Javier vs.

Veridiano
Felicidad Javier vs. Regino Veridiano and Reino Rosete
G.R. No. L-48050. October 10, 1994
Bellosillo, J.
Doctrine: A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than
possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes
a bar to an action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.
Facts:
On January 1963, Javier filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot No. 1641, Ts 308 of
Olongapo Townsite Subdivision in Olongapo City. On December 1970, Javier filed Civil
Case no. 926 (CC 926) for forcible entry against Ben Babol for entering a portion of the
southwestern part of Lot 1641, Ts 308. The case was dismissed since the court considered
the portion outside Lot 1461. The case became final and executory on April 1973.
Subsequently, Javier was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent and an Original Certificate of
Title was issued in her favor. Meanwhile, Babol who was the defendant in CC 926 had sold
the portion he was occupying to Rosete. 4 years after the finality of CC 926, Javier instituted
a Civil Case No. 2203-0 (CC 2203-0) for quieting of title and recovery of possession. Rosete
moved to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. The CFI of Zambales dismissed the case.

Issue: Whether res judicata is applicable in the case.

Held:
No. The following are the requisites of res judicata:
a) there is final judgment or order;
b) the court have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
c) former judgment is a judgment on merits; and
d) identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
The first three are present. There is identity of parties in the case. What is required is not
absolute but substantial identity of parties. In the case, Rosete is a successor in interest of
Babol by title. Nevertheless, there is no identity of cause of action. CC 926 is a complaint of
forcible entry or accion interdictal where the issue is physical or material possession of real
property. In this case, Javier merely claimed a better right or prior possession over the land
without asserting title.
CC 2203-0 is an action to recover a parcel of land or accion reivindicatori. In this case,
Javier expressly alleged ownership (by virtue of the Original Certificate of Title issued) and
specifically prayed that she be declared the rightful owner and be given possession of the
disputed portion.
A judgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no other issue than possession
and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitutes a bar to an
action for determination of who has the right or title of ownership.

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 SPOUSES WARLITO BUSTOS and HERMINIA REYES-BUSTOS, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES VENANCIO VIRAY and CECILIA NUNGA-
VIRAY, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 120784-85. January 24, 2001.
FACTS:
On September 30, 1964, the heirs executed an extra judicial partition of the estate of
Paulino Fajardo. On the same date, Manuela sold her share to Moses G. Mendoza,
husband of Beatriz by deed of absolute sale. At the time of the sale, there was no cadastral
survey in Masantol, Pampanga. Later, the Cadastre was conducted, and the property
involved in the partition case were specified as Lots 280, 283 284, 1000-A and 1000-B. The
share of Manuela, which was sold to Moses, includes Lot 284 of the Masantol Cadastre and
Lot 284 was subdivided into Lots 284-A and 284-B. Trinidad was in physical possession of
the land. She refused to surrender the land to her brother-in-law, Moses. On September 3,
1971, Moses filed with the then Court of First Instance, of Pampanga a complaint for
partition claiming the one fourth (1/4) share of Manuela which was sold to him. During the
pendency of the case, Trinidad Fajardo died. On December 15, 1984, the heirs executed an
extra judicial partition of the estate of Trinidad. On February 16, 1987, Lucio Fajardo
Ignacio, son of Trinidad, sold Lot 284-B to spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-
Viray. On February 8, 1989, the Regional Trial Court, Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55,
rendered a decision in favor of Moses. On September 13, 1991, Moses sold the subject
land to spouses Warlito Bustos and Herminia Reyes-Bustos. In the meantime, on November
6, 1989, spouses Venancio Viray and Cecilia Nunga-Viray, buyers of Lucio Ignacio's share
of the property, filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Macabebe-Masantol, Pampanga,
an action for unlawful detainer against spouses Bustos, the buyers of Moses G. Mendoza,
who were in actual possession as lessees of the husband of Trinidad, Francisco Ignacio, of
the subject land. The municipal court decided the case in favor of the spouses Viray.
Subsequently the trial court issued writs of execution and demolition, but were stayed when
spouses Bustos filed with the Regional Trial Court, Macabebe, Pampanga, Branch 55, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On December 18, 1992, the regional trial
court rendered a decision dismissing the case. In time, the spouses Bustos appealed the
decision to the Court of Appeals. On February 27, 1989, Lucio Fajardo Ignacio also
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. On August 26, 1994, the appeal docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 37607 is dismissed; Moses Mendoza is declared as owner of
the ¼ undivided share previously owned by Manuela Fajardo; and the decision of the
Regional Trial Court dated February 8, 1989 in Civil Case No. 83-0005-M was affirmed but
modified. On September 9,1994, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners could be ejected from what is now their own land

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HELD:
The petition is meritorious. Admittedly, the decision in the ejectment case is final and
executory. However, the ministerial duty of the court to order execution of a final and
executory judgment admits of exceptions. In Lipana vs. Development Bank of Rizal, the
Supreme Court reiterated the rule that "once a decision becomes final and executory, it is
the ministerial duty of the court to order its execution, admits of certain exceptions as in
cases of special and exceptional nature where it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; whenever it is necessary to accomplish
the aims of justice; or when certain facts and circumstances transpired after the judgment
became final which could render the execution of the judgment unjust."
In the present case, the stay of execution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now
legal owners of the land in question and are occupants thereof. To execute the judgment by
ejecting petitioner from the land that they owned would certainly result in grave injustice.
Besides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adjudicated ownership
to the spouses Bustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale.

