Civil Law Review 2020 192 Vda. De Consuegra vs.

GSIS
Property regime of unions without marriage 1971 Zaldivar

FACTS

The late Jose Consuegra contracted two marriages: first with respondent Rosario Diaz in 1937, second with
petitioner Basilia Berdin in 1957 while the first marriage was subsisting. In 1965, Jose died and the proceeds of
his life insurance were paid by GSIS to Basilia who were the beneficiaries named in the policy. The dispute
arose when GSIS paid the proceeds of Jose’s retirement insurance to Rosario (1/2 of the proceeds) and the
other half to Basilia and her seven children with Jose (each receives 1/16 of the proceeds). Rosario contended
that she was the only legal heir and so the proceeds must be paid only to her. Basilia filed a similar claim,
alleging that since they were named the beneficiaries in the life insurance, they should likewise be entitled to
receive the retirement benefits of Jose.

RATIO

Who among the women who were married to the same man had a better right over the deceased
spouse’s benefits
BOTH WOMEN. Retirement insurance is primarily intended for the benefit of the employee — to provide
for his old age, or incapacity, after rendering service in the government for a required number of years. The
beneficiary of the retirement insurance can only claim the proceeds of the retirement insurance if the
employee dies before retirement. If the employee failed or overlooked to state the beneficiary of his
retirement insurance, the retirement benefits will accrue his estate and will be given to his legal heirs in
accordance with law, as in the case of a life insurance if no beneficiary is named in the insurance policy.

The Court held that since Rosario had not lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband
under the New Civil Code, she is entitled to share in his estate upon his death. As to the second marriage, the
Court noted that the marriage of Basilia to Jose was contracted in good faith. Although the second marriage
can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still
there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the
second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, the only just and equitable solution
in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property
acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage.