The Philippine Election in 1998: A Question of Quality

Author(s): William Case

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1999), pp. 468-485
Published by: University of California Press
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THE PHILIPPINEELECTIONIN 1998
A Question of Quality

William Case

While the debate over political democratization has

moved on from transitionalprocesses to consolidation and promotion, a re-
lated programhas emerged addressingquality. This new agenda is more nor-
mative in tone, identifying the ways in which democracy-defined in mini-
mal, proceduralterms-has been unable to deliver all the benefits that had
been anticipatedby democratic theorists during the 1980s. Policy failings,
corruptpractices, and socioeconomic inequalities all persist even after de-
mocratizationhas taken place, though their forms may have mutated. In
broadterms, brutalindustrialpolicies dissolve now into policy immobilism;a
corruptmilitary is replaced by a party machine; and the bourgeoisie finds
new electoral methods through which to perpetuateits privileges.
This discussion of democracy's quality has been stimulatedby the collapse
of most other categories of regime types. Indeed, with its negative referents
removed, democracy's failings have been made more glaring, indicated by
rising desencanto (mass-level "disenchantment").But because this discus-
sion is new, there are no firm benchmarksyet by which to gauge democ-
racy's worth. Rather, there stands only a "vast corpus of normative demo-
cratic theory and ... the expectationsof a vast majorityof normaldemocratic
citizens."1
Nonetheless, Juan Linz has recently provided some tentative measures of
quality, focusing on the leaders and politicians that collectively make up what
he terms the "politicalclass." His measures include the extent to which this

William Case is Senior Lecturerat the School of InternationalBusi-

ness, GriffithUniversity, Nathan, Australia. The authorwould like to thank Ben Kerkvliet and
Harold Crouch for providing materials and sharing Manila contacts that helped in writing this
article. The authoralso would like to thank the anonymous referee for a thorough evaluation.
? 1999 by The Regents of the University of California
1. Philippe Schmitter,"Exploringthe ProblematicTriumphof Liberal Democracy and Con-
cluding with a Modest Proposalfor ImprovingIts InternationalImpact,"in Democracy's Victory
and Crisis, ed. Axel Hadenius (Cambridge,England:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1997), p. 297.

468

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 WILLIAM CASE 469
class regardspolitics as a vocation, ratherthan simply as a way of making a
living; its willingness to compete actively throughparties for programmatic
gains, but not at all costs; its minimizing corruptpractices; and its refusal to
"playwith or use the disloyal opposition, revolutionaryextremists,or putsch-
ists against opponents."2 Further,at the societal level, Jon Elster and James
Boham have begun to explore institutional designs for enhancing popular
participation,conceptualized as "deliberativedemocracy."3
This growing discussion over democraticquality has centeredon the estab-
lished democracies of North America and northernEurope and the new de-
mocracies of Latin America and central and eastern Europe. The present
article, however, raises questions about the quality of democracyin the Phil-
ippines, a case of third-wave democratizationin Southeast Asia. Not only
has the Philippines completed its transitionto democracy, but consolidation
has occurred,too, at least by the measures provided by Linz and Stepan. In
their oft-quotedrefrain,democraticprocedureshave been acceptedat the elite
level as the "only game in town."4 What is more, civil society has been
invigoratedthroughelectoral participationand the lobbying activities of non-
governmentalorganizations(NGOs). And the guidelines for these behaviors
have been constitutionally enshrined. Thus, as early as 1992, when Fidel
Ramos succeeded Corazon Aquino as president, Mark Thompson assessed
democracy in the Philippines as "off the endangeredlist."5
But Thompson notes too that if Philippine democracy may be assessed as
consolidated,greatproblemspersist in terms of quality. As he bluntly puts it,
"The Philippines meets the minimal criteriagenerally used to define democ-
racy without achieving what most observers would consider good govern-
ment."6 He then catalogues democracy's ratherdisappointingrecord in the
Philippines:political corruption,sustainedhumanrights abuses by the armed
forces, and an unreformedsocial structure. Of course, one can qualify these
criticisms. Responsiveness appears to have improved in several important
government departments,such as the Departmentof Economic and Natural

2. Juan J. Linz, "Some Thoughts on the Victory and Futureof Democracy,"in Democracy's
Victoryand Crisis, p. 421.
3. Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge,England: CambridgeUniversity Press,
1998); and James Bohman,Deliberative Democracy: Essays in Reason and Politics (Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press, 1998).
4. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transitionand Consolidation:
SouthernEurope, SouthAmerican,and Post-CommunistEurope (Baltimore:Johns HopkinsUni-
versity Press, 1996), part 1.
5. Mark Thompson, "Off the EndangeredList: Philippine Democratizationin Comparative
Perspective,"ComparativePolitics 282 (1996), pp. 179-206.
6. Thompson, ibid., pp. 197-98.

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 470 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

Resources.7 Local governmenthas sometimes improved, too, with city ad-

ministrationin Olongaponear Subic Bay and Naga City in Camarinesdel Sur
emerging recently as exemplars.8 In terms of the economy, Ramos intro-
duced some liberalizing reforms during his presidency, burnishinghis coun-
try's performanceenough that it was welcomed, however briefly, as South-
east Asia's latest so-called tiger cub. Moreover,even if the military still vio-
lates human rights, the extent of its abuses has necessarily been scaled back
by the collapse of the left, its primarytarget. And finally, the failure to carry
out social reform should hardly be surprising. It was the price for Corazon
Aquino's gaining the oligarchicalconsent that was necessary for maintaining
democracyduringher tenure,then consolidatingit throughan electoral trans-
fer of power to Ramos.
But if, as Aquino's presidency demonstratedso clearly, democracy in the
Philippines leaves socioeconomic structuresuntouched, it does open up the
political terrain. Democracy utilizes elections, processes in which elites can
compete for state power by making appeals to social constituents. Further,if
a government has made scant socioeconomic difference, the voters can re-
place it with a new one (even though the newly elected may also make little
difference). Thus, from the vantage point of elites, elections are crucial be-
cause they provide an outlet for political discontents, dissuading the voters
from seeking more fundamentalchanges in the socioeconomic order. The
society gets something in the bargain,too, and that is a role in shaping the
circulation of elites.
This articlefocuses on the May 1998 election in the Philippines,using it as
an indicatorby which to assess the quality of the country's democracy. Be-
cause this election is a discrete event, however, its worthcannotbe gauged by
Linz's more open-ended measures. Hence, this article proposes some alter-
native measures that appearmore appropriatefor a single electoral contest.

