India and China: Race in Maritime Activities

Political Science 3.3

Submitted by

Anshuman Pandey

UID- SM0116008

2nd year, 3rd Semester

Faculty Incharge

Dr. Mayengbam Nandakishwor Singh

Assistant Professor of Political Science

National Law University and Judicial Academy, Assam

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 Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Introduction………………………………………………….03-04

1.1Literature Review
1.2Scope and Objective
1.3Research Methodology

Chapter 2: China and the String of Pearls Theory …………………....07-09

Chapter 3: The Malacca Strait and Coco Island………………………10-13

Chapter 4: The South China Sea……………………………………….14-15

Chapter 5: The Indian Ocean ………………………………………….16-18

Conclusion

Bibliography

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 Introduction

India has always attached great importance to its relations with China, not only because of the
old long chequered history dating back thousands of years that binds the two countries
together, but also because of the China’s Strategic importance for India as its biggest and the
most powerful neighbour. The ties between China and India, the world's two most populous
countries. The two neighbours fought a short border war in 1962 and since then, a sense of
mistrust has consistently dogged their bilateral ties.

There are many vicissitudes among the relations of the India and China and that can be in
trade among or the border issues of the two countries including the tussle in the defence
strategies of the duos on either land, water or air. Once India supported the China’s bid to the
permanent seat of the United Nations Security Council and that same China is stabbing India
on its back in the India’s bid to the NSG membership.

But it’s the Interest of the Country that helps in the formation of the Foreign Policy of the
country as rightly opined out by the Lord Palmerston that:

“We have no eternal allies and we have no eternal enemies. It is our interests are eternal and
those interests it is our duty to follow”

So as India did after the backstab they got from China in 1962.

There is lot of geostrategic competition qualified by growing commercial cooperation

between the two countries. In addition, there is some asymmetry: China is a more fraught
subject in Indian national debates than India is for China. China does not appear to feel
threatened in any serious way by India, while India at times displays tr.emendous insecurity
in the face of Chinese economic success and military expansion.

Recently China has marked its important presence in the South Asia by its two megaprojects
One Belt, One Road (OBOR) that includes China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and
the China’s investment in Pakistan is another major threat for India. The Gwadar Port
developed by China for the purpose of CPEC is just the tip of the iceberg as the political
pundits believe that China will not only assist Pakistan Navy through Gwadar port but
would also launch offensive using this port in the scenario of a Sino-Indian conflict. 1

1
URL: http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/belt-and-road-china-silk-road-massive-funding-open-to-
all/1/953403.html.

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There has been lot of conflicts between India and China but this project will deal with the
race that is going between both the countries in the maritime activities. This project will deal
with the development of the Submarines and the aircraft carriers and most importantly the
ports developed by both the countries in the recent times. 2 The project will demarcate the
various developments by both the countries area wise that is the development in the:

i. Indian Ocean
ii. The Malacca Straits
iii. The South-China Sea
iv. The China and its String of Pearls.

Scope and Objective

2
URL: http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.

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The scope the project is limited to the study of the maritime activities of the India and China
in the various regions. Various development in Indian Ocean, the Malacca Straits, the South-
China Sea, the China, and its String of Pearls by both these Countries.

The objective of the project research is to compare the two countries and their strategical
developments in the water and figuring out which country has the upper hand in the maritime
activities.

Methodology

1. Approach to research

In this project, the researchers have adopted Doctrinal type of research. Doctrinal

research is essentially a library-based study, which means that the materials needed by

a researcher may be available in libraries, archives and other databases. Help from

various websites were also taken.

2. Sources of data collection

Data has been collected from secondary sources like books, web sources etc. The

researchers collected no primary sources like survey data or field data.

3. System of Citation and Footnoting:

The researchers have followed the Oxford System of citation and footing throughout

the project to maintain the uniformity.

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Literature Review

 India’s Foreign Policy, Coping with the Changing World

~by Muchkund Dubey

This book deals with the foreign policy of India. Its started with the The structure of foreign
policy of India especially with China has helped in this paper in depicting the kind of
regulations and terms countries lay down in order to safeguard themselves. As for example in
China there is a policy that foreign ships for military purposes shall be subject to approval by
the Government of the People’s Republic of China for entering the territorial sea of the
People’s Republic of China. Thus, it clearly highlights the perception of China regarding
Maritime. There is new aspect developed due to the activities of China which has denoted the
term increasingly sea power minded China. This article has helped in framing the arguments
dealt in the project.

