RULE 5 SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS
appellate court.
MACADANGDANG v GAVIOLA
FACTS
 Atty. Oswaldo Macadangdang, acting as administrator
of the Estate of Felomina G. Macadangdang
(petitioner), filed an action for Unlawful Detainer with
Damages against Respondents Lucia Gaviola et al.
 Respondents were occupying, by mere tolerance,
portions of four parcels of land in the name of the late
Felomina G. Macadangdang, covered by TCTs all in
the Registry of Deeds of Davao City.
 MTCC: Ruled in favor of petitioner. Ordered
respondents to vacate and to remove all the
improvements built, pay rent of P500 a month from
date of decision till they vacate
 Respondents appealed.
 RTC: dismissed the appeal for respondents’ failure to
file an appeal memorandum.
o Remanded back to MTCC for execution
o Denied respondent’s MR. No longer had
jurisdiction over the motion after the dismissal
of respondents’ appeal.
 Petition for review before the CA
 CA: set aside. Dismissal of an appeal on purely
technical grounds is frowned upon. The Court of
Appeals ruled that rules of procedure are intended to
promote and not defeat substantial justice and should
not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense.
o A distinction should be made between failure to
file a notice of appeal within the reglementary
period and failure to file the appeal
memorandum within the period granted by the
o The Court of Appeals ruled that failure to file a
notice of appeal within the reglementary period
would result to failure of the appellate court to
obtain jurisdiction over the appealed decision.
Thus, the assailed decision would become final
and executory upon failure to move for
reconsideration. On the other hand, failure to
file the appeal memorandum within the period
granted by the appellate court would only result
to abandonment of appeal, which could lead to
its dismissal upon failure to move for its
reconsideration.
o Thus, the RTC erred in denying respondents’
motion for reconsideration on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S && RATIO
WON CA erred in reversing the RTC’s dismissal of
respondents’ appeal for failure to file an appeal
memorandum- YES
 Petitioners allege that the case stemmed from an
unlawful detainer case where the Rules on Summary
Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules
on Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is
a prohibited pleading.
o Petitioners also allege that due to the mandatory
character of Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the RTC correctly
dismissed the appeal. 
 Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial
Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
 Since the case before the MTCC was an unlawful
detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on
Summary Procedure.
 The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to
prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to
achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is
prohibited, including the filing of a motion for
reconsideration
 However, the motion for reconsideration that petitioners
allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the
RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the
RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure.
 The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the
appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for
reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited
pleading.
 In this case, the RTC dismissed respondents’ appeal for
their failure to file an appeal memorandum in
accordance with Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC’s dismissal of the appeal
 The Court of Appeals ruled that respondents’ counsel
only realized his failure to submit the appeal
memorandum when he received a copy of the dismissal
of the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that
exceptions to the general rule are recognized to accord
relief to a client who suffered by reason of the counsel’s
gross or palpable mistake or negligence.
 The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of procedural
technique.
 There are exceptions to this rule, such as when the
reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law, or when the application of
the general rule results in the outright deprivation of
one’s property through a technicality. 
 We find no reason to exempt respondents from the
general rule.
o The cause of the delay in the filing of the appeal
memorandum, as explained by respondents’
counsel, was not due to gross negligence but due
to heavy backlog of paper work.
o It could have been prevented by respondents’
counsel if he only acted with ordinary diligence
and prudence in handling the case.
 Finally, respondents were not deprived of due process
of law. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part
of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of the law
REPUBLIC v SUNVAR
FACTS
 Petitioners Republic of the Philippines (Republic) and
National Power Corporation (NPC) are registered co-
owners of several parcels of land located along Pasong
 Tamo Extension and Vito Cruz in Makati City, and
covered by four TCTs
o Eighty percent (80%) of the subject property is
owned by petitioner Republic, while the
remaining twenty percent (20%) belongs to
petitioner NPC
 Petitioners are being represented in this case by the
Privatization Management Office (PMO), which is the
agency tasked with the administration and disposal of
government assets.
 Respondent Sunvar occupied the subject property by
virtue of sublease agreements, which had in the
meantime expired
 Petitioners leased the four parcels of land, including the
subject property, to the Technology Resource Center
Foundation, Inc., (TRCFI) for a period of 25 years  Sunvar wrote to PDAF as successor of TRCFI.
 Under the Contract of Lease (the main lease contract),
petitioners granted TRCFI the right to sublease any
portion of the four parcels of land
 Exercising its right, TRCFI consequently subleased a
majority of the subject property to respondent Sunvar
through several sublease agreements (the sublease
agreements)
 Although these agreements commenced on different
dates, all of them contained common provisions on the
terms of the sublease and were altogether set to expire
on 31 December 2002, the expiration date of TRCFI’s
main lease contract with petitioners, but subject to
renewal at the option of respondent
o The term of the sublease shall be for an initial
period of [variable] years and [variable] months
commencing on [variable], renewable for
another twenty-five (25) years at SUNVAR’s
exclusive option.
