ALVEZ V.

COURT OF APPEALS CASE DIGEST - CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

GALVEZ V. CA                                                                                 G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

FACTS:

On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan,
and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate informations with homicide and two counts of
frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi
Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr.

On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte
Motion to Withdraw Informations of the original informations. This motion was granted by Judge
Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the
court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new informations against herein petitioners
for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal
possession of firearms.

Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new informations for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners
before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on
January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.

In the meantime, prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, petitioners filed
a motion for reconsideration to Judge Villajuan that the reinstatement of the original informations be
granted. Judge Villajuan granted the MR.

On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari, petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the ex parte motion to withdraw the original informations is null and void on the ground that
there was no notice and hearing as required by Sections 4, 5 and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

HELD:

No, considering that in the original cases before Branch 14 of the trial court petitioners had not yet been
placed in jeopardy, and the ex parte motion to withdraw was filed and granted before they could be
arraigned, there would be no imperative need for notice and hearing thereof.

In actuality, the real grievance of herein accused is not the dismissal of the original three
informations but the filing of four new informations, three of which charge graver offenses and the
fourth, an additional offense. Had these new informations not been filed, there would obviously have
been no cause for the instant petition. Accordingly, their complaint about the supposed procedural
lapses involved in the motion to dismiss filed and granted in Criminal Cases Nos. 3642-M-93 to 3644-M-
93 does not impress us as a candid presentation of their real position.

Petitioner’s contention that the dismissal of the original informations and the consequent filing of the
new ones substantially affected their right to bail is too strained and tenuous an argument. They would
want to ignore the fact that had the original informations been amended so as to charge the capital
offense of murder, they still stood to likewise be deprived of their right to bail once it was shown that
the evidence of guilt is strong. Petitioners could not be better off with amended informations than with
the subsequent ones. It really made no difference considering that where a capital offense is charged
and the evidence of guilt is strong, bail becomes a matter of discretion under either an amended or a
new information.
Contrary to petitioners’ submission, the absence of notice and hearing does not divest a trial court of
authority to pass on the merits of the motion. It has been held that—“The order of the court granting
the motion to dismiss despite the absence of a notice of hearing, or proof of service thereof, is merely
an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The
court still retains its authority to pass on the merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in
such cases is either to have the order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which
dismissed the complaint or to appeal from the dismissal and not certiorari.” 

NARCISA AVILA ET AL.  vs. Sps. BARABAT (March 17, 2006)

FACTS: The subject of this controversy is a parcel of land owned and registered in the name of
Anunciacion Bahena vda. de Nemeo. Upon her death, ownership of the lot was transferred by operation
of law to her five children, petitioners  Avila, Macapaz, Adlawan, Nemeo and Bahena. These heirs built
their respective houses on the lot.

On July 1979, Avila decided to sell her house and share in the lot to her siblings but no one showed
interest in it. She then offered it to Respondents, Sps. Barabat who agreed to buy it. Their agreement
was evidenced by a private document dated July 17, 1979.

Sometime in early 1982, respondents were confronted by petitioner Adlawan who informed them that
they had until March 1982 only to stay in Avilas place because he was buying the property.

Another letter was received by respondents from Atty. Joselito Alo informing them that Avila had sold
her house and share to his clients, the spouses  Adlawan.

Respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the deed of sale to the spouses Adlawan.
Respondents anchored their claim over the property to the July 17, 1979 private document which they
presented as Exhibit A.

Avila denied having offered to sell her property to respondents.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners have right to redemption over the subject lot.

RULING: Petitioners rely on Article 1623 in relation to Article 1620 of the Civil Code to justify their right
of redemption. This is incorrect.

These provisions state:

“Art. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other
co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in
proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

x x x x x x x x x

Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of
sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor
that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.”

Petitioners right to redeem would have existed only had there been co-ownership among petitioners-
siblings. But there was none. 

