Chapter 2

Military dimension

54
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

Although most conflicts in the past few years were interstate ones, and of low or medium intensity, it would
be dangerous to minimize the risk of other interstate conflicts occurring in the future.

The gap between rich and poor countries is widening; challenging of the global regulation framework
imposed by Western powers since the end of the Second World War is increasingly felt; and it seems likely
that natural resources of all kinds will become scarcer.

The nature of these disagreements makes it likely that some states may resort to threat or even armed
forces, based on the strategic models theorized by General Beaufre1, which are still relevant when catego-
rizing some of the potential conflicts of the next thirty years.

The nature of these conflicts will still depend on the relative means of the antagonists, their respective
freedom of action and what is at stake.

These models, however, may not be suited for certain present or future confrontations where players with
limited means do not pursue military victory, which they know to be impossible, so much as political
victory and international recognition, taking advantage of globalization.

I - TYPOLOGY OF CRISES AND MILITARY TOOL

I.1 - Forms of conflictions

I.1.1 - Interstate and intrastate conflicts

As the past fifteen years would lead one to think, prevention of conflicts, globalization and the spreading of
democracy should have rendered armed action obsolete in solving differences between states, signifying the
end of the Westphalian model. War would, in the foreseeable future, follow the transverse paths of cultural,
religious or ethnic conflicts, and would find new areas of extraterritorial development outside the lone will
of states.

However, the increasing inequality between rich and poor countries and the need to access vital
resources may result in interstate “scarcity and necessity” wars.

Furthermore, territorial and extraterritorial demands (such as control of material and nonmaterial
flows) will increase the risk of states rising to extremes with each other.

Lastly, in addition to the mostly intrastate cultural, religious and ethnic conflicts and interstate conflicts,
there will now be conflicts opposing states and transnational non-state entities (terrorism, organized
crime), favoured among other factors by globalization.

In a “balkanized and retribalized”2 world emphasizing intrastate conflicts, increased access to weapons
of mass destruction, made easier by information technologies, may weaken the stabilizing effect of Western
countries’ conventional military superiority, and place renewed relevance on war as a means of solving
differences between States.

1 In his book «An introduction to strategy,» General A. Beaufre defines five models of total strategy: direct threat, indirect pressure, successive actions,
total prolonged struggle of low military intensity, violent conflict aiming at military victory.
2 According to F. Thual’s thesis.

55
I.1.2 - Symmetric, dissymmetric and asymmetric (or irregular) conflicts3

Non-state players now favour asymmetry of means and will, but in the future may no longer be alone in
choosing such conduct.

Developed countries’ technological superiority will be weakened by the displacement from the
field of dissymmetry to asymmetry, including from state players possessing significant conventional
military potential.

Easier access to advanced technology may allow the weaker opponent in a dissymmetric confronta-
tion to achieve occasional superiority through the use of sophisticated standard means. Indeed access
to certain technologies only requires the necessary amount of money.

Amid the combatants, populations play a decisive part. Their presence can constitute a factor of asym-
metry.

Populations will remain a major concern in conflicts: they will be increasingly held hostage. Their
presence may constitute an obstacle to freedom of action for players who have committed to respect
international laws and agreements.

I.1.3 - Coercion and containment of violence

Only a legal framework can now justify the use of force, in contexts where the separation between high and
low intensity becomes irrelevant.

In the future, the diversity of situations will even further impose the necessity to gradually increase the
use of force. Different types of operations will juxtapose in a coercion-stabilization-rebuilding continuum,
often against the backdrop of humanitarian relief.

However, the current broad trend towards multiplying operations of mere maintenance of order could
reverse towards a predominance of operations involving, mostly or exclusively, coercion.

I.2 - Humanitarian crises or interventions in support of national

or foreign civil administrations
Armies are often used to complement means dedicated to security and population support. This use is
justified by the armies’ responsiveness (sometimes by the specificity of their means) and the pressing duty
of States subjected to pressure from public opinions under the watchful eye of the media.

Armies will increasingly respond to entreaties of all kinds, sometimes far away from the national theatre,
in a context that will see more frequent natural and technological disasters (climate imbalance and increasing
industrialization of developing countries), and the vulnerability of poorer countries.

3 Symmetry implies that parties pursue similar goals and use similar means and modes of action. Dissymmetry implies regular armies from powers
or coalitions of different scales. Players use different means and/or procedures, but their goals remain similar in nature. Asymmetry implies that an
adversary deemed “weak” bypasses or cancels the superiority opposed to it and exploits the actual weaknesses of its opponent in the fields of values,
strategy, organization and capacities. Asymmetry is the preferred mode of action of non-state players, in particular terrorist organizations.

56
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

I.3 - Global crisis management

The growing quest for efficiency, in particular with respect to the population - a major concern - already
involves many state and non-state actors who, together, can contribute to settling a crisis. Military action
alone usually cannot lead to success.

The civilian part of crisis management will increasingly overlap with the military part and will have to
be integrated even further at the planning stage.

Contributions to UN troops, early 2007

Total number
of persons*
on 31-12-2006

9,867

2,500

1,000
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

200
1-30

MAXIMA
Pakistan 9,867
Bangladesh 9,681
India 9,483
Jordan 3,820
Ghana 2,694
States not contributing
to UN troops
* Breakdown of total Nepal 2,607
of 80,368 persons in the UN: Uruguay 2,586 Samoa, Vanuatu
Italy 2,462 Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Isl., Micronesia,
MILITARY CIVILIAN
Nigeria 2,408 Nauru, Palau, Solomon, Tonga, Tuvalu
troops observers police
69,146 2,527 8,695 Source: UN, www.un.org

During operations, this overlapping may require that on-site coordination with civilian players be taken
into account very early on.

Crises settlement will involve several ministries and will be largely multinational, with the setting
up of circumstantial coalitions. This settlement will have to favour a global approach, establishing key points
and seeking the most efficient modes of action to obtain the desired effects that contribute to achieving the
sought-after state.

The range of the armies’ missions should expand notably. They will participate more in the struggle
against all activities thwarting the security of the theatre on which they operate.

57
I.4 - Legal context
Reference is more and more frequently made to law. It is now accompanied by increased juridicization4 in the
field of armed conflicts. However this particular set of laws, ruled by an increasing number of agreements, is
far from universally accepted.

Law has difficulty adapting to challenges such as new technologies, new armaments and new spaces
(whether material or nonmaterial).

The lack of legal qualification of the crisis may translate in the long term into the enforcement of “peace-
time” law (as opposed to the law of armed conflict), which often places the forces involved in situations of
legal asymmetry.

The use of force will be increasingly restricted by law.

Increasing judiciarization5 will become a weapon exploited by adversaries less inclined to respect
law. It will entail a risk of inhibition for those who respect it.

Individually, combatants from States respecting the law will be more and more compelled to
virtuous behaviour, which will result in excess pressure on them.

Protection of the environment will also dictate additional constraints on armed action, which will
not be shared by all belligerents.

Excess of international law may lead to some states’ failure to respect its instructions in the settlement
of crises.

I.5 - Media context

Information has now become particularly fluid and manifold and public opinion has grown more sensitive to
information originating from Internet (blogs and community sites), outside traditional channels.

The public opinion’s fickleness must be anticipated while media pressure will remain a deciding
parameter in the decision process and mode of outside intervention.

The ascendancy of images over analysis and commentary will continue to rise; it will take advan-
tage of the fluidity, multiplicity and freedom offered by new digital technologies.

So, the development of interactive spaces will promote a new conception of information, in which the net
surfer himself becomes a media.

4 Juridicization means organizing a field/ domain by means of a legal framework.

5 Judiciarization means systematic recourse to the law to settle differences or controversies.

58
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

Mass media could give way to self media6, whose legitimacy would be asserted by the level of trust
placed in them by the community of net surfers.

