Agustin, Jireh N.

Cases 69-74
Legal Question/
Case Title(s) and Problem/Issue Legal Provision/Legal
citation Presented by the Why is this a Problem? Principle or Rule Involved Conclusion
Case(s)

Rivera v. Heirs of 1. Was it proven that Petitioners are the half – relatives
Villanueva the respondent of Pacita Gonzales – the deceased
G.R. No. 141501 Angelina was the while the respondents are full and
July 21, 2006 illegitmate daughter half – relatives of Romualdo
of Gonzalez? Villanueva. Pacita and Romualdo
cohabited with one another
during the subsistence latters
2. Were the properties marriage with Amanda Musngi
acquired by Gonzales who later died. They (Pacita and
and Villanueva during Romualdo) acquired several
their cohabitation properties together. Gonzales
equally owned by died intestate. Villanueva and
them? Angelina executed a deed of
extrajudicial partition with sale.
The sale was made to Angelina.
Petitioners filed a case for
partition of the estate of Gonzales
but this was dismissed by the trial
courts finding that Gonzales was
never married to Villanueva and
Angelina was her illegitimate
heir to the exclusion of the
petitioners. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
The mere registration of a 1. No. The lower courts ruled
child being adopted does not on the filiation of Angelina
purport to be a valid solely based on her birth
adoption. It is well-settled certificate. But a closer
that a record of birth is examination reveals that the
merely a prima facie respondent was adopted.
evidence of the facts
contained therein. It is not On the claim of biological
conclusive evidence of the filiation, the facts reveal that
truthfulness of the statements Angelina could not have been
made there by the interested the biological daughter of
parties. Gonzales as Gonzales at the
  time of the alleged birth of
Following the logic Angelina was at the verge of
of Benitez v. CA, respondent menopause, and for 20 years
Angelina and her co- Gonzales had been living
defendants in SD-857 should childless.
have adduced evidence of her
adoption, in view of 2. Qualified. The property
the contents of her birth relations during the 36 years
certificate.  of cohabitation is not
governed by A.144 as there
was an impediment to their
possible marriage. The
existence of Amanda Musngi.
Thus, no co-ownership exists
 in their favor for the
properties acquired while
Amanda Musngi was still
alive. Thus only the actual
contribution of Gonzales can
be attributed to her. But no
evidence of such actual
contribution was presented.
For the parcel of land
registered solely in Gonzales’
name which was acquired
between 1927 and 1963 shall
accrue to the petitioners as
the title was never challenged
the registration making the
title valid and unrebutted.

The property acquired after

Musngi’s death and registered
in the names of Villanueva
and Gonzales will be
governed by co-ownership
pursuant to A144 of the Civil
Code. Half of it should
pertain to Gonzales and the
other to Villanueva.

Maloles vs Court Is the nephew a On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Art. 842 of the Civil Code No. The private respondent
of Appeals compulsory heir of Santos, filed a petition for provides: herein is not an heir or
G.R. No. 129505 the deceased? probate of his will in the legatee under the will of the
January 31, 2000 Regional Trial Court. In his One who has no compulsory decedent Arturo de Santos.
petition, he alleged that he had no heirs may dispose by will of Neither is he a compulsory
compulsory heirs; that he had
named in his will as sole legatee
and devisee the Arturo de Santos
Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed
by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less
than P2,000,000.00; and that
copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix,
private respondent Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips.
The court issued an order
granting the petition and allowing
the will. After the death of the
testator, petitioner Octavio S.
Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention claiming that, as the
only child of Alicia de Santos
(testator's sister) and Octavio L.
Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-
blooded nephew and nearest of
kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise
alleged that he was a creditor of
the testator. Petitioner thus prayed
for the reconsideration of the
order allowing the will and the
issuance of letters of
administration in his name.
all his estate or any part of itheir of the latter. As the only
in favor of any person having and nearest collateral relative
capacity to succeed. One who of the decedent, he can inherit
has compulsory heirs may from the latter, only in case of
dispose of his estate provided intestacy. Since the decedent
he does not contravene the has left a will which has
provisions of this Code with already been probated and
regard to the legitimate of disposes of all his properties
said heirs. the private respondent can
inherit only if the said will is
Compulsory heirs are limited annulled. His interest in the
to the testators - decedent's estate is, therefore,
(1) Legitimate children and not direct or immediate.
descendants, with respect to
their legitimate parents and His claim to being a creditor
ascendants; of the estate is a belated one,
(2) In default of the having been raised for the
foregoing, legitimate parents first time only in his reply to
and ascendants, with respect the opposition to his motion
to their legitimate children to intervene, and, as far as the
and descendants; records show, not supported
(3) The widow or widower; by evidence.
(4) Acknowledged natural
children, and natural children Even if petitioner is the
by legal fiction; nearest next of kin of Dr. De
(5) Other illegitimate children Santos, he cannot be
referred to in Article 287 of considered an "heir" of the
the Civil Code. testator. It is a fundamental
rule of testamentary
succession that one who has
no compulsory or forced heirs
may dispose of his entire
estate by will. Petitioner, as