 According to petitioners, in all the sublease agreements,
respondent Sunvar agreed "to return or surrender the
subleased land, without any delay whatsoever upon the
termination or expiration of the sublease contract or any
renewal or extension thereof
 During the period of its sublease, respondent Sunvar
introduced useful improvements, consisting of several
commercial buildings, and leased out the spaces therein
o It also profitably utilized the other open spaces
on the subject property as parking areas for
customers and guests
 Less than a year before the expiration of the main lease
contract and the sublease agreements, respondent
 
 Respondent expressed its desire to exercise the option
to renew the sublease over the subject property and
proposed an increased rental rate and a renewal period
of another 25 years
 PDAF informed respondent that the notice of renewal
of the lease had already been sent to petitioners, but that
it had yet to receive a response
 6 months before the main contract of lease was to
expire, petitioner NPC – through Atty. Rainer B.
Butalid, Vice-President and General Counsel – notified
PDAF of the former’s decision not to renew the
contract of lease.
 PDAF notified respondent of NPC’s decision
 Republic reasoned that the parties had earlier agreed to
shorten the corporate life of PDAF and to transfer the
latter’s assets to the former for the purpose of selling
them to raise funds
 PDAF duly informed respondent Sunvar of petitioner
Republic’s decision not to renew the lease
 Finally, the main lease contract with PDAF, as well as
its sublease agreements with respondent Sunvar, all
expired.
 Petitioners recovered from PDAF all the rights over the
subject property and the three other parcels of land.  an accion publiciana, which fell within the
 Nevertheless, respondent Sunvar continued to occupy
the property.
 22 February 2008 or 6 years after the main lease
contract expired, petitioner Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), advised
respondent Sunvar to completely vacate the subject
property within thirty (30) days
o Respondents failed to vacate
 03 February 2009, respondent Sunvar received from
respondent OSG a final notice to vacate within 15 days.
When the period lapsed, respondent Sunvar again
refused to vacate the property and continued to occupy
it.
 PMO issued an Inspection and Appraisal Report to
determine the fair rental value of the subject property
and petitioners’ lost income – a loss arising from the
refusal of respondent Sunvar to vacate the property
after the expiration of the main lease contract and
sublease agreements
 Using the market comparison approach, the PMO
determined that the fair rental value of the subject
property was ₱ 10,364,000 per month, and that
respondent Sunvar owed petitioners a total of ₱
630,123,700  
 Petitioners filed the Complaint for unlawful detainer
with MeTC Makati
 Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss the Complaint
o Argued that the allegations of petitioners in the
Complaint did not constitute an action for
unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract
existed between them.
o Petitioners’ cause of action was more properly
jurisdiction of the RTC, and not the MeTC,
considering that the petitioners’ supposed
dispossession of the subject property by
respondent had already lasted for more than one
year.
 MeTC denied the Motion to Dismiss
o Directed respondent Sunvar to file an answer to
petitioners’ Complaint
 Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary
proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a
Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati
City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s
Motion to Dismiss.
 Petitioner’s Answer to the Rule 65 Petition of
respondent: questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC and
reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure
expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for
certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the
MeTC
 RTC: denied the motion for dismissal and ruled that
extraordinary circumstances called for an exception to
the general rule on summary proceedings
 MR Denied
RTC granted the Rule 65 Petition and directed the
MeTC to dismiss the Complaint for unlawful detainer
for lack of jurisdiction.
 o One-year period for the filing of an unlawful
detainer case was reckoned from the expiration
of the main lease contract and the sublease
agreements
o Petitioners should have then filed an accion
publiciana with the RTC in 2009, instead of an
unlawful detainer suit.
 Hence, the instant Rule 45 Petition filed by petitioners.
ISSUE/S && RATIO
[SUB] WON R45 by petitioner before the SC is proper-
YES
 Sunvar: petitioners’ resort to a Rule 45 Petition for
Review on Certiorari before this Court is an improper
mode of review of the assailed RTC Decision.
o Allegedly, petitioners should have availed
themselves of a Rule 65 Petition instead, since
the RTC Decision was an order of dismissal of
the Complaint, from which no appeal can be
taken except by a certiorari petition.
 The Court is unconvinced of the arguments of
respondent Sunvar and holds that the resort by
petitioners to the present Rule 45 Petition is perfectly
within the bounds of our procedural rules.
 As respondent Sunvar explained, no appeal may be
taken from an order of the RTC dismissing an action
without prejudice, but the aggrieved party may file a
certiorari petition under Rule 65.
 Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved
 This latter situation was one that petitioners found
themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to
raise only questions of law.
 Republic v. Malabanan: three modes of appeal from
decisions of the RTC
 by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule
41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. Taken to CA on questions of fact
or mixed questions of fact and law.
 by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby
judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. CA on questions of fact, of
law, or mixed questions of fact and law
 by a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court under Rule 45. Supreme Court only on
questions of law."