Gradual marginalization of traditional media is possible, to the benefit of independent organi-

zations or agents more difficult to identify and take into account.

I.6 - Military tools

Armies move in a context which remains very dependent on the society in which they operate.

So, in developed countries, the use of force is viewed as state violence, which can be questioned
depending on the legitimacy and duration of the intervention, in a context where death (received or
given) is less and less accepted. Besides, beyond their traditional role, armies will have to respond to
many entreaties of all natures.

On the domestic front, armies will continue to be required for missions of security enforcement
and population support, alongside dedicated state services, as part of security and defence policies.

With respect to rationalization and efficiency, the military will seek to gradually refocus on tasks
which specifically require their flexibility, availability and specific abilities. This will result in increasing
externalization of tasks which don’t specifically require these military and operational qualities, as well
as environmental functions.

These changes, however, present certain risks for the armies:

Potential privatization, excessive range of missions and negation of war may shatter the armies’
foundations, by denying their specificity and substituting other players for them.

6 Media in which individuals contribute to the creation and spreading of information.

59
 Continuing a current trend, armies in developed countries, focusing on employment and projec-
tion, will abandon conscription and will increasingly complement their numbers through various
forms of reserve (operational or citizenship-based, voluntary or national guard).

Acute recruitment problems for professional armies may force countries who adopted this system to
reconsider their choice of professionalization or consider other ways (mutualization, increased automa-
tion, etc.).

II - ADVERSE MODES OF ACTION LIKELY TO DEMAND A MILITARY

RESPONSE

In the period under consideration, the distinction between conventional and nonconventional modes
of action, some of them banned in interstate conflicts, others not mature enough from technological and
operational viewpoints, might vanish.

II.1 - Conventional modes of action

As well as giving priority to power projection, conventional modes of action will stress the pursuit of supe-
riority, whether temporary or applied to a particular sector in the critical field of information, particularly
in the case of technological inferiority of one of the adversaries.

However the spreading of advanced technologies, whose duality offers first-rate military possibilities
at a low cost, may reduce the effects of an antagonist’s superiority, which would be likely to alter the
usual standard of the balance of power.

II.2 - Use of nonconventional weapons

II.2.1 - Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)

These weapons tend to proliferate. To those who own them, they offer means of action that stand no
comparison to conventional weapons and, to those they may be used against, present particular difficulties
both in terms of protection and identification of the aggressor.

Among the WMD, nuclear weapons continue to hold a symbolic place.

Research towards increased efficiency of nuclear charges and their vectorization will continue beyond
a purely deterrent logic, making the logic of its use still possible (strikes on buried targets, destruction of
chemical and biological agents, enhanced radiation).

60
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

Specific improvements on nuclear weapons may lead certain States to lower the threshold for
triggering their use. Such would be the case of very low energy and precise weapons (reduced collateral
damages), as well as nuclear weapons with a particularly controlled HEMP7 effect, casting doubts over
what kind of retaliation should be carried out.

Over the next thirty years, terrorist organizations might possess nuclear weapons, threaten to use
them, and possibly put their threats into action.

Renewed use of nuclear weapons, after more than 60 years, might mark the end of an historical taboo,
with potential consequences on the doctrine (notably the lowering of the nuclear threshold).

Although banned, biological weapons continue to be a subject of research, and stocks are likely to exist.

The risk of biological weapons being implemented will grow, as the necessary skills tend to spread,
while in parallel misappropriation of sensitive strains by non-state players is possible.

New pathogenic agents may be developed (more resistant to antibiotics or radiation) and genetic engi-
neering may make it possible to target a particular category of individuals or living organisms.

Specific mastery of the large-scale implementation of biological weapons, which would protect the
aggressor from a boomerang effect, may lead to the present disappearance of the non-use taboo. The same
applies, but with opposite effects, with breakthroughs in the fields of diagnosis, prevention (vaccines and
antidotes) and detection in the environment.

Chemical weapons, like radiological weapons, are intended to produce psychological effects on popula-
tions rather than destructive effects.

7 High-altitude ElectroMagnetic Pulse.

61
 Despite many countries having signed the ban treaty, chemical weapons and associated modes of
action will undoubtedly continue to be a subject of research.

Specific research will likely target the modularity of chemical agents’ persistence to adapt them to
combat tactics.

Radiological weapons of “dirty bomb” type, whose constituent materials are relatively easy to obtain,
may be part of terrorist organizations’ armoury.

II.2.2 - Emerging modes of action

These include the use of electromagnetic weapons, which are about to be mastered, “computerized” weapons
and means, other than weapons, whose use has been corrupted (weapons “by destination”).

High-power laser or microwave weapons could come into service in developed countries within the
next five or ten years. They would allow the neutralization of surveillance and commandment systems
with no collateral damages. In the longer term, the setting up of electromagnetic antimissile shields is
conceivable.

The computer weapon sees its power reduced due to systems’ interconnection and modern nations’
increased dependency on these technologies (vital infrastructures, means of commandment and supervi-
sion of operations, alarm systems).

This vulnerability could increase further due to the relocation of certain computer services and
the supremacy of certain monopolistic softwares.

The attacks of September 11th, 2001 raised awareness of the destructive potential of means which were not
originally intended for a violent use.

Potential adversaries of major military powers will seek to find options of all natures (notably suicide
missions) aimed at circumventing these powers’ traditional defence capacities through the transforma-
tion of civilian means (planes, ships, trucks, etc.) into means of destruction. The primary effect sought
will be as much a strong demonstrativeness in nonmaterial fields as the will to cause heavy human losses.

II.3 - The particular case of the use of outer space

The treaty aimed at regulating the activities of States in the fields of exploration and use of extra-atmospheric
space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, opened to signing on January 27th, 1967, constitutes the
general framework of space law. Indeed, space has gone through a phase of passive militarization, playing a
stabilizing role, contributing among other things to the verification of treaties on armament control. Since the
1980s, space systems have become an integral part of the capacity arsenal of nuclear and space powers.

In the event of a major crisis, the use of space to limit and control the ability to implement adverse
C3ISR systems8 will be a decisive factor. This mastery will entail both the destruction or neutralization
of space segments and the intrusion in communications.

8 Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

III - RISKS9 AND THREATS10 LIKELY TO DEMAND

A MILITARY RESPONSE

III.1 - Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction

III.1.1 - Weapons
The current proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, should it remain unrepressed, might consti-
tute the most serious risk for peace by the end of the next thirty-year period.

It will continue to be made easier by the development of all types of exchanges favouring the spreading
of knowledge and technologies which are often dual.

In this context, the strength of non-proliferation and banning treaties will remain a central issue
and their continued efficiency will depend on the international community’s will, as well as on the
discipline of groups of sensitive equipment purveyors.

A connection between crime and terrorist networks may favour proliferation.

The collapse of the non-proliferation and banning régimes would constitute a particularly aggravating
factor for spreading weapons of mass destruction and their vectors.

Weapon suppliers: States and private companies, 2005

Top 10 suppliers of conventional weapons, over 5-year period (2001-2005)
(in % of worldwide exports)
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

Note:
43% of Russian weapon deliveries
were destined to China
and 25% to India.

31 30 27 9 6 4 2 2 2 2 2
Russia USA EU * France Ger- UK Ukraine Canada Nether- Italy Sweden
many lands
* Includes deliveries of weapons by EU member states to non-member states.

Income of the Top 10 defence consortiums in 2005

(in million $)
Income of defence division Total income of group
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

Lockheed Martin (USA) 36,465 37,213

Boeing (USA) 30,791 54,845
Northrop Grumman (USA) 23,332 30,700
BAE Systems (UK) 20,935 26,500
Raytheon (USA) 18,200 21,900
General Dynamics (USA) 16,570 21,244
EADS (Europe) 9120 40,508
L-3 Communications (USA) 8549 9,444
Thales (France) 8523 12,176
Halliburton* (USA) 7552 20,994

* Halliburton does not produce weapons strictly speaking; it is rather a defence service provider.
Sources: for statistics by state, SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, www.sipri.org
and www.defensenews.com for private companies.

9 Potential danger likely to undermine persons, goods or interests of a state.

10 Possibility of aggression against the interests of a State expressed through both the capacity and the willingness to harm.

63
Since it is a means of balancing power, the nuclear weapon will continue to appeal to States or organi-
zations aiming to challenge the geostrategic balance.

The number of countries technically able to acquire the nuclear weapon will rise significantly.

The withdrawal of a significant number of States from the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT),
through contagion, or the end of the taboo of non-use of nuclear weapons, would result in the
collapse of the NPT and the advent of a “proliferated world11”.

The formidable rise in life technologies and widespread access to them should continue to facili-
tate the potential proliferation of biological weapons.

11 Some analysts reckon that the number of nuclear states may, in an unfavourable scenario, rise to nearly twenty within the next 30 years, due to the
combined effect of budding proliferation on the one hand, and diminishing trust in security guarantees granted by certain major powers on the
other.

64
 Major terrorist attacks in the world since 1998

Oklahoma City
19.04.1995
Before 11 September 2001
New York,
16.02.1993
New York, Between 11 September 2001
Washington D.C. and 31 December 2002
and Pennsylvania
Equator

11.09.2001
ARCTIC Since January 2003

Bogota OCEAN
07.02.2003

Lima
20.03.2002
Tr o p i c

Lockerbie
21 Dec.1988
Northern Ireland
Tokyo
of Cap

15 Aug.1998
AT L A N T I C 20 March1995 PA C I F I C
OCEAN
ri

London OCEAN
corn

Moscow
09 Feb.1996
13 Sept.1999 and 06 Feb. 2004

Paris Grozny
65

Sources: 25 Jul.07 and 17 Oct.1995 17 Dec. 2002

Le Monde 2, n 14, Madrid Kabul
18-24 April 2004. 11 March 2004 25 Aug. 2008 and 05 Sept. 2002 Zamboanga
Le Monde, 16 March 2004 ; 02 Oct. 2002
Le Nouvel observateur, Casablanca Northern Afghanistan
Davao
14 August 2003 ; 09 Sept. 2001
16 May 2003 04 March 2003
Le Figaro, 11 September Islamabad

GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

and 14 October 2002 ; Djerba 17 March 2002
Le Figaro.fr, 14 October 2002 ; 11 Apr. 2002
Istanbul Calcutta
Financial Times, 29 Nov. 2002 22 Jan. 2002
15 and 20 Nov. 2003
and 9 May 2003 ;
Luxor
Buenos Aires Le Point, 18 March 2004 ; 17 Nov. 1997
18.07.1994 La Croix, 28 Nov. 2002
Niger (DC10 UTA)
and 15 March 2004. 13 Sept.1989 New Delhi

Questions internationales n° 8 - Documentation française 2004

13.12.2001
Israel Dahran
since Nov. 2000 Rawalpindi
25.06.1996
14 et 25.12.2003
Irak Riyad Bali
02 March 2004 13.11.1995 12 Oct. 2002
Jibla Colombo INDIAN
Riyad
12 May and 08 Nov. 2003
30.12.2002 31.01.1996 Djakarta
and 24.07.2001 05 Aug. 2003
Nairobi
Aden OCEAN
12.10.2000 Karachi
07 Aug.1998
08.05 and14.06.2002
Dar es-Salam Yemeni Coast 23.02.2003
07 Aug.1998 06.10.2002 Kandahar
Mombasa 06.09.2002
28.11.2002

Projection J. Bertin
 In spite of bans, the pathogenic agents domain will still be the subject of widespread interest, at least
for technological watch purposes.

Certain states or terrorist organizations may maintain programs of offensive biological weapons, some-
times home-grown but nevertheless very dangerous.

Uncontrolled use of biological weapons, where the initiator of the attack will be hit in return, would
constitute a major challenge for the possibility of operational use of this type of weapons, and may result
in limiting their proliferation.

Since these necessary technologies are both civilian and military, access to chemical weapons will
potentially remain possible for all states as well as non-state organizations.

In spite of relative lack of interest in these weapons (“poor man’s weapons” with no associated international
prestige), clandestine programs should continue to exist, some of them led by terrorist organizations
planning large-scale attacks.

III.1.2 - Ballistic vehicles

This proliferation can be seen as an aggravating factor since it allows the use of weapons of mass destruction,
with important benefits to the countries that trade in ballistic technology in spite of a control regime that seeks
to involve a growing number of states (MTCR12).

The proliferation of ballistic vehicles will benefit from the multiplication of space programmes
contributing to the spread of sensitive technologies and the continuing absence of legally restrictive control
tools.

12 Missile Technology Control Regime.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

The increased precision and range as well as the multiplication of short range vectors will strengthen
sustained interest in ballistic vectors.

However, the multi-storey technology remains delicate and the privilege of major powers.

Also, the acquisition of aerobic vehicles will be an interesting alternative for the proliferating
states if they come up against insurmountable technical difficulties.

Only the development of high-performance antimissile systems may in the future slow down
ballistic proliferation, beyond the effects of the MTCR.

III.2 - Terrorism
Transnational terrorism should retain a strategic dimension, both in the effects sought and its geopo-
litical consequences (Central Asia, Middle-East, Maghreb). Going beyond the usual framework of indirect
strategies, it will continue to take advantage of globalization.

The use of the capacities of digital networks for terrorist purposes will increase. All economic sectors
will remain potential targets, in particular strategic resources and less protected critical infrastructures.

Terrorists will be as imaginative in their choice of technologies and conventional weapons used as
in their operational concepts.

A major attack with WMDs or coordinated network attacks disrupting vital digital networks such
as telecommunication networks would constitute a major evolution of terrorist modes of action.

III.3 - Organized crime

Transnational organized crime (tax evasion, drugs, weapon and human trafficking, illegal immigration,
piracy of intellectual property, corruption, etc.) will always benefit from globalization.

In this context, an alliance of terrorism and organized crime will still appear unnatural in the interests
pursued but may happen, making the prevention of these threats even more difficult.

With natural resources becoming increasingly scarce, illicit economy may find new ground for
expansion.

67
 Mafias in Italy
Historic hotbeds
of mafia crime SWITZERLAND Crime originating
from the former
Sacra communist block
Cosa Nostra Corona Unita
Trieste CROATIA
LOMBARDY
Camorra ‘Ndrangheta
Turin Milan Venice

Spreading process PIEDMONT Bologna

ÉMILIA- BOSNIA-H.
of mafia crime ROMAGNA
Due to proximity Genoa
to mafia hotbeds FR. Florence
TUSCANY A D R I AT I C
From relegation Nigerian
centres
SEA Albanese
crime crime

LAZIO
Corsica
(Fr.) Rome MOLISE
Two-way spreading APULIA Bari
of foreign organized crime Brindisi
CAMPAGNA
Main groups
BASILICATA

Roberto Gimeno & Atelier de cartographie de Sciences Po, June 2007

of organized crime Naples
Sassari Tarento
Setting up under conditions
in historic mafia hotbeds Sardinia
(It.)
TYRRHENIAN CALABRIA
Cagliari
Crime concentrated
SEA
in provincial cities
Messina
C hinese Palermo
crime Reggio de Calabre
Darker areas represent
altitudes above 500 metres SICILY Catane
by the author
Tunis MEDITERRANEAN

Pantelleria (It.) SEA

ALG. TUNISIE Valetta

Lampedusa (It.) MALTA 0 100 km

III.4 - Marine piracy

Weakness and disorder of coastal states will continue to favour marine piracy.