 Here Is All You Should Know About 'String Of Pearls', China's Policy
To Encircle India
~ Maninder Dabas (IndiaTimes)
In this article, the author traces the growth of hostilities between the two countries. The
author explain how we went from “Hindi Chini Bhai-Bhai” to the current Clash of the titans
in arms race. In this book, the author give reason for the rise of China's naval footprint in and
around Indian Ocean and China's development of various ports in the String of the Pearls
region and India counter to the China’s strategic development. The main focus of the article
is the Country-wise China’s development in the different areas and development of the ports
in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Myanmar, Bangladesh etc.

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 Chapter 2: China and the String of Pearls Theory

‘String of Pearls’ refers to a geopolitical theory to the network of Chinese intentions in

India Ocean Region (IOR). Precisely, it refers to the network of Chinese military and
commercial facilities developed by China in countries falling on the Indian Ocean
between the Chinese mainland and Port Sudan.
With reports of China mulling to establish a naval base in Pakistan doing the rounds,
India may once again worry about the much talked about Chinese doctrine of ‘String of
Pearls’ to contain both lands as well as the maritime footprint of India in the region.
The doctrine has been discussed and debated for years and India’s ‘ Look East Policy’
was always seen as an answer to Chinese ‘String of Pearls’.

But first, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and now its macro form of One
Belt One Road (OBOR) under which China will construct various land and maritime
trade routes are also seen as a part of China’s larger military ambition.

India has already been encircled by Chinese military and commercial facilities and if as
reported, Chinese naval base comes up on Pakistan soil that is going to be the possible
last cog in the chain of pearls encircling India. Though similar military and commercial
facilities have been developed by China to encircle Japan and other American allies as
well, since our concern is India, we are discussing the Chinese presence in IOR, which
might prove costly for India at the time of conflict with China.

Those having slightest of interest in India-China relationship are familiar with the String of
Pearls theory. The phrase seems to have been in use even before but publication of Energy
Futures in Asia: Final Report in 2004 made it popular.

The report said that China was working on a strategy to expand its influence in the Indian
Ocean to extract maximum benefit from it and contain Indian hold in the region. China was
expected to raise civilian and military infrastructure at chosen points on the islands or ports -
metaphorically called pearls - surrounding India.

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String of pearl, in geostrategic parlance, refers to the Strait of Malacca, Sri Lanka, Pakistan,
the Maldives, the Strait of Hormuz and Somalia. It also includes Bangladesh and Myanmar in
Chinese strategy.3

Beijing had been clinically pursuing its “string of pearls” agenda in the Indian Ocean to
encircle India. China started building military and commercial outposts in an arc from its
mainland across to Sudan, passing through the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the
Strait of Hormuz and Lombok Strait.  This maritime “garland” would encompass ports in
Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives, Seychelles and Somalia.
China identified development of string of ports in the Indian Ocean, which includes:
 Kyaukphyu in Myanmar
 Chittagong in Bangladesh
 Hambantota in Sri Lanka
 Marao in Maldives
 Mahe in Seychelles
 Gwadar in Pakistan
Along with a military logistics base in Djibouti, as the hub to safeguard its merchant ships in
the piracy-hit waters close to the Gulf of Aden. India considers development of these ports by
China as India’s encirclement by “string of pearls”.

India’s counter strategy to Chinese “string of pearls”:

India must develop a clear counter-strategy to counter the Chinese. The key countries in
India’s own “string of pearls” are Vietnam, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Iran, the
Maldives and Seychelles.
Myanmar, with several deep-sea ports, including Yangon and Dawei, is the first pearl in
India’s garland, sweeping south into the Indian Ocean before rising up to the port of
Chabahar in southern Iran. Along the way are a friendly Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.  Both
have significant ports – Chittagong, Mongla, Matarbari and Payra in Bangladesh and
Colombo and Hambontota in Sri Lanka.  Leaders in both countries, too, lean towards India
rather than China.  The Maldives and Seychelles are small but key components in India’s
“string of pearls” which when completed would begin in Myanmar in the east, dip south to
3
Holmes, James Who Will Win the Great China-India Naval War of 2020? Accessed through

http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/08/07/who-will-win-the-sino-indian-naval-war-of-2020.

