Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance

G.R. No. 115455. August 25, 1994

ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt,
bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

FACTS: Republic Act 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the
National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but is a
mere consolidation of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings
on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.

HELD: No. The phrase “originate exclusively” refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.

Senate Bill No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement
not only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
 Alvarez vs Guingona
G.R. No. 118303. January 31, 1996.
SENATOR HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, et al., petitioners
Vs
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, et al., respondents

 Issue: Constitutionality of RA 7720 (An act converting the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into
an independent component city to be known as the City of Santiago”)

 Petitioners contend that the act was constitutionally infirm because it did not originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives (art VI sec 24 Constitution)

 Article 6 Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the
public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.

FACTS: On April 18, 1993, House Bill No. 8817, entitled "An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago
into an Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago," was filed in the House of
Representatives with Representative Antonio Abaya as principal author. The enrolled bill, submitted to
the President on April 12, 1994, was signed by the Chief Executive on May 5, 1994 as Republic Act No.
7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the registered voters
of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.

ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act 7720 can be said to have originated in the House of
Representatives given that the Senate passed Senate Bill No. 142, its own version of House Bill No. 8817
(Note: These are the Congress bills for RA 7720)

RULING:
The claim of the petitioners is untenable because the HB 8817 was FILED FIRST in the House of
Representatives BEFORE Senate Bill No. 1243. Thus, the House Bill was preclusive of the Republic Act as
well as the Senate Bill. HB 8817 was the bill that initiated the legislative process that culminated in the
enactment of RA 7720, so there was no violation of Sec 24 Article 6 of the Constitution.

 The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House,
does not contravene the constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the Senate does not act thereupon until
it receives the Housebill.

 The Constitution only means that the initiative for filing must come from the HoR since the HoR
members are more sensitive to local needs and problems. Meanwhile, the Senate approaches
the same problems from a national perspective.

 The Constitution also DOES NOT prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
anticipation of its receipt of the House bill, as long as the action of the Senate is WITHHELD
pending the receipt of the House Bill.
Pascual vs Secretary of Public Works
G.R. No. L-10405. December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-appellees.

"A law appropriating the public revenue is invalid if the public advantage or benefit, derived from such
expenditure, is merely incidental in the promotion of a particular enterprise."

FACTS: Governor Wenceslao Pascual of Rizal instituted this action for declaratory relief, with injunction,
upon the ground that RA No. 920, which appropriates funds for public works particularly for the
construction and improvement of Pasig feeder road terminals. Some of the feeder roads, however, as
alleged and as contained in the tracings attached to the petition, were nothing but projected and
planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed within the Antonio Subdivision, belonging to private
respondent Zulueta, situated at Pasig, Rizal; and which projected feeder roads do not connect any
government property or any important premises to the main highway. The respondents' contention is
that there is public purpose because people living in the subdivision will directly be benefitted from the
construction of the roads, and the government also gains from the donation of the land supposed to be
occupied by the streets, made by its owner to the government.

ISSUE: Should incidental gains by the public be considered "public purpose" for the purpose of justifying
an expenditure of the government?

HELD: No. It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. It is the essential character of the direct object of the expenditure which
must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the interest to be affected nor
the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and thus the public welfare, may be
ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from the
promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises or business, does not justify their
aid by the use public money.
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the statute is
designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the advantage of individuals,
although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the public.