But in the considered period, the list of risk areas (coasts of South-East Asia, Gulf of Guinea, Horn
of Africa) may extend to areas in the open sea.

Although there is a downward trend in acts of piracy13, this type of crime will remain an enduring
phenomenon and will require sustained attention from coastal States and maritime powers, especially
since links between terrorism and organized crime using this mode of action will remain possible.

A terrorist network hijacking a ship carrying dangerous substances, launched against sensitive coastal
facilities (chemical complex, nuclear plant), would constitute a true mutation of marine piracy. This type
of action would very significantly increase the importance of piracy to states which would then have to
devote substantial means to fighting it.

13 Annual report 2006 of the International Maritime Bureau.

68
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

IV - OPERATING SPACES
Whatever the spaces under consideration, whether material or nonmaterial, armies are increasingly
competing for their use with the civilian world (difficult sharing of air space and electromagnetic frequen-
cies for example); the joint use of these spaces will require increased coordination.

In all spaces, the need for interoperability between allied forces, for the capacity to “enter first” into a
coalition and the rise of the threat level will continue to gradually elevate the qualitative criteria for the
employability of forces.

IV.1 - Human environment

The operations’ human environment will be characterized by increasing confusion between protagonists,
amid which the sole clearly identifiable actor - the soldier - will struggle.

This identity isolation, strengthened by moral and legal obligations and by omnipresent media, will
place the military under exacerbated pressure - which probably won’t weigh on their adversary.

In such a context, all efforts will need to converge to ensure the best possible protection and support to
the troops deployed on the theatres of operation: individual and collective protection, fire support, health
support, permanent information, living conditions, etc.

Without this particular attention, the soldier’s very adherence to the action may be challenged, as a
result of ethical asymmetry and under the influence of free access information.

The increasing hyperregulation surrounding the action of “Western” soldiers will come against an
environment devoid of codes. From then on, conventional use of force may turn out to be unsuitable to
deal with the propagation of indirect strategies and the emergence of population wars. New forms of use
of force and new tools would then have to be devised (automation, reduced lethality weapons, situation
intelligence, force component embedded in the population, etc.).

IV.2 - Terrestrial environment

The intensity of engagement in terrestrial environments is a token of the degree of political determination
towards settling a crisis or conflict through the use of force. This is the environment where crises and
conflicts usually end. Terrestrial engagement is characterized by the importance of what is at stake, but
also the complexity that stems from the diversity of physical and human environments and prolonged
interaction or contact with them.

Operations in terrestrial environments are characterized by growing diversification of intensity

levels and modes of action, which may lead a unit to run several forms operation on the same theatre:
humanitarian aid, interposition, counterinsurgency, high intensity. Stabilization phases, which are often
long, will become crucial. Adaptability of men and equipment and reversibility of modes of action
will be essential.

In an asymmetrical context, the adversary’s use of difficult terrains as shelter zones will become
widespread: rainforest, mountainous zones or deserts. In particular, urban areas, interweaving with
populations and diverse configurations, will become an increasingly frequent setting.

69
 Widespread access to high technology equipment in the communication and localization fields,
but also the destruction field, will require land forces to improve reactivity in acquiring new equipment
and increase soldier protection efforts.

The use of crowds as a large-scale weapon, with instant mobilization capacity in a given location,
would constitute an important constraint.

Among the various terrestrial environments, urban areas have unique characteristics. Engagement is more
likely due to growing urbanization14, and the population is the essential issue and constraint. Gaining its
support, or at least its neutrality, is an indispensable condition for success. Consequently restriction of
collateral damage and behaviour control are vital issues.

The phenomenon of irregular militia interwoven with the population - using it as camouflage, shield,
resonance chamber, logistical support - will continue to develop.

Human intelligence, enabling discriminate actions to be conducted, will be critical for success.

The difficulty of combat in urban areas may lead to favouring “inverted asymmetric” actions conducted
by special forces in certain grey areas which have not successfully been placed under control.

Adapting the effects of the airborne component to urban areas, in support of terrestrial manoeu-
vres, must be developed further.

IV.3 - Maritime environment

Preserved for centuries from legal constraints, seas and oceans remain unequalled in the operative and strategic
autonomy they offer. Wide and continuous, maritime spaces also accommodate a significant portion of trades,
hold increasingly coveted resources which need protection, and allow the setting up of instruments of
power on a global scale. Beside, the volume of exportations of naval equipment, notably submarines,
shows the importance attached by States to the acquisition of maritime capacities which determines part
of their status.

Technological breakthroughs will allow a gradual increase in range of the naval systems towards
inland areas.

While it is still easy to shelter from coastal sensors at sea, space segments will diminish this advantage
which, in the face of adversaries of great stature, will lend even greater value to submarines.

Oceanic spaces are interstitial and inhospitable. Controlling them requires the setting up of a credible
deep-sea capacity of sufficient volume, based on autonomous, reliable and resistant tools.

Asymmetric threats at sea, until now confined to coastal waters, may develop further off shore. Representing
increasing danger for the circulation of strategic flows and for production sites (fishing and sea bed) of national
interest, this threat would result in the “withdrawal” of formerly coast-based activities to the open sea.

14 According to UN estimates, 60% of the world population will live in urban areas, half of it in shanty towns.

70
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

In the littoral zone, tactical freedom is de facto reduced (density of activities of all natures, physical
specificities, presence of sensors and coastal armament, etc.). Control of this zone may condition, on a
military level, expeditionary forces’ access to certain aeroterrestrial theatres, allowing the lasting, possibly
preliminary, positioning of naval aviation and amphibian forces, massive entry into a theatre, inter-army
fire support and resupplying from the sea, with a reduced ground imprint.

Specific threats are exerted there by increasingly less home-spun players: breaches of sovereignty, brigandage,
bombings or trafficking of migrants and various materials. The most ambitious nations fuel territorial resent-
ment or brandish the threat of potential banning of straits. The international community regularly decrees the
imposition of a military embargo, the first level of constraint.

These characteristics will require naval forces to face increasing exposure to coastal threats, symmetric
or otherwise, to master combat as well as humanitarian aid in a physically complex area with a high density
of activity, by controlling their collateral effects, on both land and sea.

Restrictions on jurisdiction and sovereignty

Base line
Territorial waters
12 nautical miles
Inland waters Contiguous zone
24 nautical miles

Bay

Exclusive economic
s
ile

Estuary
l zone (EEZ)
t i ca
m

nau 200 nautical miles

les

12
mi

utic
al

24 na High seas
s
ile

a
lm

a utic
Sediment
layers
200 n
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

Subsoil
layer
Ph
ys
ica
lc
on
tin
Ju en
r is tal
dic sh
tio elf
na
lc
on
tin Ridge
en
tal
Sources: Le grand atlas de la mer, sh Deep-sea plain
Encyclopaedia universalis - Albin Michel, elf
Paris, 1989; www.ifremer.fr
and www.industrie.gouv.fr/energie/petrole/
textes/perspectives.htm Note: 1 nautical mile equals 1,852 meters.

71
IV.4 - Air space and exo-atmospheric space
The aerospace environment will remain a crucial power issue (technological, industrial, economic,
defence, etc.). A major political tool that enables reaching simultaneously or successively, with appropriate
effects, the essential components of a State or organization, and bringing forces the necessary scope and a
global strategic coverage, aerospace power will continue to play a stabilizing role.