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Sri Lanka and link up with Iran in the west. India’s “string of pearls” strategy, along with
close relations New Delhi has forged with Nepal and Bhutan – both of which share long
borders with China – places India in a stronger geopolitical position than it enjoyed few years
back.

Chahbahar Port Vs Gwadar Port

The Indian quest for trade route to Iran and Afghanistan extending to Central Asia is about to
achieve as the technical teams agreed after negotiations took place among countries on April
11, 2016. India, Iran and Afghanistan have finalized the provisions of trilateral transport and
transit pact called Chahbahar. The agreement was signed in the presence of Narendra Modi,
Hassan Rohani and Ashraf Ghani in Iran on May 23, 2016.  The importance of Chahbahar
can be partly explained through the theory of strategic encirclement. Therefore, when China
revealed its plans to develop Gawadar port, India moved ahead with Chahbahar Port Project
(around 72 km away from Gawadar) despite international pressure.
Thus, Modi has effectively countered the threat posed by China and Pakistan of encircling
India through the Arabian Sea but it has to be seen how fast India goes ahead with
development of the Chahbahar Port.  It is interesting that even Japan has recently showed its
willingness to India for participating in the development of Chahbahar Port.  With Japan’s
entry in this mega project, to which probably Iran would not disagree, will put new energy
into the project.  On the other hand, India must ensure that the CPEC Project of China for
development of Gwadar Port is slowed down by rising voice of dissent against Pakistan and
China by Baloch leaders of Pakistan and the visible disturbances in POK.

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 Chapter 3: The Malacca Strait and Coco Island

The Strait of Malacca connects Indian Ocean with Pacific Ocean with Malaysia and
Singapore on one side while Indonesia on the other side. It is not very far from the Nicobar
Islands.
The Strait of Malacca is key for China's energy requirements. About 80 per cent of its fuel
from the Middle East passes through this. Wary of India's stronghold in the Indian Ocean,
China has been consistently working to develop friendly and cooperative relations with the
countries in the region.
In 1971, when China gave feelers about aligning with Pakistan during the Liberation War for
Bangladesh, India had threatened to block the Strait of Malacca. Later in 1999 during Kargil
war, India choked supply to Pakistan - practically blocking Karachi port - using its
dominance in the Indian Ocean. China is on a mission to turn the tide against India.4

The Indian Ocean sees nearly 60 per cent of the trade which includes the trade of oil
from the oil fields of the Middle East. In addition, 80 per cent of China’s oil imports pass
through the Strait of Malacca. Therefore, Strait of Malacca is indispensable for China
until it develops alternative routes. Therefore, China is keen to develop friendly relations
with countries like Malaysia and Singapore, which surround the Malacca Strait.

The Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea are as important to Myanmar as they are to
India. Most sea lines of communication (SLOCs) pass through these two seas. The Coco
Island north of Andamans is strategically important to both India and Myanmar. China
has shown keen interest in this island since last four decades. It is supposed to have a
SIGINT facility to monitor Indian missile launches into Bay of Bengal and Indian
Ocean. The airstrip too is considered a Chinese construction. The Myanmar coast line is
dubbed by many as China’s second coast in the IOR.

4
India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy: India shifts its focus from ‘using’ to ‘securing’ maritime security in the
Indo-Pacific accessed through https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.

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Recently a spurt of activities has been witnessed at the Coco Island. Considering Chinese
ambitions in the IOR and its assiduous expansionism, there is a strong need to monitor
all activities in the IOR especially at the Coco Island. We made an effort to read the
Myanmar activities in the island through Google Earth (GE) satellite imagery of the last
one year. 5

India has a strategic hold on Malacca Strait and in past as India had threatened to block
Malacca Strait when China was mulling to help Pakistan in 1971 war.
Geographically a part of the Andaman group of islands, Great Coco Island and Little Coco
Island are controlled by Myanmar. Since the early 1990s, there have been frequent reports of
China using those islands for military and naval purposes but there is no certain proof of
whether the islands are actually under Chinese control. Thus, Chinese presence on the Coco
Islands, developing intelligence systems and other naval facilities, is unnerving for nearby
India. While it is yet not certain whether the Great Coco island hosts Chinese intelligence
systems, there is greater acknowledgement on the building of runways and other connectivity
infrastructure on the Cocos.

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI), controlled by India, are located southwest of the
Cocos, closer to Indonesia and to the busy sea-lanes of the Malacca Strait. The islands give
India a strategic advantage in the Indian Ocean Region — perhaps why New Delhi
established there its first and only tri-command (Army, Navy and Air Force) service in 2001.
India’s control over the islands has proved instrumental in collaborating with the navies of
the region and carrying out critical exercises such as MILAN and MALABAR. Chinese
control of the Coco Islands in Myanmar would mean that Beijing would have the advantage
of monitoring the Indian Navy in close proximity.

With growing Chinese investments in Myanmar and developing ties between the two nations,
Beijing’s military presence in the Cocos is definitely a possibility over time, if not an
overnight development. A military presence in the Coco Islands, if truly established, would
give China the edge to monitor India’s naval activities with other powers in the region. It will
also affect other regional powers such as Australia and the U.S. and strengthen China’s
foothold in the Indian Ocean.

5
Vikram Bhat, ‘Strong need to monitor activities in strategic Coco Islands’ accessed online through
http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/strong-need-to-monitor-activities-in-strategic-coco-islands.

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China carried out naval exercises through the Lombok Strait near Indonesia, deploying its
largest landing ship, the Changbaishan. The drill was closely watched by countries like
India, Australia, and the U.S., as it underlines China’s ability to project power beyond its
shores. While as of now China is only projecting into the Indian Ocean, Beijing’s growing
ties with the island nations of the Indian Ocean will allow the PLA Navy to maintain a more
sustainable presence in the IOR.
Conscious of Beijing’s Indian Ocean strategy, the Indian government under Prime Minister
Modi is paying a considerable amount of attention to maritime security and to strengthening
ties with the IOR islands and littorals. With a new government coming into power in Sri
Lanka, India is eagerly looking to step up its security ties with the island nation. Chinese
infrastructure and development projects such as the Hambantota port and the frequent
docking of Beijing’s submarines at Colombo for “re-fuelling and refreshment” is a growing
concern for India. Capitalizing on the new opportunity extended by the Maithripala Sirisena
government (India was the destination of Sirisena’s maiden overseas visit).6

Modi is scheduled to travel to Colombo in March to discuss key issues of interest and
concern between the two countries. Modi will also travel to the Maldives and Seychelles
during the same leg of the trip, strengthening New Delhi’s Indian Ocean act. While India
cannot block Beijing’s entry into the Indian Ocean game, New Delhi is in dire need of
strengthening its own.

 India’s natural maritime outpost Andaman and Nicobar plays a vital role in monitoring the
world’s most strategic and trafficked Malacca Strait, through which 60,000 to 95,000
merchant, oil and gas cargos, pass through. It makes the strait an energy lifeline for Southeast
and East Asian countries.7

India’s Strategic Role in Malacca Strait

Since the regional cooperation between India and the Malacca Strait’s littoral states had
proliferated in the 19th century the security of the strait directly or diplomatically is a subject
of concern for India. Beyond countering all non-traditional threats India’s strategic interest in
securing the strait plays a major for securing mainland from the new security environments.
6
Darshana M. Baruah, The Small Islands Holding the Key to the Indian Ocean accessed through
https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-small-islands-holding-the-key-to-the-indian-ocean.

7
Sudhir Devare. (2006). India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence.  Singapore: Institute of
Southeast Asian Studies.

