Professional Documents
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IN THE MATTER OF :
:
TRICIA MEZZACAPPA, :
Requester :
:
v. : Docket No.: AP 2020-0981
:
WEST EASTON BOROUGH, :
Respondent :
INTRODUCTION
(“Borough”) pursuant to the Right-to-Know Law (“RTKL”), 65 P.S. §§ 67.101 et seq., seeking
records relating to the improper use of Borough funds and missing computers. The Borough
partially denied the Request, asserting that certain information relates to criminal and noncriminal
investigations. The Requester appealed to the Office of Open Records (“OOR”). For the reasons
set forth in this Final Determination, the appeal is granted in part and denied in part, and the
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
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improper use of Borough funds, erroneous garbage bills from January 2016 through
December 2016 which relate to the enclosed document.1
On June 10, 2020, after extending its time to respond by thirty days, see 65 P.S. § 67.902(b)(2),
the Borough partially denied the Request, asserting that certain responsive records are exempt from
public access because they relate to criminal and noncriminal investigations, 65 P.S. §§
67.708(b)(16)-(17).
On June 15, 2020, the Requester appealed to the OOR, challenging the partial denial and
stating grounds for disclosure.2 The Requester argues, in part, that the records provided are
incomplete. The OOR invited both parties to supplement the record and directed the Borough to
notify any third parties of their ability to participate in this appeal. See 65 P.S. § 67.1101(c).
On July 8, 2020, the Borough submitted a position statement, reiterating its grounds for
denial and further stating that portions of the responsive records are protected by the attorney-
client privilege. In support of its position, the Borough submitted the attestation of Joan Heebner
(“Ms. Heebner”), the Borough’s Open Records Officer. On the same day, the Requester made a
submission, asserting that “[t]he records are not exempt because the investigation is clearly long
since over” and that the Borough waived the attorney-client privilege.
On August 27 and September 4, 2020, in response to a request for additional evidence from
the OOR, the Borough submitted the attestations of Ms. Heebner and Steven Goudsouzian, Esq.
submitted a response to the Borough’s submissions, asking that the September 4, 2020 attestation
1
The enclosed document was a letter, dated August 23, 2016, from former Northampton County District Attorney
John Morganelli to the Borough’s Solicitor.
2
During the course of the appeal, the Requester provided the OOR with additional time to issue this Final
Determination. 65 P.S. § 67.1101(b)(1).
2
LEGAL ANALYSIS
“The objective of the Right to Know Law ... is to empower citizens by affording them
access to information concerning the activities of their government.” SWB Yankees L.L.C. v.
Wintermantel, 45 A.3d 1029, 1041 (Pa. 2012). Further, this important open-government law is
scrutinize the actions of public officials and make public officials accountable for their
actions.” Bowling v. Office of Open Records, 990 A.2d 813, 824 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010), aff’d 75
The OOR is authorized to hear appeals for all Commonwealth and local agencies. See 65
P.S. § 67.503(a). An appeals officer is required “to review all information filed relating to the
request” and may consider testimony, evidence and documents that are reasonably probative and
relevant to the matter at issue. 65 P.S. § 67.1102(a)(2). An appeals officer may conduct a hearing
non-appealable. Id.; Giurintano v. Pa. Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 20 A.3d 613, 617 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2011). Here, the parties did not request a hearing, but the Requester asked the OOR to conduct an
in camera review of the withheld records; however, because the OOR has the requisite information
and evidence before it to properly adjudicate the matter, the request for in camera review is denied.
The Borough is a local agency subject to the RTKL that is required to disclose public
records. 65 P.S. § 67.302. Records in the possession of a local agency are presumed public unless
exempt under the RTKL or other law or protected by a privilege, judicial order or decree. See 65
P.S. § 67.305. Upon receipt of a request, an agency is required to assess whether a record requested
is within its possession, custody or control and respond within five business days. 65 P.S. § 67.901.
3
An agency bears the burden of proving the applicability of any cited exemptions. See 65 P.S. §
67.708(b).