The development of permanent aerial vehicles (in-flight refuelling, autonomy, long-endurance unmanned
aerial vehicles, etc.) leads to a reconsideration of the concepts of aerial presence, which should be seen as
an element of diplomacy.

This offer of permanence will meet a growing need for surveillance (security demands, prevention,
complexity of situations, accelerating pace of engagements) for which the aerospace environment, thanks to
its privileged location, may provide global answers (drones, satellites, ISTAR platforms15).

A necessary prior condition to all inter-army operations, mastery of the third dimension is crucial to have
the freedom of action required for maintaining national sovereignty and engaging forces from all three
components.

The proliferation of latest generation conventional armament - combat planes, air-to-air missiles,
ground-to-air defence systems, etc. - will be a growing cause for concern.

15 Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, reconnaissance.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

The aerospace environment will also become, in the context of a growing need for global security, a
major protection issue. Securing a naturally interstitial environment will require means in sufficient quality
and quantity: vehicles, means of detection and control and command chains updated to accommodate new
challenges.

From this perspective, proliferation of ballistic vehicles or cruise missiles, potentially bearing weapons
of mass destruction, will need to be specifically taken into account, leading to consider in priority the need
for advanced alert systems (surveillance, alert, aggressor identification).

The possibilities and problems presented by aerial and space environments are largely similar. The modes
of action and the architecture of systems of the former also apply to the latter, notably in the fields of
surveillance, detection and alert.

Space activities will be increasingly risky: problems with debris, vulnerability of space segments,
freedom of circulation of information flows, growing economic interests, development of activities to
potentially unfriendly - even hostile - ends. Protection of the interests of space powers in this field is a
fundamental trend which primarily involves the preservation of freedom of access and action, in turn
requiring surveillance of space activities.

Arsenalization of space would deeply alter the approach to this environment and the capacities required
to maintain the necessary freedom of action.

IV.5 - Information space

Information media, like information itself, can be seen as a space in its own right, control of which is
essential.

The vulnerability of media will be increasingly felt as the “information space” acquires universal dimen-
sions. The difficulty of controlling it will rise with the multiplicity of interconnections between the various
players, and protection of broadcast sources will help hold up operating systems.

Computer mainframes or re-rerouting centres will become highly valued targets, especially since
they can be attacked outside contexts of open crisis.

Also, maintaining freedom of action in the field of information will depend in the long term on controlling the
use of electromagnetic spectrum, a prior and necessary condition to the engagement of all the components.

Cheap and easy to use, information (i.e. contents) is a choice weapon for asymmetrical confrontation (disin-
formation or deception16). The multiplicity of players and sensors results in the diversification of regulation
tools (political, military, etc.). This results in additional stress weighing on the combatant, with an obligation
towards results and exemplary behaviour, even though he is unable to see the issues at stake in the short
term, let alone medium or long term.

16 Measures aimed at misleading the enemy through the use of optical effects, distortion of reality or falsification, in order to prompt him to react in a
way that is detrimental to his own interests.

73
The proliferation of independent players and new means of communication, aside from major media,
makes information easier to manipulate by an adversary. Independent players may then become partisan
sources without their knowledge (military operations of influence).

Friendly force personnel will have at its disposal all the individual means necessary to pick up
and broadcast private images (war blogs), bringing about risks in the fields of safety, security and
communication.

The adversary may place military sensors, specialized or not, very close to its contacts, with a view
to collect images for evidence, deception or manipulation.

One of the protagonists may insidiously enter war games and virtual worlds in order to undermine
the shared perceptions and values of its adversaries.

V - DOMAINS TO MASTER
Whether for permanent protection of the territory or as part of future engagements, armed forces must
master the ability to settle crises, through the intensification of the planning process and supervision of
operations based on their effects17. Criteria such as tempo of operations, adaptability and endurance are
also critical.

Fulfilment of military aims is organized around six functions: understanding the situation, possessing the
adequate resources, controlling them, producing the desired effects, protecting the engaged elements and
regenerating their potential.

17 Complex military operations can no longer reconcile with the systematic attrition of the adversaries’ potential, and politico-military and civil-military
actions are increasingly linked.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

Sustaining a level of excellence for each of them imperatively requires mastery of certain domains which will
need to be, depending on each case, either strengthened or developed, using the most recent technological
building blocks.

V.1 - Understanding the situation

In a multidimensional and fast-moving context of increased complexity, up-to-date knowledge and
comprehension of the situation will be confirmed as an essential aptitude for operations planning and
supervision.

Acquiring new abilities in this domain will require the development of new space and aerobic sensors
(audio, optical, electromagnetic, infrared), and widespread use of new observation technologies18 will go
hand in hand with the improvement of the relevance and coverage of both surveillance and intelligence.

In addition, precise identification of the origin of aggressions will require, as well as mastery of data
georeferencing, evolution of the observation systems architecture through the networking of sensors,
associated operating systems and information systems.

In closed spaces, in particular urban areas, autonomy and capacities of access to situations intelligence
will be favoured, for lower grades, through the development of abilities that enable dealing with difficulties
in communication, coordination and orientation. At a higher level, development of superior simulation
tools of situation assessment and data processing will be pursued.

V.2 - Possessing the required resources

The multiplicity of instability zones and the evolutive nature of crises will require the development of an
ability to project and deploy forces of varied and changing nature and volume (strategic airlift) towards very
diverse, and sometimes very distant, theatres, possibly in emergency but always under time constraints.

This aptitude will have to include the projection of means from the other ministries concerned towards
theatres of operation, as well as their operative and tactical mobility on the theatre, possibly through
mutualization of said means.

All platforms with projection and mobility qualities will be subjected to active surveillance (high-speed
transport ship, heavy transport helicopter, etc.), and the use of innovative acquisition formulas or hiring of
services will be considered if needed. More generally, technologies in the aeronautics field (propulsion,
materials), maritime transport (platform, architecture, materials) or terrestrial vehicles mobility will be
subjected to research efforts, strengthened in cases not covered by civilian activities.

In parallel, projection systems’ high vulnerability, which remains a weak link considering the threats at stake,
will receive particular attention, as well as their capacity to deal with peaks in critical logistical consumption
(ammunitions, health) in theatres with a high concentration of engagement.

18 SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) and MTI (Moving Target Indicator).

75
V.3 - Control of resources
The nature of future engagements will require adaptation of the ability to plan, decide and supervise operations
by taking every dimension of the crisis into account. Informational networking will improve the reactivity of
opportunity decision cycles and the coordination of all protagonists’ actions. The fundamental aim remains
flexibility and speed of the decision process.

The evolution of command will be supported by the development of tools assisting decisions necessary to
information control in network operations.

As well as ensuring both safety performance and strategic transmissions integrity (indispensable for
non-dual technologies) and the capacity of displacement networks to communicate between a strategic
command centre and the theatres of operation, efforts will have to be made towards faster access to infor-
mation, digitalization and securing of deployed systems which must guarantee a level of protection adapted
to the nature of the information transmitted.

Stronger interconnection of information systems on the strategic and operational levels will go hand in
hand with increased interoperability, not only within coalitions but also - and increasingly - with nonmili-
tary governmental entities, even some nongovernmental organizations and the media.

V.4 - Producing the desired effects

“Producing the desired effects” means the ability to reach the morale and intelligence of the target
(decision-makers, adversary armed forces, populations, etc.), to dissuade it from action (through nuclear
deterrence or the power of traditional means), and if necessary to destroy or neutralize all or part of its
military assets, civilian and military infrastructures and networks of all natures all over the theatre of
operation. Implementation of a relevant operational communications strategy directly contributes to
producing these effects, notably by increasing international and national public opinion support of these
actions’ legitimacy.