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 HEIRS OF ROMAN SORIANO, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, SPOUSES BRAULIO ABALOS and AQUILINA ABALOS, respondents.
G.R. No. 128177. August 15, 2001.
FACTS:
The subject property was leased by the Heirs of Adrian Soriano to the De Vera spouses
with Roman Soriano, one of the heirs, as caretaker. The heirs later subdivided the property
into two lots, Lot No. 60052 and Lot No. 8459. In 1971, the heirs sold Lot No. 60052 and
their three fourth shares in Lot No. 8459 to the spouses Abalos. Having been ousted as
caretaker, Roman Soriano filed CAR Case No. 1724-P-68 for reinstatement and
reliquidation against the De Vera spouses. The agrarian court ordered the ejectment of
Roman Soriano, but the decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals. Prior to the
execution of the decision, the parties entered into a post-decisional agreement which
allowed Roman Soriano to sub-lease the property until the termination of the lease. In 1976,
the spouses Abalos filed LRC Case No. N-3405, an application for registration of title over
the lots sold to them. The application was granted in a decision dated June 27, 1983, which
became final. But a day after the issuance of the decision, Roman Soriano, together with
two other heirs, filed against the Spouses Abalos Civil Case No. 15958, an action for
annulment of document and/or redemption, ownership and damages. A motion to dismiss
was filed by the spouses Abalos on the ground, among others, of res judicata, but it was
denied, and the spouses Abalos were required to file their answer. On appeal, the denial
was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court and ordered the dismissal of the
annulment case. In 1993, the Heirs of Roman Soriano filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) a complaint against the spouses Abalos for
"Security of Tenure with prayer for Status Quo Order and Preliminary Injunction." Due to the
dismissal of the annulment case, the spouses Abalos moved in the registration case for
issuance of an alias writ of execution and/or writ of possession. The land registration court,
in a resolution, held the motion in abeyance until after the complaint of the heirs for security
of tenure with prayer for status quo has been received by the DARAB. The Court of
Appeals, to which the appeal was referred by the Supreme Court, set aside the resolution of
the land registration court and ordered the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
spouses Abalos. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE: May a winning party in a land registration case effectively eject the possessor
thereof?

HELD:
No. Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Possession is the holding of a
thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. A judgment of ownership does not necessarily include
possession as a necessary incident. Such declaration pertains only to OWNERSHIP and

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does not automatically include possession. This is especially true in the case at bar wherein
petitioner is occupying the land allegedly in the concept of an agricultural tenant. The court
says “allegedly” due to the fact that there is still a pending case in the DARAB (Department
of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board) on the issue. The issue of ownership of the
subject land has been laid to rest by final judgment; however the right of possession is yet
to be resolved. The Tenancy Act, which protects the rights of agricultural tenants, may limit
the exercise of rights by the lawful owners. The exercise of the rights of ownership yields to
the exercise of the rights of an agricultural tenant. Since the rights of Soriano to possess the
land are still pending litigation in the DARAB he is protected from dispossession of the land
until final judgment of said court unless Soriano’s occupancy is found by the court to be
unlawful.
The Supreme Court ruled that a judgment in a land registration case cannot be effectively
used to oust the possessor of the land, whose security of tenure rights are still pending
determination before the DARAB. Stated differently, the prevailing party in a land
registration case cannot be placed in possession of the area while it is being occupied by
one claiming to be an agricultural tenant, pending a declaration that the latter's occupancy
was unlawful. The appealed decision was set aside.

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 JOSE MA. T. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS. LUISITO & MA.
LUISA MAGPAYO AND PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
G.R. No. 133140. August 10, 1999.

Doctrine: Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists when a
thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner not prohibited
by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain rights to the
owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale.
Literally, to possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right.
Possession may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself
or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his
belief be right or wrong.

Facts:
Atty. Pedro V. Garcia, in whose name TCT No. S-31269 covering a parcel of land identified
as Lot 17 situated at Bel Air II Village, Makati, was registered, sold with the consent of his
wife Remedios T. Garcia, the same to their daughter Ma. Luisa Magpayo and her husband
Luisito Magpayo (the Magpayos). On March 5, 1981, the Magpayos mortgaged the land to
the Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom) to secure a loan. On March 9, 1981, Atty.
Garcia’s Title was cancelled and in its stead Transfer Certificate of Title No. S-108412/545
was issued in the name of the Magpayos. The Deed of Real Estate Mortgage was
registered at the Makati Register of Deeds and annotated on the Magpayos title. The
redemption period of the foreclosed mortgage expired without the Magpayos redeeming the
same, hence, title over the land was consolidated in favor of PBCom which cancelled the
Magpayo’s title and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 138233 was issued in its name. The
Magpayos failed to pay their loan upon its maturity, hence, the mortgage was extrajudicially
foreclosed and at the public auction sale, PBCom which was the highest bidder bought the
land. On October 4, 1985, the Magpayos filed at the RTC of Makati a complaint seeking the
nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage, public auction sale, and PBCom’s
title docketed as Civil Case No. 11891. This complaint was dismissed for failure to
prosecute. On October 15, 1985, PBCom filed at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a
petition for the issuance of a writ of possession over the land which was granted. Upon
service of the writ of possession, Mrs. Magpayo’s brother, Jose Ma. T. Garcia (Garcia), who
was in possession of the land, refused to honor it and filed a motion for Intervention in the
above-said PBCom petition, which motion was denied.