For this right to be exercised, co-ownership must exist at the time the conveyance is made by a co-
owner and the redemption is demanded by the other co-owner or co-owner(s).
However, by their own admission, petitioners were no longer co-owners when the property was sold to
respondents in 1979. The co-ownership had already been extinguished by partition.

The regime of co-ownership exists when the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to
different persons. By the nature of co-ownership, a co-owner cannot point to any specific portion of the
property owned in common as his own because his share in it remains intangible and ideal.

Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs is deemed to be a partition. Here, the
particular portions pertaining to petitioners had been ascertained and they in fact already took
possession of their respective parts. The following statement of petitioners in their amended answer as
one of their special and affirmative defenses was revealing:

“That all defendants [i.e., petitioners] in this case who are co-owners of lot 348 have their own
respective buildings constructed on the said lot in which case it can be safely assumed that their
respective shares in the lot have been physically segregated although there is no formal partition of the
land among themselves.”

By their own admission, petitioners already segregated and took possession of their respective shares in
the lot. Their respective shares were therefore physically determined, clearly identifiable and no longer
ideal. Thus, the co-ownership had been legally dissolved. With that, petitioners right to redeem any part
of the property from any of their former co-owners was already extinguished.RESTITUTO and Jesus
CENIZA and

JESUS CENIZA vs. CA

G.R. No. L-46345 January 30, 1990

______________________________

FACTS

Review of CA order in "Restituto

Ceniza, et al. vs. Magno Dabon, et al.,"

dismissing the petitioners' complaint for

reconveyance of their shares in coownership property and reversing the

decision of the trial court in their favor.

Petitioners filed against private

respondents, an action in CFI for recovery

of their title, which originally formed part of

"Hacienda de Mandaue" of the Seminario

de San Carlos de Cebu, covered by

reconstituted OCT in the name of "Vicente

Dabon married to Marcela [or Marcelina]

Ceniza."

Petitioners are descendants of

Manuel Ceniza while the private

respondents are the descendants of his

sister, Sofia Ceniza. Sofia Ceniza was

childless but had an adopted daughter

Flaviana Ceniza, who begot a daughter

named Marced Ceniza and who in turn

had a daughter named Marcelina (or

Marcela) Ceniza who married Vicente

Dabon.

Private respondents are the children

of this marriage and they are the greatgreat-grandchildren of Sofia Ceniza.

On the other hand, Manuel Ceniza had an

only son, Pablo, who had two sons,

Santiago and Jose Ceniza. Petitioners

Restituto and Jesus Ceniza and a certain

Nemesia Ceniza-Albina are their children

and the great-grandchildren of Manuel

Ceniza.

When Hacienda de Mandaue was

subdivided for resale to the occupants in

1929, Jose Ceniza and Vicente Dabon

jointly purchased the lot and agreed, for

convenience, to have the land registered in

the name of Dabon. Since then, Jose

Ceniza, Vicente Dabon, and their heirs

have possessed their respective portions

of the land, declared the same for taxation,

paid real estate taxes on their respective

shares, and made their respective

installment payments to the Seminario.

After Dabon died, his 7 children

succeeded to his possession of a portion

of the land. On the request of Jacinta

Dabon and Restituto Ceniza, the lot was

divided into 3 parts: that for Marcela

Ceniza; that for Restituto Ceniza; and

that for Nemesia Ceniza-Albina, who later

bequeathed her share to her brother,

Jesus Ceniza.

The present controversy arose

because the private respondents refused

to convey the last two lots to the

petitioners. They claimed that their

predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Dabon,

was the sole and exclusive owner of the

lot, by purchase from the Seminario. In

their answer to the petitioners' complaint

for reconveyance, they alleged that the

petitioners' right of action had already

prescribed.

Petitioners replied that Vicente

Dabon held the land in trust for them, as

co-owners, hence, their action for

reconveyance was imprescriptible.

CFI rendered judgment for the

petitioners finding that there existed a coownership among the parties. It ordered

the private respondents to execute deeds

of conveyance of the two lots in favor of

Restituto and Jesus Ceniza.