Among a State’s primary concerns is the imperative to protect its territory and population. Some of the
domains to master in order to honour this obligation of the State are similar in nature to those allowing the
protection of combatants on theatres of operation; consequently they are listed among those mentioned for
the constituent function of “protecting the engaged elements.”

The range of military effects to be produced will widen, notably in the fields of precision, mastery of
lethality, temporary prohibition of access to certain zones, networks and command tools neutralization,
and broadcasting of adverse information.

Over the next thirty years, beyond the evolution of strategic assets performance (supersonic ballistic and cruise
missiles) crucial to nuclear deterrence credibility, the primary objective will be to improve the efficiency of the
strikes, while reducing their collateral effects. This will mean:
r
more effective target designation (higher range in complex environments);
r
armaments of longer reach (improved propulsion and data transmission);
r
controlled weapons lethality (miniaturization, diversification of weapon loads with graded and programmable
effects);
r
increased ammunition precision (robustness of electromagnetic guides, laser, infrared, GPS19, signature
recognition);
r
improved reactivity (reduced preparation time of missions for TSTs20);
r
integrated BDA21 capacity for operational, political, legal and media reasons.

19 Global Positioning System.

20 Time Sensitive Targeting (for targets whose importance justifies real-time treatment).
21 Battle Damage Assessment.

76
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

In addition, weapon systems will not only need to be able to merge multiple data from different
interoperable sources, but also to evolve rapidly through the use of open multi-platform architectures
allowing easy incremental evolutions.

V.5 - Protecting engaged elements

Due to the complexity of intervention environments, exposed to multiform and omnipresent threat, pro-
tection of forces will become increasingly complex and involving. Consequently preserving the potential
will be a constant concern.

The challenge will consist in protecting, on the one hand, individuals (physical and psychological aggressions),
equipment and infrastructures and, on the other, the armed forces’ manoeuvres and image (preventing and
limiting anything that might undermine the trust and credibility of armed forces through manipulation or
disinformation).

For the protection of individuals, in terms of equipment, solutions will have to be found, notably technical
ones, allowing a compromise between absolute protection, strike capability and mobility. Protection
is not limited to passive response; it can be undertaken through furtiveness, hypermobility, detection and
alert against threats, and autonomy.

For the protection of stationing locations, the setting apart of zones under threat from the highest number
of functions, notably those related to command or support, will be sought.

As regards manoeuvres, dynamic protection, notably during the phase of access to the theatre, must
complement the passive and active measures. This protection will be made easier by “interarmization”
and digitization of the three manoeuvre areas.

Protection of engaged elements will require capacities of surveillance, remote detection, chase and
discrimination, interception and neutralization of ballistic missiles and well as aerobic mobile means
(including cruise missiles, drones, etc.).

These capacities will draw on various technologies concerning distant hyperresolution (high definition),
optronic detection (infrared), transhorizon radar, active decoys, ultra-high-output networks and
antennas… as well as directed energy and controlled effect weapons (laser, high-power microwaves).

Higher requirements in terms of personnel protection, beyond the ability to operate on-board armaments
under armour plating, due notably to the proximity of belligerents in urban areas, will require a deeper
knowledge of life sciences (biometrics, immunology, etc.).

For a better apprehension of the environment, in the context of increased automation and robotization,
the development of sensor miniaturization and robustness will be sought.

77
V.6 - Regenerating potential
In spite of the willingness to concentrate military engagements in time, interventions will continue to take
place over extended periods due to the growing complexity of crisis management and the support that can
be maintained during the reconstruction phase.

Logistic support will generally be inter-army and increasingly multinational. Logistics based on massive
support deployments, stockpiling and supplying of continuous flows, will be replaced by JIT (just-in-time)
logistics. In order to lighten logistical support deployment, autonomy will be sought and possibilities of
remote action and support, notably for complex equipment, will be developed.

Issues related to the complementarity between stocks and flow, strategic stocks proportioning but
also those related to normalization, standardization, interoperability or even adaptation of military
equipment life cycles, will have to be solved with a view to reducing weapon systems’ running costs, to
adapting to sociocultural standards and life support conditions (food, health), but also in the prospect of
sharing capacities between armies and allies, which does not rule out, in a context of externalization, the
recourse to services available in civilian life.

Regarding energy, efforts will have to be made in both reducing systems consumption as well as improving
autonomy in regards to resources available on theatres of operation (autonomous means of electricity produc-
tion, synthetic fuels, tolerance to various qualities of fuel, etc.).

78
 Factors of state power: from hard to soft power, 2005

VI - EVOLUTION OF THE MAIN POWERS’ CAPACITIES

criteria of "structural power" according to Susan Strange
Note: Only the first 10 states for each criterion
(dark bars) have been included in the matrix. SECURITY PRODUC TION FINANCE KNOWLEDGE

ON THE MILITARY LEVEL

Market
Area Population Nuc1 CC2 Mlitary expenses GDP valuation3 R&D spendings Foreign students
USA 9.6 298.2 507.0 12,455.1 17,000.9 2.68 572.5
EU (27) 5.2 490.0 253.3 13,505.0 10,128.1 1.33 1,083.5

Japan 128.1 45.3 4,505.9 7,542.7 3.15 117.9

Germany 38.7 2,781.9 1,221.1 2.49 260.3

United Kingdom 57.6 2,192.6 3,058.2 300.1
France* 54.1 2,110.2 2,706.8 237.6
Italy 31.9 1,723.0 40.6
Spain 1,123.7 959.9

China 9.6 1,315.8 44.2 2,228.9 1,456.9

India 3.3 1,103.4 23.6 1,069.0
Brazil 8.5 186.4 794.1
Canada 10.0 1,115.2 1,482.2 40.0
Australia 7.7 167.0
Russia 17.1 143.2 28.8 - 75.8

Argentina 2.8
79

Kazakhstan 2.7 -
Sudan 2.5 - -
Indonesia 222.8 -
Pakistan 157.9 - -
Bangladesh - - -

GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

141.8
Nigeria 131.5 - - -
Saudi Arabia 25.3 - -
Switzerland 935.4 2.57

Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

Israel 4.46 -
Sweden 3.74
Finland - 3.46
Iceland - 3.01 -
South Korea 2.4
Denmark - 2.63
South Africa 50.0
in million km2 in million inhabitants in Bn$ (2003) in Bn $ in trillion $ in % of GDP in thousands
1
Possession of nuclear weapons permanent country aspiring * Associated via Euronex with the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal for market valuation
2
Permanent seat at the UN Security Council: seat to a permanent seat 3
Total of the financial dealings carried out in the states' stock exchanges
- Null value or lack of data
Sources for: areas: CIA Factbook, www.cia.gov; population in 2005: UN, population department, www.un.org ; military expenses in 2005: Catalina Perdomo, Sipri, www.sipri.org;
GDP in 2005: World Bank, www.worldbank.org; market valuation in 2005: www.world-exchanges.org;
foreign students in 2004 and R&D spendings between 2000 and 2005: UNESCO, www.unesco.org
Estimation of military power will be increasingly based on capacities of force and power projection, as well
as the armed forces’ capacity to endure and adapt to crises lasting several years. Over the course of these
crises, phases of combat and stabilization may alternate.
Mastery of space, nuclear and information technologies will also constitute a crucial parameter in the
assessment of states’ military power.

VI.1 - United States, the world power

The United States will continue to maintain global capacities and increase their projection capacities and
their fighting power, even in the absence of any potential adversary of comparable size.

Over the next thirty years, American forces should retain indisputable superiority based on a very signifi-
cant technological lead due to high research budgets, half of which are devoted to defence and security. The
weight of defence budgets should remain considerable. However, a slight reduction is possible so that defence
contributes to the indispensable efforts of deficit and debt reduction Americans must undertake.