7. Discussions with Steven Rood, professor at the University of the Philippines, Baguio, and
memberof the boardof directors,Social WeatherStations (SWS), Makati,May 18 and 20, 1998.
SWS, on the Internet at <http://www.sws.org.ph/>,is an independent academic institute that
conducts survey researchon topics of public interest.
8. Gary Hawes, Manila-basedFord Foundationofficial, has suggested that much administra-
tive decentralizationhad taken place in the Philippines and that it was now possible for city and
municipal governmentsto be elected on the basis of good governance,ratherthan throughclan
connections and patronagemachines. He cited Naga City underMayor Jesse Robredoand Olon-
gapo until recently under Mayor Richard Gordon as key examples. Gary Hawes, authorinter-
view, Makati, May 18, 1998. Mayor Obredo, who broke with his family clan in order to stand
for office, estimated that perhapsa quarterof the 60-odd cities in the Philippines could now be
classified as administeredin professional ways. Interview, Naga City, May 29, 1998. For an
assessment of Gordon's tenure as head of the Subic Bay Metropolitanauthority,as well as that
of his successor, see Rigoberto Tiglao, "About Face," Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER),
February18, 1999, pp. 44-45.

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 WILLIAM CASE 471
Specifically, it will examine the extent to which formerPresidentRamos and
the candidate he chose to succeed him respected electoral rules during
campaigningand vote counting. It will next investigate the quality of cam-
paign appeals and debate and then the extent and meaningfulness of mass
participation. It will conclude by monitoring the level of political violence
duringthe election. Of course, these are rough measuresby which to gauge
electoral quality. It is difficult to specify exact thresholds of presidential
rule-bending and political killings, for example, beyond which democratic
quality must be rated as low. But these measures nevertheless enable one to
make some judgementsbased on widely sharednorms aboutthe acceptability
of differentpolitical behaviors.
In the Philippine general election of 1998, 64,000 candidates stood for
17,510 positions: the presidency and vice-presidency (the latter elected inde-
pendently from the president);half the 24-seat Senate; all 260 seats in the
House of Representatives(80% from single-member districts, 20% from a
new party list system); provincial governorships,mayorships,and barangay
captaincies9; and a range of provincial, city, and municipal council seats.
These contests were regulated in importantways by the 1987 Constitution.
Specifically, the presidentialcandidateswere eligible only for a single term
of six years; all others could hold local positions only for three terms of three
years each (a reform that, though designed to discourage the formation of
political dynasties, appearsto have quickenedthe pace with which offices are
bequeathed to spouses, siblings, and offspring). By stimulating turnover,
even if principallyamong family members,the Constitutionhelped to enliven
Philippine elections. Finally, while there were some elements of American
political culture in the campaigning, there was also much indigenous dyna-
mism, producing a rich local vocabulary of "presidentiables,""reelection-
ists," party "bets," and "black propaganda"(i.e., presidential contestants,
incumbent candidates, party candidates, and mud-slinging), as well as a
three-dayban on alcohol sales and cockfighting.

The Observance of ElectoralRules

In pioneeringnew frameworksby which to evaluate democraticquality, Linz
and Stepan note that the president, while technically observing democratic
procedures,may nonetheless bend rules in orderto lengthen his or her tenure,
win policy successes, or gain corrupt pay-offs; such behavior has already
been seen in Latin America.10

9. Barangay were establishedby Marcos as the smallest unit of local administration,consist-

ing of a neighborhoodor, in rural areas, a village.
10. Linz and Stepan, Problems, pp. 200-204. They provide as examples President Alberto
Fujimoriin Peru and PresidentCarlos Menem in Argentina,the first claiming to have suspended

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 472 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIX,NO. 3, MAY/JUNE1999
In the Philippines,Fidel Ramos has often been lauded as the country's best
president. Ramos recognized the disorganizednatureof the Philippine state,
then limited its extractivecapacity, largely by deregulatingstate monopolies
and privatizingstate assets. In turn,investors began to rediscoverthe Philip-
pines as a favorablesite for export-orientedindustrialization.Industrialparks
sproutedaroundManila Bay and in the Visayan city of Cebu, boosting aver-
age annual growth rates to nearly 5% throughoutRamos's term.
But Ramos appearedthen to read this evaluationof his presidencyas signi-
fying his indispensability. He began advocating that the Constitution be
changed in orderthat he could standfor reelection in 1998 (a so-called "cha-
cha," i.e., charterchange), first mounting a "People's Initiative,"then trying
to convert the Congress into a constituent assembly."1 However, he was
stoutly resisted by the former President Aquino and Catholic Archbishop
Jaime CardinalSin. ReactivatingPeople Power, the two held a great prayer
rally in Luneta Park, with audiences solemnly opposing any tamperingwith
the Constitution. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled that in any event, the
Constitutioncould not be amended by means of a signaturecampaign. Ob-
serverswatched Ramos intently to see how the formergeneral would react.12
But in confirmingonce more that democracy in the Philippines was consoli-
dated, Ramos accepted the court's decision, setting his personal ambitions
aside, and allaying fears of continuismo ("the reappearance of the past in new
guises").13
Therefore, in the short time left before the 1998 election, Ramos began
looking for a successor who would supportthe economic reforms that had
been made. He settled on the speakerof the House of Representatives,Jose
de Venecia, whose masteryof congressionaldealings indeed had securedpas-
sage of many of Ramos's bills. But this mastery also had led de Venecia to
become widely vilified in the press as "the worst trapo"(i.e., traditionalpoli-
tician, also Tagalog for "dirtyrag") then operatingin the country's political
scene.14 As speaker, he had relied heavily on patronage-in particular,the
use of pork barrel-through which to forge a rainbow coalition of support.

