Aristotle On Corrective Justice PDF

Aristotle on Corrective Justice
Author(s): Thomas C. Brickhouse

Source: The Journal of Ethics , September 2014, Vol. 18, No. 3 (September 2014), pp.
187-205
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/43895870
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J Ethics (2014) 18:187-205
DOI 1 0. 1 007/s 1 0892-0 1 4-9 1 64-3
Aristotle on Corrective Justice
Thomas C. Brickhouse
Received: 6 April 20 14 /Accepted: 8 April 2014 /Published online: 5 June 2014

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014
Abstract This paper argues against the view favored by many contemporary
scholars that corrective justice in the Nicomachean Ethics is essentially compensatory
and in favor of a bifunctional account according to which corrective justice aims at
equalizing inequalities of both goods and evils resulting from various interactions
between persons. Not only does the account defended in this paper better explain the
broad array of examples Aristotle provides than does the standard interpretation, it also
better fits Aristotle's general definition of what is just. In the last section, the paper
argues, again against the standard interpretation, that proportional reciprocity, the kind
of justice discussed in Nicomachean Ethics V.5, has two forms and is closely linked to
corrective justice. Although corrective justice and proportional reciprocity are con-
ceptually distinct and do different work in Aristotle' s political philosophy, instances of
proportional reciprocity are instantiated by instances of corrective justice. This link-
age, the paper concludes, helps to explain why Aristotle would assign corrective
justice such a prominent place in his theory of justice.
Keywords Compensatory justice • Corrective justice • Line analogies •

Proportional reciprocity • Punishment
In Nicomachean Ethics (NE), V.4, Aristotle takes up corrective justice

(6top0G)Tiicòv ÔiKaiov), the part of particular justice that is concerned with the
rectification of injustices from what he calls "interactions" (CTDvaAAay|xaxa)
between persons. Aristotle never spells out just what interactions are, but he does
state that interactions can be voluntary or involuntary (NE, 1131al-3, 1131b25-26).
Judging from the numerous examples he gives of each (NE, 1 1 31al-9), voluntary
interactions are exchanges of goods and involuntary interactions are harms done
T. C. Brickhouse (13)
Lynchburg College, Lynchburg, VA, USA
e-mail: Brickhouse@lynchburg.edu
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188 T. C. Brickhouse
voluntarily to oth
inequality that ca
that has wrongly
(Çt1|axcl), that ha
It falls to a judge
Counting the part
loss (ÇT1|iia) on t
and the initial loss
So just how does
the injustice and r
behind the idea th
Bostock writes: "S
quo; the offender
restored to the vic
"...corrective justic
(or its fungible e
striking that 'equa
the status quo bef
by H. Curzer: " Re
must be compelled
logos) for rectific
injustice state (11
porary secondary
deserves to be call
It is not difficult
Aristotle twice re
judge should recti
The judge brings

segments, and th
(tout') is added t
divided, people s
what is equal (to
H. Joachim's note is
relation which comes t
Interactions that are "by
one" are involuntary.
loss, they seem to be r
2 Bostock (2000, p. 6
3 Young (2006, pp. 1
4 Brown (2009, note o
5 Cruzer (2012, pp. 2
6For other endorsem
Rowe (2002, p. 36), E
7 In preparing the tran
Urmson after Ross (2
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Aristotle on Corrective Justice 189
Supporters of the standard inte

way of understanding what t
more than one party should ha
taken away, to the other party
before the inequality was creat
embarrassingly simplistic, but it
the injured party.
But even if acceptance of the
universal. Years ago, J. Burnet
view," calling it a "childish doct
interaction equality, accordin
different ways depending on w
interaction. When applied to the
to be exchanged be determined
standard by which to judge whe
involuntary interactions, accor
injury - presumably a material
harm specified by the law. Cor
punishment equal to what is
suffered by the victim and the
the injury.9
So, for Burnet, corrective justice is Afunctional10; it operates in different ways
depending on whether the inequality to be corrected involves a voluntary or an
involuntary interaction. Burnet's reading of V.4, however, never garnered much
support.11 If Burnet is right, Aristotle does not get around to the application of
corrective justice to voluntary exchanges until after the introduction of proportional
reciprocity in V.5. But that discussion has to do primarily with the way mutual need
(Xpeia) determines whether an exchange takes place (NE, 1 133a25-31) and so it is
hard to see what role a virtue plays in the determination of a fair price. Moreover, in
V.4 Aristotle is clear that a party to an exchange of goods is free to get as much as
anyone is willing to pay for what she has on offer (NE, 1 132b 1 1-16). Barring fraud
or deceit, which would make the interaction involuntary, corrective justice simply is
not in the business of determining what is fair prior to a mutual agreement to
exchange. In interactions of this sort, when corrective justice is called for, it is
See Burnet (1900, note on xo'3 p^ápouç xt|v 6xa<popav, pp. 218-219).
9 Burnet (Burnet 1900, note on éíiáv -yap x.xX, p. 221). For example, in a failed but attempted murder
the actual injury may be minimal, or even nonexistent, though the moral harm is considerable. On the
other hand, serious physical injury to one party may be the result of a moment of careless on the part of
the agent.
10 Aristotle employs two terms during the discussion: "6iop0coxxxóv" (NE, 1 131al, 1 13 lb25, 1 132b4)
and "eTtavopOcoxiKov" (NE, 1 132a 18, 1 132b24). Burnet takes the former to be a broad term that refers
to any "adjustment" and so to equalizing before an exchange of goods and to equalizing after an
involuntary interaction. The latter refers to equalizing only after an involuntary interaction. (Burnet 1900,
note on 6xop0íoxixóv, p. 213.).
11 One notable exception is Joachim, who writes, "...I think that on the whole Burnet is on the right
lines." (Joachim 1951, p. 146).
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applicable only aft

parties to meet th
Burnet's view of
problematic. In th
injury and wrong,
cases, where they
even in those cases
wrong committed,
arithmetic mean.
Burnet bases this
difference regardin
as equals." Burnet
between the betwe
interpretation will
is to ascertain the
before and after t
Kraut has also def
sort. One function
cases, the wrongdo
indeed, "the more
made to suffer."14
restore them to a
not provide for the
are no longer bein
cases, accordingly,
exclusively on rect
that there can be i
well. When these m
the judge is requir
the goods they are
one party has rece
it that the conditi
paid, or not paid in
So Kraut's accoun
Burnet's reading, i
understandable. In
12 Hardie (1968, p. 194

13 For additional criti
14 Kraut (2002, p. 149
15 Kraut (2002, p. 149).
under the law" in the dis
importance of "equality
according to Pericles, th
goods (See Thucydides,
applies to neither distr
16 Kraut (2002, p. 154
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without argument" that what

equality" (to Síkouov ļjiaov te
involved (oîç) and their respe
divisible goods and evils (NE,
doesnot seek to restore the part
may be the result. Rather, it re
shares of something, or the val
Moreover, Kraut never addresse
to explain away - the textual
scholars. Proponents of the s
explanation of how imposing
longer either the gain and loss.
act of retribution th ensures that
hardly clear how such a punishm
suffer (NE, 11 32b 18-20). Nor i
uneven lines analogies. How is "
this to the shorter segment"
1132a27) supposed to be like p
Kraut thinks that the equalit
involuntary interaction is equal
voluntary interaction is an equ
senses of "equality," but it seem
justice brings about equality i
injustice it is addressing, withou
that the same analysis of rectif
to the other" - is meant to app
standard interpretation maintain
In spite of my concerns with
believe a bifunctional interpret
than does the standard interpret
the standard interpretation, I a
goods or evils for the parties in
addressed is voluntary or invo
analogies, m I argue that they are
fully supports my understandin
consistent with my interpretatio
account I defend here bears im
17 For other criticisms of Kraut, see K

18 It will become clear that I think (a) bo
involuntary interactions calls for retrib
applied to voluntary interactions equaliz
also right to point out the connection be
proportional reciprocity. But I will ar
involuntary interactions yields equality
and proportional reciprocity is at best i
any other rival account.
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reciprocity" (to à
introduces in V.5
1132b31-33, also
I will argue that i
which is how it is
normative princip
forms, each one c
justice achieves e
equality, whether
forms of proporti
"hold the commun
assigns to propor
important role in
generally apprecia
1 Problems with
If Aristotle really
V.4 is remarkably
various wrongful
1132a8) obviously c
ante is to be restor
that is to be comp
estate for a wrong
respect to some go
Even if we set a
Aristotle's part,21
the uneven lines an
segments. This tim
CC/which are equa
segment CD, so th
it exceeds BB/by
Those who regard prop

194), Ross (Ross 1923
(1988, pp. 429-430). A
Aristotle's theory can
20 For examples, see B
21 This is the way Bo
examples.
22 Ross, reprinted in Brown (2009, note on 1132b, p. 230).
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A E A /
B B /
D C F C /
Since the segment AE, whic

correspond to the Çi1|xta
correspond to the icepÔoç,
understood.
Now it is true that the co
requirement of the analog
understood as consisting of a
perhaps even safety. Injustic
goods can be "taken from" on
example, that properly belon
use the second line analogy,
AA /. When this is done, CC
Unfortunately for the stand
tions at the end of V.2 Arist
bearing false witness (NE, 1
The problem these injustices
notion of compensating the
Plainly, adulterers, hotheads
problem is that whatever is g
in every case - something ide
If the victim of an assault
compensation, it is obviously
from the interaction that is
assumption that loss is alway
interactions - interactions th
requirement that gain equals
A defender compensa of the
on a misunderstanding of "Ké
the gain is only what the par
advantage realized by the per
injustice is better off as a resu
loss and he has not paid what
compensates the victim for
the assault, S's gain is $10,0
Even this understanding o
standard interpretation with
if KépSoç does not include
corrective justice restores th
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good that restores

proper measure, in
away the gain rel
case just cited, fo
had before the in
compensation is p
Now a comment
equalizing uneve
corrective justice
Whenever one tak

other, the one ex
had taken away (à
the other, the o
exceeds the inter
from which the
taken away from
less. (NE, 1132a3
The first line of t

two equals is added
two units. So, if t
standard view insi
acquisition of that
other words, if th
before the injustic
he was before the
loss of a compens
suffering the loss
interpretation, the
A final problem f
criticism of the c
Apparently, Aris
addressed. Accord
justice without qu
that "true justice"
return the very th
reciprocity of thi
that someone who
good deeds done f
Pythagorean, unq
make the point, h
strikes someone,
officeholder, he o
23 Whether Aristotle i
the doubters, see Eng
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KoXacOrjvai, NE, 1 132b29-30) Sch

è%(ùv holds,24 but there is genera
official who strikes someone in th
justified in striking back if so
position, ought not be struck in r
corrective justice because the noti
and too little. It requires too much
(NE, 1132b28) requires that the
someone be struck in return, whi
"suffering in return what one d
suffer the same blow in return h
hisway to add, "[the assailant] ou
thislast point that tells against th
made it clear that Pythagorean ju
There is nothing whatever, then,
the officeholder's assailant des
response to the assault does accord
punished as well." This is obvio
interpretation.25
It should
clear at this point t be
problems. because of the lan Still,
to" the other, we might think th
Aristotle had in mind and either
analogies or he intended correc
application. Perhaps, then, we sho
the standard interpretation and
After all, Aristotle is fairly noto
point. But before we draw either
possibility that xépSoç and Çt1|x
good which can be transferred fr
2 Two Kinds of Gain and Loss
As we have seen, the goal of corrective justice is to nullify gain and loss an
reestablish a just relationship. When Aristotle first introduces the notions of
and loss, he explicitly states that both can be understood in two ways: "An
24 Bostock (2000, p. 63) takes a0rxh'n elxwn to be someone functioning as a policeman. Pakaluk
p. 194) claims the referent is a "government official." Burnet (1900, note on olov ei k.tX, p. 224) thi
Aristotle has a military officer in mind.
25 Bostock (2000, p. 63) recognizes that the passage makes sense only if Aristotle is pointing out
response on the part of the judge would fit corrective justice. Bostock, a proponent of the sta
interpretation, simply suggests that "Aristotle himself fails to notice this fact." Brown, another prop
of the standard interpretation, also notices the problem and argues that the discussion of the assault o
officeholder is "an important qualification to the account in Chap. 4." (See Brown 2009, note on 1 1 32
23 1 .) It is hard to see how punishment for this sort of wrongdoing can be a "qualification" of any s
compensatory view of rectification.
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equality is a mean (
and loss are more an
and sometimes (5'
èvavxiov, NE, 1132
he presumably mea
of what is good tha
loss can be just the
equal, it is natural t
equal, and inthose
corresponding loss
The fact that gain
possibility that w
interaction that cal
involuntary interac
corrective justice is
to this interpretati
difference in the v
value is determin
obviously an inequa
she bargained for b
in trade. In this cas
has received what h
owes. After an invo
determined, the tas
of some sort - is co
that penalty on th
exemplified by Ari
beaten and punishe
We can see what th
"everyone underst
construed as "as a
between the value
something (èv oîç,
interaction is a matt
interaction it is a m
sort on the wrongd
are counted as of
person and his shar
part of particular j
about equality. Wh
depends upon the n
does corrective just
the rectification of
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matter of having the wrongdo