Mendoza v Delos Are the subject The properties subject in the
Santos properties not instant case are three parcels of
GR No 176422, reservable properties, land located in Sta. Maria,
March 20, 2013 coming as they do Bulacan are presently in the name
from the family line of respondent Julia Delos Santos
of the petitioners (respondent). Lot No. 1646-B, on
mendozas? the other hand, is also in the
name of respondent but co-
owned by Victoria Pantaleon,
who bought one-half of the
property from petitioner Maria
Mendoza and her siblings.
Petitioners are grandchildren of
Placido Mendoza (Placido) and
Dominga Mendoza (Dominga).
Petitioners alleged that the
properties were part of Placido
To be valid and effective, a
waiver must be couched in
clear and unequivocal terms
which leave no doubt as to
the intention of a party to
give up a right or benefit
which legally pertains to him.
A waiver may not be
attributed to a person when
its terms do not explicitly and
clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right.
Moreover, article 1044 of the
Civil Code, provides: “Any
person having the free
disposal of his property may
accept or repudiate an
nephew of the testator, is not
a compulsory heir who may
have been preterited in the
testator's will. Nor does he
have any right to intervene in
the settlement proceedings
based on his allegation that he
is a creditor of the deceased.
Since the testator instituted or
named an executor in his will,
it is incumbent upon the
Court to respect the desires of
the testator.
Reserva troncal is not
applicable. Julia, who now
holds the properties in
dispute, is not the other
ascendant within the purview
of Article 891 of the Civil
Code
Reserva troncal is a special
rule designed primarily to
assure the return of a
reservable property to the
third degree relatives
belonging to the line from
which the property originally
came, and avoid its being
dissipated into and by the
relatives of the inheriting
ascendant. 
and Dominga’s properties that inheritance.
were subject of an oral partition It should be pointed out that
and subsequently adjudicated to Any inheritance left to minors the ownership of the
Exequiel. After Exequiel’s death, or incapacitated persons may properties should be reckoned
it passed on to his spouse Leonor be accepted by their parents only from Exequiel’s as he is
and only daughter, Gregoria. or guardians. Parents or the ascendant from where the
After Leonor’s death, her share guardians may repudiate the first transmission occurred, or
went to Gregoria. In 1992, inheritance left to their wards from whom Gregoria
Gregoria died intestate and only by judicial inherited the properties in
without issue. They claimed that authorization.” dispute. The law does not go
after Gregoria’s death, farther than such
respondent, who is Leonor’s ascendant/brother/sister in
sister, adjudicated unto herself all determining the lineal
these properties as the sole character of the property. It
surviving heir of Leonor and was also immaterial for the
Gregoria. Hence, petitioners CA to determine whether
claim that the properties should Exequiel predeceased Placido
have been reserved by respondent and Dominga or whether
in their behalf and must now Gregoria predeceased
revert back to them, applying Exequiel.
Article 891 of the Civil Code on
reserva troncal. What is pertinent is that
Exequiel owned the
The RTC granted their action for properties and he is the
Recovery of Possession by ascendant from whom the
Reserva Troncal, Cancellation of properties in dispute
TCT and Reconveyance. The CA originally came. Gregoria, on
reversed and set aside the RTC the other hand, is the
decision and dismissed the descendant who received the
complaint filed by petitioners. The properties from Exequiel by
CA also denied their motion for gratuitous title.
reconsideration. Article 891 simply requires
that the property should have
 been acquired by the
descendant or prepositus from
an ascendant by gratuitous or
lucrative title. A transmission
is gratuitous or by gratuitous
title when the recipient does
not give anything in return.18
At risk of being repetitious,
what was clearly established
in this case is that the
properties in dispute were
owned by Exequiel
(ascendant). After his death,
Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus)
acquired the properties as
inheritance.

