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LANKA GUARDIA Vol. 18 No. March 15, 1996 Price Rs. 10.00 Registered at the GPO, Sri Lanka RANIL: TAKES THE OFFENSIVE — Mervyn de Siva WHY PEACE IS ELUSIVE — Howard Wriggins PRABHAKARAN: _ ISOLATING THE PONNAMBALAMS AND CHELVANAYAKAMS —H.L, D. Mahindapala TALKING TO ROMESH GUNASEKERA —Tina Faulk INDIA’S CULTURAL INVASIONS —Ahmad Hasan Sheikh ICES PUBLICATION JUST RELEASED! “SRI LANKA: THE DEVOLUTION DEBATE" ICES, 1996, 232pp. Articles: Introduction by Regi Siriwardena Towards Effective Devolution, by G. L. Peiris Some Thoughts on the Devolution Package, by Lakshman Marasinghe Devolution and Power Sharing, The Means to Peace and Development, by Bertram Bastiampillai Devolution of Power, The Problems and Challenges by Neelan Tiruchelvam Towards A Compromise Solution, by Sumanasiri Liyanage Breakthrough in Sri Lanka, by S. Guhan Control of State Land — The Devolution Debate, by Sunil Bastian ‘The Structure and Content of Education: Policy Choices and Problems of Implementation in the Context of Devolution Proposals, by Sasanka Perera Appendices: President Chandrika Kumaratunga's Address to the Nation, August 3, 1995 ‘Text of Government's Devolution Proposals of August 3, 1995 Text of Government's Devolution Proposals of January 16, 1996 A Commentary on the Devolution Proposals of the Government January 16, 1996, by G. L. Peiris ‘The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact Annexure C Text of the Indo-Sri Lanka Agreement of July 29, 1987 The Interim Report of the Mangala Moonesinghe Parliamentary Select Committee, 1992 Excerpts form Gamini Dissanayake's “Vision for the 21st Century” Price; Rs. 250 U.S. $15.00 for SAARC countries (Airshipment) U.S. $20.00 for other countries (Airshipment) All orders to: ICES, 2 Kynsey Terrace, Colombo 8, Sri Lanka. Telephone 685085 /698048; Fax 696618 NEWS BACKGROUND ~~ CEMENT AND THE P.A.’S CRACKS Mervyn de Silva nan increasingly unfriendly global ‘economic environment where the pros pects of foreign aid, particularly “untied” aid, ate poor, cash-strapped “Third World’ regimes take the easy option of selling the family siver. Fist to be sold are lossraking Siale corporations, a legacy of a once fashionable “socialism”. The chaiipersons and the managers of these stelerun enleprises were often party loyalists or the kilh-and-kin of minister or deputy minister, They made marey and contituted generausy 10 perly colfers, keeping a reasonable percentage for themselves. My, Lakshman Kadirgamar, a former Intemational cvl servant, a star of the Oxford Union, and a member of an elie professional farily, was far from satisfied that the Pultclam Cement Corporation deal was gbove bosrd, He decided offence was the best part of defence =n this case, defending "transparency, and accountabiity”, part of P.A.s pols promise and program — and he levelled Charges which alas had an explosive effect end a politcal fallout he did riot (or could not) anicpate. Mr. Kadirgamar's monumental mistake and misforunes were prompily spotted by Opposition Leader Mr. Ranil Wicke- masinghe as the UN's window of opportunity. Groomed. in Parliament's conventional and guerrila warfaro by two veterans — Presidenis Jayawardene and Premedasa — the U.N.P. leader moved fast. The result was this motion ‘of no-confidence: “Whereas this government failed to take prompt and effective action on the specific allegation made by the Minister of Foreign Aifairs, In a letter and dated 19th January 1996 adcres- sed to Her Excellency the President that aminister and an official received bribes amounting to Rs. 30 to set aside a Cabinet decision of 281d March 1885 pertaining to the Puttalam Cement Corporation Ltd.” ‘The P.A.s counier-move was the best tibute to the Opposiion’s choice of tactics. Instead of agreeing 10 debate tho no-confidence motion, tho Govorn- ment was ready to debale Mr. Kedrge- mars statement to the House, But whatever the forum, the PUTTALAM deal, and the modia exposure in iol, has done lireparable damage to the P.A‘s ‘transparency, accountabilty, good govemance” Good Guy image. it BRIEFLY “NOT GUILTY” pleads Editor ‘Tha Editor of the SUNDAY TIMES pleaded “Not Guilty’ when the trial before High Court Judge, Upali de Z. Gunavardene commenced on March 8. Mr. Sinha Ratnatinga, the editor, is charged for defaming President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The state led the evidence of the Publisher, Mr, Ranjit Wijawardene. The trial will resume on April 4th, NOT CRICKET Ik was decidedly “not ericket". Recognising Mr. Bill Tweddall whon he arrived at the grounds a large crowd — over 10,000 said ane sports writer — broke into *booa" before tho Sri Lanka-Kenya matsh began. It was titfortat, The Australians refused to play in Sri Lanka after the"Tiger® terrorist attack: on tho Contral Bane building in mid-February. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a man ie honoured in his own country even if the ‘natives’ in another place, hoot him. The new conservative goverament of Prime Minister John Heward has docidod to make him Cabinet secretary. is no surprise that the self-clected “watchdog” (clean consience?) of the A,, the “Mulbery Grounp” has made own move, While the C.l.D. le roported to have commenced inquires of the ‘whole sordid business, tho Bribery Com- missioner may launch his own inguiry. Mr. Kadirgamar took off to Egypt, an official vist. MAHA SANGHA. While the Opposition has pounced on the Foreign Minister and his. serious allegations of topevel bribery and cormu- plion, the MAHA SANGHA’ trained its heavy aitilery on the PA’s “Devolution Package" which the Buddhist clergy dently with Prof. Pies, the cempus thinketarks and NGO's, ‘all pat of elwork blessed by westem donors, GUARDIAN Vol. 18 No.21 March 15, 1996 Price Rs. 10.00 Published fortnightly by Lanka Guardian Publishing Co. Lt. No. 246, Union Place Colombe = 2. Edilor Mervyn de Silva Telephone: 447584 Printed by Ananda Press £255, Sir Ratnajothi Saravanamuttu Mawatha, Colombo 13. Telephone: 435875 CONTENTS Meaning ol the Tari Liberation Siuggle™ 3 Negotiating ina ‘Secessionist Cont 6 ‘Tho Havoc “intelectual” Phy 8 ‘The Spocitcly of Sitanka 11 Waitng for Zyugany 17 Hetrelands of ihe Heat 20 rr “The Ven. Madctiwawe Sobtha Maha “Thera, recognised as aleading spokes: tran of the Maka Sengha said in an interview wit the Sunday Times "Con Siitutional Rais Minister GL Paris Says the government does not accept the sc-ealled concapt of “traditional hhomelanc” of the EELAMISTS but f Would be the Inavitabie rsult of the package." ‘On the question of discrimination, he said: “if Tamils are discriminated against mainly because they ere Tamils and if the Sinhala people have been given certain privileges beceuse they aro Sinhalese, then there is definitely a justifiable Tamil problem. But thore Is no such issue" What is the direct outcome of this Buddhist agitation led by the Maha Sangha? The P.A. is ikely to reconsider the “constitutional reforms package" (the evelvtion proposals) put together by Prof G.L. Pieris. The PA's vulnerability. is not only exposed by the onslausht of the Naha Sangha BUT the disagree- ments WITHIN the 8-party coaltion, How allied is the Peoples Alliance? The quostion cannot be avoided... certainly not afler the statement of NOUNLF, led by Minister Srimani Athulathmudal widow of the party's founder Mr. Laith Athulathmudall: "We feel very strongly that further amendiments are necessary” sho said, Her main objection is to “union of regons", and the attempt 10 destioy ‘or erode tho sovercignty of the State. It is mow clear that the Opposition leader has bided his tine to select the ideal battleground, not just any avaiable balllefed, The Sunday Leader has tailed the controversial deal the K-Gate vee afer Foreign Minister Kaditgamar’s exposures, in his first opinion on the: Puttalam Cement privatisation issue, Oppostiion Leader Ranil Wiekrema- singhe evidently bided Hs time since this was not just 2 bazaar scandal. It involved offersfrom many firms, including, foreign, cettalnly from our big neigh ours, Pakisian and India. And the bids fanged fiom 10 millon US dolars to ‘41, million US dollars, If anything was “transparent” it wes the dscord in the “Peoples Alliance”. ‘The Oppostion Leader let the contradic- lions and conflicts within the mmutiply and mature. He has used the 2 Foreign Minister, 2 highly regarded professional whose integrity has not been chalenged, as tha Opposttion’s battering rai. AS in conventional war= fare, 60 in poltics. Tho ‘target’, tho Wekremasinghe has set about the bus- ness with a coot-hoaded professions lism, And now for the debaie... It will take bags of Puttalam Cement to cover the widening cracks in the and the batleground. Mr. Peoples Alianoe, Waiting — 19 Letter from Kundasale You wrote, ‘My letier this time ts late Thad tlwee sick cows to thine about So they had priority Over you, love. One cow, you said, was pregnant But the awe Of Jeriility The Vet had defused Saying the womb was silent. Could she have calved in the pasture in the night And the calf stolen by man or wild creature? You had surmised tt couldn't be The cows were hore early evening Then the Vet had felt right inside And brought out a wee white calf Limp and dead. Relieved but sad You checked the dairy records and confirmed ‘This was her third still bith A hopeless case The Vet suspected contagious chronic calving And if the tests confirmed this ‘He would have to condemn ter To death? Oh No! Oh yes, miss! Such are the slick decisions Of market economics. So you see, love, Why my letter was late T pleaded Jor her life, I told the Vet You must, you must please make her well. Tain sad, so i my letter Teannot make the usual happy chatter She was a fine animal, sleek and supple But couldn’t return westment on the double Denizen of a dark, animal world Birth and death had brought twofold suffering Our human world, love, What is our future promising? U. Karunatilake Meaning of the Tamil “Liberation Struggle” HL. D. Mahindapala i. Sachi Si Kantha (Lanka Guardian February 1, 1996) deser- ves a reply nol because his comments. need refuting (in fact, lignored his earlier ‘comment where he was tiling at the solid windmills of Tre New York Tires) but because he, like most other Tamils in te diaspora, refuse to face their brutal Fistory which records the inhuman oppression of Tamils by Tamils from the time of Sank (1519) But before | go further let me hasten to add that my two attices (Lanka Guardhan, Ociober 15, 1995 and Novom- ber 1, 1995) which, undoubtedly, have pricked Mr. Sri Kentha’s uity conscie- ‘Ace, wore cofinitely meant to be attacks on the Tamils who treated thelr fellow Tamils as sub-human eaves, | was foctissing on the 75 percent a the upper- castes in Jaffna who never lited a flager to fborate tho oppracsod Tamils for over tive centuries. | even pin-pointed that the loud-mouthed champions of Terrils tocay dospised and segregated the fow-caste Tamils like the furumaas who viere never ellowed to walk in daylight. One of the points stressed by me was that no other community in Si Lanka —Wuslims, Indian Tamils, Burghors or Sinhalese — ever treated the members of their own community in this degrading manner. Even a writor fico H. W. Tambiah, who is generally indined to argue that the sun that shines over Sil Lanka comes out of the Tamils’ ears, (See Laws and Cusioms of the Sinfale- 50), has stated categorically that the Tamil low-castes wore treated as “abject Saves" by the upper-castes. On this: ‘evidence | wrote that this must be the darkest chepler in Sri Lanken bistery. Unable to answer this point Nie Si Kantha says thatthe caste group known 1s rediyas among the Sinhalese shared the seme hierarchical order similer 10 turunbas of he Teruls.” So what? Wherent all Asian socioties, whether Buchist or Hind, hierarchical? For thet matte, aren't al societies and instititons hiorarchical? The issue is not about the hierarchical social structure but how the hierarchly at the top treated the sub- Castes al the base of the social pyramid. On this score, the upper-caste Tamile of Jafina have set a unique record of being the most hearless and cuel oppressors of their own people. It is an oppression which will remain as an indelible stigma on thor social con- science. As an excusa, Mr. Sri Kantha aitempis to equate the rcafyas with the turumbas. ft Mi. Si Kanth knows anything about Sri Lanka he should know that the /odjas, being nomadic outca- sles, wore naver the slavos of any caste. Nor were they forbidden to walk in daytime. They were the Sri Lankan ‘gypsies who roamad frealy all over the country, day and nicht. Besides. 