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India finds its way in order to stabilize the regional security. The BIMSTEC (Bangladesh-
India-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic cooperation) initiative gains a politico-economic
cooperation in the region through which India stabilizes the support and gains its interest in
the region. Major point of focus about Malacca Strait is that, it has become a gateway of
‘Look East Policy’ and further it reaches the bilateral and regional cooperation with several
cooperation mechanisms such as ASEAN Regional Forum to address the non-traditional
threats in the region. It has now become difficult to reinforce these ties due to changing
regional security environment. Beyond all remarkable cooperation in the region the
establishment of ANC (Andaman and Nicobar Command) grows to be need of the hour, in
turn to secure the strait on the interest of defence projection as well as economic stability in
the region.8

8
John,  B. (2005). The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia, Naval War. College
Review, 58(3).

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 Chapter 4:
The South China Sea

China considers the South China Sea its own sea, and is building artificial islands, defying
international tribunal rulings – including one favouring the Philippines. While Philippines
President Rodrigo Duterte isn't prepared to stop Beijing, Vietnam – which also claims parts
of the waterway – seems to be.

Vietnam and India are teaming up to tame China’s ambitions to control the South China Sea
and the riches that are hidden beneath. Vietnam’s and India’s challenge to China comes at a
time when tensions between New Delhi and Beijing have flared on several fronts. Like the
Dokalam area of Sikkim, where India has been trying to block China’s efforts to build a road,
and where in reply Beijing has warned New Delhi that it is risking to suffer "greater losses"
than 1962.

Then there’s the Pakistani regions claimed by India and crossed by the China Pacific
Economic Corridor (CPEC). In addition, the Malacca Straits, where India sent warships
recently--most of China's energy supplies and trade passes through this waterway.

Meanwhile, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has been traveling around the globe to
enlist old and new friends and allies to New Delhi’s cause.

So far, financial markets in the region do not seem that concerned, at least for now, focusing
on the economic fundamentals rather than the geopolitics of the region. However, things may
change as the US Navy and Air Force have stepped up their presence in the region, drawing
angry protests from Beijing.9

Several Questions were put to the Ministry of the External Affairs:

a. whether India has a range of interest in the South China Sea region like creation of
blue ocean economy including protection of offshore infrastructure and maritime

9
Panos Mourdoukoutas, Vietnam and India to Spoil China's South China Sea Ambitions accessed online
through https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/07/07/vietnam-and-india-to-spoil-chinas-
south-china-sea-ambitions/#10ec5b681af7.

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 resources, safety of trade and sea lanes of communication and also regionally
favourable geostrategic maritime position, if so, details thereof; 

b. if so, whether the award of the International Court of Arbitration dated on

Philippines case against China’s claim in the South China Sea shall have any
consequence on India’s diverse range of interest; and 

c. if so, what remedial measures Government is going to adopt in this regard?

South China Sea is a major waterway and over US$ 5 trillion trade passes through the sea-
lanes in this region. Over 55% of India’s trade passes through South China Sea. Peace and
stability in the region is of great significance to India. India undertakes various activities,
including cooperation in oil and gas sector, with littoral states of South China Sea.

The Tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea in the arbitration instituted by the Republic of Philippines against the People’s
Republic of China delivered its Award on July 12, 2016 clarifying issues concerning
maritime entitlement in the South China Sea.

Government’s position on this issue and the ruling is clear. The authority of Annex VII
Tribunal and its award is recognized in Part XV of the UNCLOS itself. India’s own record in
this regard is well known. India supports freedom of navigation and over flight, and
unimpeded commerce, based on the principles of international law, as reflected notably in the
UNCLOS. India believes that States should resolve disputes through peaceful means without
threat or use of force and exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that could
complicate or escalate disputes affecting peace and stability. As a State Party to the
UNCLOS, India urges all parties to show utmost respect for the UNCLOS, which establishes
the international legal order of the seas and oceans.10

10
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India accessed through http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-
sabha.htmdtl/27229/QUESTION+NO2014+INDIAS+INTEREST+IN+SOUTH+CHINA+SEA+REGION

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 Chapter 5:
Indian Ocean

The Indian Ocean is rich in natural resources. Forty per cent of the world’s offshore oil
production takes place in the Indian Ocean basin. Fishing in the Indian Ocean now accounts
for almost 15 per cent of the world’s total and has increased some 13-fold between 1950 and
2010 to 11.5 million tonnes. Aquaculture in the region has also grown 12-fold since 1980.
Although global fishing is reaching its natural limitations, the Indian Ocean may be able to
sustain increases in production. Mineral resources are equally important, with nodules
containing nickel, cobalt, and iron, and massive sulphide deposits of manganese, copper, iron,
zinc, silver, and gold present in sizeable quantities on the seabed. Indian Ocean coastal
sediments are also important sources of titanium, zirconium, tin, zinc, and copper.
Additionally, various rare earth elements are present, even if their extraction is not always
commercially feasible.