On appeal, CA reversed CFI saying

that petitioners' right of action had

prescribed after the lapse of 20 years from

the date of registration of the land in

Vicente Dabon's name.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE

Whether or not the registration of

the title of the land in the name of one of

the co-owners, constituted a repudiation of

the co-ownership for purposes of

acquisitive prescription.

HELD
Yes.

CFI correctly ruled that since a trust

relation and co-ownership were proven to

exist between the predecessors- in-interest

of petitioners and private respondents,

prescription did not run in favor of Dabon's

heirs except from the time that they

repudiated the co-ownership and made the

repudiation known to the other co-owners,

Restituto and Jesus Ceniza.

Article 494: No prescription shall run

in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against

his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he

expressly or impliedly recognizes the coownership.

The registration in the name of Vicente

Dabon created a trust in favor of his coowner Jose Ceniza, and the latter's heirs.

Article 1452: If two or more persons agree

to purchase property and common consent

the legal title is taken in the name of one of

them for the benefit of all, a trust is created

by force of law in favor of the others in

proportion to the interest of each.

The trustee's possession is not

adverse and therefore cannot ripen into a

title by prescription. Adverse possession

requires the concurrence of the following

circumstances:

a) that the trustee has performed

unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting

to the ouster of the cestui que trust;

b) that such positive acts of repudiation

have been made known to the cestui que

trust; and

c) that the evidence thereon should be

clear and conclusive.

The above elements are not present

here. In Custodio v. Casiano:

Where title to land was issued in the

name of a co-heir merely with the

understanding that he would act as a

trustee of his sisters, and there is no

evidence that this trust relation had ever

been repudiated by said trustee, it is held

that a reaction of co-ownership existed

between such trustee and his sisters and

the right of the successors-in-interest of

said sisters to bring the present action for

recovery of their shares therein against the

successors-in-interest of said trustee

cannot be barred by prescription.

FERNANDEZ VS. TARUN

OCTOBER 30, 2011  ~ VBDIAZ

FERNANDEZ VS. TARUN

G.R. No. 143868
November 14, 2002
FACTS: a fishpond was originally covered by a OCT, co-owned by the Fernandez
siblings. 2 of the 5 siblings, Antonio and Demetria, sold their respective shares to the
spouses Tarun, both registered and annotated on the OTC.
Later, the co-owners of the subject fishpond and another fishpond executed a Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of 2 parcels of registered land with exchange of shares.
Among the parties to the deed are the Fernandez siblings. It was stipulated in the deed
that the parties recognize and respect the sale in favor of Spouses Tarun stated above.

By virtue of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Angel Fernandez exchanged his

share on the 2nd fishpond to the shares of his co-owners in the remaining portion of the
first fishpond, making Angel and the Spouses Tarun co-owners of the first fishpond.
By virtue of said deed, a TCT was issued in the name of Angel and spouses Tarun.
However, it was Angel and later on his heirs who remained in possession of the entire
fishpond.
When Angel was still alive, Spouses Tarun sought the partition of the property and
their share of its income. Angel refused to heed their demand. After the death of
Angel, Spouses Tarun wrote his heirs (petitioners herein) of their desire for partition
but this was rejected by the latter. Hence the suit for partition and damages

RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA reversed the decision. Hence this petition.
HELD: Petitioners aver that the sale to respondents is void, because it did not comply
with the requirements of the Civil Code.  According to them, they were not notified of
the sale, but learned about it only when they received the summons for the partition
case.  They claim their right to redeem the property under the following provisions of
the Civil Code:
“Article 1620.  A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person.  If the
price of the alienation is grossly excessive, the redemptioner shall pay only a
reasonable one.
In this case, it is quite clear that respondents are petitioners’ co-owners.  The sale of
the contested property to Spouses Tarun had long been consummated before
petitioners succeeded their predecessor, Angel Fernandez.  By the time petitioners
entered into the co-ownership, respondents were no longer “third persons,” but had
already become co-owners of the whole property.  A third person, within the meaning
of Article 1620, is anyone who is not a co-owner.