Section 708 of the RTKL places the burden of proof on the public body to demonstrate that
a record is exempt. In pertinent part, Section 708(a) states: “(1) The burden of proving that a
record of a Commonwealth agency or local agency is exempt from public access shall be on the
evidence.” 65 P.S. § 67.708(a)(1). Similarly, the burden of proof in claiming a privilege is on the
party asserting that privilege. Levy v. Senate of Pa., 34 A.3d 243, 249 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
Preponderance of the evidence has been defined as “such proof as leads the fact-finder … to find
that the existence of a contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” Pa. State Troopers
Ass’n v. Scolforo, 18 A.3d 435, 439 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011) (quoting Pa. Dep’t of Transp. v. Agric.
Lands Condemnation Approval Bd., 5 A.3d 821, 827 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010)). Likewise, “[t]he
burden of proving a record does not exist ... is placed on the agency responding to the right-to-
know request.” Hodges v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 29 A.3d 1190, 1192 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011).
1. The Borough has demonstrated that one responsive record is protected by the
attorney-client privilege
The Borough asserts that it withheld one responsive record because it is protected under
the attorney-client privilege. The RTKL defines “privilege” as “[t]he attorney-work product
doctrine, the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, the speech and debate privilege
or other privilege recognized by a court interpreting the laws of this Commonwealth.” 65 P.S. §
67.102. In order for the attorney-client privilege to apply, an agency must demonstrate that: 1) the
asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; 2) the person to whom the
communication was made is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate; 3) the
communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client, without the
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presence of strangers, for the purpose of securing either an opinion of law, legal services or
assistance in a legal matter, and not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and 4) the
privilege has been claimed and is not waived by the client. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Fleming, 924 A.2d 1259, 1263-64 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007). The attorney-client privilege protects
communications to and from a client. See Gillard v. AIG Ins. Co., 15 A.3d 44, 59 n.16 (Pa. 2011);
see, e.g., Romig v. Macungie Borough, OOR Dkt. AP 2010-0674, 2010 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 573;
Staley v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer Auth., OOR Dkt. AP 2010-0544, 2010 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS
466; Fikry v. Retirement Bd. of Allegheny Twp., OOR Dkt. AP 2009-1149, 2010 PA O.O.R.D.
LEXIS 19. The Commonwealth Court has confirmed that, after an agency establishes the privilege
was properly invoked under the first three prongs outlined above, the party challenging invocation
of the privilege must prove waiver under the fourth prong. Bagwell v. Pa. Dep’t of Educ., 103
Here, the Borough states that the one withheld record is correspondence to Borough
Council from the Council’s Solicitor, whereby the Borough Council “sought and received advice
from its counsel with regard to matters involving Ms. Gross.” The Borough further contends that
the privilege has not been waived. By way of background, the Borough explains that there were
allegations of “wrongful conduct” by Ms. Gross, who is the former Borough Council President
and one-time acting Borough Manager. In support of its argument that the letter is protected from
disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, the Borough relies on the attestations of Ms. Heebner
5. Th[e] record is in the nature of a one-page letter, dated March 11, 2016 from
the Borough Solicitor … to Borough Council with regard to [the] subject of
Kelly Gross’ role as Emergency Management Coordinator, one of the issues
addressed in then-District Attorney John Morganelli’s letter of August 23,
2016.
5
Under the RTKL, an attestation is competent evidence to sustain an agency’s burden of
proof. See Sherry v. Radnor Twp. Sch. Dist., 20 A.3d 515, 520-21 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2011); Moore
v. Office of Open Records, 992 A.2d 907, 909 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010). In the absence of any
competent evidence that the Borough acted in bad faith, “the averments in [the attestation] should
be accepted as true.” McGowan v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 103 A.3d 374, 382-83 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2014) (citing Office of the Governor v. Scolforo, 65 A.3d 1095, 1103 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2013). Based on the evidence presented, the Borough has demonstrated that the attorney-client
privilege was properly invoked for the responsive letter, as the letter related to the Solicitor’s legal
advice and opinion regarding the alleged misconduct of a former Borough official.
The Requester argues that the privilege has been waived because the Borough “chose to
furnish information in the public domain to the District Attorney….” However, the Requester has
not presented any evidence indicating that the Borough shared the responsive letter with any
outside parties. Accordingly, the Borough has demonstrated that the withheld letter from the
Solicitor to Borough Council is protected by the attorney-client privilege.3 See 65 P.S. § 67.102.
