Gonzales, Phillip Joshua D.

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc.

POEA

G.R. No. 76633

Facts:

The widow filed a complaint for charges against Eastern Shipping Lines with POEA by reason that his
husband as the Chief Officer of a ship was killed in an accident in Japan. She invoke that under
Memorandum Circular No.2 which stipulated death benefits and burial for the family of overseas
workers. ESL questioned the validity of the memorandum circular as violative of the principle of non-
deligation of legislative power.

Issue:

Whether or not the issuance of Memorandum Circular No.2 is a violation of non-delagation of

powers.

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court held that there was a valid delegation of powers. It is true that
legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be
delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The
ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.
US

v.

Ang Tang Ho

43 Phil 1

Facts:

The Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 entitled “An act penalizing the monopoly and
holding of, and speculation in, palay rice, and corn under extraordinary circumstances, regulating the
distribution and sale thereof, and authorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of the council of
state, to issue the necessary rules and regulations thereof, and making an appropriation for this
purpose. The Governal-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold and
penalizing the violation thereof. The defendant questions the validity of the proclamation by the
Governor-General pursuant to Act No. 2868, in so far as it authorizes the Governor-General to fix the
price at which rice to be sold.

Issue:

Whether Act No. 2868 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

 Yes. This question involves an analysis and construction of Act No. 2868, in so far as it
authorizes the Governor-General to fix the price at which rice should be sold. Act No. 2868 is analyzed, it
is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that
proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole
discretion of the Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act,
and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and under
certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which rice should be sold, without regard to grade or
quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law
should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended
People of the Philippines

Vera

65 Phil. 56

Facts:

HSBC questioned the authority of Vera to hold such hearings and assailed the constitutionality
of the probation act since it violates the equal protection of laws and gives unlawful and improper
delegation to provincial boards. Section 11 of Art 4221 states that the act shall only be applied in those
provinces wherein the probationary officer is granted salary not lower than provincial fiscals by
respective provincial boards. The city of fiscal of manila files a supplementary petition affirming issues
raised by the HSBC, arguing that probation is a form of reprieve, hence Art 4421 bypass the exclusive
power of the Chief Executive.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of powers.

Ruling:

Yes. SC concludes that section 11 of Art. 4421 constitutes an improper and unlawful delegation
of legislative authority to the provincial boards and is, for this reason unconstitutional and void. There
can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can there be a probation officer without the
probation system.
Free Telephone Workers Union

V.

Minister of Labor

108 SCRA 757

Facts:

There was a notice of strike with the MOLE for unfair labor practices and the implementation of
conduct. Private respondent, following the lead of petitioner labor union, explained its side on the
controversy regarding the Code of Conduct, the provisions of which as alleged in the petition were quite
harsh, resulting in what it deemed indefinite preventive suspension, apparently the principal cause of
the labor dispute. Ople issued the certification for compulsory arbitration pursuant to the provisions on
strikes of the Labor Code this is to avoid adverse effects to the national interest.

Issue:

Whether or not there is undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

No. The Court holds that petitioner was not able to make out a case of an undue delegation of
legislative power. There could be, however, an unconstitutional application. For while the Constitution
allows compulsory arbitration, it must be stressed that the exercise of such competence cannot ignore
the basic fundamental principle and state policy that the state should afford protection to
labor. Whenever, therefore, it is resorted to in labor disputes causing or likely to cause strikes or
lockouts affecting national interest, the State still is required to assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work
Cebu Oxygen

V.

Drilon

176 SCRA 24

Facts:

Petitioner entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement with its employees, increasing the
salaries by P200 for the years 1986 and 1987 and P300 for 1989. It was stipulated in the contract that if
ever there were legislations passed that would increase salaries greater than the one in the CBA, the
company would pay the difference. RA 6640 was passed which directs minimum daily wage to be
increased by P10 per day. The Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment. Drilon
promulgated Implementing Rules and Regulations for RA 6640, Section 8 of which provides that
increases by companies will not be credited as compliance if these weren’t stated in the CBA in
anticipation of RA 6640. The petitioners argue that the provision is null and void on the ground that it
unduly expands the provisions of the said law.

Issue:

Whether or not an Implementing Order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment can provide
for a prohibition not contemplated by the law it seeks to implement.

Ruling:

No. Implementing rules cannot provide for a prohibition not contemplated by the law.
Administrative regulations must harmonize with the law and not unduly expand it. An administrative
agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
Tablarin

V.

Gutierrez

152 SCRA 730

Facts:

The cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined
every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other admission requirements
as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of eligibility for admission into the medical colleges. Hence, The petitioners sought to enjoin
the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for
Educational Measurement from enforcing a requirement the taking and passing of the NMAT as a
condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission.