democracy in order to save it and the second having skirted statutoryrequirementswhile ac-
cumulatingcampaign funds and perhaps a personal fortune.
11. See Segundo E. Romero, "The Philippines in 1997: WeatheringPolitical and Economic
Turmoil,"Asian Survey 38:2 (February1998), p. 197.
12. In a nationalsurvey conductedby SWS in April 1997, respondentswere asked:"Thereare
those who say that PresidentRamos would use any way to remain president after his term ex-
pires in 1998. How credible is this statement?" Some 43% considered it "credible,"while 28%
did not. Social WeatherBulletin (SWB) 97-17/18 (September 1997), p. 2.
13. GiuseppeDi Palma, To CraftDemocracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions(Berke-
ley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1999), pp. 48-49.
14. Neal H. Cruz, "WhyJoe de V Is Losing," Philippine Daily Inquirer(PDI), May 15, 1998,
p. 9.

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 WILLIAMCASE 473
For the purpose,the CountrywideDevelopment Fund had been organizedby
the Congressional AppropriationsCommittee, P 18 million to each senator
and P 12 million to each representativeannually.15 The funds ostensibly
were dedicated to necessary infrastructuralprojects; however, they often
seemed to result only in modest community halls and so-called "waiting
sheds," their painted inscriptions brightly proclaiming they had been deliv-
ered by the local congressman. The difference between the funds that were
allocated and the costs of constructingthese projects (generally estimatedby
finance officials at 40%) was then returnedby contractorsto the relevant
congressman.16
But if corruptiondamaged de Venecia's credibility among journalists, it
probablydid not affect his standingmore generally. Nor was he harmedby
later allegationsthathe had acceptedpaymentsfrom a Thai companythat had
obtained a major land reclamation project in Manila under very favorable
terms.17 Nonetheless, de Venecia's endorsement by Ramos still failed to
generate much enthusiasm-attributable at least partly, perhaps, to the eco-
nomic reforms he was pledged to uphold.18 Specifically, while Ramos's re-
forms had benefited most Filipinos in absolute terms, they also had made
relative disparitiesworse than they had been in 1985, even before politics had
been redemocratizedand the economy had recovered.19 When East Asia's
economic crisis began to affect the Philippines-slowing down annual GNP
growth to 2.5% during the first quarter of 1998, the lowest rate in five
years20-the benefits that had sifted throughto a mass-level seemed to be at
risk. Thus, while approval levels of Ramos's presidency remained quite
high, a large part of the electorate was calling for policy changes.21 Indeed,

15. Ibid. See also PDI, May 24, 1998, p. 9. Average exchange rate for May 1998: P 39 = $1.
16. Philippine Star, June 1, 1998, p. 15.
17. In a poll conductedby SWS in December 1996, respondentswere asked which "personal
qualities" they most wanted in presidential candidates. Only 34% specified "never been in-
volved in graft and corruption,"placing it fifth in the list of qualities. SWB 97-17/18 (Septem-
ber 1997).
18. SWS conducteda series of four nationalsurveys about attitudestowardpossible presiden-
tial candidatesduring September 1996-June 1997. Respondents were asked whom they would
vote for as president if the election were held that day. Joseph Estrada, Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo, and MiriamDefensor-Santiagoconsistently led the field, with Estradathe favorite in the
last two surveys with 23%. De Venecia gained 5% in April 1997, then slumped to 3% in June,
tying with two others for sixth place. SWB 97-17/18 (September 1997), p. 6.
19. Gabriela R. Montinola, "Partiesand Accountability in the Philippines,"Journal of De-
mocracy 10:1 (1999), p. 130.
20. Philippine Star, May 30, 1998, p. 21.
21. In a poll conducted by SWS in December 1996, before East Asia's economic crisis had
set in, respondentswere asked: "How closely should the next president follow Pres. Ramos's
Policies?" A total of 45% of the respondents thought that the next president should follow
Ramos's policies "a little and change most things" or "not follow at all and change almost

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 474 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

as early as 1996, survey data indicates that the personal quality most desired
in presidentialcandidateswas that they be "pro-poor,"followed by their be-
ing "approachable."22
Thus, while Ramos campaigned vigorously for de Venecia, he may have
doubted the prospects of his anointed one. He may have felt, then, that de
Venecia should be "'helped' to do well," as some analysts contended.23
They allege that Ramos resortedto bending severely, without finally break-
ing, the country's electoral rules. Most notably, he appeared to appoint a
weak slate of Electoral Commission (COMELEC) officials, figures that
would perhaps countenance the behaviors that would bolster de Venecia's
chances.24 For example, the COMELECrefused to reorganizeold voter lists
or issue identificationcards, thus leaving the door open for so-called "flying
voters" (i.e., those who vote more than once). Using the courts, it tried to
block exit polls, essential for preventingthe manipulationof returns. And it
quarreledwith the NationalMovement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)when
trying to carryout quick counts, much valued because of the many weeks that
the COMELECwould take in carryingout its own counting processes. Com-
menting on the situationin an editorial,the Philippine Daily Inquirer,proba-
bly the country's most importantdaily, intoned, "Withits officials barely able
to conceal their political colors, the Comelec's credibility is in tatters."25
Shortly before the election, a COMELECcommissioner,Manolo Gorospe,
predictedpublicly that the election would be derailedby violence, especially
in the southern island of Mindanao.26 And in the event of such a failure,
Ramos would be permittedto remain in office until a new election could be