1 went further than. the helrarchical structure and quoted Jane Russo who said: “Thore had boon slavery among the Kandyan Sinhalese but it was of the mildest fom, slaves personal bondsmen to the owners.” (Communal Foils under the Donough ‘more Consituton, 1991-1947) In other words, | was saying that there nat only a hierarchical scciey but even sleves ‘among the Sinhalese. The dfferonco, however, is in the treatment of these slaves by the two communities, Let me quote Rotert Knox who had known the Sinhalese soviaty like tha back of his hand. afier having lived with tem for 20 years. Wilting about the Sinhalese dspostion he says: “They are not very malicious towards one another, and their ‘angor deth not lastiong; seldem ornever biood shad among themin their quarrels, Itis not customary to stike; and it is very rate that they giva a blow as much a8 to thelr Slaves." (Knox, Aistoncat Relations p. 102, Tissara Pubications), Compare this to the Tamt slaves of Jaffna who wera no better off than the Negro slaves in Ametica. Like the Negro slaves they were murdered, \ynched by mobs, and even burt alive for daring to cross the caste bariers, Besides, the upper-casie Tamils not only aided the importing of Tamis from South India by tha Dutch but abetted their imperial masters h transforming the caste system to logitirico and enforce the status of the imported Indian Tamils as slaves. This wes a bonanza to the Jatina Tami. whe had no hesitation in reducing thei ‘own low-casies into untouchable slaves. They were denied the basic human fights. They were evan denied the right ‘of worshipping in Hindu temples. The Churches too falthfuly adopted the vicious caste system. They segregated the low-castes by ereciing separale pews. Apartheid became the offical docrrine inside the tabemacies of Christ in daitna long before it emerced as a fascist instrument of the eltist whites in South Arica. The Church leaders woke up to Christian charily — not to ‘mention iberation theology — orly after the Chistian domination, enforced. through their imperial masters, waned in the post-colonial period. Than the Churches joined hands with the Tarn communalists to denigrate tho Sirhala- Buddhists, ironically enough on human fights. However, no low-caste man among the Sinhalese wes deberred from ento- ring any Buddhist temple, or to be a Buddhist monk tke the Hindus. Nor were there separate places of workship for them as in the Churches. The upper-ca- ste Sinhalese have never refused to prostrate before a low-caste monk and worship him, Despite the inherent evis of the hierarchical caste systom, tho Sinhalesa used t essentially as a division of labour to make the hycraulic/feudal sociely functional, With the active assis- tance of the Tamil Brahrins, Churches and the colonial masters, the Tamil upper-caste transformed the caste sysiem info an inhuman instrument of oppression and suppression of thelr own pecpla. Through that system they exploi- ted their own people, intally to increase tholr profite from the tobacco, paddy and other farming enterprises and, later, in the post-Donoughimore pertod, to protect and consolidate their politcal power. There is discemitle pattem in the reactions ofthe Sinhalese and tho Tamis fo slavery. When, for instance, the Bitishers were pushing the Kandyan peasenis into slavery in their tea planta- tions the Sinhalese nevar gave in. Faced with their siubbom ard silent protest the British imperialists had to impert indantu- Ted labour ftom South Incia. For tying to protect their eigniy the Sinhalese had to pay the incalculable price of their tradtional homelands being confiscated ard ojested trom their horas. The Tamil socely. on the other hand. was quite comfortable with slavery ard heppiy wont along witht. Thoy enecuraged their colcnial masters to import slaves trom South India and, under coloriel protec- tion, expboted their low-castas as cheap slaves. They relected irom ther socety the Indians brought as slaves to the {ea plantations with the same kind of ontemot they ‘elected Indian staves brought by the Duich to Jaffna. Today tha Jafina Tamil leaders show a patroni- sing herests In the Indian Tamils, efter alying thomcslves with the Britsh im- periaisis who exploited the slave labour ofthe estate woikers for nealy @ century, purely to add numbors to their communal pales. Consider this with the rocord of the Smnhalese. The record reveals that it is they who took the frst step to liberate. the Tamis, long before the Mr. Valupillai Prabhakaran came on the scene. The Prevention of Social Disabilities Act, 1957 of SW.ALD. Bandaranall ‘Act which prohibited segregation in buses, schools, churches and, in geno- ral, the oppression of the low-eastes — stands as a monumental landmark not only to the liberal epirit of the Sinhalose tout also to the enlightened and plones- ring efforts of reforming the dismal and tho discriminatory logacy loft bohind by five centuries of colonial rulers. However, the Prevention of Socal Disablliles Act ren Into soricus obstades laid by the all-powerful upper-caste in Jaina to blockits implementation, Underiably, the greatest achiovemont of Mr. Prabhaka- ran is in the cismanting cf the obscene and the oppressive cats system in Jaffna. that dehumanisod Jatina socisty cince the coming of the Dutch. The ast of Tamil youths taking up arms was a double-edged weapon — 1) against the Sinhalese end 2) egainst tho uppor-casio Tarils of Jafina who have bean their oppressors for genera- tions, Consistent indoctination by the Chelvanayakam-Ponnambalam leador- ship made them perceive the Sinhala- Buddhists as their enemies. But Tami youths also had a clear grasp of the social Inherent in their castovidden They had fret hard experioncs of hei leaders as incorrigbie oppressors and poliical fellures, In their sober moments they would realise that when- ever the Sinhalese ered there were democratic, insitutonel and structural remedies for each and every one of tose misiakes, For example, those politica mictokoe tht tho Tarilelts havo raised were remecied within he turbulent four decades beginning from 1859. The saltcorrectve machaniem, thought it worked taidly at times, was Inherent in tho Sinhala-Guddhiet cocioly. But for three centures, ending as late as the 1880s, thete were no remedies for the entrenched insitutons of oppressive casieism maintained mutvessly, and it necessary through exrelegal violence, in Jaf, Even those Tamils wha relur- ned ffom Oxford and Cambridge found costeiam more rewarding ard comiorta- ble than Westem liberalism, The rigidly conservative ambience of Jafina, wuidnwn into a time warp of its own, did not leave the space of a haits breadth for any kind of passage inlo the twantiath cenlury. Tha. dominant forces were so steeped In feudal ca- stelem that they lost touch with realy. Consequently, ater the ‘lure of the Preveniion of Social Disabiltes Act, a violent overthrow of the inhuman ancien regime of Jatina was inevitable, ‘As in the case of the JYP youth in the South, the unrest in Nerthem society could not have been appeased even the linguistic, religious and other cultural demands of the Tamil cite wore granted by the “Sinhala-Budchis! gove~ riments". Like the JVPeis, there wes in them a determination to overthroy the entire Jaifna establishment which they felt had betrayed them in the past. The Tamil elite ruling Jaffna had, over the years, confirmed the belief of the “boys” — particularly in the temple entry ciisis at Maviddipuram in 1988 when the upper-caste closed ranks against the fow-castos — that thore was no escape from the oppressive Tamil past inio a liberated fulue through the entrenched caste basa, Most of all, it was the loss of human dignity, by being treated as social outcastes, that hurt them most Equally insufferable was the inbom and intemalised caste prejudices that made tho low-castos the pariahs (adomeaning and an opprobious epithet derived from the Tamil word paraiyar, according to the OED) of Jatina society. Deluded by their strug superionty, the uppar-caste did not realise that the subterranean forces were running far deener than the hate campaign whipped up by them ‘againet the Sinhela-Buddhists. Explosive tectonic forces were rising from under thelr feet to blest the crusted surface cf throe conturias of the caste/slave system. The politcally bankrupt Tami lite had no other non-corrmunal pro- CGramme or policy to rescue themselves ‘and Jaffna from the ever-widening cracks cf feudal castelem. ‘The Tami elte plennedto escape thor impending coom by “putting fonvard more and more rapacious demands’. (SW.AD Bandaranaike, Hansard 1939, quoted by Jane Russell on page 240). Inereasing demands at oach citical stage was 4 deliverate taciic adopied 1o appease the unrest growing from the ‘oppressed sub-castos below. The Tamil elie refused to heed the lesson of King Canute that there was no way of rolling back the caste forces rising against ther, Their predictable reaction was to hasty prop up their declining foudal power through anti-Sinhala-Buddhist_ slogans. ‘They resented any interference that ‘would topple this power stucture, Ther parelled objectives were (1) to accumula- te as much money as they could from. the Sinhala-Buddhist South and (2) preseive their privieged personal and politcal position in the Temil North. Both =the money from the south and the privieges of the north — worked in tandem to consotdata their dominance over Jatina society. They never wanted to part wih either. The issue of diserimi- nalion they orchastratad so successfully \Was nol about their aborrinable discrimi- ration agzinst thair own peopla but the perceived teats (0 ther privieged positions beth in the South and in the Noth. Only Tamil chauvinism could give them the slogans to promote their ‘acquistive inctincts in the South, aspo- laly through the language issue, and exploit the North by keeping thelr own poopie in submission. By turning the anger of Tamils agoinst the Sinhalese the Tami ellie successiully deflected the rising political tde ageinst themselves from their own rank and fi. In raising the communal cry they were able lo sweep under the carpet thelr filure to stand up for the basic rights / their own people by obstructing socal reforms. Furthermore, the ant-Sinhala: Buddhist ery was the opium fed fo the Tamil masses 10 legiimiss and prevent the dsmanting of tho opprossivo foudal society of Jatina. The Jaifna upper-caste was detemined to preserve Jaffna as the'r traditional foudal haven, particularly for thoir retirement. The loss of privileges derived from feucal casteism would have boon as grect as the loss of pensions derived from serving, in their partance, “the Sinhele-Buddhist_ governments" The two-pronged machinations of the Jafina upper-caste 10 retain thelr trad- tional supromacy wero diroctod simulia- neously against (1) the “Sinhela-Bud- dhist governments” and (2) their own ‘sub-eastes. They held on to their praca. rious postions by pitting (2) against (1). Naturally, they resented any outside interfarance that would thresten thair prestige, postion and power in Jatina. This point ic illustrated amply in tho ‘obstructionist tactics of the Chelvanaya- kems and Ponnambelems to the Pie- vontion of Social Disabiitios Act. it was also the only time when both parties — All Ceylon Tamil Congress and the Federal Party — buried the poltical tivally of the Jatina upper-caste and ganged up to protect their privileged position against the low-castes. it was concefted and a contemplivle attempt to dery the fundamental rights cus to the low-caste Tamil slaves of Jafina, But after three centuries the outdated caste syslem was crumbling. And the inevilable siorming cf the Jatfna Bastile ‘eceurred when Mr, Prabhakaran’s low-caste “boys” raided the upper-caste homes in-Jeffna, and cocked their leas up on their caste-rdden tables, and ordered those high-cast ladies icing behind the cadjan curtains to cock “chickon oral" for thom. It was meant fo be a kind of “revolutionary justice” dished cut by the former slaves who reversed roles with great delightby siting ‘on top of thelr cruel mastets and making them experience, forthe first time, what it was to be an oppressed caste/slave for centuries. The accumulated bit ness of conturos was exprossad not by the simple act of forcing them 10 ook but in making the Tarnl elte obey, in the most huniliating manner — no, Not the dittats of the new regime which wore inescapable but the individual whims and fancies of the low-casie parlahs who had nothing 10 fear from thoir powerless mastors. It was alco pootc justico for tho arrogant elile, who even in their hour of distiess, refused to share the toles with the low-castes in refuges camps Mr. Prabhakaran’s “iberation strugcle”, att last, dethroned forever the feudalistc fiefdom of Ponnambalam and the Chel- vanayakams in the neck of Jaffna. His LETTER Yiberation strugclo” finally brought to tho fow-caste Tamils the kind of equality which the Tamils enjoyed among the Sinhalese in the South ard tha kind (of equally the “Sinhala-Bucdhist gove- mente” hoped to introduce in the North throuch the Prevention of Social Disabil- ties Act. The essential meaning of Prabhakaran's “lberation strugcle” is that he freed the low-caste Tamils from their uppercaste oppressors. And the essential meaning of the pre-Prabhaka- ran piolests and demonstrations of the Tamil alto lod by the Foderal Party and. the Tamil Congress lies in their despera- te struggle to felain their privileges, bot in the South end tho North. Tha Chelvanayakam-Ponnambalam elte me- rely led a rearguard action to. protect and preserve the privileges inherited from a declining, fascist caste system. In faimose to Me. Prabhakoran it must be stated thet his liberation struggle was ‘4 movement oi tie Temils, by the Tarnils and for the Temils who were, oddly enouch, against the upper-case Tamil exploters of datina, It is indeed a remarkable coincidence that Ir. Prabha- karen named his organisation the LTTE = Liberation of Tamis. from Temil Exploters! The good and the bad In the £0 of Feb, there appeered a letter with a pseudonym ‘A Pairioic Muslin’ with the tile “Canards: Arabs Abused", This writer hed cficised the LTTE leader Prabhakaran for ilereating the Muslims. Before | sat down to comment on this controversiel thom, you made a pre-emptive stike by publi hing in the Feb. 15 {ssu2, Kalinga Sonovietno's commentary on the sutfo- fings of $1 Lankan women in the Middle East Muslm counties. The figures pre- sorted in it were revealing indecd. 11 deaths in March 1995 alone: average of 400 complaints a month on physical and verbal abuse: 200 Sri Lankans in the United Arab Emirates prisors. I wonder what that ‘Patriotic Muclim’ has as an answer to Kalinga Sene- viraine’s commentary? If the wealthy Muslims in the Middle East are diferent from Prebhakaran, why folks like the young Sri Lankan maid Sthi Unisa had 1 face a fring squad? Aso | wish to note thet in the Feb. 16 issue, you are overplaying the card of Chandrika Kumaratunga as the ‘peace maker. Here is a lady who could not make peace with her own brother Anura Bardaranaike. So, how can Tamils like me expect her to make peace wit Prabhakeran? Fist let her prove her sincerity by making peace with Anura. ‘Sachi Sri Kantha Fuku Ciy, Shizuoka, Japan ELUSIVE PEACE: Negotiating in a Secessionist Conflict Howard Wriggins Areiitele twocpaty negation, be came more complex as sympathetic Tamils in southern India supported tha Tarril movernentin Sri Lanka with money and ams. The government of india tse became directly invoived in two waye: i became a mediator between the goverment of Sri Lanka and the Tamil insurgents, and a provider of arms, safe houses, training camps, and logistical suppor to various Temnil factions. Four yoars of intensifying conflict produced 2 wat of secession. In July 4987 President J.R. Jayewardane of Sa Lanka and Prime Nirister Rajiv Gandhi of India signed the India-Sn Lanka ‘Accord, which provided for tha end of hostilities and the entry into Si Lanka of an Indian peacekeeping force to protect the guorrila fightore while thay laid donn thelr arms. However, because the accord had been aranged without the direct involvement of the leader of the mest miltant Tamil faction end provided less than independanca, tho guerrla movement tured on the Indian Peacekeepers and the conflict was resu- med. Aiter a yoar and a half of costly but indecsive warfere, the Indian army was told by Jayewardene's successor, Rensinche Premadesa, to go home. The Contict hzs continued between the qove- mment of S1i Lanka andthe mostdogged of the miflants. To understand the development of the spiraling hosilties, mutual distrust, and growing violence in Sri Lanka, ‘it is important to examine the background to tho Tamils cthnocecessionict strugglo and to trace over time the negotiating exchanges halween the principal prote- gonists as they sought a negotiating formula to celmit the issues end exchan= ged offers and counteroffer on dotaile; the shifing balance of capabilty on the ground as the struggle escalated; cnan- ges in the nesotiating participants: and changes in the goverament’s position and the issues at stake as successive offers were rejected by the most miitant Tamil fections. Beckground Si Lenka js 2 multiathaic isiand state cff tho south cosst of india, the ozo of West Virginia, with a population of some 15 million Beopla. Sinhalase make up 74 peicent of the population. Indige- ous Tamils represent some 13 percent 6 An examination ofthe protracted negotiations that began In 1977. of the total thay are concentrated largely in the Northem and Eastem Provinces, though a third of them nave lived for generations in tho ccs and market fowns of the south. A second Tamil. speaking community are descendenis of laborers brought 1o the island by the rich in the nineteenth century to work ‘on the fea estatas in the central high- lends: these Tamis ave not been particularly active poltically. A Musim ‘community, often called Moors, account for another 7 percent! Sri Lanka never went through the nafion buliding exporionce of a protrec ted stiuggle for independence. At the tims of independence spokespersons for the 69 percent Sinhalese majorly, the 11 percent indigenous Tamil. minority, and the 6 percent Noorich minority together shaped a consillutional bargain that provided for a democratic patliamen- tary sysiem with substantial sefecuards for the rights of the minorities.” Since Independence was ostablichod in 1948 there have been nine parfamentary and three presidential elections. Ever since the coming of indepen: dence, however, the relative political and cultural standing of the Sinhalese and Tami communities has been a source Of contention, Sinhalese zealols have maintained that Tamils have been over. Tepresented in Parliament, in the bu: reaucracy, and in university placements. ‘As Sinhaleso caw it in the ealy 19503, though they were a substantial majority of the population, mors than 40 perecnt Of the workers in the derical service ‘and one third of all uriversity graduates wore Sr Lankan Tamils’ Tamis have argued that democrate government by the majority Sinhalese has eystoratically undercut ther opportunites, that over the years virtual second-class ciizenship bas been imposed on them, and that thelr personal security has become increasingly threataned.* From 1956 onward an action-teaction dynamic between the Sinhalese and Tami communities gainod momentum, In such conflicted situations, reciprocal arceptions and mutual and escalating feats become crucial to an uncersian= ding of events. * At siake was the nature of the Si Lankan state, The Sinhalose Majority favored @ centralized, unitary stale of the kind inhorted from the British the Tamils sought a more deceniralized stale that would permit them to menage their own afiaire, ospocially in the Jaifna perisula where they were concentrated. That normal poltics could not meet Tamil needs was demonstrated over and over again, most particularly in 1958 and 1969 when’ carefully negotiated agroomonts on decentralization between government and Tamil spokespersons were aban- doned under pressure from Sinhalese proiesters.. Linguistic and callural_nationafen intensifed this isaue. Poliies within the Sinhalese community focused increasin- ly on Buddhist symbole and on legila- tion defining Sinhalese as the Slencs official language, reflecting an exclusvist concoption of the Si Lankan polty. This focus ‘einforced Tami suspcions that the original constitutional bergain was being tevised to thelr growing and ineradicabe dsadvantage.® Tami ceien- sive anxolice intoncified ther cals for a federal siructure and devolution of centralization, which in tum intersfied Sinhalese feats thal the incigenous Taril minonty really wanted ‘o join with the 55 milion Tami-speaking people in Southem India. It wes as ifthe majority Community had a sharp sense of nfeio- fly, is own Sinhalese Buddhist identity Deing percetved as under growing threat in a regon bolieved to bo dominated by the Farge Tamil community in india, only 25 mies across the Pak Stra. Underlying sociodynamic factors having litle to do with inlercommunal relations wore also at work. From 1956 ‘on educational policy had sat Tamil and Sinhalese youths on saparate aducatio- nal tracks, each to be taught in Is indigenous language, so that communi cation betwoon thom became more and fe difficuk. A rapidly growing popula tion and an expancing school system were producing graduates at a rate far faster than the economy was producing jobs, intoncifying a sense of tivaly between thess asymmetrical communi- fies Within the two commurities compe. ting poliical leaders, each seeking to Win 2 poliical folowing at tha expense cf local rivals, intensified communsl ‘consciousness and exaggerated popular fears of the evil intentions of the other ‘community. Moreover, the Tamil commu- nity was Itself divided structural be- tween the numerically dominant Vellala (aime) and the contesting Keralyar fishermen) communities, the later raly- ing lower easles resentul of “Vellala ‘cominaton’.” ironically, laroescale gove- fment investment in tho satiomont of hitherto uninhabited land, instead of easing population pressures, produced in effect epples of ciscord between the Sinhalese and Tamil communities, each holding that the other was geting an Uunlair share of scaice status-andweath- Giving land. Thus there were a number Of