Issue:

Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the constitutional
guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is unconstitutional.

Ruling:

 Yes. We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an unconstitutional
imposition. It is police power, it is commonplace learning, is the pervasive and non-waivable power and
authority of the sovereign to secure and promote all the important interests and needs in a word, the
public order of the general community. 
Pelaez

V.

Auditor

15 SCRA 569

Facts:

 From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive
orders to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. 
Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders. Suing as a
private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the Auditor General.  It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.

Issue:

Whether or not the provision in question constitute an undue delegation of legislative powers.

Ruling:

Yes, The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. As the SC
of Washington has put it “municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes. Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of Government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers.
Tatad

V.

Secretary of Energy

G.R. No. 124360

Facts:

On December 9, 1992, the Department of Energy was created (through the enactment of R.A.
No. 7638) to control energy-related government activities. In March 1996, R.A. No. 8180 (Downstream
Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996) was enacted in pursuance to the deregulation of the power and
energy thrust under R.A. 7638. Under the R.A. No. 8180, any person or entity was allowed to import and
market crude oil and petroleum products, and to lease or own and operate refineries and other
downstream oil facilities.

Petitioner Francisco Tatad questions the constitutionality of Section 5 of R.A. No. 8180 since the
imposition of tarrif violates the equal protection clause and bars the entry of others in the oil industry
business. Also, the inclusion of tarrif violates Section 26 (1) of Article VI of the constitution requiring
every law to have only one subject which shall be expressed in its title.

Issue:

Whether or not Section 15 of R.A. no. 8180 constitutes undue delegation of legislative power.

Ruling:

No, Section 15 did not violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of legislative
power. The tests to determine the validity of delegation of legislative power are the completeness test
and the sufficiency test.  The completeness test demands that the law must be complete in all its terms
and conditions such that when it reaches the delegate, all it must do is enforce it. The sufficiency test
demand an adequate guideline or limitation in the law to delineate the delegate’s authority. Section 15
provides for the time to start the full deregulation, which answers the completeness test. It also laid
down standard guide for the judgement of the President- he is to time it as far as practicable when the
prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of peso to dollar is stable- which answers the sufficiency test.
Chiongbano

V.

Orbos

G.R. No. 96754

Facts:

Pursuant to the Constitution, Congress passed a law creating the ARMM composed of the 4
provinces which through plebiscite expressed their votes that they wanted to be included in the said
region. As the said law that created ARMM also allowed the President to merge provinces who voted
not to be included in the ARMM to be merged into existing regions, E.O 429 was issued transferring
certain provinces to regions.

Issue:

Whether or not it unduly delegates legislative power the president authorizing him to merge by
administrative determination.

Ruling:

No. The existi ng regions following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim

Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial
organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is logical because
the division of the country into regions is intended to facilitate not only the administration of local
governments but also the direction of executive departments which the law requires should  have
regional offi ces.
Solgen

V.

MMDA

G.R No. 102782

Facts:

On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffi c Command V.
Gonong, that the confi scati on of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffi c violati ons
was not among the sancti ons that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission
under PD1605 and was permitt ed only under the conditi ons laid down LOI 43 in the case
of in the case of stalled vehicles obstructi ng the public streets.

Issue:

Whether or not such ordinance are valid in the exercise of such delegated power
to local government acti ng only as agents of the nati onal legislature.

Ruling:

No. The court rendered judgment the ordinance null and void. It is for Congress to
determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions, either directly
through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local governments in
Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and continues prohibit the
confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the conditions prescribed in LOI) and of
driver licenses as well for traffic violations in Metropolitan Manila.
Tobias

V.

Abalos

239 SCRA 106

Facts:

Prior to R.A No. 7675 also known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong”, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to
only one legislative district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they
approved of the said conversion. The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless,
18,621 voted “yes” whereas “7,911” voted “no”.

Issue:

Whether or not the ratification of R.A 7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, sections 5(1), 4
and 26 (1)

Ruling:

The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso  in
the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution). Contrary to
petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and
logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
Mariano

V.

Comelec

242 SCRA 211

Facts:

Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati
to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special law did
not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of
Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials;
that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative
district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

Issue:

Whether or not it attempted to alter or restart the “three consecutive term” limit for local
elective officials.

Ruling:

No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated.
They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be
raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination
of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised
on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming
mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for
the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
Montejo

V.

Comelec

G.R. No.118702

Facts:

Petitioner Cirilo Montejo, representing the First District of Leyte, pleads the annulment of
Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 of the COMELEC, redistricting certain municipalities in Leyte as it is said
to violate the principle of equity of representation.  Petitioner now seeks to transfer the municipality of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province.