Garcia thereupon filed against PBCom, the Magpayos, and the RTC Sheriff the instant suit
for recovery of realty and damages wherein he alleged, inter alia, that he inherited the land

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as one of the heirs of his mother Remedios T. Garcia, and that PBCom acquired no right
thereover. In its summary judgment, the lower court held that the mortgage executed by the
Magpayo spouses in favor of PBCom was void. The Magpayo spouses could not have
acquired the said property merely by the execution of the Deed of Sale because the
property was in the possession of the plaintiff. The vendor, Pedro V. Garcia, was not in
possession and hence could not deliver the property merely by the execution of the
document.
On appeal, CA held that Garcia’s assertion that ownership over the disputed property was
not transmitted to his sister and her husband-Magpayo spouses at the time of the execution
of the Deed of Sale as he was still in actual and adverse possession thereof does not lie.
Since the execution of the deed of sale by Atty. Pedro V. Garcia in favor of the Magpayos
took place earlier or on August 1, 1980, then contrary to his claim, Garcia was not in
possession of the property at the time of the execution of said public instrument.
Furthermore, it appearing that the vendor Atty. Garcia had control of the property which was
registered in his name and that the deed of sale was likewise registered, then the sale was
consummated and the Magpayos were free to exercise the attributes of ownership including
the right to mortgage the land.
When the land is registered in the vendor’s name, and the public instrument of sale is also
registered, the sale may be considered consummated and the buyer may exercise the
actions of an owner. That the Magpayos’ title, TCT No. S-108412, was issued four (4) days
following the execution of the deed of real estate mortgage is of no moment, for registration
under the Torrens system does not vest ownership but is intended merely to confirm and
register the title which one may already have on the land.

Issue: Whether Garcia’s possession is in a concept of an owner.

Held:
No. Garcia’s possession which started only in 1986 could not ripen into ownership. He has
no valid title thereto. His possession in fact was that of an intruder, one done in bad faith (to
defeat PBCom’s Writ of Possession). His possession is certainly not in the concept of an
owner. This is so because as early as 1981, title thereto was registered in the name of the
Magpayo Spouses which title was subsequently cancelled when the property was
purchased by PBCom in a public auction sale resulting in the issuance of title in favor of the
latter in 1985.
The Court stressed that possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership
exists when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a manner
not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership confers certain
rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the thing by way of sale. Atty.
Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their right to dispose of what they owned
when they sold the subject property to the Magpayo spouses. On the other hand,

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possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. Literally, to
possess means to actually and physically occupy a thing with or without right. Possession
may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and possession of a
holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner himself or one who
claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in
another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or
wrong.
The records show that petitioner occupied the property not in the concept of an owner for
his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. Consequently, it is of no moment that
petitioner was in possession of the property at the time of the sale to the Magpayo spouses.
It was not a hindrance to a valid transfer of ownership. On the other hand, petitioner’s
subsequent claim of ownership as successor to his mother’s share in the conjugal asset is
belied by the fact that the property was not included in the inventory of the estate submitted
by his father to the intestate court. This buttresses the ruling that indeed the property was
no longer considered owned by petitioner’s parents.
The Court upheld the Court of Appeals in holding that the mortgage to PBCom by the
Magpayo spouses is valid notwithstanding that the transfer certificate of title over the
property was issued to them after the mortgage contract was entered into. Registration does
not confer ownership, it is merely evidence of such ownership over a particular property.
The deed of sale operates as a formal or symbolic delivery of the property sold and
authorizes the buyer to use the document as proof of ownership. All said, the Magpayo
spouses were already the owners when they mortgaged the property to PBCom.

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 Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 129609 & 135537, November 29, 2001, 422 PHIL 388-404

CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; OWNERSHIP; RIGHT OF OWNER. — The owner has the right to
enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. Every
owner has the freedom of disposition over his property. It is an attribute of ownership, and
this rule has no exception. The REPUBLIC being the owner of the disputed property enjoys
the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with RODIL in the exercise of its jus
disponendi. Hence, as lessor, the REPUBLIC has the right to eject usurpers of the leased
property where the factual elements required for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are
present.

FACTS:
The O'racca Bldg. is owned by the Republic of the Philippines. It was leased by Rodil and
subleased by respondents. Later, Rodil offered to purchase the property while respondents
offered to lease it from the owner. Pending action to the offer, on September 23, 1987, Rodil
and the Republic agreed to a renewal of the lease contract, but the same was disapproved.
At any rate, on May 18, 1992, Rodil and the Republic executed another renewal contract of
lease for 10 years commencing on September 1, 1987, supplemented on May 25, 1992,
increasing the lease rentals.

ISSUE:

HELD:
While the disapproved contract of September 23, 1987 is not valid, the subsequent
contracts of May 18 and May 25, 1992 are valid. They are not proscribed by law and neither
were they considered novation or renewal of the September 23, 1987 contract. There is no
specific provision to that effect and there is no incompatibility between the contracts to imply
novation. On the action for unlawful detainer filed by Rodil against respondents, the Court
affirmed the same. The occupation of respondents on the property was merely by tolerance
of the owner. That as the property is validly leased to Rodil, he acquired the right to file an
action for unlawful detainer against respondents as one from whom possession of property
has been unlawfully withheld.