victim.26
Obviously, the case of what the officeholder's assailant deserves is important
partial confirmation of my reading of NE, V.4. But someone might well object that
taking the punishment of the officeholder's assailant to be an instance of corrective
justice must be a mistake, for the passage clearly implies the same injury, being
struck, may or may not constitute a harm depending upon who did the striking and
who was struck.27 Aristotle is clear, however, that one thing that distinguishes
distributive justice from corrective justice is that the former allows for the parties to
whom allotments are made to be treated as having different merits and hence as
unequals (NE, 1132a24-29), whereas, as we have just seen, corrective justice
requires that the parties involved be treated as equals. Since the officeholder's
assailant and the officeholder are not treated as equals, according to this objection,
the example cannot reasonably be seen as an instance of corrective justice after all.
If Aristotle is to hold onto his distinction between the equalities that constitute
distributive and corrective justice, whatever the point of the example of the
officeholder and the person who struck him, it cannot be to illustrate corrective
justice.
The objection overlooks the distinction between the law's interest in classifica-
tions of persons for the purpose of determining what is or is not to be considered a
harm and favoring some individuals over others once the determination has been
made that a wrong has been committed. The law may well state that lying to a
policeman who is conducting an investigation is an injustice, while lying to one's
spouse, who is conducting an investigation of another sort, is not, or that assaulting
a child is worse than assaulting a priest, which is worse than assaulting an
officeholder, which is worse than assaulting an ordinary adult citizen. Once the
determination that a harm has occurred, say, the assaulting of a priest by an ordinary
citizen, other questions about the character or past deeds or the political affiliation
of the individuals involved are not to be raised. Thus, the harm done by a good
person qua citizen assaulting a bad person qua citizen is the same that done by a bad
person qua citizen by assaulting a good person qua citizen. The harm done a good
person qua citizen assaulting an officeholder, who happens to be a bad person,
however, is more serious than any assault of any mere citizen by any other mere
citizen. Thus, when Aristotle states, "The law looks only at the difference [caused
by] the harm, and treats them as equals," (NE, 1 132a4-5) I take him to mean that the
law looks first to the harm, the determination of which may involve the status or
26 Broadie (2002, p. 36) maintains that Aristotle recognizes rectification through punishment, but that he
does not distinguish between that and rectification through "forced reparation." It is hard to believe,
however, that Aristotle would not recognize the important difference between the two. Moreover, Broadie
states nothing about how Aristotle's remarks in V.4 apply to the rectification of injustices from voluntary
and involuntary interactions. Pakuluk (2005, p. 196) seems to hold the same view as Broadie: rectification
can come "...by taking goods away from the offender and restoring them to the victim, or by simply
punishing the offender." But like Broadie, Pakaluk nowhere explains how Aristotle's comments,
especially the line analogies, are supposed to fit such very different ways of rectifying.
27 A similar objection is raised against Kraut by Keyt (2003), which, if valid, would also apply to my
interpretation.
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legal classification
been made about w
A more troubling
evils for evils - is t
analogies, which A
injustices (NE, 1 1
equalizing of good
interpretation und
this to the other."
equally to the bifu
inflicting an evil o
When Aristotle in
thinking about a
Accordingly, by "t
he is thinking abo
single line divided
are segments of on
is adding to the ot
making the other,
becomes part of a
thereby lengthene
segment exceeds th
mean that taking
loss.
If gain correspond
of a single line , w
that the party wh
good or evil, for j
Since the party w
gain the judge ha
making the good h
party. Just as to b
other segment, so
just is to have an a
against my interp
strongly supports i
Still, does not th
interpretation and
the uneven segmen
divided into unequ
the first of which
Ross' illustration a
is something that "
the one having les
the shorter, and
possibly equalize e
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Because Aristotle separates the