Article 891 provides that the

person obliged to reserve the
property should be an
ascendant (also known as the
reservor/reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia,
however, is not Gregoria’s
ascendant; rather, she is
Gregoria’s collateral relative.

Gonzales vs Are the subject Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the In reserva troncal: In the instant case, the
Legarda properties reservable son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, (1) a descendant inherited or properties in question were
G.R. No. L-34395 properties? died on June 17, 1933. He was acquired by gratuitous title indubitably reservable
May 19, 1981 survived by his widow, Filomena property from an ascendant or properties in the hands of
Races, and their seven children.
The real properties left by Benito
Legarda y Tuason were
partitioned in three equal portions
by his daughters, Consuelo and
Rita, and the heirs of his
deceased son Benito Legarda y
De la Paz who were represented
by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena
Legarda y Races died intestate
and without issue on 1943. Her
sole heiress was her mother,
Filomena Races Vda. deLegarda.
Mrs. Legarda executed an
affidavit adjudicating
extrajudicially to herself the
properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter. Mrs.
Legarda executed two
handwritten identical documents
wherein she disposed of the
properties, which she inherited
from her daughter, in favor of the
children of her sons, Benito,
Alejandro and Jose (sixteen
grandchildren in all). Mrs.
Legarda died on September 22,
1967. Her will was admitted to
probate as a holographic will. In
the testate proceeding, Beatriz
Legarda Gonzales, one of the
daughters of the testatrix, filed a
motion to exclude from the
from a brother or sister;
(2) the same property is
inherited by another
ascendant or is acquired by
him by operation of law from
the said descendant, and
(3) the said ascendant should
reserve the said property for
the benefit of relatives who
are within the third degree
from the deceased descendant
(prepositus) and who belong
to the line from which the
said property came.
Mrs. Legarda. Undoubtedly,
she was a reservor. The
reservation became a
certainty when at the time of
her death the reservees or
relatives within the third
degree of the prepositus
Filomena Legarda were living
or they survived Mrs.
Legarda.
We hold that Mrs. Legarda
could not convey in her
holographic will to her
sixteen grandchildren the
reservable properties which
she had inherited from her
daughter Filomena because
the reservable properties did
not form part of her estate.
Article 891 clearly indicates
that the reservable properties
should be inherited by all the
nearest relatives within the
third degree from the
prepositus who in this case
are the six children of Mrs.
Legarda. She could not select
the reservees to whom the
reservable property should be
given and deprive the other
reservees of their share
therein.
 inventory of her mother's estate
the properties which she inherited
from her deceased daughter,
Filomena, on the ground that said
properties are reservable
properties which should be
inherited by Filomena Legarda's
three sisters and three brothers
and not by the children of Benito,
Alejandro and Jose.