everything."SWB 97-17/18 (September 1997), p. 3. In the SWS exit poll conducted during the
May 1998 elections, this question was asked again. The total of respondentswanting to "change
most things"or to "changealmost everything"rose to 54%. MaharMangahas,Manila Standard,
June 8, 1998, p. 17.
22. National Survey, SWB 97-17/18 (September 1997), p. 8. Approximately64% of respon-
dents said that being "pro-poor"was the most importantquality in presidentialcandidates. Be-
ing "approachable"was second at 40% and "knowledge in running economic affairs" third at
38%.
23. The phrase "'helped' to do well" comes from O'Donnell and Schmitter,"TentativeCon-
clusions about Uncertain Democracies," in Transitionsfrom AuthoritarianRule: Prospects for
Democracy, eds. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter(Baltimore:Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity Press, 1986), p. 62. It refers to the importance of "artificially"bolstering parties that
representthe "Right-Centerand Right," perhapsby "rigging the rules," in order to prevent an
authoritarianbacklash. Such "help"after a democracyhas been consolidated,however, as in the
Philippines, augurs poorly for that democracy's quality.
24. Discussion with David Wurfel, University of the Philippines, Diliman, April 31, 1998.
Wurfel observed that Ramos had been behaving "rashly"for the previous year-and-a-half,sully-
ing what up until then had been a largely favorable assessment of his presidency.
25. PDI, May 4, 1998, p. 8.
26. Today (Makati),April 29, 1998, pp. 1 and 12.

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 WILLIAMCASE 475
organized. A candidatefor the presidency, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who
had claimed after the 1992 election to have been cheated by Ramos, re-
spondedthat the COMELEC'sbehaviorwas "partof Malacanang'slast-ditch
effort to perpetuatePresidentRamos in power."27 A much respected former
president of the Senate, Jovito Salonga, noted too that Ramos would be the
"beneficiary"of any election failure, though he suggested that a military
takeover was also possible.28 In turn, Archbishop Sin warned the military
against "'collusion' . . . in any such fraudulent intervention," promising the
resurgence of People Power.29 And the Young Officers Union (YOU), an
organized faction of officers that had been involved in sundrycoup attempts
during the late 1980s, firmly admonished those "people with intentions to
sow trouble or to cheat. Don't attemptit because the YOU is watching."30
As the election drew nearer,PresidentRamos took still more controversial
actions. First, he appearedto harass the candidate who had emerged as de
Venecia's most serious competitor, his own vice-president, Joseph Estrada.
Ramos ordered state security agencies to investigate reportsof Estradahav-
ing tried to assassinatehim on four differentoccasions during 1992-reports
that were widely dismissed as baseless. In addition, a week before the elec-
tion, Ramos abruptlyissued an executive orderto release the so-called "coco
fund," revenues that had been levied by Eduardo Cojuangco on coconut
farmers during FerdinandMarcos's presidency but ordered sequestered by
the courts after Marcos's ouster. Ramos claimed that the fund at last would
be made available to the farmers as livelihood loans in order to rehabilitate
their industry. However, while this decision might normally have been ap-
plauded, its eleventh-hourtiming instead raised suspicions in the press that
the coco levy monies were being used to court the 1.4 million coconut farm-
ers' vote. Cojuangco, supportingEstrada,may have been correct, then, in
claiming thatRamos's real intentionwas to build "thelargestpresidentialwar
chest ever."'31Cojuangco's counsel thus chargedthat Ramos had "reverseda
decision of the Supreme Court and usurped legislative powers,"32and he
succeeded in blocking the lifting of the sequestrationorderthrougha special
anti-graftcourt (sandiganbayan).
Finally, after the elections had been held and the vote counting began,
suspicions arose once more over the very slow pace with which COMELEC
officials proceeded. They protestedthe allegations, attributingdelays to the
difficulties of tallying votes for the new party list system. Further,when at

27. PDI, April 30, 1998, p. 1.

28. Today, April 29, 1998, p. 1.
29. PDI, May 5, 1998, p. 1.
30. CaptainCarlos Magalang, YOU spokesman, quoted in ibid., May 8, 1998, p. 2.
31. Belinda Olivares-Cunanan,"Elusive Bro. Mike," ibid., March 5, 1998, p. 7.
32. Ibid., May 5, 1998, p. 2.

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 476 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

last the results were reported,they correlatedmore closely than in past elec-
tions with the estimates made by watchdog groups NAMFREL and Social
Weather Stations (SWS), indicating that electoral cheating had indeed sub-
sided, at least at the presidentialand congressionallevels.33 This did little to
allay doubts over the COMELEC'sindependence,however. In taking stock
of the elections, Joel Rocamora,directorof the Institutefor PopularDemoc-
racy, writes that "it appearsthat de Venecia people preparedto cheat,"34but
de Venecia trailed Estradaby so great a margin that any fabricatedresults
would have been quite implausible.35 In these circumstancesof continuing
distrust,the restraintshown finally by the incumbentpresidentand his chosen
successor did little to build confidence in Philippine democracy.

Level of Campaign Appeals

Another measure of democraticquality involves the appeals that candidates
make to voters. Substantive appeals addressing serious issues and inviting
constituent debate can, of course, make election campaigns meaningful.
Conversely, candidateswho rely on entertainers,sports celebrities, and evan-
gelists probably diminish a campaign. In the Philippines, after the COME-
LEC had culled some nuisance entrants,a field of 11 candidatesstood for the
presidency in 1998. And duringthe two-month campaignperiod, they made
appeals of uneven quality.
With Jose de Venecia's political record consisting largely of deal-making,
he began by advocating little more during his campaign than pushing ahead
with Ramos's agenda. However, with the Philippine peso having recently
lost a quarterof its value, causing inflationandjoblessness to rise, the appeal
of deregulationalreadyhad begun to fade. De Venecia thus turnedto assert-
ing his religiosity, calling upon born-againChristiangroups to mount cam-
paign rallies. The Jesus Is Lord Ministry and Jesus Victory Crusadeobliged
him, with the leader of the lattergroup even declaringthat "if Joe de Venecia
loses, I'm willing to be shot before a firing squad."36At the same time, de
Venecia operatedmore sedately throughthe Lakas-NationalUnion of Chris-
tian Democrats (NUCD) which, while offering little ideology, was thoughtto
be able to dispense patronagethrough its party machinery and control over
the pork barrel. Never, though, did he or his partytake up issues of poverty,
unemployment,or the environment,a decision that would prove pivotal: he

33. See ComparingSWS Exit Poll Results and Official Results: Presidential Votes, Philip-
pines, SWS 1998 National Exit Poll, posted June 22, 1998, on the Internet at <http://
www.sws.org.ph/exit-com.htm>.
34. Joel Rocamora, "Who Won? Who Lost?" Political Briefs (Manila: Institute of Political
Democracy, forthcoming).
35. Discussion with David Wurfel, University of the Philippines, Diliman, April 31, 1998.
36. PDI, May 5, 1998, p. 1.

