that they are entitled to reimbursement of the
rentals collected on the apartment built on Lot No. 4349-B-2, while
respondent spouses claimed that they are buyers in good faith. On
January 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
decision of the trial court. It ruled that notwithstanding the absence of
The issues for resolution are as follows: (1) What is the status of the
sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent spouses? (2) Assuming that the
sale is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety or only with
respect to the share of Ignacia? (3) Are respondent spouses purchasers
in good faith?
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time
29 

Ignacia’s consent to the sale, the same must be held valid in favor of
the assailed sale was contracted, provide:
respondents because they were innocent purchasers for value. The 26 

decretal potion of the appellate court’s decision states –

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision appealed from and
the Orders dated May 31, 1990 and June 29, 1990, are SET ASIDE and
in lieu thereof a new one is rendered –
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 1, 1983 executed
by Vicente Reyes in favor of spouses Cipriano and [Florentina] Mijares
valid and lawful;
2. Ordering Vicente Reyes to pay spouses Mijares the amount of
P30,000.00 as attorney’s fees and legal expenses; and
Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium,
the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she refuses
unreasonably to give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the
same…
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property.

17
Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently
alienated by the husband.
Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, the husband could not alienate or
encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or
implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Indeed, in several
cases30 the Court had ruled that such alienation or encumbrance by the
husband is void. The better view, however, is to consider the transaction as
merely voidable and not void.31 This is consistent with Article 173 of the Civil
Code pursuant to which the wife could, during the marriage and within 10
years from the questioned transaction, seek its annulment.32
In the case of Heirs of Christina Ayuste v. Court of Appeals,33 it was
categorically held that –
There is no ambiguity in the wording of the law. A sale of real property of
the conjugal partnership made by the husband without the consent of his
wife is voidable. The action for annulment must be brought during the
marriage and within ten years from the questioned transaction by the wife.
Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room
for interpretation — there is room only for application.34
Likewise, in Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals,35 the Court quoted with
approval the ruling of the trial court that under the Civil Code, the
encumbrance or alienation of a conjugal real property by the husband
absent the wife’s consent, is voidable and not void. Thus –
…Under Article 166 of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership without
the wife’s consent. The alienation or encumbrance if so made however is
not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended wife may bring an
action to annul the said alienation or encumbrance. Thus, the provision of
Article 173 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the
transaction questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of
the husband entered into without her consent, when such consent is
required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to defraud her
or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife
fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the
marriage, may demand the value of property fraudulently alienated by the
husband.
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10) years x x x during [the]
marriage to annul the alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation or encumbrance made
after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife is null and
void…
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that Lot No. 4349-B-2, is a conjugal
property having been purchased using the conjugal funds of the spouses
during the subsistence of their marriage. It is beyond cavil therefore that the
sale of said lot to respondent spouses without the knowledge and consent
of Ignacia is voidable. Her action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which
was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 year
prescriptive period under Article 173 of the Civil Code. Even if we reckon
the period from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and
the respondent spouses entered into a contract concerning Lot No. 4349-B-
2, Ignacia’s action would still be within the prescribed period.
Anent the second issue, the trial court correctly annulled the voidable sale
of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety. In Bucoy v. Paulino,36 a case involving
the annulment of sale with assumption of mortgages executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife, it was held that the alienation or
encumbrance must be annulled in its entirety and not only insofar as the
share of the wife in the conjugal property is concerned. Although the
transaction in the said case was declared void and not merely voidable, the
rationale for the annulment of the whole transaction is the same thus –
18
The plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the wife's consent,
may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit such
annulment in so far as the contract shall "prejudice" the wife, such limitation
should have been spelled out in the statute. It is not the legitimate concern
of this Court to recast the law. As Mr. Justice Jose B. L. Reyes of this Court
and Judge Ricardo C. Puno of the Court of First Instance correctly stated,
"[t]he rule (in the first sentence of Article 173) revokes Baello vs. Villanueva,
54 Phil. 213 and Coque vs. Navas Sioca, 45 Phil. 430," in which cases
annulment was held to refer only to the extent of the one-half interest of the
wife…
The necessity to strike down the contract of July 5, 1963 as a whole, not
merely as to the share of the wife, is not without its basis in the common-
sense rule. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of Articles
161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for
many obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The
conjugal property is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered (Article 163, par. 3), if it turns out that the spouse who is
bound thereby, "should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient." These are considerations that go beyond the mere equitable
share of the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the
husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the
consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is
decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an
indispensable party to the contract under Article 166.37
With respect to the third issue, the Court finds that respondent spouses are
not purchasers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one who buys
property of another, without notice that some other person has a right to, or
interest in, such property and pays full and fair price for the same, at the
time of such purchase, or before he has notice of the claim or interest of
some other persons in the property. He buys the property with the belief
that the person from whom he receives the thing was the owner and could
convey title to the property. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in
good faith.38
In the instant case, there existed circumstances that should have placed
respondent spouses on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that
she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals
that – (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao
Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was
reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her
burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982.39 These obvious flaws in
the death certificate should have prompted respondents to investigate
further, especially so that respondent Florentina Mijares admitted on cross
examination that she asked for the death certificate of Ignacia because she
was suspicious that Ignacia was still alive.40 Moreover, respondent spouses
had all the opportunity to verify the claim of Vicente that he is a widower
because it was their lawyer, Atty. Rodriguito S. Saet, who represented
Vicente in the special proceedings before the Metropolitan Trial Court.
Neither can respondent spouses rely on the alleged court approval of the
sale. Note that the Order issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch XXXI, appointing Vicente as guardian of his 5 minor children,
as well as the Order authorizing him to sell the estate of Ignacia were
issued only on September 29, 1983 and October 14, 1983, respectively. On
the other hand, the sale of the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 to respondent
spouses appears to have been made not on March 1, 1983, but even as
early as November 25, 1978. In the "Agreement" dated November 25,
1978, Vicente in consideration of the amount of P110,000.00, sold to
Cipriano Mijares Lot No. 4349-B-2 on installment basis, with the first
installment due on or before July 31, 1979.41 This was followed by a
"Memorandum of Understanding" executed on July 30, 1979, by Vicente
and Cipriano – (1) acknowledging Cipriano’s receipt of Vicente’s down
payment in the amount of P50,000.00; and (2) authorizing Florentina
Mijares to collect rentals.42 On July 14, 1981, Vicente and Cipriano executed
another "Memorandum of Agreement," stating, among other, that out of the
purchase price of P110,000.00 Vicente had remaining balance of
19
P19,000.00.43 Clearly therefore, the special proceedings before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch XXXI, could not have been
the basis of respondent spouses’ claim of good faith because the sale of
Lot No. 4349-B-2 occurred prior thereto.
Respondent spouses cannot deny knowledge that at the time of the sale in
1978, Vicente was married to Ignacia and that the latter did not give her
conformity to the sale. This is so because the 1978 "Agreement" described
Vicente as "married" but the conformity of his wife to the sale did not appear
in the deed. Obviously, the execution of another deed of sale in 1983 over
the same Lot No. 4349-B-2, after the alleged death of Ignacia on March 22,
1982, as well as the institution of the special proceedings were, intended to
correct the absence of Ignacia’s consent to the sale. Even assuming that
respondent spouses believed in good faith that Ignacia really died on March
22, 1982, after they purchased the lot, the fact remains that the sale of Lot
No. 4349-B-2 prior to Ignacia’s alleged demise was without her consent and
therefore subject to annulment. The October 14, 1983 order authorizing the
sale of the estate of Ignacia, could not have validated the sale of Lot No.
4349-B-2 because said order was issued on the assumption that Ignacia
was already dead and that the sale dated March 1, 1983 was never
categorically approved in the said order.
The fact that the 5 minor children44 of Vicente represented by the latter,
signed the March 1, 1983 deed of sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 will not estop
them from assailing the validity thereof. Not only were they too young at
that time to understand the repercussions of the sale, they likewise had no
right to sell the property of their mother who, when they signed the deed,
was very much alive.
If a voidable contract is annulled, the restoration of what has been given is
proper. The relationship between parties in any contract even if
subsequently annulled must always be characterized and punctuated by
good faith and fair dealing. Hence, for the sake of justice and equity, and in
consonance with the salutary principle of non-enrichment at another’s
expense, the Court sustains the trial court’s order directing Vicente to
refund to respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 which they have
paid as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2.45 The court a quo correctly
found that the subject of the sale was the entire Lot No. 4349-B-2 and that
the consideration thereof is not P40,000.00 as stated in the March 1, 1983
deed of sale, but P110,000.00 as evidenced by the – (1) "Agreement" dated
November 25, 1978 as well as the July 30, 1979 "Memorandum of
Understanding" and the July 14, 1981 "Memorandum of Agreement" which
served as receipts of the installment payments made by respondent
Cipriano Mijares; and (2) the receipt duly signed by Vicente Reyes
acknowledging receipt of the amount of P110,000.00 from respondent
spouses as payment of the sale of the controverted lot.46
The trial court, however, erred in imposing 12% interest per annum on the
amount due the respondents. In Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,47 it was held that interest on obligations not constituting a loan or
forbearance of money is six percent (6%) annually. If the purchase price
could be established with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint,
the six percent (6%) interest should be computed from the date the
complaint was filed until finality of the decision. In Lui v. Loy,48 involving a
suit for reconveyance and annulment of title filed by the first buyer against
the seller and the second buyer, the Court, ruling in favor of the first buyer
and annulling the second sale, ordered the seller to refund to the second
buyer (who was not a purchaser in good faith) the purchase price of the
lots. It was held therein that the 6% interest should be computed from the
date of the filing of the complaint by the first buyer. After the judgment
becomes final and executory until the obligation is satisfied, the amount due
shall earn interest at 12% per year, the interim period being deemed
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.49
Accordingly, the amount of P110,000.00 due the respondent spouses which
could be determined with certainty at the time of the filing of the complaint
shall earn 6% interest per annum from June 4, 1986 until the finality of this
decision. If the adjudged principal and the interest (or any part thereof)
remain unpaid thereafter, the interest rate shall be twelve percent (12%) per
annum computed from the time the judgment becomes final and executory
until it is fully satisfied.
20
Petitioner’s prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. Other than the
allegation of Ignacia in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that the apartments could
be rented at P1,000.00 a month, no other evidence was presented to
substantiate her claim. In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual
damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations,
conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the
best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.50 None,
having been presented in the case at bar, petitioner’s claim for rentals must
be denied.
While as a general rule, a party who has not appealed is not entitled to
affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court
below, law and jurisprudence authorize a tribunal to consider errors,
although unassigned, if they involve (1) errors affecting the lower court’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) plain errors not specified, and (3)
clerical errors.51 In this case, though defendant Vicente Reyes did not
appeal, the "plain error" committed by the court a quo  as to the award of
moral and exemplary damages must be corrected. These awards cannot be
lumped together as was done by the trial court.52 Moral and exemplary
damages are different in nature, and require separate determination. Moral
damages are awarded where the claimant experienced physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury as a result of the
act complained of.53 The award of exemplary damages, on the other hand,
is warranted when moral, temperate, liquidated, or compensatory damages
were likewise awarded by the court.54
Hence, the trial court’s award of "P50,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages" should be modified. Vicente Reyes should be ordered
to pay the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages. Since Vicente Reyes was among the heirs substituted
to the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, payment of moral and exemplary
damages must be made by Vicente to his children, petitioners in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is PARTIALLY
GRANTED. The January 26, 2000 Decision and June 19, 2002, Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28464 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The May 31, 1990 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 101, in Civil Case No. Q-48018, which annulled the March 1,
1983 Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot No. 4349-B-2, and ordered the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City to cancel TCT No. 306087 in the name of
respondent spouses Cipriano Mijares and Florentina Mijares covering the
same property; as well as the June 29, 1990 Order correcting the
typographical errors in the order dated March 1, 1983, are REINSTATED,
with the following modifications –
(1) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new
certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of petitioners
as co-owners thereof;
(2) Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses
the amount of P110,000.00 as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2,
with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of
this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate
of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof)
shall be imposed until full payment.
(3) Defendant Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late
Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral
damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
21
G.R. No. 125172 June 26, 1998
Spouses ANTONIO and LUZVIMINDA GUIANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GILDA COPUZ, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and the wife. The absence of the consent of one renders the
sale null and void, while the vitiation thereof makes it merely voidable.
Only in the latter case can ratification cure the defect.
The Case
These were the principles that guided the Court in deciding this petition
for review of the Decision   dated January 30, 1996 and the
1
Resolution   dated May 28, 1996, promulgated by the Court of
2
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 41758, affirming the Decision of the
lower court and denying reconsideration, respectively.
On May 28, 1990, Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed an
Amended Complainant   against her husband Judie Corpuz and
3
Petitioner-Spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The said
Complaint sought the declaration of a certain deed of sale, which
involved the conjugal property of private respondent and her
husband, null and void. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato, Branch 25. In due course, the
trial court rendered a Decision   dated September 9, 1992,
4 follow:
disposing as follow:  5
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is rendered for the
plaintiff and against the defendants,
1. Declaring both the Deed of Transfer of Rights
dated March 1, 1990 (Exh. "A") and the "amicable
settlement" dated March 16, 1990 (Exh. "B") as null
void and of no effect;
2. Recognizing as lawful and valid the ownership
and possession of plaintiff Gilda Corpuz over the
remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC)
Psd-165409 which has been the subject of the Deed
of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A");
3. Ordering plaintiff Gilda Corpuz to reimburse
defendants Luzviminda Guiang the amount of NINE
THOUSAND (P9,000.00) PESOS corresponding to
the payment made by defendants Guiangs to Manuel
Callejo for the unpaid balance of the account of
plaintiff in favor of Manuel Callejo, and another sum
of P379.62 representing one-half of the amount of
realty taxes paid by defendants Guiangs on Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409, both with legal interests
thereon computed from the finality of the decision.
No pronouncement as to costs in view of the factual
circumstances of the case.
Dissatisfied, petitioners-spouses filed an appeal with the Court of
Appeals. Respondent Court, in its challenged Decision, ruled as
 
