HELD

RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534, MARCH 18, 1954
FACTS
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the
Rules of Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that a candidate (for admission to the Bar)
may be deemed to have passed his examinations successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127,
sec. 14, Rules of Court).
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have
been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system
from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and
legislative departments of the government.

Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and passed by this
court, and feeling conscious of having been discriminated against (See Explanatory Note to R. A.
No. 972), unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few percentage lower than those
admitted to the Bar agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the passage of Senate Bill No.
12 which, among others, reduced the passing general average in bar examinations to 70 per cent
effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the court on the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted written comments adverse thereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate
Bill No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for bar examinations from nineteen hundred
and forty-six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-five, embodying substantially the
provisions of the vetoed bill.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar those candidates
who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparations. By and large, the
law is contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their failure in the exams.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect a judgment revoking the resolution of the court,
and only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution. 3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and supplement the rules on
admission to the bar (since the rules made by congress must elevate the profession, and those
rules promulgated are considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972
is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of art. 1, the entire law is void.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the
bar invoking its provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their examination papers
were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. To avoid
injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,
irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972. Unfortunately, the court has
found no reason to revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the bar, it must be pursuant to
Republic Act No. 972 which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to all concerned whether
they have filed petitions or not.

ISSUE

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

 behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which
his license confers upon him.

[A.C. No. 5170. November 17, 1999]
LILIA FERRER TUCAY, complainant, vs. ATTY. MANUEL R. TUCAY, respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Complainant Lilia F. Tucay, feeling deeply aggrieved by the immoral conduct of her husband Atty.
Manuel Tucay, seeks the latter's disbarment in the instant administrative proceedings.
Complainant and respondent have long been married, the two taking their vows years back on 14
July 1963 at the St. Ignatius church, Camp Murphy, in Quezon City. For thirty years, the couple
have lived together with their children.
Just a few days before their thirtieth anniversary or on 07 July 1993 to be exact, with the first
marriage still subsisting, respondent lawyers contracted another marriage with one Myrna C.
Tuplano, herself married since 1983 to a certain Florante T. Tabilog. Respondent left the conjugal
dwelling in July 1993 to cohabit with Myrna Tuplano.
Complainant also caused the filing of bigamy charge against respondent lawyer and his second
wife, docketed Criminal Case No. Q-94-54709, before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, of
Quezon City, which case still pends. In an attempt to defeat the early prosecution of the criminal
case, respondent filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City seeking the judicial
declaration of nullity of the second marriage. The petition was later dismissed due to lack of
interest; subsequently, however, respondent filed a second petition for the same purpose, this time
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. In both petitions, he averred that neither he nor the
other supposed party to the second marriage was physically present on the date of its alleged
celebration thereby rendering void any such marriage, if at all, under the provisions of Article 3,
paragraph 3, and Article 6 of the Family Code.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming of an attorney. The grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, including deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law,
or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so, are not preclusive in
nature even as they are broad enough as to cover practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer
does or commits in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer at no time must be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which not only are conditions precedent to his entrance to, but
are likewise essential demands for his continued membership in, a great and noble profession.
The Court concurs with the IBP-CBD and IBP Board of Governors in their findings and thus
accepts their recommendation that respondent lawyers, having ceased to meet and possess the
qualifications required of every lawyer, must forthwith be disbarred.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolved to disbar respondent Atty. Manuel Tucay immediately upon
his receipt of this Resolution. Let a copy hereof be made a part of the records of said respondent in
the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and copies to be furnished the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

The IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Jaime V. Vibar gave neither credence nor validity to the
explanation of respondent and recommended to the IBP Board of Governors the disbarment of
Atty. Tucay for gross misconduct and failure to maintain the highest degree of morality expected
and required of every member of the Bar. On 13 December 1997, the IBP Board of Governors
passed Resolution No. XIII-97-164 which "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE" the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner after being satisfied that the latter's findings
were amply supported by the evidence on record.

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is
enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent
has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only
indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable

A.C. No. 6792             January 25,
2006
ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant,
vs.
Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit 1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto
Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral turpitude,
together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; 2 and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under
Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.3
Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD issued a
Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had
been scheduled for June 11, 2004. 4 After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was
submitting the case on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments. 5 Accordingly, the CBD
directed him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004. 6 Afterwards, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its
Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the latter for frustrated
homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
The facts leading to respondent’s conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the Regional Trial
Court of Baguio City in this wise:
"x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home after gassing
up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver
overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had overtaken is
not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of the Baguio community who was under
the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a
turn at [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi driver
and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door causing the
accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to
help him get up. But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal
the taxi driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell down a
second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and
turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he could be pacified and then
released him. The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that the handle
was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed
the eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel of the gun
held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the
accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes
whose testimony corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto
Soriano."8
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and brought the
latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his
neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a
spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as
a taxi driver.
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, 2002,
respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court on several conditions.
These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended
party, Roberto Soriano."10
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to comply with this
particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court of Appeals. 11
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that respondent be
disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, but that the
latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on the following facts:
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car;
"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the latter, driving a
taxi, had overtaken him;
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent went back to his
car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled;
"5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant;
"6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the one mauled by
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
"7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil
liabilities to Complainant."12
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution adopting the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and
adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude
is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become
unfit to uphold the administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
character.13 In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final
judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no
longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his guilt warrants disbarment.
Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes
his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." 14
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been discussed
in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC, 15 a labor case concerning an employee
who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the particular
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this Court rejected the employer’s
contention and held that homicide in that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime
would have been violative of the IRRI’s Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances, the
employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for the latter to
determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the
courts, as explained thus:
"x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the
crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and
intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may
be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x
x."16 (Emphasis supplied)
In the IRRI case,  in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the Court
appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of aggravating
circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are
quoted as follows:
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating and had his
back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the victim then forcibly rubbed
Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack but was
ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that position that he drew a fan knife from the left
pocket of his shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after
the latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was not to slay
the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total absence of any aggravating
circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were not inherently vile, immoral
or unjust."17
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances clearly evince
the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when the latter least
expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he
was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were reasonable
actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyer’s assault.
We also consider the trial court’s finding of treachery as a further indication of the skewed morals of
respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a position to defend himself. In fact,
under the impression that the assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely
returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters
worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave
fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his conduct,
respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like
a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate
reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal
profession. His overreaction also evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait
in any individual, more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see
not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of one trying
to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge.
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm 18 and his unjust
refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful
orders of the courts. We remind him that, both in his attorney’s oath 20 and in the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to "obey the laws of the land."
All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a basic sense of
justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted
him probation. And yet, it has been four years 21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to
complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his
extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation,
he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim. Still, Atty.
Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could never even fully restore what the latter
has lost.
Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of the profession of
lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character. 22 Where their misconduct outside of their
professional dealings is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court may be justified in that meting out a lesser penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal
suspending or removing them from that office.23 profession -- that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We also adopt the IBP’s finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good moral character,
which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral
character includes at least common honesty.24
In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous behavior. As found
by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Fariñas, an out-of-court
settlement with complainant’s family. 25 But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that had sought a conference with
him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.26
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending circumstances – not the
mere fact of their conviction – would demonstrate their fitness to remain in the legal profession. In
the present case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent
clearly show his unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely implausible story of WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is
having been mauled by complainant and two other persons. 27 The trial court had this to say: ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his
record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
does not support his allegation that three people including the complainant helped each other in
kicking and boxing him. The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not SO ORDERED.
downright unbelievable[,] that three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do
so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant’s version of the incident
particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x." 28

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is more important
than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and
condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be
misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good faith.

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal profession.
They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually,
academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal
system, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients
and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach." 31

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral
flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP proper and commensurate.

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice by requiring
that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in
whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and
vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of
odious members.

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and that
disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired.
In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His actions
so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and his profession. We are convinced

G.R. No. L-19450             May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged Simplicio Villanueva with
the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said
accused was represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de parte. The
complainant in the same case was represented by City Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City,
having entered his appearance as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the
Secretary of Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he would
appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official leave of absence, and that he
would not receive any payment for his services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private
prosecutor was questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino, et al. vs.
Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had been appointed to the
position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he
ceased to engage in private law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining
the appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above ruling. On December
17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a "Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule
from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec.
35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims
that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP Court ruled on the motion by upholding the
right of Fule to appear and further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio,
which rendered judgment on December 20, 1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no reservation by the offended party of
the civil liability, the civil action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The
offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a legal
counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court of a justice of the peace a party
may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that
purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the
Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he was being paid
for his services or that his appearance was in a professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of
San Pablo he had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of crimes committed in
the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna, because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from
Alaminos are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the City Attornev of San
Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant
City Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal case. On the other hand, as
already pointed out, the offended party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was impliedly instituted together with
the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney Ariston D. Fule may appear before
the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna,
allowing the apprearance of Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without merits.1äwphï1.ñët
Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge, heretofore reproduced, and
which we consider plausible, the fallacy of the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which provides
that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor
General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case was
engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not
constitute private practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and
demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the
private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his
said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who
is a relative.
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against appellant..