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 WILLIAM CASE 477
finished the presidentialrace a very distant second, gaining less than 16% of
the popularvote.
Meanwhile, a pair of third force candidatescrafted more imaginative ap-
peals and began chipping away at the top end of de Venecia's upper and
middle-class constituencies. Raul Roco, a lawyer and senatorwho possessed
no party machine, outlined a high-tech vision for Philippine economic re-
newal. And even if it appearedthat Roco was ahead of his time in a country
still struggling with land tenure issues and food shortages, he nonetheless
placed third in the vote count with nearly 14%, thus raising his statureand
positioning him for the next election. In addition,Emilio Osmena, the gover-
nor of prospering Cebu, offered a decentralized,province-based economic
plan for the country. He promisedto "abolishincome taxes, since they don't
work anyway" and proposed introducingconsumption taxes instead.37 But
even as he pledged to middle-class audiences that he would be a business-
orientedpresident,he made populist appeals to the masses of poor farmersin
the provinces who often gravitatedto Manila slums. However, though articu-
lating his themes with eloquence, Osmena was unable to maintain much
mass-level supportbeyond the Visayas, thus confining him to fourthplace in
the polls.
In contrast to the aforementionedcandidates, a trio of law-and-orderand
anti-corruptionfigures seemed to drive the quality of campaign appeals back
down. Alfredo Lim, the mayor of Manila and formerchief of police, focused
solely on crime issues. His dispensing of rough justice in the capital had
earned him the sobriquet "Dirty Harry,"ennobling him to some voters but
greatly alarmingothers. In particular,duringhis tenureas mayor, he person-
ally had led teams of police in sealing and signposting the houses of sus-
pected drug dealers. Corpses were sometimes found in Manila's streets,
bearingmessages in Tagalog: "I'm a drug pusher. Don't follow."38 Interest-
ingly, Lim gained the endorsementof CorazonAquino. But ratherthan win-
ning him any new support,it seemed insteadto erode Aquino's own standing,
leaving her remainingsupportersto wonder what had ever become of People
Power. The second candidatewas Miriam Defensor Santiago. Still striking
the indignantposture against corruptionthat had nearly won her the election
in 1992, she evidently fatigued the voters this time around. Christeningher
campaign"The Returnof the Jedi" and erecting a billboardthat depicted her
wielding a laser sword, she slumped to seventh in the polls and gained less
than 3% of the vote. Finally, the PartidoBansang Marangal(National Dig-
nity Party)candidatefor president,formerPhilippine Sweepstakes and Lotto
ManagerManuel Morato,harpedsolely on the moral shortcomingsof Joseph

37. FEER, March 5, 1998, p. 26.

38. Ibid.

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 478 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIX,NO. 3, MAY/JUNE1999
Estradain his campaign. He wound up in last place as a result of this narrow
focus, achieving less than 1% support.
Finally, among a cohort of minor candidates one found Imelda Marcos,
heading the New Society Movement (KBL). In campaigning, she promised
to "use the wealth" of her late husbandto revive the economy-and thereby
disclosed this wealth's existence.39 She also reviewed the virtues of her hus-
band's direct grants to barangays and the promise of aquaculture. Still, she
managedonly to inspire a small band of loyalists. And upon recognizing the
futility of her bid, she pledged to withdraw,passing on her voters to Estrada.
Indeed, Estrada was well-known for his admirationof FerdinandMarcos,
even pledging now that the former president's body would at last be shifted
from its glass, air-conditionedcrypt in the Marcos family mansion at Batac to
the resting place of national heroes, the Libingan ng mga Bayani Filipino.
But whatever Estradamight do, Imelda still found herself in a terriblebind
over her decision to quit. On the one hand, she reasoned, "I withdrew be-
cause I did not want to be a party to the COMELEC-predictedbloody elec-
tions. On the otherhand, my supportersare threateningto kill themselves if I
pursue my withdrawal."40But she formally withdrew only two days before
the election, too late to remove her name from the ballot or to shake off her
small following.

The Estrada Campaign

In their campaigning,the candidatesmainly addressedways to halt the eco-
nomic decline or ameliorateits effects on law and order. However, Joseph
"Erap"Estrada, heading the Struggle of the Nationalist Filipino Masses
(LaMMP)ticket,41went further,focusing intently on the needs of the urban
and rural poor. His campaign slogan was straightforward-"Erap para sa
mahirap"(Erapfor the poor)-thereby eclipsing Osmena's more nuancedap-
peals. Of course, Estradaoffered no specific proposals, save the need to pro-
mote "food security"in a country afflicted by El Niiio while perhaps doing
something for small business, too.42 But his concerns nonetheless were
given force by his roles as a film star during the 1950s-60s, portraying
figures that were street smart and crime busting yet moved by the plight of
poor city dwellers. It must be pointed out, however, that in real life Estrada
was not a member of the poor. He has instead been depicted as a "'black

39. Ibid., p. 23.

40. Today (Makati), May 4, 1998, p. 12.
41. On the origins of the newly formed LaMMP, see Romero, "The Philippines in 1997," p.
197.
42. See, e.g., Estradainterview, FEER, January15, 1998, p. 24. After his election, though,
Estradawas more forthcoming,elaboratinginterestrate policies and commitmentsto "free-mar-
ket institutions." Ibid., May 14, 1998, p. 20.