 There is a question of law when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the
facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct
application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.5
 In the instant case, petitioners raise only questions of
law with respect to the jurisdiction of the RTC to
entertain a certiorari petition filed against the
interlocutory order of the MeTC in an unlawful detainer
suit
[MAIN] WON RTC violated the Rules on Summary
Procedure when it took cognizance and granted the
certiorari petition against the denial by the MeTC of the
Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Sunvar- YES.
REMANDED BACK TO MeTC

Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari
petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order
issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a
prohibited pleading.
 The prohibition is plain enough, and its further
exposition is unnecessary verbiage
 The RTC should have dismissed outright respondent
Sunvar’s Rule 65 Petition, considering that it is a
prohibited pleading. Petitioners have already alerted the
RTC of this legal bar and immediately prayed for the
dismissal of the certiorari Petition,
 Yet the RTC not only refused to dismiss the certiorari
Petition but even proceeded to hear the Rule 65 Petition
on the merits.
 When Section 19 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure bars a petition for relief from judgment, or a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against
any interlocutory order issued by the court, it has in
mind no other than Section 1, Rule 38 regarding
petitions for relief from judgment, and Rule 65
regarding petitions for certiorari, mandamus, or
prohibition, of the Rules of Court, respectively.
 Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino and
Go v. Court of Appeals to justify a certiorari review by
the RTC owing to "extraordinary circumstances" is
misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and
specific circumstances that justified the filing of the
mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised
Rules on Summary Procedure – conditions that are not
availing in the case of respondent Sunvar.
 Indisputably, the appealed [suspension] order is
interlocutory, for "it does not dispose of the case but
leaves something else to be done by the trial court on
the merits of the case." It is axiomatic that an
interlocutory order cannot be challenged by an appeal.
 However, where the assailed interlocutory order is
patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not
afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court may
allow certiorari as a mode of redress."
 Clearly, private respondent cannot appeal the order,
being interlocutory. But neither can it file a petition for
certiorari, because ejectment suits fall under the
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, Section 19(g) of
which considers petitions for certiorari prohibited
pleadings:
 As correctly held by Respondent Court of Appeals, "the
purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to
achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of cases without regard to technical rules.’ (Section 36,
Chapter III, BP Blg. 129)"
 Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions
for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order
to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the
disposition of cases. In this case, however, private
respondent challenged the MTCC order delaying the
ejectment suit, precisely to avoid the mischief
envisioned by the Rules
 Contrary to the assertion of respondent Sunvar, the
factual circumstances in these two cases are not
comparable with respondents’ situation, and our rulings
therein are inapplicable to its cause of action in the
present suit.
 As this Court explained in Bayog, the general rule is
that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed
with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised
 Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent Sunvar filed
a certiorari Petition in an ejectment suit pending before
the MeTC. Worse, the subject matter of the Petition was
the denial of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, which
was necessarily an interlocutory order, which is
generally not the subject of an appeal.  Publiciana- YES. UNLAWFUL DETAINER. One
 When confronted with the MeTC’s adverse denial of its
Motion to Dismiss in the ejectment case, the
expeditious and proper remedy for respondent
should have been to proceed with the summary
hearings and to file its answer. Indeed, its resort to a
certiorari Petition in the RTC over an interlocutory
order in a summary ejectment proceeding was not only
prohibited. The certiorari Petition was already a
superfluity on account of respondent’s having already
taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by
filing an Answer with the MeTC.
 Respondent Sunvar failed to substantiate its claim of
extraordinary circumstances that would constrain this
Court to apply the exceptions obtaining
 The Court hesitates to liberally dispense the benefits of
these two judicial precedents to litigants in summary
proceedings, lest these exceptions be regularly abused
and freely availed of to defeat the very goal of an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of an
unlawful detainer suit.
 If the Court were to relax the interpretation of the
prohibition against the filing of certiorari petitions
under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the
RTCs may be inundated with similar prayers from
adversely affected parties questioning every order of the
lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of
summary proceedings in forcible entry or unlawful
detainer suits.
 [SUB] WON the petitioner were correct in filing a
case for Unlawful Detainer and not Accion
year counted from the date of last demand to vacate
 Under the Rules of Court, lessors against whom
possession of any land is unlawfully withheld after the
expiration of the right to hold possession may – by
virtue of any express or implied contract, and within
one year after the unlawful deprivation – bring an
action in the municipal trial court against the person
unlawfully withholding possession, for restitution of
possession with damages and costs
 Unless otherwise stipulated, the action of the lessor
shall commence only after a demand to pay or to
comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee; or after a written notice of that
demand is served upon the person found on the
premises, and the lessee fails to comply therewith
within 15 days in the case of land or 5 days in the case
of buildings.
 Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of
real property from one who illegally withholds
possession after the expiration or termination of his
right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful
detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the
expiration or termination of the right to possess. The
proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over
which lies with the proper MTC or metropolitan trial
court. The action must be brought up within one year
 from the date of last demand, and the issue in the case
must be the right to physical possession.  February 2009.