Evolution of military spending, 1990-2005

7.0
in Bn$ Iran
(2003 inflation adjusted)

37.7
China

1.5 6.6 Syria

12.3 20.4
India

3.1
10.5
9.6
Israel
7.7

8.9 Turkey
7.4 3.2 Pakistan
2.7

42.0
37.7 Japan
478.1
431.3 USA

50
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

46.1
51.2 France

126.4
33.2
Germany

21.0
Source: SIPRI, Russia
www.sipri.org
1990 1995 2000 2005

80
 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

The architecture of North American territory protection will change dramatically and will be based on
protection measures outside the USA, reinforced borders and operational ballistic antimissile defence.
The United States may then be less dependent on nuclear weapons in the defence of their vital interests,
while retaining a large range of energies and effects.

Once its transformation is completed, American defence should gain flexibility and be more suited to geo-
political and military realities. Asymmetrical threats and conflicts involving non-state actors will remain
two particularly essential doctrinal and strategic axes.

Systems of information and communication will, more than ever, form the keystone of the chain of
command, capacities of projection, strike and protection. Consequently, space - a strategic domination
tool - should have an important place, not only because it will allow the development of these systems, but
also because it is a major security issue in the fields of intelligence and antimissile defence. On the domestic
front, security should still be the focus of attention. However, following a phase of continuous rise, the
budget for Homeland Security should stabilize, like that of the Department of Defense.

At the international level, the United States’ supremacy should not be challenged, in terms of
equipment and budget, except perhaps by China. But, in all likelihood, the United States will retain their
rank of first military power.

The United States will remain the leading State in terms of military expenses. Over the next thirty years, they
will remain unchallenged in their ability to project power at the international level autonomously with all
necessary means at their disposal. They will possess a capacity of ballistic antimissile defence against which
threatening states will develop cruise missiles or modes of asymmetric aggression.

VI.2 - Regional powers with a global focus

For the European Union, demographic imbalance with emerging military powers (China, India) will have
serious and lasting consequences. For example, the reduction of the format of European armies seems
inescapable, both for economic reasons and because of the population decline.

Generally, the construction of the European security and defence policy (ESDP) will remain a central issue
in years to come. The European Union’s military power will depend strongly on the direction of the ESDP,
with options ranging from the present status quo to a strong integration of all European armies, to uniting
the armies of certain European states into a “hard core.”

81
 Military spending, 2005

in million $

507,000
(USA)

57,000
(United Kingdom)

(Netherlands) 10,000
(Mexico) 3,000
(Peru) 1,000
< 500

MAXIMA
USA 507.0
EU (27) 253.3
UK 57.6
France 54.1
Japan 45.3
China 44.2
Germany 38.7
Italy 31.9
Russia 28.8 no available
India 23.6 data
South Korea 20.7
Data from: 2005 or 2004, except:
2003: Barbada, Congo, Ivory Coast, Eritrea, Malawi, Niger, Uzbekistan and Sudan;
2002: Brunei, Djibouti, Guinea and Liberia; 2001: Guinea-Bissau, Laos, Madagascar and Swaziland; 2000: Zambia;
1999: Turkmenistan and Panama; 1996: Guyana; 1995: Equatorial Guinea; 1995: Vietnam.

in % of GDP
19.6
4.2
2.2
1.2
0
no available
data
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

MAXIMA
Erythrea 19.6
MINIMA Oman 12.0
Costa Rica, Israel 8.7
Iceland, S. Arabia 8.3
Liberia and Jordan 8.2
Panama 0 Kuwait 7.9
Haiti 0.1

Source: Catalina Perdomo, The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), www.sipri.org

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

United Kingdom

The United Kingdom, whose defence budget should stay at its present level in years to come, will remain a
major player within the European Union and NATO. In addition to engaging in operations abroad, the renewal
of its nuclear arsenal will ensure its continued status on the international scene. With the completion of
its army’s “transformation” and efforts on the technological capacities required for implementing the
Network Enabled Capability22, it will have at its disposal forces in concentrated format, stressing flexibility,
deployability and interoperability at the service of “effects to be obtained”. Its industrial cooperations in the
field of aeronautics as well as research and technology with the United States will ensure interoperability
and make it a “natural military partner” for Washington in large-scale operations.

Although largely dependent on its American ally from the technological and nuclear standpoint, the United
Kingdom will not neglect the European Union, where it will also reveal itself to be a key partner in the
preparation and supervision of multinational operations.

Germany
Germany will retain an essential and leading role within the European Union. However, in spite of its outspoken
ambitions, it seems unlikely to gain more influence on the international scene. Indeed, while defence expenses
should still be one of the main items in the national budget, they will probably be insufficient to allow the
financing of the necessary armament programmes to fill its technological gaps.

Considering its population decline23, the main challenge facing Germany will be the recruitment in its
armies which, although transformed and modernized, will be projection armies, specializing in three
domains: combat, stabilization and support.

Consequently Germany should remain a major purveyor of troops for foreign operations in the frame-
work of its Euro-Atlantic alliances.

Russia

Despite having all the necessary capacities at its disposal to play a major role on the military level,
Russia will struggle to compensate for its growing technological backwardness and to renew its equip-
ment. Efforts will be made, however, in the field of research and development, as well as the setting up
of industrial partnerships, notably with European companies. Although the current trend in Moscow and
Washington is the reduction of arsenals, the priority placed on maintaining the credibility of Russian
strategic nuclear forces should allow Russia to retain its rank.

The marked population decline which should endure for many years to come24 will strongly penalize the
already difficult recruitment for armies.

In the absence of any significant drop in the prices of oil and gas, the defence budget should continue to rise
and number among the world’s highest defence budgets, keeping Russia in the category of military powers
to be reckoned with.

China

Although its capacities and standards remain well below those of the most modern armies, the Chinese
People’s Republic will display a thirst for power and international recognition which is unlikely diminish.
More generally, China will seek to compensate its technological backwardness and implement a coherent
and efficient force. Reckoning that it has not yet reached what it views as its level of “sufficiency”, China

22 General capacity allowing the acquisition of a decisive advantage by means of a particular management of information and intelligence which
improves decision-making quality and efficiency of action.
23 The German population, which numbers 82 million inhabitants today, will reach 78 million in 2035. With a very low fertility rate (1.36 child per
woman), the tendency for population decline will endure, especially since immigration is too low to make up for the low birth rate.
24 In 2035, the number of deaths in Russia will be almost double that of births (a million newborns, nearly two million deaths). Russia will lose 20 million
inhabitants compared to today, sinking from 144 to 124 million.

83
will go on developing its nuclear arsenal. Control of the maritime environment will also be among its
priorities.

Its defence budget should, like its GDP, continue to rise over the next thirty years, making it the second
highest in the world. In addition, China will still benefit from the weight of numbers which, along with its
sophisticated equipment, will make it a military heavyweight.

Also, in the considered period, China will assert itself as a first-rate military power (beyond the technical
modernization of its overabundant armed forces, increased participation in operations of peace maintenance
will favour this status), although it seems unlikely that its backwardness in terms of military capacities,
particularly compared to the United States, may be compensated for.

India

India displays a willingness to take its full place on the regional and international scenes, but will need to
progress on a number of issues to develop the necessary capacities to support its regional ambitions.

Indeed, it will take from ten to fifteen years to complete and modernize its nuclear triad. It will also seek
to improve the capacities of its navy, which is now acknowledged by the Indian political power as a real
diplomatic tool (reaction to the tsunami, evacuation of nationals in Lebanon, etc.). Its defence budget will
keep rising in years to come. Such efforts will continue to be necessary to reassert the military condition
and allow modernization of its ageing equipment.