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 WILLIAM
CASE 479
sheep' of the elite," a dropoutfrom Ateneo National University, one of the
country's leading tertiary institutions.43 The films he made after leaving
Ateneo made him wealthy and paved the way for his entry into politics-first
as mayor of San Juan, an importantsuburbcity of Manila; later as senator;
then as the Philippine vice-president under Ramos. One notes, too, that his
wife, Loi Ejercito, a psychiatristtrained at the University of Santo Tomas,
was regardedas a member of the upper-classsocial set.44 Estrada'spopulist
appeals, then, were necessarily cross-class. But they gave him the lead over
othercandidates,one that grew ever largeras election day nearedand enabled
him finally to win the presidency with nearly 40% of the vote. His LaMMP
also gained a pluralityof 110 seats in the House, soon bumpedup to a major-
ity after mass defections from de Venecia's Lakas-NUCD.
The limited substance in Estrada's campaign appeals made it difficult to
know what precisely Estrada would offer the poor.45 And confusion only
deepened as analysts began scrutinizing the highly eclectic make-up of his
advisory team.46 In brief, Estrada outlined some redistributive schemes,
pledging state assistance for sectors that had been neglected under Ramos,
agricultureand small business in particular. Associated with these sentiments
were Robert Aventajado, a long-time friend who had coordinatedEstrada's
campaign vehicle, Citizens' Movement for Justice Economy, Environment,
and Peace (JEEP),and Horacio "Boy"Morales, a formerchair of the commu-
nist National Democratic Front who was tipped now to become secretaryof

43. Amando Doronila, PDI, May 15, 1998, pp. 1 and 9.

44. Ibid., May 17, 1998, p. 17.
45. To sample the appeals that so resonated with mass audiences, consider the following
journalistic account of one of Estrada'srallies in his home district of San Juan:
The portly actor-turned-politicianeventually arrives. Currentmayor (and Erap's son) Jose
"Jinggoy"Estradashouts:"It is my honor to introducemy own father,who is definitelybetter-
looking than I am!" A whoop goes up among the 10,000-strong crowd. "He is definitely a
betteractor than I am!" continues Jinggoy. More cheers. "The next presidentof the Republic
of the Philippines,Joseph 'Erap' Estrada!"As EstradaSr. bounds onto the stage, his support-
ers breakinto a chant:"Erap,Erap,Erap,Erap!" Estradathrows a joke at his son: "Thankyou
for telling the truth. You can see the evidence-I am far better-lookingthan you." He in-
troducesthe local senatorialcandidatesfor his LaMMPparty and then turnsto Luisa Ejercito,
a doctor, whom he presents as "the only wife of Erap." The throngs understandthis allusion
to his reputedphilandering(he has three childrenout of wedlock) and roar. "You don't seem
to believe me," laughs Estrada. The people giggle and clap. "Do you want me to sing?" A
resoundingyes. Erapwarbles a line: "Of the many women I have loved, I marriedonly one."
That, he assures the crowd, "is Dr. Ejercito."The people demanda more tangible proof of his
fidelity. "Kiss, kiss, kiss," they shout. Ejercito stands up and kisses the vice president,much
to the crowd's delight.
Sangwon Sun and Antonio Lopez, "Is EstradaUnstoppable,"Asiaweek, April 10, 1998, p. 16.
Estradaended all campaign appearancesa week before elections, alleging that death threatshad
been made against him. Ibid., May 9, 1998, p. 7
46. See Amando Doronila, "ErapCabinet Patchworkof Conflicting Interests,"ibid., May 24,
1998, pp. 1 and 6.

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 480 ASIANSURVEY,VOL.XXXIX,NO. 3, MAY/JUNE1999

agrarian reform. But Estrada evidently wished also to retain the confidence
of internationalinvestors and aid donors. Thus, like de Venecia, he stated
that he would preserve Ramos's reforms, and he recruitedsome economists
from the University of the Philippines to provide technocraticadvice. Fur-
ther, to reassure local business people, Estradabrought in some prominent
bankers,selecting one of them, EdgardoEspiritu,to be finance secretary. On
the other hand, he also maintainedties to some Marcos-erabusiness people,
seemingly through the Zamorrabrothers, Ronaldo, whom he tipped as his
executive secretary,and Manuel, his campaigntreasurer.The Zamorraswere
linked in turn to EduardoCojuangco and Lucio Tan.47 Finally, speculation
mounted over Estrada'seven darkerties to the Chinese-Filipinounderworld
of drug traffickersand illegal lottery operatorswho, it was alleged, had pro-
vided the LaMMP with a long credit line for vote-buying.48
Given this mixed bag of advisors, questions arose over which factions
would prevail-and whetherEstradawould really assert much personalinflu-
ence over outcomes. Indeed, there were hints that some of these groups,
especially the technocraticones, had only chosen to join Estradabecause of
the populist cover he could offer them duringtroubledeconomic times. One
University of Philippinesprofessorstated,"Whatendearsus to Erapis that he
listens to what we say, and seems to be open to ideas as long as you can
explain these to him.... He has been known to talk openly against things
like liberalizationand open trade, but he really has no hard line position."49
Thus, while these different factions coalesced uneasily during Estrada's
campaigning, it was possible their conflicts would intensify once he was in
office.
Given these circumstances,in the interludeafter the elections that Estrada
was being projectedto win, some candidatesdwelled publicly on the contra-
dictions among Estada's advisors and then focused intently on the crime syn-
dicates. De Venecia complainedof vote-buying funded by the syndicates and
warned, "I will not recommend 'People Power' at this time because we want
to review the situation. But it could lead to that if there is truly nationwide

47. EduardoCojuangco and Lucio Tan were both business people who rose to prominence
underMarcos. Because of the Zamorrabrothers'close connections to Estrada,analysts advised
a close monitoringof developments surroundingCojuangco and the coco levy and the seques-
tered San Miguel shares, as well as several tax avoidance cases in which Tan was embroiled.
Indeed, a month after Estrada'selection, Cojuangcowas elected presidentand chief executive of
San Miguel, paving the way for his recapturingthe sequesteredshares. "Marcos'sBeer Baron Is
Back," Australian, July 8, 1998, p. 25.
48. Belinda Olivares-Cunananalleged that Estrada,after winning the presidency, wished also
to be secretaryof the Departmentof Interiorand Local Governmentso that he could control the
national police, then repay the underworldsyndicates. "Can EstradaAbolish the Pork," PDI,
May 24, 1998, p. 9.
49. Ibid., May 5, 1998, p. B2.