 "On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary
action to recover the right of possession which should
be brought in the proper regional trial court when
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an
ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right
of possession of realty independently of title.
o n other words, if at the time of the filing of the
complaint, more than one year had elapsed since
defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession
or defendant’s possession had become illegal,
the action will be, not one of forcible entry or
illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana.
 There are no substantial disagreements with respect to
the first three requisites for an action for unlawful
detainer.
o Respondent Sunvar initially derived its right to
possess the subject property from its sublease
agreements with TRCFI and later on with
PDAF.
o However, with the expiration of the lease
agreements on 31 December 2002, respondent
lost possessory rights over the subject property.
Nevertheless, it continued occupying the
property for almost seven years thereafter.
o It was only on 03 February 2009 that petitioners
made a final demand upon respondent Sunvar to
turn over the property. What is disputed,
however, is the fourth requisite of an unlawful
detainer suit.
 The Court rules that the final requisite is likewise
availing in this case, and that the one-year period
should be counted from the final demand made on 03
 Contrary to the reasoning of the RTC,65 the one-year
period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted
from the expiration of the lease contract on 31
December 2002. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners
to vacate is the reckoning period for determining the
one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer.
"Such one year period should be counted from the date
of plaintiff’s last demand on defendant to vacate the
real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful.
o In case several demands to vacate are made, the
period is reckoned from the date of the last
demand
 Thus, respondent Sunvar’s possession became unlawful
upon service of the final notice on 03 February 2009.
Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of
petitioners, and without any contract between them,
respondent is "necessarily bound by an implied
promise" that it "will vacate upon demand, failing
which a summary action for ejectment is the proper
remedy against them.
 Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent
Sunvar should have vacated the property and,
consequently, petitioners had one year or until 02
February 2010 in which to resort to the summary action
for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their
Complaint was filed with the MeTC on 23 July 2009,
which was well within the one-year period.
 With the grant of the instant Petition and the remand of
the case to the MeTC for continued hearing, the Court
emphasizes the duty of the lower court to speedily
 resolve this matter once and for all, especially since this
case involves a prime property of the government
located in the country’s business district and the various
opportunities for petitioners to gain public revenues
from the property
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT v PO
FACTS
 Fairland, in its complaint for unlawful detainer, filed
before the MeTC, alleged that it was the owner of
Condominium Unit No. 205 in Cedar Mansion II on
Ma. Escriba Street, Pasig City.  but the amount of damages being prayed for was
 The said unit was leased by Fairland to Po by verbal
agreement, with a rental fee of P20,000.00 a month, to
be paid by Po at the beginning of each month.
 From March 2011, Po had continuously failed to pay
rent. For said reason, Fairland opted not to renew the
lease agreement anymore.
 Jan 30, 2012: Fairland sent a formal letter to Po
demanding that he pay the amount of P220,000.00,
representing the rental arrears, and that he vacate the
leased premises within fifteen (15) days from the
receipt of the letter.
 Despite receipt of the demand letter and the lapse of the
said 15-day period to comply, Po neither tendered
payment for the unpaid rent nor vacated the premises
 Dec 12, 2012: Fairland was constrained to file the
complaint for unlawful detainer before the MeTC. Po
had until January 7, 2013 to file his answer but he failed
to do so.
 Hence, on February 6, 2013, Fairland filed a motion to
render judgment
 Po's counsel filed his Entry of Appearance with Motion
for Leave of Court to file Comment/Opposition
o denied the allegations against him and
commented that there was no supporting
document that would show that Fairland owned
the property
o that there was no lease contract between them
o that there were no documents attached to the
complaint which would show that previous
demands had been made and received by him
o that the alleged unpaid rental was P220,000.00,
P440,000.00
o that the issue in the case was one of ownership;
and that it was the RTC which had jurisdiction
over the case.
 MeTC: treated the comment/opposition as Po's answer
to the complaint. Regardless irt was filed out of time.
So the motion was denied
o dismissed the complaint for lack of merit due to
Fairland's failure to prove its claim by
preponderance of evidence. 
o although the complaint sufficiently alleged a
cause of action, Fairland failed to prove that it
was entitled to the possession of the subject
property. There was no evidence presented to
support its claim against Po either
 Fairland seasonably filed its appeal before the RTC
under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
 Fairland: an unlawful detainer case was a special civil
action governed by summary procedure.
o Judgment should be based on the "facts alleged
in the complaint,"13 and that there was no
 requirement that judgment must be based on
facts proved by preponderance of evidence
o Considering that the presentation of evidence
was not required when a defendant in an
ejectment case failed to appear in a preliminary
conference, the same should be applied when no
answer had been filed.
o Failure to file an answer in an ejectment case
was tantamount to an admission by the
defendant of all the ultimate facts alleged in the
complaint.
o There was no more need for evidence in such a
situation as every allegation of ultimate facts in
the complaint was deemed established by the
defendant's acquiescence.