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 Cornelio M. Isaguirre vs. Felicitas De Lara
G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000
Facts:
Alejandro de Lara was the original applicant-claimant for a Miscellaneous Sales Application
over a parcel of land identified as portion of Lot 502, Guianga Cadastre, filed with the
Bureau of Lands with an area of 2,342 square meters. Upon his death, his wife –
respondent Felicitas de Lara, as claimant, succeeded Alejandro de Lara. The
Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources amended the sales application to
cover only 1,600 square meters. By virtue of a decision rendered by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, a subdivision survey was made and the area was
further reduced to 1,000 square meters. On this lot stands a two-story residential-
commercial apartment declared for taxation purposes in the name of respondent’s sons –
Apolonio and Rodolfo, both surnamed de Lara.
Respondent obtained several loans from the Philippine National Bank. When she
encountered financial difficulties, respondent approached petitioner Cornelio M. Isaguirre,
who was married to her niece, for assistance. A document denominated as “Deed of Sale
and Special Cession of Rights and Interests” was executed by respondent and petitioner,
whereby the former sold a 250 square meter portion of Lot No. 502, together with the two-
story commercial and residential structure standing thereon, in favor of petitioner, for and in
consideration of the sum of P5,000.
Apolonio and Rodolfo de Lara filed a complaint against petitioner for recovery of ownership
and possession of the two-story building. However, the case was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioner filed a sales application over the subject property on the basis of the
deed of sale. His application was approved, resulting in the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title, in the name of petitioner. Meanwhile, the sales application of respondent over the
entire 1,000 square meters of subject property (including the 250 square meter portion
claimed by petitioner) was also given due course, resulting in the issuance of Original
Certificate of Title, in the name of respondent.
Due to the overlapping of titles, petitioner filed an action for quieting of title and damages
with the RTC of Davao City against respondent. After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered judgment, in favor of petitioner, declaring him to be the lawful owner of the
disputed property. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, holding
that the transaction entered into by the parties, as evidenced by their contract, was an
equitable mortgage, not a sale. The appellate court’s decision was based on the inadequacy
of the consideration agreed upon by the parties, on its finding that the payment of a large
portion of the “purchase price” was made after the execution of the deed of sale in several
installments of minimal amounts; and finally, on the fact that petitioner did not take steps to
confirm his rights or to obtain title over the property for several years after the execution of
the deed of sale. As a consequence of its decision, the appellate court also declared

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Original Certificate issued in favor of petitioner to be null and void. This Court affirmed the
decision of the Court of Appeals, we denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondent filed a motion for execution with the trial court, praying for the immediate
delivery of possession of the subject property, which motion was granted. Respondent
moved for a writ of possession. Petitioner opposed the motion, asserting that he had the
right of retention over the property until payment of the loan and the value of the
improvements he had introduced on the property. The trial court granted respondent’s
motion for writ of possession. The trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, a writ of possession, together with the Sheriff’s Notice to Vacate, was served
upon petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the mortgagee in an equitable mortgage has the right to retain
possession of the property pending actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by
the mortgagor.

Held:
A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal
obligation. Recording the document, in which it appears with the proper Registry of
Property, although, even if it is not recorded, the mortgage is nevertheless binding between
the parties, constitutes it. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is to
demand the execution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is
formalized. As a general rule, the mortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property
since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does not pass to the mortgagee.
However, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no
impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subjects the property
upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation
for whose security it was constituted. If the debtor is unable to pay his debt, the mortgage
creditor may institute an action to foreclose the mortgage, whether judicially or
extrajudicially, whereby the mortgaged property will then be sold at a public auction and the
proceeds there from given to the creditor to the extent necessary to discharge the mortgage
loan. Apparently, petitioner’s contention that “to require him to deliver possession of the
Property to respondent prior to the full payment of the latter’s mortgage loan would be
equivalent to the cancellation of the mortgage is without basis. Regardless of its possessor,
the mortgaged property may still be sold, with the prescribed formalities, in the event of the
debtor’s default in the payment of his loan obligation.
A simple mortgage does not give the mortgagee a right to the possession of the property
unless the mortgage should contain some special provision to that effect. Regrettably for
petitioner, he has not presented any evidence, other than his own gratuitous statements, to
prove that the real intention of the parties was to allow him to enjoy possession of the
mortgaged property until full payment of the loan.

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The trial court correctly issued the writ of possession in favor of respondent. Such writ was
but a necessary consequence of affirming the validity of the original certificate of title in the
name of respondent Felicitas de Lara, while at the same time nullifying the original
certificate of title in the name of petitioner Cornelio Isaguirre. Possession is an essential
attribute of ownership; thus, it would be redundant for respondent to go back to court simply
to establish her right to possess subject property.

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 Abejaron v. Nabasa
G.R. No. 84831

FACTS:
Petitioner Abejaron claimed that he is the actual and lawful possessor and claimant of a
118-square meter portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in Silway, General Santos
City described as "Block 5, Lot 1, Psu-154953, bounded on the North by Road, on the
South by Lot 2 of the same Psu, on the East by respondent Felix Nabasa, and on the West
by Road. In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-square
meter land and introduced improvements thereon. Respondent Nabasa did not oppose or
complain about the improvements. On September 24, 1974, Nabasa was issued Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4140 pursuant to Free Patent No. (XI-4) 2877, covering Lot 1,
Block 5, Psu-154953. As the title included petitioner Abejaron's 118-square meter portion of
the lot, his son, Alejandro Abejaron, representing Matilde Abejaron (petitioner Abejaron's
wife), filed a protest with the Bureau of Lands, Koronadal, South Cotabato against Nabasa's
title and application. The protest was dismissed for failure of Matilde and Alejandro to attend
the hearings. Petitioner Abejaron filed against respondent Nabasa an action for
reconveyance with damages seeking reconveyance of his 118-square meter portion of Lot
1, Block 5, Psu-154953. After trial on the merits, the trial court ruled in favor of petitioner
Abejaron. Respondent Nabasa's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of
respondent Nabasa. The appellate Court ruled that Abejaron failed to substantiate the
existence of actual fraud. There was also no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title nor
in the proceedings incident thereto nor was there a claim that fraud intervened in the
issuance of the title; thus, the title had become indefeasible. Hence, the present petition for
review.