Issue:

Whether COMELEC has jurisdiction to promulgate Resolution No. 2736

Ruling:

It is then held that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
when it promulgated Section 1 of its Resolution No.2736. Section 1 is then annulled and set aside. The
petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second
District of the province of Leyte is denied.
Ang Langlad

V.

Comelec

G.R. NO. 190582

Facts:

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-
genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However,
due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited
certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral
and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable
under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent violated the non-establishment clause of the constitution.

Ruling:

Yes. we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s
registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest
Aksyon Magsasaka-Partido Tinig ng MASA

v.

COMELEC

758 SCRA 587

Facts:

Before us is a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 in relation to Rule 64 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, with prayer for injunctive reliefs, assailing the respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) for alleged grave abuse of discretion in prematurely and
erroneously allocating additional seats to certain party-list groups proclaimed as initial winners in the
2013 automated elections.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in allocating the additional seats for the 38
party-list candidates proclaimed as winners in the May 13, 2013 elections.

Ruling:

We dismiss the petition. COMELEC is authorized by law to proclaim winning candidates if the
remaining uncanvassed election returns will not affect the result of the elections. An incomplete canvass
of votes is illegal and cannot be the basis of a subsequent proclamation. A canvass is not reflective of the
true vote of the electorate unless the board of canvassers considers all returns and omits none.
However, this is true only where the election returns missing or not counted will affect the results of the
election.
Bengzon

v.

Cruz

G.R. No. 142840

Facts:

The citizenship of Teodoro Cruz, a member of the HOR, is being question on the ground that he is no a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. Cruz was born in the Philippines in 1960, the time when the
acquisition of citizenship rule was still jus soli. However, he enlisted to the US Marine Corps and he was
naturalized as US citizen in connection therewith. He reacquired Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under RA 2630 and ran for and was elected as a representative. When his nationality was
questioned by petitioner, the HRET decided that Cruz was a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Issue:

Whether or not Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. Natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship." On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications12 and none of the disqualification.
Aquino

v.

COMELEC

243 SCRA 400

Facts:

On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. In his certificate of
candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of the aforementioned district 10months. Move Makati,
a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo,
Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground that the latter lacked the residence
qualification as a candidate for congressman which under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
should be for a period not less than one year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.

Issue:

Whether “residency” in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes “domicile” to warrant the

disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.

Ruling:

Yes, The term “residence” has always been understood as synonymous with “domicile” not only
under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
Marcos

V.

Comelec

248 SCRA 300

Facts:

Imelda Marcos ran for candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte
for the 1995 elections. Hence, A petition was filed against Marcos by Montejo the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position filed a “Petition
for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that the petitioner did not met the
constitutional requirement for residency.

Issue:

Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1 year residency requirement to be eligible in running as
representative of the First District of Leyte.

Ruling:

Residence is used synonymously with domicle for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte
despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district.
Domino

v.

Comelec

G.R. No. 134015

Facts:

Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the lone
legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in the constituency where
he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents filed a petition seeking to cancel
the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that Domino, contrary to his declaration in the
certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani
where he seeks election. 

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the May 11, 1998 elections

Ruling:

The term “residence,” as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and for
elective office, means the same thing as “domicile,” which imports not only an intention to reside in a
fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, whenever absent for business, pleasure, or
some other reasons, one intends to return. 
Dimaporo

v.

Mitra

202 SCRA 779

Facts:

Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District
of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the
COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao in the immediately following elections. Upon being informed of this development by
the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's
name from the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67

Issue:

Could the respondent speaker and/or the respondent secretary, 'by administrative act', exclude the
petitioner from the rolls of the house of representatives, thereby preventing him from exercising his
functions as congressman, and depriving him of his rights and privileges as such?

Ruling:

Additionally, this Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of

legislative enactment. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach
of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded.

In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his office.
Tolentino

v.

COMELEC

G.R No. L-34150

Facts:

After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held on November 10, 1970, the
convention held its inaugural session on June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to amend Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution, lowering the voting age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with the senatorial elections on
November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that
Organic Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and void.

Issue:

Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

Ruling:

The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec, the issue of whether or not a
resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one and
thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because the Court is superior to the Convention
but they are both subject to the Constitution.
Ocampo

V.

Hret

432 SCRA 145

Facts:

In the case at bar, private respondent, a duly elected congressman, was declared disqualified 22 months
after the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner avers that, having garnered the second highest number of
votes, the same should be declared the winner in the said elections.

Issue:

Whether or not a second placer in congressional elections can be proclaimed the duly elected
Congressman,

Ruling:

In the case at bar, private respondent, a duly elected congressman, was declared disqualified 22
months after the May 14, 2001 elections. Petitioner avers that, having garnered the second highest
number of votes, the same should be declared the winner in the said elections.