 Po: countered that there was no merit in Fairland's
insistence that evidence was unnecessary when no
answer had been filed.
o all the statements in the complaint were mere
allegations which were not substantiated by any
competent evidence.
o no proof presented to show that the subject
property was indeed owned by Fairland;
o Po also reiterated that the case involved an issue
of ownership over the condominium unit he was
occupying.
 RTC: affirmed the MeTC ruling and agreed that
Fairland failed to establish its case by preponderance of
evidence.
o Though it had been consistently ruled that the
only issue for resolution in an ejectment case
was the physical or material possession of the
property involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the party-litigants, the
court may go beyond the question of physical
possession provisionally
o Assuming that Po was not the lawful owner, his
actual physical possession of the subject
property created the presumption that he was
entitled to its possession thereof.
 MR Denied
 CA via R42: Action for unlawful detainer would not lie
against Po. Notwithstanding the abbreviated proceeding
it ordained and the limited pleadings it allowed, the
Rules on Summary Procedure did not relax the rules on
evidence
o In order for an action for recovery of possession
to prosper, it was indispensable that he who
brought the action should prove not only his
ownership but also the identity of the property
claimed.
ISSUE/S & RATIO
WON there was a valid cause of action for Unlawful
Detainer- YES
 Stated differently, unlawful detainer is a summary
action for the recovery of possession of real property.
This action may be filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or
other person from whom the possession of any land or
building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of
any contract, express or implied
 The possession of the defendant was originally legal, as
his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account
of an express or implied contract between them
 The defendant's possession, however, became illegal
when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate
the subject property due to the expiration or termination
of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand.
 A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year
from the unlawful withholding of possession
 A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for
unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
 initially, possession of the property by the defendant
was by contract with or by tolerance of the plaintiff;
 eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice
by the plaintiff to the defendant of the termination of
the latter's right of possession;
 thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the
property, and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment
thereof; and
 within one (1) year from the last demand on defendant
to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment.
 There is no question that the complaint filed by Fairland
adequately alleged a cause of action for unlawful
detainer
 The above-cited portions of the complaint sufficiently
alleged that Fairland was the owner of the subject
property being leased to Po by virtue of an oral
agreement. There was a demand by Fairland for Po to
pay rent and vacate before the complaint for unlawful
detainer was instituted. The complaint was seasonably
filed within the one-year period prescribed by law. With
all the elements present, there was clearly a cause of
action in the complaint for unlawful detainer.
WON MeTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of
preponderance of evidence- NO  
Under the Rules of Summary Procedure, the weight of
evidence is not considered when a judgment is rendered
based on the complaint
 Fairland posits that judgment should have been
rendered in its favor on the basis of the complaint itself
and not on its failure to adduce proof of ownership over
the subject property. SC AGREES
 The summons, together with the complaint and its
annexes, was served upon Po on December 28, 2012.
This presupposes that the MeTC found no ground to
dismiss the action for unlawful detainer.
 Nevertheless, Po failed to file his answer on time and
the MeTC had the option to render judgment motu
proprio or on motion of the plaintiff.
 Section 6, Rules on Summary Procedure: is clear that
in case the defendant failed to file his answer, the court
shall render judgment, either motu proprio or upon
plaintiffs motion, based solely on the facts alleged in
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for.
 The failure of the defendant to timely file his answer
and to controvert the claim against him constitutes his
acquiescence to every allegation stated in the
complaint. Logically, there is nothing to be done in this
situation  except to render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint.
 Similarly, under Section 7, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, which governs the rules for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer, if the defendant fails to answer the
complaint within the period provided, the court has no
authority to declare the defendant in default. Instead,
 the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff,
shall render judgment as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed
for.
 In this case, Po failed to file his answer to the complaint
despite proper service of summons. He also failed to
provide a sufficient justification to excuse his lapses.
Thus, as no answer was filed, judgment must be
rendered by the court as may be warranted by the facts
alleged in the complaint.
 Failure to attach annexes is not fatal if the complaint
alleges a sufficient cause of action; evidence need not
be attached to the complaint
 The lower courts erroneously dismissed the complaint
of Fairland simply on the ground that it failed to
establish by preponderance of evidence its ownership
over the subject property. As can be gleaned above, the
rules do not compel the plaintiff to attach his evidence
to the complaint because, at this inception stage, he
only has to file his complaint to establish his cause of
action.
 Also, there was no need to attach proof of ownership in
the complaint because the allegations therein
constituted a sufficient cause of action for unlawful
detainer. Only when the allegations in the complaint are
insufficient to form a cause of action shall the
attachment become material in the determination
thereof.
 Similarly, in the case at bench, there was no need for
documentary attachments to prove Fairland's ownership
over the subject property.  and defenses. Before the issuance of the record of
 First, the present action is an action for unlawful
detainer wherein only de facto or material possession is
required to be alleged. Evidently, the attachment of any
deed of ownership to the complaint is not indispensable
because an action for unlawful detainer does not
entirely depend on ownership.