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
According to the Court, while petitioner has shown continued existence of the improvements
he introduced on the disputed land, he, however, failed to establish the portion of the
disputed land that his original nipa house, small store and wooden fence actually occupied
as of January 24, 1947. In the absence of said proof, the Court cannot determine the land
he actually possessed and occupied for thirty years which he may acquire under Sec. 48(b)
of the Public Land Act. Worthy of notice is the fact that the disputed land was surveyed,
subdivided into and identified by lots only in the 1970's. Therefore, prior to the survey, it
would be difficult to determine the metes and bounds of the land petitioner claims to have
occupied since 1947 in the absence of specific and incontrovertible proof. Petitioner's
evidence does not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary to acquire
title through possession and occupation of the disputed land at least since January 24, 1947
as required by Sec. 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by R.A. 1942. The Court also

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ruled that petitioner Abejaron is not the proper party to file an action for reconveyance that
would result in the reversion of the land to the government. It is the Solicitor General, on
behalf of the government, who is by law mandated to institute an action for reversion.
||| (Abejaron v. Nabasa, , [June 20, 2001], 411 PHIL 552-576)

FACTS:
Petitioner Aberon avers that he is the actual and lawful possessor of a 118 square meter
portion of a 175-square meter residential lot in General Santos City.
In 1945, petitioner Abejaron and his family started occupying the 118-sq.m. land. In 1949,
petitioner improved their abode and all this time, respondent Nabasa did not oppose or
complain about the improvements. Knowing that the disputed land was public in character,
petitioner declared only his house, and not the disputed land, for taxation purposes.
Petitioner stated that beginning 1955, respondent Nabasa resided on the remaining 57-
square meter portion of the lot.
Before 1974, employees of the Bureau of Lands surveyed the area in controversy. Abejaron
merely watched them do the survey and did not thereafter apply for title of the land on the
belief that he could not secure title over it as it was government property. Without his
knowledge and consent, however, Nabasa “clandestinely, wilfully, fraudulently, and
unlawfully applied for and cause the titling in his name” of the entire lot, including petitioner
Abejaron’s lot portion. As a result of which, Nabasa was issued a Title over the said lot.
In 1982, an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent was filed before the
trial court.

T/C ruled in favour of petitioner.

CA: Reversed the ruling of T/C and ruled in favour of respondent, declaring that since
Abejaron failed to substantiate the existence of actual fraud and given that the only basis or
reconveyans is actual fraud, the title has become indefeasible.

Issue: Should the action for reconveyance prosper?

Held:
It is well-settled that reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property
alleged to be erroneously title in another’s name. In the case at bar, petitioner does not
claim to be the owner of the disputed portion. Admittedly, what he has is only a “preferential
right” to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his “open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the land for 30 years at least since January 24,
1947”. However, the petitioner was not able to adduce any “well-nigh incontrovertible”
evidence of title to the land. Therefore, not being the owner, the reconveyance cannot
prosper.

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 German Management & Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76216 and 76217, September 14, 1989, 177 SCRA 495
Fernan, J.

FACTS: Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio
Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 sq. M. The land was
originally registered on 5 August 1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds Rizal as OCT
19, pursuant to a Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on 27
July 1948. On 26 February 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing German Management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. Consequently, the German Management obtained Development Permit
00424 from the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission for said development.
Finding that part of the property was occupied by Gernale and Villeza and 20 other
persons, German Management advised the occupants to vacate the premises but the
latter refused. Nevertheless, German Management proceeded with the development of
the subject property which included the portions occupied and cultivated by Gernale, et.al.
Gernale, et.al. filed an action for forcible entry against German Management before the
MTC Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of Sitio Inarawan who
have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some 12 to 15 years prior to the promulgation
of PD 27, and that they were deprived of their property without due process of law when
German Management forcibly removed and destroyed the barbed wire fence enclosing
their farmholdings without notice and bulldozing the rice, corn, fruit bearing trees and
other crops that they planted by means of force, violence and intimidation The MTC
dismissed Gernale et.al.'s complaint for forcible entry. On appeal, the RTC sustained the
dismissal by the MTC. Gernale then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
Said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the MTC and
the RTC. The Appellate Court held that since Gernale, et.al. were in actual possession of
the property at the time they were forcibly ejected by German Management, they have a
right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. German Management moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the
Appellate Court. Hence, here is the present recourse.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrine of self-help may be availed of when respondents refused to
vacate the premises.

HELD: No. The justification that the drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops
of the prior possessor on the basis of the doctrine of self help (enunciated in Article 429
NCC) is unavailing because the such doctrine can only be exercised at the time of actual
or threatened dispossession, which is absent in the present case. When possession has
already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.
This is clear from Article 536 New Civil Code which provides that "in no case may
possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who
objects thereto. He, who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the
holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse
to deliver the thing."

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 Caisip v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. L-28716, November 18, 1970, 36 SCRA 17

Concepcion, C. J.

FACTS: Spouses Marcelino Guevarra and Gloria Cabalag cultivated a parcel of land
known as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in Nasugbu, Batangas, the same land
used to be tenanted by Cabalag’s father when he was still alive. Hacienda Palico is owned
by Roxas y Cia, administered by Antonio Chuidian, and supervised by the overseer, Felix
Caisip. Prior to the incident involved, Guevarra sought recognition as a lawful tenant of
Royas y Cia from the Court of Agrarian Relations but his action was dismissed.
Thereafter, Roxas y Cia filed an action against Guevarra for forcible entry with prayer that
Guevarra be ejected from the premises of Lot 105-A. The Justice of the Peace of Court
of Nasugbu decided in favor of Roxas y Cia and on June 6, 1959, a trouble between
Cabalag and Caisip occurred regarding the cutting of sugarcane.