6
WHEREFORE, the appealed of the lower court in
Civil Case No. 204 is hereby AFFIRMED by this
22
 Court. No costs considering plaintiff-appellee's
failure to file her brief despite notice.
Reconsideration was similarly denied by the same court in its
assailed Resolution: 7
Finding that the issues raised in defendants-
appellants motion for reconsideration of Our
decision in this case of January 30, 1996, to be a
mere rehash of the same issues which we have
already passed upon in the said decision, and there
[being] no cogent reason to disturb the same, this
Court RESOLVED to DENY the instant motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
The Facts
The facts of this case are simple. Over the objection of private
respondent and while she was in Manila seeking employment, her
husband sold to the petitioners-spouses one half of their conjugal
peoperty, consisting of their residence and the lot on which it
stood. The circumstances of this sale are set forth in the Decision
of Respondent Court, which quoted from the Decision of the trial
court as follows: 
8 They are thus adjoining neighbors of the Corpuzes.
1. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant Judie Corpuz
are legally married spouses. They were married on
December 24, 1968 in Bacolod City, before a judge.
This is admitted by defendants-spouses Antonio
and Luzviminda Guiang in their answer, and also
admitted by defendant Judie Corpuz when he
testified in court (tsn. p. 3, June 9, 1992), although
the latter says that they were married in 1967. The
couple have three children, namely: Junie — 18
years old, Harriet — 17 years of age, and Jodie or
Joji, the youngest, who was 15 years of age in
August, 1990 when her mother testified in court.
Sometime on February 14, 1983, the couple Gilda
and Judie Corpuz, with plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as
vendee, bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in
Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal,
South Cotabato, and particularly known as Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 from Manuel Callejo who
signed as vendor through a conditional deed of sale
for a total consideration of P14,735.00. The
consideration was payable in installment, with right
of cancellation in favor of vendor should vendee fail
to pay three successive installments (Exh. "2", tsn
p. 6, February 14, 1990).
2. Sometime on April 22, 1988, the couple Gilda and
Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of their Lot No. 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165409 to the defendants-
spouses Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang. The latter
have since then occupied the one-half portion [and]
built their house thereon (tsn. p. 4, May 22, 1992).
3. Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime in
June 1989. She was trying to look for work abroad,
in [the] Middle East. Unfortunately, she became a
victim of an unscrupulous illegal recruiter. She was
not able to go abroad. She stayed for sometime in
Manila however, coming back to Koronadal, South
Cotabato, . . . on March 11, 1990. Plaintiff's departure
for Manila to look for work in the Middle East was
23
with the consent of her husband Judie Corpuz (tsn.
p. 16, Aug. 12, 1990; p. 10 Sept. 6, 1991).
After his wife's departure for Manila, defendant
Judie Corpuz seldom went home to the conjugal
dwelling. He stayed most of the time at his place of
work at Samahang Nayon Building, a hotel,
restaurant, and a cooperative. Daughter Herriet
Corpuz went to school at King's College, Bo. 1,
Koronadal, South Cotabato, but she was at the same
time working as household help of, and staying at,
the house of Mr. Panes. Her brother Junie was not
working. Her younger sister Jodie (Jojie) was going
to school. Her mother sometimes sent them money
(tsn. p. 14, Sept. 6, 1991.)
Sometime in January 1990, Harriet Corpuz learned
that her father intended to sell the remaining one-
half portion including their house, of their homelot
to defendants Guiangs. She wrote a letter to her
mother informing her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied
that she was objecting to the sale. Harriet, however,
did not inform her father about this; but instead
gave the letter to Mrs. Luzviminda Guiang so that
she [Guiang] would advise her father (tsn. pp. 16-17,
Sept. 6, 1991).
4. However, in the absence of his wife Gilda Corpuz,
defendant Judie Corpuz pushed through the sale of
the remaining one-half portion of Lot 9, Block 8,
(LRC) Psd-165409. On March 1, 1990, he sold to
defendant Luzviminda Guiang thru a document
known as "Deed of Transfer of Rights" (Exh. "A")
the remaining one-half portion of their lot and the
house standing thereon for a total consideration of
P30,000.00 of which P5,000.00 was to be paid in
June, 1990. Transferor Judie Corpuz's children
Junie and Harriet signed the document as witness.
Four (4) days after March 1, 1990 or on March 5,
1990, obviously to cure whatever defect in
defendant Judie Corpuz's title over the lot
transferred, defendant Luzviminda Guiang as
vendee executed another agreement over Lot 9,
Block 8, (LRC) Psd-165408 (Exh. "3"), this time with
Manuela Jimenez Callejo, a widow of the original
registered owner from whom the couple Judie and
Gilda Corpuz originally bought the lot (Exh. "2"),
who signed as vendor for a consideration of
P9,000.00. Defendant Judie Corpuz signed as a
witness to the sale (Exh. "3-A"). The new sale (Exh.
"3") describes the lot sold as Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC)
Psd-165408 but it is obvious from the mass of
evidence that the correct lot is Lot 8, Block 9, (LRC)
Psd-165409, the very lot earlier sold to the couple
Gilda and Judie Corpuz.
5. Sometimes on March 11, 1990, plaintiff returned
home. She found her children staying with other
households. Only Junie was staying in their house.
Harriet and Joji were with Mr. Panes. Gilda gathered
her children together and stayed at their house. Her
husband was nowhere to be found. She was
informed by her children that their father had a wife
already.
6. For staying in their house sold by her husband,
plaintiff was complained against by defendant
24
Luzviminda Guiang and her husband Antonio
Guiang before the Barangay authorities of Barangay
General Paulino Santos (Bo. 1), Koronadal, South
Cotabato, for trespassing (tsn. p. 34, Aug. 17, 1990).
The case was docketed by the barangay authorities
as Barangay Case No. 38 for "trespassing". On
March 16, 1990, the parties thereat signed a
document known as "amicable settlement". In full,
the settlement provides for, to wit:
That respondent, Mrs. Gilda Corpuz
and her three children, namely: Junie,
Hariet and Judie to leave voluntarily
the house of Mr. and Mrs. Antonio
Guiang, where they are presently
boarding without any charge, on or
before April 7, 1990.
FAIL NOT UNDER THE PENALTY OF
THE LAW.
Believing that she had received the shorter end of
the bargain, plaintiff to the Barangay Captain of
Barangay Paulino Santos to question her signature
on the amicable settlement. She was referred
however to the Office-In-Charge at the time, a
certain Mr. de la Cruz. The latter in turn told her that
he could not do anything on the matter (tsn. p. 31,
Aug. 17, 1990).
This particular point not rebutted. The Barangay
Captain who testified did not deny that Mrs. Gilda
Corpuz approached him for the annulment of the
settlement. He merely said he forgot whether Mrs.
Corpuz had approached him (tsn. p. 13, Sept. 26,
1990). We thus conclude that Mrs. Corpuz really
approached the Barangay Captain for the annulment
of the settlement. Annulment not having been made,
plaintiff stayed put in her house and lot.
7. Defendant-spouses Guiang followed thru the
amicable settlement with a motion for the execution
of the amicable settlement, filing the same with the
Municipal Trial Court of Koronadal, South Cotabato.
The proceedings [are] still pending before the said
court, with the filing of the instant suit.
8. As a consequence of the sale, the spouses
Guiang spent P600.00 for the preparation of the
Deed of Transfer of Rights, Exh. "A", P9,000.00 as
the amount they paid to Mrs. Manuela Callejo,
having assumed the remaining obligation of the
Corpuzes to Mrs. Callejo (Exh. "3"); P100.00 for the
preparation of Exhibit "3"; a total of P759.62 basic
tax and special education fund on the lot; P127.50
as the total documentary stamp tax on the various
documents; P535.72 for the capital gains tax; P22.50
as transfer tax; a standard fee of P17.00;
certification fee of P5.00. These expenses
particularly the taxes and other expenses towards
the transfer of the title to the spouses Guiangs were
incurred for the whole Lot 9, Block 8, (LRC) Psd-
165409.
Ruling of Respondent Court
Respondent Court found no reversible error in the trial court's
ruling that any alienation or encumbrance by the husband of the
25
conjugal propety without the consent of his wife is null and void as
provided under Article 124 of the Family Code. It also rejected
petitioners' contention that the "amicable sttlement" ratified said
sale, citing Article 1409 of the Code which expressly bars
ratification of the contracts specified therein, particularly those
"prohibited or declared void by law."
Hence, this petition.  9
The Issues
In their Memorandum, petitioners assign to public respondent the
following errors: 10
I Petitioners insist that the questioned Deed of Transfer of Rights
Whether or not the assailed Deed of Transfer of
Rights was validly executed.
II
Whether or not the Cour of Appeals erred in not
declairing as voidable contract under Art. 1390 of
the Civil Code the impugned Deed of Transfer of
Rights which was validly ratified thru the execution
of the "amicable settlement" by the contending
parties.
III
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not
setting aside the findings of the Court a quo which
recognized as lawful and valid the ownership and
possession of private respondent over the
remaining one half (1/2) portion of the properly.
In a nutshell, petitioners-spouses contend that (1) the contract of
sale (Deed of Transfer of Rights) was merely voidable, and (2) such
contract was ratified by private respondent when she entered into
an amicable sttlement with them.
This Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: Void or Voidable Contract?
was validly executed by the parties-litigants in good faith and for
valuable consideration. The absence of private respondent's
consent merely rendered the Deed voidable under Article 1390 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or
annullable, even though there may have been no
damage to the contracting parties:
x x x           x x x          x x x
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake,
violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are
annulled by a proper action in court. They are
susceptible of ratification.(n)
26
The error in petitioners' contention is evident. Article 1390, par. 2,
refers to contracts visited by vices of consent, i.e., contracts which
were entered into by a person whose consent was obtained and
vitiated through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or
fraud. In this instance, private respondent's consent to the
contract of sale of their conjugal property was totally inexistent or
absent. Gilda Corpuz, on direct examination, testified thus:  11
Q Now, on March 1, 1990, could you
still recall where you were?
A I was still in Manila during that time.
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. FUENTES:
Q When did you come back to
Koronadal, South Cotabato?
A That was on March 11, 1990, Ma'am.
Q Now, when you arrived at
Koronadal, was there any problem
which arose concerning the
ownership of your residential house
at Callejo Subdivision?
A When I arrived here in Koronadal,
there was a problem which arose
regarding my residential house and
lot because it was sold by my
husband without my knowledge.
This being the case, said contract properly falls within the ambit of
Article 124 of the Family Code, which was correctly applied by the
teo lower court:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnerhip properly shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disgreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject recourse
to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
must be availed of within five years from the date of
the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or
otherwise unable to participate in the administration
of the conjugal properties, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include the powers of disposition or
encumbrance which must have the authority of the
court or the written consent of the other spouse. In
the absence of such authority or consent, the
disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However,
the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse
or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors. (165a)
(Emphasis supplied)
Comparing said law with its equivalent provision in the Civil Code,
the trial court adroitly explained the amendatory effect of the
above provision in this wise: 12
27
The legal provision is clear. The disposition or
encumbrance is void. It becomes still clearer if we
compare the same with the equivalent provision of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. Under Article 166
of the Civil Code, the husband cannot generally
alienate or encumber any real property of the
conjugal partnershit without the wife's consent. The
alienation or encumbrance if so made however is
not null and void. It is merely voidable. The offended
wife may bring an action to annul the said alienation
or encumbrance. Thus the provision of Article 173 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the
marriage and within ten years from
the transaction questioned, ask the
courts for the annulment of any
contract of the husband entered into
without her consent, when such
consent is required, or any act or
contract of the husband which tends
to defraud her or impair her interest in
the conjugal partnership property.
Should the wife fail to exercise this
right, she or her heirs after the
dissolution of the marriage, may
demand the value of property
fraudulently alienated by the
husband.(n)
This particular provision giving the wife ten (10)
years . . . during [the] marriage to annul the
alienation or encumbrance was not carried over to
the Family Code. It is thus clear that any alienation
or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the
Family Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without the consent
of the wife is null and void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the fraud and the intimidation
referred to by petitioners were perpetrated in the execution of the
document embodying the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
alleged during trial that barangay authorities made her sign said
document through misrepresentation and
coercion.   In any event, its execution does not alter the void
13
character of the deed of sale between the husband and the
petitioners-spouses, as will be discussed later. The fact remains
that such contract was entered into without the wife's consent.
In sum, the nullity of the contract of sale is premised on the
absence of private respondent's consent. To constitute a valid
contract, the Civil Code requires the concurrence of the following
elements: (1) cause, (2) object, and (3) consent,   the last element
14
being indubitably absent in the case at bar.
Second Issue: Amicable Settlement
Insisting that the contract of sale was merely voidable, petitioners
aver that it was duly ratified by the contending parties through the
"amicable settlement" they executed on March 16, 1990 in
Barangay Case No. 38.
The position is not well taken. The trial and the appellate courts
have resolved this issue in favor of the private respondent. The
trial court correctly held: 
15
By the specific provision of the law [Art. 1390, Civil
Code] therefore, the Deed to Transfer of Rights (Exh.
28
 "A") cannot be ratified, even by an "amicable WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS
settlement". The participation by some barangay the challenged Decision and Resolution. Costs against petitioners.
authorities in the "amicable settlement" cannot
otherwise validate an invalid act. Moreover, it cannot SO ORDERED.
be denied that the "amicable settlement (Exh. "B")
entered into by plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendent Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
spouses Guiang is a contract. It is a direct offshoot
of the Deed of Transfer of Rights (Exh. "A"). By
express provision of law, such a contract is also
void. Thus, the legal provision, to wit:

Art. 1422. Acontract which is the

direct result of a previous illegal
contract, is also void and inexistent.
(Civil Code of the Philippines).

In summation therefore, both the Deed of transfer of

Rights (Exh. "A") and the "amicable settlement"
(Exh. "3") are null and void.

Doctrinally and clearly, a void contract cannot be ratified. 

16

Neither can the "amicable settlement" be considered a continuing

offer that was accepted and perfected by the parties, following the
last sentence of Article 124. The order of the pertinent events is
clear: after the sale, petitioners filed a complaint for trespassing
against private respondent, after which the barangay authorities
secured an "amicable settlement" and petitioners filed before the
MTC a motion for its execution. The settlement, however, does not
mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance of
such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that private
respondent would vacate the property. By no stretch of the
imagination, can the Court interpret this document as the
acceptance mentioned in Article 124.

29
G.R. No. 155043             September 30, 2004
ARTURO R. ABALOS, petitioner,
vs.
DR. GALICANO S. MACATANGAY, JR., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The instant petition seeks a reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48355 entitled "Dr. Galicano S.
Macatangay, Jr. v. Arturo R. Abalos and Esther Palisoc-Abalos,"
promulgated on March 14, 2002. The appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision which dismissed the action for specific performance
filed by respondent, and ordered petitioner and his wife to execute in
favor of herein respondent a deed of sale over the subject property.
Spouses Arturo and Esther Abalos are the registered owners of a parcel
of land with improvements located at Azucena St., Makati City
consisting of about three hundred twenty-seven (327) square meters,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 145316 of the
Registry of Deeds of Makati.
Armed with a Special Power of Attorney dated June 2, 1988,
purportedly issued by his wife, Arturo executed a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement (RMOA) dated October 17, 1989, in favor
of respondent, binding himself to sell to respondent the subject property
and not to offer the same to any other party within thirty (30) days from
date. Arturo acknowledged receipt of a check from respondent in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00), representing earnest
money for the subject property, the amount of which would be deducted
from the purchase price of One Million Three Hundred Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱1,300,000.00). Further, the RMOA stated that full
payment would be effected as soon as possession of the property shall
have been turned over to respondent.
Subsequently, Arturo’s wife, Esther, executed a Special Power of
Attorney dated October 25, 1989, appointing her sister, Bernadette
Ramos, to act for and in her behalf relative to the transfer of the
property to respondent. Ostensibly, a marital squabble was brewing
between Arturo and Esther at the time and to protect his interest,
respondent caused the annotation of his adverse claim on the title of the
spouses to the property on November 14, 1989.
On November 16, 1989, respondent sent a letter to Arturo and Esther
informing them of his readiness and willingness to pay the full amount of
the purchase price. The letter contained a demand upon the spouses to
comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the property to
him. On the same date, Esther, through her attorney-in-fact, executed in
favor of respondent, a Contract to Sell the property to the extent of her
conjugal interest therein for the sum of six hundred fifty thousand pesos
(₱650,000.00) less the sum already received by her and Arturo. Esther
agreed to surrender possession of the property to respondent within
twenty (20) days from November 16, 1989, while the latter promised to
pay the balance of the purchase price in the amount of one million two
hundred ninety thousand pesos (₱1,290,000.00) after being placed in
possession of the property. Esther also obligated herself to execute and
deliver to respondent a deed of absolute sale upon full payment.
In a letter dated December 7, 1989, respondent informed the spouses
that he had set aside the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety
Thousand Pesos (₱1,290,000.00) as evidenced by Citibank Check No.
278107 as full payment of the purchase price. He reiterated his demand
upon them to comply with their obligation to turn over possession of the
property. Arturo and Esther failed to deliver the property which
prompted respondent to cause the annotation of another adverse claim
on TCT No. 145316. On January 12, 1990, respondent filed a complaint
30
for specific performance with damages against petitioners. Arturo filed
his answer to the complaint while his wife was declared in default.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint for specific
performance. It ruled that the Special Power of Attorney (SPA)
ostensibly issued by Esther in favor of Arturo was void as it was
falsified. Hence, the court concluded that the SPA could not have
authorized Arturo to sell the property to respondent. The trial court also
noted that the check issued by respondent to cover the earnest money
was dishonored due to insufficiency of funds and while it was replaced
with another check by respondent, there is no showing that the second
check was issued as payment for the earnest money on the property.
On appeal taken by respondent, the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the trial court. It ruled that the SPA in favor of Arturo,
assuming that it was void, cannot affect the transaction between Esther
and respondent. The appellate court ratiocinated that it was by virtue of
the SPA executed by Esther, in favor of her sister, that the sale of the
property to respondent was effected. On the other hand, the appellate
court considered the RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of respondent
valid to effect the sale of Arturo’s conjugal share in the property.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court’s disposition of the case, petitioner
seeks a reversal of its decision alleging that:
I.
The Court of Appeals committed serious and manifest error
when it decided on the appeal without affording petitioner his
right to due process.
II.
The Court of Appeals committed serious and manifest error in
reversing and setting aside the findings of fact by the trial court.
III.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that a contract to sell is a
contract of sale, and in ordering petitioner to execute a
registrable form of deed of sale over the property in favor of
respondent.1
Petitioner contends that he was not personally served with copies of
summons, pleadings, and processes in the appeal proceedings nor was
he given an opportunity to submit an appellee’s brief. He alleges that his
counsel was in the United States from 1994 to June 2000, and he never
received any news or communication from him after the proceedings in
the trial court were terminated. Petitioner submits that he was denied
due process because he was not informed of the appeal proceedings,
nor given the chance to have legal representation before the appellate
court.
We are not convinced. The essence of due process is an opportunity to
be heard. Petitioner’s failure to participate in the appeal proceedings is
not due to a cause imputable to the appellate court but because of
petitioner’s own neglect in ascertaining the status of his case.
Petitioner’s counsel is equally negligent in failing to inform his client
about the recent developments in the appeal proceedings. Settled is the
rule that a party is bound by the conduct, negligence and mistakes of
his counsel.2 Thus, petitioner’s plea of denial of due process is
downright baseless.
Petitioner also blames the appellate court for setting aside the factual
findings of the trial court and argues that factual findings of the trial
court are given much weight and respect when supported by substantial
evidence. He asserts that the sale between him and respondent is void
31
for lack of consent because the SPA purportedly executed by his wife
Esther is a forgery and therefore, he could not have validly sold the
subject property to respondent.
Next, petitioner theorizes that the RMOA he executed in favor of
respondent was not perfected because the check representing the
earnest money was dishonored. He adds that there is no evidence on
record that the second check issued by respondent was intended to
replace the first check representing payment of earnest money.
Respondent admits that the subject property is co-owned by petitioner
and his wife, but he objects to the allegations in the petition bearing a
relation to the supposed date of the marriage of the vendors. He
contends that the alleged date of marriage between petitioner and his
wife is a new factual issue which was not raised nor established in the
court a quo. Respondent claims that there is no basis to annul the sale
freely and voluntarily entered into by the husband and the wife.
The focal issue in the instant petition is whether petitioner may be
compelled to convey the property to respondent under the terms of the
RMOA and the Contract to Sell. At bottom, the resolution of the issue
entails the ascertainment of the contractual nature of the two
documents and the status of the contracts contained therein.
Contracts, in general, require the presence of three essential elements:
(1) consent of the contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the
subject matter of the contract; and (3) cause of the obligation which is
established.3
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of
obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation.4 In a contract of sale, the
seller must consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price, the
subject matter must be determinate, and the price must be certain in
money or its equivalent.5 Being essentially consensual, a contract of
sale is perfected at the moment there is a meeting of the minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the
price.6 However, ownership of the thing sold shall not be transferred to
the vendee until actual or constructive delivery of the property.7
On the other hand, an accepted unilateral promise which specifies the
thing to be sold and the price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable
consideration distinct and separate from the price, is what may properly
be termed a perfected contract of option.8 An option merely grants a
privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at a determined price.
It is separate and distinct from that which the parties may enter into
upon the consummation of the option.9 A perfected contract of option
does not result in the perfection or consummation of the sale; only when
the option is exercised may a sale be perfected.10 The option must,
however, be supported by a consideration distinct from the price.11
Perusing the RMOA, it signifies a unilateral offer of Arturo to sell the
property to respondent for a price certain within a period of thirty days.
The RMOA does not impose upon respondent an obligation to buy