in the first analogy, namely to
lengthening EA/. Does this not
taking something from one par
other, and if so, is not that ve
claims is, and I claim is not, A
Now it would be odd if in the
equalizing different segments
make one equal to half withou
second to ask us to think abou
same line, where it would be p
to the other. Moreover, now
transferring anything. Instead,
to a
third, BB/, the point of w
recognize what is to be taken f
less" (xoiftco &pa yvcopio')|i8v x
rcpoaOeivai xćo sAxxxxov ë%ovx
DC/ and EA//, in order to com
which the first is less than the
the third. By separating the s
then, Aristotle is showing us t
gain is equal to that which wou
is somewhat different from the first. But the second is nonetheless consistent with
my interpretation, according to which what is to be "taken away" and "added to" is
what is owed and what is owed is what equalizes. After a voluntary interaction, what
is owed is a good that will then equalize the parties and after an involuntary
interaction what is owed is the suffering of an evil that will then equalize the parties.
Perhaps an opponent will wish to press two further apparent difficulties. The first
concerns Aristotle's mention of wrongful killings as examples harms to be rectified.
We saw that these pose an obvious problem the standard interpretation. Does my
interpretation do any better? It does, for according to my interpretation the judge is
to aim at establishing an equal relationship between two parties and the goods or
evils they have received after an injustice. After an involuntary interaction, all that
is required is that, assuming that the parties are counted as equal, the evil suffered
by the one is equal to the evil that had been suffered by the other. Whether the party
who has lost is aware that the injustice has been rectified is irrelevant. If so, my
account shows how wrongful killings as examples of injustices to be rectified fit
Aristotle's view as well as any of his other examples.
The second difficulty concerns a passage occurring at the end of V.4, NE, 1 132bl3-
16, which, though brief, may be taken as decisive evidence against my interpretation
and in favor of the standard interpretation. Here Aristotle explains that the terms
"gain" and "loss" actually come from voluntary transactions such as buying and
selling. We say that someone "gained" when he got the better bargain and someone
"lost" when she underestimated the value of the goods she gave up. On the other hand,
when two people exchange things of the same value and so there is neither more nor
less, "people say they got what they deserved (xà aùxcov) and there is neither gaining
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nor losing. So jus

involuntary [for
interaction] (NE, 1
standard interpret
'equalizing' is to m
offense."28 Brown
respect before an i
the respect in whic
saying that the tas
But we need not r
corrective justice
injustice, and that
am ©v) after the
According to my
voluntary intera
estimations of the
they to deserve is
from a voluntary
respect to their re
kind, then, there i
what it is importan
that there is again
correction of an i
worse off, there i
evils, they are equ
equal basis with th
require my interpr
3 Corrective Jus
I now want to argu

and evils has an im
(tò ávTi7C67tov0ò
introduces in V.5
assailant deserved
fits with distribut
that distributive a
In spite of the fac
contradicted by th
the standard interp
justice, which is
justice.29 Accordin
28 Brown (2009, comm

29 See note 19.
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this newly introduced justice ob

are exchanged voluntarily. This
V.5, has nothing to do with eit
I believe we should reject this
favor of one that links it closel
reasons for doubting that propo
corrective justice. Correspon
distribution and correction are
kinds of equality, geometric
1132al-2). But although propor
that is, a form of what is just
choose it. If a farmer and a cob
an instance of proportional rec
exchange. Whether either is
1133a25-29), depends in part
the other is offering. If there
distribution and in rectification
reciprocity does not explains w
reciprocity, however we unders
this difference between distrib
and proportional reciprocity, o
reciprocity does not function a
just in distribution and what is
Moreover, it is simply a mi
concerned exclusively with equ
it is "proportional doing in ret
communities for exchange t
following explanation of its
evil for evil, otherwise [their c
for good, otherwise exchange d
exchange" (NE, 1132b34-1133a
evils, there are two types of pr
to receive goods for goods prov
with evils, and both are tied to
respect to the desire to exchang
involved in an exchange has re
the desire for having an evil re
suffered at the hands of anoth
30 As noted, I am agreement with Krau