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 WILLIAM CASE 481
vote-buying, nationwidecheating, and nationwideuse of Mafia-money,drug-
lord money, underworldmoney. We cannot allow a Mafia-structureto take
hold of the government."50However, de Venecia also let it be known that
try as he might to restrainthem, his born-againChristiansupportersmight
spontaneouslybegin to mount protestrallies. Furthermore,MiriamDefensor
Santiagotried to substantiatede Venecia's claims, even specifying a figure of
at least P 900 million that had been spent by Estrada's LaMMP to buy
votes.51 She then demandedthat all election returnsbe submittedto the Sen-
ate for inspection, thus delaying the proclamationof the next presidentuntil
afterthe June 30 inaugurationdate. She also statedthat while she was aware
thatthis would trigger a constitutionalcrisis, with Ramos ineligible to remain
as caretaker,she would nevertheless press her case.
Accordingly, one concludes that, even if still observing formal democratic
procedures,de Venecia and Santiago formed a marriageof distinct conven-
ience, then together rehearsedscenarios that auguredpoorly for democratic
quality. To be sure, their suspicions of Estradamay have been well-founded,
enabling them to make appeals that could be likened to those of Peruvian
President Alberto Fujimori in their resting on the need to suspend democ-
racy-or at least to delay electoral outcomes-in order to save it, even if it
were to provoke a constitutionalcrisis. But after Santiago had so critically
attackedde Venecia during the campaigning, one doubted their motivations
in coming together now to block Estrada'srise to the presidency. In conse-
quence, far from cleansing the electoral process, their collaborationseemed
to diminish its quality further.
In sum, the level of campaign appeals for the presidency in 1998 must be
assessed as mixed. Raul Roco and Emilio Osmena appearedto heighten the
campaign's quality, by generating proposals for economic renewal. Other
candidatesdiminished it, however, invoking appeals tinged with fundamen-
talism, anxieties over crime, and nostalgia for Marcos. Meanwhile, Estrada
came up with the winning issue, i.e., addressingthe plight of poor masses.
But in refusing to discuss seriously how poverty might be alleviated, then
deepeninguncertaintiesby recruitingan eclectic band of advisers,his appeals
did little to raise the campaign's tenor.

Quality of Mass Participation

One is quickly impressedin the Philippineswith the depthof political knowl-
edge possessed by many activists and their commitments to safeguarding
democraticprocedures. One clear manifestationof this is the many organiza-
tions thatresearch-and act upon-political and social issues. These take the

50. Quoted in ibid., May 17, 1998, p. 2.

51. Ibid., May 17, 1998, p. 2.

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 482 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

form of interestedthirdparties,university study centers, NGOs, social move-

ments, churchgroups, and the like. TeachersVillage, in particular,a subdivi-
sion of the Philippine capital, Quezon City, bristles with cause-oriented
groups in rented suburbanhomes and shop fronts. In total, more than 14,000
secular voluntaristorganizationsoperate in the country.52
In the 1998 election, it was the Catholic Churchthat seemed to do the most
to raise the quality of mass-level electoral participation. VoteCare, overseen
by the Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines, provided voter edu-
cation about candidates,issues, and electoral mechanics (much in contrastto
COMELEC, which did little to elucidate the new party list system). The
Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting organized poll-watching
across the country. And NAMFREL,directedby ArchbishopSin, carriedout
OperationQuick Count. These three organizations,together with the Inte-
grated Bar of Philippines Lawyers, which provided legal assistance, coa-
lesced for the first time in 1998 under the banner of HOPE, or "honest,
orderly, and peaceful elections."53 In addition,Social WeatherStations pro-
vided objective and accurate voter surveys throughoutthe campaign, while
sundryother agencies were commissioned by media outlets to carry out exit
polls.
These organizationswere confrontedby differentforms of electoral cheat-
ing, many of them highly refined duringthe long Philippine experience with
democracy. They included stuffing ballot boxes before polling stations were
opened, circulatingso-called "flyingvoters"throughmultiple precincts,vote-
buying (or more commonly, paying voters not to vote), lanzadera (paying a
voter to submit an alreadycompletedballot, then returnwith the empty ballot
so that it can be filled out and submittedby the next voter), and the infamous
dagdas-bawa (shaving votes from one candidate's totals, then using them to
pad another's,thus leaving the total returnunchanged). But in the 1998 elec-
tion, despite high voter turnoutof 75%-80%, the incidence of cheating ap-
peared to have been moderated,at least at the national level.54
Thus, in observing the participatorynature of the Philippine electorate-
and the infrastructureprovided by civil society through which to make that
participationmeaningful-one finds reasons for celebratingthe political ma-
turity of the people. However, a noted Manila-based columnist, Belinda
Olivares-Cunanan,cautioned that during elections in 1998, this maturity
"ha[d] to be qualified."She tallied the number of media celebrities, actors,
and sports stars elected to office, especially in the Senate, and questioned
whether it was "mature"to have elected, for example, a basketball star who