A day later, Cabalag entered again the premises of Lot 105-A and refused to be driven
out by Caisip. Due to Cabalag’s tenacious attitude, Caisip sought the help of the Chief of
Police of Nasugbu. The Deputy Sheriff, however, informed Caisip that his request to eject
Cabalag cannot be acted upon without a proper court order. Nevertheless, the Chief of
Police assigned Sergeant Ignacio Rojales and Corporal Frederico Villadelrey to Haciendo
Palico. On June 17, 1959, Cabalag was seen weeding a portion of Lot 105-A which was
a ricefield. Caisip approached her and bade her to leave, but she refused to do so. So,
Caisip went to Sgt. Rojales and Cpl. Villadelrey and brought them to Cabalag. Rojales
told Cabalag to stop weeding but she insisted on her right to stay in the said lot. While in
squatting position, Cabalag was grabbed by Rojales who twisted her right arm and
wrested the trowel she was holding. Villadelrey held her left hand and together Rojales
forcibly dragged her towards a banana plantation while Caisip stood nearby, with a drawn
gun. Cabalag shouted, “Ina ko po! Ina ko po!” and was heard by some neighbors. Zoilo
Rivera, head of the tenant organization to which Cabalag was affiliated, went with them
on their way to the municipal building. Upon arrival, Cabalag was turned over by Rojales
and Villadelrey to the policemen on duty, who interrogated her. But upon representations
made by Rivera, she was released and allowed to go home. Cabagan then filed a
complaint charging Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey of the crime of “grave coercion.”

The Court of First Instance of Batangas found them guilty as charged. On appeal, The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the force employed by Caisip and others, in the exercise of his
right granted by Article 429, is reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.

HELD: No. Caisip was not even entitled to the right granted by Article 429. This is totally
inapplicable to the case, for, having been given 20 days from June 6th within which to
vacate the lot, Cabalag did not, on June 17th and within said period, invades or usurps
the said lot. She had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda

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owner may have become its co-possessor by reason of the prior order of the Justice of
Peace Court of Nasugbu. Caisip and others did not repel or prevent an actual or
threatened physical invasion or usurpation. They expelled Cabalag from a property which
she and her husband were in possession, despite the fact that the Sheriff had explicitly
authorized Guevarra and Cabalag to stay in said property up to June 26th, and had
expressed the view that he could not oust them without a judicial order. It is clear,
therefore, that Caisip, Rojales and Villadelrey, by means of violence, and without legal
authority, had prevented the complainant from doing something not prohibited by law
(weeding and being in Lot 105-A), and compelled her to do something against her will
(stopping the weeding and leaving said lot), whether it be right or wrong, thereby taking
the law into their hands, in violation of Article 286 of the Revised Penal Code.

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 People of the Philippines v. Pletcha
G.R. No. 19029-CR, June 27, 1977, 22 CA Rep. 807
Sison, J.

FACTS: Tito Pletcha, Jr., farmer, invoking ‘self-help’ in defense of the land he inherited
from his father 19 years ago against the workers of Radeco Corporation, who without
court order, were constructing a fence in a hacienda allegedly leased by the corporation
from a certain Lopinco.

Claiming actual possession and ownership and believing that the land sought to be
fenced was an integral part of the land he inherited, Pletcha asked the group to desist
from fenicing pending a resurvey he proposed, but he was totally ignored, thus he fought
off and prevented the workers. As a result of such resistance he was prosecuted and
convicted of grave coercion by the Municipal Trial Court. Pletcha appealed the decision
of the MTC with the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether the appellant’s action is a legitimate exercise of a private citizen’s ‘self-
help.

HELD: Yes. In the instant case,the usurper’s possession has not yet become complete
and the complainants were in the act of building a fence. Such an act constitutes force in
contemplation of the law. This act of trespass justified the appellant to drive them away,
even by means of bolo because they refused to listen to his appeal which is reasonable.
The appellant need not rush to the court to seek redress before reasonably resisting the
invasion of his property. The situation required immediate action and Art. 429 gave him
the self executory mechanics of self-defense and self-reliance. The provision in Art 429
of the New Civil Code confirms the right of the appellant, an owner and lawful possessor,
to use reasonable force to repel an invasion or usurpation, actual, threatened or physical
of his property. The principle of self-defense and the protective measures related thereto,
covers not only his life, but also his liberty and property.

“The principle of self-help authorizes the lawful possessor to use force, not only to prevent
a threatened unlawful invasion or usurpation thereof; it is a sort of self-defense. It is lawful
to repel force by force. He who merely uses force to defend his possession does not
possess by force. The use of such necessary force to protect propriety or possessory
rights constitutes a justifying circumstance under the Penal Code.”

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 Fuentes vs. Roca
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010

FACTS:

Sabina Tarroza owned a land in Canelar,Zamboanga City and she sold it to her son,
Tarciano T. Roca (Tarciano) under a deed of absolute sale. Six years later in 1988,
Tarciano offered to sell the lot to petitioners Manuel and Leticia Fuentes (the Fuentes
spouses). They met in the office of Atty. Romulo D. Plagata whom they asked to prepare
the documents of sale and signed an agreement to sell that Atty. Plagata prepared. It
expressly stated that the sale was to take effect in six months. Within six months, Tarciano
was to clear the lot of structures and occupants and secure the consent of his estranged
wife, Rosario Gabriel Roca (Rosario), to the sale.

Upon Tarciano’s compliance with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses were to take
possession of the lot and pay him an additional pay besides the downpayment, depending
on whether or not he succeeded in demolishing the house standing on it. If Tarciano was
unable to comply with these conditions, the Fuentes spouses would become owners of the
lot without any further formality and payment.