 Second, Fairland sufficiently alleged ownership and
superior right of possession over the subject property
 he Court is of the view that these allegations were clear
and unequivocal and did not need supporting
attachments to be considered as having sufficiently
established its cause of action. Even the MeTC
conceded that the complaint of Fairland stated a valid
cause of action for unlawful detainer.
o It must be stressed that inquiry into the attached
documents in the complaint is for the
sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations in the complaint.
 Third, considering that Po failed to file an answer
within the prescribed period, he was deemed to have
admitted all the allegations in the complaint including
Fairland's claim of ownership. To reiterate, the failure
of the defendant to timely file his answer and controvert
the claim against him constituted his acquiescence to
every allegation stated in the complaint.
 Fourth, it is only at the later stage of the summary
procedure when the affidavits of witnesses and other
evidence on factual issues shall be presented before the
court.
 Accordingly, it is only at this part of the proceedings
that the parties will be required to present and offer
their evidence before the court to establish their causes
preliminary conference, the parties are not yet required
to present their respective evidence.
 These specific provisions under the Rules of Summary
Procedure which are also reflected in Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, serve their purpose to immediately
settle ejectment proceedings
 "Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are
summary proceedings designed to provide for an
expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved. It does not
admit of a delay in the determination thereof.
 Thus, as a consequence of the defendant's failure to file
an answer, the court is simply tasked to render
judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
 In order to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive
determination of unlawful detainer cases, a remand of
this case to the lower courts is no longer necessary and
the case can be determined on its merits by the Court.
o To recapitulate, as Po failed to file his answer
on time, judgment shall be rendered based only
on the complaint of Fairland without the need to
consider the weight of evidence. As discussed
above, the complaint of Fairland had a valid
cause of action for unlawful detainer.
o Consequently, there is no more need to present
evidence to establish the allegation of Fairland
of its ownership and superior right of possession
over the subject property.
o Po's failure to file an answer constitutes an
admission of his illegal occupation due to his
non-payment of rentals, and of Fairland's
rightful claim of material possession. Thus,
judgment must be rendered finding that
Fairland has the right to eject Po from the
subject property.
SORIENTE v ESTATE OF ARSENIO
FACTS
 Respondent Nenita S. Concepcion established that she
was the registered owner of the lot occupied by
petitioner Angelina Soriente at No. 637 Cavo F.
Sanchez Street, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila.
 During the lifetime of Arsenio E. Concepcion, who
acquired the lot in 1978, he allowed and tolerated the
occupancy of the lot by petitioner, who was already
staying on the property.
 Petitioner was allowed to stay on the lot for free, but on
a temporary basis until such time that Concepcion
and/or his family needed to develop the lot.
 After Arsenio E. Concepcion died on December 27,
1989, his family initiated steps to develop the lot, but
petitioner's occupancy of the lot prevented them from
pursuing their plan.
 Verbal demands to vacate the lot was made on
petitioner. Petitioner pleaded for time to transfer to
another place, but she never left.
 Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated
September 22, 2000 by registered mail, demanding that
she peacefully surrender the property and extending
financial assistance for her relocation. Despite receipt
of the demand letter, petitioner did not vacate the
premises
 April 27, 2001, respondent filed against petitioner a
Complaint for unlawful detainer with the MTC of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 59
o The Complaint alleged that respondent was the
registered owner of the subject property, while
 petitioner had no title to the property and her
free occupancy thereof was merely tolerated by
respondent.  
o Moreover, petitioner was occupying the
premises together with her family, and she had
maintained boarders for a fee.
 It appears from the records of the case that petitioner
Soriente, as a defendant in the lower court, did not file a
separate Answer, but affixed her signature to the
Answer filed by defendant Alfredo Caballero in another
ejectment case filed by respondent
 Hence, respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to
Render Judgment under Section 7, Rule 70 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure for Soriente's failure
to file an Answer to the Complaint.
o Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Motion to
Render Judgment.
 MTC: denied the Motion to Render Judgment
o allegations of the Complaint in both Civil Cases
are similar, the only substantial difference being
the time when defendants occupied the subject
property allegedly through the tolerance of
Arsenio Concepcion
o Signing the Answer filed in Civil Case filed
against Caballero, Soriente intended to adopt the
same as her own, as both defendants Caballero
and Soriente had a common defense against
Respondent Conception separate claim against
them
 MTC’s preliminary conference was reset a number of
times.
 In the scheduled preliminary conference held on
February 18, 2003, only respondent's counsel and
petitioner Severina Sadol and Alfredo Caballero were
present.