HERMOGENA G. ENGRESO WITH SPOUSE JOSE ENGRESO v. NESTORIA DE LA

CRUZ, GR No. 148727, 2003-04-09
Facts:
private respondent Nestoria de la Cruz instituted an action for declaration of ownership,
possession and damages against petitioner spouses Hermogena and Jose Engreso... n her
complaint, Nestoria alleged that in 1979 she purchased from... her sister Hermogena one-
half (½) of an unregistered property located in Zamboanguita, Negros Oriental, designated
as Lot No. 10561, containing an area of 112.5 square meters, more or less, as specified
and delineated in the deed of sale.
Nestoria further averred that their deceased father Romeo Gajelloma had constructed a
residential/commercial building on their adjoining properties such that a part of the structure
stood on her property and the remaining half on Hermogena's land. During his lifetime,
Romeo... lived in the building and leased a portion thereof to third parties. After Romeo's
death petitioner spouses deprived her of her rights over the purchased property as well as
the building thereon. Private respondent Nestoria also complained that her sister
Hermogena mortgaged Lot
No. 10561 with all its improvements in favor of the Rural Bank of Zamboanguita, Negros
Oriental, without her knowledge and consent. In support of her complaint Nestoria
presented in evidence a notarized Deed of Sale dated 20 January 1979 attesting to the fact
that in... consideration of P3,000.00 Hermogena sold to her an identified portion of the
disputed property. Private respondent prayed that she be declared owner of one-half (½)
portion of Lot No. 10561 as well as the building thereon, and that petitioner spouses be
ordered to render an... accounting of the rentals derived from the lease of the property.
Issues:
a petition for certiorari insisting that it was error for the trial court not to have dismissed the
complaint and to have declared valid the "falsified deed of sale."
Ruling:
the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the sole MODIFICATION
that petitioner Hermogena Engreso and private respondent Nestoria de la Cruz are
declared co-owners of the residential/commercial building standing on Lots Nos.
10561 and 10561-A and they may exercise jointly the right of dominion over the aforesaid
structure until they effect its partition and until their respective portions are properly
determined. This is without prejudice to the rights of the other heirs of Romeo Gajelloma, if
any,... to demand their share in the building. No costs

ASE DIGEST: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner,

vs. LA TONDENA DISTILLERS, INC. (LTDI [now GINEBRA SAN
MIGUEL], Respondent. (G.R. No. 175188; July 15, 2015)

PRINCIPLE: The transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant

to a merger is not subject to Documentary Stamp Tax (DST).

FACTS:
La Tondeña (LT) entered into a merger with SBC, SMCJI and MBWC. So, the
assets and liabilities of the absorbed corporations were transferred to LT as
surviving corporation.

LT requested from the BIR a confirmation of the tax-free nature of the merger
process. BIR confirmed that no gain or loss shall be recognized by the absorbed
corporations as transferors of all assets and liabilities. Hence, tax-free. However,
BIR insisted that the transfer of assets, such as real properties, shall be subject to
DST

BIR posits that DST is levied on the exercise of the privilege to convey real
property regardless of the manner of conveyance. LT, on the other hand,
contends that DST is imposed only on conveyances, deeds, instruments, or
writing, where realty sold shall be conveyed to a purchaser or buyer.
ISSUE:
Is transfer of real property to a surviving corporation pursuant to merger subject
to DST?

HELD:
No, it is not subject to DST. The DST law under the Tax Code does not include the
transfer of real property from one corporation to another pursuant to a merger.

In a merger, the real properties are not deemed "sold" to the surviving
corporation and the latter could not be considered as "purchaser" of realty since
the real properties subject of the merger were merely absorbed by the surviving
corporation by operation of law and these properties are deemed automatically
transferred to and vested in the surviving corporation without further act or deed.
Therefore, the transfer of real properties to the surviving corporation in
pursuance of a merger is not subject to documentary stamp tax.