inlractable local forces at work to impede a negoticted resoluticn of Sinha- less and Tamil differences, Before the 1977 election thet brought IF. Jayewardena's government to Power ine sweeping victory for the United Natonal Party, Tami youths, based mainly in the ‘Jaffna area. of northern SriLanka, had Become embite- red and demanded the creation of an independent slate in the northern and eastern paris o! the county, obs called Tami Eclam. The Urited Netional Party's election maniiesto promised to deal with spectic Tami giievancss while roafir ming the governments comrritment to a unitary govemmental structure On coring to powier one of Jayewar- one's first movas was to rescind the ‘ordre regarcing university entrance that had been promulgated by the previous goverment, and which Tamil youths considered perticular'y dscriminaiory. ‘And very early in Jayeivarcone's admin stration the Tarrl languege was given a substanially higher consttutional status than boforo, But thos measures proved insulficient to soften the demands f Tamil youths for Tamil Eelam, The Analysis in thls chapler turns now to negotiations between the Jayewardene ‘govornmont and olocted Tamil mombers Of Patliamert about what addtional grievances should and could be coiec- ted end how that should be done, ‘Two-Party Negotiations, 1978-82 From 1978 to 19€2 principal negota- tions focused on defining the structure and powers of proposad aistict develo. ment councls as a way of meeting rami demands for greater decentraiza- tion. At the outset the negotiating patios Were the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), than occupying eighteen coats in Parlanent and designated the offidal ‘Opposiion, and President J/A. Jaye- wardene, whose Urited Natonal Party (UNP) held a thres-fiths majority in Paillament. There was litle tustbetween, the two sides. In tho 1977 dleotons the Tamil Urited Liberation Front had won over-wnel- ming in Tarikspeaking areas on a platform demanding secession of those areas. Although publicly sounding sympathote 10 tho mora intransigent Tamil youths, TULF leaders privately reassured the governrrentthat they were moderates teady to negolete a resolie tion of Tamil grievances short of inds- pandonco. Jayewardene stood head and shiould- ers above all the other members of Fis United National Party. He held that Sri Lanka was overly centralized. How- fever, the UNP had influontial mambere Whose Views differed flue from those of the rival Sri Lanka Freedom Paity (GLFP), ong an advocete of Sinhalese Buddhist inferesis at the expense of Tamil concars. Because many Sinhale- ‘se saw any devolution from centralization as the first step toward rarttioning the island, Jayowardene was reluctant to prompty offer the Tami Urited Liberation Front the extensive devolution it da- manded out of fear that to do so would split his party and stiengthen the SLEP, which was ready to exploit any con cessions he might make to the Tamils. Nor could Jayowardene entirely discount Tamil spokespersons who publicly held that proposals that fell short of indepen- dance wore novarthcloss significant frst steps. Moreover, there were other priority ‘toms on tho government's agenda: ‘introducing 4 new presidential consitu- tion, and accelerating construction of a hue firigation ard hydroelectric sysien while foreign donors were in @ generous ‘mood. In addition, eccriomic poley had {o be liberalized to open up what nad been a stagnant, semisccialiet, and administraiively contialed economy. ‘Thus the Jayewardens govemment, caught in tho middla beiwoon militant Tamil end Sinhalese zeelots, proceeded slowly in responding to reltersted Tamils demends. These demands wete. now ‘and again emphasized by acts of violen- 0 in the norhem and easiem pro- vinces. ‘The government possessed offical authority and an army of some 13,000 Men, although the amy was wihout combat experionce and at least at the outset was il-isciplined. The army was almost exclusively Sinhalese, recrut- mont of Temils having boon sharply reduced by the preceding Bancaranalke government. There wera some 14,000 police. The Tamil youths at first seemed to be no match for oovernment forces. However, thoy quicky learned the aris of guerilla warfare, in part from the Palestine Liberation ‘Organization in Le- banon, but also in training camps organ zed in India. They early demonstrated Unusual resolve whon arrested, com- mittng suicide by biting into cyanioe capsules rather than raveal the move mon't socrots. In 1970 the government and the Tamil insurgents had differing perceptions of tha value cf time in resolving the confict, The government at fist was in no hurry. The number of commited activists, limited to the north, was though! to be in the low hundreds. Intemal rivalries had elweys plagued Tamil poltcs, and some leaders of the United National Party hoped these divisions might solve the insurgent problem with only a mode- stly increased presence cf the national amy and police in tho Jaffna arc. Hoviever, the elacted leaders of the Tamil Unted Liberation Front, who ware mainly legelly oriented, feared that unless there was more rapid progress in resolving Tamil grievancos throuch negotiation they would be thrust aside by the more viclent Tamil factions. (To bo continsecy Notes 1 See KN We Sina, surat kane Tensons a Matte Socctes — $7 Lanta 19501585 (ashame Ma Urivrsty Pass of Ameria, 1988). 2, For background, soo H. Wega, Coven, Dis ‘nas ef 2 Naw Nitin (Pinson Unverty Proce 106), gp. 70404; Michsol Robt, Clore ‘enties, Natensisns and Proto Aten St {arka Cobmte, Se Lan: Naga ste, 1579, 8. GR te Siva, 57 tanta: a HSI (ew Donk ‘Was, 1967), p 29, 4 For dette of 6 coneeurat ote folowing the ‘ptorlolecton of 1077, «28 Government ol SA ania. Rear of the Prati Canin of (haute bo noone woh Took Place baboon 13) August art (Sh Sept, 1577 (Sessa Faper Nb. 2) (inown ast Sansori Conmisson Fetor) (olerbe, 1830, 8 Eorodct LOG Ancor, Inagnnd Communes ‘Rotations cn the Cigh ant Sead Nona (Leeder: oe, 108 Resort N, Kasay, Gar ‘muna wd argu fe Pols of Capon (Ou Umversty Press, 1957. 6. Sue Wigghs, Geyer pp 190211. See aso Sut Fornamaan, st Lanka: Tpo Natoral Quetin: ‘and the Tar Liboaton Stroy (London Tar Infomation Cortor and 208 Bos, 1253) 1. Dagmar Helman-Raanayagan, "The tha Socal ‘Sytor: Corny and Change Unéar Careions War", gape rad atthe Asscien of Aan ‘Slules mesing, Boson. Maren 1604. For ct ‘7 devoogans win the dane porns. 536 ‘eitg Hosa, Orya Somemunderen, Saray, _SpdPsj Thonagana, he Beer Pay: To Til Gs fy A Lanta — An Wie Aci (Csreont Cat: Si Lanka Sues Ist, 1990, 7 Dear Sir, and recugnised schola” Sheikh. TODAY'S KARACHI Kindly recall my visit to your office in December. I drew your attention to an article titled “A Solution to Karachi’ published in your respected journal on Nov. 16. I pointed out to you, sir, that the artide was written by a former Indian diplomat, Mr. Mani Shankar Aiyar. As I mentioned Mr. Alyar had not only attacked the basic ideology of Pakistan but also prosonted scurrilous views about the oxictoneo of Pakistan, views unbosersing of a diplomat but perhaps acceptable from a politician trying ta gain cheap popularity from uneducated voters. ‘Mr. Biltor, Sir, you were prepared to place an article in your estaemed journal written by “a renowned journslist T now forward an article on the subject by a rowned journalist and a scholar of reputed viz. Ahmed Hasan. Rai Riaz Hussain (Pross Attache) With regards, Yours sincerely, The havoc ‘intellectuals’ play Ahmad Hasan Sheikh fs only now aftr two and a hall decades that loud and clear volees from that Indira Gendhi in her exullant momient of victory had proncun- ced es the graveyard of the twe-nation. theory have sterted reaching our ears- affrning faith in it. The alfirmation does not cone so muich from the ‘collaborators’ of separate Mustimnationhoodasfromine revoluton- aries’ who had participated in its ‘ourial’ as armed insurrectionists of IAukti Bahini, The realisation has dawned less on gecount of colfanalyeic and moro on account of the Hindu's contruing thrust against the ‘polluting’ presence of Muslin Identity in the subcontinent, all of which ho regards as hie Bharat Nata (mothor India). Poltical and economic stiangulation apart, what the ‘iberater’ has been doing in Bangladesh since the heady days of 1971 is to cubvort and smathor tho cultural identity of he Muslims o! Beng desh. It was courtesy the intellectuals’ — the votaries of Bengalee-Ism-inat Hindu India was ablo to mako first Inrcads into the feith of the vanguard of the Musfm froedom movomont wo Used to call East Pakistan, Qvertime the magic had worked so woll that what was Islaric came to denigrated as ‘communal, linked as It was wih the West Pakistani ‘exploiters’ and wha wes Hindu came to be fevered 8 as ‘secular, and hence fberal, linked as it was with the Indian fiberators' ‘As an October 1973 report of Desh Bangla, Dhaka, has it, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's government not only closed all offces and courts for two days on the occasion of the principal Hindu festival of ‘Durgapuia’ but also provided money from the public exchequer for each altar made for idol worship. Per haps no other way of exoression of grattude would have gone well with the Sboratore', But only a fow wooks lator, a Times of india report published cn 12 Novem- ber 1873 quoted him astelling a stidenis ‘moct in Dhaka that the “Pailstanis had tried to wield tho woapon of eommuna- Jism 10 perpetuate their ule but they had failed”, and asserting that ‘commu fialism nad been banished from the Soil ‘of Bangladesh”. How woll ‘soculavism’ has dug ite foot fn the sol of Bangladesh since then has boon highighied by Zainal Abedin, a Dhaka joumalist, who had taken up arms against Pakistan in 1971, in his latest book, “Raw and Bancladash” which probably would have boon mors appro- pralely tiled as “The ‘Liberator of Bangladesh”, It is @ wolkdocumented sccount of Hindu India’s metcless ravishing of the poliical and economic Landscape of Bangladesh. But what merits partculer attention is the enslaverient of the Muslin mind that is taking place with the collaboration of ‘inlelestuals’ in the name of culture and modem outleak, “Above all’, says Zainal Abecin, “cuk tural and religious identity of 90% people cf Bancladesh is being eroded out by systematic altacks on Islamic values", the objective being “to uncermine Islam the lives of Bangladeshi Muslims so that thair blending with Hindus is faclia- ted”. Under the pretext of Bengalee culture, “the cim is to promote Hindu couture” He pons out that “RAW backed intelecueis take ininte pains © prove to the naw generation thatthe liberation Wer of 1971 disproved the vliiy ot the Two Nation Theory and generated the spint ct secuaism, Hovever, tis is tctely wrong. The ‘war of Foeraton Wes diestad against the then West Pakistan domination and expotetionand ‘not against Islam and our Muslim iden- tty’. it fe tue ho saye that “thet demand for amanciaion found expression ia Bengelee.nallonaliam”, but "this was purely the coriext of Pakistan and at no stage the people intended to pat with the Two Nation Theory". In fact, “the emergence of Bangladesh is in consonance wih Latore Resoution of 4940", and “once renunciaton of Two Nation Theory is acoepted, reuniicaton of India becomes obvious". In his oyos, *propaaaticn and promotion of Benga- leciam is a conepiracy against the very foundations of Bangladesh’ He poses the question “Why Hindus of West Bengal do noi support Bengaiee nationalism egainst indian (Hindu) natio~ nals, Why the idea is being drummed to people of Bangladesh orly?..... Ben- gall speaking Hindus and the Muslims ould never became one national