G.R. No. 99287 June 23, 1992 allowed to plead guilty to a lesser offense.

Subsequently, on
February 25, 1991, respondent Judge rendered a decision
granting the accused's motion, to wit:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR., AND JAIME It may well be appropriate at this time to
MANUEL, respondents. state that the accused is not availing of
the "voluntary plea of guilt" as a
mitigating circumstance envisioned
under Article 13, paragraph 7 of
the Revised Penal Code. The accused
MEDIALDEA, J.: simply wants to avail of Section 2, Rule
116 of the Rules. As pointed out by Atty.
Fernando Fernandez of the PAO, there
This petition for certiorari seeks to reverse the decision and is nothing in the said provision which
the order of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital requires that the same be availed of
Region at Pasig, Metro Manila dated February 25 and March prior to the presentation of the evidence
13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D entitled for the prosecution. It is conceded
"People of the Philippines v. Jaime Manuel y Ohide" for though, as pointed out by the
violation of Section 16, Article 111, RA 6425, as amended. prosecution, that such is a waste of time
on the part of the Office of the Provincial
Briefly, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows: Prosecutor and of the Court,
nonetheless, this Court, having in
mind Section 2 of Rule 1 which provides
On August 24, 1990, Jaime Manuel y Ohide was charged that the rules shall be liberally construed
with violation of Section 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as in order to promote their object and to
amended. The penalty prescribed in the said section assist the parties in obtaining just,
is imprisonment ranging from six years and one day to speedy and inexpensive determination
twelve years and a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve of every action and proceeding and also
thousand pesos. The information against him reads: for humanitarian considerations, hereby
APPROVES and GRANTS the Motion at
That on or about the 21st day of August, bar.
1990, in the Municipality of San Juan,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the Moreover, such an admission of guilt by
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the the accused indicates his submission to
above-named accused, without the the law and a moral disposition on his
corresponding license or prescription did part to reform. (Vide: People vs.
then and there willfully, unlawfully and Coronel, G.R. No. L-19091, June 30,
feloniously have in his possession, 1966)
custody and control 0.08 grams of
Methamphetamin Hydrocloride (Shabu)
wrapped with an aluminum foil, which is Let it be made of record however that
a regulated drug. the Court is not putting a premium on
the change of heart of the accused in
mid-stream.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 15, Rollo)

WHEREFORE, finding the accused

During the arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not JAIME MANUEL Y CHIDE @ Manny
guilty. Thereafter, trial ensued. On November 21, 1990, the guilty beyond reasonable-doubt of the
prosecution rested its case. On January 9, 1991, counsel for crime of violation of Section 17, Article
private respondent verbally manifested in open court that III, Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
private respondent was willing to change his former plea of he is hereby sentenced to a straight
"not guilty" to that of "guilty" to the lesser offense of violation prison term of two (2) years and one (1)
of Section 17, R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The said section day of prision correccional, to pay a fine
provides a penalty of imprisonment ranging from six months of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00)
and one day to four years and a fine ranging from six with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
hundred to four thousand pesos shall be imposed upon any insolvency and to pay the costs.
pharmacist, physician, dentist, veterinarian, manufacturer,
wholesaler who violates or fails to keep the records required
under Section 25 of the Act; if the violation or failure involves In the service of his sentence, the
a regulated drug. That same day, the respondent Judge accused shall be credited in full with the
issued an order (Annex "B," p. 17, Rollo) directing private period of his preventive imprisonment.
respondent to secure the consent of the prosecutor to the
change of plea, and set the promulgation of decision on Pursuant to Section 20, Article IV of
January 30, 1991. On January 30, 1991, respondent Judge Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, let
postponed the promulgation of the decision to February 18, the 0.08 grams of methamphetamine
1991 to give private respondent another opportunity to hydrochloride (shabu) subject matter of
secure the consent of the prosecutor. Also, on the said date, this case be confiscated and forfeited in
the private respondent filed his Request to Plead Guilty to a favor of the Government and be turned
Lesser Offense. On February 18, 1991, respondent Judge over to the Dangerous Drugs Board
issued another order (Annex "D," p. 19, Rollo) postponing Custodian, NBI, to be disposed of
the promulgation of decision to February 25, 1991 to give according to law.
private respondent further opportunity to secure the consent
of the prosecutor. On February 20, 1991, the prosecutor filed
his Opposition to the Request to Plead Guilty to a Lesser SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 24-25)
Offense (annex "E," p. 20, Rollo) on the grounds that: (1) the
prosecution already rested its case on November 21, 1990;
Forthwith, the prosecutor filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(2) the possibility of conviction of private respondent of the
of the aforestated decision but the same was denied in the
crime originally charged was high because of the strong
order of March 13, 1991, which states:
evidence of the prosecution; and (3) the valuable time which
the court and the prosecutor had expended would be put to
waste. On February 21, 1991, private respondent filed his It is the considered view of this Court
Reply to Opposition with Leave of Court to Plead Guilty to a that Section 2, Rule 116 of
Lesser Offense (annex F, p. 21, Rollo), alleging therein, the Rules should not be interpreted to
among other matters, that the Rules on Criminal Procedure the letter in "victimless crimes" such as
does not fix a specific period within which an accused is this case, possession of regulated
 drugs, which is more of a "social
disease" case so to speak and in the
light of (the) provision itself that "with the
consent of the offended party and the
fiscal." Is the fiscal the offended party?
Moreover as the records show, the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal has not
been very consistent on this "lesser
offense plea" thing. It would perhaps be
in consonance with justice that a
guideline be laid down by the said
Office, if only to apprise the public, the
Court and the accused on when said
consent is to be given by the fiscal as a
matter of course and when it will be
withheld. For to leave the same
undefined is in the mind of this Court,
not conducive to a "just, speedy and
inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 41-42)
Hence, this petition raising the following issues:
I. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
JUDGE ERRED IN GRANTING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S REQUEST
TO PLEAD GUILTY TO A LESSER
OFFENSE BECAUSE THE REQUEST
WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND THE
CONSENT THERETO OF THE
PROSECUTOR AND THE OFFENDED
PARTY WAS NOT OBTAINED.
II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT
JUDGE ERRED IN CONVICTING
PRIVATE RESPONDENT OF THE
LESSER OFFENSE OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 17, REPUBLIC ACT NO.
6425, AS AMENDED, INSTEAD OF
THE OFFENSE ORIGINALLY
CHARGED OF VIOLATION OF
SECTION 16 OF THE SAME LAW, IN
VIEW OF THE ABSENCE OF A VALID
CHANGE OF PLEA. (Rollo, pp. 74-75)
In the resolution of January 20, 1992, We issued a
temporary restraining order to enjoin the respondent Judge
from enforcing the questioned judgment in the aforesaid
criminal case (Rollo, p. 86).