2. The Borough has not demonstrated that certain records relate to a criminal
investigation
The Borough asserts that it withheld one responsive record because it relates to a criminal
investigation. Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL exempts from disclosure “[a] record of an agency
conduct … [and] [i]nvestigative materials, notes, correspondence, videos and reports.” 65 P.S. §§
67.708(b)(16)(i)-(ii).
3
Because the responsive letter is exempt from disclosure under the attorney-client privilege, the OOR need not reach
the Borough’s alternative grounds for denying access. See Jamison v. Norristown Bor. Police Dept., OOR Dkt. AP
2011-1233, 2011 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 927.
6
While jurisdiction of appeals of local agency criminal investigative records normally rests
with the district attorney, 65 P.S. § 67.503(d)(2), a local agency claiming records are exempt under
Section 708(b)(16) does not automatically divest the OOR of jurisdiction over such appeals.
Section 503(d) creates a two-step analysis for determining when cases should be heard by the OOR
and when they should be heard by the appeals officer appointed by a District Attorney. First,
jurisdiction is properly transferred from the OOR to the District Attorney’s Office when an appeal,
on its face, involves records that relate to a criminal investigation (e.g., search warrants, witness
statements, etc.). See Porter v. Allegheny County Sheriff’s Office, OOR Dkt. AP 2014-1910, 2014
PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 1444 (transferring appeal to District Attorney’s Office where the request for
a search warrant was, on its face, related to a criminal investigation). Second, when it is unclear
whether the requested records relate to a criminal investigation, the local agency must provide
some evidence showing how the records relate to a specific criminal investigation. Although a
low threshold for transferring a case is needed, an agency must provide more than a conclusory
affidavit that merely repeats the language of Sections 503(d) and 708(b)(16). See Bush v.
Westtown-East Goshen Police Dep’t, OOR Dkt. AP 2016-1869, 2016 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 1708
(Agency submitted affidavit demonstrating how the requested records related to a specific criminal
investigation); Burgess v. Willistown Twp. Police Dep’t, OOR Dkt. AP 2013-1511, 2013 PA
O.O.R.D. LEXIS 868 (holding that where a local agency made a preliminary showing that records
relate to a criminal investigation, the OOR lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal).
In support of the Borough’s argument, Ms. Heebner and Attorney Goudsouzian both attest
that the withheld record is “a five-page letter, dated May 19, 2016 from [Attorney] Goudsouzian
to then-District Attorney John Morganelli, addressed to the Borough’s claims against Kelly Gross,
their evidence of the same, and a list of potential witnesses.” Thus, the Borough contends that the
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letter is exempt because it is “therefore in the nature of a complaint of potential criminal conduct
submitted to … the Northampton County Office of the District Attorney.” However, “the OOR
will not deprive itself of jurisdiction over appeals … where an entity other than the agency from
which records are requested has conducted the investigation.” Wise v. Borough of Steelton, OOR
Dkt. AP 2015-0063, 2015 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 204. The criminal investigative exemption has
“only been extended to protect the record of an agency carrying out an investigation.” Hayes v.
Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welf., OOR Dkt. AP 2012-0415, 2012 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 530; see also Univ.
of Pittsburgh Medical Center v. City of Pittsburgh, OOR Dkt. AP 2014-0089, 2014 PA O.O.R.D.
LEXIS 186 (holding that records relating to a criminal investigation conducted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation were not exempt from public access under Section 708(b)(16)). Similar
to the case cited above, the criminal investigation in the instant matter was conducted by an entity
other than the Borough. Accordingly, Section 708(b)(16) of the RTKL does not apply to the
records at issue, and the OOR retains jurisdiction over this appeal. See Konias v. Allegheny
3. The Borough had not demonstrated that certain records relate to a noncriminal
investigation
The Borough also argues that the letter sent from its Solicitor to the Northampton County
District Attorney’s Office is exempt from public access because it relates to a noncriminal
investigation. Section 708(b)(17) of the RTKL exempts from disclosure “[a] record of an agency
investigative records exemption, the agency must demonstrate that “a systematic or searching
matter. Pa. Dep’t of Health v. Office of Open Records, 4 A.3d 803, 810-11 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
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2010). Further, the inquiry, examination or probe must be “conducted as part of an agency’s
official duties.” Id. at 814. An official probe only applies to noncriminal investigations conducted
by agencies acting within their legislatively granted fact-finding and investigative powers.