petitioner’s property, as in fact it does not even bear his signature
thereon. It is quite clear that after the lapse of the thirty-day period,
without respondent having exercised his option, Arturo is free to sell the
property to another. This shows that the intent of Arturo is merely to
grant respondent the privilege to buy the property within the period
therein stated. There is nothing in the RMOA which indicates that Arturo
agreed therein to transfer ownership of the land which is an essential
element in a contract of sale. Unfortunately, the option is not binding
upon the promissory since it is not supported by a consideration distinct
from the price.12
As a rule, the holder of the option, after accepting the promise and
before he exercises his option, is not bound to buy. He is free either to
buy or not to buy later. In Sanchez v. Rigos13 we ruled that in an
accepted unilateral promise to sell, the promissor is not bound by his
32
promise and may, accordingly, withdraw it, since there may be no valid
contract without a cause or consideration. Pending notice of its
withdrawal, his accepted promise partakes of the nature of an offer to
sell which, if acceded or consented to, results in a perfected contract of
sale.
Even conceding for the nonce that respondent had accepted the offer
within the period stated and, as a consequence, a bilateral contract of
purchase and sale was perfected, the outcome would be the same. To
benefit from such situation, respondent would have to pay or at least
make a valid tender of payment of the price for only then could he exact
compliance with the undertaking of the other party.14 This respondent
failed to do. By his own admission, he merely informed respondent
spouses of his readiness and willingness to pay. The fact that he had
set aside a check in the amount of One Million Two Hundred Ninety
Thousand Pesos (₱1,290,000.00) representing the balance of the
purchase price could not help his cause. Settled is the rule that tender
of payment must be made in legal tender. A check is not legal tender,
and therefore cannot constitute a valid tender of payment.15 Not having
made a valid tender of payment, respondent’s action for specific
performance must fail.
With regard to the payment of Five Thousand Pesos (₱5,000.00), the
Court is of the view that the amount is not earnest money as the term is
understood in Article 1482 which signifies proof of the perfection of the
contract of sale, but merely a guarantee that respondent is really
interested to buy the property. It is not the giving of earnest money, but
the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract
of sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.16 No
reservation of ownership on the part of Arturo is necessary since, as
previously stated, he has never agreed to transfer ownership of the
property to respondent.
Granting for the sake of argument that the RMOA is a contract of sale,
the same would still be void not only for want of consideration and
absence of respondent’s signature thereon, but also for lack of Esther’s
conformity thereto. Quite glaring is the absence of the signature of
Esther in the RMOA, which proves that she did not give her consent to
the transaction initiated by Arturo. The husband cannot alienate any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent.17
However, it was the Contract to Sell executed by Esther through her
attorney-in-fact which the Court of Appeals made full use of. Holding
that the contract is valid, the appellate court explained that while Esther
did not authorize Arturo to sell the property, her execution of the SPA
authorizing her sister to sell the land to respondent clearly shows her
intention to convey her interest in favor of respondent. In effect, the
court declared that the lack of Esther’s consent to the sale made by
Arturo was cured by her subsequent conveyance of her interest in the
property through her attorney-in-fact.
We do not share the ruling.
The nullity of the RMOA as a contract of sale emanates not only from
lack of Esther’s consent thereto but also from want of consideration and
absence of respondent’s signature thereon. Such nullity cannot be
obliterated by Esther’s subsequent confirmation of the putative
transaction as expressed in the Contract to Sell. Under the law, a void
contract cannot be ratified18 and the action or defense for the declaration
of the inexistence of a contract does not prescribe.19 A void contract
produces no effect either against or in favor of anyone–it cannot create,
modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers.20
True, in the Contract to Sell, Esther made reference to the earlier
RMOA executed by Arturo in favor of respondent. However, the RMOA
which Arturo signed is different from the deed which Esther executed
through her attorney-in-fact. For one, the first is sought to be enforced
33
as a contract of sale while the second is purportedly a contract to sell
only. For another, the terms and conditions as to the issuance of title
and delivery of possession are divergent.
The congruence of the wills of the spouses is essential for the valid
disposition of conjugal property. Where the conveyance is contained in
the same document which bears the conformity of both husband and
wife, there could be no question on the validity of the transaction. But
when there are two (2) documents on which the signatures of the
spouses separately appear, textual concordance of the documents is
indispensable. Hence, in this case where the wife’s putative consent to
the sale of conjugal property appears in a separate document which
does not, however, contain the same terms and conditions as in the first
document signed by the husband, a valid transaction could not have
arisen.
Quite a bit of elucidation on the conjugal partnership of gains is in order.
Arturo and Esther appear to have been married before the effectivity of
the Family Code. There being no indication that they have adopted a
different property regime, their property relations would automatically be
governed by the regime of conjugal partnership of gains.21
The subject land which had been admittedly acquired during the
marriage of the spouses forms part of their conjugal partnership.22
Under the Civil Code, the husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership. This right is clearly granted to him by law.23 More, the
husband is the sole administrator. The wife is not entitled as of right to
joint administration.24
The husband, even if he is statutorily designated as administrator of the
conjugal partnership, cannot validly alienate or encumber any real
property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s
consent.25 Similarly, the wife cannot dispose of any property belonging
to the conjugal partnership without the conformity of the husband. The
law is explicit that the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without
the husband’s consent, except in cases provided by law.26
More significantly, it has been held that prior to the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership, the interest of each spouse in the conjugal assets
is inchoate, a mere expectancy, which constitutes neither a legal nor an
equitable estate, and does not ripen into title until it appears that there
are assets in the community as a result of the liquidation and
settlement. The interest of each spouse is limited to the net remainder
or "remanente liquido" (haber ganancial) resulting from the liquidation of
the affairs of the partnership after its dissolution.27 Thus, the right of the
husband or wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until
the dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership, or after
dissolution of the marriage, when it is finally determined that, after
settlement of conjugal obligations, there are net assets left which can be
divided between the spouses or their respective heirs.28
In not a few cases, we ruled that the sale by the husband of property
belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife
when there is no showing that the latter is incapacitated is void ab
initio because it is in contravention of the mandatory
requirements of Article 166 of the Civil Code.29 Since Article 166 of the
Civil Code requires the consent of the wife before the husband may
alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal partnership, it
follows that acts or transactions executed against this mandatory
provision are void except when the law itself authorizes their validity.30
Quite recently, in San Juan Structural and Steel Fabricators, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals,31 we ruled that neither spouse could alienate in favor
of another, his or her interest in the partnership or in any property
belonging to it, or ask for partition of the properties before the
34
partnership itself had been legally dissolved. Nonetheless, alienation of one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the
the share of each spouse in the conjugal partnership could be had after conjugal partnership. Nemo dat qui non habet. No one can give what he
separation of property of the spouses during the marriage had been has not.
judicially decreed, upon their petition for any of the causes specified in
Article 19132 of the Civil Code in relation to Article 21433 thereof. WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. 90-106 of the Regional Trial
As an exception, the husband may dispose of conjugal property without Court of Makati is ordered DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
the wife’s consent if such sale is necessary to answer for conjugal
liabilities mentioned in Articles 161 and 162 of the Civil SO ORDERED.
Code.34 In Tinitigan v. Tinitigan, Sr.,35 the Court ruled that the husband
may sell property belonging to the conjugal partnership even without the Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario*, JJ., concur.
consent of the wife if the sale is necessary to answer for a big conjugal
liability which might endanger the family’s economic standing. This is
one instance where the wife’s consent is not required and, impliedly, no
judicial intervention is necessary.

Significantly, the Family Code has introduced some changes particularly

on the aspect of the administration of the conjugal partnership. The new
law provides that the administration of the conjugal partnership is now a
joint undertaking of the husband and the wife. In the event that one
spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the conjugal partnership, the other spouse may
assume sole powers of administration. However, the power of
administration does not include the power to dispose or encumber
property belonging to the conjugal partnership.36 In all instances, the
present law specifically requires the written consent of the other spouse,
or authority of the court for the disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
partnership property without which, the disposition or encumbrance
shall be void.37

Inescapably, herein petitioner’s action for specific performance must

fail. Even on the supposition that the parties only disposed of their
respective shares in the property, the sale, assuming that it exists, is
still void for as previously stated, the right of the husband or the wife to G.R. No. 109355 October 29, 1999

35
SERAFIN MODINA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ERNESTO HONTARCIEGO, PAUL
FIGUEROA, TEODORO HIPALLA AND RAMON CHIANG,
MERLINDA CHIANG, respondents.
PURISIMA, J.:
At bar is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 26051 affirming the decision of the
trial court in the case, entitled "Serafin Modina vs. Ernesto Hontarciego,
Paulino Figueroa and Ramon Chiang vs. Merlinda Plana Chiang,
intervenors", which declared as void and inexistent the deed of definite
sale dated December 17, 1975 as well as the Certificates of Title Nos.
T-86912, T-86913, T-86914 in the name of Ramon Chiang. 1âwphi1.nêt
The facts that matter are as follows:
The parcels of land in question are those under the name of Ramon
Chiang (hereinafter referred to as CHIANG) covered by TCT Nos. T-
86912, T-86913, and T-86914. He theorized that subject properties
were sold to him by his wife, Merlinda Plana Chiang (hereinafter
referred to as MERLINDA), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated December 17, 1975,   and were subsequently sold by CHIANG to
1 T-86914 and T-86915 in the name of Ramon Chiang; (2)
the petitioner Serafin Modina (MODINA), as shown by the Deeds of
Sale, dated August 3, 1979 and August 24, 1979, respectively.
MODINA brought a Complaint for Recovery of Possession with
Damages against the private respondents, Ernesto Hontarciego, Paul
Figueroa and Teodoro Hipalla, docketed as Civil Case No. 13935
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City.
Upon learning the institution of the said case, MERLINDA presented a
Complaint-in-intervention, seeking the declaration of nullity of the Deed
of Sale between her husband and MODINA on the ground that the titles
of the parcels of land in dispute were never legally transferred to her
husband. Fraudulent acts were allegedly employed by him to obtain a
Torrens Title in his favor. However, she confirmed the validity of the
lease contracts with the other private respondents.
MERLINDA also admitted that the said parcels of land were those
ordered sold by Branch 2 of the then Court of First Instance of Iloilo in
Special Proceeding No. 2469 in "Intestate Estate of Nelson Plana"
where she was appointed as the administratix, being the widow of the
deceased, her first husband. An Authority to Sell was issued by the said
Probate Court for the sale of the same properties. 2
After due hearing, the Trial Court decided in favor of MERLINDA,
disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered (1)
declaring as void and inexistent the sale of Lots 10063,
10088, 10085 and 10089 of the Cadastral Survey of Sta.
Barbara by Merlinda Plana in favor of Ramon Chiang as
evidenced by the deed of definite sale dated December
17, 1975 (Exhibits "H"; "3"-Chiang; "9" Intervenor) as
well as the Certificates of Title Nos. T-86912, T-86913,
declaring as void and inexistent the sale of the same
properties by Ramon Chiang in favor of Serafin Modina
as evidenced by the deeds of sale (Exhibits "A", "B", "6"
— Chiang and "7" — Chiang) dated August 3, and 24,
1979, as well as Certificates of Title Nos. T-102631,
102630, 102632 and 102890 in the name of Serafin
Modina; (3) ordering the Register of Deeds of Iloilo to
cancel said certificates of title in the names of Ramon
Chiang and Serafin Modina and to reinstate the
Certificates of Title Nos. T-57960, T-57962, T-57963
36
 and T-57864 in the name of Nelson Plana; (4) ordering
Serafin Modina to vacate and restore possession of the
lots in question to Merlinda Plana Chiang; (5) ordering
Ramon Chiang to restitute and pay to Serafin Modina
the sum of P145,800.00 and; (6) ordering Serafin
Modina to pay Ernesto Hontarciego the sum of
P44,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages plus
the sum of P5,000.00, for and as attorney's fees, with
costs in favor of said defendants against the plaintiff.
On appeal; the Court of Appeals affirmed the aforesaid decision in toto.
Dissatisfied therewith, petitioner found his way to this Court via the
present Petition for Review under the Rule 45 seeking to set aside the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.
Raised for resolution here are: (1) whether the sale of subject lots
should be nullified, (2) whether petitioner was not a purchaser in good
faith, (3) whether the decision of the trial court was tainted with excess
of jurisdiction; and (4) whether or not only three-fourths of subject lots
should be returned to the private respondent.
Anent the first issue, petitioner theorizes that the sale in question is null
and void for being violative of Article 1490   of the New Civil Code
3
prohibiting sales between spouses. Consequently, what is applicable is
Article 1412   supra on the principle of in pari delicto, which leaves both
4
guilty parties where they are, and keeps undisturbed the rights of third
persons to whom the lots involved were sold; petitioner stressed. 1âwphi1.nêt
Petitioner anchors his submission on the following statements of the
Trial Court which the Court of Appeals upheld, to wit:
Furthermore, under Art. 1490, husband and wife are
prohibited to sell properties to each other. And where, as
in this case, the sale is inexistent for lack of
consideration, the principle of in pari delicto non oritur
actio does not apply. (Vasquez vs. Porta, 98 Phil 490),
(Emphasis ours) Thus, Art. 1490 provides:
Art. 1490. The husband and the wife
cannot sell property to each other,
except:
(1) when a separation of propety was
agreed upon in the marriage settlements;
or
(2) when there has been a judicial
separation of property under Art. 191.
The exception to the rule laid down in Art. 1490 of the
New Civil Code not having existed with respect to the
property relations of Ramon Chiang and Merlinda Plana
Chiang, the sale by the latter in favor of the former of the
properties in question is invalid for being prohibited by
law. Not being the owner of subject properties, Ramon
Chiang could not have validly sold the same to plaintiff
Serafin Modina. The sale by Ramon Chiang in favor of
Serafin Modina is, likewise, void and inexistent.
x x x           x x x          x x x
The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, adopted the following
findings a quo: that there is no sufficient evidence establishing fault on
the part of MERLINDA, and therefore, the principle of in pari delicto is
inapplicable and the sale was void for want of consideration. In effect,
MERLINDA can recover the lots sold by her husband to petitioner
MODINA. However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the sale was void
37
for violating Article 1490 of the Civil Code, which prohibits sales
between spouses.
The principle of in pari delicto non oritur actio   denies all recovery to the
6
guilty parties inter se. It applies to cases where the nullity arises from
the illegality of the consideration or the purpose of the contract.   When
7
two persons are equally at fault, the law does not relieve them. The
exception to this general rule is when the principle is invoked with
respect to inexistent contracts. 8
In the petition under consideration, the Trial Court found that subject
Deed of Sale was a nullity for lack of any consideration.   This finding
9
duly supported by evidence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Well-
settled is the rule that this Court will not disturb such finding absent any
evidence to the contrary.  10
Under Article 1409   of the New Civil Code, enumerating void contracts,
11
a contract without consideration is one such void contract. One of the
characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is that it produces no
effect. So also, inexistent contracts can be invoked by any person
whenever juridical effects founded thereon are asserted against him. A
transferor can recover the object of such contract by accion
reivindicatoria and any possessor may refuse to deliver it to the
transferee, who cannot enforce the transfer.  12
Thus, petitioner's insistence that MERLINDA cannot attack subject
contract of sale as she was a guilty party thereto is equally unavailing.
But the pivot of inquiry here is whether MERLINDA is barred by the
principle of in pari delicto from questioning subject Deed of Sale.
It bears emphasizing that as the contracts under controversy are
inexistent contracts within legal contemplation. Articles 1411 and 1412
of the New Civil Code are inapplicable. In pari delicto doctrine applies
only to contracts with illegal consideration or subject matter, whether the
attendant facts constitute an offense or misdemeanor or whether the
consideration involved is merely rendered illegal.  13
The statement below that it is likewise null and void for being violative of
Article 1490 should just be treated as a surplusage or an obiter
dictum on the part of the Trial Court as the issue of whether the parcels
of land in dispute are conjugal in nature or they fall under the exceptions
provided for by law, was neither raised nor litigated upon before the
lower Court. Whether the said lots were ganancial properties was never
brought to the fore by the parties and it is too late to do so now.
Furthermore, if this line of argument be followed, the Trial Court could
not have declared subject contract as null and void because only the
heirs and the creditors can question its nullity and not the spouses
themselves who executed the contract with full knowledge of the
prohibition. 
14
Records show that in the complaint-in-intervention of MERLINDA, she
did not aver the same as a ground to nullify subject Deed of Sale. In
fact, she denied the existence of the Deed of Sale in favor of her
husband. In the said Complaint, her allegations referred to the want of
consideration of such Deed of Sale. She did not put up the defense
under Article 1490, to nullify her sale to her husband CHIANG because
such a defense would be inconsistent with her claim that the same sale
was inexistent. 1âwphi1.nêt
The Trial Court debunked petitioner's theory that MERLINDA
intentionally gave away the bulk of her and her late husband's estate to
defendant CHIANG as his exclusive property, for want of evidentiary
anchor. They insist on the Deed of Sale wherein MERLINIDA made the
misrepresentation that she was a widow and CHIANG was single, when
at the time of execution thereof, they were in fact already married.
Petitioner insists that this document conclusively established bad faith
38
on the part of MERLINDA and therefore, the principle of in pari
delicto should have been applied.
These issues are factual in nature and it is not for this Court to
appreciate and evaluate the pieces of evidence introduced below. An
appellate court defers to the factual findings of the Trial Court, unless
petitioner can show a glaring mistake in the appreciation of relevant
evidence.
Since one of the characteristics of a void or inexistent contract is that it
does not produce any effect, MERLINDA can recover the property from
petitioner who never acquired title thereover.
As to the second issue, petitioner stresses that his title should have
been respected since he is a purchaser in good faith and for value. The
Court of Appeals, however, opined that he (petitioner) is not a
purchaser in good faith. It found that there were circumstances known
to MODINA which rendered their transaction fraudulent under the
attendant circumstances.
As a general rule, in a sale under the Torrens system, a void title cannot
give rise to a valid title. The exception is when the sale of a person with
a void title is to a third person who purchased it for value and in good
faith.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another
without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such
property and pays a full and fair price at the time of the purchase or
before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person in the
property.
In the case under scrutiny, petitioner cannot claim that he was a
purchaser in good faith. There are circumstances which are indicia of
bad faith on his part, to wit: (1) He asked his nephew, Placido Matta, to
investigate the origin of the property and the latter learned that the
same formed part of the properties of MERLINDA's first husband; (2)
that the said sale was between the spouses; (3) that when the property
was inspected, MODINA met all the lessees who informed that subject
lands belong to MERLINDA and they had no knowledge that the same
lots were sold to the husband.
It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts
which would put a reasonable man upon his guard to make the
necessary inquiries, and then claim that he acted in good faith. His
mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his wilful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in his vendor's title,
will not make him an innocent purchaser for value, if it afterwards
develops that the title was in fact defective, and it appears that he had
such notice of the defect as would have led to its discovery had he
acted with that measure of precaution which may reasonably be
required of a prudent man in a like situation. 15
Thus, petitioner cannot claim that the sale between him and MODINA
falls under the exception provided for by law.
With regard to the third issue posed by petitioner — whether the Trial
Court's decision allowing recovery on the part of Merlinda Chiang of
subject properties was void — petitioner's contention is untennable. It is
theorized that as the sale by MERLINDA was by virtue of an Order to
Sell issued in the Intestate Estate Proceedings of her late husband,
Nelson Plana — to allow recovery will defeat the said order of the
Probate Court. Petitioner equated the aforesaid Order to Sell as a
judgment, which another court in a regular proceeding has no
jurisdiction to reverse.
Petitioner is under the mistaken impression that as the Order to Sell had
become a judgment in itself as to the validity of the sale of the
properties involved, any question as to its nullity should have been
39
brought before the Court of Appeals on appeal when the said Order was
issued.