The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases, is a process whereby the
accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval
(see Black Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979, p. 1037). It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment
in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge (ibid). Ordinarily, plea-bargaining is made during the
pre-trial stage of the criminal proceedings. However, the law
still permits the accused sufficient opportunity to change his
plea thereafter. Thus, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court,
Section 2 thereof, provides:
Sec. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
— The accused, with the consent of the
offended party and the fiscal, may be
allowed by the trial court to plead guilty
to a lesser offense, regardless of
whether or not it is necessarily included
in the crime charged, or is cognizable by
a court of lesser jurisdiction than the trial
court. No amendment of the complaint
or information is necessary.
A conviction under this plea, shall be
equivalent to a conviction of the offense
charged for purposes of double
jeopardy.
However, the acceptance of an offer to plead guilty to a
lesser offense under the aforequoted rule is not demandable
by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter that is
addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court
(Manuel v. Velasco, et al., G.R. No. 94732, February 26,
1991, En Banc Resolution).
In the case at bar, the private respondent (accused) moved
to plead guilty to a lesser offense after the prosecution had
already rested its case. In such situation, jurisprudence has
provided the trial court and the Office of the Prosecutor with
yardstick within which their discretion may be properly
exercised. Thus, in People v. Kayanan (L-39355, May 31,
1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450), We held that the rules allow such
a plea only when the prosecution does not have sufficient
evidence to establish guilt of the crime charged. In his
concurring opinion in People v. Parohinog (G.R. No. L-
47462, February 28, 1980, 96 SCRA 373, 377), then Justice
Antonio Barredo explained clearly and tersely the rationale
of the law:
. . . (A)fter the prosecution had already
rested, the only basis on which the fiscal
and the court could rightfully act in
allowing the appellant to charge his
former plea of not guilty to murder to
guilty to the lesser crime of homicide
could be nothing more nothing less than
the evidence already in the record. The
reason for this being that Section 4 of
Rule 118 (now Section 2, Rule 116)
under which a plea for a lesser offense
is allowed was not and could not have
been intended as a procedure for
compromise, much less bargaining.
As evident from the foregoing, the trial court need not wait
for a guideline from the Office of the Prosecutor before it
could act on the accused's motion to change plea. As soon
as the fiscal has submitted his comment whether for or
against the said motion, it behooves the trial court to
assiduously study the prosecution's evidence as well as all
the circumstances upon which the accused made his change
of plea to the end that the interests of justice and of the
public will be served. A reading of the disputed rulings in this
case failed to disclose the strength or weakness of the
prosecution's evidence. Apparently, the judgment under
review dwelt solely on only one of the three objections
(i.e.waste of valuable time already spent by the court and
prosecution) interposed by the Fiscal which was the least
persuasive. It must be recalled that the other two grounds of
objection were that the prosecution had already rested its
case and that the possibility of conviction of the private
respondent of the crime originally charged was high because
of the strong evidence of the prosecution. Absent any finding
on the weight of the evidence in hand, the respondent
judge's acceptance of the private respondent's change of
plea is improper and irregular.
The counsel for the private respondent argues that only the
consent of the fiscal is needed in crimes involving, violation
of RA 6425 as amended because there is no offended party
to speak Of and that even the latter's consent is not an
absolute requirement before the trial court could allow the
accused to change his plea.
We do not agree. The provision of Section 2, Rule 116 is
clear. The consent of both the Fiscal and the offended party
is a condition precedent to a valid plea of guilty to a lesser
offense (see Manuel v. Velasco, et al., supra, p. 6). The
reason for this is obvious. The Fiscal has full control of the
prosecution of criminal actions (Cinco, et al. v.
Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 92362-67, October 15,
1991). Consequently, it is his duty to always prosecute the
proper offense, not any lesser or graver one, when the
evidence in his hands can only sustain the former
(seePeople v. Parohinog, supra, concurring opinion of then
Justice Barredo, p. 377; also Vda. de Bagatua, et al. v.
Revilla, et al., 104 Phil. 393, 395-396).
It would not also be correct to state that there is no offended
party in crimes under RA 6425 as amended. While the acts
constituting the crimes are not wrong in themselves, they are
made so by law because they infringe upon the rights of
others. The threat posed by drugs against human dignity and
the integrity of society is malevolent and incessant (People
v. Ale, G.R. No. 70998, October 14, 1986, 145 SCRA 50,
58). Such pernicious effect is felt not only by the addicts
themselves but also by their families. As a result, society's
survival is endangered because its basic unit, the family, is
the ultimate victim of the drug menace. The state is,
therefore, the offended party in this case. As guardian of the
rights of the people, the government files the criminal action
in the name of the People of the Philippines. The Fiscal who
represents the government is duty bound to defend the
public interests, threatened by crime, to the point that it is as
though he were the person directly injured by the offense
(see United States v. Samio, 3 Phil. 691, 696). Viewed in
this light, the consent of the offended party, i.e. the state, will
have to be secured from the Fiscal who acts in behalf of the
government.
Lastly, the counsel for the private respondent maintains that
the private respondent's change of plea and his conviction to
the lesser offense of violation of Section 17, RA No. 6425 as
amended is no longer open to review otherwise his
constitutional right against double jeopardy will be violated.
Such supposition has no basis. The right against double
jeopardy given to the accused in Section 2, Rule 116 of the
Rules of Court applies in cases where both the fiscal and the
offended party consent to the private respondent's change of
plea. Since this is not the situation here, the private
respondent cannot claim this privilege. Instead, the more
pertinent and applicable provision is that found in Section 7,
Rule 117 which states:
Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal;
double jeopardy. —
G.R. No. 80845
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and mandamus filed by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal (now Provincial Prosecutor) of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, in behalf of the People of the
Philippines, assailing the judgment of respondent Judge
Ernesto M. Mendoza in Crim. Case No. 4264 acquitting
accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion, private respondent
herein, of the crime of robbery with force upon things
notwithstanding his plea of guilt. Petitioner prays that
respondent Judge be ordered to reverse his judgment
exonerating Magalop and, instead, to impose upon him the
proper penalty for the offense to which he pleaded guilty.
The evidence discloses that on 20 January 1987, the
storeroom of the Bukidnon National School of Home
Industries (BNSHI) in Maramag, Bukidnon, was ransacked.
After an on-the-spot investigation, the police found
themselves at a loss as to the identity of the culprit or
culprits. The value of the missing articles was estimated at
P15,298.15.
Eventually, responsibility for the robbery with force upon
things was laid on accused Juan Magalop y Salvacion,
Petronilo Fernandez y Cano and Ricarte Dahilan alias Ricky.
All three (3) were represented by District Citizens Attorney
Isidro L. Caracol. At the arraignment on 23 June 1987,
Magalop pleaded "guilty" while Fernandez pleaded "not
guilty." The arraignment of Dahilan was deferred as he was
"not mentally well."
Instead of pronouncing judgment on Magalop, the court a
quo conducted trial. The prosecution presented Pat.
Jakosalem, INP, who investigated the break-in, as well as a
clerk and a storekeeper of the BNSHI. The prosecution
likewise offered in evidence colored pictures of the ransacked
storeroom, a pair of ordinary pliers colored blue, a pair of
xxx xxx xxx
However, the conviction of the accused
shall not be a bar to another prosecution
for an offense which necessarily
includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under
any of the following instances:
(a) . . . ;
(b) . . . ;
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser
offense was made without the consent
of the Fiscal and of the offended party;
x x x           x x x          x x x
Under this rule, the private respondent could still be
prosecuted under the original charge of violation of Section
16 of RA 6425 as amended because of the lack of consent
of the Fiscal who also represents the offended party, i.e., the
state. More importantly, the trial court's approval of his
change of plea was irregular and improper.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
judgment and order of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Region at Pasig, Branch 156 dated February 25 and
March 13, 1991, respectively in Criminal Case No. 1345-D
(People v. Manuel y Ohide) are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The said criminal case is hereby remanded to the
trial court for continuation of trial on the original charge of
violation of Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6425 as
amended. The temporary restraining order issued in this
case is made permanent. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
long-nose pliers colored red, and a coping saw. The last three
items were said to have been recovered by the police.
The defense having opted to waive its right to present
evidence, the case was submitted for decision.
On 8 October 1987, respondent Judge acquitted accused
Fernandez as well as Magalop who earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge. The two-paged, single-spaced judgment is quoted
hereunder for careful scrutiny and better appreciation. Thus
-
This is a case where three accused were allegedly responsible
for forcibly taking things from the storeroom of the
Bukidnon National School of Home Industries.
It was established by the prosecution that the storeroom of
the Bukidnon National School of Home Industries at
Maramag, Bukidnon, on January 20, 1987 was ransacked as
shown by the testimonies of the policemen and by the
keepers of the storeroom. After on the spot investigation, the
policemen were at a loss to identify the person or persons
responsible thereof.
Except for the accused Juan Magalop who pleaded guilty, the
identity of the perpetrators remained a problem. Accused
Ricarte Dahilan is mentally deranged; hence the trial was
separate for accused Petronilo Fernandez and Juan Magalop.
As shown by the evidence of the prosecution, some of the
stolen things were in the possession of a certain Babie Tan,
consisting of two pliers and a saw, and these were all
allegedly sold to said Babie Tan who refused to testify on the
matter.
The evidence of the prosecution failed to prove that the three
accused were responsible for stealing these three articles or
tools.
Although Juan Magalop pleaded guilty, it was not shown
who (how?) they conspired and helped each other in the
commission of the crime charged. To the Court, the plea of
Juan Magalop was not intelligently done. In the course of the
proceedings, it was not established how Juan Magalop and
Petronilo Fernandez participated in the looting. No evidence
was introduced to show that the accused sold the stolen
things to Babie Tan, which the prosecution could have
proved to show that the possessors of the stolen things could
have been identified as the thief or thieves; hence, the
prosecution utterly failed to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond doubt(underscoring supplied).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the accused Petronilo Fernandez
and Juan Magalop are hereby ACQUITTED. With respect to
Ricarte Dahilan, let this case be held in abeyance until he is
mentally well.[1]
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
is now before us contending that the decision of 8 October
1987 and the order of 4 November 1987 denying
reconsideration are "purely capricious and arbitrary, made
for no proper reason at all and rendered without legal
authority whatsoever, thereby amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion, and curtailed
the power of the state to punish criminals." [2]
Petitioner submits that the accused Magalop, who was
assisted by counsel, had voluntarily, spontaneously and
intelligently pleaded guilty to the crime of robbery with force
upon things. Thus, the trial court had no alternative but to
pronounce judgment and impose the proper penalty.
Parenthetically, petitioner interposed no objection to the
acquittal of accused Fernandez.
It may be stressed that the petition is defective since it was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal and Assistant Provincial Fiscal
of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and not by the Solicitor General.
We have already ruled in a number of cases that only the
Solicitor General may bring or defend actions on behalf of
the People of the Philippines once such actions are brought
before the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. [3] As a
matter of fact, in his Manifestation filed with this Court on 8
June 1989, the Solicitor General steered away from the case,
explaining that the petition was filed directly by the
Provincial Fiscal of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, "without coursing
it through the OSG," as a consequence of which it should be
the fiscal who should submit the required pleadings.
Nonetheless, even if we overlook this procedural lapse and
treat the case on the merits, the petition should, just the
same, be dismissed.
Petitioner would have this Court set aside the acquittal of
Magalop, insisting that with his voluntary plea of guilt, the
trial court had no other recourse but to pronounce judgment
and impose the proper penalty.
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his
guilt freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge and
understanding of the precise nature of the crime charged in
the information as well as the consequences of his plea. [4] It
is an unconditional admission of guilt with respect to the
offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend oneself
from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative but
to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances.
[5]
 Thus, under the 1985 New Rules on Criminal Procedure,
as amended, when the accused pleads guilty to a non-capital
offense, the court may receive evidence from the parties to
determine the penalty to be imposed.[6]
This rule is at most directory. It will certainly be a clear
abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to persist in
holding the accused bound to his admission of guilt and
sentencing him accordingly when the totality of the evidence
points to his acquittal. There is no rule which provides that
simply because the accused pleaded guilty to the charge that
his conviction automatically follows. Additional evidence
independent of the plea may be considered to convince the
judge that it was intelligently made.
Here it is evident, even from the start, that the case of the
prosecution against the three (3) accused was virtually non-
existent as the asported articles were found in the possession
of a certain Babie Tan and yet, quite inexplicably, the
prosecution did not summon him to the witness stand. Babie
Tan could have positively identified those who sold him the
stolen articles if called to testify. Or, he could very well have
been the perpetrator of the crime himself. In the absence of
an explanation of how one has come into possession of stolen
effects, the possessor is presumed to be the author of the
crime of robbery.[7]
Indeed, not even the testimonies and the mute exhibits
introduced during the trial could breathe life into the
moribund state of the case for the prosecution. While the
loss of articles in the storeroom of the BNSHI was
established, there was nothing, independent of the
acknowledgment of guilt, which could link accused Magalop
to the robbery. As the trial court succinctly put it, "the plea of
Juan Magalop was not intelligently done."
Admittedly, the procedure followed by respondent judge was
not the normal course, as the better procedure would have
been that set forth in People v. Padernal, [8] where the court
sustained the exoneration of the accused notwithstanding his
plea of guilt. In that case, in view of the exculpatory
testimony of the accused who had earlier pleaded guilty to
the charge of homicide, the trial court correctly considered
the plea as withdrawn and, in its place, ordered a plea of not
guilty entered. This was not done by respondent judge. For
even after finding that the plea of Magalop was not
intelligently made, Judge Mendoza proceeded to pass
judgment without requiring Magalop to plead anew to the
charge. Applying the principle laid down in the Padernal
case, it can fairly be concluded that there was no standing
plea at the time the court rendered its judgment of acquittal
hence said acquittal was a nullity.
Be that as it may, however, in the interest of substantial
justice, we cannot allow such procedural error to prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. In fairness to Magalop,
outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no
evidence against him presented or forthcoming. From the
evidence of the prosecution, there is no way by which
accused Magalop could have been implicated. It is for this
fundamental reason that, even pro hac vice, his acquittal
must be sustained. Interdum evenit ut exceptio quae prima
facie justa videtur, tamen inique noceat. It may sometime
happen that a plea which on its face seem just, nevertheless
is injurious and inequitable. It is so in this instance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit and the acquittal of the
accused-respondent JUAN MAGALOP Y SALVACION is
sustained.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 92362-67 October 15, 1991
CIRILO A. CINCO, DOMINGO AMARO, ANTONIO
ABALOS AND ANDRES SABALZA, petitioners, 
vs.
SANDIGANGBAYAN (Second Division) and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Emerito M. Salva & Associates for petitioners.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks the reversal of a
resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan dated
February 23, 1990, which denied the petitioners' motion to
quash Criminal Cases Nos. 13827 to 13832.
The antecedent facts as summarized by the respondent
court are as follows:
1. On April 20, 1981, Fredeswinda P. Balana
lodge a letter-complaint with the Office of the
Tanodbayan (now of the Special Prosecutor)
against Cirilo A. Cinco, Jose Bantigue, Domingo
Amaro, Antonio Abalos, Andres Sabalza, and
others. She swore to her letter-complaint before
Prosecutor Perfecto Llacar, Jr., who certified at the
bottom thereof that he personally examined the
affiant and that he was satisfied she executed and
understood it (Annex A of Rejoinder, Record, pp.
125-132). The charge was docketed as TBP Case
No. 81-042401.
Cinco submitted his counter-affidavit on June 16,
1981, and supplemental counter-affidavit on July
16, 1981. Amaro executed his counter-affidavit in
June 1981 and supplemental counter-affidavit on
July 16, 1981; Abalos filed his counter-affidavit on
June 18, 1981; Bantigue, on June 25, 1981; and
the others, on various dates in the same year;
Sabalza, however, did not.
2. On June 11, 1982, Balana filed another letter-
complaint against Cinco and Amaro, which she put
under oath before Prosecutor Ricardo A.
Buenviaje who also certified in writing that he
personally examined the affiant and that he was
satisfied she voluntarily executed and understood
the letter-complaint (Annex B of Rejoinder,
Record, pp. 133-134). The additional charge was
given the number TBP Case No. 82-061408.
Cinco submitted his counter-affidavit on August
11, 1982, and Amaro, on a date which does not
appear on record, but in or before 1986.
3. After the submission of the countervailing
affidavits which the defense impliedly admitted,
Balana presented her reply affidavits.
4. The preliminary investigation of the charges
was assigned to Prosecutor Ricardo A. Buenviaje,
and it was up for resolution when he was
appointed to the judiciary in 1986. It was then re-
assigned to Prosecutor Gregorio G. Pimentel Jr.,
who, on July 23, 1987, issued a resolution
recommending the prosecution of the accused for
alleged violations of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (Annex C of Rejoinder, Record, pp. 131-
143). The resolution having been approved by
Raul M. Gonzales, the then Tanodbayan, the
corresponding informations for the said violations
were filed with the Sandiganbayan on September
7, 1987, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos.
12420 and 12421 against Cinco; 12422 against
Bantigue, Amaro, Cinco, and Abalos; 12423
against Cinco; 12424 against Bantigue, Amaro,
and Sabalza; and 12426 against Cinco.
5. The accused filed a motion to quash on May 17,
1988, praying that the said informations be
dismissed for lack of authority on the part of
Tanodbayan Gonzales or his prosecutor to file
them and invoking Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan,
160 SCRA 843, which had held that the
Tanodbayan, now called Special Prosecutor, was
... clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct
the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of
the Ombudsman. This right to do so
was lost effective February 2, 1987.
From that time, he has been divested of
such authority.
After hearing the prosecution, this Court
promulgated a resolution on July 5, 1988, granting
the motion to quash. In that resolution, it observed
... (T)he dismissal of these cases will be
without prejudice to the right of the
State, acting through the Hon.
Ombudsman, to conduct a new
preliminary investigation and refile the
cases if the evidence warrants the
same.
6. On August 4, 1988, Balana requested the re-
filing of the cases, and in view thereof, the
accused, through counsel, in turn requested on
December 26, 1988, that she did so 'under
separate and distinct charges in accordance with
the new rules of preliminary investigation' (Secs. 3
and 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court effective
October 1, 1988) so that the respondents can
refute her charges and specific evidences she
may present in support of each separate charge
(Annex A of Motion to Quash, Record, pp. 61-61).
7. In his order of February 16, 1990, Prosecutor
Eleuterio F. Guerrero, to whom the charges of
Balana were re-assigned for preliminary
investigation, denied the request of the accused
and noting that the parties had already adduced
their respective evidence in the preliminary
investigation conducted by the previous
prosecutor, gave her 10 days from receipt to
manifest if she elected to adopt the same charges
and evidence already submitted. In the same
order, he also granted the accused an equal
period to adduce their controverting evidence.
Balana opted on March 8, 1989, to adopt her said
charges and evidence, and the accused having
failed to submit countervailing evidence or any
pleading, Prosecutor Guerrero construed their
omission as waiver.
8. On June 27, 1989, he issued a resolution
finding prima facie cases for alleged violations of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and
recommending the filing of the corresponding
informations. The Hon. Ombudsman approved the
resolution. Accordingly, (Criminal Cases Nos.
13827 to 13832 against the petitioners) were
instituted on August 28, 1989. Each information
carries with it the certification of Prosecutor
Guerrero
that a preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case; that there is a
sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that the crime charged
herein has been committed and that the
accused are probably guilty thereof.
(Rollo, pp. 136- 140).
On December 4, 1989, petitioners filed a Motion to
Quash the informations filed in the aforementioned
criminal cases on the following grounds:
I. THE INFORMATIONS ARE NULL
AND VOID BECAUSE SAME WERE
FILED IN VIOLATION OF SECTION 3
OF RULE 112 OF THE RULES OF
COURT AS AMENDED;
II. THAT THE OFFICER WHO FILED
THE INFORMATIONS HAD NO
AUTHORITY TO DO SO; AND
III. THAT THE INFORMATIONS DO
NOT CONFORM SUBSTANTIALLY TO
THE PRESCRIBED FORM. (Rollo, pp.
46-47)
After the filing of appropriate pleadings by the
Ombudsman in opposition to and by the
petitioners in support of the foregoing motion, the
respondent court, on December 20, 1989, issued
a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
 WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to
Quash dated November 24, 1989, and
submitted for resolution on January 29,
1990, to be without merit, the same is
DENIED.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 151)
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners submit the following assignment of
errors:
1. THE RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED
GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE
INFORMATIONS FILED IN CRIMINAL
CASES NOS. 13827-32 IN QUESTION,
ARE NULL AND VOID BECAUSE
SAME WERE FILED IN VIOLATION OF
SECTION 3 AND 4 OF RULE 112 OF
THE NEW RULES OF COURT AS
AMENDED;
2. THAT RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED
SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR IN
NOT RULING THAT THE
PROSECUTOR WHO FILED THE
INFORMATIONS HAD NO AUTHORITY
TO DO SO; AND
3. THAT THE RESPONDENT
SANDIGANBAYAN COMMITTED
SERIOUS AND GRAVE ERROR IN
NOT FINDING THAT INFORMATIONS
FILED IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS.
13827-32 DO NOT CONFORM
SUBSTANTIALLY TO THE FORM
PRESCRIBED IN SECTION 4 OF RULE
112 OF THE NEW RULES OF COURT.
(Rollo, p. 19)
We affirm.
The peculiar circumstances of this case do not
support petitioners' plea for a new preliminary
investigation. It is true that the first informations
filed against the petitioners were nullified because
the then Special Prosecutor had no authority to do
so in line with Our ruling in the Zaldivar case. Yet,
a careful analysis of the facts shows that the nullity
did not extend to the entire preliminary
investigation proceedings undertaken by that
office. We note that the preliminary investigation
on Balana's charges started wayback in 1981.
Between the years 1981 and 1983, the contending
parties already submitted the counter and
supplementale affidavits as well as a reply
affidavit. All the requisite papers having been
submitted, the preliminary investigation was up for
resolution in 1986 when the Prosecutor who
handled the case was promoted to the Judiciary in
that same year. It was just unfortunate that the
said resolution was issued in July 1987 and the
informations filed in September of that year. Under
such facts, it cannot be said that the proceedings
before February 2, 1987 were null and void
inasmuch as the then Tanodbayan was clothed
with authority to conduct the same. Consequently,
the portion of the investigation proceedings which
consists in the oath of Balana to her letters-
complaint, the certifications of the Prosecutors
Llacer and Buenviaje, Balana's evidence, and
petitioner's counter and supplemental affidavits
with their evidence are still effective and valid. To
countenance the plea of petitioners who have
already been afforded the right to a preliminary
investigation conformably with PD 911 would
be fait accompli. A new pleriminary investigation
will be useless and repetitious because the same
facts and evidence will be elicited. The
investigation proceedings in 1981 and 1983 being
valid and proper, the Ombudsman through the
Special Prosecutor III Eleuterio Guerrero could
simply take over and continue from that point. This
move will be more conducive to an orderly and
speedy administration of justice.
Even granting arguendo that a new preliminary
investigation is proper in this case, the same in
effect had already been given to the petitioners. It
is noteworthy that before his evaluation of the
records of the first preliminary investigation,
Special Prosecutor Officer III, Eleuterio F.
Guerrero, required (1) Balana to manifest if she
elected to adopt the same charges and evidence
already submitted; and (2) petitioners to submit
their controvering evidence if Balana decided to
adopt the same charges. This directive partakes of
the nature of a preliminary investigation which is
noting more than the submission of the parties'
respective affidavits, counter-affidavits and
evidence to buttress their separate allegations.
Balana opted to adopt her charges and evidence.
Petitioners did not submit any countervailing
evidence and consequently, lost the opportunity to
submit additional arguments and supporting
evidence in their favor. Their failure, therefore,
should not work against the right of the
complainant to an expenditious determination of
her complaints.
Petitioners argue that the letters-complaint cannot
serve as affidavits or evidence in support of the
charge against petitioners allegedly constituting
violations of Section 3, sub-par. (e) of RA No.
3019 as amended; that complainant never
positively Identified the other respondents and the
offenses for which they are charged; and that she
never presented affidavits of witnesses in support
of the charge or charges against them.
We are not convinced. The Special Prosecutor
has full discretion and control of the prosecution of
criminal actions. He alone has the power to decide
which as between conflicting testimonies or
evidence should be believed (see People v.
Liggayu, 97 Phil. 865). While indeed he has this
full power, it does not follow, however, that the
designation of the offense by the Fiscal is binding
upon the court. Settled is the rule that it is crime
after the trial and following its own ascertainment
of the facts needed to constitute the elements of
the crime attributed to the accused (People v.
Eleuterio, G.R. No. 63971, May 9, 1989, 173
SCRA 243, 251). In his study of the entire records
of the preliminary investigation of Balana's
charges, Special Prosecutor Guerrero believed
that he has at least a prima facie evidence to
establish the guilt of the petitioners and hence,
refiled the cases. This is enough. It must be
emphasized that the Fiscal is not required to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Our statement in Trocio v. Manta (L-34834,
November 15, 1982, 118 SCRA 241, 246), bears
repeating, to wit:
... When a fiscal investigates a
complaint in order to determine whether
he should file charges with the court
against the person complained of, the
scope of the investigation is far short of
a trial of an accused before the court. It
is not required that all reasonable doubt
of the guilt of the accused must be
removed; it is only required that the
evidence be sufficient to established
probable cause that the accused
committed the crime charged. ... .
(emphasis ours)
We also see no need for the Ombudsman to act
favorably on petitioner's bill of particulars seeking
to segregate the particulars of each of the six
cases to support the re-filing of the six dismissed
cases. The reason being that such procedure has
no place in preliminary investigation where no
finding of guilt is made. In Bernabe, Jr., et al. v.
Rosario (G.R. No. 83095, July 19, 1988, En Banc
Minute resolution), We held:
... The investigating fiscal, to be sure,
has discretion to determine the specify
and adequacy of averments of the
offense charged. He may dismiss the
complaint forthwith if he finds it to be
insufficient in form or substance or if he
otherwise finds no ground to continue
with the inquiry, or proceed with the
investigation if the complaint is, in his
view, in due and proper form. It certainly
is not his duty to require a more
particular statement of the allegations of
the complaint merely upon the
respondent's motion, and specially
where after an analysis of the complaint
and its supporting statements he finds it
sufficiently definite to apprise the
respondents of the offenses with which
they are charged .... Moreover, the
procedural device of bill of particulars,
as the Solicitor General points
out, appears to have reference to
informations or criminal complaints filed
in a competent court upon which the
accused are arraigned and required to
plead, and strictly speaking has not
application to complaints initiating a
preliminary investigation which cannot
result in any finding of guilt, but only of
probable cause. .... (Emphasis supplied)
It appears too that the respondent court found the
petitioners' request for particulars of their
respective offenses under Sec. 3 of RA No. 3019,
unmeritorious. Such findings, being unrebutted,
are binding on Us. Thus,
2. The accused cannot plausibly claim
that they were misled by the
designations of the offenses charged
against them and were at a loss as to
what to controvert.
(a) For if their claim were true they could
not have prepared, verified, and
submitted their respective counter-
affidavits and supplemental counter-
affidavits.
(b) They are not ordinary government
employees with modicum education.
They are professionals. Amaro, Cinco,
Abalos, and Sabalza are the School
Administrator, Collecting and Disbursing
Officer, College Instructor, and
Secondary School Teacher,
respectively, in Sumoroy Agro-Industrial
School, a State College owned by the
Government. Bantigue is a lawyer and
Hearing Officer in the Ministry (now
Department) of Education, Culture and
Sports.
(c) In the dismissed Criminal Cases
Nos. 12422, 12424, and 12426, the
accused were also charged with
violations of Section 3 (e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. They filed motion for
reinvestigation wherein they never
complained that they were preliminary
investigated for alleged offenses other
than for those violations. Instead, they
narrated in Criminal Cases Nos. 12422
and 12426 their own versions of the
facts constituting their defenses. This
means that when entry requested for
specification of the accusations under
Section 3 (e), on plaints of Balana
included charges under Section 3 (e)
and knew precisely what to controvert.
So when Prosecutor Guerrero denied on
February 16, 1989, their request and
gave them 10 days to submit
controverting evidence, they could have
presented those defenses.
3. The 1988 request for specification of
the charges under Section 3 (e) came
too late, as it was made only long after
the accused had presented their
controverting evidence in 1981 and
1982 and after the preliminary
investigation had been deemed
submitted for resolution in or before
1986. To have granted the request was
to unnecessarily conduct a new
preliminary investigation and delay the
resolution of the letter complaint. (Rollo,
pp. 146-147)
Petitioners' apprehension that they might be put in
jeopardy of being charged with informations or
crimes other than the crime imputed in the
dismissed cases is baseless. There could be no
double jeopardy for the simple reason that they
have not year pleaded to the offense (see Gaspar
v. Sandiganbayan, G. R. No. 68086, September
24, 1986, 144 SCRA 415, 420). Beside, a
preliminary investigation is not a trial for which
double jeopardy attaches. We ruled in Tandoc v.
Resultan (G. R. Nos. 59241-44, July 5, 1989, 175
SCRA 37, 43) that:
Preliminary investigation is merely
inquisitorial, and it is often that only
means of discovering the persons who
may be reasonably charged with a
crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complain or information. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no
purpose except that of determining
whether a crime has been committed
and whether there is probable cause to
believe that the accused is guilty
therefor, and it does not place the
person against whom it is taken in
jeopardy.
Further, petitioners claim that the respondent court
has supported their plea for another preliminary
investigation when in the resolution of July 7,
1988, it directed that the dismissal of the
informations against them will be without prejudice
to the right of the Ombudsman to conduct a
preliminary investigation and to re-file the cases if
the evidence warrants the same.
Such contention is untenable. That portion of the
respondent court's resolution is orbiter
dictum which lacks the force of an adjudication
and should not ordinarily be regarded as such
(see Morales v. Paredes, 55 Phil. 565, 567). We
stated earlier that the fiscal or the Special
Prosecutor has full discretion and control of the
prosecution. The courts generally will not interfere
with this power. As the respondent court held:
Nowhere in the resolution of July 5,
1988, did this Court direct the conduct of
a new preliminary investigation on the
charges of Balana against the accused.
It merely observed in that resolution that
 the dismissal of these cases
will be without prejudice to the
right of the State, through the
Hon. Ombudsman, to conduct
of a new preliminary
investigation and refile the
cases if the evidence warrants
the same.
This certainly is not such an order by
any stretch of the imagination. (Rollo,
pp. 140-141)
Lastly, petitioners protest against the certification
issued by Special Prosecutor Guerrero as highly
irregular because it did not comply with Section 4,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. They aver that he
did not personally examine the complainants and
witnesses; that he did not inform the petitioners of
the complaint and of the evidence submitted
against them and he did not give them to the
opportunity to submit controverting evidence since
there was none to controvert. Hence, they
conclude that the said irregularity renders the
present informations null and void.
We do not agree. The well-reasoned dissertation
of the respondent court in refutation of the
aforesaid arguments needs no amplification. We
therefore cite it as Our own:
1. It has been held that if a preliminary
investigation was actually conducted,
the absence of the certification by the
investigating fiscal that it was conducted
is not fatal. This is the ruling in Estrella,
vs. Ruiz, 58 SCRA 779, 784, which
arose when Presidential Decree No. 77
on preliminary investigation was
enforced.
It should be observed that
Section 3 of Rule 110 [now
Section 4] defines an
information as nothing more
than an 'accusation in writing
charging a person with an
offense subscribed by the
fiscal and filed with the court.'
Thus, it is obvious that such
certification is not an essential
part of the information itself
and its absence cannot vitiate
it as such. What is not allowed
is the filing of the information
without a preliminary
investigation having been
previously conducted, and the
injucntion that there should be
a certification is only a
consequence of the
requirement that a preliminary
investigation should first be
conducted.
Since the absence of the certification
does not render null and void the
information filed after a preliminary
investigation was conducted, with more
reasons the presence of a certification
deficient in any respect does not have
that effect.
preliminary investigation has been
conducted in this case. Such preliminary
investigation which actually took place is
presumed to have been regularly held-
that is, in accordance with law. It can
therefore be said that the quoted
certification impliedly includes the
statement that the accused were
informed of the complaint and evidence
against them and that they were given
the chance to controvert the same. That
they were in fact so informed and given
the chance cannot be denied. They
could not have submitted their counter-
affidavits and supplemental counter-
affidavits in 1981 and 1982 had they not
been aware of the accusations and
evidence against them. With respect to
Sabalza who did not submit counter-
affidavit, he did not avail of the
opportunity given him in the order of
February 16, 1989, of Prosecutor
Guerrero. He waived his right to present
evidence.
For the same reason, the same
certification also carries with it the
implied statement that 'as shown by the
record.' Llacar and Buenviaje'
'personally examined the complaint and
his witnesses,' as in fact these
prosecutors so certified in the letter-
complaints of Balana.
3. Untenable is the further contention
that "sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief is less categorical
than "reasonable ground to believe"
and, therefore, not enough compliance
with law. The quoted phrases are
equivalent expressions conveying the
same thought. This is a mere perusal of
the pertinent provisions of law
demonstrates:
Preliminary investigation is an
inquiry or proceeding for the
purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient
ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional
Trial Court has been
committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty
thereof, and should be held
for trial. (Sec. 1, Rule 112,
1985 Rules).
He shall certify under oath ...
that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a crime
has been committed and that
the accused is probably guilty
thereof ... (Sec. 4, Rule 112,
1985 Rules). ' (Rollo, pp. 148-
150)
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby
DENIED. The resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, Second Division dated
February 23, 1990 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

As already seen, in the instant cases, a

SO ORDERED.
preliminary investigation was actually
held, and the accused were even
afforded two opportunities to submit  
their controverting evidence.
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995
2. Prosecutor Guerrero expressly
certified in each information that a
PANFILO S. AMATAN, complainant,  the maximum period, exactly in accordance with the plea
vs. bargaining agreement.3
JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO, respondent.
On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed to the
RESOLUTION Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-in-
law of the deceased, accused Judge Vicente Aujero of gross
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and gross
misconduct, relative to his disposition of Crim. Case No. H-
223 entitled People v. Rodrigo Umpad alias "Meon." In said
KAPUNAN, J.: letter-complaint, complainant contends that the sentence of
respondent judge finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the lesser offense of Attempted
A criminal complaint accusing Rodrigo Umpad, alias "Meon" Homicide and not Homicide as charged is proof indicative,
of the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised "on its face, of gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the
Penal Code was filed by the Philippine National Police law or gross misconduct.
Station Commander in Bato, Leyte for the fatal shooting of
Genaro Tagsip in the afternoon of September 14,
1987.1 After preliminary investigation by the office of the Responding to the complaint, respondent Judge asserts that
provincial fiscal, an information charged Umpad with the he relied on Sec. 2, Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of
crime of Homicide as follows: Criminal Procedure, as amended, which allows an accused
individual — with the consent of the offended party — to
plead guilty to a lesser offense, regardless of whether or not
The undersigned Assistant Provincial such offense is necessarily included in the crime charged, or
Fiscal of Leyte accused Rodrigo Umpad is cognizable by a court of lesser jurisdiction. He explains
alias "Meon" of the crime of Homicide that during the May 3, 1990 hearing, accused and his
committed as follows: counsel, with the acquiescence and in the presence of the
prosecutor, informed the Court of the defendant's desire to
That on or about plea bargain pursuant to the aforestated rule. Moreover, he
the 14th day of avers that in a conference on June 27, 1990, the wife of the
September 1987, in victim herself agreed to the accused's plea of guilty to
the Island of attempted homicide, instead of homicide as she needed the
Dawahon, monetary indemnity to raise her two orphaned children. In a
Municipality of Bato, Memorandum dated February 5, 1993, the Deputy Court
Province of Leyte, Administrator recommended that the complaint be
Philippines and dismissed, explaining that:
within the
preliminary Section 2 116 is more liberalized as it
jurisdiction of this allows the accused to plead guilty to a
Honorable Court, lesser offense whether or not it is
the above-named included in the offense charged in the
accused, with complaint or information, with the
deliberate intent, consent of the offended party and the
with intent to kill did fiscal. In this regard, it is inferred that
then and there the fiscal consented to abbreviate the
willfully, unlawfully proceedings and in order not to run the
and feloniously shot risk of the accused being acquitted,
one GENARO because there was no conclusive
TAGSIP, with a evidence to obtain the conviction of the
revolver .38 Cal. accused to the offense charged in the
Snub Nose Smith complaint of information.
and Wesson (Paltik)
which the accused
had provided It may be stated in this connection that
himself for the unlike in the crime of murder where the
purpose, thereby accused may plead to the lesser offense
causing and of homicide, in homicide a
inflicting upon the misinterpretation may arise, as in this
victim fatal gunshot case, when the accused pleads guilty to
wound on his head attempted homicide, because here the
which was the fact of the death of the victim, which is
direct and the principal element of the crime is
immediate cause of obliterated. This is specially so because
the death of Genaro the decision/sentence does not contain
Tagsip. findings of fact and conclusions of law
but merely an account that the accused
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense and
CONTRARY TO LAW. the penalty imposed.4

Hilongos, Leyte, October 20, 1987.
Upon arraignment, however, the parties, with the
acquiescence of the Public Prosecutor and the consent of
the offended party, entered into plea bargaining where it was
agreed that the accused would plead guilty to the lesser
offense of Attempted Homicide instead of homicide as
originally charged in the information, and would incur the
penalty of "four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) year ofprision
correccional maximum as maximum."2 Consequently, in his
decision promulgated on the 27th of June 1990, respondent
judge found the accused, Rodrigo Umpad, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the lesser crime of Attempted Homicide
and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum to six years of prision correccional maximum, as
Section 2, Rule, 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, allows the accused in criminal case
to plead guilty "to lesser offense regardless of whether or not
it is necessarily included in the crime charged." The fact of
death of the victim for which the accused Rodrigo Umpad
was criminally liable, cannot by simple logic and plain
common sense be reconciled with the plea of guilty to the
lower offense of attempted homicide. The crime of homicide
as defined in Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code
necessarily produces death; attempted homicide does not.
Concededly, hiatus in the law exists in the case before us,
which could either lead to a misapprehension of Section 2 of
Rule 116 or to outright confusion. Such a result was itself
recognized by the Deputy Court Administrator when he
recommended an amendment to the provision in his
Memorandum.
However, the law is not entirely bereft of solutions in such
cases. In instances where a literal application of a provision
of law would lead to injustice or to a result so directly in
opposition with the dictates of logic and everyday common
sense as to be unconscionable, the Civil Code5 admonishes
judges to take principles of right and justice at heart. In case
of doubt the intent is to promote right and justice. Fiat justice
ruat coelum. Stated differently, when a provision of law is
silent or ambiguous, judges ought to invoke a solution
responsive to the vehement urge of conscience.