We differ about the extent of the linka
31 In spite of what is suggested in V.5,
are one form of proportional reciproci
voluntary interaction can exchange. I
àvxutB7rov0óç) and he makes it explicit
What is different is that in the Politic
from different stations in life presuma
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wrongdoer. Accor
these just relation
comparable goods
Earlier, I argued
Aristotle's genera
and their respecti
now be obvious th
correspond to the
goods that have b
goods and evils th
cancels gain and lo
reciprocal repaym
involuntary inter
instantiate correct
is important to s
different work in
goods to the satisf
are not instance
establishing equal
we have seen, Ari
when it rectifies a
of corrective jus
reciprocity, by co
with others. It is
common to all citi
goods bargained fo
another avenged. A
involuntary intera
instances of corre
mistake to conclud
at vengeance or th
If I am right abo
linked, corrective
communities. Wh
communities for
joining in a comm
To the extent they
suffered requited,
has already noted
1 126a7-8), and are
Kraut writes: "...in so

suffer some punishm
reciprocity, nor does h
kind of equality. (See
33 In the Rhetoric (136
person harmed.
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Although Aristotle does not exp

such anger is directed not only
at the community itself for no
"even." Someone who is angry
of the community's various go
satisfy - even if not fully - th
not to do so will incline the vi
Aristotle writes in IV.5, "For re
òpyfjç) and puts pleasure in th
people experience the weight [o
is vitally important, then, that
to be avenged. When that desir
wrongdoer is equal to the ev
proportional reciprocity. Plainly
is equal and so with what it is ju
proportional reciprocity after u
bringing some measure of stabi
This is not to say, of course, th
they are owed will always feel
they are still owed goods or that
penalty than the court imposed
anger, some of which is directe
and some directed at the city
Nonetheless, communities whos
their due will, over time, gener
will see that, at least in general,
just satisfaction of their basic de
a community that fails to reco
proportional reciprocity it brin
least a loss of support, not onl
injustice, but even of those who
injustices that are not likely to b
Perhaps in an ideal society
completely virtuous, there wou
be no involuntary interactions
even when a member of the co
than he bargained for, his frie
him to overlook or forgive the
injustices would be relatively ra
Doubtless, many contemporary theoris

includes equalizing evils between wron
that Aristotle is mistaken if he really
desires to be avenged be fulfilled. I wou
though, that we be clear that because
provides the just satisfaction of a victi
what is just, not at the satisfaction of t
Ô Springer

201.131.90.36 on Mon, 28 Sep 2020 05:13:00 UTC
common, if there
it, the community
to understand th
reciprocity, while
regarding commun
ideal communities
as the community
4 Conclusion
In this paper I have argued against the view that corrective justice in the NE i
essentially compensatory, and in favor of a bifunctional account. But unlike other
who defend bifunctional accounts, I have argued that, for Aristotle, correctiv
justice aims at equalizing inequalities of both goods and evils resulting from various
interactions. The account I have defended here better explains the broad array of
examples Aristotle provides of actions that call for rectification than does the
standard interpretation, or so I have argued. Moreover, with respect to the two
famous analogies of equalizing unequal line segments, which are often taken a
compelling evidence in favor of the compensatory interpretation, my account is
actually supported by the first and is at least consistent with the second. In addition,
unlike the received interpretation, my account of rectifying involuntary interaction
does not have the implausible consequence that in V.4 Aristotle developed a view,
namely correction as compensation, that appears nowhere else in the corpus.
Finally, I take it to be a virtue of my account that it makes good sense - indeed,
better sense that do rival accounts - of the way Aristotle introduces proportional
reciprocity and what he says about it in connection with goods and evils. If what I
have argued is correct, although corrective justice aims at a kind of equality after
injustices, it also yields instances of proportional reciprocity, which is essential to
the stability of the political community. That both, equality and stability, are
essential to the wellbeing of the political community helps to explain why Aristotle
would assign corrective justice such a prominent place in his theory of justice.
Acknowledgments I am indebted to N.D. Smith and Angelo Corlett for helpful comments on an earlier
draft of this paper. It should not be assumed that either agrees with the theses defended here or with any of
the arguments offered in their support.
References
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Philosophical Introduction, and Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Brown, Lesley. 2009. Explanatory Notes. In The Nicomachean Ethics. By Aristotle, transi, by David. Ross
and edited by Lesley Brown. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Burnet, John. 1900. The ethics of Aristotle. London: Methuen.
Curzer, Howard. 2012. Aristotle and the virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Englard, Izhak. 2009. Corrective and dist

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Hardie, W.D.R. 1968. Aristotle's ethical t
Irwin, Terence. 1988. Aristotle's first prin
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ö Springei

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