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Constituents of game:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LJS7Ig
vk6ZM
COOPERATIVE
VS.
NON-COOPERATIVE GAME
• Cooperative game
Game in which participants can negotiate binding contracts that
allow them to plan joint strategies
e.g.: think of a market of any normal commodity
Matching Pennies
Prisoners’ Dilemma
BATTLE OF SEXES
BATTLE OF SEXES
Normal Form
Extensive Form
NORMAL FORM REPRESENTATION
OF
‘BATTLE OF SEXES’ GAME
Wife
Husband
Cricket Movie
Cricket 4,2 0,0
Movie 0,0 2,4
EXTENSIVE FORM REPRESENTATION
OF
‘BATTLE OF SEXES’ GAME
Husband
Movie Cricket
Wife
M C M C
• Game tree
• Sub- game
• Branches
• Nodes
Initial
Terminal
Singleton
Non-singleton
Information set
COMPLETE VS. PERFECT
INFORMATION
Complete information:
Everybody knows everybody’s possible moves, payoffs
etc.
Player 1 knows everything about himself and Player 2
Player 2 knows everything about himself and Player 1
and so on
Perfect Information
All players are well-aware of the history of the game.
MATCHING PENNIES
Player 2
Heads Tails
Player 1
Prisoner B
Confess Don’t Confess
Prisoner A
Prisoner B
Confess Don’t Confess
Prisoner A
Top 1, 2 0, 1
Bottom 2, 1 1, 0
Check for previous games
CONCEPT: NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Prisoner B
Player B
Left Middle Right
Player A
Up 1, 0 1, 2 0,1
Down 0, 3 0, 1 2,0
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
VS.
DOMINANT STRATEGY
Dominant Strategy :
I am doing the best I can no matter what you do
You are doing the best you can no matter what I
do
Nash Equilibrium:
I am doing the best I can given what you are doing
You are doing the best you can given what I am
doing.
LEARNING
Question
Is all Nash Equilibrium a dominant strategy
equilibrium as well?
Clue: Battle of Sexes
ANOTHER APPROACH TO FIND
NASH EQUILIBRIUM
Check dominant strategy
Player B
Left Centre Right
Player A
Heads(p) -1 ,1 1,-1
Tails(1-p) 1,-1 -1,1
Player 1
If plays H then her expected payoff is
[−1 × 𝑞 + 1(1 − 𝑞)] = 1 − 2𝑞
If plays T then her expected payoff
[1 × 𝑞 − 1(1 − 𝑞)] = 2𝑞 − 1
So player 1 will play H iff
1 − 2𝑞 > 2𝑞 − 1
1
𝑞 <
2
Player 1 will play T iff 𝑞 > 1/2
She is indifferent between playing H & T if 𝑞 = 1/2
if q<1/2 then p=1
if q> 1/2 then p=0
q
if q=1/2 the pє (0,1)
1
0 1/2 1 p
Player 2
If plays H then her expected payoff is
1 × 𝑝 − 1 1 − 𝑝 = 2𝑝 − 1
If plays T then her expected payoff
−1 × 𝑝 − 1 1 − 𝑝 = 1 − 2𝑝
So player 2 will play H iff
2𝑝 − 1 > 1 − 2𝑝
1
p>
2
Player 1 will play T iff p< 1/2
She is indifferent between playing H & T if p= 1/2
if p>1/2 then q=1
if p< 1/2 then q=0
q if p=1/2 the qє (0,1)
0 1/2 1 p
Combining both
q Equilibrium p=1/2 & q 1/2
0 1/2 1 p
PURE VS. MIXED
STRATEGIES
Wife
M C M C
Play C if H plays C
Play C if H plays M CC
Play C if H plays C
CM
Play M if H plays M
Play M if H plays C
MC
Plays C if H plays M
Play M if H plays C
MM
Play M if H plays M
NORMAL FORM
REPRESENTATION FOR
DYNAMIC GAME
Wife
CC CM MC MM
Husband
• Three NE’s
• Is refinement possible?
SPNE
• Definition
• A Nash equilibrium is a sub-game perfect Nash
equilibrium if the player’s strategies constitute a Nash
Equilibrium in every sub game.
• It helps in eliminating the non-credible Nash equilibria
DYNAMIC GAME
OF
‘BATTLE OF SEXES’ GAME
Husband
Movie Cricket
Wife
M C M C
• SPNE {C,CM}
Husband
Movie Cricket
Time 1
Wife
M C M C
Time 2
(2,4) (0,0) (0,0) (4,2)
CHECK THE SEQUENTIAL
BATTLE OF SEXES