The parties left their signed agreement with Atty. Plagata who then worked on the other
requirements of the sale. According to the lawyer, he went to see Rosario in one of his trips
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit of consent. After 6 months, a new title was issued in
the name of the spouses who immediately constructed a building on the lot. Thereafter
Tarciano passed away, followed by his wife Rosario who died nine months afterwards.

Eight years later in 1997, the children of Tarciano and Rosario, namely,
respondents(collectively, the Rocas), filed an action for annulment of sale and re-
conveyance of the land against the Fuentes spouses before the RTC.

The Rocas claimed that the sale to the spouses was void since Tarciano’s wife, Rosario, did
not give her consent to it. Her signature on the affidavit of consent had been forged. They
thus prayed that the property be reconveyed to them upon reimbursement of the price that
the Fuentes spouses paid Tarciano.

The spouses denied the Rocas’ allegations. They presented Atty. Plagata who testified that
he personally saw Rosario sign the affidavit at her residence. He admitted, however,that he
notarized the document in Zamboanga City four months later. All the same, the Fuentes
spouses pointed out that the claim of forgery was personal to Rosario and she alone could

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invoke it. Besides, the four-year prescriptive period for nullifying the sale on ground of fraud
had already lapsed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether Rosario’s signature on the document of consent to her husband Tarciano’s sale
of their conjugal land to the Fuentes spouses was forged?

2. Whether the Rocas’ action for the declaration of nullity of that sale to the spouses already
prescribed?

3. Whether or not only Rosario, the wife whose consent was not had, could bring the action
to annul that sale?

HELD:

It was forged
It did not prescribe
The heirs of Rosario may bring an action to annul the sale.
RATIO:

1. The key issue in this case is whether or not Rosario’s signature on the document of
consent had been forged. For, if the signature were genuine, the fact that she gave her
consent to her husband’s sale of the conjugal land would render the other issues merely
academic. The SC agreed with the CA that the signature was forged.

While a defective notarization will merely strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of forgery
in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosario’s consent to the sale of the
land. That the Fuentes spouses honestly relied on the notarized affidavit as proof of
Rosario’s consent does not matter. The sale is still void without an authentic consent.

2. Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the
Family Code, not the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950,
Tarciano sold the conjugal property to the Fuentes spouses on January 11, 1989, a few
months after the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988.

When Tarciano married Rosario, the Civil Code put in place the system of conjugal
partnership of gains on their property relations. While its Article 165 made Tarciano the sole
administrator of the conjugal partnership, Article 166 prohibited him from selling commonly

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owned real property without his wife’s consent. Still, if he sold the same without his wife’s
consent, the sale is merely voidable. Article 173 gave Rosario the right to have the sale
annulled during the marriage within ten years from the date of the sale. Failing in that, she
or her heirs may demand, after dissolution of the marriage, only the value of the property
that Tarciano fraudulently sold.

But, as already stated, the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on
Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further, the Family Code provisions were
also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without prejudice to vested
rights.

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of
gains already established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without
prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws,
as provided in Article 256.

(n)

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide
a period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the
real property. It simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court
order allowing the sale, the same would be void.

Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent contract has
no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to contracts that are
declared void by positive provision of law, as in the case of a sale of conjugal property
without the other spouse’s written consent. But, although a void contract has no legal effects
even if no action is taken to set it aside, when any of its terms have been performed, an
action to declare its inexistence is necessary to allow restitution of what has been given
under it. This action, according to Article 1410 of the Civil Code does not prescribe.

Here, the Rocas filed an action against the Fuentes spouses in 1997 for annulment of sale
and re-conveyance of the real property that Tarciano sold without their mother’s (his wife’s)
written consent. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

3. As stated above, that sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained
the property of Tarciano and Rosario despite that sale. When the two died, they passed on
the ownership of the property to their heirs,

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 Marcelo G. Saluday vs. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2018

CASE:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari on the Decision and Resolution, CA-G.R. CR No.
01099, of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint to check the presence of contraband, illegal firearms or
explosives and suspicious individuals. A bag, small but too heavy for its size, belonging to
the Petitioner, Marcelo G. Saluday, was found by SCAA Junbert M. Buco (Buco). Petitioner
was arrested for failure to produce authority to carry firearms and explosives.

In an inquest conducted, the Prosecutor of Davao City found probable cause for violation of
PD 1866 for carrying firearms, explosives and ammunition.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

A. TRIAL COURT

The trial court declared the Petitioner in actual or constructive possession of firearm and
explosive without authority or license and was adjudged guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of firearm, ammunition, and explosives under PD 1866.

B. COURT OF APPEALS

The Petitioner questioned the decision of the trial court on the ground on misappreciation of
evidence and illegality of the search.

The Court of Appeals sustained the conviction and affirmed the ruling of the trial court.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution for being pro forma.

C. SUPREME COURT

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

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ISSUE:

Whether the trial court misappreciated the evidence against the Petitioner by the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.
Whether the search was illegal.
RULING:

Rule 45 under the Rules of Court applies only to question of facts. The finding of the trial
court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is accorded with great respect.

The elements of the crime committed, particularly the possession or ownership of the
firearm, explosive or ammunition, and lack of license to own or possess said firearm,
explosive or ammunition, raises questions of fact. The Court of Appeals affirmed the finding
of the trial court; hence, there was no need to disturb the latter’s findings.

On the issue on the illegality of the search, the Supreme Court disagrees with the Petitioner.
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution applies only to unreasonable searches or seizures.

The prohibition of unreasonable search and seizure emanates from one’s right to privacy.
When a person displays an expectation of privacy, which the society is ready to recognize
as reasonable, the State cannot violate a person’s right against unreasonable search or
seizure (Katz vs. United States). In addition, one’s expectation of privacy to be reasonable,
it must counter the safety and welfare of the people.