It is a well-settled rule that a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial

Court) has jurisdiction over a case brought to rescind a sale made upon
prior authority of a Probate Court. This does not constitute an
interference or review of the order of a co-equal Court since the Probate
Court has no jurisdiction over the question of title to subject properties.
Consequently, a separate action may be brought to determine the
question of ownership.  16

Lastly, on the issue of whether only three-fourths of the property in

question should have been returned to MERLINDA, petitioner's stance
is equally unsustainable. It is a settled doctrine that an issue which was
neither averred in the Complaint nor raised during the trial before the
lower court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, as such a
recourse would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice, and
due process.  17

The issue of whether only three-fourths of subject property will be

returned was never an issue before the lower court and therefore, the
petitioner cannot do it now. A final word. In a Petition for Review, only
questions of law may be raised. It is perceived by the Court that what
petitioner is trying to, albeit subtly, is for the Court to examine the
probative value or evidentiary weight of the evidence presented below  . 18

The Court cannot do that unless the appreciation of the pieces of

evidence on hand is glaringly erroneous. But this is where petitioner
utterly failed.
1âwphi1.nêt

G. R. No. 136773               June 25, 2003

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 30, 1992, in CA-G.R. CV No. 26051 MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. MANONGSONG, Petitioners,
vs.
SO ORDERED. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA JUMAQUIO, NARCISO

40
ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA O.
OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ BENJAMIN DELA
CRUZ, SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS,
GLORIA RACADIO, ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA
CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ, Respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review assailing the Decision of 26
1  2 
June 1998 and the Resolution of 21 December 1998 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51643. The Court of Appeals reversed the
Decision dated 10 April 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 135, in Civil Case No. 92-1685, partitioning the property in
controversy and awarding to petitioners a portion of the property.
Antecedent Facts
Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6)
children, namely: (1) Dominador Lopez; (2) Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio,
the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio sisters"); (3) Victor Lopez, married to
respondent Leoncia Lopez; (4) Benigna Lopez-Ortiz, the mother of
respondents Narciso, Celestino, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr. and Romeo Ortiz,
and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo; (5) Rosario Lopez-dela Cruz, married to
respondent Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. and the mother of respondents
Benjamin Jr., Roberto, and Joselito, all surnamed dela Cruz, and of
Gloria dela Cruz Racadio and Aurora dela Cruz Nicolas; and (6) Vicente
Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez Manongsong
("Manongsong").
The contested property is a parcel of land on San Jose Street, Manuyo
Uno, Las Piñas, Metro Manila with an area of approximately 152 square
meters ("Property"). The records do not show that the Property is
registered under the Torrens system. The Property is particularly
described in Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 as bounded in the north
3 
by Juan Gallardo, south by Calle Velay, east by Domingo Lavana and
west by San Jose Street. Tax Declaration No. B-001-00390 was
registered with the Office of the Municipal Assessor of Las Piñas on 30
September 1984 in the name of "Benigna Lopez, et al". However, the
4 
improvements on the portion of the Property denominated as No. 831
San Jose St., Manuyo Uno, Las Piñas were separately declared in the
name of "Filomena J. Estimo" under Tax Declaration No. 90-001-02145
dated 14 October 1991. 5
Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint on 19
6 
June 1992, alleging that Manongsong and respondents are the owners
pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil
Code, petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area
7 
equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the Property or its prevailing market
value, and for damages.
Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the
Property. Upon Guevarra’s death, her children inherited the Property.
Since Dominador Lopez died without offspring, there were only five
children left as heirs of Guevarra. Each of the five children, including
Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the
Property. As Vicente Lopez’ sole surviving heir, Manongsong claims her
father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.
There is no dispute that respondents, who are the surviving spouses of
Guevarra’s children and their offspring, have been in possession of the
Property for as long as they can remember. The area actually occupied
by each respondent family differs, ranging in size from approximately 25
41
to 50 square meters. Petitioners are the only descendants not
occupying any portion of the Property.
Most respondents, specifically Narciso, Rodolfo, Pastor Jr., and
Celestino Ortiz, and Erlinda Ortiz Ocampo ("Ortiz family"), as well as
Benjamin Sr., Benjamin Jr., and Roberto dela Cruz, Aurora dela Cruz
Nicolas and Gloria Dela Cruz Racadio ("Dela Cruz family"), entered into
a compromise agreement with petitioners. Under the Stipulation of
Facts and Compromise Agreement dated 12 September 1992
8 
("Agreement"), petitioners and the Ortiz and Dela Cruz families agreed
that each group of heirs would receive an equal share in the Property.
The signatories to the Agreement asked the trial court to issue an order
of partition to this effect and prayed further that "those who have
exceeded said one-fifth (1/5) must be reduced so that those who have
less and those who have none shall get the correct and proper portion."
Among the respondents, the Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez –
who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property – and
Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement. However, only the
10 
Jumaquio sisters actively opposed petitioners’ claim. The Jumaquio
sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the
mother of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarra’s daughter Enriqueta
Lopez Jumaquio.
The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 911 for
11 
the year 1949 in the sole name of Navarro. Tax Declaration No. 911
described a residential parcel of land with an area of 172.51 square
meters, located on San Jose St., Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal with the
following boundaries: Juan Gallardo to the north, I. Guevarra Street to
the south, Rizal Street to the east and San Jose Street to the west. In
addition, Tax Declaration No. 911 stated that the houses of "Agatona
Lopez" and "Enriquita Lopez" stood on the Property as improvements.
The Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA ("Kasulatan") dated 11 October 1957, the relevant
12 
portion of which states:
AKO SI JUSTINA NAVARRO, sapat ang gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at
naninirahan sa LAS PIÑAS, ay siyang nagma-may-ari at nagtatangkilik
ng isang lagay na lupa na matatagpuan sa Manuyo, Las Piñas, Rizal,
lihis sa anomang pagkakautang lalong napagkikilala sa pamamagitan
ng mga sumusunod na palatandaan:
BOUNDARIES:
NORTH: JUAN GALLARDO SOUTH: I. GUEVARRA ST. EAST: RIZAL
ST., WEST: SAN JOSE ST.,
9
na may sukat na 172.51 metros cuadrados na may TAX
DECLARATION BILANG 911.
NA DAHIL AT ALANG ALANG sa halagang DALAWANG DAAN
LIMANGPUNG PISO (₱250.00), SALAPING PILIPINO, na sa akin ay
kaliwang iniabot at ibinayad ni ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, may sapat na
gulang, Pilipino, may asawa at naninirahan sa Las Piñas, Rizal, at sa
karapatang ito ay aking pinatutunayan ng pagkakatanggap ng nasabing
halaga na buong kasiyahan ng aking kalooban ay aking IPINAGBILI,
ISINALIN AT INILIPAT sa nasabing, ENRIQUETA LOPEZ, sa kanyang
mga tagapagmana at kahalili, ang kabuuang sukat ng lupang nabanggit
sa itaas nito sa pamamagitan ng bilihang walang anomang pasubali.
Ang lupang ito ay walang kasama at hindi taniman ng palay o mais.
Simula sa araw na ito ay aking ililipat ang pagmamay-ari at
pagtatangkilik ng nasabing lupa kay ENRIQUETA LOPEZ sa
kanilang/kanyang tagapagmana at kahalili x x x.
42
The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Manila certified on 1
June 1994 that the "‘KASULATAN SA BILIHAN NG LUPA’, between
Justina Navarro (Nagbili) and Enriqueta Lopez (Bumili), was notarized
by Atty. Ruperto Q. Andrada on 11 October 1957 and entered in his
Notarial Register xxx." The certification further stated that Atty. Andrada
13 
was a duly appointed notary public for the City of Manila in 1957.
Because the Jumaquio sisters were in peaceful possession of their
portion of the Property for more than thirty years, they also invoked the
defense of acquisitive prescription against petitioners, and charged that
petitioners were guilty of laches. The Jumaquio sisters argued that the
present action should have been filed years earlier, either by Vicente
Lopez when he was alive or by Manongsong when the latter reached
legal age. Instead, petitioners filed this action for partition only in 1992
when Manongsong was already 33 years old.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision of 10 April 1995
14  Since the other respondents had entered into a compromise agreement
ruled in favor of petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was
void, even absent evidence attacking its validity. The trial court
declared:
It appears that the ownership of the estate in question is controverted.
According to defendants Jumaquios, it pertains to them through
conveyance by means of a Deed of Sale executed by their common
ancestor Justina Navarro to their mother Enriqueta, which deed was
presented in evidence as Exhs. "4" to "4-A". Plaintiff Milagros
Manongsong debunks the evidence as fake. The document of sale, in
the observance of the Court, is however duly authenticated by means of
a certificate issued by the RTC of the Manila Clerk of Court as duly
notarized public document (Exh. "5"). No countervailing proof was
adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the document’s legality or
its validity.
xxx The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity
because the property conveyed had a conjugal character. No positive
evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property.
The name of Justina Navarro’s spouse/husband was not mentioned
and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time the conveyance
was made to Justina Navarro. Agatona Guevarra as her compulsory
heir should have the legal right to participate with the distribution of the
estate under question to the exclusion of others. She is entitled to
her legitime. The Deed of Sale [Exhs "4" & "4-1"(sic)] did not at all
provide for the reserved legitime or the heirs, and, therefore it has no
force and effect against Agatona Guevarra and her six (6) legitimate
children including the grandchildren, by right of representation, as
described in the order of intestate succession. The same Deed of Sale
should be declared a nullity ab initio. The law on the matter is clear. The
compulsory heirs cannot be deprived of their legitime, except on (sic)
cases expressly specified by law like for instance disinheritance for
cause. xxx (Emphasis supplied)
with petitioners, the dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision was
directed against the Jumaquio sisters only, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintiffs and against the remaining active defendants, Emiliana
Jumaquio and Felomena J. Estimo, jointly and severally, ordering:
1. That the property consisting of 152 square meters referred to
above be immediately partitioned giving plaintiff Milagros Lopez-
Manongsong her lawful share of 1/5 of the area in square
meters, or the prevailing market value on the date of the
decision;
43
 2. Defendants to pay plaintiffs the sum of ₱10,000.00 as
compensatory damages for having deprived the latter the use
and enjoyment of the fruits of her 1/5 share;
3. Defendants to pay plaintiffs’ litigation expenses and attorney’s
fee in the sum of ₱10,000.00; and
4. Defendants to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied)
15 
When the trial court denied their motion for reconsideration, the
Jumaquio sisters appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioners, in their appellee’s brief before the Court of Appeals,
presented for the first time a supposed photocopy of the death
certificate of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarra’s mother was a
16  of co-ownership between the common owners either by (1) Court action
certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit from
17  or proper deed of tradition, xxx xxx xxx."
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he knew Justina Navarro only by
name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some
years with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On
the basis of these documents, petitioners assailed the genuineness and
authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate
and affidavit presented by petitioners on the ground that petitioners
never formally offered these documents in evidence.
The appellate court further held that the petitioners were bound by their
admission that Navarro was the original owner of the Property, as
follows:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees themselves admitted before the trial court
that Justina Navarro and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of
the subject property and was the mother of Agatona Navarro (sic).
Plaintiffs-appellees in their Reply-Memorandum averred:
"As regards the existence of common ownership, the defendants clearly
admit as follows:
x x x           x x x          x x x
‘History of this case tells us that originally the property was owned by
JUSTINA NAVARRO who has a daughter by the name of AGATONA
GUEVARRA who on the other hand has six children namely: xxx xxx
xxx.’
which point-out that co-ownership exists on the property between the
parties. Since this is the admitted history, facts of the case, it follows
that there should have been proper document to extinguish this status
The trial court confirms these admissions of plaintiffs-appellees. The
trial court held:
"x x x           x x x          x x x
With the parties’ admissions and their conformity to a factual common
line of relationship of the heirs with one another, it has been elicited
ascendant Justina Navarro is the common ancestor of the heirs herein
mentioned, however, it must be noted that the parties failed to amplify
who was the husband and the number of compulsory heirs of Justina
Navarro. xxx xxx xxx"
44
Therefore, plaintiffs-appellees cannot now be heard contesting the fact Costs against plaintiffs-appellees.
that Justina Navarro was their common ancestor and was the original
owner of the subject property. SO ORDERED. 18

The Court of Appeals further held that the trial court erred in assuming Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals
that the Property was conjugal in nature when Navarro sold it. The denied the same in its Resolution of 21 December 1998. 19

appellate court reasoned as follows:

On 28 January 1999, petitioners appealed the appellate court’s decision
However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption and resolution to this Court. The Court initially denied the petition for
that all property of marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, must review due to certain procedural defects. The Court, however, gave due
first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of course to the petition in its Resolution of 31 January 2000. 20

acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua non for the

operation of the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. The Issues

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that Petitioners raise the following issues before this Court:
the subject property was acquired by Justina Navarro during her
marriage. xxx
1. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS NO COUNTERVAILING
EVIDENCE ON THE ALLEGED SALE BY ONE JUSTINA
The findings of the trial court that the subject property is conjugal in NAVARRO;
nature is not supported by any evidence.
2. WHETHER THERE IS PRETERITION AND THE ISSUES
To the contrary, records show that in 1949 the subject property was RAISED ARE REVIEWABLE;
declared, for taxation purposes under the name of Justina Navarro
alone. This indicates that the land is the paraphernal property of Justina
3. WHETHER THERE IS CO-OWNERSHIP PRO INDIVISO;
Navarro.
4. WHETHER THE RULE OF THE MAJORITY CO-OWNERS
For these reasons, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
ON THE LAND SHOULD PREVAIL;
trial court, thus:
5. WHETHER THE ALLEGED SALE IS VALID AND BINDS
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby
THE OTHER CO-HEIRS;
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby rendered
DISMISSING plaintiffs-appellees’ complaint in so far as defendants-
appellants are concerned. 6. WHETHER PRESCRIPTION APPLIES AGAINST THE
SHARE OF PETITIONERS. 21

45
The fundamental question for resolution is whether petitioners were
able to prove, by the requisite quantum of evidence, that Manongsong
is a co-owner of the Property and therefore entitled to demand for its
partition.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issues raised by petitioners are mainly factual in nature. In general,
only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45.
However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of
Appeals conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary,
reverse the findings of fact of the lower courts. This is precisely the
22  presented tax declarations and the testimonies of witnesses. However,
situation in this case.
We review the factual and legal issues of this case in light of the general
rules of evidence and the burden of proof in civil cases, as explained by
this Court in Jison v. Court of Appeals : 23
xxx Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the
burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof
never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff
makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of
evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiff's prima facie case,
otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must produce a
preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
defendant’s. The concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing, that which is
offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the validity of
the Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa
Petitioners anchor their action for partition on the claim that
Manongsong is a co-owner or co-heir of the Property by inheritance,
more specifically, as the heir of her father, Vicente Lopez. Petitioners
likewise allege that the Property originally belonged to Guevarra, and
that Vicente Lopez inherited from Guevarra a 1/5 interest in the
Property. As the parties claiming the affirmative of these issues,
petitioners had the burden of proof to establish their case by
preponderance of evidence.
To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties
the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners’ claim of co-
ownership.
The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public,
is a public document and prima facie evidence of its authenticity and
due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a
notarized document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more
than merely preponderant. Otherwise the authenticity and due
24 
execution of the document should be upheld. The trial court itself held
25 
that "(n)o countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or
impugn the document’s legality or its validity."
26
Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient
document and thus still presumed to be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1)
more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It
appears, on its face, to be genuine.27
46
Nevertheless, the trial court held that the Kasulatan was void because
the Property was conjugal at the time Navarro sold it to Enriqueta Lopez
Jumaquio. We do not agree. The trial court’s conclusion that the
Property was conjugal was not based on evidence, but rather on a
misapprehension of Article 160 of the Civil Code, which provides:
All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife.
As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during
the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the
presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership. 28
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired
the Property during her marriage. There is no basis for applying the
presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On
the contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in
1949, the Property was declared solely in Navarro’s name. This tends
29 
to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.
We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale
embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the compulsory heirs of Guevarra
of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or
gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish
the estate of the seller. When the disposition is for valuable
consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a
substitution of values, that is, the property sold is replaced by the
30 
equivalent monetary consideration. 1âwphi1
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of
sale are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject
matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent. The presence of
31 
these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The
Property was sold in 1957 for ₱250.00. 32
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not admitting the documents
presented by petitioners for the first time on appeal
We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ refusal to give any probative
value to the alleged birth certificate of Guevarra and the affidavit of
Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents
to their appellee’s brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these
documents during the proceedings before the trial court. Instead,
petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal
without any explanation. For reasons of their own, petitioners did not
formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court as
required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. To admit these
33 
documents now is contrary to due process, as it deprives respondents
of the opportunity to examine and controvert them.
Moreover, even if these documents were admitted, they would not
controvert Navarro’s ownership of the Property. Benjamin dela Cruz,
Sr.’s affidavit stated merely that, although he knew Navarro by name,
he was not personally acquainted with her. Guevarra’s alleged birth
34 
certificate casts doubt only as to whether Navarro was indeed the
mother of Guevarra. These documents do not prove that Guevarra
owned the Property or that Navarro did not own the Property.
Petitioners admitted before the trial court that Navarro was the mother
of Guevarra. However, petitioners denied before the Court of Appeals
that Navarro was the mother of Guevarra. We agree with the appellate
court that this constitutes an impermissible change of theory. When a
party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his
theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other
47
party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process. 35

If Navarro were not the mother of Guevarra, it would only further

undermine petitioners’ case. Absent any hereditary relationship
between Guevarra and Navarro, the Property would not have passed
from Navarro to Guevarra, and then to the latter’s children, including
petitioners, by succession. There would then be no basis for petitioners’
claim of co-ownership by virtue of inheritance from Guevarra. On the
other hand, this would not undermine respondents’ position since they
anchor their claim on the sale under the Kasulatan and not on
inheritance from Guevarra.

Since the notarized Kasulatan is evidence of greater weight which

petitioners failed to refute by clear and convincing evidence, this Court
holds that petitioners were not able to prove by preponderance of
evidence that the Property belonged to Guevarra’s estate. There is
therefore no legal basis for petitioners’ complaint for partition of the
Property.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in

CA-G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against
Felomena Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ.,

concur.

G.R. No. 120122 November 6, 1997

GLORIA R. CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.

48
COURT OF APPEALS, ROMY V. SUZARA and MANUEL R.
VIZCONDE, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A woman spurned and beguiled now whines — a costly odyssey in
relations extra legem.
Gloria R. Cruz was the owner of Lot 10, BLK. 565, PSD-38911, with an
area of 747.7 square meters, together with the improvements thereon,
situated at 22 Bituan St., Bgy. Doña Imelda, Quezon City, covered by
TCT No. 242553 in her name; in 1977 she and respondent Romeo V.
Suzara lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage;
in September 1982, solely out of love and affection for Suzara, she
executed a deed of absolute sale over Lot 10 in favor of Suzara without
any monetary consideration; thereafter, Suzara registered the document
in his favor and used the property as collateral for a bank loan
P350,000.00; he however failed to pay the loan so that after four (4)
years the mortgage was foreclosed. She paid the bank P40,638.88 to
restructure the loan resulting in the extension of the redemption period
to two (2) years. However, without her knowledge and before the
expiration of the extended period, Suzara redeemed the property. She
tried to talk to him but he avoided her. Finally, to protect her interest,
she executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim which she filed with the
Register the Deeds of Quezon City asserting that her sale in favor of
Suzara was null and void for lack of consideration and being contrary to
law and public policy.
On 22 February 1990 she filed a complaint with Regional Trial Court of
Manila against respondent Suzara for quieting of title, declaration of
nullity of documents and damages with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction.
Denying petitioner's claim, respondent Suzara claimed that he was
already the registered owner of the property as evidenced by TCT No.
295388, having acquired the same from petitioner through a notarized
deed of absolute sale; the sale was for a valuable consideration and not
tainted with fraud nor executed under duress; and, petitioner was
estopped from impugning the validity of the sale and questioning his title
over the property.
On 22 March 1990 the trial court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining private respondent, his agents and/or any person or persons
acting in his behalf, from disposing and/or encumbering the litigated
property until further orders.
On 3 April 1990 petitioner filed an ex parte motion to admit her
amended complaint impleading respondent Manuel R. Vizconde as
additional defendant and praying that the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City be ordered to annotate her notice of lis pendens on respondent
Suzara's title. Favorably resolving her motion, the trial court admitted
her amended complaint and ordered the Register of Deeds to show
cause why it was refusing to annotate the notice of lis pendens filed by
her.
On 22 May 1990 the Register of Deeds filed a manifestation informing
the trial court that the property had been sold by respondent Suzara to
his co-respondent Vizconde who was already the registered owner
thereof and since Vizconde was not impleaded in the case the notice
of lis pendens could not be annotated on his title until the requirements
of law were met and the annotation of the notice judicially ordered. As
stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the motion to admit
amended complaint impleading respondent Vizconde was filed ex
parte on 3 April 1990.1
On 24 September 1990, responding to the amended complaint,
Vizconde answered that there was no privity of contract between him
49
and petitioner; he (Vizconde) was a purchaser for value in good faith;
the sale between him and Suzara was executed on 22 December 1989
or long before the execution of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim; and, the
action was barred by laches, estoppel and prescription.
On 24 May 1993 the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the
complaint and the counterclaims as well as the cross claim of
respondent Vizconde. It ruled that the sale between petitioner and
respondent Suzara was valid with "love, affection and accommodation"
being the consideration for the sale. It also found Vizconde an innocent
purchaser for value because at the time he purchased the property he
was unaware of the adverse claim of petitioner. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court a
quo. 3
Petitioner now comes to us for review on certiorari seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and that of the trial
court. She contends that the lower courts erred in holding that the sale
between her and Suzara was valid; that she had no legal personality to
question the legality of the sale in his favor, and, respondent Vizconde
was an innocent purchaser for value in good faith.
Petitioner insists that there being a factual finding by the trial court and
the Court of Appeals that she and respondent Suzara were common-
law husband and wife, the sale between them was void and inexistent,
citing Art. 1490 of the Civil Code. She argues that the consideration of
"love, affection and accommodation" for the sale was not a valid cause
for the conveyance of the property as there was no price paid in money
or its equivalent, and since her sale to Suzara was null and void the
issue of its illegality cannot be waived or ratified; resultantly, the sale by
Suzara to his co-respondent Vizconde must also be declared null and
void the latter being a purchaser in bad faith. Petitioner also contends
that although she filed her adverse claim on 22 January 1990 or after
the execution of the deed of sale between the private respondents on
22 December 1989, the sale was nevertheless nullified when it was
substituted by a second deed of sale dated 5 February 1990, registered
6 March 1990, to avoid payment of fines and penalties for late
registration.
We cannot sustain petitioner. Although under Art. 1490 the husband
and wife cannot sell property to one another as a rule which, for policy
consideration and the dictates of morality require that the prohibition
apply to common-law relationships,   petitioner can no longer seek
4
reconveyance of the property to her as it has already been acquired by
respondent Vizconde in good faith and for value from her own
transferee.
The real purpose of the Torrens system of registration is to quiet title to
land and to put a stop to any question of legality of the title except
claims which have been recorded in the certificate of title at the time of
registration or which may arise subsequent thereto.   Every registered
5
owner and every subsequent purchaser for value in good faith holds the
title to the property free from all encumbrances except those noted in
the certificate. Hence, a purchaser is not required to explore further
what the Torrens title on its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect
or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.  6
Where innocent third persons, relying on the correctness of the
certificate of title thus issued, acquire rights over the property the court
cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate.  The effect of such an outright cancellation would be to
7
impair public confidence in the certificate of title, for everyone dealing
with property registered under the Torrens system would have to inquire
in every instance whether the title has been regularly or irregularly
issued. This is contrary to the evident purpose of the law.  Every person
8
dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the
certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to
50
go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the We cannot grant petitioner's prayer to have respondent Vizconde's
property.  Even if a decree in a registration proceeding is infected with
9
certificate of title declared null and void. Neither can we order the
nullity, still an innocent purchaser for value relying on a Torrens title reconveyance of the property to petitioner. Vizconde being a purchaser
issued in pursuance thereof is protected. A purchaser in good faith is of registered land for value in good faith holds an indefeasible title to the
one who buys the property of another without notice that some other land. This is without prejudice however to any appropriate remedy
person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair petitioner may take against her erstwhile common-law husband,
price for the same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice respondent Suzara.
of the claim of another person.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Both lower courts found that at the time respondent Suzara executed Appeals affirming that of the trial court is AFFIRMED. Costs against
the deed of absolute sale on 22 December 1989 in favor of respondent petitioner.
Vizconde, which was acknowledged before a notary public, Suzara was
the registered owner appearing in the certificate of title. When the sale SO ORDERED.
was executed, nothing was annotated in the certificate to indicate any
adverse claim of a third person or the fact that the property was the
subject of a pending litigation. It was only on 22 January 1990, after the
sale to respondent Vizconde, that petitioner filed her adverse claim with
the Register of Deeds. Based on this factual backdrop, which we
consider binding upon this Court, there is no doubt that respondent
Vizconde was a purchaser for value in good faith and that when he
bought the property he had no knowledge that some other person had a
right to or an adverse interest in the property. As the Court of Appeals
observed, Vizconde paid a full and fair price for the property at the time
of the purchase and before he had any notice of petitioner's claim or
interest in the property. For purposes of resolving the present
controversy, the allegation that there was a second deed of sale
executed solely for the purpose of evading the penalties resulting from
late payment of taxes and registration is immaterial. The fact is,
petitioner herself admits that the actual sale of the property occurred on
22 December 1989. A contract of sale is consensual and is perfected
once agreement is reached between the parties on the subject matter
and the consideration therefor.
G.R. No. 142913. August 9, 2005