The Indian Ocean basin is of particular importance for India, as the region’s most populous
country and geopolitical keystone. Although India has long been preoccupied by continental
considerations, it has recently begun to re-evaluate its priorities. India’s Indian Ocean Region
strategy—that in only just taking shape—conforms closely to global priorities for preserving
the Ocean as a shared resource: an important channel for trade, a sustainable resource base,
and a region secure from heightened military competition, non-state actors, and catastrophic
natural disasters. Achieving these objectives will require further investments in capacity,
greater transparency and confidence-building measures, and enhanced institutional
cooperation.

The Indian Ocean is important for three reasons.

 First, it enjoys a privileged location at the crossroads of global trade, connecting the
major engines of the international economy in the Northern Atlantic and Asia-Pacific.
This is particularly important in an era in which global shipping has burgeoned.
Today, the almost 90,000 vessels in the world’s commercial fleet transport 9.84
billion tonnes per year. This represents an almost four-fold increase in the volume of
commercial shipping since 1970.11  The energy flows through the Indian Ocean are of
11
Amit A. Pandya, Rupert Herbert-Burns, and Junko Kobayashi, “Maritime Commerce and Security: The Indian
Ocean,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2011, p. 36.

16
 particular consequence. Some 36 million barrels per day—equivalent to about 40 per
cent of the world’s oil supply and 64 per cent of oil trade—travel through the
entryways into and out of the Indian Ocean, including the Straits of Malacca and
Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb.
 The Indian Ocean is more than just a conduit for commerce. The Ocean’s vast
drainage basin is important in its own right, home to some two billion people. This
creates opportunities, especially given the high rates of economic growth around the
Indian Ocean rim, including in India, Bangladesh, Southeast Asia, and Eastern and
Southern Africa.  However, the densely populated littoral is also vulnerable to natural
or environmental disasters. Two of the most devastating natural disasters in recent
memory occurred in the Indian Ocean rim: the 2004 tsunami that killed 228,000
people, and Cyclone Nargis that hit Myanmar in 2008 and took 138,300 lives.
 The amount of natural resources available in the Indian Ocean.

India’s Importance in the Indian Ocean:

The Indian Ocean holds particular importance for India, as the littoral’s most populous
country. Indeed, for the rest of the Ocean’s littoral states, and even those outside the region,
India’s leadership role will be important in determining the strategic future. India is
geographically located at the Ocean’s centre, and has over 7,500 kilometres of coastline.
“India is at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in a
speech in Mauritius in 2015. “The Indian Ocean Region is at the top of our policy priorities.”

The Ocean has long been a key determining factor of India’s cultural footprint, with people,
religion, goods, and customs spreading from India to Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast
Asia and vice-versa.  India’s approach after independence was initially defined by the British
withdrawal from east of Suez and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi calls for a zone of
peace. Only after the late 1990s, under the BJP-led government of Prime Minister Atal Bihari
Vajpayee and the Congress-led government of Manmohan Singh, did the possibilities of
openings in and around the Indian Ocean come to be seriously contemplated.

Today, 95 per cent of India’s trade by volume and 68 per cent of trade by value come via the
Indian Ocean. Additionally, 3.28 million barrels per day—or nearly 80 per cent of India’s
crude oil requirement—is imported by sea via the Indian Ocean. Taking into account India’s

17
offshore oil production and petroleum exports, India’s sea dependence for oil is about 93 per
cent, according to the Indian Navy. India is also the fourth-largest importer of liquefied
natural gas (LNG), with about 45 per cent coming by sea.12

12
“Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics,” Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India,
2014-2015, p.10.

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 Conclusion

India and China shares the complicated relationship, which one side share the friendly
business ties and on the other hand it turns red-hot when it comes to the border issues or the
issue of proving sovereignty in the south-Asia or superpowers of the world.