in the pest. Now thet the ideological, cutural ard polticel diferences between the Mo have grown futher, how can there be any ratonale for a common Bengelee nationalism” Butthe “intelecuals” vio are ensoon- ceed according to Zainal Abedin in various academies of art and culture and the media are busy in promoting “Brah- ministic and atielstic diseases’ in the body-poliic of Bangladesh. Bangla Aca- demy, for instanca, financed wih public money’, due to dominance of pro-Indian elements is In effect working for the rovival of Incian cuiture. It has been promoting books writen by Hindu and Secular minded ‘Musim’ vriters. Bangla Academy is allercic to anything Islami lis doors are shut for all Muslin nationalist writers while works of even third grade prondian writors who claim to be secular are published” Commenting on the opposition leader. Stelkh Hesina’s ringing of a metal bell to inaugurate a function al the Bangla ‘Academy in connection with the Bengal New Year of 1968, Zainal Abadin says, “Sounding a metal bell (an integral part of Puja or Hindu form of worship) Was unprecedented not only in any funstion of Bangla Acadomy but also in the history of independent Bangia- doch. Now link it with the Kinding of the Mongal Pracesp — first of its Kind in the Shipakala Acadomy premices by Sulla Kemai and you will easily cisoaver wihore the teins of these two organisa: tions actually ley. The sponsors of these [practices claim that those practics are ‘only ceremonial. But let me ask them ville Hindu stert his work with recitation, of Bismillah” Stilpakala Academy, en organisation set up to promote art and culture of Bangladesh, favours “indian artists more then those ‘of Banglacesh with higher standing... (lt) invites indian cultural aclvsis and seeks to popularize the songs, dance and drama” In January 1996, the Academy organised a national Jatra festival (open alr opera popular In rural Bangladesh), which was inaugu- rated by Prime Minister Khala Zia. Its ‘sponsors, aclo's, and audience were all Bangladeshis but out of eleven writers Of this Jaira, ten were Indians. Naturelly the dress, decoration and dialogues of these Jaltas rellected Indian culture and social values. Bangladest has almost been irundex ted wih immerel Indian video fires to coiryst the Troals of the youth and Zainal Abedin notes with surprise thet “the nation which had fought and strug- ced egainsl Ure now preuly watches Hing fins and listens to Hindi music" ‘Tho official electronic media, particula- tly the Bangladesh Televison, purvey programmes, which are mosily repug- fant fo the main piincipes of Islan. la most of the dramas, on the plea of Recessiy of the story, the traditional Muslim culture, norms and social valves of Bangladesh are ignored, When any antisocial character is depicted, he S generaly shown with @ beard and a ‘cap on his heed. Attime, evi characters are shown @s Hell, Maul, Fir etc (ie. personalities respected in Islam). The feligon Is ridiculed and prqected in poor ight’. BTV Is also “promoting a pseudo to Hberal culture, In most of the plays it Is shown that young boys and gifs rise in revolt against their parents. Wives revolt egainst their husbands. The main purpose of depicting such acts is to destroy our tracitional social values and family ties, In many pleys explicit love scenes are shown diteyarding our social values". Rabindranath Tagore is over projected in most of BTVs dramas. “There is hardly any play where Tagore is not shown, or his congs aro not sung or his poems ere not read..... On the opeasion of Rabindranath’s bith anni- Versery, BTV's herones, hercs and dancers dplay on their foreheads the Hindu symbol of lak’, “Even between presentation of Eid programmes, BTV Punches in Tagore tems. Since BTV commonly uses Hindu names in its diferent proarammes, the “acepin of Hindus nick names by Muslim boys and gifs has become quite ‘commen in Bangladesh, Hindu names like Sawen, Sager, Somundra, Nadi, Abantika, Sauray, Sujan, Shentu, Ral. Tonun, Gagan, Anta, Bipasha, Shnata, Shani, Amit, Ajt ete, have infilzaied into Nuslin ‘anilies. Musim families coué not think to keep such nick names even in pre:pattiion ora when Bangladesh was patt of India and the Musims were a minority’. Rarely, “there is any mention of atroctios comrritted by Incian forces and Hindu fundamentalists on Muslims in India including Kashmir’. But “plays about Razakars and Albadars of 1977 are repeatedly telecast” by BTV. A number of lndian-sponsored and financed papers constenlly carry on ification campaigns against pronato- alist elements. They unabashed ciitict- 2 parttion of India end clrectly and indirectly propagate for merger of Barr ladesh with india, They spread disinfor- mation, discontent and promote dishar- mony amongst different classes, particu- larly witi reference to events of 1971 liberation war. The aim is to impede rational integration and progress. They iso vehemently oppose Bangladesh's fiendship with Musi countries". Indian text books are batng prescribed many prestigious private schools from K.G. levelto higher classes. Thase books have al Hindu cheraciers and preach and promote Indian causes, Hindu cultu- fe and history. As a result of a vigorous drive toaltract students from Bangadesh to educational ‘institutions in India, as many as one hundred thousand Bangla~ deshi students are presenily studying in India. Incredibly, even chiddrer of Class | to V are sent to India for education. A craze has developed ‘among bureaverats, businessmen and politcans to send ther warcs abroad, particularly to India for studying. Recently, according to Zainal Abedin, the Indians, have adopted “a novol way. {o contact and recruit important religious. and poltical leaders of Bangladesh. They send some of their Incian Musim stoo- ges fo Bangladesh to approach hich feiglous and pallial personalties of Bangladesh. Moulana Asad Madni of Deoband, Alnaj Kashani Baba cf Dargah Nezam-uddin Auta and uloma from Ajmor Shari have been visting Bangladesh for tho purpose” and trying to sall the line that partiion of India has done no good to Muslims and therefore the Musims should work for re-untication of india. 9 The Specificity of Sri Lanka Towards a Comparative History of Sri Lanka and India Eric Meyer A comparative history of India and Sit Lanka reveals thet there is more to 08 gained by recognising the spectticiy Of hibtorlcal developments in Sit Lanka rather than by regarding It as @ microcosm of India. RS eile Se rottats eare @ the major elements of the Indian world and can in fact bo regarded as a soit of microcosm of India. But seen in a diferent perspective its characteri ssics are strongly specific. the elm of this papor is to dotinoate comparative aspects of the history of Sii Lanka ang Incia during the period between the 1th century and Independence. ‘The ralural and climalc features of Sti Lanka parallel those of south nda: the wet south.ivastom regions can be Compared wih Kerala, the Kandyan Up-couniry with tha Nilais, the low lends f the diy zone with the plains of Tamil Nau. The society. and cuture of Si Lanka result from the juxtaposition, and in a large measura the ecrrbination of noth Indian and south Indian elements. During. the historieal_ period, varios ‘groupe coming from tho continent settlad in the isand. Some of them spoke languages and belonged to culture originaling in the indo-Gangstc plains Under the combined infusnce of the kings estabished in the cenire-nortn of tho island, and of the lige. Buddhist ‘monasteries which they protected, these elements slowly fused into tho Sinhala community (net race). Over groups, Prcbably mre numerous, came fromthe hearer southem part of the peninsua. Most of those must havo maliod into the evolving Sinhala communty over a fong period. By the end of tho fist milennium AD, when Buddhism disep: peared from the continent where new Teliglous forms developed (espedally devoiional Saivsm), and when expanso- fist stales were. established in south Inda, a Tamil idenity soliified in the roth and east of the island. Under the combined influence of clmalio change, fefpanding matiime trade end unseitled conditions created by was with tha Chola empite and other Indian powers, the highly elaborated hydraulic system, upon which the enaiont cviisation was built, eveniualy coliapsed, Alter the 12th ccontury, the core of the Sinhala popula: tion drited towards the south west and the central hls, white the Jafina peninsu- la boceme the centro of the Sri Lankan Tamil communiy. Athough geographic separation inoroased the cultural dis- tance bewean the two communites, the links ofthe island with the eontinontwore by no means severed. The development of a rich Sinhala Tterature was deeply Influenced by the flourishing Indian cultue res of the middle ages; and different gioups continued to setle [a the island, integrating with one cr the other commu- nil oF, as in the case of tre Muslinis, keeping an identty of their awn. ‘The internal organisation of the insular society rficeted these Indian influences: as in the ingated ateas of south Tamil Nadu, the rce-culiwating caste was ‘numerically and hierarchically dominant ‘among both the Sinhlas (goyigame) and the northein Tamils (velalan); the fishing castes wera more or loss te same on both sides of the Pak Strats; kinship systems and vocabulary were sintlar, religious practices — bolh Buddhist and Hindu — derived from India, The first distinguishing factor lay in the reslioncs of Buddhicm in tho ieland, Its survival was irked to that of a ‘elatively ciablo monarchical cystom which extenced iis protection to the community of monks, while the growing braiminical influence in south India put fan end to its patonace by tho local kings, and the ceciine of the Sengha reached a point of no roturn with tho estaiserent of Musi states fh noch ‘The second distinguishing factor resul- ted from the lengih and the depth of the colonial impact: four-and-a-half Centuries of foreign domination in the coastal areas, a century and a half in the interior. Integration of the islend into the world market was stronger than in India, Following the trading oconomy focused cn cinnamon set up by the Portuguese and the Dutch, th Briish imposed in the intetior @ plantation system for coffee, then tea and rubber production, which bocare the dominant feature of the economy and made it ‘inerablo tothe fluctuations of the world marcet. While the Bitish revenue system in India was_mainy dopendent en peasent acriclture and cimatc fuctua- tions, taxation in Cayion was based on the plantation sactor. Moreover, after a shot experiment with ruling Ceylon from Madras, which ended in falure, the Britsh administration of the island remained separate from that of India and contributed to iis ceniinuing panicularism. While encoura- ging the migration of a new group of South Indan manual workers for employ- ment in plantation and urban jobs, the British discouraged their iniergration the local sociely, contrary to the ago-old piellemn of acculuration, At the level of teprecentations, while they roinforoad in India @ taxonomy besed on caste and eigious categories, they uphold in Ceylon a taxonomy based on so-caled ‘rectal’ and linguistic categories, Faally, the growth of a nationalist movement in Ceylon, although parallel fo the Indian freedom movement, en- hanced the distinctiveness of the island from India, and inside, the separateness of the diferent commuritios, as it was ina large measure based on a growing eensciousnass, among the Sinhala poo- ple, of Sri Lanka 2s a holy land of Buddhiem, and to a lesser degros among the Sri Lankan Tamis, of Jafina as a repository of the Saivits Taml tradition. The beginnings of the modem pariod