52. Montinola, "Partiesand Accountability,"p. 129.

53. Sunday InquirerMagazine (Manila), May 10, 1998, p. 3.
54. See footnote 30.

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 WILLIAMCASE 483
openly admittedthat he'd only be a part-timesenator."55Even more worri-
some was the willingness of voters to elect convicted criminals. In the prov-
ince of Nueva Ecija, for example, five members of the Joson family were
elected to various local offices, despite two of them having campaignedfrom
prison where they were serving life sentences for having murderedtheirpolit-
ical rivals. Similarly, in Zamboangadel Norte, RepresentativeRomy Jalosjos
won reelection overwhelmingly,notwithstandinghis imprisonmentfor raping
and killing an 1 -year old girl. And while voters had rejectedImelda Marcos
as their president,they elected her son, Bongbong, as governor of Ilocos del
Norte, and her daughter,Imee, as congresswoman. However, the Philippine
electorateis not necessarily committedto entertainers,jailbirds, and the prog-
eny of dead dictators. Olivares-Cunancites a SWS survey showing that 45%
of the electorate was willing to sell its vote in 1998 to the highest bidder,
irrespectiveof celebrity status.
Rocamoracounters,though, that mass-level voters should not be dismissed
simply as starstruckor irrationallyselling their votes. Despite Estrada'sfilm
personage,voters had few illusions about what his presidencymight achieve.
Indeed, they had learned generally to expect little from state institutions,im-
pelling them earlierin Philippinepolitical experienceto seek aid from patrons
and bosses, and today from NGOs. In Rocamora's view, the voters' election
of such candidates representedfaintly reasoned but nonetheless meaningful
mass actions that served effectively to tauntelites.56 In terms of the analysis
made in this article, though, even if meaningful, such actions did little to put
qualified politicians in office.

PoliticalViolence
Philippine elections historically have been notorious for high levels of vio-
lence, surely diminishing their quality. Of course, because top politicians
have, apart from the Marcos period, adhered to some tacit understandings
about the acceptabilityof different behaviors, they have limited their violent
actions against one another. And during the 1998 general election, violence
appearedto be relatively limited at the mass level, too, resultingin a compar-
atively low 50 or so deaths. Still, for uninitiated first-time observers, the
level of violence seemed unacceptable. Candidates at the local level were
assassinated in many districts during the campaign, promptingthe COME-
LEC to declare hot spots that were directly overseen by its officials. The
most conspicuous of these involved the race for the mayorshipof Makati,the

55. Belinda Olivares-Cunanan,"Can Estrada Abolish the Pork," PDI, May 24, 1998, p. 9.
Indeed, the player even assured supportersthat his senatorial duties would not be allowed to
compromise his game. Montinola, "Partiesand Accountability,"p. 126.
56. Joel Rocamora, "Revenge of the Masses? Or Snubbing the Snobs?" Conjuncture(forth-
coming).

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 484 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXXIX, NO. 3, MAY/JUNE 1999

capital's central business district, where thugs associated with the incum-
bent-seeking now to ensure the election of his wife-killed two of his chal-
lenger's campaign workers inside city hall. In addition, one notes that if
families sometimes perpetuatedlengthy dynasties in the Philippines, they at
other times eruptedin deadly feuds. As one example, in Samar,the last-term
mayor of Matuguinao,Celso de la Cruz, was shot dead in front of 200 sup-
porters. The killing was blamed on the mayor's younger brother,running
against the slain mayor's wife.57 Finally, at the barangay level, shootings
were widely reported,especially in volatile Mindanao.
Political violence did not end once the campaignperiod was over. Indeed,
in a country where the local wisdom holds that there are only two kinds of
candidates-those who win and those who have been cheated-it must be
expected that protests would take place while ballots were counted, causing
the violence to surge anew. COMELECseemed to bear some of the blame,
confusing precinct workers over how they should make their returnsknown
to NAMFREL at a time when officials were trying to performquick counts.
And amid this uncertainty,supportersof local favorites, who were feared to
be losing, assaulted polling stations, either making off with ballot boxes or
barricadingthe stations so that returnscould not be delivered. Such violence
surroundedeven the contest for the mayorshipof Quezon City, the country's
administrativecapital. One concludes, then, that while the 1998 Philippine
election was more peaceful than in previous years, it could not yet be evalu-
ated on this score as high quality.

Conclusions
One aim of this articlehas been to outline some new indicatorsfor measuring
democraticquality as a means of helping move debate beyond consolidation.
Thus, in analyzing electoral processes in a new democracy,or ratherin a re-
democratizedregime, it has focused on the attitudestowardelectoral rules of
an incumbentnationalleader, the characterof campaign appeals and debates,
the quality of political awarenessand participationdisplayedby an electorate,
and the amounts of political violence.
Most observers now gauge democracy in the Philippines as consolidated.
It was accepted by factional military leaders during the late 1980s, then
capped by Fidel Ramos's election as president in 1992. However, although
democracymay have become the only game in town, it has remaineda low-
quality one, with doubts emerging over the behavior of Ramos late in his
tenure as well as that of top COMELECofficials. Though these figures re-
mained committedto formal democracy,they limited its effectiveness in their
testing of its electoral rules. Indeed, they would perhaps have tested them

57. PDI, May 8, 1998, p. 18.

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 WILLIAM CASE 485
more severely had de Venecia had not been so far behind Estradathat a "sto-
len" election would have lacked all credibility. Regardingthe voters' possi-
ble use of their ballots on seemingly frivolous candidates, how else might
they have respondedto campaign appeals that amountedto what one colum-
nist labeled a "political burlesque?"58Even Estrada,who at least addressed
the concerns of the poor, did so only in the sketchiest of terms, mouthingthe
slogans of food security and small business yet giving no hint as to how they
might be fulfilled. And political violence, finally, while perhapslow by the
standardsof previous elections in the Philippines, still occurredat levels that
most observers would find disturbing.
In sum, while democracyin the Philippineshas been consolidated,its qual-
ity-as measuredby the 1998 election-is compromised. One looks forward
to its quality being raised during Estrada'stenure as president. In checking
for gains, analysis must now shift from electoral processes to state capacity
and responsiveness. For starters,Estrada'sperformancemight be evaluated
by the yardstickthat he has himself suggested, namely, the capacity of gov-
ernmentat least to see that Filipinos are fed. Additional progress should be
assessed in terms of his government'sreviving the economy while smoothing
the social structure, as well as containing political corruption and human
rights abuses. But should Estrada's governmentfail grievously in these ar-
eas, researchersmust turnfinally to the ways in which democracy'slow qual-
ity might begin to undo its prior consolidation.

58. Amando Doronila, ibid., May 10, 1998, p. 1. Doronila lamented also the "lack of com-
manding charismaticpolitical personality that has capturedthe imaginationof the nation."

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