In view of the absence of defendant Angelina Soriente
or her authorized representative, respondent's counsel
moved that the case be submitted for decision, and that
he be given 15 days within which to submit his position
paper
 MTC: Granted the motion of respondent Conception’s
counsel and considered the case against petitioner
Angelina Soriente submitted for decision in accordance
with Section 7 of the Rules on Summary Procedure.
o Respondent established by preponderance of
evidence that she was entitled to the relief
prayed for
 Petitioner appealed the trial court's Decision to the RTC
of Mandaluyong City
 RTC: affirmed MTC
o Case records readily disclosed that the
ownership of the subject lot belongs to the late
Arsenio E. Concepcion, married to herein
Plaintiff-Appellee Nenita S. Concepcion
o As should be known by Appellant Soriente
through counsel, no title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse
possession. Prescription is unavailing not only
against the registered owner Arsenio E.
Concepcion but also against his hereditary
successors
ISSUE/S && RATIO
WON the lower courts erred in ruling that ejectment was
proper- NO

 Petitioner: substantial evidence exists that she and her
predecessors-in-interest have continuously and openly
occupied and possessed, in the concept of owner, the
subject property since time immemori
 To make out a case of unlawful detainer under Section
1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Complaint must
allege that the defendant is unlawfully withholding
from the plaintiff the possession of certain real property
after the expiration or termination of the former's right
to hold possession by virtue of a contract, express or
implied, and that the action is being brought within one
year from the time the defendant's possession became
unlawful.
 The Complaint alleged that petitioner occupied the
subject property by tolerance of the late Arsenio
Concepcion. While tolerance is lawful, such possession
becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner
and the possessor by tolerance refuses to comply with
such demand
 Respondent sent petitioner a demand letter dated
September 22, 2000 to vacate the subject property, but
petitioner did not comply with the demand.  No. 12892, which was "issued in the name of Arsenio
 A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's
tolerance or permission, without any contract between
them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that
he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
 Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the
one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful
detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of
demand, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful.
 Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioner
on April 27, 2001, which was less than a year from the
date of formal demand. Clearly, therefore, the action
was filed within the one-year period prescribed for
filing an ejectment or unlawful detainer case
 All that the trial court can do is to make an initial
determination of who is the owner of the property, so
that it can resolve who is entitled to its possession
absent other evidence to resolve ownership
 Courts in ejectment cases decide questions of
ownership only if it is necessary to decide the question
of possession.
 The reason for this rule is to prevent the defendant from
trifling with the summary nature of an ejectment suit by
the simple expedient of asserting ownership over the
disputed property
 In this case, the trial court found that respondent owns
the property on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title
E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco." It is
settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over
a land is entitled to possession thereof.Hence, as the
registered owner of the subject property, respondent is
preferred to possess it
 The validity of respondent's certificate of title cannot be
attacked by petitioner in this case for ejectment. Under
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a
certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack
 Whether or not the petitioner has the right to claim
ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful
detainer
 Although petitioner alleges that substantial evidence
exists that she and her predecessors-in-interest had
continuously and openly occupied and possessed, in the
concept of owner, the subject property since time
immemorial, petitioner failed to present evidence to
substantiate her allegation. Whereas respondent holds a
Torrens title over the subject property; hence, she is
entitled to the possession of the property
 The court's adjudication of ownership in an ejectment
case is merely provisional, and affirmance of the trial
court's decision would not bar or prejudice an action
between the same parties involving title to the property,
if and when such action is brought seasonably before
the proper forum
WON the lower court erred in rendering jdugement on
the basis of Petitioner’s failure to appear- NO
 Petitioner: considering that the cases against her,
defendants Caballero and Sadol were consolidated, and
she and defendant Caballero signed and filed one
common Answer to the Complaint, thus, pleading a
common defense, the trial court should not have
rendered judgment on her case based on Section 7 of
the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure when
she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.
 Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant shall fail to
appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall
be entitled to judgment in accordance with Section 6 of
the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may
be warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and
limited to what is prayed for therein.
o However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply
where one of two or more defendants sued
under a common cause of action, who had
pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the
preliminary conference."
 Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to
her as a defendant, since the ejectment cases were
consolidated by the trial court, and she and Caballero
filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial
court should not have rendered judgment against her
when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference
 The Court holds that the italicized provision above does
not apply in the case of petitioner, since she and
Caballero were not co-defendants in the same case. The
ejectment case filed against petitioner was distinct from
that of Caballero, even if the trial court consolidated the
cases and, in the interest of justice, considered the
Answer filed by Caballero in Civil Case No. 17974 as
the Answer also of petitioner since she affixed her
signature thereto.
 Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate case
for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol,
petitioner's failure to appear in the preliminary
conference entitled respondent to the rendition of
judgment by the trial court on the ejectment case filed
against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in
accordance with Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure.

MAULEON v MORAN
FACTS
 Respondent Lolina Moran Porter, represented by Ervin
C. Moran, filed a complaint for ejectment against
petitioner Remedios Mauleon and all persons claiming
rights from her, seeking to recover possession of the
property located at 10th Avenue, Caloocan City
 espondent alleged therein that she is the absolute owner
of the subject property which she purchased from
petitioner and her husband, Renato M. Mauleon, by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale
 However, the petitioner continued to occupy the subject
property through respondent’s tolerance.