in Sri Lanka ate signaled by the tise of the meantime trade from the 14th century onwards under the impulse of Musiim metchanis. Tha next phase invclved the expansion of the European demand for spices (e market eventually coplured by the Portuguase in the 16th century). The development of coconut and arecanut culation, einnamen pos- 1 ling, sem dogging and peat diving provided important export rescurces for ew stales which came into existence along tho westom coast jin interaction with soutnwest india, such as the kingdom of Kotte. The west-ees! routes Of trade linking Sri Lanka with the west ‘Asia and Eurcpo on ono sido, south-onst Asia and the Far East on the other, became more important than the north: south axis linking the island with the peninsula. But south Indian groups such as Weavers, fishers and agricultural labourers continua to trickle in and were integiaied into the caste system of the Sinhalesa, After the annexation of Kotte and of vatina by the Portuguese, the channels Of exchange with India were kept open. by the new Sinhala kingdoms establi- shed in the interior at Stawaka and Kandy, Even under the Duicn who expeled the Portugucco in tho middle Of thie 17Ih century and atlempled 10 cut Kandy from accass to the coasts, the Indian connecion was maintained by the intermediary of the (mainly Tarril) regions of the norh and east. The Kandyan kings married princesses from Madurai and in the 18th century a Nayaikkar dynasty of south indian (Telu- gu) crigin came to power in tho high- lands. As protectors of the Sanana, those rulers played an important role in tho Fevivel of Buddhism. By the end of the 18th century, however, they wero finally cut fiom the mainland by the British Conquest, and their authorilarianism intensified by the Briish intigues made them unpopular. The establishment by the successive European powers of a system of direct tue in the coastal regions lefl a deep imprint on the economy, society and insttutions, which cistinguished Gri Lanka from India and brought it closer to the Javanese experionce, The Island Was integrated into @ network which linked it wih the world market of acricul- \urel products, whereas India under thie Mughals was the major world cenire of lextle manufacture and exports. As a result, Caylon was much more depen- dent on @ limted range of producis over which it had no contol, The Salagama, a south Indian weaver caste {umed inio cinnamon pealers, prodiced under a eyctem of compulsory labour the main anicle of export, which was exceedingly proftsble fer the Dutch Company. But these profits were impert- led by frequent revolts encouraged by the Kandyan authorities. 12 In areas controlled by the Dutch, tho Roman civil law was imposed much earlor than under the Bitish in India Individual land rights became the rule, instead of the traditional undivided rights in a family share (panguwa') of the vilage land. Personal and famifal law tended to erode status hierarchies, although the Dutch recognised the hege- mony of high casie goyicama and bestowed honorific itlas upon theirhead- men, the so-called mudaliyar of the Low country, who formed a kind of landed gentry. The couris of lew became the focal point of public life, and a class of lawyers, generelly recruited among the Burghers of Dutch or mixed descert, became very influential. Tegother with the mudaliyar, they formed the backbone of a new elie in the 18h century. The development of wastem ecucation ensu- red tho continuing power of these groups imbued wih a ‘colonic! cullure’, Urban devalopmant in Colombo, Gallo, Matara and Jatina was encouraged by the Dutch who loft their mack en architecture and jumture, A tho tum of the 19th. century, when the Erlish took over from the Dutch, western influence was by no means a ‘new thing in Sri Lanka, Whet the Britsh did Was to oxtond it to the interior and generally make t more pervasive. Unike in India, they had not to deal with the legacy ol a vast Imperial system, nor with the dynamism of en autenomous lade economy, not with the intricacies of a highy caste-concclous peasant soviely. They attempted to rule the island ke any cther colony, with administrators wlio had made thelr careers in A‘rica, south-east Asia or the Caribboan rather than in India; but they could not ignore that Ceylon, with its ancient civilisation deeply iniluenced by India, was not just another ‘sugar island’ which they could fil with slaves or coclies and govern at will While the Brtish retumed Indonesia to the Dutch aftor the Napoleonic wars, they reinforced ther contol on Ceyion botween 1796 and 1818, because of the stiateyic value of ks pots (Tilncoma- lee, Galle) for ruling the south Indian coasts, But 2s soon as they found themselves unpopular as a result of a sucvession of pollical mistakes, they dalinkad the Ceylon adrriristration from that of Madras and made ita separate Crown Colony. Instead of transforming Kendy into a vibutary ‘princely’ state, they atlempled to conquer it in 1803: the war ended in falure. They then ‘added tus! to cout ingles $0 2s to destabilise a young king, unti then rather popular, and eventually succeeded in annexing the kingdom in 1815. The cession was tecognised by the aristocracy and the Sangha in a witien ‘convention by which the British undar- took to protect the Kendyan tradiions and privileges. But the Kandyans were soon disilusioned end in 1817-18 they joined en masse a rebelion sirred up by the appearance of a protonder, This rebellion can be compared to the great upheaval of 1857-58 in india, in that volved people who had lost ‘ith in the faimess of the Raj, But thoro ere also obvious differences: it flared immadiately and net long after the annexation; end its repression weekened the Kandyan aristocracy to euch an extent thet it eould never recover. While the Brlish chose after the Mutiny to coma. to tems with tradiional forces and pamperthe princes, in early 19th contury Ceylon, where they felt the leghimacy of their nile to be mora sacure, they id not hesitate to fester the missionaries ‘and openly denounce the contents of the Kendyan convention by severiig the links between the state and the Sangha. ‘The missionaries gave a major impulse to the development of English medium ‘educatien in Colomibo, Jaffna end to a lesser exient in Kandy and Gelle, and they insured the formation of an englick sed elite conforming to the programme fprociaimed in India by Bentinck and Macauley, The economic strategies developed by the British in the early 19th century were parallel in both countries. They aimed at dismanting the impediments to free enierprise. Unil 1692, tho East India Company retained the cinnamon mono- poly and manipulated prices to suit its Interests on the continent. A commission ‘of enquiry pointed out this anomaly and con the basis of its report the monopoly was abolished together with the corvee system which supposedly hindered the dovelepment of free enterprise, while privete appropriation of uncukivated land Was sncouraged shorty afterwards. ‘These measures enabled European adieniurers end spooulators tolayhands (on @ substantal part of the Kandyan highlands and opon coifee estates; but the reluctance of the local vilagers to aceept working conditions akin fo clave labour led the planters to attract coolies from Tarril Nadu, fist on a tomporary basis, and later when tea replaced coffee as tho major erop, as permanent labourers. ‘At that stago, the evolution of Caylon radically deviated from thal of India, in spile of siilartias with some regions Of the continent such as Assam, Coorg and Travancore. The strength of the pantation economy model was suc thal when the coffee estates were abando- nad in the 1880s as a result of a leal disease and of south American competi tion, the fSland was 50 dependent on that system that tea was promplly adopled 2s a substitute, soon followed bby rubber. Contrary to a common view, tiie planiation and the subsistence sec- tors did not operate in watertight com- partments but were linked, so thet any Grisis on one sector affected tha other. Enterprise was by no means limited to Europeans: in the latter part of the 19th century, Ceylonese invested in estates (especially coconut) the wealth amassed in theirincirect involvementin the plenta- tion economy: between 1868 and 1906, 72. per cent of tho land arcas cold by the Crown were acquired by non-Euro- peana. Tho esiatos overtualy provided large amount of various resources to the local population: regular employment jn coconut and rubber estates, czsuel ‘employment on tea plantations; arrack, cor and latex manufacture; carpentry ‘and wood products; transport, building, ‘vade in agrcultural procuce, and derived acivties in towns and roadside markets. ‘The sising standard offiving on the islend at tha beginning ofthe 20th century stood in dear contrast wih the continuing subsistence crises on the continent and. contibuted (9 allract Indian immigrants. whose numbers exceeded thal of tha indigenous Tamiis of the north and est. ‘The colonial state backed the planters? interests because its budget depended ‘on custom duties peid by that secior. For want of a survey and settlement ‘on Indian linos, the administration was tunable to lay the basis for a general land tax. Tho only taxstion basod on agricultural production was te very unpopular paddy tthe, levied by tax faimers or commuted to a fixed payment, ‘which was finally abofshed in 1802. Ths, Is in obvious conirast with india where the taxation of agricultural produce was. the mainstay! tne budget anda decisive factorin the development of rural discon- tent and of the nationalist movement. The ‘plantocraoy’ wes very influential in government circles (ai the beginning vl servants were quite offen involved in the planting industy, and later, the Planters’ Association tecame the most powerul lobby ia the country). They Suczessfuly aGitated for cheap land, public roads for ther private uso and 4n abundant supply of coote labour. The goverment devoted a substantial part of its budget and of the labour provided by poll tax commutors to tho bulcing of roads and railways in the plentaion areas, It promulgated in 1840 an orc nance proclaiming as Grown land any Uunculivated o- irogurly cultivated land (Guch as by slast-and-bun cultvators) for whish nebody could ‘umish a writen ant, and sold it for a song to the prospective planters. Whon thase Crown lands became scarce, European and Caylenese riidelemon entered the game and prompted the vilagers to pari wih tho romaining land. A naw lecisation establishing a systein of land seltement falled to arest land alienaton, which resiroted the ling space availabe for vilage subsistence culivation, Moreover irdScrivinale deforestation by plante- tions led to scil erosion and siting of paddy felds, drying of springs, scarcity ‘of fuelwood, and scarcty of grazing grounds for Gaile. Thus lendhunger and environmental problems in Ceylon were much more the resut of planttion expansion than in India, ‘The supply of stable and obedient south India coole labourers, generally from uniouchable castes, was enst through tha activity of “kanganies, usually older lebourers who were given advances by the planters to recruit new vorkers whom they ccnirolled through indebtedness (and not under an inden- ture system like longer distance migra- tion to Mauritus and the Caribbean). The tiavel and working conditions wete ep- palling Until the end of the 19th century, when the conversion to tea and the intervention of the colonial authorities improved the situation, From 1901 on wares, population growth was more rapid than elsewhere in eouth Asia; the conti. ung immigration of Indians unil the 4930s was an important contributing