India and China were used to have the close ties after getting independence from the imperial
rule of the United Kingdom. For maintaining the friendly ties with the China, India even
sacrificed its UNSC permanent membership, which was offered by the USA and USSR in
1950 and 1953 respectively. But as already mentioned earlier nothing is eternal expect for the
Interest here in case the national interest when China figured out that India was not in
condition to defend itself it back stabbed India in 1962 since then the relationship of both
countries got strained and is not got better from that moment of time.

China wants to prove its sovereignty in Asia by dominating its presence on the land and in
the water. For this China has already started its development projects which includes the
marking its presence in the Indian Ocean, proving its authority in South China Sea, having its
control over Tibet and Taiwan and its others neighbouring countries which even includes
Pakistan. China’s major threat to the domination in Asia is the New emerging India so in
order to tackle India, China wants to encircle India through land and water. Either it be the
huge investment in the Pakistan or in the Myanmar in recent times, or its master projects,
which includes the One Border One Road (OBOR) and CPEC. The development of the of the
several ports in the Region of the string of Pearls which includes the Gwadar Port in Pakistan,
China’s port in Lammu Atol in Maldives, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, Chittagong Port in
Bangladesh, Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar and important port in the Coco Island.

However, China has the upper hand in the race going on between the two countries but India
is not too far India has come up with their “Look East” and “Act East Policy” through which
India has developed ports in the Indian Ocean in order to counter China. Under the Banner of
SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region). to seek a climate of trust and
transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity
to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime
cooperation.”

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Indian leadership will also be necessary if international coordination and cooperation is to
improve, whether on sustainable resource extraction, humanitarian measures, or Indian Ocean
governance. Some institutions have already been established with these objectives in mind.
India has thrown its weight behind the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, which has 35
members and seeks to “increase maritime co-operation among navies” of the Indian Ocean
littoral states. Meanwhile, the Indian Ocean Rim Association—which has traditionally
emphasised maritime security, trade, cultural promotion, tourism, and fisheries, but has
recently diversified into resource management and governance—involves 21 states.

India has developed the ties with the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Japan, Australia, Djibouti, and Iran in order to tackle China’s Policy to
encircle India.

India in recent times had increased its defence budget by 6.2% and planned many strategies
to mark its bold presence in the waters. India is planning to have 212 warships, 458 aircrafts
and develop 46 warships in India with the investment of the 3 lac crores by 2027.

India is also planning to have 3 aircraft carriers one for East and West each and one extra. 6
scorpene Submarines, 5 S400 Air Defence Missile System, 7 Shivalik Frigates, 4 Vizag-II-
class Destroyers and 45 Russian Mig29K,s and Indian Tejas light combat aircraft.

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2020.

2. India’s Evolving Maritime Strategy: India shifts its focus from ‘using’ to ‘securing’
maritime security in the Indo-Pacific accessed through
https://thediplomat.com/2015/12/indias-evolving-maritime-strategy.

3. Vikram Bhat, ‘Strong need to monitor activities in strategic Coco Islands’ accessed
online through http://www.orfonline.org/expert-speaks/strong-need-to-monitor-
activities-in-strategic-coco-islands.

4. Darshana M. Baruah, The Small Islands Holding the Key to the Indian Ocean
accessed through https://thediplomat.com/2015/02/the-small-islands-holding-the-
key-to-the-indian-ocean.

5. Sudhir Devare. (2006). India & Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. 

Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.
6. John,  B. (2005). The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security in Southeast Asia,
Naval War. College Review, 58(3).
7. Panos Mourdoukoutas, Vietnam and India to Spoil China's South China Sea
Ambitions accessed online through
https://www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/2017/07/07/vietnam-and-india-to-
spoil-chinas-south-china-sea-ambitions/#10ec5b681af7.
8. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India accessed through
http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-
sabha.htmdtl/27229/QUESTION+NO2014+INDIAS+INTEREST+IN+SOUTH+CHI
NA+SEA+REGION
9. Amit A. Pandya, Rupert Herbert-Burns, and Junko Kobayashi, “Maritime Commerce
and Security: The Indian Ocean,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2011, p.
36.

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10. “Indian Petroleum and Natural Gas Statistics,” Ministry of Petroleum and Natural
Gas, Government of India, 2014-2015, p.10.

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