 But when she made demands to vacate – the last of
which was through a letter dated November 3, 2008 –
petitioner refused to do so, and even failed to pay rent
at the rate of P10,000.00 per month
 As the parties failed to settle the matter before
the barangay, respondent instituted a suit for unlawful
detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 53 (MeTC)
 Petitioner: espondent’s complaint is dismissible on the
grounds that:
o respondent failed to include her husband as
party-plaintiff; and
o there is a pending action for annulment of
documents, title and reconveyance with
damages between the parties before the
Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch
125 (annulment of documents and reconveyance
case)
 During preliminary conference petitioner Remedios
failed to appear, despite notice. 
 Respondent moved for the rendition of judgment
pursuant to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure
 MeTC Granted. Ordering petitioner to vacate the
subject property, and to pay respondent the amount of
P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs of suit.
 Instead of appealing the aforesaid MeTC Decision,
petitioner filed a “Most Very Urgent Manifestation with
Omnibus Motion to Reconsider the Order to Suspend
the Proceedings and/or to Dismiss the Case,” before the
MeTC
 Respondent filed a motion for execution of the MeTC
Decision, which she claimed to have attained finality.
 MeTc: Denied Petitioner’s motions and Respondent’s
Motion for Execution was granted
 R65 before the RTC: Dismissed for lack of merit
 RTC: pendency of the annulment of documents and
reconveyance case did not abate an ejectment suit nor
bar the execution of the judgment therein
o Neither did it deprive the MeTC of its
jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case
which merely involves the issue of
possession de facto
o Petitioner was not deprived of her right to
adduce evidence. Instead, records showed that
petitioner and her counsel failed to appear at the
scheduled preliminary conference 
 CA: Affirmed RTC
o filing of the certiorari petition before the RTC
was inappropriately resorted to by petitioner as a
substitute for an appeal
 o MeTC had jurisdiction to entertain the ejectment
case
o RTC’s finding that the pendency of a prior case
for annulment of documents and reconveyance
is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary
remedy of ejectment
ISSUE/S && RATIO
WON CA erred in upholding the dismissal of
petitioner’s certiorari petition- NO
 At the outset, it bears to note that petitioner’s course of
action before the RTC was principally anchored on the
validity of the Order which granted the execution of the
MeTC Decision.
 On this score, Section 1(e), Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court explicitly provides that an order of execution is
not appealable, hence, an aggrieved party may resort to
the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court.  same date and only after the MeTC judge had already
 This is because an order of execution is not a final order
or resolution within the contemplation of the rules, but
is issued to carry out the enforcement of a final
judgment or order against the losing party, hence,
generally not appealable
 While there are circumstances wherein appeal from an
improper execution is allowed, none obtains in this
case.
 Petitioner properly availed of the remedy
of certiorari before the RTC, contrary to the finding of
the CA37that she should have appealed therefrom.
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court nonetheless
perceives no reversible error on the part of the CA in
upholding the RTC’s finding that no grave abuse of
discretion attended the issuance of the MeTC Decision
and the August 18, 2009 Order directing its execution.
 Records show that during the scheduled preliminary
conference on March 27, 2009, petitioner and her
counsel failed to appear despite notice. Hence, the
MeTC was justified in granting respondent’s motion
to render judgment in the ejectment case pursuant
to Section 6 in relation to Section 7 of the Rules on
Summary Procedure
 The use of the word “shall” in the foregoing provisions
makes the attendance of the parties in the preliminary
conference mandatory, and non-appearance thereat is
excusable only when the party offers a justifiable cause
for his failure to attend
o The petitioner in this case, however, failed in
this respect.
 It is undisputed that petitioner’s counsel filed an urgent
motion to postpone the March 27, 2009 hearing on the
granted respondent’s motion for rendition of judgment.
 Petitioner’s: non-appearance in the hearing was due to
her counsel’s assurance that he had duly filed a motion
for postponement
 Consequently, absent any justifiable reason for her and
her counsel’s non-appearance at the said preliminary
conference, the Court concurs with the RTC’s finding
that no grave abuse of discretion can be ascribed against
the MeTC in submitting the case for decision and
ordering ejectment
 Similarly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed
against the MeTC in issuing the August 18, 2009 Order
directing the execution of its Decision.
 ection 19, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court provides for
the immediate execution of judgment in favor of the
plaintiff in ejectment cases, which can only be stayed if
the defendant perfects an appeal, files a supersedeas
bond, and makes periodic deposit of rental or other
reasonable compensation for the use and occupancy of
the subject premises during the pendency of the appeal.
 In this case, it is evident that petitioner failed to
interpose an appeal from the MeTC Decision rendering
the same final and executory. Hence, the August 18,
2009 Order granting its execution was properly issued.
 It is settled that when a decision has acquired finality,
the same becomes immutable and unalterable
 By this principle of immutability of judgments, the
Court is now precluded from further examining the
MeTC Decision and to further dwell on petitioner’s
perceived errors