factor. In the British Enperial eystom controd on India, Ceyon occupied a marginal place, but the economic Inks wih the continent were signifcant throuch the ‘ciivliss of the same banks, managing 2g2nces and exoortimoort fins. Indian businessmen wero present in fro rural credit market (the natiukottai chettiars from south India), the rice and the cotton trade (the Borahs and the Sinchis from. ‘wesiem India) and the retail o! Imported goods (Muslin morchants from Kerala). ‘Their competition was resented by the Sinhala tadors, especially the karava from the west coast, and led to tensions. including sovero antiMusim ots in 1919. Communal violence was until en almost unknown in Si Lanka, and ia any case less commen than in India. Tho 1915 events, caused by conflicing econormic fnierests rather than religious, differences, were a portent of things to come. The exclusive emphasis on plantation agriculture led to the neglect of peasant subsistence agiiculure. Paddy cultva- ticn sulfered irom the lack of concem for iigation and the aboliion of corvee labour by which tie resemvoirs and ‘channels usad fo be cleared and repel fed. Any attempt at resiodng the hydrau- fie works of the dry zone was foled by the persistence of malaria untl the 1840s, and the competion in the town and plantation rice market of cheep paddy produced in Incia and Burma: Even the aboition of the paddy tax dd not improve the condition of the pea- saniy, nor increase tice productivity. AS similar stagnation occured in. the pacdy-producng areas of eastom India (in contrast with the development of Purjebi agriculture), the plantation system wes probably not the only factor responsible, There is a tendency to overstress the rationally of the British rajin scuth Asia. Recent research has shown that there was a laige amount of improvisation, expediency and contradicions in the Colonial practice both in India and Ceylon. But in the latter country the authorties had at their disposel a much denser network of civil servants, better communications and —_ information systems, and therefore more efficient tools to impose their policy. The nationa- list answer to British raj has been constructed as the major trend in 20th century India’s history, untill some Cambridge-based hisioriano started to question that exclusive emphasis on the basis of local leval studios in political mobilisation. In comparison, Sit Lenka’s path to froodem has usually boon doseri bed as relatively smooth, uneventful, and rathor parochial: but if tho omphacis is put on India’s regional and not national History, tho diforonco is lose obvious. 13 In both counties there was an attempt by the Briish in the socond half of the 19th century to restore the authority of tho traditional elites. The services due {o temples and to Kandyen chels were registered end caste hiorarchies were leghimised, especially in Jatina (although they were naver officially recognised in Censuses as in India). A conservative brand of Buddhism was encouraged and an allempt at ‘moralising’soclal practices Was made by condemning polyandry, and exposing corruption in the admin stration of temple proparties. The decay of the Kandyen atistoctacy was altrbu- fed to alecholism (which the Bish had themselves fostered by encouracing the opening of taverns up-country for fiscal reasons), At the same time the dynamism of the westemised low-country elie was censured oxactly like that of ite Beng ‘counterpan. I's economic success was ‘condomnad as speculative and oxplcita- tive of the peasantry, and is pretensions, {0 roprosont tho nation were denounced as unauthentic, is members were barred from access to tha highor administative posis while at the same tme English missionary schools and the professions were liberally opened to these so-called ‘brown sahibs’. Members of this now bourgevisie were ethnically diverse and. divided into rival coteries, but had much in common: Engish wes tielr second oroften frst language, coconut or nibber property their favourite invesiment, law tr possibly mecicine the career to which they desiined their children. As in India, religious revivalist movo- ments were slated by members of the elie in an atterrpt to counter missionary influence in education. As early as the middle of tha 19th century, Arumugam Navalar tied to recreate a Hindu Saivie ‘action in Jaffna: by the end of tha century, the Anagarika Oharmapaia played a major role in the development ‘of Budshist revival frst supported by the theosophists (who were also active in India curing the time of Annie Besant and B G Tilak) and later emancipated from their influence. Dharmapala kept close links with india where he spent a large partof his if restoring the sacced. places of Buddhism. ‘Agzin as in India, the period of the first world wer witnessed an upsurce of nafionalist militancy end a stifering on the part of the colonial authorities, a face to face which could erupt into. open conflict. The first centenary of the 14 cession of Kandy in 1915 provided such an opportunity, but itis tar the panic of the colonial authoriies than any inientonal plot which was at the basis of the troubles. The execution of rioters and the imprisonment of the mein Sinha- la leaders of the nafcnalsi movement aroused the sympathy oflarge searienis of the population, including Tamil mode- rates; but hdd net lead io a vast ‘ion-cooperation movement comparable to that which challenged Bish rule in India after the 1919 Amftsar massacre, In the early 1920s, tho colonial author. ties in Ceylon were able fo manipulate tho potontal rvalies between the ser- munities to break tne movernent. ‘These everts are not very different ‘rom those which encouraged the growth of tho Indian mase movomant. Among he ceeper causes for the diferent trajectories of the national movemonis ih India ard in Ceylon, the length and depih of the colonial impact may be a contributing factor as also the lack of leaders as dotorminad and cchssive as the westemised Indian brimins. The ‘gap between the anglcised elite and the locel dominants was possibly wider in Sri Lanka, and the Kind of mass mobilisation which made the non-ccope- ration movemen's sa impressive in India might have keen more difficult to organi se in Ceylon. Finally, Colombo was certainly not a place where poitical debates as lvely 2s in Calcutta or Bombay would normally take place, and the Ceylon National Congress founded in the aftermath of the 1915 repression remained a weak organisation, riven with factional rivalries. Cotere was also a characteristic of local Indian politics, as shown by the recent studies of tho ‘Cambridge schoo’ of historians of India, but tho national leaderchip of the Indian Congress proved able to rise above Parcchial intorasts. ‘Three specific teciors in the Sri Lankan situstion requke special mention. The first {5 that the Ertish chose fo make Ceylon a showcase of gradual home ube, The s2cond is that even if Ceylon weleomed Ganchi and Nehru, its lies cenerally regarded developments in India with como diffidence lect thoy should impinge on Geylon’s independent waysrin the 1980s and 19402, the group led by DS Senanayake who was to become the prime minister at indepen- dence, wes quite clear cn this point, Moreover, ant-indian sentiments were fuelld by the national-populst prope ganda of party and union leaders such as AE Goonesinha, who accused Immigrant workers of being responsible for the largocealo unemployment in turban end plantation areas during the dopression, and Indian tradere (cope Giely the chettian) of depriving Geyonese ‘owners of paddy, coconut and rubber [properties of their lands. These deve- lopments are exaclly parallol to those which led to the separation of Burma nother Buddhist ccuntry) from India, but they never took in Ceylon a violent tum as in Burma, probably because the Geylonese lite had then choses the parliamentary way which gave them etter prospects for paltcel advance- ment than crisis and confrontation The third factor is the lack of social tensions in the rural world ecmparable to those which underlay Gandhi's mess mobilisation. After the abolition of the addy tax, in spite of the repression f siash-end-bum cultivation end of the fadhunger resuling from plantation expansion, there was until the dapres- sion no widosproad peasant discontent, because most peasants could draw some advantages from the opperturitios created by agricultural expansion, When the depression sotin, tho vilagors whose numbers had been inflated By an early populction growth found themselves deprived of these opportunities or even thrown out of employment, The dramatic meleria epidemic of 1984-35 owed IIs deacly character fo the fact that many peasants were undemnouristied, Tocoun ter the prospect of an impending crisis, both the colonial govemmentand Ceyo- nase leaders such as D S Senanayake Were quick to revise the land policy hitherto biased towards the estate sactor, along the Ines suggested in 1929 by the Gaylon Land Commission. Land redistribution to peasenis in the wet zone, and later the large-scale restora tion and croation of hydraulic works for Paddy culuvation in the cry zone, succee- dod in defusing peasant unrest At the same time, the bases of a woltare state were being set up, in the form of free dispensares and schocls, ‘The transfer of power by the Biitsh to the Sii Lankan ellie was a long drawn ut exercise. A legSlative council establi- shed during the 19th century had bean, ‘opened to unofficial representatives elec ted on a narrow and communal basis. The enlargement of tho electorate in the 1920s under governor Manning had left the communal eystom intact, tho colonial Motto being then ‘divide and rule’ in Caylon as well as in India. But in the late 1920s, the Donoughmore Commis- sion, sent to the island about at tho same time as te Simon Commission to the cubcontinent, cuggested a diferent course: the abandonment of separate clectoratos, universal franchise, and a system of limited home rule with dyarchy. While the governor retainad responsibil ty for law and order, justice, hance and foreign relations, a board of ministers (without @ prime minister) elected by a state council was {0 manage home: effaits, education, health agticuture, incusties and communicatons. The r= forms were adopted in 1931 — wel belore the provincial devolution of 1937 in India. Si Lanka thus served as a test case of gracual decolonisation, possibly to chow tho Indian nationalists the benetlts they could cain from collabo- ration with tho raj. The poltical class reluctanty accented the new sysiem. Universal suffrago compelled them to play the electoral ‘gama, without giving them full respons fiy, and even ts supporters such as the trado unionist Goorsinha lost ther influence when confronted with the femergence of a Menist movement led by the Lanka Sema Sameia Paty. The communal systom of representation died hard end led many pottiians to revive Caste, religious or ethnotnguistic loyalties to oncuce vote banks for themeoWves, The rise cf communal polties nthe 49305 was in @ way the outcome of the majorty rule implicit in a representa- tive eysiem in which tho insitutons did fol provide for a measure of federalism. Some leaders of the Tarril mineriy in Jaina induced their people to boycott the slactions for two years, and they later advocated an equal representation for the mincrites (about 30 per cert f the population) and the majority. On the other sida of the deepening divide, § WR D Bendaranake started a ‘communal movement, the Sirhala Maha- ‘sabha, omiaiscentol the Hindu Mchase- ‘bha in India. But at thet stage there existed in Ceylon no separatisi movement compa- rable to that advocated