These are fundamental tenets of law. In the case at bench,
the fact of the victim's death, a clear negation of frustrated or
attempted homicide, ought to have alerted the judge not only
to a possibly inconsistent result but to an injustice. The
failure to recognize such principles so cardinal to our body of
laws amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects
respondent judge's lack of prudence, if not competence, in
the performance of his duties. While it is true, as respondent
judge contends, that he merely applied the rule to the letter,
the palpably incongruous result ought to have been a "red
flag" alerting him of the possibility of injustice. The death of
an identified individual, the gravamen of the charge against
the defendant in the criminal case, cannot and should not be
ignored in favor of a more expedient plea of either attempted
or frustrated homicide. We have held before that if the law is
so elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not
know it, constitutes gross ignorance of the law.6
Finally, every judge must be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence.7 A judge should
not only be aware of the bare outlines of the law but also its
nuances and ramifications, otherwise, he would not be able
to come up with decisions which are intrinsically fair. In
failing to exercise even ordinary common sense, a judge
could be held administratively liable for a verdict that could in
no way be legally or factually sustained or justified.
We note, however, that under the circumstances of the case,
respondent judge's erroneous exercise of his judicial
prerogative was neither tainted with malice nor bad faith.
The phraseology of Sec. 2, Rule 116 is not crafted with such
precision as to entirely eliminate possible misinterpretation.
This observation is bolstered by the fact that the same
provision prompted the Department of Justice, on July 31,
1990, or three months after respondent judge took
cognizance of the case on April 17, 1990, to issue Circular
No. 35,8 later amended by Circular No. 55 dated December
11, 1990, clarifying and setting limitations on the application
of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that respondent reached
compulsory retirement age on April 5, 1995 after a long
period of service in the judiciary entitles him to a certain
measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench stands
unique because of the potently absurd result of respondent's
application of the law.
ACCORDINGLY, we are constrained to find the respondent
judge GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law for which he is
hereby REPRIMANDED na FINED ONE THOUSAND
(P1,000.00) PESOS. Let this decision appear in
respondent's record of service.
SO ORDERED.
PANFILO S. AMATAN v. JUDGE VICENTE AUJERIO
A.M. No. RTJ-93-956 September 27, 1995
Facts:
1. On October 16, 1992, a letter-complaint addressed
to the Chief Justice and signed by Pedro S. Amatan, a brother-
in-law of the deceased in Crim. Case No. H-223 entitled People
v. Rodrigo Umpad alias “Meon.”
2. Complainant contends that the sentence of
respondent judge Vicente Aujero is gross incompetence, gross
ignorance of the law and gross misconduct.
3. Respondent Judge asserts that he relied on Sec. 2,
Rule 116 of the 1985 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended, which allows an accused individual with the consent
of the offended party to plead guilty to a lesser offense,
regardless of whether or not such offense is necessarily
included in the crime charged, or is cognizable by a court of
lesser jurisdiction. The Deputy Court Administrator
recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Judge erred in holding the deposited
decision in Criminal Case No. H-223?
Held:
Under the circumstances of the case, respondent judge’s
erroneous exercise of his judicial prerogative was neither
tainted with malice nor bad faith. The phraseology of Sec. 2,
Rule 116 is not crafted with such precision as to entirely
eliminate possible misinterpretation. This observation is
bolstered by the fact that the same provision prompted the
Department of Justice, on July 31, 1990, or three months after
respondent judge took cognizance of the case on April 17,
1990, to issue Circular No. 35, later amended by Circular No. 55
dated December 11, 1990, clarifying and setting limitations on
the application of Sec. 2, Rule 116. The fact also that
respondent reached compulsory retirement age on April 5,
1995 after a long period of service in the judiciary entitles him
to a certain measure of leniency. Nonetheless, the case at bench
stands unique because of the potently absurd result of
respondent’s application of the law.
263 People vs. Alicando [GR 117487, 12 December 1995] En Banc,
Puno (J): 9 concur Facts: In the afternoon of 12 June 1994, Romeo
Penecilla, father of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was
drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus Gaddi in his
(Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo.
Arnel Alicando y Briones joined them but every now and then
would take leave and return. Alicando was living in his uncle's
house some 5 arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30
p.m., Penecilla's group stopped drinking and left. At about 5:30
p.m. of that day, Luisa Rebada saw the victim at the window of
Alicando's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but Alicando
closed the window. Soon she heard the victim crying. She
approached Alicando's house and peeped through an opening
between its floor and door. The sight shocked her — Alicando was
naked, on top of the victim, his left hand choking her neck. She
retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children
together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in
her house, about what she saw. Lagrana was also overcome with
fear and hastily left. Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at
8:00 p.m.. He did not find Khazie Mae. He and his wife searched
for her until 1:00 a.m. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada was
aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did
not tell them what she knew. Instead, Rebada called out Alicando
from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae left his
house. Alicando replied he was drunk and did not know. As the
sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went
down from his house to answer the call of nature. He discovered
the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her parents were
informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a
change of heart. She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie
Ann, that Alicando committed the crime. Forthwith, Alicando was
arrested and interrogated by P03 Danilo Tan. He verbally
confessed his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis
of his uncounseled verbal confession and follow up interrogations,
the police came to know and recovered from Alicando's house,
Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a
stained pillow and a stained T-shirt. Alicando was charged with
the crime of rape with homicide. On 29 June 1994, Alicando was
arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the
PAO, Department of Justice. Alicando pleaded guilty. After
Alicando's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to
present its evidence. It also set the case for reception of evidence
for Alicando, if he so desired. On 20 July 1994, the trial court
found Alicando guilty and sentenced him to death, and to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D.
Penecilla, the sum of P50,000.00. Hence, the automatic review.
Issue: Whether the pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged
bloodstains, evidence derived from the uncounselled confession
illegally extracted by the police from Alicando, may be admitted
as evidence. Held: It is now familiar learning that the Constitution
has stigmatized as inadmissible evidence uncounselled confession
or admission. Section 12 paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution provide that "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford
the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel"; and "Any confession or admission obtained in violation
of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible against him";
respectively. Herein, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense
to reduce the all important confession of Alicando in writing.
Neither did he present any writing showing that Alicando waived
his right to silence and to have competent and independent
counsel. It is not only the uncounselled confession that is
condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence derived therefrom.
The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were
evidence derived from the uncounselled confession illegally
extracted by the police from Alicando. The Court has not only
constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in Philippine jurisdiction.
It has also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix
Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States.
According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is
shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or
derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is
obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from
the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. The
rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by
the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the
originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained. The burden to prove that an accused
waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel before
making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the
prosecution. It is also the burden of the prosecution to show that
the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as "fruit of
the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and
convincing evidence.