It seems unlikely, however, that India may rise to the level of major military powers, or even that of
Europe.

Japan

Japan, the United States’ preferred economic and military partner, is fully aware of China’s fast economic
rise and its slower rise on the military level.

The intensifying competition for free access to energy and raw materials may force the country to imple-
ment a regional security policy and supplement the military means required for it. It seems likely that
article 9 of the Japanese constitution, which states that Japan “renounces war forever” and restricts the
deployment of forces abroad, will be revised in the coming years.

Because of the low share of GDP devoted by Japan to self-defence forces, there is a great margin for
progression should the international situation require it. Its considerable research efforts also allow it to
have recent and sophisticated military equipment at its disposal. But Japan may have to face difficulties
in recruiting, in years to come, due to the decline and ageing of its population. In the long term, a closer
political and military connection with its Asian neighbours, at the expense of its special relationship with
its present allies (United States and Australia), seems quite unlikely.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

Russia, China and India will seek to base their military power on modernized nuclear arsenals.

China and India will seek to develop their capacities to control the environment, flows and projection.
They may acquire global capacities.

Russia, for demographic as well as economic reasons, should not acquire conventional capacities on a
global scale within the same period.

VI.3 - The standard troublemaker

The standard troublemaker, whether State or transnational group, is motivated by an ideology (religion/
political ideas/ particular world view) which allows it to mobilize energies beyond a specific geographic
framework. Its opposition to the international community then brings support from those who challenge
Western-style globalization.

It takes advantage of information technologies to spread its ideology, and is either self-financed or supported
by illicit activities (mafias, trafficking, proliferation), relying on the extreme complexity and opacity of the
international system.

It has a real nuisance capacity (classic or asymmetric war, terrorism, possession or suspected possession of
weapons of mass destruction). In the case of a state, this gives it a form of sanctuarization.

The régime of this troublemaker state remains opaque to the outside world. Negotiating with it is very
difficult, as it does not necessarily share the values of the majority of the international community. It does
not respect international law and plays a double game. It may try to demand a status of regional power.

In the next thirty years, the international community should be faced with players, whether state or
non-state, who will increase world instability.

VII - MAIN TRENDS AND DISRUPTIONS -

CONSEQUENCES FOR FRANCE AND EUROPE

VII.1 - Nature of conflicts and military interventions

Conflicts in the next thirty years will still, in many cases, find their origin in the rise of cultural, religious
and ethnic tensions, often within states.

But the scarcity of natural resources, the correlated increase in their price and acute economic competition
in a globalized world, generating latent territorial demands or resentment, may cause serious disagree-
ments between States that may degenerate into armed conflicts.

Although dissymmetric to begin with, and despite the increasingly controlled use of force, these conflicts may
become asymmetric, with the weaker protagonist trying to free itself of the constraints imposed by law.

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 Excess of international law might lead to its own demise, with states freeing themselves from it
in the name of their “superior interests”.

States will also continue to be confronted with non-state organizations, in asymmetric conflicts, in which
technology and imagination may occasionally reverse the balance of power.

In future conflicts, the border between conventional, nonconventional and emerging modes of action
may gradually become blurred. Indeed, the spreading of technological breakthroughs facilitates the use of
weapons of mass destruction, or attacks in the nonmaterial digital field, in which societies and armies will
present increasing vulnerability.

The use of nuclear or biological weapons, or offensive space assets, would constitute major changes in
the art of war.

Lastly, beyond their defensive role, armies, security players in the broader sense and regulation tool par
excellence, will be increasingly appealed to, even on the domestic front.

VII.2 - Main identified threats

Transnational terrorism and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction by a troublemaking regional
power are presently the main identified threats which France and Europe may have to face in the next thirty
years.

Terrorist organizations will try to devise ever more innovative or unexpected modes of action.

In the considered period, large-scale terrorist attacks - biological, nuclear or cybernetic - would have
grave consequences and would deeply alter the context of the fight against this threat.

Several regional troublemakers, driven by an aggressive ideology towards Western powers, will take advan-
tage of widespread technology availability, even the most sensitive. The appeal of nuclear weapons and
their great balancing power will remain strong, and the quest for mastery of this technology, or the simple
acquisition of the weapon, will be accompanied by strong efforts in the field of ballistic and aerodynamic
vehicles.

Widespread access to weapons of mass destruction, favoured by the new information technologies,
may weaken the regulating effect of Western countries’ military superiority.

The development of very efficient antimissile systems, which would give developed countries’
defence a significant advance to the detriment of regional troublemakers, would be likely to undermine
the proliferants’ willpower.

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 GEOSTRATEGIC PROSPECTIVES FOR THE NEXT THIRTY YEARS

VII.3 - Military evolution of major state players

In the next thirty years, the United States will likely remain the only superpower. However, their need of sur-
veillance and control over global activity will force them to seek partnerships in order to share the weight
of these missions, beyond their traditional allies (as with the implementation of the American Smart
Borders25 system, the promotion of the 1000-Ship Navy26 concept or the attempt to reform partnerships
within NATO).
r
The armies of Western countries will continue their evolution towards increased professionalization and
the formation of reserves or national guards. It cannot be ruled out that acute recruitment problems,
combined with a high level of engagement, or the appearance of a major threat, may force them to return
to a system based partly on a form of conscription.

Russia, China and India should modernize their nuclear arsenals in order to reinforce their status. In the
first two cases, the aim will be to dissuade all potential aggressors to intervene in their respective environ-
ments.

Meanwhile, China and India may develop their capacities of influence and control of the environment and
flows, but are unlikely to pose a major threat to the United States in their conventional supremacy on a
global scale. As for Russia, it should carry out improvements to its conventional forces, but its efforts will
be restricted by unfavourable demographic evolutions and economic difficulties, despite the considerable
revenue derived from exploitation of its natural resources (rentier economy).

Purchases of conventional weapons, 2004

MAXIMA
China 11,677
India 8,526
Greece 5,263
UK 3,395
Turkey 3,298
Egypt 3,103
South Korea 2,755
UAE 2,581
United Nations Australia 2,177
Pakistan 2,018
Atlas de la mondialisation - Presses de Sciences Po 2007

Purchases of
conventional
weapons (M $*)

11,677 5,250 2,000 500 60 *1990 $

Source: The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), www.sipri.org

25 This programme concerns transportation of goods and free movement of people.

26 With this concept, the United States reveals their willingness to involve all naval forces of friendly states in order to control all international maritime
activities for security purposes.

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Consequences for France and the European Union

In the next thirty years, France and other European countries will have to take into account a wide range of
possible confrontations and situations.

In order to avoid strategic surprises and maintain its influence on the military level, in an environment
characterized by the emergence of new powers, the European Union will have to develop the full range of
necessary capacities. Most of all, it will have to adapt to very changeable threats, and potentially very innova-
tive modes of action.

The handling of all crises will have a strong interdepartmental character and, whatever the level of
European integration, taking the present model as reference, an interagency and interpillar procedure
will be imperative to achieve maximum efficiency.

Outside the Union, engagements, mostly multinational, will require the maintenance of a high level of
interoperability. Individual and collective protection of the engaged forces will require strong efforts.

But whatever the level of outside engagement and the level reached by ESDP, ensuring the security of
member states’ populations will be at the heart of the armies’ missions. Strong efforts will need to be made
to this end. In a threatening environment, nuclear deterrence, whether mutualized or made available to
the community by Great Britain and France, would be the final guarantee of the safety of populations and
territories.

This protection could be complemented by a system of antimissile defence, if this type of component’s
performance is satisfactory with respect to the necessary investments and geostrategic environment.

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