by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. During the second world war, whereas the collaboration of tho Musim League with the British, in contrast with the Quit India movamont of the Con- ress, paved the way for Pakistan, the good rolations of D S Senanayeke with the Bish and his ablily to intearate the Jafina Tamils inio the poltical ‘system, ensured the independence of Coylon as a unitary ciate, On the other hand, the Caylonese leadership (mainly Low couniry Sinhalese), parly in order to gain the support of the Kandyans, ‘excluded the Indian immigrants (espe- Cally the plantaiion Tamils) from lana deiribution measures and from some government jobs. Inca retaliated with ban on migratory movements, and a Serious crisis developed in the plantation sector in 1940, At independence, most of the immigrants were dsenfianchises and became staloloss; thair fate remai- ned for decades a major bone of contention between India and Sri Lanka, Futthermore, the movernent towards completa independence of Si Lanka followed a path very diferent from that of India and Pakistan: the new opnortuni- lias erected by tha war hed praciclly opposite effects. After 1942, the sland became the heacquerters forthe anthla- Panese war in soulh-ces! Asia. The economy bensiited immencay from va. rious contracts, from the damand for rubber and gaphito. In addition, @ planning apparatus was set up which Teid the bacie for a wotlare stato whish was lo Decome a hiallmare of the Si Lankan poliy after independence: acr- Gulurel prices were guaranteed for the producer and controlled jor the benefit Of the consumers: public services were batter organised, the heath and educa. tion syslems were given a sounder fooling, malaria was pail eradicated by systematic spraying of DDT. On the politcal side, the extensive powers given to the milltary, far from arresting the march to independence, ‘encouragedit; the unfailing support given by D'S Senanayake to the war effort made him appear as the perfect pariner in view of the transfer of power, at the very moment when the Quit India move ‘ment tweatened the Biitsh ra] on the continent. In 2 way, Coyfoneso indopon dence from India was quaranteed. by the same circumstances which provided for the creation of Pakistan, and was prepared by the same man who presided over the August 1947 transier of power. ‘As early as June 1944, Lord Mountoat- ten, then commander-in-chief, persua- ded the war cabinet to exarrine a draft Constitution submitted by D S Senanaya- ke. The report of the Soulbury Commis- sion sent fo Ceylon by the end of 1944 served as a basis fora negotiation which lasted for three years — not because there were actual obstacles, but because the Atco govormment choo to give priory to the buming Indian issue. The independance: of Coylon was therefore proclaimed ony in February 1948, although it had matured during a longer Period than on tha continent, Compared with the violent conditions that prevailed in India, Pakistan and Burma, the vansfer of powerin Sil Lanka appeared as a transition as smooth as had been the takeover ofthe Low county in 1798 and that of Kandy in 1815. Defenca and co-operation agreements ensured that Ertan kept an inlluence on foreiga relations and economicatfaire, The more radical nationalists such as Bandaranaike, and the Manést loaders who were becoming popular, coud therefore describe the operation as a cease of non-genuine decolonisation, In a way, 1948 doos not ropracent a malor watershed in the history of the island, The peaceful character of the transition could nothide for long a serles of Weaknesses, which were to appear @ decade later, with a succession of crises culminating in the 1980s with the Tamil separatist movemert and the JVP. uprising in the south. It is perhaps the sinall size, the high degree of education, Communication and polticisation which mado tho Sri Lankan probloms appear so unlraclable, as in the cases of Lobancn or Cyprus. But in spite of these major cifferences, tho study of SriLankan history can shed some lignt on certain aspects of Incian tory and contribute to its crifcal examination. if one considers india as a Slate throughout the modem period, the history of Sri Lanka appears as bascally specific: the limited relations: between India and Si Lanka have always been of a nature different from thos between tho contre of India's power (be it Deihi or Calcutta) and any of ts peripheral parts. If on tho contrary. the focus is on the regional aspects of tha Indian world, there are mere similar fies for example between Kerala and Sri Lanka than between Kerala and Rajasthan, That a comparative study of ‘Sil Lanka and Kerala opens a rich field of research in poilical economy as well as history has been amply demonstrated (see Rex Casinador, Et; Docombor 2, 1938). [his ecsay ie an adaptation of a chapter ily published in French in a volume fn the history of modem Inia ected by Claude Markovlts (Histone ce Ande Modem, 1480-1950, Pars, Fayaid, 1934), The aulhar wishes to express his thanks to Alice Thomer fot her help in translating and ediing the text] 15 A Selection of the Finest International Brands. Hilleggs IAPeRS BREAKFAST CEREALS Huccies maxwell DIAPERS mouse core Sue ise rs DENTAL CARE Ardmona : CANNED FRUITS pe Palmolive PERSONAL CARE LURPAK BUTTER Tomato FRopucTs Daley eropucrs ; JOBLERONE MAMEE ‘CHOCOLATES = INSTANT NOODLES WELIA A HAIR CAKE BERRI @ Sole Agents \ CANNED MEATS PURE FRUIT JUICE 883, Si mavo Bandaranalke Mawatha, P.0. 80x 1970, Colombo 14. ‘el: 522871-2, 522830, 522832, 527934, 529155, 572373. Telex: 21418 Tasstea CE, 21991 Solpro CE, 26426 Seiten CE. Cable: Tasstea. Telefax: (941) 522913, Quality and Variety within your reach. Available at all Supermarkets & leading groceries Waiting for Zyuganov Rethinking Marxism’s Impasse Dayan Jayatilleka The ‘Crisis of Mandsm', the End of Manism; had been proclaimed not merely by its enemies but even its friends, Can the collapse of Soviet and Soviet style socialism and the faire Of Manaisis to identiy and agree upon any universal agency for social change lead us (0 conchide that Marxism fs dead? What were the factors which caused the demise of realy existing soclalism? Which is dead, and which remains alive within Mandsm Which Mansi, whose Manism, which aspect of Marxism is in crisis? What ts Mandsm’s Original Sin? How can Manis’ structural lacuene be over: come so as to enable it to escape from (is current cul-de-sac? In short ean — and how can — Marxism be revived? in what why can the iremen- dbus ideological and cuftural resour- 2s of impeniclism be countovaled? As Mansts, 18 incumbent upon us to seek answers to these questions while we wait for the Party of Lenin to make its conne back in Fussia PART | Marxism and the Intangible ‘There are two major interpretations within Manism, conceming the motor force of history; {wo ciflerent Hentiica- tions of the basic contradiction which propels large scale qualiiaive change. ‘One Is the contradiction between the ferces of production and tho relations Of production, This view hos that at Some pcint, the growing forces of pro- duction come up against the consticion. of the existant relations of production, A nuance or modification of this thesis — as Intioduced by Stalin in his Econo. ile Problems of Social in the USSF = efvisages a situation In which the felations of production become a fetter on the fulure/potential growtn of the forces of production, The second major thesis identifying the_motiva force of soctochistorical change is the conlradction between Glasses; the class struggle. O! course, tho two interpretations are far from mutually exclusive and the latter can be cen as caused by and the expression of, the former, In a string leap of theoretical orginal ty or pathaps intuition — qualtias that are denied him by his legion of erties and denouncers — Stalin, inthe essey cilod above, envisaged the possibilty of a contradiction between the forces and ‘elaions of production, under socialism {resuting fiom ertonedus policies). Wrile Kautsky and Trolsy clearly vsualsed such a contradiction, predicting the direst consequences from i, they did so witin an analytic framowork that rofused to identity post 1917 Soviet society 2s socialist. Indeed Kautsky deomod it counlerrevoluionary while Trotsky, more chanitably, identlied a callecive form of property but siopped well shart of defining it socialist in the case of both these thinkers, their refusal to describe post revolutionary USSR 2s socialist or even as ‘building soctalcm', stemmed nol enly from theoretical execic tude, but also from an eprioristc notion of sacielism as a successor to developed cepialism end therefore incapable of coniaining a soriousy consequential Contraction betnean the forces and the telations of production. (Gomauhal fip- penily, we mey clscein echoes in their notion’ of socialism, of @ ‘heaven cn earth). Hence, what was boing built in the USSA was not and could not be sooialsrr-indeod, for Kautshy, i was tis exact opposite; something more reac- tionary than capitalism. One notes that tho capitalism he had in mind included that of Germany, which, ashe wes wilting ast were, threw Up Nazi fesefom! Defenders of Kavisky and Trotsky Would argue that i they could be faulted for anyihing, it is of excessive fidelity to Marx (and Engels) who clearly sooke of socialism as arising on the basic of advanced cepitalism wih ts abundance ‘of consumer goods. This defence over- fooks a question that stems from Marx's ow well known reply to Vera Zasulich, admiting tho posabilly of @ ravolutionary Russia making a direct transiton from the communal 'mir to socialicm, provided the Russian revolution acted as a signal for the European tevelution, Certainly, Mare added this last mentioned proviso, ‘but howevar great the importance one attributes toi, however great the empha sis one gives it, the problem remains that any Russian eocislism/communiam arising on the basis of the mic, and not issuing from the womb of = developed Russian capitalism, in fact bypassing such a siage, had of necessity to be very different from a socialism arising In Britain or Western Europe, whatever the degreo of assietanco from a victo- fous European proletariat This Is so, tunless one can argue that Mane and Engels envisaged a ‘substtionistn" by the external — in a context other than. that of colonial conquest — which could ‘compersata for bypassing the intemal ovolution of a dovalopod cepitaliom. This needs to be explored, Slatin’s perfcular mest was thot he not merely admitted, but cautioned of and indeed drew attontion to the possibi= lity of suc a contadiction (between forces and relations of procucton) and. iis seriousness in a system which he unambiguously saw as socialist and which he was the architect and artisan of. Maocerainly concoptualizedcortradie- tions, including antagonistic ones, under socialism and (non antagorisic ones?) Under communism. However, hough he spoke of those between mental end manual labour and town and couniry, Mao cleaily emphasized class struggie as the fundamental contradioton in postrevoluicnary, sovety'. It was, Lu Shao Chi, Deng Hsiao Peng and less explicily Chou en Lai, who folowed the Stalin thesis ofthe contradiction between forces and relations of production under sozialsn, It was not entirely a fiction ‘when the Macists ertiqued thie school of thought as ‘Bukharinte’ and In the interests of accuracy it would be correct totermte Staln-Bukharin tiesis (hough iis evoluton was @ hwo step one and dose not dato from the period of the Bukharin-Sialin bloc). Professional Sovietclogsts and the more iterate ofjoumalssic commentators con the fall of tho socialist

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