Aglibot vs Who is entitled to the The allegations of the complaint Article 891 of the New Civil It is clear from the facts of the
Mañalac land which Anacleto are that the Aglibots inherited the Code provides that the case that the land in question
G.R. No. L- Mañalac inherited property subject matter thereof ascendant who inherits from is reservable property in
14530, 4 S 1030 from his daughter, from their deceased niece Juliana his descendant any property accordance with the
April 25, 1962 Juliana, as between Mañalac; that upon the death of which the latter may have provisions of Article 811 of
appellees (sisters of AnacletoMañalac, father of acquired by gratuitous title the Spanish Civil Code (Art.
Maria Aglibot, first Juliana, the defendants took from another ascendant, or a 891 of the New Civil Code).
wife of Anacleto possession of said property, brother or sister, is obliged to Both parties now admit that
Mañalac), on the one claimed it as their own and had reserve such property as he the entire parcel covered by
hand, and appellants since then appropriated for may have acquired by Original Certificate of Title
(Anacleto's second themselves all the palay annually operation of law for the No. 10 belonged to the
wife and their harvested therefrom amounting to benefit of relatives who are conjugal partnership of the
children), on the 30 cavanes; that within the third degree and spouses AnacletoMañalac
other? nothwithstanding demands made who belong to the line from and Maria Aglibot; that upon
upon said defendants by the which said property came. the death of the latter on
Aglibots, they had refused to October 2, 1906, their only
surrender the property to the daughter, Juliana Mañalac,
latter. In their answer, appellants inherited one-half of the
alleged substantially the property, the other pertaining
following as affirmative defense: to her father as his share in
that the land in question was the conjugal partnership; that
purchased from Esteban Garcia upon the death of Juliana
by the spouses AnacletoMañalac
and Maria Aglibot for P1,000.00;
that when Maria Aglibot died,
only P300.00 of this amount had
been paid; that the remaining
P700.00 was paid to the vendor
during the marriage of
AnacletoMañalac and appellant
Andrea Acay; that Juliana
Mañalac, the only daughter of
Anacleto and his first wife, died
in 1920, while Anacleto died in
1942; that upon his death, his
widow, Andrea Acay, and their
children acquired the property in
question as his sole legal heirs.
Their answer likewise claimed
the sum of P1,000.00 as
attorney's fees by way of
counterclaim.
Mañalac on October 2, 1920
without leaving any
descendant, her father
inherited her one-half portion
of said property. Therefore,
Anacleto Mañalac was
obliged to reserve the portion
he had thus inherited from his
daughter, for the benefit of
appellees, Leona and Evarista
Aglibot, aunts of Juliana on
the maternal side and who
are, therefore, her relative
within the third degree
belonging to the line from
which said property came.
Appellants' contention that
the major portion of the
purchase price of the land in
question was paid to the
original owner, Esteban
Garcia, after the death of
Maria Aglibot is rendered
clearly untenable not only by
the lack of sufficient evidence
to this effect but also by the
very significant circumstance
that the property was titled in
the name of AnacletoMañalac
"married to Maria Aglibot"
— circumstance that strongly
indicates that said spouses
had acquired full ownership

Solivio vs Court Are the subject Esteban Javellana, Sr., married
of Appeals properties reservable SalustiaSolivio on December
G.R. No. 83484 properties? 1916 or barely ten months before
February 12, his death. SalustiaSolivio brought
1990 paraphernal properties to the
marriage. Salustia died on
October 11, 1959, leaving all her
properties to her only child,
Esteban Jr., including a house
and lot where she, her son, and
her sister had lived. The titles of
all the properties were transferred
in the name of Esteban Jr. During
the lifetime of Esteban, he
expressed his plan to place his
estate in a foundation to help the
poor and deserving students
obtain a college degree to honour
his mother. However, he died on
February 26, 1977, single and
without issue. Petitioner and
Article 891 of the New Civil
Code provides that the
ascendant who inherits from
his descendant any property
which the latter may have
acquired by gratuitous title
from another ascendant, or a
brother or sister, is obliged to
reserve such property as he
may have acquired by
operation of law for the
benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and
who belong to the line from
which said property came.
thereof during the lifetime of
Maria Aglibot. The remaining
contention of appellants that
the lower court should have
ordered appellees to refund to
them 50% of the annual realty
tax paid on the property
cannot be sustained, this
matter having been raised by
them for the first time on
appeal.
No, the property of the
decedent is not a reservable
property. In order for a
property to be reservable, the
property must be inherited by
an ascendant from his
descendant which the
descendant has acquired such
property by gratuitous title
from another ascendant or a
brother or sister. The
decedent in this case is not an
ascendant but a descendant of
the origin of the property,
mother of the descedent,
therefore the principle of
reservatroncal does not find
applicability in this case.
Private Respondent entered into
an agreement to put all the
properties of the decedent to a
foundation, just as planned by the
decedent. Petitioner later filed a
petition to declare herself as the
sole heir of the deceased on the
ground that the properties of the
estate of the decedent came from
her sister, mother of the decedent,
and that she was the decedent’s
nearest relative by degree on his
mother’s side. After being
declared as such, she proceeded
to put up the foundation.
However, respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the
declaration of petitioner as the
sole heir claiming that she too,
respondent, was a heir of the
deceased.