The Supreme Court did not agree to the Petitioner’s position that his failure to object to the
search cannot be construed as an implied waiver. Constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that can be waived. However, the
waiver should be voluntary, clear, specific and intelligently given, absent any duress or
coercion.

HELD:

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.

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 Natividad V. Andamo, Et Al., V. Intermediate Appellate Court Et Al.
G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990

Lessons Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
• Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation, built through its
agents, waterpaths, water conductors and contrivances including an artificial lake
within its land
• Inundated and eroded the spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo's land, caused
a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly
fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy
seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction.
• July 1982:spouses instituted a criminal action
• February 22, 1983: spouses filed a civil case for damages
• CA affirmed trial court issued an order suspending further hearings in Civil Case until
after judgment in the related Criminal Case
• spouses contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing Civil
Case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict
•
ISSUE: W/N there is quasi-delict even if done in private property

HELD: YES. REVERSED and SET ASIDE

All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit:
(a) damages suffered by the plaintiff
(b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must
respond
(c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damages incurred by the plaintiff
While the property involved in the cited case belonged to the public domain and the property
subject of the instant case is privately owned, the fact remains that petitioners' complaint
sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due
to the waterpaths and contrivances built by respondent corporation
It must be stressed that the use of one's property is not without limitations. Article 431 of the
Civil Code provides that "the owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as
to injure the rights of a third person." SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS.
Moreover, adjoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which require that each
must use his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and
interests of others. Although we recognize the right of an owner to build structures on his

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land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable care so
that they cannot be dangerous to adjoining landowners and can withstand the usual and
expected forces of nature. If the structures cause injury or damage to an adjoining
landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the injury or damage
suffered.
Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter

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 REPUBLIC v. RURAL BANK OF KABACAN,
GR No. 185124, 2012-01-25

Facts:

• NIA needed some parcels of land for the purpose of constructing the Malitubog-
Marigadao Irrigation Project.
• It filed with the RTC of Kabacan, Cotabato a Complaint for the expropriation of a
portion of three (3) parcels of land covering a total of 14,497.91... square meters.
• NIA filed an Amended Complaint to include Leosa Nanette A. Agdeppa and
Marcelino Viernes as registered owners of Lot No. 3039.
• NIA further prayed that it be authorized to take immediate possession of the
properties... after depositing with the Philippine National Bank the amount of
19,246.58 representing the provisional value thereof.
• Respondents filed their Answer with Affirmative and Special Defenses and
Counterclaim.[6] They alleged, inter alia, that NIA had no authority to expropriate
portions of their land, because it was not a sovereign political entity;... that NIA's
valuation of their expropriated... properties was inaccurate because of the
improvements on the land that should have placed its value at ?5 million; and that
NIA never negotiated with the landowners before taking their properties for the
project, causing permanent and irreparable damages to their properties... valued at
?250,000.
• The lower court issued an Order stating it would issue a writ of possession in favor of
NIA upon the determination of the fair market value of the properties, subject of the
expropriation proceedings.
• The committee had agreed that the fair market value of the land to be expropriated
should be ?65 per square meter based on the zonal valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR).
• As regards the improvement on the properties, the report recommended the
following compensation:... a. P200 for each gmelina tree that are more than four (4)
years old... b. P150 for each gmelina tree that are more than one (1) year old... c.
P164 for each coco tree... d. P270 for each banana clump
• NIA, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the Decision of the
RTC to the CA,... the CA... affirming with modification the RTC Decision. It ruled that
the committee tasked to determine the fair market value of the properties and...
improvements for the purpose of arriving at the just compensation, properly
performed its function.

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Aggrieved by the appellate court's Decision, NIA now comes to this Court via a Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

Issues:

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S

FINDING OF JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND AND THE IMPROVEMENTS
THEREON BASED ON THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS.

Ruling:

the Petition is not meritorious.

In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain,
but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word

"compensation" and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the
property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[32] The constitutional
limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the... market value
of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual
and ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as
between one who receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the... actual
taking by the government.

In the instant case, we affirm the appellate court's ruling that the commissioners properly
determined the just compensation to be awarded to the landowners whose properties were
expropriated by petitioner.

The records show that the trial court dutifully followed the procedure under Rule 67 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it formed a committee that was tasked to determine the
just compensation for the expropriated properties. The first set of committee members made
an... ocular inspection of the properties, subject of the expropriation. They also determined
the exact areas affected, as well as the kinds and the number of improvements on the
properties.[34] When the members were unable to agree on the valuation of the land... and
the improvements thereon, the trial court selected another batch of disinterested members
to carry out the task of determining the value of the land and the improvements.

The new committee members even made a second ocular inspection of the expropriated
areas. They also obtained data from the BIR to determine the zonal valuation of the

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expropriated properties, interviewed the adjacent property owners, and considered other
factors such as distance... from the highway and the nearby town center.[35] Further, the
committee members also considered Provincial Ordinance No. 173, which was promulgated
by the Province of Cotabato on 15 June 1999, and which provide for the value of the
properties and the... improvements for taxation purposes.

We can readily deduce from these established facts that the committee members
endeavored a rigorous process to determine the just compensation to be awarded to the
owners of the expropriated properties. We cannot, as petitioner would want us to,
oversimplify the process... undertaken by the committee in arriving at its recommendations,
because these were not based on mere conjectures and unreliable data.

In the instant case, the committee members based their recommendations on reliable data
and, as aptly noted by the appellate court, considered various factors that affected the value
of the land and the improvements.

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