51
ESTATE OF SALVADOR SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO. 242)
AND ESTATE OF GREGORIO SERRA SERRA (SPEC. PROC. NO.
240), BOTH REPRESENTED BY THE JUDICIAL CO-
ADMINISTRATOR LUIS ISASI, MARGARITA SERRA SERRA,
FRANCISCA TERESA SERRA SERRA and FRANCISCO JOSE
SERRA SERRA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF PRIMITIVO HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY
PRESENTACION HERNAEZ BELBAR, HEIRS OF LUISA HERNAEZ,
REPRESENTED BY WILFREDO GAYARES, LOLITA GAYARES,
JULIETA FORTALEZA AND ROSAURO FORTALEZA, HEIRS OF
ROGACIANA HERNAEZ, REPRESENTED BY LOURDES
MONCERA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure assails the March 3, 2000 decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52817, and its April 17, 2000 resolution
denying reconsideration thereof.
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On December 27, 1967, a petition for reconstitution of alleged lost
original certificates of title (OCT) and owner’s duplicate copies in the
name of Eleuterio Hernaez covering Lot No. 1316 of Kabankalan
Cadastre and Lot Nos. 2685 and 717 of Ilog Cadastre, in the Province
of Negros Occidental, was filed by his successors-in-interest Primitivo,
Rogaciana and Luisa, all surnamed Hernaez (Hernaez) with then Court
of First Instance (CFI) of Bacolod City.
On April 6, 1968, the CFI granted the petition and ordered the
reconstitution of the subject OCTs and its duplicate copies. Accordingly,
1 
the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental issued reconstituted OCT
Nos. RO-10173, RO-10174, and RO-10175, for Lot Nos. 1316, 2685,
and 717, respectively. These reconstituted OCTs were cancelled on
May 29, 1969 upon presentation by Hernaez of a "declaration of
heirship" and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. T-
51546, T-51547, and T-51548 were issued in their names.
Upon learning of the existence of the above TCTs, Salvador Serra
Serra, for and in behalf of his co-heirs, registered their adverse claim
and moved for the cancellation of the reconstituted titles. They averred
that they are holders of valid and existing certificates of title over the
subject properties and have been in continuous and actual possession
thereof.
The trial court denied petitioners’ motion to cancel the reconstituted
titles and granted instead Hernaez’ prayer that they be placed in
possession of the subject properties, which petitioners challenged
before the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-
G.R. No. SP-00139. 2
On June 7, 1971, the appellate court issued a writ of preliminary
injunction which was ordered lifted in a resolution dated August 3, 1971.
3 
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied, hence they filed
before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
docketed as G.R. No. L-34080 and consolidated with G.R. No. L-
34693, seeking to annul the resolution lifting the writ of preliminary
4 
injunction.
On March 22, 1991, this Court rendered judgment the decretal portion
of which reads:
52
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions are GRANTED. The questioned order of
the respondent Court of Appeals lifting the writ of preliminary injunction
is SET ASIDE. The writ of possession issued in Cadastral Case No. 17,
GLRO Records No. 163 is declared NULL and VOID. The records of
this case and of CA-G.R. No. 00139 are remanded to the trial court for
hearing of the motion for cancellation of the reconstituted titles. Private
respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the possession of the
properties in question. The temporary restraining order issued by this
Court on February 15, 1972, enjoining private respondents from
interfering in any manner, with petitioners’ right of possession of the
properties in question, shall remain effective until the issue of ownership
and/or possession of the properties is finally settled by a competent
court.
SO ORDERED. 5
Pursuant thereto, the trial court heard petitioners’ motion for
cancellation of certificates of title and on November 25, 1998, rendered
judgment the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises and considerations,
the court hereby renders judgment in favor of the oppositors and hereby
orders the following:
1) The petition filed by movants Serra Serra dated November 4, 1968 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit;
2) Declaring the Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27644 covering Lot
No. 1316, Kabankalan Cadastre and Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22344 covering Lot No. 717-A, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-22351, Ilog Cadastre, all issued in the
name of movants Serra Serra NULL and VOID for being issued to
foreigners;
3) Declaring the oppositors Hernaez as owners of Lot No. 1316,
Kabankalan Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
51546; Lot No. 2685, Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. T-51547; and Lot No. 717, Ilog Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certiticate of Title No. T-51548; and
4) Ordering the movants Serra Serra to return possession of said lots to
the oppositors Hernaez.
SO ORDERED. 6
Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners assailed the lower
court’s decision before the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari.
On March 3, 2000, the appellate court rendered the herein assailed
judgment which dismissed the petition for lack of merit, pertinent portion
of which reads:
In the case at bench, We find no cogent reason to disturb the assailed
decision denying petitioners’ motion for cancellation of the reconstituted
titles, especially after the court a quo found that the evidence presented
is sufficient and proper to uphold the reconstituted certificates of title in
question. A perusal of the assailed order shows that the trial court
correctly applied the established legal principle that in cases of
annulment and/or reconveyance of title, a party seeking it should
establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and
convincing evidence that the land sought to be reconveyed is his.
Petitioners (Serra Serra), however, as noted by the court a quo in its
Order dated November 25, 1998, failed to present in court as evidence
the original certificates of title of the aforementioned lots, Lot No. 1316,
Lot No. 2685 and Lot No. 717. Petitioners were also found to be of
Spanish citizenship and, hence, as aliens, disqualified to acquire lands
in the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution. 7
53
Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied, hence
the instant petition based on the following assigned errors:
I The petition is denied. Other than citing general exceptions to the rule
THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS ... DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS AS
TO CALL FOR THE EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF SUPERVISION
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT, IN THAT:
THE RULE THAT THE PETITIONER SHOULD HAVE PREVIOUSLY
FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH THE LOWER
COURT BEFORE HE MAY AVAIL HIMSELF OF THE WRIT
OF CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS
SUBJECT TO WELL-SETTLED EXCEPTIONS ...
...
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ... HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 26, OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN SERRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
G.R. NO. L-34080, MARCH 22, 1991. 8 Philippines. As a rule, only a Filipino citizen can acquire private lands in
Petitioners assail the dismissal of their petition on the ground that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration with the lower court before
filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. While admitting
procedural lapse on their part, they argue that the rule is subject to well-
settled exceptions, such as, when the questions raised before the
Supreme Court are the same as those which have been squarely raised
and passed upon by the trial court, or when the petitioner has been
deprived of due process of law, or when the writ is urgent under the
circumstances. 9
requiring a motion for reconsideration as a pre-condition to instituting a
petition for certiorari, the petitioners did not offer valid reason why their
particular case fall under any of the specified exceptions.
The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a sine qua
non condition for the filing of a petition for certiorari. The purpose is to
grant an opportunity to public respondent to correct any actual or
perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and
factual circumstances of the case. Petitioners’ failure to file a motion for
10 
reconsideration deprived the trial court of the opportunity to rectify an
error unwittingly committed or to vindicate itself of an act unfairly
imputed. Besides, a motion for reconsideration under the present
circumstances is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy to the adverse
judgment of the trial court.
Granting arguendo that certiorari is the proper remedy, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless did not err in dismissing the petition.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that petitioners are
Spanish citizens and as such, disqualified from acquiring lands in the
the Philippines and the only instances when a foreigner can own private
lands are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-
born Filipino citizen who lost his Philippine citizenship. The records are
bereft of any showing that petitioners derived their title by any mode
which would qualify them to acquire private lands in the country.
Petitioners’ bare allegation that they acquired the subject lots from
Salvador Serra Serra has no probative value lacking sufficient proof that
the latter is not disqualified to own or hold private property and was able
to legally transmit to petitioners title thereto.
54
Petitioners’ alleged possession of TCTs and actual possession of the WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 3, 2000 decision and
subject lands, although strong proof of ownership, are not necessarily the April 17, 2000 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
conclusive where the assertion of proprietary rights is founded on 52817 are AFFIRMED.
dubious claim of ownership. They claimed that their title over the subject
properties emanated from Salvador Serra Serra; yet they failed to SO ORDERED.
present in evidence the OCT in the name of the latter. Since petitioners
impugn the proprietary claim of Hernaez over the properties, the burden Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.,
rests on them to establish their superior right over the latter. To recall, concur.
the trial court found that the evidence they presented have not
established superior proprietary rights over the respondents’ on the
subject lots. It held that the non-presentation of the OCTs cast doubt on
the veracity of their claim. He who asserts must prove.

It is also undisputed that petitioners are all Spanish citizens. Under

Philippine law, foreigners can acquire private lands only by hereditary
succession or when they were formerly natural-born Filipinos who lost
their Philippine citizenship. In this case, petitioners did not present proof
that they acquired the properties by inheritance. Neither did they claim
to be former natural-born Filipinos. On the contrary, they declare in this
petition that they are all Spanish citizens residing in Mallorca, Spain.

It is axiomatic that factual findings of trial courts, when adopted and

confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive and will
not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. It is not its
function to examine and determine the weight of the evidence
supporting the assailed decision. Moreover, well entrenched is the
prevailing jurisprudence that only errors of law and not of facts are
reviewable by this Court in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court, which applies with greater force to the
petition under consideration because the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are in full agreement with what the trial court found. 11

55