Johnson v. Pa. Convention Center Auth., 49 A.3d 920 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012); see also Pa. Dep’t
In this instance, the Borough acknowledges that the local District Attorney’s Office
conducted the investigation. Specifically, both Ms. Heebner and Attorney Goudsouzian attest that
“[r]ather than conduct the investigation itself, the Borough made a determination to forward the
information to the Office of the District Attorney to review and determine what steps, in any,
should be taken.” The Borough further acknowledges that “the District Attorney’s Office
conducted the investigation pursuant to their official duties, making a systematic or searching
In Hayes v. Pa. Department of Public Welfare, the OOR found that Section 708(b)(17)
only protects records of the agency conducting the investigation. OOR Dkt. AP 2012-0415, 2012
PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 530; see also Bagwell v. Pa. Office of the Governor, OOR Dkt. AP 2013-
1551, 2013 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 1227 (finding records possessed by the agency that relate to an
investigation conducted by a law firm on behalf of a state-related institution are not exempt under
Section 708(b)(17)); Silver v. City of Pittsburgh, OOR Dkt. AP 2013-1395, 2013 PA O.O.R.D.
LEXIS 886.
Here, the Borough acknowledges that it did not conduct the investigation; rather, the local
District Attorney’s Office conducted the investigation. While the Borough’s letter may have been
used as part of the investigation by the District Attorney’s Office, “the presence of an investigation
conducted by another … agency does not transform records existing independently of the
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investigation into non-public records, particularly where the records exist in the possession of an
agency that did not conduct the investigation.” Carter v. Pa. Dep’t of Human Servs., OOR Dkt.
AP 2017-2167, 2018 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 1246; see, e.g., Hockeimer v. City of Harrisburg, OOR
Dkt. AP 2015-1853, 2015 PA O.O.R.D. LEXIS 1655, affirmed by, No. 2015-CV-9289-MP
(Dauph. Com. Pl. Mar. 11, 2016). Therefore, the Borough has not met its burden of proving that
the withheld letter is exempt from disclosure under Section 708(b)(17) of the RTKL. See 65 P.S.
§ 67.708(a)(1).
4. The Borough has demonstrated that no other responsive records exist in the
Borough’s possession, custody or control
The Requester asserts that the records provided are “incomplete.” The Borough, in turn,
contends that other than what has been provided to the Requester and the two withheld letters, no
other responsive records exist in the Borough’s possession, custody or control. In support of the
Borough’s assertion, Ms. Heebner attests that she is “familiar with the records of the Borough”
and that she emailed the Requester “all responsive documents with the exception of a video that
[the Borough] offered to make available on a flash drive, and the two documents exempt from
disclosure under the RTKL.” Ms. Heebner further attests that “[a]ll documents and any other items
not exempt from disclosure have been provided to the Requester in their entirety.” The Requester
proof. See Sherry, 20 A.3d at 520-21; Moore, 992 A.2d at 909. Accordingly, based on the
evidence submitted, the Borough has demonstrated that a search was conducted and that no
additional responsive records exist in the Borough’s possession, custody or control. Hodges, 29
A.3d at 1192.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Requester’s appeal is granted in part and denied in part,
and the Borough is required to provide the Requester with the responsive letter, dated May 19,
2016, within thirty days. This Final Determination is binding on all parties. Within thirty days of
the mailing date of this Final Determination, any party may appeal to the Northampton County
Court of Common Pleas. 65 P.S. § 67.1302(a). All parties must be served with notice of the
appeal. The OOR also shall be served notice and have an opportunity to respond as per Section
1303 of the RTKL. However, as the quasi-judicial tribunal adjudicating this matter, the OOR is
not a proper party to any appeal and should not be named as a party.4 This Final Determination
4
See Padgett v. Pa. State Police, 73 A.3d 644, 648 n.5 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2013).
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